Do No Harm in Nepal

DO NO HARM PROJECT

Do No Harm in Nepal

October 2006

Peter Bauman Winifred Fitzgerald

This document was developed as part of a collaborative learning project directed by CDA. It is part of a collection of documents that should be considered initial and partial findings of the project. These documents are written to allow for the identification of cross-cutting issues and themes across a range of situations. Each case represents the views and perspectives of a variety of people at the time when it was written.

These documents do not represent a final product of the project. While these documents may be cited, they remain working documents of a collaborative learning effort. Broad generalizations about the project’s findings cannot be made from a single case.

CDA would like to acknowledge the generosity of the individuals and agencies involved in donating their time, experience and insights for these reports, and for their willingness to share their experiences.

Not all the documents written for any project have been made public. When people in the area where a report has been done have asked us to protect their anonymity and security, in deference to them and communities involved, we keep those documents private

Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 2 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 2. METHODOLOGY ...... 1 3. CONFLICT IN NEPAL ...... 2 4. THE HISTORY OF DNH IN NEPAL ...... 5 5. UNDERSTANDING, INTEGRATION, AND APPLICATION OF DNH IN NEPAL ...... 6

BUILDING CONFIDENCE ...... 10 APPLYING THE TOOL ...... 11 ADAPTING THE TOOL ...... 13 GENERATING OPTIONS ...... 14 FACTORS THAT ENHANCE OR INHIBIT THE UPTAKE AND APPLICATION OF DNH ...... 17 6. DNH TRAINING ...... 20

CURRENT APPROACH TO TRAINING ...... 20 WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS – DETERMINING WHO PARTICIPATES IN A DNH TRAINING ...... 21 DNH TRAINING METHODOLOGY...... 21 TRAINING CONTENT ...... 22 MENTORING AND FOLLOW UP SUPPORT ...... 24 RESOURCES ...... 24 MOTIVATION & INCENTIVE ...... 24 7. POLITICAL RESISTANCE AND CONSTRAINTS TO DNH IN NEPAL ...... 25 8. DO NO HARM AT THE MACRO LEVEL ...... 26 9. RELEVANCE OF DNH IN THE “NEW NEPAL CONTEXT” ...... 29 APPENDIX A—CONFLICT IN THE TERAI ...... 32 APPENDIX B—REFERENCES ...... 34 APPENDIX C—FRAMEWORK ...... 34 APPENDIX D—BASIC OPERATING GUIDELINES ...... 38

List of Abbreviations

ADRA Adventist Development and Releif Agency AIN Association for International NGOs BOGS Basic Operating Guidelines CBO Community-Based Organization CDA Collaborative Development Alternatives CECI Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPN/M Communist Party of Nepal / Maoists DDC District Development Committee DLA District Line Agency DFID Department for International Development DNH Do No Harm GON Government of Nepal GTZ German Technical Organization HURDEC Human Resource Development Center IEM Implicit Ethical Message LCPP Local Capacities for Peace Project LDTA Local Development Training Academy NGO Non-Governmental Organization PPR Forum for Protection of People's Rights PVSE Poor, Vulnerable and Socially Excluded RBA Rights-Based Approach RMO Risk Management Office RNA Royal Nepal Army SCF Save the Children Foundation SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Corporation SPA Seven Party Alliance ToT Training of Trainer UN United Nations UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal UPF United People’s Front USAID United States Agency for International Development UG User Group VDC Village Development Committee YCL Young Communist League

1. Introduction

The Do No Harm Project (DNH), originally called Local Capacities for Peace (LCP), began in the mid- 1990s. It was designed to help those involved in humanitarian and development work better understand their potential and actual impacts so they can avoid causing greater tension and can intervene in ways that complement local mechanisms for mitigating conflict.

In 2006, the Do No Harm Project set out to determine how DNH was being used in the world and whether that use was leading to more effective programming decisions. A series of Reflective Case Studies was written in multiple countries to determine how practitioners in those places are learning, thinking about, using and spreading DNH. Some organizations are experienced and effective in applying Do No Harm principles and framework to their work, while others are struggling. This range of experience provides valuable lessons. Whether implementing Do No Harm in their daily work, in their program design and monitoring, or in shaping policies and organizational procedures, the cases look at where in their work people find it easy to use Do No Harm, where they find roadblocks, and how (or if) they overcame them.

As part of this process, Peter Bauman and Winifred Fitzgerald, independent consultants commissioned by CDA, traveled to Nepal to complete the Nepal DNH case study. This report highlights the major themes and questions that emerged during these interviews and field visits.

The paper is divided into several sequential parts beginning with an overview of the case study methodology followed by a brief analysis of the conflict in Nepal. The third section outlines the history of DNH in Nepal leading into a discourse regarding the understanding and application of DNH in Nepal. Section five examines DNH training and is followed by a description of different approaches to conflict sensitivity and adaptations of DNH. Section nine explores the relevance of DNH in the new context of Nepal and the final section provides recommendations and areas for further inquiry.

2. Methodology

This case study was developed in three phases. The first, in September 2006, included interviews with individuals and organizations in Katmandu, provided the researchers with a macro-view. During the researchers’ second visit, conducted in November and December 2006, the researchers accompanied CARE Nepal to project sites in the field, providing a micro-view of CARE’s use, application and uptake of DNH.1 Last, Peter Bauman remained in Nepal to complete an impact assessment of the UJYALO project, a major USAID funded peacebuilding and development project being implemented by Save the Children, CARE, International Development Enterprises, Winrock International, and the Asia Foundation in thirteen conflict-affected districts in Western Nepal. This experience enabled the researchers to triangulate their findings from the first two phases, adding depth and insight to the case study.

1The complete findings of the second phase of this research are available in an additional case study, “A Review of CARE Nepal's Use of the Do No Harm Framework-Executive Summary” www.cdainc.com

To understand and categorize the level of understanding and application of DNH, the researchers developed a framework that provides categories and indicators ranging from awareness, conceptualization and application to mainstreaming and knowledge management.2 Our aim was to understand the differing depths and breadths of understanding and application of the DNH tool and to determine what factors contributed to its use, uptake, and institutionalization. Through probing, open- ended questions, and formal and informal discussions we tried to ascertain how respondents have used the tool (i.e. the process of doing a DNH analysis); if there were elements of the DNH framework that were particularly helpful (i.e. Dividers & Connectors, Implicit Ethical Messages, Resource Transfers); when they may have used DNH (i.e. at various points in the project life cycle, when there were changes in the context or in the project, during staff orientations); and if they adapted the tool or incorporated it into other preexisting tools, trainings, and policies. After completing field interviews and observations the researchers sorted the data and reviewed the corresponding literature to develop emerging themes and recommendations. Similar to CDA’s methodology for developing the original concept and framework of DNH, this case study will be utilized with other case studies in a series of feedback workshops to develop common themes. The outcome of this is not yet known.

3. Conflict in Nepal

Nepal, a country landlocked between China and India, is a composite of many kingdoms with diverse ethnic, social-political, and religious characteristics. Beginning in 1765, Prithvi Naravan Shah began unifying these kingdoms through force, eventually capturing the Katmandu Valley and establishing the Kingdom of Nepal. In the mid-1800s, the Rana dynasty appropriated power from the Shah dynasty and in 1923 the British recognized Nepal as an independent country. The legacy of these dynasties had lasting affects on Nepal’s current dynamic. The monarchy was successful in uniting enormously diverse geographic, ethnic, religious, and socio-cultural groups to form the state of Nepal. However, in the process of building a nation, the monarchy failed to equally include these diverse groups in socio- political and economic activities, which resulted in extreme inequalities.3

During these dynasties, the political system was ‘patrimonial’, meaning that the state was organized as an extension of the ruler’s household (Whelpton, 49). In addition to political policies, the monarchy utilized Hinduism to solidify a strong caste and class system. Then to maintain control the King “motivated his rank-and-file troops by offering... land assignments rather than relying on his officers raising and paying soldiers themselves” (Whelpton, 35). As a result, from the time of its inception, the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has been and remains allegiant to the monarchy. This system placed a large

2 See Appendix D for this framework 3 Lower caste groups, marginalized ethnic and religious groups, and women are severely deprived of opportunities in all dimensions of cultural, social, political, and economic life. These inequalities contribute to high levels of unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and poor health for large portions of society. For example, the average per capita income for Brahmin/Chhetri households is 42% higher than Dalits; Janajati and Muslims per capita income is approximately 14% less than Brahmins and Chhetris; The literacy rate for males (62.7%) is almost double that of the females (34.7%)3; And, 31% of Nepalese are classified as under the poverty level, yet over 60% of Dalits live below the poverty level.

portion of Nepal’s land, wealth, and power in the hands of upper caste elites who were faithful to the King. Beginning in 1951, the monarchy began building an alliance with Nepal’s intellectual elites and the policy of seclusion from the outside world was abandoned, leading to an influx of international organizations and Nepal’s first attempt at a parliamentary system. In 1960 King Mahendra dissolved the government and centralized power in the royal palace. Frustrated by the socio-political and economic situation, in 1989, the Nepalese challenged the monarchy in the form of a people's movement, Jan Andolan I, resulting in a transformation of the feudal system into a constitutional monarchy. Girija Prasad Korana of the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) was Nepal’s first democratically elected Prime Minister.

The new political system opened space for the expression of grievances, but elite, Katmandu-centric politicians were more interested in partisan ends and personal gains. Thus the new government and constitution “failed to recognize the country’s multiethnic and multilingual character” (Rizal, 288). Difficulties with governance were part of, and also masked, broader problems. High levels of poverty, caste and class exploitation, unemployment, low levels of education, and gender discrimination created a breeding ground for communist political parties like the United People’s Front (UPF). Instead of responding to the people’s needs and grievances, the Koirala-led government attempted to isolate the communists leading to greater discontent and increased support among the poor and disenfranchised. In November 1991, the Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) announced a policy for achieving a ‘New People’s Democracy’ through a ‘People’s War’ and in 1994, Prachanda’s wing of the UPF renamed itself the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (CPN/M). On February 2, 1996, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, head of the political wing of the CPN/M, submitted a list of forty demands to the government. Instead of initiating a dialogue with the Maoists to discuss these grievances, the Government of Nepal (GON) responded with force and the Maoists began attacking government and police headquarters in Rolpa and Rukum, two of the poorest districts in the western hills.

After ten years of fighting, the Maoist rebels agreed to work with opposition politicians as a common front against the King and on April 24, 2006 in the wake of a massive non-violent people’s movement, Jan Andolan II, the King was forced to relinquish power and parliament was reinstated. Days later the Maoists announced a unilateral three-month truce after a series of talks between the CPN/M and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), a loose coalition of the seven major political parties in Nepal. On November 21, 2006 Prime Minister Koirala and Prachanda signed a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) formally ending a decade of war.

Two years after the signing of the CPA, people remain hopeful, but expectations are waning. While the situation in the Terai4 deteriorates, the peace process becomes increasingly vulnerable and unpredictable. The CPN/M and the SPA have been unable to build consensus and the NCP and the CPN/M are struggling with internal threats between moderates and radicals and the external threat of losing their constituents. While the SPA has fulfilled few of its obligations, the Maoists continue parallel

4 See Appendix A for a brief analysis of the conflict in the Terai.

tracks: agitation through the Young Communist League (YCL) and politically through the government. According to interviews and reports, the risk of return to open conflict is high. As ICG states, the CPN/M “define the peace process as a transitional phase in which they can destroy the ‘old regime’ and restructure the state... If this succeeds, they will declare the ‘peaceful revolution’ a victory...But, if the process is derailed, they will try to lead a more traditional “revolution in the form of a mass insurrection.” (N132: 14) This threat of war works as a veto that allows the Maoists to gain concessions and violate the CPA with impunity. Until the Maoists and other political parties feel confident of success in an election, it is likely that they will continue to pursue political delaying tactics while weighing the costs and benefits of a return to armed conflict.

Thus, the current situation in Nepal is fragile and unpredictable. Some indicators of emerging stability seem relatively promising. For example, the Monarchy has now been sidelined; The CPN/M and the SPA have signed a peace agreement, and combatant groups on both sides are in barracks and cantonment camps. Yet the social fabric of Nepal is torn. While the death toll of the war was relatively low (approximately 13,000 people over 10 years), the conflict had severe negative impacts on industry, livelihoods, education, health, and economic and agricultural development. An estimated 200,000 people were internally displaced and an additional 2 million people migrated out of Nepal to work in other countries. Much of the population is traumatized. Women have been widowed and left landless, jobless, and hopeless; children have been abducted, brainwashed, forced to witness torture and murder, and caught in cross fire at school; rural villages lack clean water and sanitation, schools, and health facilities. These conditions compounded by deep structural inequalities and a political vacuum, provide ripe opportunities for the political mobilization of grievances and a return to violent conflict. A culture of conformity easily mobilized for violence is omnipresent and incentives to try to gain political advantage through violence remain. Due to lack of participatory or representative governance, law and order, people feel like the only way to express grievances are through strikes, violence, and other destructive means. Political spoilers and opportunists remain active and latent inter-communal and social divisions have already escalated into incidents of overt violence. Without major changes in the mentality of political parties and leaders, security sector reform, and reform of the justice system, this culture of violence is likely to persist. Two rounds of promised Constituent Assembly elections have been stalled, essential basics of governance are absent in many areas, and the current experience of relative law and order are products of local initiative and culture, not of active governance institutions. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has a very limited mandate and lacks the ability to intervene on major issues. Experience from other civil conflicts (i.e. Sri Lanka) illustrate that formal peace agreements mark the beginning, not the conclusion, of a much longer stabilization and reconciliation process.

Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with over 30 per cent of the population living below the poverty line, over 40 per cent unemployed, and nearly half illiterate.5 Also, the distribution of wealth is in the hands of a few and this inequality supports caste, class and geographic disparities. Thus,

5 The 2006 Human Development Report ranked Nepal 138 out of 177 countries. Nepal’s 2006 estimated GDP was $41.18 billion (GDP per capita PPP = $1,500) with a growth rate of 1.9 per cent and an inflation rate (consumer prices) of 8.6 per cent. Also, in FY06/07 Nepal’s expenditure of $1.927 billion outweighed it’s revenues of $1.153 billion.

the sense of relative deprivation is a potential source of tension easily mobilized by political “entrepreneurs”.6 As Whelpton points out, “Urban Katmandu Valley and the rest of Nepal, in effect, are two separate and unequal countries...around the capital, where about 5% of the population live, the incidence of poverty is around 4% and illiteracy is 24%; in the rest of the country, poverty is ten times as high and the chance of being literate almost three times lower” (225). It is important to note that the highest levels of poverty are found in rural, mountain and hill districts in the mid- and far-western development regions where the Maoists began staging their insurgency. Unless currently missing ‘political will’ can be generated and the root causes and incentives for violence greatly reduced, Nepal’s recent conflict experience may well reflect its future.

The international community and development industry will likely have a major role in the transitional and, if successful, post-conflict activities in Nepal. The manner in which Bi-lateral Donors, INGOs, and UN agencies continue with pre-existing development projects and begin to engage in new projects that are meant to support the peace process and transformation of Nepal will have a major impact on not only the sustainable development of Nepal but also, and perhaps more urgently, the peace process.

It is important to note that this drastic change in context occurred just prior to and during the development of this case study. Thus the role of DNH in this fragile transition was an important issue that came up in nearly every discussion. Also, since the completion of this case study overt conflict has erupted in the Terai, which has further complicated the already fragile peace process.7

4. The History of DNH in Nepal

In February 1996, when the CPN/Maoists began their armed struggle in the remote hill districts of the mid-western development region, the conflict was not considered a major threat to national development and stability and therefore conflict sensitivity was not a major topic of discussion. However in 2001, after the CPN/Maoists attacked an army barrack in the western district of Dang, the Government of Nepal declared a state of emergency. Soon after, the conflict escalated expanding to 73 of Nepal’s 75 districts and posing a severe threat to human security and stability in the country.

Initially, the CPN/Maoists focused on social issues like banning alcohol, stopping polygamy, and protecting vulnerable and marginalized groups from exploitation. They voiced the concerns of the poor, women, and socially-excluded people. To apply pressure to the government the CPN/Maoists began obstructing development activities and committing human rights violations (killing, torture, abduction, extortion, etc). Informally, they proclaimed, “No development without a political settlement.”

6 The 2006 Human Development Report portrays this economic disparity with the lowest 10 per cent of the population accounting for 2.6 per cent of HH income or consumption by percentage while the highest 10 per cent account for 39.1 per cent. 7 See Appendix A for a brief analysis of the conflict in the Terai.

The government’s control became limited to the areas around the district headquarters and its periphery. The absence of elected government bodies created a political vacuum in the Village Development Committees (VDCs), which were filled by the local Maoist’s Janasarkar (Peoples' Government). Whether development programs in these areas were able to continue largely depended upon the decisions and behavior of the local Maoist leaders. The degree of obstruction depended on whether the Maoists considered the project exploitative, capitalistic, imperialistic, and/or religious. Thus, many development projects were threatened and/or halted in districts under Maoist control. Some offices were burned and destroyed including a CARE Nepal field office in Mangalsen, the district headquarters of Achham. In effect, if a project fit into the Maoists ideology they were typically allowed to progress. However, this posed another challenge to development agencies. If the Maoists allowed a project to continue, then government security forces were often suspicious that development workers were complicit with the rebels. Thus I/NGO staff, partners, and beneficiaries became wedged between the government’s security forces and the Maoists. This extremely precarious situation pushed many international actors to review their development policy and practice.

Organizations and individuals engaged in development began searching for ways to navigate this tumultuous terrain. For some agencies, access was the critical issue that prompted their interest in DNH. For others, risk and security were the impetus. One of the frontrunners of DNH in Nepal was the late Robin Needham, former country director of CARE Nepal. After hearing about the activities related to DNH in Sri Lanka, many suggest that he spearheaded DNH in Nepal. In August 2002, following the Maoists attack in Achham, Needham organized two DNH workshops in Katmandu for representatives of various development organizations and arranged a more in-depth session for CARE Nepal staff in Nepalgunj, site of the sub-office for all CARE’s activities in mid- and far-western Nepal. Awareness of DNH spread even further through a Training of Trainers (ToT) workshop in September 2003, sponsored jointly by DFID and the British Council and facilitated by CDA. First, eleven persons from different agencies participated in the ToT provided by CDA. This network of new trainers helped in the early spread of DNH as almost sixty participants took part in two workshops facilitated by the new Nepal national DNH trainers. To add additional reinforcement Marshall Wallace, Director of the DNH Project at CDA, visited the leadership of the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) and the heads of organizations to help catalyze the dissemination of DNH. Since then, multiple DNH trainings and workshops have been provided to international and local organizations. In addition, many people who received DNH training outside of Nepal have transferred their learning and experience to Nepal and others not directly involved in DNH training have utilized books and electronic resources to understand, integrate, and apply DNH in Nepal.

5. Understanding, integration, and application of DNH in Nepal

An important issue the researchers wanted to explore was the extent aid workers and their partners understood the concept of DNH. The researchers found a wide range across individuals, agencies, and partners. Some could describe the tool and its various components very well; some had a basic grasp of different parts of the DNH framework, such as ‘Dividers and Connectors’; and others had little knowledge or awareness of DNH. Some respondents seemed to misunderstand what DNH meant and

what its purpose is (i.e. “DNH is social inclusion”, “DNH means making everyone happy”, “DNH means everyone benefits” or “With DNH, we should work with a positive attitude and include everyone”). Others conflated DNH with other tools and approaches, such as conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Some felt that the concept of DNH contradicted and inhibited their organizations’ Rights Based Approach (RBA). For example, one interviewee stated, “the title itself – Do No Harm - is like oil in water, particularly when people and organizations want to work on conflict.” Many interviewees interpreted the concept of “Do No Harm” by literally translating the terms to mean - being neutral, keeping everyone happy, and/or maintaining the status quo. Another interviewee stated that, “If you are exercising an excess amount of power and I have no power and an external source provides strength to the disempowered, then this is not causing harm!” Another staff member stated that, “In Gopalpur (a district of Nepal) the people are very poor...They are not allowed to get water from the public well. So we are doing advocacy work for them. Many people are against this because the people we are helping are Dalit. For advocacy, we should do harm to some people because advocacy work would make them lose their power. So, we feel like we are doing harm.” Another INGO staff asked the following question: “So DNH does not mean that you should always follow the system because in the existing system there are so many inequities?”

Respondents also referred to DNH as all things related to risk and conflict-coping strategies. For them, DNH was not necessarily applying the tool itself or formally using the DNH framework but rather thinking beyond the tool to see how they could “Do No Harm”. In other words, people were using the term DNH but not actually referring to a specific application of the tool or concepts generated by the original case studies and feedback meetings. The DNH training therefore created dissonance between one’s perception of DNH and its actual meaning and purpose. Thus, for many the DNH training was the impetus for a major change in mind-set and a greater understanding of the concept of DNH, its potential benefits, and limitations.

While working with CARE Nepal, the researchers split into two teams. One visited programs in the west, the other in the east. The comparison revealed a deeper level of understanding among CARE Nepal staff and partners working in the western districts of Nepal compared to those in the east. This finding seemed odd because almost all of CARE Nepal’s staff had participated in DNH training previously; both the staff in the east and west had been equally exposed to DNH. A few reasons might account for this disparity. First, DNH seemed to resonate more with staff and partners working in the west because, in general, the level and duration of fighting in the west is greater than in the east. Second, donors have different requirements. At least one of the CARE’s projects, Accessing Services for Households (ASHA), being implemented mostly in the west is being funded by DFID and requires the use of Safe and Effective Development in Conflict (SEDC)8. This analytical guidebook developed by the DFID-GTZ’s Risk Management Office (RMO) in 2005 evolved out of DNH. As a result, staff and partners working on DFID funded projects may have had greater exposure to DNH.

8A more detailed discussion of SEDC will be included in another section of this report.

Individual and organizational understanding of DNH also depended on the type and length of DNH training. Some individuals participated in the full 8-day ToT and others participated in a 3-day workshop facilitated by a ToT participant. Others attended a 1-day exposure session while some only received a 2- hour information-sharing session included in a broader workshop, which included other concepts and frameworks like Sphere Standards, Conflict Resolution, and RBA. Though, there were exceptions, the length and depth of training typically reflected the individual’s and the organization’s awareness and understanding of DNH.9

Some staff and partners misunderstood and/or misinterpreted how the DNH framework works and the potential limitations of the tool. For example, some understood ‘Dividers and Connectors’ as those factors that enable or hamper project implementation, or they considered their own project activities as connectors in and of themselves. This might indicate that they did not fully understand that Dividers and Connectors already exist in the context where they work and that program interventions introduced into that context interact with the existing Dividers and Connectors. For others, the DNH framework was useful in describing and analyzing the context but they felt that it did not “help to prescribe what to do when a situation became complex”. This view, however, reflects a misunderstanding of what an analytical tool can and cannot do. DNH prompts us to ask questions, guides us in what types of information we need to collect and analyze, and highlights the relationships between these categories of information. The quality of the analysis will depend on the quality of the information, rigor and depth of the analysis. The tool itself does not provide “the answer”.

Other respondents noted that tensions may arise because there are insufficient resources to meet all the needs in Nepal and as a result some vulnerable groups or regions of the country do not receive aid. Therefore, a project could create or enhance tensions by only serving a portion of the community. CARE Nepal and its partners along with many other agencies working in Nepal should take a look at their targeting practices with regards to partners, beneficiaries, and geographic location. However, it should be noted that aid can never be given to everyone, nor should it be, and inequality does not always lead to inter-group violence. Furthermore, aid programs cannot overcome all inequality. The focus of DNH is on inter-group divisions and tensions that are dangerous and damaging to society – those that are violent and destructive as well as those that are actually present or latent. To understand how targeting and beneficiary/client selection can worsen conflict, we need to focus on whether (and, if so, how?) our selection criteria overlap with and reinforce dangerous societal divisions. For instance, one of the grievances currently being used to mobilize armed groups in the Terai is the perceived unequal distribution of aid. Had the Donors and INGOs utilized DNH at the macro-level this grievance might have been reduced.

In addition, a few respondents viewed the left side (Dividers) of the DNH framework as negative or “bad” and the right side (Connectors) as positive or “good”. In other words, they correctly understood how our programs could increase tensions and they recognized the importance of connectors in bringing

9 A more in depth discussion of DNH training is explored further in the next section of this report.

groups together, but they often failed to see how our aid programs potentially undermine or weaken connectors. Positive and negative impacts of aid programs can be uncovered on both sides of the DNH framework. Tensions can be increased or decreased and connectors can be weakened or strengthened. Some respondents were confused when something seemed to serve as both a connector and divider (religion, education, infrastructure). This indicates the need to go deeper into why and how something divides people and can be a source of tension, and why and how the same topic can continue to connect people. For instance over 80 % of Nepal’s population practices some form of Hinduism. Thus religion is an obvious connector. However, many suggest that interpretations of Hinduism support the caste system, an obvious divider and one of the grievances that the Maoist leaders have mobilized. By carefully distinguishing between the aspects that are positive (i.e. shared value of education) and those that are negative (i.e. inequitable access amongst groups to educational opportunities), we open up the possibility for orienting our programs so as to reinforce the connectors and diminish the sources of tension.

For some respondents, their understanding of DNH was the options that were developed and adopted through a DNH analysis. For example, some said that transparency, neutrality and/or social inclusion was what DNH meant. In some instances, the options we selected, for example public auditing, were viewed as connectors that helped reduce tensions.

Another important issue was how respondents understood DNH as it relates to a RBA. There seemed to be some confusion that DNH and RBA were incompatible, that adhering to DNH principles may prevent them from doing advocacy work, and that it was a matter of using either DNH or RBA. In other words, when adopting RBA, it was argued, we encourage people to struggle for their rights and are trying to promote social justice, yet this may raise tensions and could possibly erupt into violence in societies where we work and therefore run counter to what DNH asks us to do. For instance one interviewee stated, “When we received RBA, training it contradicted DNH training. DNH told us to be safe and not cause harm. The principle of DNH means don’t increase the conflict, but sometimes we should cause conflict.” Another interviewee stated, “There is an issue related to the name DO NO HARM. The name does not equal the content and therefore is misleading. When I mention it to staff, they say that it’s not for us... we are a Rights-Based Organization... DNH equals neutrality... We are rights based, not neutral.”

As described in a separate section of this report, in the chapter concerning the relevance of DNH in the current context of Nepal, the researchers explain how DNH can help us to manage conflict transformation constructively, including the transformation of structural and cultural violence, and is not just simply “to keep the peace” as one respondent noted. DNH does not suggest that we should not promote people’s rights but that it should be done in a thoughtful, careful way. In other words, human rights work should be carried out with conflict sensitivity. If it is not, the results of advocacy work or RBA could reinforce the very attitudes, behaviors, and structures they are trying to transform. The ‘security dilemma’, a classic conflict resolution concept, is a case in point. In the long run, RBA may help to promote peace, social harmony, and a dignified society. However, in the short run it may generate some social discourse and raise unrealistic expectations. It is this process and the way it is managed and implemented that will determine whether or not advocacy for Poor, Vulnerable and Socially Excluded

(PVSE) will produce positive conflict or negative conflict. In this case, DNH can help in determining the potential positive and negative impacts of a program or policy. Some suggest that this is an area in which DNH and RBA overlap. By using the DNH framework, the programs using RBA can be assessed. The outcome of this program analysis can help to show the potential positive and negative impact of the program or organizational commitment.

Despite these misunderstandings and confusions, the researchers felt that the DNH concepts have spread in Nepal, that there is an awareness of these issues, and that they have captured people’s imagination. People have grasped the ideas, particularly about Dividers and Connectors as well as Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages (IEMs).

Building Confidence

Several respondents noted that using DNH helped to facilitate and structure their thinking and did indeed give them the confidence to work in difficult contexts; to review the implications of their decisions; to anticipate problems; and to consider programming options. Many mentioned how training in DNH gave them a new, common language for discussing and reviewing their programs. Also, a Code of Conduct or Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs)10 were developed and utilized by many INGOs. BOGs, which emerged out of a DNH analysis and was informed by IEMs, gave partners the confidence to dialogue with the Maoists about a project’s goals and objectives, to be transparent about activities, budgets and staffing, and to insist on their neutrality.

While some acknowledged that it was difficult to say precisely how they used DNH or they were not formally using the tool (the framework itself, with all the boxes and arrows, seemed a bit complicated to some people), they confirmed that DNH has helped them in their reflections and has allowed them to think more regularly about the context and the impacts of their programs on Dividers and Connectors. Indeed, this mind-set change – the fact that they were thinking differently and that they had internalized the DNH ideas – was very important for many respondents and was a theme that came up often in discussions. As noted earlier, the team noticed that people refer to DNH as meaning ‘doing no harm’ rather than a specific application of the tool, and the term DNH now tends to encompass a whole range of other risk management actions. This also links with internalization of the concepts. Many people appeared to have absorbed the concepts, although they do not necessarily use the tool or framework. There are, however, risks that this could result in unstructured and/or unsystematic use.

Gael Robertson has lived in Nepal for the last 17 years and consulted several international organizations and she spearheaded DFID / GTZ’s adaptation of DNH into the Safe & Effective Development in Conflict (SEDC) Workbook. When asked about people’s conceptual understanding of DNH in Nepal, Gael suggested the following:

10 See Appendix E for a copy of BOGs

“I am concerned that tools are coming into the development industry as ‘packages.’ It happened with Gender, DNH, RBA, Conflict Transformation, Participatory approach, etc. We do a ToT and then we roll it out. It becomes a buzzword and then it becomes mechanical. There is very little in these packages that engages self-reflection and internalization by an organization or an individual. Many people talk about DNH but there are very few who are actually doing it. Headquarters or central offices tell others to use DNH but they don’t actually do it themselves. For example, CARE was very resistant to SEDC. They said they were already doing it. But, we knew from the field that they really weren’t. Also, organizations are doing so many different things. For example, conflict transformation. It really creates problems because people were struggling to survive in the midst of a violent conflict. People were not doing DNH at all. They were doing what they call ‘peace-building activities’. But, they were really placing communities at risk. The issue of neutrality and impartiality was an area of huge confusion in the early stages of SEDC. There is still a lot of confusion. No one can really ever be neutral. But being impartial is important. These concepts of Impartiality and Neutrality / Transparency and Confidentiality are overused and under- analyzed. They are in fact very complex and confusing terms. To use these tools you have to be confident and flexible in practice. This is a major problem. Many organizations and individuals are not confident and therefore not flexible. “Also the question of ‘How People Learn” is very important. A lot of work and support needs to be given to people especially when working with the shades of grey. Many people see things as black and white, but nothing is – especially in a conflict. People go through the factory process but don’t internalize anything. Thus, tools like DNH and SEDC, if not done well can become a danger because if a person or organization is not trained well or doesn’t fully get it, they can go out and give the wrong messages. I participated in a follow-up DNH training in Nepal. The British Council sponsored the training and the trainer was from India and he was a DNH purist. Meaning any adaptation of DNH was to him sacrilege. I felt there was superficiality in the process. The integrity of DNH is fairly sound. Changes don’t really need to be made. It’s about the application of DNH. The ones who get it…love it…use it… are bought in. But, those who don’t are the ones who question the integrity. There are those who say, “We need context specific examples.” That has less to do with Tajikistan than it does with systems and styles of learning. We have to learn how to teach people to think analytically and creatively. We have to look at individuals and their capacity and work from there.”

Applying the Tool

While respondents noted that the tool helps them in their reflections and has given them insights into their programming, the researchers noticed that it does not seem to be applied and used in a systematic or regular manner. Several interviewees mentioned that DNH has helped inform their thinking and made them more vigilant; and that certain aspects of the DNH framework, such as Context Analysis and IEMs, were particularly useful. In general, though, they did not tend to do a full analysis using the seven steps of the DNH framework. A few people commented that they had already been using aspects of the DNH framework informally and intuitively, but the training validated and reaffirmed what they had already been doing. When utilized, the framework helped to provide structure and organize their thinking. They also noted that DNH gave people a common language and is appropriate for working in

conflict versus on conflict. Several interviewees, however, criticized DNH for this and noted that DNH was insufficient for working on conflict and therefore was not relevant to their work and/or incomplete.

For CARE Nepal, the DNH implications of their programming are discussed at staff meetings. For one project team, it prompted monthly meetings rather than 6-month reviews so that they could deal with problems that may arise in a more timely fashion. CARE staff noted that they do not necessarily refer to the formal DNH framework during these meetings, but they keep the concepts in mind when problems are encountered and possible solutions are discussed. The use of DNH was very important during the design phase of several CARE Nepal projects including JIBIKA, WatSan, ASHA and UJYALO, and helped staff in reviewing and modifying key project strategies and methodologies, especially as the context changed. The ASHA project, for example, was previously implemented through the District Development Committees (DDCs). As the situation in the west deteriorated and especially after the Achham office was attacked, it was becoming increasingly difficult for CARE Nepal to maintain this working relationship, particularly in Maoist controlled areas. The DNH analysis helped them change their operating strategies and prompted them to work through local NGO partners rather than through government counterparts. The decision to change procurement procedures – with purchases being made directly by Users’ Groups (UGs) rather than by CARE itself – also came about through a DNH analysis. As a result of DNH reflections, CARE staff mentioned that they have attempted to prioritize local resources and materials, focus on Dalits and other marginalized groups, and select partners that have a good reputation and image in the communities.

According to respondents, the CARE staff who participated in DNH trainings understand the relevance of DNH but they are not really using or applying it on a regular basis. However, as noted above, a number of strategies were developed by the program team through a DNH analysis that shaped program support operations, such as procurement procedures and direct payments to UGs. After developing these strategies through the DNH process, CARE Nepal held a workshop with UGs, partners and CARE staff including program support to understand the risks of adopting these new practices and to develop risk management strategies. The purpose was to determine how to apply these new practices/strategies, without putting people at risk and creating further tensions. DNH prompted them to consider the implications of these decisions and was helpful in trying to manage potential risks. For example, with the new system of making direct payments to UGs, rather than payments through an intermediary, UGs would have to travel to district headquarters to collect their funds. There is a risk of getting robbed when transporting significant sums of money.

The DNH Framework’s IEMs have influenced CARE staff and its local partners, particularly regarding how they behave in the field. The positive IEM of respect for all resonated clearly for many staff. They recognized that if they acted in an arrogant manner, it could have negative consequences affecting how they are perceived in and accepted by the communities where they work. For example, at one point during the conflict the security situation in Doti, a district in the far-western hills became very dangerous. Communications were cut off. Senior management considered hiring a helicopter to evacuate field staff to Katmandu. But, the staff based in Doti reflected on the implications of such an action (i.e. different values for different lives) and decided not to evacuate their staff.

One interesting application of the DNH tool was using it to understand relationships in the contexts where CARE and its partners were intervening. Because access to areas was such a concern and challenge for CARE staff and partners, the DNH framework was often used to help analyze relationships between staff and partners, Maoists and security forces. Normally when the DNH framework is used for the context analysis, it is suggested to consider “who” is in conflict and between which groups tensions exist. In a typical DNH analysis, the aid agency is not considered amongst those groups; DNH is typically used to analyze the impact of introducing our aid programs into that context where tensions and dividers already exist. However, in Nepal, CARE staff and partners used the DNH framework to analyze their own relations with the Maoists and security forces so as to better understand how they could gain access to areas and improve their operations.

During discussions, the review team received several interesting recommendations for applying DNH in the future.

. Training and subsequent analyses and reviews should be done in cooperation with the government and members of civil society in order to be comprehensive and promote local ownership. . Mentoring and accompaniment should be provided to encourage and assist staff and partners in applying the tool after training workshops. . DNH should be incorporated into Monitoring and Evaluation plans. . A DNH lens should be applied to CARE Nepal and other INGO and UN agencies’ internal procedures (i.e. how recruitment is carried out, how staff salaries are determined; who benefits from external training and learning opportunities; and how senior staff are treated vs. project field staff?).

Adapting the Tool

A popular adaptation of DNH was Safe and Effective Development in Conflict (SEDC). This approach, developed by the DFID-GTZ RMO, includes many DNH concepts - especially Dividers and Connectors, Resource Transfers and IEMs - and incorporates good development practice, risk management and security measures. SEDC is geared for projects funded by DFID and GTZ and targets DFID’s and GTZ’s own staff and partners in the field. CARE Nepal staff and partners, for example, were exposed to SEDC because it was a requirement of the ASHA project donor, DFID. Feedback from staff and partners indicates that it has been particularly useful for getting a realistic understanding of their own activities and of their relationships with others through such exercises as image and acceptance, relationship mapping, threats, vulnerability and risk, and the elements about “Who Am I?” One criticism of SEDC is that it focuses more on staff security and risk management then on the potential impacts of aid on beneficiaries and communities. Thus, just like DNH, there may be some gaps in SEDC particularly regarding the role of beneficiaries and their security. Other feedback regarding SEDC presented by multiple interviewees is included in the shaded box below.

“SEDC was written as a guidebook to help practitioners ask critical, reflective, and guiding questions. But, people are seeing it as another tool. The philosophical difference is that these are supposed to be reflective processes. Not just a tool for implementing. Thus, there is a major gap in SEDC and the

philosophy beyond it. This is why the guidebook is supposed to be more flexible - not so black and white. But, people aren’t really seeing the subtleties and nuances. They aren’t debating over the questions and topics. They aren’t seeing things from multiple perspectives. This is why there is a real need for support and accompaniment... it can’t just be a one-time training... it has to be a long-term facilitation. ToTs or three-day trainings are not enough. We have to embrace these concepts differently. A lot of it has to do with who is involved in the process and the time needed to engage the managers of programs. One must take the necessary time to build a rapport otherwise people will not be interested and will possibly shut down. The end of the training is just the beginning. It is at this point that people need the support. Otherwise they get confused, overwhelmed, and it becomes mechanical. People just give the response everyone wants to hear.”

“GTZ and DFID disagreed on the concept of DNH. GTZ wanted more of a conflict transformation approach so they developed the SEDC manual. The frameworks provided by DNH are very good for academics but we need to keep it simple in the field. This is why SEDC has become the DNH for Nepal. Also, SEDC is for project staff directly contracted out by DFID/GTZ. SEDC is not meant for NGO partner staff because SEDC is a mix of security and DNH. There is a gap between SEDC and DNH in several areas. For example, SEDC it is highly focused for during overt conflict, whereas, DNH is good even after a ceasefire.”

“Those who have received the SEDC training like it very much because it is very appropriate for the context. The main problem comes in the training. The people at the field level are uneducated therefore the training needs to be adapted. If the training is done at an intellectual/theoretical level it will lose the audience at best and make them feel stupid, at worst. In addition, the training manuals are not appropriate for people on the ground. For the drivers and field staff the manuals can be very hard to understand. In such a small place it is hard to follow all the rules. For example: if a Maoists is hurt or a local villager is hurt, the rules say that the driver can not pick them up and transport them to help. Once a local leader joined our team to review the roads... we used him when we needed him. A few days later he needed a ride. We had to say no. What is the message we are giving?”

“SEDC ultimately meant best practices in delivering aid in a conflict environment. But, SEDC is looking at the impact on staff and the organization, not necessarily of the impact of the programs on the people and the conflict. DNH is looking out and SEDC is looking in. This is because DFID became nervous when the conflict erupted because the conflict could have inhibited its ability to implement programs. Also, when the conflict was escalating... safety was a major issue. This is why SEDC was made mandatory. Whereas DNH came out of the realization that aid was feeding conflict.”

Generating Options

A key purpose of the DNH framework is to help aid workers generate programming options to minimize unintended negative consequences and to maximize the positive impacts of their work. An important element of the review during the second visit in November-December was to determine if the DNH framework did indeed help expand programming options for CARE Nepal staff and its partners. The

review team sought to confirm whether decisions made as a result of DNH analyses were useful and appropriate and whether they had helped to reduce tensions and/or strengthen connectors. This approach also allowed the researchers to draw valuable feedback from communities and government representatives about the effectiveness and appropriateness of these strategies or options. These were groups that, while not necessarily familiar with DNH or its application, would be able to share their views about its impact.

The issue of access was a major concern for CARE Nepal and for other agencies throughout the conflict. Due to severe constraints in access to communities and beneficiaries, CARE staff needed to re-examine the way they worked. DNH helped them reflect on their policies, procedures and modes of operation. Through reflection options were developed that strongly guided the implementation of their programs. Some of these included:

1. Public auditing – Public auditing was adopted as a means to avoid misuse of funds and minimize corruption; to maintain transparency; and to gain the trust/confidence of local communities. Through the public auditing system, CARE Nepal and partners shared project budgets, plans, and activities with UGs and communities in an open, public manner. This practice helped to avoid tensions with Maoists, Security Forces, and the communities. It also strengthened community connectors. There were numerous instances where partners and community groups were able to defend their projects and better negotiate with Maoists because they had been involved in the planning of activities and budgets through the public auditing system where information and responsibilities were shared and it was clear who was accountable for what. Respondents often commented that through this system, there was little doubt about how money was used, and that if project expenditures had been done secretly, it would have raised suspicions and possibly created tensions. Also, public auditing enabled UGs and community members a sense of ownership.

2. Direct payments – CARE Nepal adopted the practice of making direct payments to UGs, rather than directing funds through their partners. This was done to minimize risk of diversion of funds, avoid extortion or “taxation” by Maoists, increase efficiency, provide greater accountability, and promote more local ownership. For the partner agencies, for example, the fact that funds did not transit through their bank accounts meant that, when they shared information with the Maoists, they were not subject to “taxes” and the full funding could be channeled to the communities.

3. Codes of Conduct – The BOGs were developed by CARE staff and partners, which helped staff and partners to be mindful of their behavior, attitudes and actions. Adopting a modest attitude and having appropriate dress were helpful for gaining acceptance by communities. This practice also helped to avoid sending the message that they were superior to the communities where they worked. Staff noted that if their dress and behavior were extravagant, they might also be accused of benefiting from the aid program and people might be suspicious that funds were not going to the intended beneficiaries.

4. Neutrality – Not having a political affiliation with parties and not being politically influenced; not taking sides and maintaining transparency, without divulging sensitive information have been critical practices for CARE staff and its partners. These practices enabled CARE to gain access to certain areas and to avoid creating tensions. In Nepal, development workers have had to maintain a delicate balance between Maoists and GON’s security forces. The Maoists often suspect that they are spies and the GON accuses them of taking on Maoist issues and producing Maoist supporters. Neutrality, however, does not preclude taking the side of the poor and marginalized; indeed, for CARE staff and partners, the emphasis on a community focus helped when dialoguing with the Maoists and Security Forces.

5. Working with partner organizations and hiring of local staff – For the past few years, CARE International has made a conscious shift to working through local partner organizations. But the situation in Nepal prompted CARE Nepal to move forward with it more vigorously. CARE Nepal, an INGO with substantial U.S. government support, was often viewed with suspicion by the Maoists and had to be very careful and discreet, particularly in rural areas where the Maoists are prevalent. It was necessary to review their operations and to look more seriously at working through local partner organizations. There are certainly important development reasons for adopting this approach (i.e. sustainability, creation of local employment opportunities, greater acceptance and ownership) but also from a DNH perspective, working through local partners and hiring local staff versus bringing in outside workers was considered as a means of reducing tensions and reinforcing connectors. Local staff were often more easily accepted by conflicting parties and by communities; they were not viewed as spies; and their access and movements were more readily permitted. Many respondents suggested that hiring local resource persons facilitated negotiations with the Maoists and promoted greater ownership of projects amongst the local population. Previously, projects had been more contractual in nature, with partner organizations and/or Village Development Committees (VDCs) either hiring contractors and workers from the outside or engaging locals at cheaper rates. Through the ASHA project, local workers were hired at the district rates. Many respondents, especially community members, thought this approach helped to avoid tensions.

6. Equity in geographical spread of programs – Spreading projects around the district, rather than clustering them in one area or near the district headquarters, for example, was adopted as a way to avoid unhealthy competition and tensions amongst VDCs. It also sent a message to even the most remote villages that development was going on in their communities. This gave beneficiaries hope that development was possible (i.e. if there was space for one development project, then there was space for other development activities). Moreover, there was high interest and support for development activities in remote areas, which generated a greater likelihood that projects could continue during the conflict and if/when a development project was disturbed or halted, the community often advocated with the Maoists and/or the Security Forces to continue the project.

These six strategies framed the DFID funded ASHA project. They were strongly reaffirmed by the communities, District Line Agencies (DLAs), partners and international NGOs. These strategies have been transferred to other projects and have become part of CARE Nepal’s Best Practices.

Factors that enhance or inhibit the uptake and application of DNH

During individual interviews and focus group discussions, the researchers wanted to draw staff and partners’ views about factors that enhance the uptake and application of DNH and factors that limit or constrain the uptake and application. Several respondents mentioned that closer proximity to overt conflict prompted their interest in DNH. A specific incident, such as the attack on the Achham office or a confrontation with the Maoists or Security Forces, often sparked an interest in or highlighted a need to learn about conflict-sensitive tools such as DNH. Representatives of one INGO stated that, “In 2002, one of our offices was confronted by the Maoists. We used this as a case study for training in DNH. There was a real need in our situation as we were constantly confronted by Maoists.” Incidents also reinforced staff and partners’ learning from DNH workshops and trainings. For example, one partner recounted how her organization had planned a training workshop on the topic of women’s rights. They heard through various channels that the Maoists were going to detain anyone who participated so the workshop was postponed. The partner staff member went to the community to inquire as to why and asked the Maoists directly why they had threatened to detain participants. The Maoists explained that they do not give permission to meet on the same day that they had organized a meeting. The staff member realized that when they organized workshops could put people at risk and could create tensions, especially since the Security Forces were likely to do searches on those days. She had not done a DNH analysis prior to the workshop but the incident reinforced the learning from a previous DNH training. She made the connection with the DNH framework, recognized that the timing of their activities was important and could create tensions, and made sure to consider timing issues and other details for their future activities. Other factors supporting the uptake and use of DNH mentioned during interviews include:

Leadership – Several interviewees suggested that the success of any organizational change takes a leader who is a passionate agent of change. For example, Robin Needham, former Country Director of CARE-Nepal, was also well placed to push DNH forward in CARE-Nepal and more generally in his role as president of the Association for International NGOs (AIN) in Katmandu. As Archana of the British Council stated, “We overlooked the fact that we should have gotten the head of the organizations more invested and involved from the beginning. Several of the people who attended didn’t get the support they needed after the training because their directors were not invested.” Peter Neil, a consultant working for DFID who was part of the development of SEDC reiterated the importance of leadership stating that, “buy-in from senior management is very important.” Peter added another important component - Inter-organization and intra-organizational accountability - “while some Donors and senior staff realized the value of DNH, others skirted responsibility suggesting that DNH was not relevant to their work because they were not implementing bodies.” For example, “In DFID the program advisors often see DNH as a program issue, not a director’s issue or advisor’s issue so they say that it is not their job. As a result there is no ownership by mid-management.” Peter also stated that he sees the significance of DNH, but others do not use it because it is “too complex and would take too much time... one of the reasons why DNH worked so well for me and why I bought into it was because I knew both the context of the conflict and the organizational constraints. This knowledge allowed me to really sell it

within DFID and its partnering organizations because I could relate it to each level of program planning, design, and implementation.”

Donor Encouragement – Several donors have begun to encourage and at times require partner organizations to use either DNH or an adaptation in all the projects they fund. For example, DFID requires its partners to use SEDC. According to Bikram Subba of HURDEC & DFID/GTZ-RMO, “All of DFID/GTZ’s partners must complete a program review from a DNH perspective every six months and DFID will not accept any report without a DNH analysis.” Another example of donor encouragement included USAID inviting Chantelle Allen of Adventist Development and Releif Agency (ADRA) to attend DNH training. There are obvious setbacks to this practice. For instance, an outside mandate from a Donor may not encourage buy-in and in fact, could cause resentment. Also, as Peter Neil stated, “when you partner with a Donor and they enforce something like SEDC only for the projects they are funding it can have a negative impact on the organizations.” A senior staff at UMN recognized this complication stating that, “One organization should not have different policies based on their donors. They need a common mission, policy, etc. for all projects.”

Institutional or “Corporate” Support – In some cases corporate headquarters have provided institutional backing and financial resources. For example, Bill Lowry of World Vision spearheaded the international rolled out LCP (DNH) worldwide.

Timing and Organizational Preparedness – It appeared that the timing in relation to an organization’s preparedness were key for the success of DNH trainings. For example, one INGO who received DNH training, noted that they had recently gone through a major re-structuring, having become less operational and downsizing their staff so they could work through local partners, and they were awaiting the arrival of a new country director. As Chantelle Allen of ADRA stated, “One reason I wasn’t able to take the DNH training forward more was the timing and place that ADRA was in. We were in the process of a major organizational redevelopment project. But, for the first time, I have an integrated team... now would be a good time to move forward with DNH.”

Positive Reinforcement “Incentives” – Several interviewees stated that recognition and/or promotions based on the training and use of DNH was helpful in gaining buy-in. For example, one organization reported that they received recognition from INGOs and donors at the national level because they used DNH and other tools. Another interviewee stated that, “People attend trainings and acquire skills for different reasons. A Nepali staff who attends a training often has a different incentive than an International staff. For example, one incentive is to improve one’s positioning in an organization. In this sense, the simple act of deciding who attends trainings and who does not can cause conflict within and organization at the national and international level.” As Archana of the British Council stated, “Everyone has different incentives for using DNH. Some of these incentives include: Donor and/or Organizational mandates, organizational leadership, and income generation activities. For example, some of the ToT participants saw the DNH training as a way to make money. What came across very strongly was the individuals and organizations that could use DNH to generate income, were more likely to use the tool.”

Additional Factors hindering or limiting the uptake of DNH:

Respondents noted several factors that would hinder or limit the uptake and use of DNH. A heavy workload and too many other obligations were noted by several staff members. Many felt that they do not have enough time to do regular DNH analyses. Others suggested that there are too many tools and approaches. Not having a critical mass of people in the organization or on the project team could also affect whether DNH was taken on and used regularly by staff. If only one or two people are familiar with the tool, it is hard for the ideas to spread and take root.

There was a difference in the ability of organizations to follow up and carry on depending on the organizational structure. For example, government-training institutes, such as LDTA and NASC, seemed to be able to follow through less easily than I/NGOs. Private consulting groups had an incentive to move forward because they would receive compensation for their services.

Some interviewees mentioned that it is difficult to translate DNH concepts into Nepali so that might affect whether people are able to understand and use the tool regularly. Staff turnover and transfers to other projects also contributed to a limited use of DNH. People were not sure, for example, if replacements received training in DNH or if a person who is transferred to another project carries on DNH in his/her new post. A lack of mentoring and accompaniment after training workshops was also mentioned as a factor that limited people’s ability to apply DNH to their activities in a systematic manner. Some felt that DNH was “not their issue” and relegated it to the conflict advisor or peacebuilding officer. Also, predetermined and inflexible program parameters also affected whether staff will be likely to use DNH regularly.

Several interviewees stated that DNH training could cause social resistance. One respondent stated that, “Directors need a lot of courage to implement DNH because it can challenge their authority. The IEMs can challenge certain leadership styles because during the training process participants are asked to discuss critical questions and begin a process of critical reflection.” As Tory Clawson, Country Director of SCF-Nepal stated, “DNH must be made non-threatening to powerful leaders and structures that may contradict the DNH methodology, particularly implicit ethical messages.” For example, Josh Niraula, a ToT-participant stated that, “At Caritas most of the leadership is appointed by the Bishop to Priests. We gave 3-day DNH workshop for Caritas Nepal – Father Bogati was in the group. He was excited about DNH. But, DNH has to be careful because there is a glass ceiling for non-Christians. So the DNH training could threaten the integrity of the organization.” It is worth noting that during the CARE DNH review there was resistance by some of the senior staff during reflective discussions about CARE’s role modeling of DNH principles. Also, the majority of national (Nepali) staff working for INGOs in Nepal are upper-caste Brahmin men who typically own land, which in Nepal equals wealth. Discussions regarding hiring practices, the redistribution of land to include lower-caste and other marginalized groups, and other sensitive topics, often threatened their position in society and caused participants in the discussion to either shut-down, minimize or justify their behavior and attitudes. Therefore, it is highly recommended that any DNH trainer take into account the cultural and conflict sensitivities particularly regarding the positions of the participants in relation to the context.

6. DNH Training

It is, of course, necessary to build the individual and organizational capacity to understand, process, and apply any new concept. Training processes and methodologies were identified as a major factor contributing to the conceptual understanding and effective application of DNH. The depth of understanding, buy-in, and uptake of DNH were directly related to the type, length, and style of training received. It seems that different training ‘packages’ have been developed based on the level and depth of training required by the individuals and organizations. For example, some DNH trainings at the grassroots level have been delivered by national staff from 3-day sessions to 2-hour sessions while ToTs have been delivered by international trainers to staff in Katmandu. During the review, we noted that, very often, participants’ understanding and use of DNH was based on the level and depth of training received.

Current Approach to Training

CARE Nepal and many other organizations use a cascade approach for building the capacity of staff and other stakeholders. For example, in the case of CARE Nepal, a senior staff member attended a DNH ToT facilitated by CDA. In turn, these DNH trainers typically provide a three-day training to program/project managers at the field level. Then, the program/project managers provided a shorter training to staff working on different projects. These staff introduced the concepts to their partners and lastly, they were expected to share the information with their staff who were implementing the project on the ground. There are several pros to the cascade training approach. It is relatively cost-effective, can generate a wide reach, and is better rooted in the local context. It does, however, require more extensive follow- up. Based on interviews, observations, and analysis, this cascade approach also has some repercussions including: lack of buy-in, dilution, confusion, misinterpretation, and improper or ineffective use of DNH. Based on this feedback it was recommended that if the cascade approach is continued, training should be limited to three levels. In addition, in most instances DNH training is undertaken in the start-up phase of the project or after an incident with limited follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation. During our conversations with staff at the national and local levels several recommendations were provided.

. Direct Application and Inclusive Participation - Staff from a single project could attend DNH training together. Participants would include the following: program manager from the Donor agency, INGO program manager/s at the national and local level, NGO and Community Based Organizations (CBO) program manager/s and staff from the partner organization/s, representative/s of government who will be overseeing the project, and the most important are selected members of the community being served, the beneficiaries. It was even recommended that in certain cases a representative of the Maoists attend the training particularly in regions that are more affected by the conflict. Based on the current transition and peace process this could help in building rapport, and de-stigmatizing the ‘other.’

. Focus on field staff - Field-staff directly engaged with beneficiaries and therefore aware of overt and potential conflict and the potential positive and negative effects of a project on the conflict.

Therefore, they should receive more, not less, context related training than the staff at the national level.

Workshop Participants – Determining Who Participates in a DNH Training

As one respondent stated, “We have to be more intentional regarding who attends trainings.” As mentioned above, DNH training is executed at different levels and at various phases of a program/project. At the implementation stage, staff from different projects are trained together, often based on geographical proximity. Participants included CARE staff, members of local partner NGOs and CBOs, community beneficiaries, government officials and Maoists. While there was often a broad range of participants in a single training, it did not appear that the selection was intentional. It was recommended that staff from the same project attend the same training instead of staff from multiple projects. Another option would be to have staff from different projects during the introductory phase of the training and as the training gets more specific, the trainees divide into their respective teams. In addition, a relatively significant percentage of participants were usually from CARE and the partnering NGO/CBO. Some interviewees suggested that difficulties in buy-in, implementation, and institutionalization of DNH were a result of low levels of participation by government officials from the VDCs who were directly and indirectly associated with projects. For example, in the Churia watershed project, the only government official who was given DNH training transferred to another region and no other person in the government office was aware of DNH. Several interviewees recommended that members of civil society, political representatives, and other social leaders in communities attend, among others, DNH trainings. This would enable various stakeholders to understand their respective roles in a program resulting in shared ownership, transparency, accountability, and sustainability. To elaborate on this point – Even though DNH was developed for aid workers, several interviewees suggested that government workers and community members were not aware of DNH. They felt that if the training was extended beyond aid workers the tool would be more effective. This raised some important questions that deserve further reflection. For example, Who should receive DNH training; who should DNH target; do communities need to be trained; do they need to know how to use the tool or is simply be exposed to it - raising their awareness about how activities can possible harm or divide people sufficient?

DNH Training Methodology

In the view of many respondents, the current training methodology tends to be classroom-based and provided in the local language using visual, verbal, and written communications. Existing examples (case studies) of DNH that are available from different practicing countries are used to emphasize concepts and other aspects of DNH. Participants, especially at the field level, suggested that the examples used in the training should be more related to their specific context. In order to make trainings more context- specific it was suggested that the DNH trainers do their own context analysis before designing and implementing trainings. This would enable the trainers to make more practical links between the DNH model and the context in which the participants will be using the DNH concept and framework. In addition, many interviewees, particularly at the field level, suggested that training should be more

experiential / hands-on. They encouraged more practical sessions rather than lectures. The classroom approach is difficult for field teams to relate to and they also find it difficult to translate the concepts into action if they do not run through the process in depth. This is another risk of the cascade approach. In the workshops that CDA leads and in the ToTs, participants do have the chance to apply the DNH framework to their own projects and activities. For example, during a typical 3-day workshop, participants are split into small groups, often by project teams and/or sectors, so that they can go through all seven steps of the DNH framework. Typically, participants are given an entire day for this activity. Unfortunately, this approach may not be adopted in subsequent trainings as was seen from feedback from the field. Also, if trainers only offer 1-day or half-day sessions, there is little time for participants to apply the framework to their own activities. In order to expedite the learning process it was also suggested that introductory documents including case studies be provided prior to the training. This would enable participants to familiarize themselves with the language and ideas.

Several respondents also suggested a more practical approach to the training that would include using DNH as a tool for program planning & design, implementation, monitoring & evaluation throughout the training process. In addition several respondents suggested the need for on-going coaching and follow- up support.

Chantelle Allen, Program Director at Adventist Development and Releif Agency (ADRA), was introduced to both CDA’s DNH and Management Sciences for Health’s (MSH) Leadership Development Program. Several of ADRA’s staff received both trainings within close proximity. After the initial training, Chantelle and her staff did little with DNH, however, they completely embraced MSH’s leadership training. According to Chantelle, MSH applied a four-step workshop whereby the training focused on real, tangible projects and the context of ADRA’s work in Nepal. MSH provided a framework, tools, and coaching for an extended period of time. The training was completely experiential, the trainers and staff had clearly defined roles, and information was disseminated on the Internet. After the initial training Chantelle received ongoing support from MSH through weekly telephone consultations with MSH staff in Boston. Based on this anecdote, it might be a good idea, in certain contexts, for CDA to collaborate with MSH, based in Boston, to see if a similar training model could be developed for DNH.11

Training Content

Trainings - particularly sessions held over several days at the field level, often combined modules of different approaches including concepts on RBA, conflict transformation, and security or risk management. A lot of information was given at these trainings, leading to information overload and at times confusion. As a result, none of the concepts were fully understood as several interviewees suggested perceived contradictions between the different tools and concepts. It was recommended that if/when these approaches, philosophies, and tools are combined in a single training, their relationship in

11 See www.msh.org - Chantelle recommended contacting Sylvia Vriesendorp, lead facilitator; Naomi Blumberg David and Thomas Mcminnin, Project Managers for more information.

terms of when and how they relate to each other should be discussed during trainings and in training manuals and documents. DNH could include a section on how it can be combined with RBA, conflict transformation, and risk management so they do not contradict each other both practically and in peoples’ perception. Some also suggested that from the very beginning of DNH trainings, the facilitator should tell the participants what DNH should be used for and what it is not supposed to do. For example, as noted earlier in this report, many interviewees were confused with regards to working in and working on conflict.

Many organizations have begun combining several trainings into one. The response to this approach was mixed. However, many suggested that when RBA and DNH were combined, they were confused. However, many organizations and academic institutions are beginning to see the value of cross-training in human rights, conflict transformation, and development because as Parlevliet suggests in Bridging the Divide, “a synergy exists between the two fields which, if left untapped, complicates and undermines processes that work towards peace, justice, and reconciliation.” Going further Parlevliet states that,

“[W]ithout a proper understanding of the human rights dimension in conflicts, conflict management is bound to be unsustainable. Not only are efforts to protect and implement human rights essential to the constructive management of conflict, but institutionalized respect for human rights is also a primary form of conflict prevention. Moreover, processes that aim to resolve conflict must take place within a framework in which fundamental rights and freedoms are considered non-negotiable."

To find a middle ground several respondents suggested that if proper time is given, with context and culturally sensitive examples, and the necessary relationships are made evident then the fields of conflict resolution and human rights can mingle. Therefore, if DNH is presented effectively in RBA trainings and RBA is presented effectively in DNH trainings, they could complement each other. Thus, the major issue is not the topics themselves but the perception and lack of deep understanding of each, alone and in relation to the other.

Interviewees also stated that the trainings consisted of a lot of theoretical concepts with examples from different parts of the world. It was found difficult to translate the concepts into action at the field level. Participants would have preferred more emphasis on the practical aspects of DNH. It would be easier to relate to the examples provided if they were related to their specific place within the context of Nepal. For example, while there are many similarities in Nepal, the geographic regions all offer very different challenges including access, marginalized populations, socio-political tensions, and proximity to conflict. Thus, field level staff should be trained based on the context in which they work. It was also recommended that specific stages of programming be included in trainings with reference to how DNH can be utilized at each stage (i.e. planning, implementation, M & E, and transference or exit strategies). Also, programming does not happen within a vacuum and therefore several interviewees suggested that DNH be combined with other topics like stress management, mediation and facilitation as well as dialogue skills and decision-making techniques.

Mentoring and Follow up Support

Several staff who participated in DNH training returned to their respective projects and implemented activities using the framework. Several expressed the need for a follow-up mechanism that could be utilized throughout a program cycle. In addition, very little emphasis has been given to monitoring and evaluating (M&E) and the use and impact of DNH. Thus, it was recommended that possible mechanisms for M&E as well as ongoing systems for coaching and follow-up be explored. Another recommendation was DNH updates and refresher courses.

Resources

It is important to note that several CARE staff and local partners, particularly at the field level, suggested a lack of and disparity in human and financial resources provided for training. They expressed the need for appropriate resources in order to provide effective training. For example, tension was created by the location and services provided at trainings particularly in regard to fancy hotels in Katmandu as opposed to the facilities provided to field staff and partners. In addition, the director of a partner organization expressed frustration because she was expected to train her staff in DNH but did not have the funding to provide per-diem, lunch, and coffee during the training. Also, they did not have funding to print documents, etc. Tension was also expressed in relation to who was selected to attend trainings and at what level. It was not clear to some staff why they were not invited to attend DNH trainings.

Motivation & Incentive

Several interviewees expressed ideas related to the concept of incentive. This relates to several areas of DNH training. For example, in some cases, organizations reported getting recognition from INGOs and Donors at the national and international level for using DNH in their programs and projects. This has positive and negative ramifications because it can encourage organizations to invest and participate in DNH trainings but it can also encourage the use of the term ‘DNH’ in proposals and brochures as promotional rhetoric instead of actual understanding and proper usage. Another example was expressed in regard to incentive to attend trainings. Attending DNH training, gave some organizations the capacity to work in complex situations without feeding into conflict or causing further conflicts. This ability to work in complex environments resulted in recognition by the government, INGOs, and donor agencies. In addition, the incentive for individual staff at different levels to attend trainings differs because they are constantly bombarded by different tools and trainings, it was recommended that some form of a certificate program be created in order to get recognition and possibly even compensation for attending training such as DNH.

In conclusion, it appears that many individuals and organizations working in Nepal are familiar with the term DNH. The level and depth of understanding and application vary depending on the individual, organization, and location. Several major areas related to training became apparent during our interviews including the need for longer, program-specific, experiential, and context-appropriate trainings; greater inclusion and participation of outside stakeholders; and more appropriate resources

necessary for conducting effective trainings at the community level. If these and the other recommendations provided in the above discourse are considered and integrated into the current trainings and project budgets, the result could be higher levels of understanding and application of DNH thereby promoting greater buy-in, decreasing tensions created or exacerbated by international aid and development activities, and perhaps enhancing contributions to local capacities for peace.

7. Political Resistance and Constraints to DNH in Nepal

During the course of our interviews there appeared to be a divide between the major donors on how to work both in and on conflict in Nepal. While some organizations such as USAID have enormous constraints based on foreign policy, other donors such as SDC and to some extent DFID/GTZ seem to be less constrained. This manifests itself in several ways and has become illuminated by the past few years of extreme violence and then the sudden transition to a very fragile peace process. Many interviewees suggested the difficulty in being conflict sensitive in the post 9/11 context. For instance, several staff working for USAID suggested that there were “political limits to USAID’s ability to implement DNH.” Senior representatives of INGOs suggested “the relationship between INGOs, Donors, and local NGOs and CBOs becomes complex when external foreign politics become involved. For example: USAID is a major donor in Nepal and the US foreign policy (Patriot Act) does not allow it’s partners to interact with the Maoists. Whereas, others donors do.”

Interviews with representatives of the Norwegian Embassy and SDC shed light on this discourse.

“Yes, home-based agendas do complicate issues overseas. Foreign policies are not always conducive for operating in the context on the ground and not the best for developing a nation. The advantage of Norway and the Swiss is they don’t really have a ‘home-grown’ agenda besides their basic principles including poverty reduction, national ownership, local resources, support for peaceful development, and peace processes. We also believe strongly that conflict should be resolved through dialogue. In order to have dialogue you have to be open to speaking with everyone. The US Foreign Policy is very frank when it comes to Nepal: No speaking with the Maoists and partiality to the Government of Nepal. We believe that the Maoists are a legitimate party to the peace process. When the seven major political parties agree to speak with the Maoists we support them. Who are we to interfere? But, there are good people at USAID trying to make their development projects as sensitive as possible and helping as many as possible in practical terms, but not necessarily doing so ideologically. So, in reality they may not be doing so much harm.

“DNH lacks political depth and the acknowledgement of the heaviness of working in a conflict situation. If an individual or organization says that its work at any level and in any sector, including health, is not affected by the Maoists, they are not being honest. The Maoists’ presence as a political machine is omnipresent. DNH is missing the realpolitik of conflict. It does not ask these questions. For example: How do you deal with political actors who see development as a tool to power? And, how to find out who speaks to whom, and when? For example, organizations that say their staff can’t work with or speak to the Maoists are leaving the weakest part of the development chain to negotiate with the

Maoists. This is what USAID is causing their staff to do. USAID’s policy is don’t see and don’t tell. By talking with the Maoists we also have to speak with the Nepali Government. At a very concrete level this has allowed us to become mediators. Now, with the peace process we are taking this to another level because by having mid-level actors talking to the Maoists it has created transparency and reduces the stigma of “terrorist” and builds relationships between nationals working for NGOs and Maoists. Therefore, our development work has become an implicit CR tool by de-stigmatizing and building relations. This is where we begin the topic of working on conflict by working in conflict.”

8. Do No Harm at the Macro Level

Is the Aid Industry supporting the economic and ideological factors associated with the war in Nepal? One could argue that the substitution effect created by international donors and INGOs might be supporting the Government’s war machine. Simultaneously implicit ethical messages of INGOs may be supporting the Maoist ideology. The question raised in this section is the following: How does the DNH framework account for macro affects of aid? If the concept and tool does account for this, then are individuals and organizations using it at this level? If so, how? If not, why not? If DNH does not account for the macro impact of aid, should it? If so, how?

During the course of our interviews, several people suggested that a major root cause of the conflict in Nepal is social exclusion / marginalization. However, according to Dhurba Rizal, the conflict in Nepal should not be rationalized by

“[E]conomic inequality, deprivation, grievances or even economic benefits... nor can the primordial concept of ethno-nationalism be grasped as a cause igniting conflict in Nepal. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is neither separatist nor secessionist. The conflict is neither a case of ethnic upheaval nor the cause of economic destitution and marginalization. Violent insurgencies have erupted in Nepal not from the areas of abject poverty and deprivation, but from the relatively well-off areas.”12

Several scholars suggest that marginalization is a manifestation of conflict, not a cause of conflict. For example, Rizal suggests that a “[s]tate in conflict consciously shifts the attention from social to security sector” (ibid). Consequently, such a policy change deepens deprivation and marginalization. This situation has increasingly been reflected in the steady rise in the regular expenditure of the government in comparison with the falling development expenditure in the national budgetary allocation. Development organizations fill this gap causing a substitution effect and thus, inadvertently support a

12 According to Dhurba Rizal, “the first Maoist insurgency erupted from the comparatively rich Jhapa district in eastern Nepal in the early 1970s, where the Government had launched the land reform pilot project with American aid. Similarly, the presently ensuing Maoist movement has spread from the area where USAID had spent some $50 to $60 million in the 1980s through 1995 on the Rapti Doon Integrated Development Project (Gersony 2003). Had insurgency any embryonic relationships with destitution, deprivation and discrimination, the inaccessible and the least developed Karnali Zone could have been a logical breeding ground for violent anti-state movement rather than Rapti Zone as a citadel of the Maoist uprising.”

war economy. The shear numbers provide substantial evidence for such a claim. After the ‘war on terrorism’ was declared,

“[t]he US alone has provided Rs.1,716 million ($22 million USD) worth of security assistance in the past three years. Under the Global Fund for Prevention of Conflict, the British interests have also been resurrected for aiding Nepal militarily with the initial fund of Rs.780 million (6.5 million sterling pound). The neighbouring states of India and China, particularly India that had previously been most reluctant to support Nepal with arms assistance, have become the most generous and the largest providers of military hardware worth Rs.6.5 billion sensitizing its own security interests in Nepal” (Rizal).

While the conflict in Nepal is typically characterized as political, not ethnic or inter-communal, if not managed properly, the geographic, cultural, and religious diversity compounded by a strong caste system could be easily mobilized by political entrepreneurs, leading to much more complex dynamics.13 Already, grievances related to the exploitation of resources, centralization of power, unequal distribution of social services, political representation, and disparity in the distribution of humanitarian aid to regions such as the flat river plains of the Terai, are being mobilized by both non-violent and armed separatist movements. This threatens the very fragile peace process and could lead to an intractable situation that some have already compared to Sri Lanka.

Bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, governments, and INGOs have been working to develop Nepal for at least the last fifty years. Despite enormous amounts of international aid, Nepal’s tremendous natural resources14 (hydro-electric power), unique heritage and culture and other eco / adventure based tourist attractions have not been harnessed successfully. Some suggest that Nepal’s landlocked location, technological backwardness, and the long-running civil war have also prevented Nepal from fully developing its economy. The distribution of wealth among people is consistent with that in many developed and developing countries: the highest 10% of households control 39.1% of the national wealth and the lowest 10% control only 2.6%. In addition to economic dependency and vast polarization the literacy rate is approximately 53.74% (68.51% for males and 42.49% for females). As Gael Robertson, a development and conflict consultant in Nepal, stated in an interview, “International aid has been coming into Nepal since the 1950s. Most of this international aid has only reinforced the status quo. But, this isn’t a bad thing for those who benefit from it. But, it’s not getting to the roots of development

13 According to the 2001 census, Hindus constitute 80.6% of the population. Buddhists make up 10.7%, Muslims 4.2%, Kirant 3.6%, other religions 0.9%. The largest ethnic group is the Chhettri (15.5%). Other groups are the Brahman-Hill 12.5%, Magar 7%, Tharu 6.6%, Tamang 5.5%, Newar 5.4%, Kami 3.9%, Yadav 3.9%, other 32.7%, unspecified 2.8%. Nepali is the national language with 47.8% of the population speaking it as their first language. Other languages include Maithili 12.1%, Bhojpuri 7.4%, Tharu (Dagaura/Rana) 5.8%, Tamang 5.1%, Nepal Bhasa 3.6%, Magar 3.3%, Awadhi 2.4%, other 10%, unspecified 2.5% (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepal and www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/np.html). 14 In relation to the total land mass (143,181 sq km) Nepal has one of the largest quantities of water (4,000 sq km) in the world (See www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/np.html). Nepal also has a unique climate for agriculture and the production and exportation of unique natural plants, herbs, spices that can only be found in Nepal.

issues in Nepal. Also, development in Nepal has not really taken into account the external context of India and China.”

The final chapter of, Do No Harm, raises a few concerns. One of these is “the issue of how the micro level of warfare (and peace-fare) relates to the macro level.” In her own words Anderson suggests that the process of induction utilized in the LCPP process “has not bridged the gap between communities at war and the international context in which intra-national wars occur...and the book (does not) examine the ways international assistance can and does directly interact with these macro level forces” (145- 146). Sighting the horrific genocide in Rwanda as a case in point, Anderson continues...“international aid may play a role in enabling people in a war torn society to exert influence to gain the international political assistance they need and want. But much more is to be tried – and learned – in this area” (146).

The researchers’ findings in Nepal reiterated this concern at three levels. First, it seems that in many cases international aid has become an arm of donor government’s foreign policies. Many of the humanitarian assistance projects being implemented in conflict environments are funded and controlled by donors such as USAID, DFID, DANIDA, NORAD, etc. This connection between humanitarian assistance and foreign policy combined with the new post-9/11 geopolitical landscape and the “War on Terrorism” has made it difficult for agencies to act independently. For instance many organizations working in Nepal like Save the Children or Chemonics are financially dependent on USAID and therefore cannot work with anything associated with the CPN/Maoists because they are on the United States’ list of terrorist organizations. If these agencies were caught working with the Maoists their operations could be shut down. Yet, everyone working in Nepal knows that it is virtually impossible to provide humanitarian assistance without in some way working with the Maoists. This is a very similar situation to the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Hamas in Gaza. Thus, many interviewees including staff at USAID raised the question and concern, “How can DNH help us to work in the post-9/11 context?” The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this case study, but the topic might is an important concern for CDA to explore.

The second concern regarding the gap between the micro and macro use of DNH involves the regional impact of international aid. In many cases organizations like CARE, Save the Children, World Vision, etc. use the DNH framework in the design and implementation of individual programs. Evidence suggests that when used appropriately it did help to reduce inter-personal, intra- and inter-community tensions and in some cases did build local capacities for peace. However, there was no evidence that there was a macro DNH analysis employed by the Government of Nepal, Donor agencies, the UN, INGOs, local NGOs and others working in Nepal. As a result, many interviewees suggested the perceived inequality in the distribution of aid at a national level has helped political entrepreneurs to mobilize groups based on a combination of grievances including geographic neglect. Though this anecdote is simplified, one of the grievances of the Madeshi movement, a potential threat to the current peace process, is the inequitable distribution of aid. Due to difficulties in finding employment and land many hill people (pahardi) have moved to the Tarai for livelihoods. For a number of social and political reasons tensions between the hill people and those living in the Tarai have developed. The new political context has catalyzed these tensions resulting in verbal and physical threats to the parhardi’s living in the Tarai. When driving across

the drastically diverse landscape of Nepal it appears that the Southern flat plain bordering India, the Tarai, is the most fertile and developed region of Nepal. However, Horowitz theory of relative deprivation is useful in explaining the Madeshi’s ability to mobilize people based on the grievance of inequality. Regional tensions could be ameliorated if the appropriate actors employed DNH at a macro- level to understand the positive and negative ramifications of aid. This is another topic beyond the scope of this study that requires exploration.

The third concern involves geo-politics, a topic that receives too little attention in the realm of international aid in conflict situations. Conversations with international and national aid workers, government officials, conflict resolution consultants, and intellectuals alluded to the following quagmire. The United States and other powerful governments have peripheral interest in Nepal. However, they have extensive interest in China and India. Therefore, if China and India have policies that inhibit the development of Nepal, major donors often make decisions that support their regional interests, even if these results in negative ramifications on the development of Nepal. For example, one of Nepal’s greatest natural resources is water, however the government of Nepal lacks the resources to harness this water to develop hydroelectric plants that could be used for exporting electricity to Northern India and other countries in the neighborhood. India’s policy is a major factor inhibiting Nepal’s progress in this area. Unfortunately, the major donors support, ignore, or are complacent to India’s policies towards Nepal. This creates a paradox. Major donors pump enormous amounts of funds for short-term micro level projects yet they support governments and policies that inhibit more sustainable macro level development. This dynamic perpetuates dependency. Again, this issue is beyond the scope of this case study but worth further exploration.

9. Relevance of DNH in the “New Nepal Context”

During the course of our interviews and field observations in Nepal a common theme formed that deserves further discourse. What role does DNH have in the ‘new’ Nepal context? How does a rights- based approach (RBA) work in relation to conflict transformation? How can development organizations support the current peace process in Nepal and how can they utilize and integrate RBA and conflict transformation activities? Further, how can DNH help - not hinder this process; and if the immediate peace process is successful, how can DNH assist in post-conflict activities particularly for those organizations interested in using RBA?

Some interviewees expressed concern that in post-conflict situation, people will “relax” and think that conflict sensitive programming is no longer necessary. It should be emphasized that conflict sensitive programming is just as, if not more important after the signing of the CPA. The underlying tensions / root causes of conflict and grievances that pre-date the war (caste, class, religious, and gender discrimination) are still prevalent. There is also a host of post-conflict issues that remain unresolved including: security sector reform, refugees and IDPs, ex-combatants, victims/ perpetrator relations, etc. With high expectations, underlying tensions and resentments, and lot of money flowing in, resource transfers and IEMs will be very important during this transition phase.

If the immediate political agreements do not collapse and the peace process succeeds the reintegration of Maoists, the demobilization of militias, the reformation of the Nepali Army, and the development of a ‘new’ government in Nepal will all become serious issues that deserve attention, proper planning, and preparation. There have been an enormous number of organizations working in Nepal on development related activities for decades. Due to the conflict environment and various other reasons many of them have worked independently of the national and local government bodies. This has created a substitution effect. At the macro level the government does not have to be responsible for developing Nepal in terms of human and financial resources because everyone else is. Thus, the government can spend its money on other ‘security-related’ activities and continue to squander money from both the people and the development organizations working in Nepal. At the micro level, the people have very little trust in the government of Nepal and in many cases look to international organizations as de-facto governments in terms of infrastructure, health, education, and other social services. If there is to be sustainable development and sustainable peace in Nepal this scenario will have to change. Development organizations and donors should be very cautious in there slow transition from being “impartial” to both the GON and the Maoists to working with the GON at every level to build its capacity to govern and build the peoples’ willingness to trust the new government’s ability to govern.

While many suggest that a full DDR process will not be necessary and a formal truth and reconciliation commission will also be in question, these processes and activities related to them should raise everyone’s eyebrows and get everyone thinking more sensitively, not less. In these processes, the loci of power will likely be challenged. While this paradigm shift from a monarchy to a power-sharing, decentralized democratic system is the very premise of RBA in regard to creating space for the marginalized and excluded populations; it is an extremely fragile and precarious environment in which to make change. If the balance is offset in one direction too much the equilibrium could be pushed too far, too fast, causing one side of the seesaw to come crashing down. Despite the optimism and momentum, the people’s expectations are very high; their patience could potentially wear thin faster than the time it will take for real change to reach the ground. Therefore, how can donors, development organizations, and their partners support the peace processes? We all know that large outpouring of money, drastic changes in policy, and the sudden influx of new organizations, though usually unintentional, can have negative consequences.

If Donors, INGOs, the GON and the Maoists raise false expectations and make unrealistic promises that cannot be kept, problems can arise. Foreign actors bring in unrealistic expectations particularly if they lack an understanding of the context. As one interviewee stated, “the GON is asking for unrealistic amounts of funding... we can be sure that in the lead up to elections, the government, political parties, and the Maoists will make promises they can’t keep... Donors and INGOs can help to manage expectations by developing communication networks, creating mechanisms for transparency and accountability, and role modeling realistic policies, attitudes, and behaviors.”

At the macro-level there is polarization among the major Donors working in Nepal. This is partially caused by the political constraints of external foreign policies and differences in approaches and philosophies regarding conflict and development activities. At the micro level there appears to be a lack

of role modeling in terms of the expectations, attitudes, and behaviors that Donors, IGOs, and INGOs have for themselves as compared to what they expect of their partners, the communities they serve, and the GON. Development organizations must be more reflective on their own programs and projects as well as their processes and organizational structures. As one interviewee stated, “The crucial point is power-sharing but we as organizations have to be role models (i.e. Social Exclusion). The GON has agreed to this but it is a very slow process. The public sector is so hierarchical it will take a long time to change. But, if organizations role model the behavior they can help in this change.” In this regard some organizations have started internship programs for less skilled, lower caste, and socially excluded groups. However, the number of individuals participating in such programs is minimal and therefore, the impact is low.

Concepts, approaches, principles and models for development, human rights, and conflict resolution such as DNH, RBA, and peacebuilding have become jargon too often used on proposals and program reports never to see the light of day in reality. Trainings have become a major business causing the flooding of too many tools in the industry. This often dilutes the messages, confusing and overwhelming the participants. There is a danger that with the transition in Nepal many organizations will begin using the language of peacebuilding even if they don’t have the necessary contextual knowledge and skills. A mechanism for quality control would be very helpful to make sure the very activities meant to build peace do not actually create conflict.

There is also the danger of an explosion of new groups and individuals entering Nepal due to the current peace process. Too many organizations working in a small and very sensitive space can cause confusion, distraction, and problems with coordination. While many of these organizations and individuals are highly skilled they may not know the background and context of Nepal. Good intentions without proper knowledge can lead to bad outcomes. Also, a lack of coordination and competition for funding can lead to, among other issues, duplication of efforts and the unequal distribution of aid.

Appendix A—Conflict in the Terai

The roots of the current conflict in the Terai date back to the unification of Nepal in the late 18th century. Nepal is split into three extremely diverse terrains with the northern third typically referred to as the Mountains (Himalayas) bordering China, the middle third the hills, and the bottom third the Terai or flat plains bordering India. This diverse topography helps to preserve differences and cultural affinity. Throughout Nepal’s history, politicians have used all of these fault lines to gain support. Prior to the conquest of the Rana dynasty, the people in the Terai were the ‘cultivators’ with prominent “positions in the revenue-extraction hierarchy.” When the Rana dynasty incorporated the Terai, the “Madheshis15 were never part of the inner core of the bharadari [hills]” and therefore, when the hierarchy was established, “those appointed were predominantly from the hills” (Whelpton 58). This favoritism gave the hill people superior status and “[s]ince a common sense of separation from the plains was the main thing that hill Nepalese shared, Madheshis were naturally felt to be outsiders” (ibid). In addition to the geographic division, “[m]odern Nepali nationalism...was shaped around the monarchy, Hinduism and the Nepali language...., [which] excluded Madhesis, whose distinct cultures and cross-border links have led hill Nepalis to view them with suspicion and derision.” (N136: 3) Fueling the Madhesis frustration was the migration of hill people into the Tarai. Many moved to the Tarai for better economic opportunities, particularly in agriculture development and later to escape war in the hills. But, others moved as a result of government policies to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and its cultural, religious, and linguistic identity. According to Welpton, “by 1991, over a million people had left the mountains or hills to set up new homes in the Terai... an increase from 6 per cent in 1951 to over 33 per cent.” (123) Today the Madhesis make up a third of Nepal’s population. They are completely underrepresented and tend to be poorer and have lower education and health indicators than hill communities. (ICG, N136: 5)

The political transformation triggered by Jan Andolin II (2nd People’s Movement) and the peace process heightened the Madhesi and other marginalized groups expectations that they would gain representation in the new government and their grievances would be managed appropriately. When they were excluded from the peace process, and they realized that the CPN/M and SPA had no intention of inclusion and social transformation, the pressure cooker was opened and ethnic-based revolts ensued. Since the eruption of violence in the Terai, the government has made minor attempts to appease the Madhesi and other marginalized groups through various appeals. Regardless of these attempts, the majority of the marginalized groups do not believe that the offers will ever be realized. With nothing to lose they are becoming more aggressive and with the splintering factions in the Terai, it is difficult to determine what groups are legitimate and which ones are criminal opportunists. The

15 Madhes is a near synonym of Tarai but it, and Madhesi (used for people) has distinct political connotations – Madhesis have been defined as non-pahadis with plains languages as the mother tongue. It encompasses both caste Hindus and Muslims, and, in some definitions, the indigenous Tarai ethnic groups.” (N136: 2) Madhesi communities are also divided along caste and class lines so there is also internal fighting between different ethnic, caste, and class groups in the Terai.

people in the Terai are terrified and frustrated due to regular strikes, inter-communal violence, and criminal behavior including forced disappearances, bribery, armed robbery, and murder. Though ethnic cleansing has not occurred on a large scale, extreme tension and occasional outbursts of violence between the hill people (pahadis) and the Madhesi is a tinderbox on the verge of explosion. Already, large numbers of pahadis have been forced to leave the Terai and most of the Madhesis have left the Maoists to join other militant groups in the Terai. The porous border with India allows for easy access to arms, militant groups, and cross-border criminal behavior. With the police completely demoralized and the army in their barracks, the people of Nepal find themselves in an extremely insecure situation.

Appendix B—References

Anderson, M. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid can support Peace- or War, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

HRW (Human Rights Watch)(2005) Essential Background: Overview of Human Rights Issues in Nepal. 31 December 2005. See www.hrw.org.

ICG (International Crisis Group) 2007, ‘Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists’ in ICG Asia Report 132, 18 May 2007, Jakarta & Brussels; 2007, ‘Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region’ in ICG Asia Report 136, 9 July 2007, Jakarta & Brussels; 2007, ‘Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process’ in ICG Asia Report 68, 28 September 2007, Jakarta & Brussels; ‘Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal’ in ICG Asia Report 99, 15 June 2005 Jakarta & Brussels; ‘Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy’ in ICG Asia Report 104, 27 October 2005. See www.icg.org.

IRIN. 2005, ‘Between Two Stones: Nepal’s Decade of Conflict’. December 2005 Web Special. See www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/Between-Two-Stones-IRIN-In-Depth.pdf.

Parlevliet, M. Bridging the Divide: Exploring the Relationship Between Human Rights and Conflict Management in Centre for Conflict Resolution - Track Two II (1) March 2002. Pp. 8-43.

Rizal, D. & Yokota, Y. 2006, Understanding Development, Conflict and Violence: The Cases of Bhutan, Nepal, North-East India and Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, New Delhi, India: Adroit Publishers.

UNDP (United Nations Development Program) (2006) Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and Global Water Crisis. New York. UNDP. See www.hdr.undp.org.

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) & WFP (World Food Programme). 2007. Impact of Conflict and Priorities for Assistance: Food Security Monitoring and Analysis System. August 2007. See www.un.org.np.

Whelpton, John. 2005. A History of Nepal, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Appendix C—Framework

Stages Depth / Indicators Breadth Stage 1 Awareness Information . Language (Basic – Intermediate – Advanced) Stage 2 Conceptualizatio Knowledge . Articulation . n Relation of DNH to program/projects

Stage 3 Application Skill (depth/quality) . Elements used . Basic-Intermediate- (Bits / pieces) . Demonstrated use (examples) Advanced . Program change . Policy change . Impact Assessment (M & E) . Documentation & Info - sharing Stage 4 Mainstreaming Institutionalization . Project . Program . Sector . Phases / life cycle . Organization . Partner . Country . Region . Globally Stage 5 Knowledge Organizational Learning . Platforms for sharing . Management Meetings – intra/inter program/project, country, region, etc. . Conferences . Discussion groups . Communities of practice . Documentation – Incident reports, case studies, books, lessons learned, best practices . Dissemination (to whom?)

Framework for gathering and analyzing data & Potential questionnaire:

Describe Actor: Actor: Actor: Actor: Actor:

1. Organization 2. Position 3. Tasks/Programs 4. Level of Training 5. Exposure

Stage 1 Indicators: Indicators: Indicators: Indicators:

“Awareness”

Stage 2 Indicators: Indicators: Indicators: Indicators:

“Conceptualization”

Stage 3 Indicators: Indicators: Indicators: Indicators:

“Application”

Stage 4 Indicators: Indicators: Indicators: Indicators:

“Mainstreaming”

Stage 5 Indicators: Indicators: Indicators: Indicators:

“Knowledge Management”

(Based on the indicators marked or unmarked) the impact of Impact Impact Impact Impact this actor has been the following: Assessment: Assessment: Assessment: Assessment:

Organizational Impact: Level 1 = General Program Support Level 2 = Program / Project Design Level 3 = Program / Implementation Level 4 = Monitoring / Evaluation

Contextual impact: -Decreasing / increasing tensions & vulnerabilities

Lessons Learned / Best practices Lessons Lessons Lessons Lessons Learned: Learned: Learned: Learned:

Contributing Factors / Recommendations: Recommend Recommendat Recommend Recommendat . Leadership ations: ions: ations: ions: . Staff turn-over . Incidents (implicit/explicit) . Training (level/depth)

. Incentives . Organizational will . Management commitment / investment . Donor relations / perceptions / mandates

Anecdotes: Anecdotes: Anecdotes: Anecdotes: Anecdotes:

Follow-up: Follow-up: Follow-up: Follow-up: Follow-up:

Appendix D—Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs)