Why Do Bloggers Keep Silent?

Why do bloggers keep silent?

Self-censorship in social media: cases of Belarus and Russia

By: Alesia Rudnik

Supervisor: Liudmila Voronova Södertörn University | School of Social Sciences Master’s thesis 15 credits Journalism | 2 semester 2020

Abstract Social media are often referred to as democracy drivers in autocratic states, whereas in some countries, they appear as tools of the regimes that employ a wide range of mechanisms to restrict freedom of expression online. In authoritarian countries, political bloggers stand out as new political leaders or anti-regime actors, serve as alternative information sources, advocate for political action, or mobilize financial support for different initiatives. Political conditions in countries with established governments’ control practices complicate publishing routines for political bloggers and may increase incentives to self-censor. Employing the theory of the spiral of silence, this study analyzes self-censorship in social media among political bloggers in two neighboring post-Soviet autocratic countries - Belarus and Russia. The research is based on a comparison of media legislation in Belarus and Russia, textual analysis of political blogs, and survey among political bloggers in the two countries. The survey demonstrates that political bloggers face obstacles in forms of administrative or criminal sentences, forceful blocking of their pages, online threats, or experience pressure/ attention from secret services. Despite these challenges, political bloggers in Belarus and Russia demonstrate readiness to speak out and criticize political elites. According to the model suggested in this thesis, the majority of political bloggers practice self-censorship at the pre-publishing stages in forms of selecting topics and wording, avoiding particular names. The author argues that in autocratic countries, the spiral of silence, that engages more people to silence their opinion due to political obstacles, can be and is currently challenged by political bloggers, as decentralized political opinion leaders, who aim to break down the spiral of silence. The research contributes to media studies of social media and freedom of expression in autocratic countries. Political bloggers as neither ordinary social media users or media in non-democratic world require more attention among media and political scholars. Acknowledgments: I would like to express sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Liudmila Voronova, who positively impacted this research by academic advise and strong personal support. Her willingness to carefully scrutinize the material and patience in responding to all questions created a plausible working at- mosphere. I wish to thank all the survey participants who, despite their hectic and stressful lives, found time to both fill in the questionnaire and contribute by broadening the survey sample. Key Words: authoritarian regimes, Belarus, censorship, political bloggers, freedom of speech, Russia, self-censorship, social media.

Contents

List of figures and tables 4 Introduction 5 I. Theoretical framework and literature review 8 1.1. Political discussion in social media: new media - new journalists 8 1.2. Web 2.0. in authoritarian states 12 1.3. Spiral of silence - do you dare? 15 1.4. Political and media background 17 1.5. Filling the research gap 23 II. Methodology 24 2. 1. Research design 24 2.2. Analysis of media legislation 25 2.3. Textual analysis 26 2. 4. Web-survey 27 2. 5. Respondents sampling 28 2. 6. Limitations 30 III. Results and analysis 31 4.1. Comparing media legislation in Belarus and Russia 31 4.2. What do political bloggers in Belarus and Russia talk about? 34 4.3. Survey findings 36 4.4. General findings 39 IV. Discussion 41 5.1. What causes self-censorship? 41 5.2. Bloggers’ perception of self-censorship 42 5.3. Self-censorship’s impact on freedom of expression 44 Conclusion 47 List of references 49 Appendices 60 Appendix I. Questionnaire (translated to English) 60 Appendix II. Code sheet 63 Appendix III. List of the analyzed legislative acts 69 Appendix IV 69 Appendix V 70

List of figures and tables

Figure 1. Internet control tactics in CIS countries (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010) 14 Figure 2. Spiral of Silence 15 Figure 3. Political regimes in Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine (Way, 2005, p.247). 19 Table 1. Belarus and Russia in the international ratings 21 Table 2. legislative regulations concerning online media in Belarus and Russia 32 Table 3. Illustrating the approach to textual analysis 35 Figure 4. Have you faced any problems due to your social media publications? (N=61) 37 Figure 5. Self-censorship in Belarus and Russia (N=61) 38 Figure 6. Three stages of self-censorship 43 Figure 7. Spiral of Silence in social media in autocracies 45 Figure 8. Topics covered by political bloggers in Belarus 70 Figure 9. Topics covered by political bloggers in Russia 70 Figure 10. Topics covered by political bloggers in Belarus and Russia 70

Introduction

In February 2020, Russian blogger Tumso Abdurakhmanov, who openly criticized the Chec- nya’s president Ramzan Kadyrov, was attacked in the town of Gävle, Sweden, where he resided after escaping the republic (The Moscow Times, 2020). In December 2019, a 21-year-old Russian blogger Yegor Zhukov was freed from jail where he had spent several months for calling to participate in anti-governmental protests via his YouTube channel in August the same year (The Moscow Times, 2019). Two years earlier in Belarus a criminal case was opened against another blogger, now Poland-based 19-year-old Stsiapan Sviatlou (known as NEXTA). This became a result of his publications critical towards the Belarusian authorities, including president Alyaksandr Lukashenka (Spring96, 2018). Zmicer Kazlou, another blogger from Belarus, received 120 days of criminal sentence for mobilizing his readers for a street protest against the authorities' foreign policy in Decem- ber 2019 (Spring96, 2020). Each of the named bloggers produced different type of political content, but all share a similar feature – they express opinion critical towards authorities in their countries. In this thesis, I refer to such content producers as political bloggers. According to McKenna&Pole (2008), political bloggers are political content producers who publish information, opinions, and encourage to take part in political events or charity projects. The thesis places in focus those who critically speak up against political regimes in Belarus and Russia by sharing political information and opinions on their social media pages1. Due to cheap and quick access to the internet, citizens of authoritarian countries receive more opportunities to consume news through sources alternative to traditional state-owned and/or state- controlled channels such as TV and print media. However, social media, widely utilized for surveillance and control over oppositional groups and individuals, can also bring a threat to citizens in non-democracies (Schlozman et al., 2010). With authoritarian governments employing technological development for their benefit, there is a risk of regime consolidation, a proliferation of surveillance by governments, as well as a crackdown on dissidents. In that sense, political bloggers in authoritarian states become exposed to pressure for their online activism. At the same time, autocrats strive for securing the status-quo, and in an attempt to create a more democratic international

1 Belarus and Russia are classified as countries with authoritarian political regimes (Way, 2005), or as electoral autocracies (Lührmann, et al., 2020). 5 image, autocratic regimes intend to avoid arresting everyone who is critically reporting about the government (Soest & Grauvogel, 2017). Instead of detaining every dissident, autocrats attempt to use other means to control freedom of expression in social media, such as legal restrictions (Al-Saqaf, 2014). In 2018, the Belarusian parliament passed the law that obliges online media editions (newspapers and magazines) to intro- duce identification of readers willing to comment on an article (government.by, 2018). Similarly, Russian authorities regulate content online, while security services can access personal data of the users of the popular social networks (The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 1996, 2014). Belarusian and Russian governments impose criminal and administrative charges not only on journalists formally affiliated with a newsroom but also on individuals publishing undesirable political content. In Russia, 875 court cases for reposts, online publications, and comments in social media were reported between 2014 and 2019 (BlackScreen.Report, 2019). Authoritarian governments often classify political bloggers as journalists in order to limit access of the latter to broader audience. In 2014, Russian parliament passed the so-called blogger law (Federal Law No. 97-FZ ) that requires social media users with more than 3000 visits per day to register as media. It allowed for prosecution of political bloggers under the media laws (Reporters Without Borders, 2019). Legal limits and repressive practices towards those expressing political views online make them adapt publishing routines to the existing media system. For example, to minimize risks of offline repressions, political bloggers may opt to limit and self-censor their content published online. International human rights reports often note that self-censorship becomes a result of government restrictions imposed on press and online media. "The government exerted pressure on the vast majority of independent publications to exercise self-censorship, warning them not to report on certain topics or criticize the government," highlights the US Department of State in a human rights report on Belarus (2019, p.11). Self-censorship in this thesis is addressed as an act of refraining from expression in forms of "decreasing and limiting expressive behaviors" and demonstrating "withdrawal behaviors (deleting, editing, untagging)" (Chen, 2018, p.3921). Political bloggers' capacity to cover broad audience without any formal affiliation with media outlets and their open criticism towards authorities in the social media placed these individuals into focus of secret services and authorities in many autocratic states. An increased number of criminal and administrative sentences against bloggers have a significant impact on freedom of expression on the internet (Freedom House, 2020). To summarize, previous research and reports indicate that 6 those who avoid expressing criticism often end up silencing their opinion, limiting their expressive behaviors, or stop blogging. This thesis aims to a) identify how political bloggers perceive and motivate self-censorship they practice in authoritarian countries (focusing on examples of Belarus and Russia); b) explain self-censorship's impact on freedom of expression in the two states based on the analyzed materials. Further, the study seeks to fill a gap in studies of self-censorship of political bloggers in autocracies, explaining the phenomena with help of the theory of the spiral of silence. The study is based on analysis of media legislation, textual analysis of political blogs in Russia and Belarus, and an anonymous survey answered by bloggers from Belarus and Russia. Researching self-censorship allows for finding new explanations for how an authoritarian environment affects freedom of expression in a digitalizing world.

There are three research questions answered in the thesis:

1. What factors influence self-censorship among political bloggers in Belarus and Rus- sia? 2. How do political bloggers in Belarus and Russia perceive and describe self-censorship? 3. How does self-censorship impact freedom of expression in Belarus and Russia?

The theoretical chapter (chapter I) establishes theoretical framework and presents a literature review on web 2.0. in autocracies and self-censorship in social media.The methodology chapter (chapter II) explains a research approach and methods applied for collecting and analyzing empirical data. Chapter III presents the results of the conducted survey, analysis of the media regulation of the two countries, and a textual analysis of ten political blogs in Belarus and Russia. Finally, chapter IV discusses the results in relation to previous research and the theory of the spiral of silence. Sug- gestions on ideas for future research finalize the thesis.

I. Theoretical framework and literature review

This chapter discusses the specifics of the internet and web 2.0. in authoritarian countries explained by political and media scholars. Sub-chapter 1.1. focuses on examining whether bloggers shall be treated as journalists and peculiarity of the bloggers’ political function in authoritarian regimes. In the second section, I present an overview of research on self-censorship and discuss theory of spiral of silence that will later be applied for describing and explaining the phenomena of self-censorship among bloggers. Descriptions of political context and media landscape of Belarus and Russia conclude the chapter.

1.1. Political discussion in social media: new media - new journalists

“Are bloggers journalists? Journalists: no way. Bloggers: no thanks” (Singer, 2006, p.23).

With a growing role of the internet and especially social media, many traditional media shifted online. Digitalization of the press impacted journalistic profession, making anyone possessing information and internet access to be able to provide the public with exclusive news (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). Former monopoly on publishing unique content had been shared among all with bloggers (Kapustina, 2015). In Wiley Online Library, blogs are referred to as “online publications that include individual messages (“posts”) arranged in reverse chronological order and on which readers are usually allowed to comment” (Wiley Online Library, 2015). Among the full range of thematic blogs, there are political blogs that “are relevant in two domains: the flow of political information and the promotion and organization of political action”. Davis (2009, p.3) defines political blogs as “online journals that discuss politics.” However, there seems to be a lack of agreement between media scholars on how political bloggers are defined. Political bloggers have been addressed as new journalists, bloggers, activists, citizen journalists or alternative journalists (Atton, 2009); as micro-celebrity activists, who are motivated by politics and advocate their position through the social media (Tufekci, 2013); or as online public intellectuals that present their political views through the digital media (Dahlgren, 2013).

Despite the lack of agreement on the definition of political content producers among scholars and those individuals' perception of themselves, - political role of these people is rather significant, especially in authoritarian states (Morozov, 2007). Blogs have a function of assisting their readers to understand their daily life in a specific context; blogs' audience appears often more politically engaged than the consumers of traditional media (Zelizer, 2009). The study based on the survey in the US suggests that there are four main functions per- formed by political bloggers: informational, watchdogs of the traditional media, political advocacy and charity promotion (McKenna&Pole, 2008). The authors claim that even though bloggers might not possess enough resources for performing journalists' work, they proved to become a reliable source of firsthand information. 90% of the bloggers, according to the study, encourage their audience to take part in political activities, such as elections or demonstrations, while 44% often call on to donate for charity initiatives (McKenna&Pole, 2008). Political bloggers are influential not only because of the functions mentioned above but also because their audience consists of traditional journalists, politicians, and opinion leaders (Tomaszeski et al., 2009). Thus, political leaders might turn to political bloggers for lobbying and influencing political agenda (Farell&Drezner, 2008). In authoritarian states, bloggers often appear as a source of alternative information for the audience that has a lower trust in official newspapers and television (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). Bode&Makarychev (2014) argue that in contemporary Russia “there is simply no other way to increase public visibility of such issues as electoral fraud, government malpractice, and corruption than through the new social media” (Bode&Makarychev, 2014, p.54). Russian media scholar Ivan Zassoursky (2004) expresses that in Russia, internet allows for forming groups of watchdogs that both control the traditional media and the political regime to which these media formally or informally belong. During the forest fires in central Russia, bloggers united and provided technical assistance to fire firms and participated in stopping the fires themselves – thus bloggers often become “moral authorities” (Bode&Makarychev, 2014, p.58). Political bloggers identify everyday problems: corruption, environment, healthcare, - and of- fer solutions to them. Additionally, they rely on a society with low education and experience of active civic participation, and their rights’ protection - they share ideas, show examples, explain phenomena (Bode&Makarychev, 2014). In that way political bloggers can often take a role of educators.

Using new media such as Facebook and Twitter, bloggers are also able to take a role of political educators that allows for increasing political engagement in autocratic countries (Diamond, 2010). Precisely these two social media appeared to host a significant share of oppositions' political content in authoritarian Russia, compared to the other social networks, such as Vkontakte or Odnoklassniki (Reuter, Szakonyj, 2015). The authors argue that the opposition groups politicized Facebook and Twitter and that the usage of these networks impacted awareness on the election fraud in the regions with relatively high freedom of the press (Reuter, Szakonyj, 2015). Bodrunova&Litvinenko (2016) claim that social media and blogging in such counties as Rus- sia brought a change to the media system. Media hybridization, as the authors address it, implies “not only tech-based changes in the structure of media systems and growth of online segments but also numerous social and political consequences of these technological advances” that include increased participation in political discussion and “formation of online pressure groups and the growth of political movements” (Bodrunova&Litvinenko, 2016, p. 114). The changes in the media systems due to technological development have also challenged the essence of journalistic profession creating blurred boundaries between traditional journalists and bloggers. Many scholars agree that journalists and bloggers are not synonyms. Journalists that serve public by providing quick facts and qualitative information are most of the time different from the bloggers who approach their social media posts as fun, and "enhancing democracy is not high on their agenda" (Singer, 2006, p.1). However, there are those bloggers who become a source of primary information, and in that sense, they take on a journalistic role. Singer believes that bloggers have a different understanding of truth when they collect information and present it to the broader audience that can decide whether to consume this information, while sometimes bloggers take on the more prominent journalistic role when they, for instance, get accreditation to cover certain events. Blogging is often associated with different practices - observing, collecting information from in- formants, commenting, expressing an opinion, and sharing others' opinions (Atton, 2009). The perception of their role by bloggers themselves might vary. Although bloggers can perform the journalistic function by providing the public with facts and stories, political bloggers often refuse to be named journalists. Fulton (2015) conducted interviews with “media entrepreneurs” to find out whether the perception of journalism by traditional journalists and bloggers differs. The author concluded that even if bloggers perform a journalist's function, they might not agree to label themselves as journalists.

Even if bloggers do not belong to the newsroom and have no formal education in journalism, bloggers that Singer (2006) refers to, become a source of unique information and sometimes add value to the content produced by a traditional journalist. Defining bloggers and journalists sometimes might have more than professional and academic importance. For instance, there is a clear need to distinguish the two roles when it comes to court cases and the protection of information sources (Docter, 2010). In authoritarian countries bloggers can often face legal limitations and restrictions being classified as journalists by laws. I will get back to the problematization of how media laws in Belarus and Russia apply to bloggers and journalists in the chapter III, but first let me establish the definition of the political blogger to be used in this thesis. Based on the scholarship that addressed political bloggers (even though scholars have applied different terms to characterize the same group of people) and authoritarian context where these bloggers operate, I suggest defining political bloggers as individuals or group of individuals that facilitate political discussion on the internet by a) informing the audience, sharing political opinions, or/and b) serving as watchdogs of ruling elites and pro-governmental media, or/and c) advo- cating on political matters, or/and d) political charity promotion. In the methodology chapter, I present detailed approach for selecting political blogs for a thematic analysis and political bloggers for the survey. Before that, let us take a look at the authoritarian environment where these political bloggers operate.

1.2. Web 2.0. in authoritarian states

Politics in the world is becoming more accessible due to the digitalization of journalism and the development of social media (McNair, 2009). Internet that allowed for the development of web 2.0 in the last decades has become an essential part of protests, especially in authoritarian countries (Sandoval-Almazan et al., 2014). When the wave of color revolutions covered post-Soviet countries, social media became a mobilizing platform and source of information; and authoritarian regimes were believed to have less control over online media in comparison to print press (Kalathil&Boas, 2001). As Diamond addresses it, liberation technology, allows for expanding “political, social and economic freedom” (Diamond, 2010, p.70). Groshek (2009) attempted to find a correlation between democratization (based on the four indicators of the Polity IV database)2 and the internet usage by conducting a quantitative study in 152 countries. The results indicated that Internet diffusion had become an essential component of democratization but not the only decisive factor. Semi-democratic regimes are believed to have more chances to enjoy the internet as a liberating instrument on the democratization path (Groshek, 2009). Although in the countries where social media appear as a platform for democratic forces, democratization is more likely to happen, democratic development rather depends on the whole range of other factors. Based on the field experiment in Tanzania during the presidential election in 2010, Bailard states that although Facebook users tend to criticize government more, it does not necessarily lead to tangible political actions (Bailard, 2012). Vital Silitski (2005) suggested that authoritarian regimes of the countries of the former Soviet Union are taking preemptive measures, and thus their political regime can be named preemptive authoritarianism. "<...> hard-line authoritarian regimes ensure their continued stability and survival not just by sporadic reactions to already existing political and social challenges, but by preemptive attacks that eliminate threats before they arise”, writes Silitski (p. 84). According to Silitski, authoritarian regimes aim to restrict dissidents when they have not yet reached the stage of organized democratic force that can threaten the government's status quo. Preemption covers civil society organizations, election procedures, opposition, and independent media. The author distinguished three types of preemption: tactical (targeting opposition and civil society activists), institutional (creating

2 Polity IV indicators are: “competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive” (Groshek, 2009, p.121) 12 institutional restrictions for yet weak democratic actors), and cultural preemption (propaganda oriented at supporting regime's political course or creating a negative image of opposition). Larry Diamond believes that indeed authoritarian states put effort in limiting different spheres of life. His concept of liberation technology works differently in some authoritarian states. Dia- mond notes: “Authoritarian states such as China, Belarus, and Iran have acquired (and shared) im- pressive technical capabilities to filter and control the Internet, and to identify and punish dissenters” (Diamond, 2010, p.70). MacKinnon (2011) introduces a concept similar to Diamond’s but goes further and considers the role of technologies and digital development in restricting democratic forces within the authoritarian context. Networked authoritarianism refers to the process when authoritarian states develop strategies of utilizing technological developments for maintaining the regime's status quo (MacKin- non, 2011). Similarly, Morozov (2011) argued that romanticizing the Internet as a liberation instrument in contemporary authoritarian regimes is somewhat naive. Al-Saqaf (2014) follows this argument and claims that authoritarian states choose to employ censorship "to maintain the upper hand in controlling the flow of information and to minimize the capacity of dissidents and activists to undermine the state's authority" (p.45). Censorship of social media in a non-democratic environment can be explained through the typology of preemption (Silitski, 2005), as both tactical and institutional preemption. The tactical preemption happens when the regimes track, filter, and/or block accounts of the dissidents before they manage to accumulate protest force through social media. In China, the internet filtering and surveillance help authorities to decrease the influence of alternative opinions before they become popular (Shirk, 2011). Surveillance in authoritarian states is often used for monitoring information about the regime's opponents in order to employ oppression against them (Gohdes, 2014), whereas institutional preemption can imply harsher methods on restricting online space by media legislation. Besides restricting possibilities for the opposition and pro-democratic forces, some authoritarian regimes learned using the internet in their favor. Morozov (2011) analyzed how the governments in China, Iran, and Russia used technological development to increase the regime's support and oppressing the influence of alternative groups. He believes that the internet can empower authoritarian regimes more than democratic forces as the first possess more resources and power to control to oppress the latter (Morozov, 2011).

Scholars also pointed out the tendency to controversial social media effect when social activism aims at shifting offline when possible (Mehrabov, 2017). Authoritarian regimes put effort in restricting freedom of expression of social media activists in a sophisticated way, Mehrabov claims (2017). The figure below gives an example of Internet control tactics in CIS countries by Open Net Initiative in 2007-2008 (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, p.23).

FIGURE 1. INTERNET CONTROL TACTICS IN CIS COUNTRIES3 (DEIBERT AND RO- HOZINSKI, 2010)

The scholarship provides a range of those sophisticated social media management strategies employed by the Chinese government. Thus, Li, Lee & Li (2016) conclude that, to prevent the democratization of a country, authoritarian states undergo the three main stages of Internet control. The first stage relates to filtering and censoring the Internet by any means, including the hack methods. The second implies the legal obstacles for freedom of speech on the internet and trying to establish legitimized informational control. The last stage described in the research refers to the authoritarian regimes trying to enter online space with proactive measures, for instance, paid government campaigns online. In some autocracies, authorities manage to force social media platforms to moderate their content. As an example, 16% of posts (out of 1,3 million posts in a random sample) in Chinese Weibo were deleted by the network owners (Bamman et al., 2012).

3 Deibert, R., and Rohozinski, R., 2010. Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace, 14

1.3. Spiral of silence - do you dare?

Noelle-Neumann (1974) suggested an approach that explains individuals’ behaviors on opinion expression in a society. The concept of the spiral of silence has been widely used in political and communication studies. Neumann claimed that individuals tend to silence their opinion when they encounter a fear of social isolation (Neumann, 1974). Whenever one feels that the opinion is rather marginal compared to most society members, the chances are high that an individual will avoid expressing genuine view under the fear of social isolation. The author calls this phenomenon a spiral of silence (Neumann, 1974). With increasing pressure on individuals who express radical opinions considered as unethical in certain community, a desire to express is decreasing as do the consequences of this expression. Therefore, it becomes more challenging to express oneself on certain topics or in a certain way. The more people decide not to post unpopular opinion the less popular it becomes, resulting in those individuals who dare to speak being referred to as radicals. In this way, the spiral of silence, is unfolding and integrating more and more people (see Figure 2).

FIGURE 2. SPIRAL OF SILENCE4

4 Noelle-Neumann E. (1974). The spiral of silence a theory of public opinion. Journal of Communication. 24 (2). pp. 43–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1974.tb00367.x 15

Chen (2018) applied the theory of the spiral of silence for analyzing self-censorship in social media in Hong Kong. The author defines self-censorship as refraining from expression and distin- guishes, "decreasing and limiting expressive behaviors” and demonstrating “withdrawal behaviors (deleting, editing, untagging)” (Chen, 2018). Self-censorship in forms of either expressive or withdrawal behaviors is primarily caused by the fear of being isolated in a network individual belongs to, claims Chen following Noelle-Neumann’s argument. The author analyzed self-censorship behavior during the 2016 election in Hong-Kong and concluded that despite anonymity provided by the social media, there is also a factor of publicness that in political matters may lead to higher levels of self-censorship. Communication in social media allows for greater anonymity by engaging a significant number of anonymous users in a discussion. Nevertheless, it is also public as social media are character- ized by monitoring fellows online, quick reactions, and broader communication opportunities, as well as more significant influence of the groups and networks (Kwon et al., 2015). Kwon et al. (2015) apply the argument of Neumann for social media and conclude that social media users in fear of social sanctions and disapproval stay away from expressing their position. By conducting a quantitative survey among social media users, Kwon et al. (2015) assume that social media put pressure on its users when it comes to expressing political opinions. Horton (2011) explains the phenomenon of self-censorship as an everyday practice. "Self- censorship is a choice that is made by the self-censor not to express whatever is being self- censored," claims Horton (p.97). Self-censorship is caused and affected by external factors such as political, social, and cultural environments and often arises from fear of the reaction of the readers. However, as Horton highlights, it is an individual decision to self-censor. The author suggests dis- tinguishing self-censorship as a) self-restraint (an act of restraining oneself from an expression that is motivated by exclusively personal decision); and b) form of censorship (decision not to express oneself that is motivated by fear of threats or circumstances) (Horton, 2011). Evaluating self-censorship can appear more challenging than finding an explanation of the phenomenon, as it is often an unconscious act that occurs in the social context (Parks, Mukherjee, 2017). Schimpfossl and Yablokov studied Russian journalists' self-censorship for understanding political motives behind it. They concluded that often journalists, TV-hosts understand what is allowed for public discussion in a current political situation. (Schimpfossl&Yablokov, 2014). Reporters in- terviewed by the authors claimed that "with regard to censorship one must not report negatively about Vladimir Putin" (Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014, p. 307). Respondents imposed self- restric- 16 tions on the topics and people they covered - this led to a sophisticated scheme of "executing Krem- lin policies, without ever making this process too explicit" (Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014, p. 310). The authors highlight that self-censorship decreases the quality of the journalistic product as it becomes less creative and realistic.

1.4. Political and media background

Political profile of independent Belarus and Russia Belarus and the Russian Federation were the part of the Soviet Union that broke up in 1991. In the early years of independence, both countries seemed to be developing in a democratic direc- tion. Countries began economic reforms, held democratic elections to parliament and local authorities, a multi-party system was quickly formed, restructuring of political elites occurred, and non- state media appeared. In 1994 Belarusians elected Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the president at the only free and fair election in the history of independent Belarus. From the very beginning of his rule, Lukashenka made a bid to return to the Soviet model of governance based on the hard-central- ized management of the economy and control over all spheres of life. Amid the background of a painful economic reform in the early 1990s the president's populist slogans allowed him to get quite serious support from the electorate (Way, 2005). In 1996, a referendum initiated by Lukashenka took place, which nullified the term of Lukashenka's rule (the beginning of his cadence began in 1996), abolished the election of heads of local authorities (since that time, the heads of regions and cities are appointed personally by the president). After the referendum was not recognized by either OSCE or the EU (Bennett, 2011), Be- larus started to turn into the authoritarian state. In neighboring Russia, after two Chechen wars, and amid painful economic reforms, democratic transformations have also begun to curtail from the second half of the 1990s. The authority of Russian President Boris Yeltsin was rapidly falling. Yeltsin faced the challenge of supporting the country’s economy and uniting political elites that appeared to be not loyal enough for consolidating the political regime (Way, 2005). Against this background, Alexander Lukashenka hoped to take the presidency of the new Union State of Belarus and Russia (Silitski, 2015). This was one of the reasons why Lukashenka decided on signing the agreement on the Union State of Belarus and Russia in 1997 - a symbolic agreement that outlines the possibility of creating a single currency and parliament. For a long time, this document was purely symbolic, until in 2019

17 when it was almost used by president Putin to force the Belarusian leader to work more closely with Russia and create a real Union state led by Vladimir Putin (Preiherman, 2020). Putin that took over the power in Russia in 2000 stepped into the XXI century with increased oil and gas prices, a more robust economy, and more prominent support from the political elites. By this time, Belarusian president restricted possibilities of political and civic participation for the regime’s opponents (Rouda, 2009). Presidential candidates, journalists, political elites' representatives - at least five open critics of Lukashenka disappeared in the beginning of the 2000s, and the story behind their disappearance remains uncovered (Benett, 2011). In 2004 Lukashenka conducted one more referendum putting down the restrictions on the term of the presidency through the constitutional reform (Rouda, 2009) - the step that Putin pre- pares to take only in 2020, while this thesis is being written. While many post-Soviet countries experienced color revolutions, Belarusians attempted to organize an electoral protest under the name “Jeans Revolution” in 2006. The same attempt was made in Minsk in 2010. The outcome was 639 arrested protesters, including all oppositional candidates (Astapenia, 2013). A similar protest happened in Russia in 2011-2012, although on a much broader scale. Alexey Navalny - the famous Russian oppositional politician, who led the protests, was attacked, detained as well as many other protesters (Klyueva, 2016). According to Way (2005), regime closure under Lukashenka and Putin happened due to several factors. Weak anti-incumbent and weak anti-Soviet national identity and civil society, an un- derdeveloped system of the rule of law, and strong leadership capacity of Lukashenka and Putin, as well as Russia’s growing economy in 2000s - became decisive factors in consolidating authoritarian regimes of Belarus and Russia (Way, 2005; see Figure 3). Fifteen years after the publication of Way (2005), Belarus and Russia are still governed by Lukashenka and Putin and are still among the most stable electoral autocracies (Lührmann et al., 2020). The two political and media systems have long been classified as not free (Freedom House - Belarus, Freedom House - Russia, 2020). Election fraud and violation of political rights of political opponents of the regimes are combined with limited freedom of expression and freedom of speech (Freedom House - Belarus, Freedom House - Russia, 2020). Belarus that became independent in 1991, has been going through the constant deterioration of human rights, especially press freedom. Control over the traditional media prevented many independent media from operating in the country since the 2000s: numerous printed media were closed and banned (Aliaksandrau, 2013). In the early 2000s, non-state media were seriously cleaned up in 18 the country. They were forbidden to distribute newspapers through the state subscription system, to sell through the state distribution system, and to be printed in state printing houses. State-owned enterprises were prohibited from advertising in non-state media, which put the latter on the brink of survival. Only in 2020 some of the earlier closed media were permitted enter the state distribution system again (Aliaksandrau & Bastunets, 2020).

FIGURE 3. POLITICAL REGIMES IN BELARUS, MOLDOVA, RUSSIA AND UKRAINE (WAY, 2005, P.247).

Digitalization of journalism As a result of increased pressure on the printed press, digitalization of the journalistic profession, and the development of web 2.0, the independent media sector in Belarus and Russia gradually shifted online. Social media have played a significant role in the protests in both Belarus and Russia consolidating and mobilizing protest participants in 2010, 2011-2012, and 2017 (Herasi- menka, 2017; Ilyuk, 2017; Klyueva, 2016). However, Belarusian and Russian civil societies had not enjoyed the freedom online. During the last decade, Russian and Belarusian governments invest in developing surveillance mechanisms and efforts on controlling political journalists offline and online and prosecuting them under the media law (Herasimenka, 2018; Aliaksandrau, 2013; Freedom House - Belarus, Freedom House - Russia, 2020; Reporters Without Borders, 2019). Independent journalists are often forced to work without accreditation as the governments restrict possibilities for registering independent media in the countries and work for journalists of the foreign media that have not obtained accreditation. Some journalists or even the whole media agen- 19 cies are fleeing the states.“<…> independent Russian outlets are increasingly publishing from abroad due to the repressive environment at home”, reads Freedom of the Net report (2018). For instance, one of the popular online media Meduza that covers Russia, emerged in Latvia for avoiding potential problems in the country. Similarly, TV channel Belsat, registered in Poland, offers broadcasting about Belarus. However, due to Belarusian authorities’ denial to register its office in Belarus, the media’s journalists are fined for working without accreditation in Belarus. As it reads on the homepage of Belsat , “$96,292 - we have been fined for our work” (Belsat.eu, n.d.). A similar trend is topical for online content producers: Viachaslau Dzianisau, in 2010 the manager of “Movement of the Future” group in the social network Vkontakte, had to flee Belarus (Aliaksan- drau, 2013). Russian blogger Sasha Sotnik has moved to Georgia after receiving numerous threats due to his posts critical towards Kremlin. Since 2010, the amount of arrests of independent journalists has been gradually decreasing. However, the number of repressions continued in the form of webpages being blocked, and the number of journalists receiving fines (Reportes Without Borders, 2018). Attacks on journalists, prosecution for working without accreditation, fines and criminal charges for covering protests - are just some forms of violation of freedom of expression. Freedom House gives an example of Russian journalist Ivan Golunov who was detained for allegedly possessing drugs but later freed under the pressure of society (Freedom House - Russia, 2019). Besides, Belarusian and Russian authorities practice forceful blocking of the webpages and personal accounts of independent media or political bloggers. As an example, the Belarusian Ministry of Information has blocked over 500 informational sources over three years (Freedom of the Net, 2018). It is combined with cyber-attacks against independent online media, as in the case of Nasha Niva, Onliner.by (BAJ, 2019) in Belarus or Dozhd, Kommersant, Echo Moskvy in Russia. Belarusian authorities have been limiting access to some websites of the independent media since long ago, such anti-governmental pages as Char- ter97 are still often unavailable in Belarus (Freedom of the Net, 2018). The media monitoring conducted by Press Club Belarus concluded that most of the media in Belarus are loyal to the government or the president personally (Press Club Belarus, 2019). “Ac- cording to a Mediastandart Foundation study, 60 percent of Russian citizens and 81 percent of journalists think that Russian journalists are not free to report unbiased news but rather work in the interests of their bosses”, reports Media Sustainability Index (2019, p.6).

TABLE 1. BELARUS AND RUSSIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL RATINGS Rating Belarus Russia Reporters Without Borders, 2019, 180 countries measured 153 out of 149 out of 180 180

Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2020), 100 countries 19 out of 100 20 out of 100 measured Internet Penetration (Freedom of the Net, 2018) 74.4% 76% Media sustainability Index 0-4 (the higher - the better) 1,46 1,49 Population (CIA World Factbook, 2018) 9,527,543 142,122,776

Internet and social media Both countries have relatively high internet penetration rates - 74,4% in Belarus and 76% in Russia (Freedom of the Net, 2018). Internet popularity had also been growing very quickly in the 2010s. For example, according to Gemius reports the percentage of Belarusians using broadband had increased from 10% in 2010 to 70% in 2012 (Aliaksandrau, 2013). Internet has become the main source of news supply for the majority of the population in Russia after the protests in 2011-2012 (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2016). Social media platforms in Belarus and Russia are numerous: Vkontakte, Odnoklassniki, Face- book, Instagram, Twitter, and Telegram. In Belarus, 40% of the population are active social media users, and the number is 48% for Russia (Datareportal.com). In both countries, Russian social media platform Vkontakte is the most popular among social media users at the age of 16-64 (datareportal.com, 2020; Eurasiaexpert, 2019). "Social networks are also providing a significant challenge to the closed media environment in Belarus”, writes Aliaksandrau (2013, p. 8). Besides, social media have proved their importance for political events in Russia during the protests of 2011-2012. They contributed to the communication and mobilization of the oppositional groups (Klyueva, 2016). Facebook and Twitter have been politicized by Russia's opposition, as Reuter and Szakonyj (2015) show. Koltsova and Bodrunova (2019) state that Facebook in Russia is a niche social media mostly used by the politics interested users with oppositional views. According to Freedom of the Net report (2018), users of the internet in Russia experienced difficulties with accessing such messenger apps as Telegram or Viber. Moreover, Telegram was accused of providing a platform for terrorist-related content after it refused to share the encrypted data

21 with the government in comparison to, for example, the largest social media platform Vkontakte (Freedom of the Net, 2018). Many Belarusian and Russian bloggers have thereafter opted to use Telegram after it refused to provide users' data as it became seen as a safe messenger. One of the Russian political bloggers with a nickname Stalingulag compared expressing a political opinion in Vkontakte to coming directly to the office of the Russia authorities, therefore he chose Telegram as a safe platform (BBC, 2019). In the analysis of Media in Belarus, Telegram is called the platform of the year (Aliaksandrau & Bastunets, 2020). Blogosphere Although enjoying a relative online freedom in 2010s, bloggers became the new targets of the regimes (Aleksandrov & Bastunets, 2020). In Belarus, blogger Stsiapan Sviatlou is currently under the criminal investigation for insulting the president in his videos, while Siarhei Piatruhin and Ali- aksandr Kabanau were fined for expressing their critical opinion towards the construction of the polluting factory in the town of Brest (Freedom of the Net, 2018). Seven years earlier, in July 2011, a freelance journalist Andrzej Poczobut was twice sentenced to three-years term in jail for libel against the president and producing “defamatory” articles for independent media online (Aliaksan- drau, 2013). The so-called “Blogger Law” (Federal Law No. 97-FZ ) in Russia introduced in 2014 obliged content writers to register as media if they had more than 3000 visitors per day (Reporters Without Borders, 2019). The law is seen as limiting bloggers’ freedom of expression by revealing their personalities (Freedom of the Net, 2018). “Many of the limitations on free press are caused by censorship as well as self-censorship of media workers and other related actors. <…> This self-censorship is often caused by the fear of surveillance and persecution”, believes Herasimenka (2018, p.2). In this regard, it is possible to assume that some political bloggers and journalists tend to protect themselves online after facing administrative or criminal charges. En example of leading a popular blog and staying safe is a blogger NEXTA that resides abroad himself and ensures high sources protection. For several years now, dozens of pieces of local and regional news per day appear in the Telegram of the Belarusian blogger. The blogger created a secure channel where he gathers information from citizens in any part of Belarus and reports in his blog in Telegram that in June 2020 had almost 300 000 subscribers - one of the biggest personal blogs in Belarus (Telegram, NEXTA, n.d.). The blogger receives leaks from Ministry of Internal affairs, police, healthcare workers, teachers with numerous documents or news linked to the news or instances often absent from being reported on official TV. 22

A Russian blogger nicknamed Stalingulag (1 million followers in Twitter and 388 000 subscribers on Telegram in April 2020) who had been anonymous for almost ten years for security reasons, provides readers with his political opinions, including in form of satire. Alexey Navalny is probably the most known Russian blogger who was able to convert his online support into street protest (Bode&Makarychev, 2014, p.58). Apart from providing personal political opinions, Navalny with his team conduct investigations in the field of corruption, for example “He is not Dimon for you” (2017) describes corruption surrounding the Russia’s former Prime-Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Similarly, an investigative film on HIV situation in Russia was produced by the Russian Youtube blogger Yury Dud’ who raised criticism over the authorities’ approach to healthcare system in Russia. These are just some examples of what bloggers in Belarus and Russia cover. In the section 4.2 I identify the most popular topics among ten political bloggers in Belarus and Russia in the period of two weeks. Before that, let me present the research design and main methods of the study.

1.5. Filling the research gap

Results of the preliminary literature review have shown that scholars focused on the discussion of the effects of social media in non-democratic context and analysis of restrictions for social media activists imposed by authoritarian regimes. However, there is a clear research gap in studies of self-censorship of political bloggers in the authoritarian context. While Chen (2018) applied the spiral of silence theory for analyzing self-censorship among individual users of social networks, Schimpfossl and Yablokov (2014) look at self-censorship among journalists, i.e., individuals who take decisions to self-censor being affiliated with a media outlet. Applying the theory of spiral of silence on political bloggers, is, therefore, novel in media studies. Self-censorship in authoritarian states is an important aspect mentioned in the reports of international organizations. At the same time, self-censorship lacks academic discussion and empirical research, although it is continuously practiced by the content producers and social media users in these authoritarian countries (Herasimenka, 2018). Belarus and Russia were chosen based on the author's academic interest, knowledge of the region, language skills, and an academic gap in media studies of the countries.

II. Methodology

This chapter discusses research strategy and methods applied in this study. After presenting the research design in sub-chapter 2.1. I provide detailed description of data collection and processing. 2. 1. Research design

Self-censorship among political bloggers in Belarus and Russia lies in the focus of this thesis. An empirical aim of the thesis is to a) identify how political bloggers perceive and motivate self- censorship, and whether they admit practicing it, and b) to explain self-censorship's impact on freedom of expression in Belarus and Russia. There are three research questions formulated for this research: 1. What factors influence self-censorship among political bloggers in Belarus and Russia? 2. How do political bloggers in Belarus and Russia perceive and describe self-censorship? 3. How does self-censorship impact freedom of expression in Belarus and Russia? In order to answer these three questions, the study first explores what political, media, and legal conditions shape the environment where Belarusian and Russian political bloggers operate (RQ1). It further analyzes how political bloggers assess their blogging practices in terms of expressive and withdrawal behaviors (Chen et al., 2016). This is done through web-survey among 61 political bloggers in Belarus and Russia. The bloggers were asked to fill in the questionnaire with closed and open questions, formulated for collecting data on self-censorship (RQ2). Finally, based on the survey results as well as the comparison of political, media, and legal environments in Russia and Belarus, I discuss what impact self-censorship among bloggers has on freedom of expression (RQ3). Thus, this study combines qualitative methods such as analysis of political and media background, analysis of media laws, textual analysis of bloggers’ posts, and quantitative method - web- survey. Applying mixed methodology allows for providing greater validity to the research through cross-checking of the findings (Bryman, 2008). Mixed-method research requires the methods to complement each other despite the difference in their logic; it, therefore, means that “the quantitative and the qualitative data deriving from mixed methods research should be mutually illuminat- ing” (Bryman, 2008, p.628).

Accessing self-censorship can appear rather challenging, providing reliability concerns in dis- cussing the abstract phenomenon. In order to provide more reliability to the research, three measures were taken. Firstly, I relied on Chen’s (2016) operationalization of self-censorship, where the author suggests breaking down the concept into expressive behaviors that can be limited and withdrawal behavior (editing and deleting the content). Secondly, I formulated the survey questions in a way that respondents could reflect on their self-censorship practices and report on their strategies in different situations and in relation to various groups. For example, one of the survey questions asks: “To what extent can you criticize the following groups? (where “0 - is not at all” and “5 - as much as I want”): local authorities, president, businessmen, journalists, educational institutions, church, healthcare institutions”, etc. Such questions allow to place self-censorship on a relatively understandable scale and compare the responses. At the same time, instead of assuming some facts regarding political blogospheres, some questions were left open for respondents (see Appendix I). Finally, for ensuring reliability, I transparently present the findings as the bloggers’ own assessment of self-censorship practices, rather than making assessments myself. My role is to track associations that emerge between certain variables of the research and to discuss how self-censorship affects freedom of expression.

2.2. Analysis of media legislation

There are different approaches to assess legislative acts. Media and internet laws in Belarus and Russia are partly described by international human rights reports. However, I am interested in mapping out specific legislative acts that impact the restriction of freedom of expression in these countries concerning bloggers. Therefore, following Sherstoboeva (2014), I focused specifically on three aspects of these laws: a) whether online media, traditional media and bloggers referred differently, b) what the bodies responsible for online media control are, and c) what restrictions the law implies. The laws were analyzed in their original versions, available in the Russian language at the governments’ webpages. Firstly, I read the laws and identified what definitions are used for addressing online media and bloggers. Secondly, I compared the state bodies executing sanctions for violating the media laws. Finally, I mapped out the media legislation in Belarus and Russia and present a discussion on how these acts impact freedom of expression for media and bloggers.

2.3. Textual analysis

For conducting the textual analysis, I aimed to review twenty political blogs on different social media platforms. As the second step, the timeframe had to be chosen. The selection was motivated by the context in which this thesis is being written. The COVID19 is already a recognized pandemic - the topic that has dominated media coverage and social media discussions in the world, including Belarus and Russia. In early February neither Belarus nor Russia were facing the pandemic on the large scale, meaning the bloggers’ posts had supposedly not been deviating from usual/ normal/non-crisis ones. Thus, I selected the timeframe of 1-15 February 2020, that reduced the number of messages about coronavirus to minimal and allowed for recording the picture of the “normal”/non-crisis blogosphere in Belarus and Russia. When creating the sample of respondent who were asked to fill in the survey (see sub-chapter 2.4), I listed the bloggers and their contact information, that I later used only for the firsthand contact, in the table under the numbers. By the moment when the textual analysis was conducted, there were 94 names on the list. For modeling a random sample, I used the webpage random.org that allows generating a desired amount of numbers out of the given interval. As a result, random.org generated 20 numbers, each of them corresponded to the name of the blogger in the list that I created for collecting survey respondents. After briefly looking at the volume of the content produced by the 20 randomly generated bloggers in the period of 1-15 February 2020, I realized that the time resources do not allow for analyzing such a massive of information. Therefore, considering the time resources and the fact that describing a blogosphere is not the primarily objective of the study, the decision was made to analyze ten political blogs. I turned to random.org again and it generated ten new numbers (See Appendix IV). As a result, the random generation led to the following portrait of bloggers for the textual analysis: six Belarusians, four Russians, among them - six men and four women. However, as the purpose is to describe the blogospheres of Belarus and Russia, I have decided not to analyze differences between publications of men and women. Totally, there were 99 posts analyzed, meaning the unit of analysis became a whole post that varied from three to twenty sentences. Inconsiderable number of adds, information on technical details about the blog, links to other personal pages, family-related posts were excluded from the sample, as they are off the study’s interest. Therefore, the thematic analysis presented in analysis (see subchapter 4.2.) is rather an attempt to understand what public/society-related/political topics are covered by political bloggers in Belarus and Russia.

2. 4. Web-survey

A decision to conduct cross-sectional online survey, that is focused on analyzing a phenomenon at a particular point of time, was made for several reasons. First, it allows for accessing a whole group of people free of charge, and within a short time frame, overcoming distance (Bryman, 2008). Besides the sensitivity of the studied topic, trust in online surveys is lower than, for instance, in postal surveys (Bryman, 2008). Before selecting a web-survey platform, I consulted one of the political bloggers in Belarus, who suggested that in such countries as Belarus and Russia, Google Docx is considered as a somewhat familiar and trustworthy platform. Although Google Docx forms allow for less technical manipulations in a survey than Survey Monkey, I have considered trust in the platform as an essential factor and utilized Google Docx. The survey, conducted in the period of 25 March - 5 May 2020, consisted of twenty-three questions (see Appendix I). It started with an explanatory note about the aim of the research, the researcher's background, and contacts. Google Docx then directed respondents to the section explaining how the data will be stored following the GDPR recommendations from Södertörn Univer- sity. Only after the respondents clicked the tick box agreeing to accept the conditions of data collection, proceeding and storage, they were allowed to move on to the section with questions. The questions were in the Russian language, official in both Belarus and Russia, while the respondents were invited to answer either in Belarusian, Russian, or English. The survey included both open and closed questions; assessment scales, and multiple choices dominated in the questionnaire. For providing anonymity to the survey participants, respondents had to indicate only the age interval instead of their actual age; no name or contact information were required to fill in. The questions were based on the literature review, analysis of legislation, and the textual analysis of the bloggers' posts presented in chapter III. Two questions were aimed at assessing whether bloggers refrain from expressing their position, and one following question addressed withdrawal behaviors (editing). The survey also asked respondents to reflect if, how often, and in which situation they practice self-censorship. A complete questionnaire translated to English can be found in the appendix I. Based on the literature review and the context of the countries, dependent and independent variables were identified. In order to understand what factors can influence self-censorship, all the variables related to self-censorship (operationalized through several questions) were set as dependent. Such variables as age, gender, number of followers and country of residence are referred to as

27 independent variables. In order to limit neither the respondents nor the researcher, every question, aimed at measuring dependent variable, was followed by an empty row where the respondents could suggest their own explanation if it was absent from the answer range. Adding option for comments requires a researcher to rather apply qualitative logic of analysis or codify every open reply, meaning time for processing dataset increasing. However, I still decided to leave a possibility to add own comments for ensuring higher validity by including all the possible options that the researcher might have not thought through (Al-Saqaf, 2014). The data was analyzed according to the responses to the closed questions, every response added in the comment was codified as “other”. Even though there were not many responses added in the comment section, some of them are of the high value and therefore serve as an illustration in the findings section. Besides being classified as dependent/independent, the variables are also divided into: a) perception variables when the bloggers were asked to choose the reply clarifying their role or opinion on particular situation; b) assessment variables referring to the questions where bloggers had to assess their routines in the social media according to the given scale. The variables are presented in the appendix II. After the collection of the questionnaire replies, the data was exported to SPSS - the program of statistical analysis for further processing. As a first step, I codified the responses by assigning values for each variable and programming in the collected data. As the next step, I examined independent variables to constitute the portray of the sample. As the final step, SPSS tools were applied for measuring dependent variables against independent ones5. The findings of the statistical analysis are further presented in section 4.3. Choosing SPSS as the tool for data analysis, I aimed to reach a high degree of reliability. Repeating the study based on the survey results will, therefore, lead to the same findings later presented in this thesis.

2. 5. Respondents sampling

As it was discussed in the theory chapter, political bloggers are often referred to by scholars under different definitions. Additionally, the perception of the bloggers by themselves might deviate from the assessment of the researcher. Therefore, among the first questions in the survey, respondents were asked to reflect on their role: “Do you consider yourself a blogger?”, “Do you consider yourself a journalist?” “Do you consider yourself an opinion leader?”. Thus, the survey did not as-

5 SPSS Inc. (2004). SPSS Survey Tips [online], SPSS Inc. Last accessed on 3/11/2008 at: http://www.spss.com/PDFs/ STIPlr.pdf 28 sume that everyone invited to participate considers themselves political bloggers. However, as noted before, the aim of the study is to capture the whole group of political content producers that were operationalized as political bloggers but not necessarily refer to as so themselves. It appears challenging to assess how many political bloggers exist in Belarus and Russia. As Bryman (2008) notes, there are few expensive means for identifying the general online population. That is why I have used a non-probability sampling of selecting political bloggers and snowball sampling. I contacted the most famous political bloggers via Facebook or email. According to Bry- man (2008, p. 202), “with this approach to sampling, the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others”. Later, I have looked at friends on their social networks to identify more political bloggers. After receiving responses from those who agreed to fill in the survey, I asked for recommendations on other bloggers whom I could contact. The questionnaire was neither distributed via social media posts, media editions, nor forwarded by other participants, and I instead selected to contact each potential respondent personally. In order to ensure personal safety of the respondents, I deleted the messages upon receiving the response - the day after the survey was closed. Before the respondents received the questionnaire, they had to fit into the sample by corresponding to the following criteria: 1. they had a personal page/blog/channel in the social media (even if it is a journalist, I examined only those who potentially made publishing decisions themselves); 2. their pages in social media are dominated by posts of political character (criticizing political elites, local governance, environment policy etc.); 3. more than 1000 subscribers. As the Russian “Bloggers law” addresses those whose content attracts more than 3000 viewers daily as media, I have decided to use it as a starting point but decrease the number to 1000 considering the lower population in Belarus. In the absence of the numerical definition on who can be referred to as a blogger, the number of 1000 subscribers is rather suitable for this research and shall be reconsidered upon potential replication. As a result of sampling, I have created the list of political bloggers from Belarus and Russia. Overall, there were 128 bloggers whom I contacted, out of which I received 61 responses, making the response rate 47,6%.

2. 6. Limitations There are several limitations related to current research: generalization, operationalization, sensitive research subject, and ethics. Firstly, as noted above, the study is not the first to evaluate self-censorship in social media. Still, it is the first attempt to assess self-censorship among political bloggers in authoritarian countries. In general terms, it is rather exploratory than explanatory. Considering the low response rate to the web-survey (Williams, 2007) and limited possibilities to identify a general population of political bloggers (Bryman, 2008), a generalization of the results is possible within the countries but is not necessarily applicable for the other authoritarian states, since the survey was designed in association with the countries’ specific political, legal and media background. Secondly, coming back to the definition of a political blogger, the operationalization of the term should be treated as a challenge in this research. Therefore, scholarly literature and political and media contexts in Belarus and Russia were applied for operationalizing this group of people. Only respondents corresponding to the criteria mentioned above (see sub-chapter 1.1), were suggested to fill in the survey. This means that the task of identifying political bloggers was left for the researcher to provide conditions for valid and reliable comparison. For the third, the topic of self-censorship is a sensitive subject of analysis, which might lead to deviation in findings on self-censorship practices via online survey. For the fourth, ethics is another limitation that was considered. Even though I did not ask for the real name of respondents, their contact information, the exact age in the survey, the anonymity of the respondents could have been protected better upon wider resources. As the study was conducted among the respondents from authoritarian countries, authorities of which employ various tools and tactics in censoring political bloggers, there is no guarantee that the first-hand conversations between me and the bloggers were safe. At the same time, even if unauthorized personalities access the survey data, it appears impossible to associate a particular person with their response in the survey. Finally, the study’s limitation lies in its method of researching self-censorship. Qualitative methods, such as semi-structured interviews with political bloggers, would add significant value to the research of self-censorship in authoritarian countries. The same logic could be applied to the textual analysis. Instead of revealing the topics, one could have created a broader sample of social media posts and quantitatively analyze them. Combining quantitative research of social media posts with a qualitative method of self-censorship analysis is recommended for future research upon broader time resources. 30

III. Results and analysis

This is the chapter where empirical results of the study are presented. The first section maps the media and internet legislation in the two countries. I argue that besides oppressive actions of authorities aimed at restricting the freedom of speech, the countries’ laws limit space for expressing one’s opinion online. The chapter further presents the result of the textual analysis of political blogs in Belarus and Russia. Finally, the survey findings are presented.

4.1. Comparing media legislation in Belarus and Russia The most popular method of hard censorship among authoritarian regimes is legal prosecution that allows for placing charges on dissidents who were to violate the law (Al-Saqaf, 2014). In Be- larus and Russia bloggers and journalists are often suited under the Criminal Code for what is formally not related to the content they produce: for allegedly possessing drugs (see above: Ivan Gol- unov, Russia), for defamation of president (see above: Stsiapan Sviatlou), or abusing the police of- ficers (see above: Siarhei Piatruhin, Belarus). However, the daily work of media outlets, indepen- dents journalists, and bloggers is regulated by media laws, although the legal measures used against bloggers are numerous. The section below gives an overview of the legislation that is most often applied for suppressing freedom of expression. Namely, I analyzed the Law on Media, Law on Counter-extremism in Belarus, and the Federal Law “On Information, Informational Technologies, and Protection of Information” and Criminal Code, Art. 282.1, 282.2 in Russia. In 2018, Belarusian parliament voted for an amendment to the media law that referred to online media as “network editions” and introduced the procedure of voluntary registration as media. Amid registration, online media receive a license and wider access to coverage of various events. However, if online media decide to not voluntary register, they are deprived of access and other working rights and risk to receive an administrative sentence for producing illegal media product (baj.by, 2018). Additionally, the law amendment announced compulsory identification of readers willing to comment on an article via mobile phone number. Forceful blocking of webpages became easier for the responsible bodies upon the amendment ratification. As Reporters Without Borders write, “they would just have to say that a website was ‘disseminating illegal content’ or was being used for ‘illicit activities’ – dangerously vague concepts open to the broadest interpretation” (Re- porters Without Borders, 2018).

Similarly, the situation with media freedom in Russia changed with the amendments to the Criminal Code’s article 282. The so-called “extremism laws” or the articles 282.1 and 282.2 of the Criminal code, serve as a tool for the government on sanctioning journalists and bloggers criticizing the regime (The Criminal Code of Russian Federation: 1996, 2014, p.144-145). The report of the SOVA center demonstrated that 96% sentenced according to Art. 282.1 and 282.2 were individual or group online publishers (Freedom of the Net - Russia, 2018). According to the Prosecutor Gener- al of Russia, there were 1200 extremism sentences since the law’s introduction (US Department of State, 2020). In 2018 Russian Parliament (Duma) ratified an amendment to the Law on Informa- tion, Information Technology, and Protection of Information. The amendment implies identification of readers in “communication platforms” that is subjected to storage at the databases of Federal Se- curity Service FSB (kremlin.ru, 2019). Several state bodies are assigned to forcefully block webpages without a need to receive a court order in the following cases: “information about suicide, drug propaganda, images of child sexual abuse, information about juvenile victims of crimes, materials that violate copyright, content related to extremism, and calls for unsanctioned public actions or rallies” (Freedom of the Net - Russia, 2018).

TABLE 2. LEGISLATIVE REGULATIONS CONCERNING ONLINE MEDIA IN BE- LARUS AND RUSSIA Belarus Russia

Law • Law on Media (“means of mass information”) • Federal Law “On Information, • Counter-extremism law Informational Technologies, and Protection of Information”, • Criminal Code, Art. 282.1, 282.2 Concepts “network editions”, “producing and distributing “network edition”, “content related extremism materials”, “extremist organization” to extremism, or calls for unsanctioned public actions or rallies” What does • media license, restricted access without it • authorization of commentators amendment • authorization of commentators • blocking content online by sev- include • network editions can be blocked online eral federal bodies • to register a media, the owner must be either • blocking webpages with warning entity or citizen of Belarus who worked in the • network operators must block media field for at least five years. access to the page on a request • closing organizations that are accessed as ex- from the federal body tremist • restriction on receiving foreign funds for media emerged after 2014 Bodies Ministry of Information, Customs, internal affair Roskomnadzor, Rospotrebnadzor, responsible for bodies, prosecutor general, public administration Federal Drug Control, Prosecutor online media body responsible for mass media General, FSB control

The table above summarizes the content of media and extremism laws in Belarus and Russia. "Network edition" is used as a notion to refer to social media and online media, placing political bloggers in the same category as online media outlets. "Content related to extremism," as Russian Criminal Code's articles 282.1 and 282.2 read, make it easier for Russian authorities to suppress dissidents, including political bloggers (Freedom House - Russia, 2018). In the Belarusian case, "producing and distributing extremist material" implies a broad spectrum of activities, and interpretation of specific actions as extremist is not regulated by the law itself but is set to be decided by the courts. Belarusian media system places bloggers in a position when they have to either register as media or risk to become a subject of administrative prosecution (Art. 22.9 of Administrative Code) for producing illegal media content. Both in Belarus and Russia state institutions are responsible for controlling and regulating published content. Russian media law's last amendment allowed FSB to block content online. In Belarus, secret services are not mentioned in media law. Ministry of information and prosecutor general are the central state bodies in charge of blocking online content. Recent amendments to media laws in Belarus and Russia also included such measures as identification of commentators, content removal, forceful blocking of websites and pages, media license for online media. Additionally, Russian legislation forces network operators to block content upon order of one of the state bodies. Analysis of the laws demonstrated that the power of mediating the online sphere belongs to authorities in Belarus and Russia. The reviewed laws limit not only traditional journalists but also bloggers. Obligations for political bloggers that are not directly referred to as so, imply risks of administrative or criminal charges. Executing their right for freedom of expression, political bloggers in these countries can fall under the jurisdiction of extremist laws, texts of which are vague and often become a subject of manipulation when court decisions are made in conditions when courts are loyal to the regimes. The most puzzling effect of the media legislation in both countries lies in the jurisdiction of media laws that technically do not see bloggers as media if they are not registered as so, however, puts on them the same obligations as on media. Media laws serve as a preventive measure for the governments on filtering entrance of anti- regime content to the public discourse (Al-Saqaf, 2014; Silitsky, 2007). These laws and their appliance are harshly criticized by human rights defenders and democratic politicians for not only limiting media space but also preventing the countries' democratization. Based on these findings, it is possible to conclude that the legal restrictions in Belarus and Russia limit online users, including bloggers, in their right to freedom of expression. It allows for 33 assuming that legal limits are one of the strongest motivations for self-censorship among bloggers as they possess a physical threat that is difficult to avoid as they are written in the laws. Limited freedom of expression, covering only permitted topics, leads to the silenced society where, as the spiral of silence theory reads, citizens do not dare to express their opinion. The analysis of media laws in Belarus and Russia allows for exploring one possible motivation of bloggers to self-censor and connecting it to the theory of the spiral of silence. Other motives are tracked in the analysis of the survey data below. But first I will turn to the thematic analysis.

4.2. What do political bloggers in Belarus and Russia talk about?

In order to understand political blogospheres of Belarus and Russia, I have conducted the textual analysis of posts in the blogs of ten political bloggers from Belarus and Russia. The analysis presents brief but empirically grounded description of the blogospheres. The textual analysis of political blogs selected among the political bloggers who participated in the study, helped to identify the topics covered by political bloggers in Belarus and Russia for identifying whether there are certain topics dominant in the two countries. This can help understanding whether freedom of expression among political bloggers is present when covering certain topics and reveal the absence of other potential topics being self-censored. On the example of transcript analyses, Pfaff-Rüdiger (2007) suggested a systematic approach of content reduction. According to the authors, analyzing the text pieces, such as quotes, can be done through either inductive or deductive approach. In case of this textual analysis, I was interested in topics covered by political bloggers, they can be referred to as categories. As there was no similar research done before, I selected inductive approach, i.e. forming categories based on the content instead of assigning the categories based on the theory. However, the categories/topics where inspired by the literature reviewed in the chapter I. Pfaff-Rüdiger (2007) suggest to first reflect on the content, then paraphrase it and assign a category as the last step. Following Pfaff-Rüdi- ger (2007, p. 39) I have collected every post in its full lengths (in the original language), conducted a linguistic reduction that followed by the content reduction and the category assignment (in Eng- lish). Analyzed publications are the posts from Telegram and Facebook - two platform where randomly selected bloggers had the most subscribers for the moment of analysis. An example below demonstrates the logic of categories formation. In order to protect identity of the bloggers, the original text was shortened and translated to English.

TABLE 3. ILLUSTRATING THE APPROACH TO TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

No Quote Linguistic reduction Content reduction Topic

10 “We continue to receive details about one of the most high-profile cases of several detentions of Corruption scandal corrup- recent years in Belarus. Besides the fact that the leaders of the whole industry state officials due to involving high tion were sent to jail, detentions also affected senior officials of the power block. their involvement into officials First of all, one of the most famous fighters against organized crime - the corruption scandal. Vladimir Tikhini. As we wrote earlier, they detained him for bribes and put Ex-interior minister is him in the infamous "American". freed from KGB but Our sources from the KGB report that Tikhin for a certain amount of money might be under the was resolving issues with colleagues from Russia so that sugar passed home detention. Soon through their territory without problems. After that, a senior officer reported there will be a report to Major General Ivan Podgursky, First Deputy Minister of the Interior. For on two residences of this reason, on January 30 (in the midst of "sugar" detentions), the general the ex minister that are was removed from his post and dismissed. So it is quite possible that another impossible to build high-ranking security official will soon be detained…”. with his salary.

As an additional measure, I tracked whether posts in the analyzed blogs were demonstrating opinion of the blogger or providing readers with exclusive firsthand information. As a result, 22 out of 99 posts were related to unique firsthand information, while 77 pieces were categorized as opinion expression. As a result of the analysis, upcoming presidential election in Belarus, conflicts within the opposition and the ongoing constitutional reform in Russia were discussed the most. As an example, one of the bloggers wrote: “By Belarusian tradition - every presidential election generates new wave of political prisoners in the country. This year is not being an exception.”

Among the Russian bloggers much attention was drawn to judiciary system criticism and vio- lations of human rights: “The defendants in the “Delo Seti” were accused of trying to overthrow the constitutional order. But those who initiated this business did much more for this overthrow than any possible organization. Because nothing pushes the country to the edge as cannibalistic terms based on confes- sions obtained under torture. Nothing destroys the state as the lack of justice, morality, and humanity”.

Bloggers in both countries criticized detentions of oppositional representatives and addressed healthcare system disadvantages. Interestingly, neither in Belarus or Russia presidents and law enforcement became a subject of harsh criticism. Therefore, the main field of discussion became politics and social issues, with anti-governmental critical discourse dominating the blogosphere in Be- larus and Russia. To illustrate the analysis, the word clouds (see Appendix V) were generated with the help of the webpage wordclouds.com.

The textual analysis of political blogs in Belarus and Russia allowed for identifying topics dominating the Belarusian and Russian blogospheres. The primarily limitation of this textual analysis, though, is the number of reviewed blogs (10) and posts (99). However, the formed categories are referred in the survey and serve as empirical description of political blogs in Belarus and Russia. After analyzing what bloggers write about, the next section presents the survey findings reflecting the self-censorship practices in Belarus and Russia.

4.3. Survey findings

The survey conducted in the period of 26th March-5th May resulted in 61 answers being collected, making a 47,6% response rate. The majority of respondents were aged between 31 and 50+ years old, while no bloggers younger than 20 participated in the survey. On the stage of searching for political bloggers, I encountered a visible dominance of men falling under the sample’s criteria. At the same time, female political bloggers demonstrated a higher willingness to participate in the study. As a result, 75,4% of survey respondents were men. De- spite active efforts of the researcher to collect more respondents from Russia, 57,4% of political bloggers who answered the questionnaire are covering Belarus. At the same time, 21,1% reside neither in Belarus or in Russia, but in the EU, US, or UK. Almost everyone indicated politics and social issues as the main topics they write about in the mostly used social media, which turned out to be Facebook for 85,2% of respondents. 14,6% use Live Journal as their primary blogging platform and 21,3% - Telegram. Among 61 respondents, only one (1,6%) had more than 500.000 followers, while most participants belong to the group of political bloggers with 5000-10.000 followers. 8,2% of respondents produce content for political blogs with their team. As it was mentioned above, political bloggers' definition is not a single concept but has rather many different connotations. The respondents were selected according to the researcher's interpretation of political bloggers described in the beginning of the paper. Nevertheless, additional questions were added for tracking bloggers perception of their own role. The survey showed that 62,3% consider themselves bloggers, 44,3% name themselves journalists, while over 70% referred to themselves as opinion leaders. Contrary to the researcher's expectation, the majority of respondents believed that the authorities in the country have less impact on freedom of expression and speech than media legislation. There was no consensus on whether self-censorship in Belarus and Russia are connected purely to

36 the political situation or to unspoken rules of political correctness and respect to readers. To illustrate, one of the bloggers said: “Self-censorship for me is associated solely with the understanding that some ideas and statements may not be approved by certain ideologically oriented groups”. For some of the respondents, self-censorship implies both, ethics and fear motivated by political situation in a country: I am a rather calm and gentle person; therefore, I usually have calm and sus- tained posts without "extremist" and foul language. At the same time, I clearly understand that I will never write anything about Ramzan Kadyrov [The president of Chechnya who was publicly threating journalists, see No- vaya gazeta, 2020 - author], for example - because I do not have an in-depth knowledge of the topic, and it would be frivolous for me to fight with him just like that, for the sake of a word. This, of course, relates to the political situation in the country.

At the same time, 44,3% of respondents believe that their social media posts can lead to attention from secret services (KGB or FSB), and 42,6% indicated that there is a risk of receiving an administrative punishment for social media publications. Some respondents shared their personal experience absent from the range of given options, for example: “My daughter was going to school with security guards for more than one and a half year”. Besides realizing the risks of threats, two-thirds of respondents indicated that they have already faced the consequences of their social media posts. Namely, 42% experienced online threats, 18% received criminal punishment, 18% - administrative punishment, and 26% reported on attention or pressure from secret services. 19% of the respondent also reported on cases of their publications being forcefully blocked. Some participants commented that they were forced to leave the country because of danger put after their anti-governmental social media activity (see Figure 4).

FIGURE 4. HAVE YOU FACED ANY PROBLEMS DUE TO YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA PUB- LICATIONS? (N=61)

In order to analyze political bloggers’ perception of political bloggers on self-censorship, the questionnaire included a range of questions addressing expressive and withdrawal behavior (Chen, 2016), (see questions 15-19 in the appendix I). An overall tendency showcases that both Belarusian and Russian bloggers self-censor before publishing, with slightly stronger self-censorship among the Russian bloggers (see Figure 5). Only 13,1% of all respondents indicated that they often soften the formulations and avoid naming particular people.

FIGURE 5. SELF-CENSORSHIP IN BELARUS AND RUSSIA (N=61) ( 0 - never self-censor, 5 - self-censor very often/always). At the same time, Russian respondents are more open to criticizing their president without limitations. Belarusians opt to select words when writing about the president, while only one respondent never dares to discuss the president. There is an insignificant but visible difference in gender on this variable - women are more prone to self-censor before publication (66,7% vs. 39,1% among men). Both groups of bloggers demonstrated that they are ready to criticize prime-minister and local authorities rather openly. When it comes to editing the posts after publication, the consensus among Russian and Be- larusian bloggers is that they rarely change the publications for personal safety reasons, but often edit the content to correct factual mistakes or typos. Criminal, administrative punishments or secret services’ pressure experience of two-thirds of the respondents does barely impact on bloggers’ self- censorship routines. At the same time, almost everyone would stop blogging amid threat of imprisonment or threats to their families. No significant association was found between the number of followers and self-censorship practices, as well as between the place of residence and openness to criticize the authorities.

4.4. General findings

Several conclusions derive from the conducted review of legislation, textual analysis of the ten political blogs, and the survey among 61 political bloggers in Belarus and Russia. Media legislation in Belarus and Russia restricts political bloggers in two ways. According to the first scenario, bloggers are forced to choose to register as media and bear responsibilities regulated by the media laws. Otherwise, bloggers often continue writing as private individuals risking to 1) receive administrative charges for producing the content as an unregistered media; 2) fall under the jurisdiction of extremism laws; and 3) become a subject of criminal charges. Respondents in the two countries serve as an example for all these scenarios: 18% of sur- veyed political bloggers in Belarus and Russia faced administrative charges, and 18% - criminal sentences. However, as most bloggers agree, freedom of expression is limited not only by the legislation but by the actions of the authorities. The appliance of laws and criticism of the judiciary system became a central topic for the reviewed Russian political blogs. While the majority of reviewed posts of political blogs represented bloggers’ opinions, at least 22 out of 99 posts were providing unique firsthand information collected personally or through their sources. Two bloggers who produced firsthand information for political blogs analyzed in the study were subjected to criminal charges. This is related to the fact that neither state-owned nor independent media are allowed to cover specific sensitive topics due to the obligations regulated by media law. At this point, political bloggers who challenge the authorities' status-quo by publishing critical information face resistance in different forms. Pressure from the secret services is one of the control tactics employed against political bloggers in Belarus and Russia. While 26% of respondents faced secret services' harassment, 44% believe that FSB or KGB's attention is one of the possible negative consequences of their social media posts. Secret services' role in assessing data and tracking social media is additionally grounded in Russia's media legislation reviewed above. Forceful blocking of websites or pages was noted as one of the consequences of political blogging in Belarus and Russia. 19% of respondents in the survey faced it. If in Belarus authorities block whole websites on the country's territory, Russian authorities managed to push social networks' owners to allow secret services to access databases and personal information of the users. In Russia there is a specified list of reasons to block the websites such as drugs propaganda or calls for

39 unsanctioned rally. Nevertheless, in Belarus, reasons for page blocking are somewhat vague, and the webpage can be closed for doubtful reasons as disseminating illegal content. Even though most respondents demonstrate minor intentions to self-censor, 54% are ready to criticize the president by selecting wording. While 50% of Russian respondents argue that they can criticize the president freely, 57% of Belarusian bloggers would formulate their criticism carefully. In a conducted textual analysis, I was able to track an interesting trend when presidents were mentioned but not directly. Phrases such as "tsar" or 'they are up there' were used to refer to Vladimir Putin or Alyaksandr Lukashenka. While Belarusian bloggers mentioned their president sometimes, none of the researched blogs mentioned Putin's name. Bloggers in both countries selected words and synonyms but were very critical towards the presidents. Defamation of the president in Belarus (that is identified according to the vague criteria) is a subject of criminal prosecution. Therefore, by selecting words political bloggers ensure their safety. As one of the survey participants clarified: “The task is to make yourself heard, but with minimal risk to yourself and your loved ones”. The following chapter presents a discussion of empirical results in relation to previous research and the theory of the spiral of silence.

IV. Discussion

Findings of the survey, textual analysis and review of legislation are discussed in this chapter in relation to each other, previous research and theory. Each section of this chapter addresses the corresponding research question.

5.1. What causes self-censorship?

Decision whether covering certain topics or personalities is safe can depend on political regime. As it follows from the textual analysis, criticism of high officials in authoritarian regimes that can lead to sanctions, is often softened in social media posts of political bloggers. Sanctions for online expression are often regulated by the legislation. As Li, Lee& Li (2016) argue, creating legal obstacles limiting freedom of speech on the internet allows regimes to establish informational control. For example, a requirement to register as media places the produced content under media laws jurisdiction, while acting as an individual can lead to bloggers being suited under extremist laws or criminal codes (such as production of material without journalistic accreditation in Belarus). Scholars agree that one of the motivations for self-censorship is political situation in a country (Chen, 2018; Horton, 2011). Horton (2011) views self-censorship as a form of censorship because it is not managed by a self-censor herself but rather caused by fear that emerges due to conditions created by authorities. The respondents of the survey noted that they believe self-censorship is often related to fear caused by political situation. However, many chose to clarify their position and explained that self-censorship is also explained by community ethics or political correctness. Some respondents expressed their unwillingness to publish genuine opinion because they feel pressure from the social media community. Following Horton’s argument, this is a form of pure self-restrain when a self-censor's decision to express in one's understanding would unlikely lead to harsh after- maths. In case of unwillingness to express due to social pressure, the likeliness of whether one dares to speak up depends on ethics of communication. As Robinson and Tannenberg highlight (2019), ordinary citizens might have less motivation to express political opinion openly. Political bloggers aim to stop the spinning of spiral of silence by expressing their opinion. The silent spiral’s members are often supporting the ones who dare to speak - including political bloggers, who often serve as the main information source alternative to state-owned and/or state-controlled media. Silent support

41 of society members includes activism in the social media, likes, shares and comments, while the capacity of political bloggers to mobilize their readers into the street protest is often limited. How- ever, the regime suppresses such efforts to “minimize capacity of dissidents and activists to undermine the state’s authority” (Al-Saqaf, 2014, p.45). While Noelle Norman (1974) describes fear of social isolation as one of the motivations to avoid expressing on particular topics, self-censorship among researched political bloggers is besides all caused by another fear - fear of political sanctions. The wider the toolbox of suppressing the freedom of expression in authoritarian regimes is the lesser people dare to speak out against the rules. In that way, the spiral of silence is unfolding, integrating wider groups and spheres of society.

5.2. Bloggers’ perception of self-censorship

Political bloggers in authoritarian countries often serve as an alternative source of information or representatives of a dissident collective thought (Bode & Makarychev, 2014; Kovach & Rosen- stiel, 2001). In contrast to media outlets they have more chances to avoid criminal or administrative charges under the media legislation; while contrary to the politicians they have no responsibility in front of the potential voters; political bloggers are also often independent individuals taking publishing decisions on their own. These factors put political bloggers in a position to express their opinion relatively free. However, control resources of authoritarian regimes such as discriminative legislation or internet tools on revealing dissenters negatively impact on freedom of speech in the social media (Morozov, 2007, 2011; Mehrabov, 2017). Bloggers are one of the primary social media targets for the regimes as they are easier to be traced and have a support of wide audience possessing more resources to influence public opinion comparing to ordinary social media users (Zelizer, 2009). Therefore, in the last years, Belarusian and Russian bloggers often appear victims of authoritarian regimes, receiving criminal or administrative sentences, and threats. The survey in this study was based on the assumption that in order to ensure personal safety and opportunity to continue leading their blogs, political bloggers in Belarus and Russia would practice self-censorship in forms of either limiting expressive or demonstrating withdrawal behaviors (Chen, 2018). Self-censorship is a complex phenomenon that has been explained through psychological, philosophic and other social sciences’ perspectives. Based on the conducted study, I argue that self- censorship in social media consists of the three main stages depicted on the Figure 6 below. Firstly,

42 an individual decides whether the conditions allow for safely expressing on certain topic or about particular people or events. Second stage implies selecting wording and degree of criticism regarding the subject in the process of content creation. A final step of self-censorship is post-publishing editions related to eliminating certain words, decreasing a degree of criticism, hiding the names.

FIGURE 6. THREE STAGES OF SELF-CENSORSHIP

As the survey demonstrates, each of the three stages can depend on both community rules or ethics, and on political situation. Community rules and ethics, noted by the survey respondents, included criticism of their readers, peers, due to radical position on certain issues. According to some respondents’ assessment, ethics that influences their publishing decisions is associated with self- censorship. However, this is a complex issue, since ethics can also relate to bloggers culture in the social media rather than self-censorship exclusively. As this study focuses on primarily exploring political motives behind self-censorship, and the majority of respondents believe that self-censorship in social media is related to political situation in their country, the influence of community rules and ethics was left behind current discussion. Nevertheless, analyzing whether community rules and ethics are rather culture than self-censorship is recommended for the future research within different theoretical framework. The highest degree of self-censorship was demonstrated at the level of pre-publishing decision meaning the respondents assessed risks and wins of publishing critical content in the social media before writing. The questionnaire data shows that political bloggers in Belarus and Russia are ready to risk expressing anti-regime opinions despite potential threats. Personal safety becomes a weak motivation for editing already published posts among political bloggers in Belarus and Rus- sia. 43

Political bloggers who participated in a survey experienced various forms of consequences of their publications: criminal and administrative charges, secret services’ pressure, online threats and forceful blocking of bloggers’ posts. At the same time, there was no correlation found between an experience of threats, criminal or administrative charges or secret services pressure with self-censorship routines. In other words, even after spending some time in prison, some political bloggers in Belarus and Russia not only continued blogging but also demonstrated no clear motivation to limit their expressive behavior, neither had they indicated withdrawal behavior routines. This pattern op- poses my initial expectations and signals that political bloggers might see external sanctions for their social media content as a part of their blogging practices. Such behavior of political bloggers causes an academic interest to research why punishments barely become an obstacle on the way of political bloggers and do not stop them from continuing to freely express their political position. There is a clear awareness among the political bloggers that social media posts can lead to secret services’ attention. Reports by international organizations and national human rights defenders indicate that Russian and Belarusian political bloggers suffer from constant pressure from secret services as any other dissidents institutionalized within media outlets or NGOs. Soviet past left a trace in control practices of modern authoritarian regimes in Belarus and Russia. Secret services are still utilized as an instrument to suppress anti-governmental activism. Psychological pressure, threats to family, blackmailing and violence employed by secret services are not regulated by the laws and therefore can sometimes appear more dangerous than a short imprisonment as a result of a court decision based on existing legislation.

5.3. Self-censorship’s impact on freedom of expression

Self-censorship caused by political situation leads to creation of unspoken rules in the society on what is possible to criticize and what topic is a taboo. In the Figure 7 below, I present a model of self-censorship in authoritarian countries, or a visualization of how spiral of silence theory applies for understanding self-censorship in autocracies. It suggests that the more measures are imposed by a regime for restricting freedom of expression on social media - the bigger is the number of people who practice self-censorship. In this way, the spiral of silence is spinning up when the state's control increases. This process is happening within multiple networks, where a country is the biggest network, with smaller systems that are social media and blogs. The network existence and functioning

44 create relations and communication model between, bloggers' subscribers, general social media audience, and state's servants.

FIGURE 7. SPIRAL OF SILENCE IN SOCIAL MEDIA IN AUTOCRACIES6

According to the survey results, political bloggers demonstrated lower incentives to self-censor than expected by the researcher, based on the countries’ media and political context. This illus- trates that despite restrictions and threats that political bloggers face, they still openly criticize political situation in their countries. By defending their right for freedom of expression, political bloggers aim to tear apart the spiral of silence utilizing technology and social media. As the textual analysis of political blogs demonstrates, Belarusian and Russian political bloggers facilitate political debate and serve as watchdogs of ruling elites, highlighting the community problems and criticizing political decisions (McKenna&Pole, 2008; Bode&Makarychev, 2014). Some of them are sanctioned by the authorities for attempts to destroy the well-functioning system of silence and end up silencing their genuine opinion in the future. As Bode & Makarychev (2014) highlight, blogging allows to broaden political discourse “making it polyphonic and feed- back-based” (2014, p.54). The more individual bloggers who are ready to challenge the spiral of silence emergence, the wider are chances to crack the silence by widening the range of topics al-

6 Figure is made by the author based on the literature review 45 lowed for safe coverage. Strict conditions for media editions and independent TV and radio stations lead to appearance of more bloggers who are not considered as media according to the laws and are more difficult to be traced and sanctioned by the autocracies. Thus, a decentralization of critical political content broadens freedom of expression and increases chances for spiral of silence break down. As numerous sources of information are more difficult to block, the more political bloggers emerge, the bigger are chances for the spiral of silence to crack since a) the resources of autocrats are limited; and b) modern authoritarian regimes try to avoid arresting every dissident even if they have enough resources (Soest & Grauvogel, 2017). Additionally, decentralization of political content epicenters impacts the structure of media system in post-Soviet authoritarian countries where political bloggers take a role of alternative informational sources and leaders of opinion. One of the bloggers’ functions - to mobilize readers for political action (McKenna&Pole, 2008) - becomes essential in autocracies as other channels of regime’s criticisms often appear under stricter control (Bode&Makarychev, 2014). This can explain relative freedom of expression evident from the survey findings. However, authorities attempt to limit any activism leading to growing protest sentiment and exercise oppression targeted at popular bloggers. While this survey was conducted, political vlogger and current candidate for presidency in Belarus Siarhei Tsihanouski and 34 other people related to him were detained for calling to organize or willing to participate in a political protest against military parade devoted to the commemoration of the victory in the WWII that was conducted by the Belarusian authorities despite strict recommendations of the World Health Organization on preventing the spread of covid19 (Radyjo Svaboda, 8 May 2020). Political bloggers’ role in political and media processes in democratic and non-democratic countries represents a broad field of research for social scientists. Self-censorship is one of the factors that limits political bloggers’ capacity to express themselves in social media. Conditions influencing self-censorship routines among political bloggers in Belarus and Russia include legal restrictions, fear of political sanctions and fear of social isolation.

Conclusion

In this thesis I aimed at developing my academic and professional interests into a solid research of self-censorship among political bloggers in Belarus and Russia. Reviewed literature and the theory of spiral of silence allowed for structuring the study, identifying and operationalizing suitable research concepts. Mixed methodology, namely, analysis of legislation, textual analysis and survey among political bloggers generated a massive of information to portray the phenomenon of self-censorship in autocracies. Triangulation approach increased reliability of the study by assessing the subject from different angles and providing possibilities for cross-check analysis. The study came to a conclusion that authorities in Belarus and Russia play a significant role in restricting freedom of speech for bloggers by constructing a legal framework that focuses on obligations rather than rights protection. The research allows to summarize that political bloggers in these countries practice self-censorship through softening wording or avoiding particular names. At the same time, participants of the study demonstrated high degree of criticism towards authorities in their countries and less incentives to self-censor in the social media than expected by the researcher based on the legal and political context. Political bloggers make a significant impact to ensuring pluralism of opinions and mobilizing critical readership, combining the roles of media and political activists in Belarus and Russia. This thesis became one of the first known attempts to fill in research gaps in a) media studies in the post-Soviet countries with focus on political bloggers; b) analysis of self-censorship phenomena that strongly influences the media system in relation to freedom of expression in autocracies. Additionally, this research allowed not only for covering the subject of interests and responding to the research questions, but also led to exploring and identifying new areas and perspectives for future research. While self-censorship and its connection to gender were not in the focus of the study, insignificant difference in percentage of men and women censoring their posts before publishing, cause interest in measuring these differences. Considering the fact that some bloggers produce content in the team, financial aspect is potentially involved. On the one hand, if the team members work for the page named after a political blogger, they may receive a salary from the blogger. On the other hand, there is a potential possibility that blogger, as a brand or a company, is sponsored by certain political powers and is involved in lobbying of donor’s interests (Farell&Drezner, 2008). Both phenomena represent an interesting an-

47 gle for the future research of political blogs as either a product of collective work, a business platform or as a project implementors who are financed by certain groups. Political bloggers serving as multiple decentralized sources of information and opinion leaders in a media system allow for broadening freedom of expression in authoritarian countries. Plac- ing this into the spiral of silence theory, political bloggers aim to break down the spiral and inte- grate more society members to support them. Besides, bloggers often communicate with each other in social media and their interaction becomes possible and significant for the network members due to technological aspect. Researching the interaction of political bloggers with society members and between each other through social media utilizing the actor-network theory is recommended for the future research. The comparative component of this study shaded away as political blogs’ analysis and respondents’ replies indicated high similarity of blogospheres in the two countries. However, during collection of information on political and media background, I was able to trace direct or indirect interactions between Belarusian and Russian blogospheres. Therefore, analyzing how these blogospheres interact with each other, or studying political discourses about one neighboring country in political blogs of the other - is another angle to approach research in this field. This study focused on tracing how political environment influences self-censorship among political bloggers but does not exclude other factors leading to self-censorship. Participants in the survey indicated that sometimes self-censorship they practice is caused by established ethics. Clear- ly, claiming that self-censorship depends exclusively on political environment in an autocracy would mean ignoring such factors as community context, unspoken rules, and ethics. Investigating how ethical standards in a society influence self-censorship practices of political bloggers as individual or group actors is another angle for the future research. Finally, the reasons for not practicing self-censorship in challenging non-democratic context can become the next step in researching political bloggers in autocracies.

List of references

1. Aleksandrov, A., & Bastunets, A. (2020). Media v Belarusi 2020. Rynok, zakony i informat- sionnaya bezopasnost'. Minsk: BAJ. Retrieved from https://baj.by/sites/default/files/event/ files/2020/report_media2020_rus.pdf

2. Aliaksandrau, A. (2013). Belarus: Pulling the Plug, Policy paper on digital challenges to freedom of expression in Belarus. Minsk: Index of Censorship. Retrieved from https:// www.indexoncensorship.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/IDX_Belarus_ENG_WebRes.pdf

3. Al-saqaf, W. (2014). Breaking digital firewalls: analyzing internet censorship and circumvention in the Arab world. (Doctoral Thesis, Örebro university, Örebro). Retrieved from urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-34596

4. Al-Saqaf, W. (2016). Internet Censorship Circumvention Tools: Escaping the Control of the Syrian Regime. Media and Communication, 4(1), 39–50.

5. Astapenia, R. (2013, August 13). Belarus And The OSCE: Peacekeeping And Elections Critisism. BelarusDigest. Retrieved from http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-and-osce- peacekeeping-and- elections-critisism-23037

6. Atton, C. (2009). Alternative and citizen journalism. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Ed.), The handbook of journalism studies (pp. 265-278). New York : Routledge.

7. Bailard, C. (2012). A Field Experiment on the Internet's Effect in an African Election: Savvi- er Citizens, Disaffected Voters, or Both? Journal of Communication, 62(2), 330-344.

8. Bamman, D., O’Connor, B., & Smith, N. (2012). Censorship and deletion practices in Chi- nese social media. First Monday, 17(3). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v17i3.3943

9. Baron, L. F., & Gomez, R. (2016). The Associations between Technologies and Societies: The Utility of Actor-Network Theory. Science, Technology and Society, 21(2), 129–148.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0971721816640615.

10. BBC News - Russkaja Sluzhba (2019, 2 May). Avtor Stalingulaga raskryl svojo imia [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yMk1Rj9iVx8

11. Belarusian Association of Journalists (2018, April 6). Popravki V Zakon O Smi: Registratsija Internet-izdanij, Identifikatsiya Komentatorov, Blokirovka Setej. Retrieved from Baj.by Https://Baj.By/Be/Content/Popravki-v-zakon-o-smi-registraciya-internet-izdaniy-identi- fikaciya-kommentatorov-blokirovka

12. Belaruskaja Asacyjacyja Zhurnalistau (2019). SMI u Belarusi 2019. Retrieved from website BAJ.by https://baj.by/sites/default/files/analytics/files/2020/media-monitoring-2019-by.pdf? fbclid=IwAR1HZyMbMTmPLQ7zPsu-VWti7vnTv9SyRH7Myht4xGvhfle-djLJ0TqnL6w

13. Bennett, B. (2011). The last dictatorship in Europe: Belarus under Lukashenko. New York: Columbia University Press.

14. Chen, H. (2018). Spiral of silence on social media and the moderating role of disagreement and publicness in the network: Analyzing expressive and withdrawal behaviors. New Media & Society, 20(10), 3917-3936.

15. Chulitskaya, T., Ivanou, U., and Stsiapanau, A. (Eds). (2016). Politics and Society in Be- larus. Collected Works of EHU Political Science Graduates. Vilnius: EHU, KAS.

16. Cunningham, M. E., & Wasserstrom, J. N. (2012). Authoritarianism: There’s an app for that. Chinese Journal of Communication, 5(1), 43 – 48. doi: 10.1080/17544750.2011.647743

17. Diamond, L. (2010). Liberation Technology. Journal of Democracy, 21(3), pp.69–83.

18. Docter, S. (2010). Blogging and Journalism: Extending Shield Law Protection to New Media Forms. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 54(4), pp.588–602.

19. Doroshevich, M., Sokolova., M. (2017). Digital Tranformation: to what extent is the country ready to embrace it? Retrieved from the website of Nashe Mnenie: https://nmnby.eu/year- book/2017/en/page16.html

20. European Federation of Journalists. (2018). Belarus: more media censorship and control with new amendments of the Media Law. Retrieved from https://europeanjournalists.org/ blog/2018/06/24/belarus-more-media-censorship-and-control-with-new-amendments-of-the- media-law/

21. Farrell, H., & Drezner, D. (2008). The power and politics of blogs. Public Choice, 134(1), 15-30.

22. Federlnij Zakon "Ob Infromacii, Informacionnih Technologijah I Zashchite Informacii” (31- F3). Retrieved from website of the Russian government: http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/44084

23. Freedom House. (2020). Freedom in the World, Belarus. Retrieved from https://freedom- house.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2019

24. Freedom House. (2020). Freedom in the World, Russia. Retrieved from https://freedom- house.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2020

25. Freedom on the Net 2018 - Belarus, Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/ 5be16b2413.html

26. Freedom on the Net 2018 - Russia, Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/ 5be16afe21.html

27. Fulton, J. (2015). Are You A Journalist? New Media Entrepreneurs and Journalists in the Digital Space. Javnost - The Public: Journalism in Crisis? 22(4), 362-374.

28. Gohdes, A. (2014). Repression in the digital age: Communication technology and the politics of state violence (Doctoral thesis, University of Mannheim, Mannheim). Manheim, Uni- 51

versity of Mannheim. https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37902

29. Groshek, J. (2009). The Democratic Effects of the Internet, 1994—2003 A Cross- National Inquiry of 152 Countries. International Communication Gazette, 71(3), 115-36. doi: https:// doi.org/10.1177/1748048508100909

30. Gross, P. (2005). Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. By Ivan Zassoursky. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. xii, 271 pp. Slavic Review, 64(1), 203-204. doi:10.2307/3650104

31. Hall, S. G. F. (2017). Preventing a Colour Revolution: the Belarusian example as an illustration for the Kremlin? East European Politics, 33(2), 162-183, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2017.1301435

32. Hanitzsch, T., Hanusch, F., Mellado, C., Anikina, M., Berganza, R., Cangoz, I., . . . Kee Wang Yuen, E. (2011). Mapping Journalism Cultures Across Nations: A comparative study of 18 countries. Journalism Studies, 12(3), 273-293.

33. Herasimenka, A., (2017, April 3) Chem poslednyaya volna protestov otlichayetsya ot predy- dushchikh. Nasha Niva. Retrieved from https://nn.by/?c=ar&i=185684&lang=ru

34. Herasimenka, A. (2018). Responding to Democratic Decay: Large-Scale Political Cam- paigning on Social Media in Russia. University of Westminster, Westminster School of Me- dia and Communication. Retrieved from https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 77/2018/09/IPP2018-Herasimenka.pdf

35. Horton, J. (2011). Self-Censorship. Res Publica, 17(1), pp.91–106.

36. Human Rights Watch. (2018). Belarus - Events of 2018. Retrieved from https:// www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/belarus

37. Human Rights Watch. (2018). Russia - Events of 2018. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/ world-report/2019/country-chapters/russia#6e5592

38. Ilyuk, Y. (2017). Social media and (non)democracy: The analysis of daily Facebook use by political opposition in Belarus, (Master’s thesis, Stockholm University, Stockholm). Re- trieved from http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1214362/FULLTEXT01.pdf

39. IREX (2019). Media Sustainability Index. Retrieved from https://www.irex.org/resource/ media-sustainability-index-msi

40. Kalathil, S., B, C.Taylor. (2001). The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, And the Counterrevolution. First Monday, 6(8). DOI:10.5210/ fm.v0i0.1788

41. Kapustina Anna Georgievna. (2015). Law Status of Journalists and Bloggers in the Newest Information Legislation of Russian Federation. Izvestiâ Ûžnogo Federalʹnogo Universiteta: Filologičeskie Nauki 2015(1), pp. 153-60.

42. Kemp, S. (2019). Digital 2019: Belarus, Retrieved from the website of Data Reportal: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-belarus?rq=belarus

43. Kemp, S. (2020). Digital 2020: Russia, Retrieved from the website of Data Reportal: https:// datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-russian-federation?rq=russia

44. Klyueva, A. (2016). Taming Online Political Engagement in Russia: Disempowered Publics, Empowered State and Challenges of the Fully Functioning Society. International Journal of Communication, 10, 20. Retrieved from https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/4883

45. Koltsova, O., & Alexanyan, K. (n.d.). Blogging in Russia is not Russian blogging. In In- ternational Blogging: Identity, Politics and Networked Publics (pp. 65–84).

46. Koltsova, O., Bodrunova, S. (2019). Public Discussion in Russian Social Media: An Intro- duction. Media and Communication, 7(3), pp.114–118. DOI: 10.17645/mac.v7i3.2389

47. Kovach, B., & Rosenstiel, T. (2001). The elements of journalism: what newspeople should know and the public should expect. 1st paperback ed. New York: Three Rivers Press

48. Kwon, K., Moon, H. & Stefanone, S.-I. (2015). Unspeaking on Facebook? Testing network effects on self-censorship of political expressions in social network sites. Quality & Quanti- ty, 49(4), pp.1417–1435. DOI: 10.1007/s11135-014-0078-8

49. LI, X; LEE, F.; LI, Y. (2016). The Dual Impact of Social Media Under Networked Authori- tarianism: Social Media Use, Civic Attitudes, and System Support in China. International Journal of Communication, 10 (2016), pp. 5143–5163

50. Lührmann, А., Maerz, S.F., Grahn, S., Alizada, N., Gastaldi, L., Hellmeier, S., Hindle, G., and Lindberg, S.I., 2020. Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows. Democracy Report 2020. Retrieved from the website ofVarieties of Democracy Institute: https://www.v- dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_re- port_2020_low.pdf

51. MacKinnon, R. (2011). Liberation Technology: China's "Networked Authoritarianism". Journal of Democracy 22(2), 32-46. doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0033.

52. Margolis, M. (2010). Typing Politics: The Role of Blogs in American Politics. Political Communication, 27(2), 218-221, doi: 10.1080/10584601003711593

53. McKenna, L., Pole, A. (2008). What do bloggers do: an average day on an average political blog. Public Choice, 134(1), pp.97–108. DOI 10.1007/s11127-007-9203-8

54. MacKinnon, R. (2008). Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship, and civic discourse in China. Public Choice, 134, pp. 31 – 46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9199-0

55. McNair, B. (2009). Journalism and Democracy. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin & T. Hanitzsch, Thomas (Eds.). The handbook of journalism studies (pp. 237-249). New York: Routledge.

56. Mehrabov, I. (2017). All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace: Activist Practices in an Era of Mediatized Surveillance (Doctoral thesis, University of Karlstad, Karlstad). Karl- stad, Karlstad University Studies. URN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-47924

57. Morozov, E. (2007). Blogs: The New Frontier in Human Rights. Transitions Online, 5(01).

58. Morozov, E. (2011). The Net Delusion. The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (1. ed.). New York, US: PublicAffairs.

59. Narushenije Zakonodatelstva o sredstvah massovoj informatsii. Kodeks Respubliki Belarus ob administrativnyh pravonarushenijah (22.9, 194-3). Minsk: Retrieved from the webside of Kodeks.by: https://kodeksy-by.com/koap_rb/22.9.htm

60. Nicole Bode & Andrey Makarychev (2013) The New Social Media in Russia. Problems of Post-Communism, 60(2), 53-62, DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216600205

61. Noelle-Neumann E. (1974). The spiral of silence a theory of public opinion. Journal of Communication. 24 (2). pp. 43–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1974.tb00367.x

62. O Sredstvah Massovoj Informacii (№128.3, 2008, 2018). Minsk. Retrieved from website of Ministerstvo Informatsii Respubliki Belarus http://Mininform.Gov.By/Upload/Iblock/8dc/ 8dca9553743c798b828f2f980aa15248.Pdf

63. Оb Utverzhdenii Polozheniya O Poriadke Predvaritelnoj Identifikatcii Polzovatelej Internet- resursa, Setevogo Izdanija (№ 850). Minsk. Retrieved from website Natsionalnij pravovoj Internet-Portal Respubliki Belarus http://Www.Government.By/Ru/Content/8427

64. Parks, L. & Mukherjee, R. (2017). From platform jumping to self-censorship: internet freedom, social media, and circumvention practices in Zambia. Communication and Critical/ 55

Cultural Studies, 14(3), pp.221–237. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2017.1290262

65. Pfaff-Rüdiger, S. (2007). Medien im Alltag. Methodenprobleme qualitativer Nutzungs- forschung. In S. Pfaff- Rüdiger & M. Meyen (eds.), Alltag, Lebenswelt und Medien. Qualita- tive Studien zum subjektiven Sinn von Medienangeboten. (pp. 9–45). Berlin: LIT

66. Podvalskaya, V. (2019, August 7). Vkontakte stal samoj populiarnoj socsetju v Belarusi. Evrazija Ekspert. Retrieved from https://eurasia.expert/vkontakte-stal-samoy-populyarnoy- sotssetyu-v-belarusi/

67. Poell, T., de Kloet, J., & Zeng, G. (2014). Will the Real Weibo Please Stand Up? Chinese Online Contention and Actor-Network Theory. Chinese Journal of Communication, 7(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2013.816753

68. Preiherman, Y. (2020). Unsettled union: The future of the Belarus-Russia relationship, Eu- ropean Council on Regional Relations. Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commen- tary_unsettled_union_the_future_of_the_belarus_russia_relationship

69. Radyjo Svaboda (2020, May 8). Kaho Zatrymali za Salidarnasc z blogeram Siarheem Tsi- hanouskim. Spis. Retrieved from https://www.svaboda.org/a/30601463.html

70. Reporters without borders. (2018). Belarus media law could get even more repressive. Re- trieved from https://rsf.org/en/news/belarus-media-law-could-get-even-more-repressive

71. Reporters Without Borders (2019). Taking Control? Internet Censorship and Surveillance in Russia. Retrieved from rsf.com: https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/ Downloads/Berichte/2019/russiareport_web_updated.pdf

72. Reuter, O. J. and Szakonyi, D. (2015). Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Au- thoritarian Regimes. British Journal of Political Science. Cambridge University Press, 45(1), pp. 29–51. doi: 10.1017/S0007123413000203.

73. Robinson, D. & Tannenberg, M. (2019). Self-censorship of regime support in authoritarian states: Evidence from list experiments in China. Research & Politics, 6(3). doi: https:// doi.org/10.1177/2053168019856449

74. RosKomSvoboda (2020). Monitoring Presledovanija Grazhdan za Onlajn Publikacii, Blackscreen Report. Retrieved from https://blackscreen.report/

75. Rouda, Uladzimir. (2009). Comparative political science, (Sravnitselnaja politologiya). Vil- nius, Lithuania: European Humanities University.

76. Sandoval-Almazan, R. & Ramon Gil-Garcia, J. (2014). Towards cyberactivism 2.0? Under- standing the use of social media and other information technologies for political activism and social movements. Government Information Quarterly, 31(3), pp.365–378. doi: https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2013.10.016

77. Schimpfossl, E. & Yablokov, I. (2014). Coercion of conformism? Censorship and self-censorship among Russian media personalities and reporters in the 2010s. Demokratizatsiya, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 295-311.

78. Schlozman, Lehman, Verba, and Brady (2010). The Internet in authoritarian regimes “Weapon of the Strong? Journal of Peace Research. 52(3), pp. 338–351.

79. Sherstoboeva, E. (2014), Media Bill Reform in Postsoviet Turkmenistan. Problems Of Post- communism, 61(5), pp. 32-45. Retrieved from Https://Doi.Org/10.2753/ Ppc1075-8216610503

80. Shirk, S. (2011). Changing media, changing China. In S. L. Shirk (Ed.). Changing media, changing China (pp. 1 – 37). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 81. Silitski, V. (2015). Doŭhaja daroha ad tyranii: postkamunistyčny aŭtarytaryzm i baraćba za demakratyju ŭ Sierbii i Bielarusi. Minsk, Belarus: Inbelkult.

82. Silitski, V. (2005). Preempting democracy: the case of Belarus. Journal of Democracy, 16(4), pp.83–97.

83. Singer, J. B. (2006). Journalists and News Bloggers: Complements, contradictions, and challenges. In A. Bruns and J. Jacobs (Eds). Uses of Blogs (pp. 23-32); New York: Peter Lang.

84. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Article 281.1-article 282.2.). 13 June 1996, Pp. 144-145.

85. Tomaszeski, M., Proffitt, J.M. & Mcclung, S. (2009). Exploring the Political Blogosphere: Perceptions of Political Bloggers About Their Sphere. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 17(2), pp.72–87.

86. Tufekci, Z. (2013). Not This One’: Social Movements, the Attention Economy, and Micro- celebrity Networked Activism. American Behavioral Scientist. doi:10.1177/0002764213479369

87. Two Russians Arrested for Assassination Attempt on Chechen Dissident Blogger (2020, March 7). The Moscow Times. Retrieved from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2020/03/07/two-russians-arrested-for-assassination-attempt-on-chechen-dissident-blogger- a69556

88. US Department of State (2019). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Belarus. Re- trieved from website state.gov:.

89. US Department of State (2019). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia. Re- trieved from website state.gov: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/RUSSIA- 2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

90. Vaccari, C. (2015). Blogging, Political, Willey Online Library. Retrieved from https://on- linelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc209

91. Way, L., 2005. Authoritarian state building and the sources of regime competitiveness in the fourth wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. World Politics. 57(2), pp.231-261. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2005.0018

92. Williams, M. (2007). Cybercrime and Online Methodologies, in R. King and E. Wincup (Eds.), Doing Research on Crime & Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

93. Yegor Zhukov Wants to Be Russia’s President One Day (2019, December 13). The Moscow Times. Retrieved from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/13/yegor-zhukov-wants- to-be-russias-president-one-day-a68597

94. Zakon Respubliki Belarus, O Protivodejstvii Ekstremizmu (№ 203-З). Minsk. Retrieved from website pravo.by: http://www.pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=H10700203

95. Zelizer, B. (2009). Journalism and the Academy. K. Wahl-Jorgensen and H. Thomas (Eds.) in The Handbook of Journalism Studies. pp. 29-41.

Appendices Appendix I. Questionnaire (translated to English)

Welcome Note Good afternoon! Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey! My name is Alesia. Now I am getting my second master's degree in Sweden, within the framework of which I am pre- paring a study on freedom of speech and expression in Belarus and Russia. International organizations increasingly note that self-censorship among opinion leaders is becoming a serious obstacle to freedom of speech in Belarus and Russia. However, a study on self-censorship among opinion leaders in Russia and Belarus is being conducted for the first time. Its presentation will take place at the University of Södertörn in Stockholm in June 2020. The survey is anonymous. Try to answer the questions posed in it openly. If you have less than 1000 subscribers, and if you do not write about Belarus or Russia, this survey is irrelevant to you. You can answer in Russian, Belarusian and Eng- lish. Filling out the questionnaire will take about 5 minutes. Thank you for your participation! Informed Consent Please read the data security items listed below and proceed to the survey only if you agree with all the provisions. Participation in the study is voluntary. By participating in an anonymous survey, you give the right to process the information provided. You can withdraw your consent at any time without specifying a reason; in that case, the unprocessed data will be deleted. During the study, data is stored on the cloud services Google Drive and One Drive. Your answers will be used for quantitative analysis, and the information is transformed into charts and graphs. All information provided will be available only to the researcher and only for the duration of the study. Upon completion of the study and publication of the results in the form of a master's thesis, all data, except anonymized and processed, will be destroyed. Södertorn University is legally responsible for the security of respondents' personal data; for more information, please contact [email protected]. Following the EU general data protection regulation, you have the right to find out for free what data about you has been collected and processed, as well as requesting to correct the errors that occurred. You can also request deletion, restrict access, or object to the processing of personal data. If you have any complaints, contact the Swedish Data Protection Authority. You can send a complaint by e-mail: [email protected] or by phone +46 (0) 8 657 6100. To start the questionnaire, click on “agree with conditions described above”.

1. How old are you? week, 4 - every day, 5 - more than once a day, >20 6 - more than ten times a day, 7 - so much that 20-25 I can not count) 26-30 Vkontakte 31-40 Telegram 41-50 Facebook <50 Youtube 2. Your gender? Twitter man Instagram woman TikTok other Odnoklassniki 3. Where do you live? Live Journal In Belarus 12. In which social networking is your pri- In Russia mary audience? In one of the EU countries Vkontakte In the US Telegram other Facebook 4. What country do you cover in your posts? Youtube Belarus Twitter Russia Instagram 5. Do you consider yourself a blogger? TikTok Yes Odnoklassniki No Live Journal 6. Do you consider yourself a journalist? 13. What do your publications most often Yes focus on? (you can choose several options) No Social issues 7. Do you consider yourself an opinion Politics leader? Economy Yes Culture No Environment 8. Who can be considered as an opinion Sports leader? (names or definitions) Other 9. How many subscribers do you have on the 14. Have you faced any problems due to most used social network? your publications? 1000 to 5000 Yes, received administrative punishment From 5,000 to 10,000 Yes, underwent criminal prosecution 10,000 to 50,000 Yes, threats online 50,000 to 100,000 Yes, compulsory blocking of my publications, 100,000 to 500,000 pages and channels 500,000 to 1,000,000 Yes, prosecution or attention from the KGB, More than 1,000,000 the FSB 10. Who makes the posts on your blog? No I Other: My team and I 15. How openly can you express yourself in 11. What social networks do you use and social media that you use the most? Rate on how often? (0 - never, 1 - once or twice a year, a scale from 0 to 5 (where 0 - I can’t speak out; 2 - several times a month or less, 3 - every 1 - I can only touch upon certain non-political 61 topics; 2 - I can touch on politics, but only at 20. Do you think that the self-censorship of the local level; 3 - I can criticize officials, but your posts is primarily related to the politi- not the president; 4 - I can criticize everyone, cal situation in your country? including the president, but I select the words; Yes 5 - I can criticize everyone as I want). No 16. How often do you censor (soften the maybe wording, do not give names, etc.) of your I do not know posts before publication? (0 - never, 1 - Other: rarely, 2 - sometimes, 3 - depends on the situa- 21. Do you think that publications on social tion, 4 - quite often, 5 - always) networks on political topics can lead to neg- 17. How often do you edit your posts after ative consequences for you and your loved posting, and why? ones? 0 - never 1 - rarely 2 - sometimes 3 - depends yes, to administrative punishment on the situation 4 - often 5 - very often / always yes, to criminal punishment typos yes, to the persecution of the KGB or FSB Abusive Content Complaints yes, to threats and insults online source security no personal safety I do not know factual errors difficult to answer other Other: 18. How often do you edit your posts after 22. What can make you refuse to express posting, and why? 0 - never 1 - rarely 2 - your position on social networks openly? sometimes 3 - depends on the situation 4 - of- The threat of imprisonment ten 5 - very often / always The risk of job loss typos Threats to loved ones Abusive Content Complaints Competition with other bloggers and journal- source security ists personal safety Other: actual errors 23. Do you consider that the legislation on other the media (and Internet space) of your coun- 19. How openly can you criticize the follow- try: ing groups? (1 - almost can not, 2 - to some Provides freedom of speech and expression extent, 3 - depends on the circumstances, 4 - Restricts freedom of speech and expression quite openly, 5 - as much as I want). Difficult to answer local authorities Other: the president 24. Do you think that the actions of the au- Prime Minister thorities in your country: mayor governor contribute to freedom of speech businessmen impede freedom of speech the journalists depends on the topic of statements educational institutions difficult to answer church Other: health institutes strong structure

Appendix II. Code sheet Independent Variables

Variable Position Label age 1 age gender 2 gender country_of_focus 3 What country do you write about? are_you_blogger 4 Are you a blogger? are_you_journalist 5 Are you a journalist? are_you_opinion_leader 6 Are you an opinion leader? followers 7 How many followers do you have in the most used social media? posts_producer 8 Who produces content for your channel, page? country_of_residence 9 Where do you live? main_audience 10 In which social media is your main audience? topics 11 What are the main topics of your posts? problems_dueto_online_- 12 Have you had any problems due to your activity in social me- posts dia? self_censorship_political_sit- 31 Is self-censorship caused by political situation? uation negative_eﬀect_of_social_- 32 Can social media posts lead to negative eﬀects for you and media_posts your family? legislation_media 34 Does media legislation in your country guarantee or restrict freedom of speech and expression? authorities_media 35 Do authorities in your country provide or restrict freedom of speech and expression? Dependent Variables freedom_of_expression_on- 13 How open can you express yourself in the social media used line the most? self_censoring_posts 14 How often do you self-censor yourself before publishing a post? edit_posts_typos 15 Do you edit posts because of typos? edit_posts_complaints 16 Do you edit posts because of someone's complaints on it? edit_posts_sources_protec- 17 Do you edit posts for sources protection? tion edit_posts_personal_safety 18 Do you edit posts for personal safety? edit_posts_factual_mistakes 19 Do you edit posts because of factual mistakes? edit_posts_other 20 Do you edit posts for other reasons?

63 criticize_local_authorities 21 How openly can you criticize local authorities? criticize_president 22 How openly can you criticize president? criticize_prime_minister 23 How openly can you criticize prime minister? criticize_maoyr 24 How openly can you criticize mayor of your city? criticize_businessmen 25 How openly can you criticize businessmen? criticize_journalists 26 How openly can you criticize other journalists? criticize_educational_insitu- 27 How openly can you criticize educational institutions? tions criticize_law_enforcement 28 How openly can you criticize law enforcement institutions? criticize_church 29 How openly can you criticize church? criticize_healthcare 30 How openly can you criticize healthcare institutions? stop_publishing_if 33 Under which circumstances would you stop blogging?

Variable Values

Value Label

age 0 >20

1 20-25

2 26-30

3 31-40

4 41-50

5 <50

sex 1 male

2 female

country_of_focus 0 Belarus

1 Russia

are_you_blogger 0 Yes

1 No

are_you_journalist 0 Yes

1 No

are_you_opinion_leader 0 Yes

1 No

followers 1 From 1000 to 5000

2 From 5000 to 10000

3 From 10000 to 50000

4 From 50000 to 100000

5 From 100000 to 500000

6 From 500 000 to 1 000 00 posts_producer 1 Me

2 My team and me country_of_residence 0 Belarus

1 Russia

2 EU

3 US

4 UK

5 Georgia

6 Anonymous problems_dueto_on- 1 no line_posts 6 other

7 Yes, administrative charges

5 Yes, attention/pressure from KGB or FSB

2 Yes, criminal charges

4 Yes, forceful blocking of posts, pages or channels

3 Yes, threats online freedom_of_expres- 0 can not openly express myself sion_online 1 can only touch upon apolitical issues

2 can discuss local politics

3 can criticise oﬃcials but not the president

4 can criticise president but I am careful with words

5 I can criticise everyone without limitations self_censoring_posts 0 never

1 seldom

2 sometimes

3 depends on situation

4 rather often

5 always edit_posts_typos 0 never

1 seldom

2 sometimes

3 depends on situation

4 often 65

5 very often/always edit_posts_complaints 0 never

1 seldom

2 sometimes

3 depends on situation

4 often

5 very often/always edit_posts_- 0 never sources_protection 1 seldom

2 sometimes

3 depends on situation

4 often

5 very often/always edit_posts_person- 0 never al_safety 1 seldom

2 sometimes

3 depends on situation

4 often

5 very often/always edit_posts_factu- 0 never al_mistakes 1 seldom

2 sometimes

3 depends on situation

4 often

5 very often/always edit_posts_other 0 never

1 seldom

2 sometimes

3 depends on situation

4 often

5 very often/always criticize_local_authori- 1 almost can't ties 2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly 66

5 as much as I want criticize_president 1 almost can't

2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want criticize_prime_minister 1 almost can't

2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want criticize_maoyr 1 almost can't

2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want criticize_businessmen 1 almost can't

2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want criticize_journalists 1 almost can't

2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want criticize_education- 1 almost can't al_insitutions 2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want criticize_law_enforce- 1 almost can't ment 2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly 67

5 as much as I want criticize_church 1 almost can't

2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want criticize_healthcare 1 almost can't

2 to some extent

3 depends on situation

4 rather openly

5 as much as I want self_censorship_politi- 0 yes cal_situation 1 no

2 maybe

3 other

4 don't know negative_eﬀect_of_so- 0 diﬃcult to answer cial_media_posts 1 yes, to criminal charges

2 yes, to attention/pressure from secret services

3 yes, to online threats and insult

4 yes, to administrative charges

5 no

6 other

7 don't know stop_publishing_if 0 Threat of imprisonment

1 Threat of job loss

2 Threats to my family

3 Competition with other bloggers and journalists

4 Other legislation_media 0 restricts freedom of speech and expression

1 depends on topic

2 guarantees freedom of speech and expression

3 diﬃcult to answer

4 other authorities_media 0 restrict freedom of speech and expression 68

1 depends on topic

2 guarantee freedom of speech and expression

4 other

Appendix III. List of the analyzed legislative acts

• Federalnij Zakon "Ob Infromacii, Informacionnih Technologijah I Zashchite Informacii” (31-F3). Retrieved from website of the Russian government: http://kremlin.ru/acts/ bank/44084 • Narushenije Zakonodatelstva o sredstvah massovoj informatsii. Kodeks Respubliki Belarus ob administrativnyh pravonarushenijah (22.9, 194-3). Minsk: Retrieved from the webside of Kodeks.by: https://kodeksy-by.com/koap_rb/22.9.htm • Оb Utverzhdenii Polozheniya O Poriadke Predvaritelnoj Identifikatcii Polzovatelej Inter- net-resursa, Setevogo Izdanija (№ 850). Minsk. Retrieved from website Natsionalnij pravovoj Internet-Portal Respubliki Belarus http://Www.Government.By/Ru/Content/8427 • O Sredstvah Massovoj Informacii (№128.3, 2008, 2018). Minsk. Retrieved from website of Ministerstvo Informatsii Respubliki Belarus http://Mininform.Gov.By/Upload/Iblock/8dc/8d- ca9553743c798b828f2f980aa15248.Pdf • The Criminal Code Of The Russian Federation (Article 281.1-article 282.2.). 13 June 1996, Pp. 144-145. Retrieved from https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ru/ru080en.pdf • Zakon Respubliki Belarus, O Protivodejstvii Ekstremizmu (№ 203-З). Minsk. Retrieved from website pravo.by: http://www.pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=H10700203

Appendix IV

The sсreenshot of the random number generation

Appendix V

The following figures present the most popular topics covered by political bloggers in Russia and Belarus in the period of 1-15 February 2020 (see subchapter 4.2).

FIGURE 8. TOPICS COVERED BY POLITICAL BLOGGERS IN BELARUS

FIGURE 9. TOPICS COVERED BY POLITICAL BLOGGERS IN RUSSIA

FIGURE 10. TOPICS COVERED BY POLITICAL BLOGGERS IN BELARUS AND RUS- SIA