ASPJ–Africa and Francophonie Winter 2009
Winter 2009 Inaugural Issue Lt Col Timothy Cullen, USAF Cullen, Timothy Col Lt
aérienne au Soudan au aérienne
Analogies séduisantes et limites de la coercition employant la puissance puissance la employant coercition la de limites et séduisantes Analogies Sauver le Darfour le Sauver The Requirement for a Future Strategy
Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired
Stephen F. Burgess, PhD Burgess, F. Stephen
Corne de l’Afrique de Corne Remarks to the Ghanaian Parliament Stabilisation, construction de la paix et durabilité au sein de la la de sein au durabilité et paix la de construction Stabilisation, Accra International Conference Center, Accra, Ghana (West Africa)
Barack H. Obama, President of the United States of America
Lt Col Robert Munson, USAFR Munson, Robert Col Lt
Les réflexions d’un historien sur le Commandement africain Commandement le sur historien d’un réflexions Les Stay Out
en Afrique ? Afrique en Why Intervention Should Not Be America’s Policy Est-ce que nous voulons « tuer des gens et casser des choses » » choses des casser et gens des tuer « voulons nous que Est-ce James Wood Forsyth Jr.
B. Chance Saltzman
Abel Esterhuyse, PhD Esterhuyse, Abel
AFRICOM du point de vue sud-africain vue de point du AFRICOM The Iraqization of Africa? L’irakisation de l’Afrique ? l’Afrique de L’irakisation Looking at AFRICOM from a South African Perspective
Abel Esterhuyse, PhD
B. Chance Saltzman Chance B.
James Wood Forsyth Jr. Jr. Forsyth Wood James Do We Want to “Kill People and Break Things” in Africa?
Pourquoi l’intervention ne devrait pas être la politique de l’Amérique de politique la être pas devrait ne l’intervention Pourquoi A Historian’s Thoughts on Africa Command
Ne pas se mêler se pas Ne Lt Col Robert Munson, USAFR
Barack H. Obama, président des états-Unis d’Amérique états-Unis des président Obama, H. Barack Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in
Au Palais international des congrès, Accra, Ghana (Afrique de l’Ouest) de (Afrique Ghana Accra, congrès, des international Palais Au the Horn of Africa
Discours au parlement ghanéen parlement au Discours Stephen F. Burgess, PhD
John A. Shaud, général (c.f.), USAF (c.f.), général Shaud, A. John Saving Darfur Le besoin d’une future stratégie future d’une besoin Le Seductive Analogies and the Limits of Airpower Coercion in Sudan
Lt Col Timothy Cullen, USAF
Édition inaugurale Édition 2009 Hiver ASPJ–Afrique et Francophonie Hiver 2009 ASPJ–Afrique et Francophonie
http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/aspj_f/Index.asp
2009-4 outside cover 1.indd 1 1/20/10 10:25:03 AM Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Norton A. Schwartz
Commander, Air Education and Training Command http://www.af.mil Gen Stephen R. Lorenz
Commander, Air University Lt Gen Allen G. Peck
Director, Air Force Research Institute Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired
Editor Rémy M. Mauduit http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Professional Staff Col Robyn S. Read, USAF, Retired Military Defense Analyst Col John Conway, USAF, Retired Military Defense Analyst Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Nedra O. Looney, Prepress Production Manager
The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1931-728X), published http://www.au.af.mil quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors ASPJ—Africa and Francophonie and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction 155 N. Twining Street of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or U.S.A. departments of the US government. Telephone: 1 (334) 953-6739 e-mail: [email protected] Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air & Space Visit Air and Space Power Journal online Power Journal requests a courtesy line. at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil http://www.af.mil/subscribe Winter 2009 Inaugural Issue
Editorial
ASPJ — Africa and Francophonie ...... 3 Remy .M . .Mauduit
Feature Articles
The Requirement for a Future Strategy ...... 5 John .A . .Shaud, .General, .USAF, .Retired, Director,. Air. Force Research Institute
Remarks to the Ghanaian Parliament: Accra International Conference Center, Accra, Ghana (West Africa) ...... 7 Barack H. .Obama, . .President .of .the .United .States .of .America
Stay Out: Why Intervention Should Not Be America’s Policy ...... 14 James .Wood .Forsyth .Jr . .and .B . .Chance .Saltzman
The Iraqization of Africa? Looking at AFRICOM from a South African Perspective ...... 21 Abel .Esterhuyse, .PhD
Do We Want to “Kill People and Break Things” in Africa? A Historian’s Thoughts on Africa Command ...... 35 Robert .Munson, .Lieutenant .Colonel, .USAFR .
Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa ...... 45 Stephen .F . .Burgess, .PhD .
Saving Darfur: Seductive Analogies and the Limits of Airpower Coercion in Sudan ...... 72 Timothy Cullen,. .Lieutenant .Colonel, .USAF
E-Contents.indd 1 1/12/10 11:11:26 AM Book Reviews
Regime Changes: A U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 ...... 93 Robert .S .Litwak .
Electoral Systems and Democracy ...... 94 Edited by:. Larry. .Diamond . and .Marc .F . .Plattner
E-Contents.indd 2 1/12/10 11:11:27 AM ASPJ — Africa and Francophonie
Welcome to the inaugural issue of Air and Space Power Journal–Africa and Francophonie (ASPJ– A&F). Air and Space Power Journal has published journals in English, Spanish and Portuguese since the 1940s. Editions in Arabic and French were launched in 2005, and a Chinese edition fol- lowed in 2007. Recognizing the importance of Africa and the broad French-speaking areas in the world, we are proud to announce the birth of ASPJ–A&F, a refinement of the current French edition. The enhanced edition will continue to reflect Air University’s philosophy of openness and transparency to the global community, which is the foundation of the Air Force Research Institute’s vision and mission. This evolutionary publication will inherit the French-language ASPJ’s network of libraries, research centers, government agencies, embassies, and so forth, in 103 countries, as well as a wide range of audiences in 32 francophone countries. The Africa and Francophonie edition will be published in French and English for readers in the African conti- nent and French–speaking world: more than 80 countries. Like its predecessor, ASPJ–A&F embodies the spirit of democratic ideals, intellectual indepen- dence, critical analysis, vigorous and scholarly research, and realistic methodologies. It continues the US Air Force tradition of intellectual curiosity unconstrained by scope, subject matter and prevailing thought relative to air, space and cyberspace power and employment. The new journal covers all areas of activity of the world’s air forces and the armed forces in general, as well as their operational environment, both national and international. Air University and the Air Force Research Institute are proud of their history of developing air, space, and cyberspace power-projection concepts applicable to mutual national security and defense worldwide. In addition, the University and the Institute are fortunate to possess the capability to advance those conceptual tenets through vigorous research and education pro- grams that span the professional military education continuum. We believe that professional development is greatly enhanced by the free exchange of information, ideas, and viewpoints with our allies and friends. Critical thought, intellectual discussions, and scholarly writing relative to the military profession increase the range of potential solutions to the international challenges faced by our armed forces. Air University schools are internationally regarded for developing warrior-scholars, and the various editions of the Air and Space Power Journal provide a credible and well-recognized forum for advancing the innovative and rigorously tested ideas of our students. The Journal also provides an excellent venue for extending the international security dialogue globally, and we therefore encourage our readers to employ these publications to enrich that dialogue. We welcome the opportunity to consider unsolicited work from our readers. All editions of ASPJ encourage and promote professional dialogue among the world’s airmen and soldiers in order to showcase the best ideas to be exploited by air and space forces fulfilling national and international objectives. Our goal is to provide a forum for aviators, members of the armed forces and specialists in African Affairs and Francophonie to discuss subjects of common interest; stimulate new ideas that will make the best use of air, space and cyberspace power; and encourage military professionalism.
01-Editorial.indd 3 1/12/10 11:12:17 AM This new publication reflects the importance we place on our military and civilian colleagues. We believe we can greatly benefit from their innovative and strategic thinking. It focuses on the specific needs and various interests of African and French-speaking militaries around the world. Again, we encourage our readers to recognize the importance of global engagement in the current international environment and to employ the ASPJ–A&F to spur that necessary engagement. We hope to exchange ideas, compare experiences, and explore new opportunities with the airmen, soldiers, and experts from all countries with the aim of advancing the skills of the world’s armed forces. There are a wide range of relevant and important ideas that must be examined in depth––even debated vigorously–– at a time when the military profession is undergoing significant changes to its perspective, equipment, structure, and probable methods for conducting future operations. I therefore hope that our exchanges, which are the substance of this journal, would be frank and open. ASPJ–A&F seeks to maintain openness and share knowledge with the world. It is a forum where different currents meet. We do not want to promote a preconceived idea or advocate a ready-made concept; rather, we are committed to providing the most accurate possible reflection of the world’s armed forces. We are witnesses, not judges. Accordingly, ASPJ–A&F does not col- late negative reviews––or polemic––nor is it journalism. That is why we chose simply to provide reading materials and entrust our readers with judgment and critique. Because this role also applies to other cultures and languages, we will continue to publish articles of substance as well as thought pieces, leaving the floor open to academics, aviators/soldiers of all ranks, experts, and civilian/military decision makers of various opinions and nationalities. In reality, this open- ness is a certain vocation of quest and discovery.
Rémy M. Mauduit, Editor Air & Space Power Journal—Africa and Francophonie Maxwell AFB, Alabama
01-Editorial.indd 4 1/12/10 11:12:17 AM The Requirement for a Future Strategy
John A. Shaud, General, USAF, Retired, Director, Air Force Research Institute Maxwell AFB, Alabama
We must also look at the world as it is, First, our leaders must institute a balance not as we’d like it to be, and we must between meeting the needs of the present and acknowledge that much of the world preparing for those of the future. This is not does not necessarily see us as we would an either/or proposition; both are essential strategic tasks. Our country finds itself in a see ourselves. And we must look clear- particularly difficult era with respect to this eyed beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. strategic component because of the imme- Only with that understanding can we diacy of the present conflicts and the ill-defi- determine where we want to go and how ned nature of the future threat. Achieving our we want to get there. But as this vision strategic objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan develops, we must keep in mind that after removing the regimes in those two coun- it is no good if we cannot provide the tries has required our forces to develop new means to achieve it, nor is it useful if skills and operating concepts in the crucible of irregular warfare. While critics may argue it is not a realistic fit with the rest of about the decision to become involved milita- the world. rily or about the pace of progress, no one can —Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), dispute that US and coalition forces have 10 July 2008 demonstrated unparalleled operational flexi- bility in adapting to the post–9/11 environ- irst of all, I want to take this opportu- ment. That adaptation has provided the fled- nity to thank former Air Force secre- gling democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan tary Mike Wynne and Gen Buzz Mose- time and security to organize and start the process of resolving core issues for their socie- ley for their many contributions to our ties. Regardless of the justifiable pride in our FAir Force. Among these contributions are the progress, we must seek to do even better in establishment of the Air Force Research Insti- the near term. We must also integrate the les- tute, the Strategic Studies Quarterly and ASPJ sons from this experience into our Services so Africa & Francophonie. We will do our best to that they become part and parcel of our doc- live up to their great expectations. trines, organizations, and capabilities. Today, our Air Force is the best in the world. Regarding the future, our challenge is to However, to remain the best we must take on present to our national leaders a realistic some of the most critical challenges we have assessment of the threats we expect to face. ever faced—especially with regard to moder- With the fall of the Soviet Union, our national nization. Having said that, in my view, the security planning lost its focal point. Instead most significant challenge all of us in the mili- of a single enemy against which to plan, pro- tary face today concerns developing a unifying gram, and budget our military capabilities, we strategy that will guide our contributions to now find few states that confront our interests solving the problems our nation confronts. and capabilities directly in the same way the This challenge has at least two components. Soviets had. Instead, we see failing states,
Shaud.indd 5 1/12/10 12:00:17 PM ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE
humanitarian disasters, genocides, transnatio- This intellectual activity requires research, nal criminals, and the rise of transnational discussion, debate, and engagement with a terrorism. The picture becomes even more wide range of public policy, strategy, acade- complicated with the addition of interconnec- mic, and defense professionals. On occasion ted trends spawned by globalization, environ- we will find that our partners in these discus- mental degradation, global demographic sions will disagree with our perspectives—that imbalance, and energy and resource scarcity. This stream of nontraditional challenges is part of the process. We need to be effective came into sharp relief in the form of the ter- and knowledgeable advocates of our positions rorist attacks on 11 September 2001—we are as Airmen as well as sufficiently confident to no longer in just a post–Cold War era, we find listen carefully to the range of perspectives ourselves also in the post–9/11 era. But as presented by those outside our community or important and immediate as the complex technical specialties. Our charge is to synthe- threats that coalesced into the terrorists size the best options for securing the nation attacks of 9/11 are, their immediacy can tend by engaging with the most creative, percep- to obscure potential threats from nation-state tive, professional, and thoughtful people who, adversaries. To repeat, this is not an either/or like us, dedicate themselves to providing for proposition—our national security depends on fielding capabilities and forces to cope our nation’s security. with the full range of security challenges. Research, debate, publication, outreach, The second component of our strategic and engagement are some of the lines of ope- challenge involves presenting options that ration that converge into solutions to these provide national leaders and operational components of strategy. Those of us in the commanders the flexibility to gain a return military, in the government, and in academia on our Services’ investments in training, orga- must evaluate our progress, question our nizing, and equipping. This is an intellectual assumptions, and propose creative alternati- challenge that requires us to question our ves that help us confront the complex chal- preconceived notions of how best to employ lenges of today’s and tomorrow’s global secu- military capabilities to serve the national inte- rity environment. Strategic Studies Quarterly rest. It requires integrating policy develop- ment with planning and programming rather and ASPJ Africa & Francophonie are one forum than dealing with those essential activities as if for these exchanges to take place—I look they were divorced from each other and from forward to participating in these engagements the ends of strategy and national defense. as we move ahead. ❏
Shaud.indd 6 1/12/10 12:00:17 PM Remarks to the Ghanaian Parliament Accra International Conference Center, Accra, Ghana (West Africa)
Barack H. Obama, President of the United States of America
ood afternoon, everybody. It is a democracy can help advance human rights great honor for me to be in Accra for people everywhere. and to speak to the representatives So I do not see the countries and peoples of the people of Ghana. I am deeply of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a Ggrateful for the welcome that I’ve received, as fundamental part of our interconnected are Michelle and Malia and Sasha Obama. world, as partners with America on behalf of Ghana’s history is rich, the ties between our the future we want for all of our children. two countries are strong, and I am proud that That partnership must be grounded in this is my first visit to sub-Saharan Africa as mutual responsibility and mutual respect. President of the United States of America. And that is what I want to speak with you I want to thank Madam Speaker and all about today. the members of the House of Representati- We must start from the simple premise ves for hosting us today. I want to thank Pre- that Africa’s future is up to Africans. sident Mills for his outstanding leadership. To I say this knowing full well the tragic past that has sometimes haunted this part of the the former Presidents—Jerry Rawlings, for- world. After all, I have the blood of Africa mer President Kufuor—Vice President, within me, and my family’s, my family’s own Chief Justice—thanks to all of you for your story encompasses both the tragedies and extraordinary hospitality and the wonderful triumphs of the larger African story. institutions that you’ve built here in Ghana. Some of you know my grandfather was a I’m speaking to you at the end of a long cook for the British in Kenya, and though he trip. I began in Russia for a summit between was a respected elder in his village, his two great powers. I traveled to Italy for a employers called him “boy” for much of his meeting of the world’s leading economies. life. He was on the periphery of Kenya’s libe- And I’ve come here to Ghana for a simple ration struggles, but he was still imprisoned reason: The 21st century will be shaped by briefly during repressive times. In his life, what happens not just in Rome or Moscow or colonialism wasn’t simply the creation of Washington, but by what happens in Accra, unnatural borders or unfair terms of trade— as well. it was something experienced personally, day This is the simple truth of a time when the after day, year after year. boundaries between people are overwhelmed My father grew up herding goats in a tiny by our connections. Your prosperity can village, an impossible distance away from the expand America’s prosperity. Your health American universities where he would come and security can contribute to the world’s to get an education. He came of age at a health and security. And the strength of your moment of extraordinary promise for Africa.
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The struggles of his own father’s generation mistake: It will ultimately be more significant. were giving birth to new nations, beginning For just as it is important to emerge from right here in Ghana. Africans were educating the control of other nations, it is even more and asserting themselves in new ways, and important to build one’s own nation. history was on the move. So I believe that this moment is just as But despite the progress that has been promising for Ghana and for Africa as the made—and there has been considerable moment when my father came of age and progress in many parts of Africa—we also new nations were being born. This is a new know that much of that promise has yet to be moment of great promise. Only this time, fulfilled. Countries like Kenya had a per we’ve learned that it will not be giants like capita economy larger than South Korea’s Nkrumah and Kenyatta who will determine when I was born. They have badly been out- Africa’s future. Instead, it will be you—the paced. Disease and conflict have ravaged men and women in Ghana’s parliament, the parts of the African continent. people you represent. It will be the young In many places, the hope of my father’s people brimming with talent and energy generation gave way to cynicism, even des- and hope who can claim the future that so pair.Now, it’s easy to point fingers and to many in previous generations never realized. pin the blame of these problems on others. Now, to realize that promise, we must first Yes, a colonial map that made little sense recognize the fundamental truth that you helped to breed conflict. The West has often have given life to in Ghana: Development approached Africa as a patron or a source depends on good governance. That is the of resources rather than a partner. But the ingredient which has been missing in far too West is not responsible for the destruction many places, for far too long. That’s the of the Zimbabwean economy over the last change that can unlock Africa’s potential. And decade, or wars in which children are enlis- that is a responsibility that can only be met ted as combatants. In my father’s life, it was by Africans. partly tribalism and patronage and nepo- As for America and the West, our commit- tism in an independent Kenya that for a ment must be measured by more than just long stretch derailed his career, and we the dollars we spend. I’ve pledged substan- know that this kind of corruption is still a tial increases in our foreign assistance, which daily fact of life for far too many. is in Africa’s interests and America’s Now, we know that’s also not the whole interests. But the true sign of success is not story. Here in Ghana, you show us a face of whether we are a source of perpetual aid that Africa that is too often overlooked by a world helps people scrape by it’s whether we are that sees only tragedy or a need for partners in building the capacity for trans- charity. The people of Ghana have worked formational change. hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, This mutual responsibility must be the with repeated peaceful transfers of power foundation of our partnership. And today, even in the wake of closely contested I’ll focus on four areas that are critical to the elections. And by the way, can I say that for future of Africa and the entire developing that the minority deserves as much credit as world: democracy, opportunity, health, and the majority. And with improved governance the peaceful resolution of conflict. and an emerging civil society, Ghana’s eco- First, we must support strong and sustainable nomy has shown impressive rates of growth. democratic governments. This progress may lack the drama of 20th As I said in Cairo, each nation gives life to century liberation struggles, but make no democracy in its own way, and in line with its
Obama.indd 8 1/12/10 12:01:01 PM PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA
own traditions. But history offers a clear helped prosecute the first human trafficker verdict: Governments that respect the will of in Ghana. We see it in the young people their own people, that govern by consent who are speaking up against patronage, and and not coercion, are more prosperous, they participating in the political process. are more stable, and more successful than Across Africa, we’ve seen countless exam- governments that do not. ples of people taking control of their des- This is about more than just holding tiny, and making change from the bottom elections. It’s also about what happens up. We saw it in Kenya, where civil society between elections. Repression can take many and business came together to help stop forms, and too many nations, even those that post-election violence. We saw it in South have elections, are plagued by problems that Africa, where over three-quarters of the condemn their people to poverty. No country country voted in the recent election—the is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit fourth since the end of Apartheid. We saw it the economy to enrich themselves or if police in Zimbabwe, where the Election Support can be bought off by drug traffickers. No Network braved brutal repression to stand business wants to invest in a place where the up for the principle that a person’s vote is government skims 20 percent off the top or their sacred right. the head of the Port Authority is corrupt. No Now, make no mistake: History is on the person wants to live in a society where the side of these brave Africans, not with those rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality who use coups or change constitutions to and bribery. That is not democracy, that is stay in power. Africa doesn’t need strong- tyranny, even if occasionally you sprinkle an men, it needs strong institutions. election in there. And now is the time for Now, America will not seek to impose any that style of governance to end. system of government on any other nation. In the 21st century, capable, reliable, The essential truth of democracy is that and transparent institutions are the key to each nation determines its own destiny. But success—strong parliaments; honest police what America will do is increase assistance forces; independent judges; an indepen- for responsible individuals and responsible dent press; a vibrant private sector; a civil institutions, with a focus on supporting society. Those are the things that give life good governance—on parliaments, which to democracy, because that is what matters check abuses of power and ensure that in people’s everyday lives. opposition voices are heard; on the rule of Now, time and again, Ghanaians have law, which ensures the equal administration chosen constitutional rule over autocracy, of justice; on civic participation, so that and shown a democratic spirit that allows young people get involved; and on concrete the energy of your people to break solutions to corruption like forensic accoun- through. We see that in leaders who accept ting and automating services strengthening defeat graciously—the fact that President hotlines, protecting whistle-blowers to Mills’ opponents were standing beside him advance transparency and accountability. last night to greet me when I came off the And we provide this support. I have plane spoke volumes about Ghana; victors directed my administration to give greater who resist calls to wield power against the attention to corruption in our human rights opposition in unfair ways. We see that spirit reports. People everywhere should have the in courageous journalists like Anas Aremeyaw right to start a business or get an education Anas, who risked his life to report the truth. without paying a bribe. We have a responsi- We see it in police like Patience Quaye, who bility to support those who act responsibly
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and to isolate those who don’t, and that is end in itself. The purpose of foreign assis- exactly what America will do. tance must be creating the conditions Now, this leads directly to our second area where it’s no longer needed. I want to see of partnership: supporting development that Ghanaians not only self-sufficient in food, I provides opportunity for more people. want to see you exporting food to other With better governance, I have no doubt countries and earning money. You can do that. that Africa holds the promise of a broader Now, America can also do more to pro- base of prosperity. Witness the extraordinary mote trade and investment. Wealthy nations success of Africans in my country, America. must open our doors to goods and services They’re doing very well. So they’ve got the from Africa in a meaningful way. That will talent, they’ve got the entrepreneurial spi- be a commitment of my administration. And rit. The question is, how do we make sure where there is good governance, we can that they’re succeeding here in their home broaden prosperity through public-private countries? The continent is rich in natural partnerships that invest in better roads and resources. And from cell phone entrepre- electricity; capacity-building that trains peo- neurs to small farmers, Africans have shown ple to grow a business; financial services that the capacity and commitment to create their reach not just the cities but also the poor own opportunities. But old habits must also and rural areas. This is also in our own inte- be broken. Dependence on commodities— rests—for if people are lifted out of poverty or a single export—has a tendency to and wealth is created in Africa, guess what? concentrate wealth in the hands of the few, New markets will open up for our own and leaves people too vulnerable to down- goods. So it’s good for both. turns. One area that holds out both undeniable So in Ghana, for instance, oil brings peril and extraordinary promise is energy. great opportunities, and you have been Africa gives off less greenhouse gas than any very responsible in preparing for new other part of the world, but it is the most revenue. But as so many Ghanaians know, threatened by climate change. A warming oil cannot simply become the new planet will spread disease, shrink water cocoa. From South Korea to Singapore, resources, and deplete crops, creating history shows that countries thrive when conditions that produce more famine and they invest in their people and in their more conflict. All of us—particularly the infrastructure; when they promote multi- developed world—have a responsibility to ple export industries, develop a skilled slow these trends—through mitigation, and workforce, and create space for small and by changing the way that we use energy. But medium-sized businesses that create jobs. we can also work with Africans to turn this As Africans reach for this promise, Ame- crisis into opportunity. rica will be more responsible in extending Together, we can partner on behalf of our our hand. By cutting costs that go to Wes- planet and prosperity, and help countries tern consultants and administration, we increase access to power while skipping— want to put more resources in the hands of leapfrogging the dirtier phase of develop- those who need it, while training people to ment. Think about it: Across Africa, there is do more for themselves. That’s why our bountiful wind and solar power; geothermal $3.5 billion food security initiative is energy and biofuels. From the Rift Valley to focused on new methods and technologies the North African deserts; from the Western for farmers—not simply sending American coasts to South Africa’s crops—Africa’s producers or goods to Africa. Aid is not an boundless natural gifts can generate its own
Obama.indd 10 1/12/10 12:01:02 PM PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 11
power, while exporting profitable, clean because in the 21st century, we are called to energy abroad. act by our conscience but also by our com- These steps are about more than growth mon interest, because when a child dies of a numbers on a balance sheet. They’re about preventable disease in Accra, that dimi- whether a young person with an education nishes us everywhere. And when disease can get a job that supports a family; a farmer goes unchecked in any corner of the world, can transfer their goods to market; an entre- we know that it can spread across oceans preneur with a good idea can start a and continents. business. It’s about the dignity of work; it’s And that’s why my administration has com- about the opportunity that must exist for mitted $63 billion to meet these challenges— Africans in the 21st century. $63 billion. Building on the strong efforts of Just as governance is vital to opportunity, President Bush, we will carry forward the it’s also critical to the third area I want to talk fight against HIV/AIDS. We will pursue the about: strengthening public health. goal of ending deaths from malaria and In recent years, enormous progress has tuberculosis, and we will work to eradicate been made in parts of Africa. Far more polio. We will fight—we will fight neglected people are living productively with HIV/ tropical disease. And we won’t confront ill- AIDS, and getting the drugs they need. I nesses in isolation—we will invest in public just saw a wonderful clinic and hospital health systems that promote wellness and that is focused particularly on maternal focus on the health of mothers and children. health. But too many still die from diseases Now, as we partner on behalf of a heal- that shouldn’t kill them. When children thier future, we must also stop the destruc- are being killed because of a mosquito bite, tion that comes not from illness, but from and mothers are dying in childbirth, then human beings—and so the final area that I we know that more progress must be made. will address is conflict. Yet because of incentives—often provided Let me be clear: Africa is not the crude by donor nations—many African doctors and caricature of a continent at perpetual war. But nurses go overseas, or work for programs if we are honest, for far too many Africans, that focus on a single disease. And this creates conflict is a part of life, as constant as the gaps in primary care and basic prevention. sun. There are wars over land and wars over Meanwhile, individual Africans also have to resources. And it is still far too easy for those make responsible choices that prevent the without conscience to manipulate whole spread of disease, while promoting public communities into fighting among faiths and health in their communities and coun- tribes. tries. These conflicts are a millstone around Afri- So across Africa, we see examples of peo- ca’s neck. Now, we all have many identities—of ple tackling these problems. In Nigeria, an tribe and ethnicity; of religion and Interfaith effort of Christians and Muslims nationality. But defining oneself in opposi- has set an example of cooperation to confront tion to someone who belongs to a different malaria. Here in Ghana and across Africa, we tribe, or who worships a different prophet, see innovative ideas for filling gaps in care— has no place in the 21st century. Africa’s for instance, through E-Health initiatives that diversity should be a source of strength, not allow doctors in big cities to support those in a cause for division. We are all God’s small towns. children. We all share common aspirations— America will support these efforts through to live in peace and security; to access edu- a comprehensive, global health strategy, cation and opportunity; to love our families
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and our communities and our faith. That is advance the security of America, Africa, and our common humanity. the world. That is why we must stand up to inhuma- In Moscow, I spoke of the need for an nity in our midst. It is never justified—never international system where the universal justifiable to target innocents in the name rights of human beings are respected, and of ideology. It is the death sentence of a violations of those rights are opposed. And society to force children to kill in wars. It is that must include a commitment to support the ultimate mark of criminality and cowar- those who resolve conflicts peacefully, to dice to condemn women to relentless and sanction and stop those who don’t, and to systemic rape. We must bear witness to the help those who have suffered. But ultimately, value of every child in Darfur and the dignity it will be vibrant democracies like Botswana of every woman in the Congo. No faith or and Ghana which roll back the causes of culture should condone the outrages against conflict and advance the frontiers of peace them. And all of us must strive for the peace and prosperity. and security necessary for progress. As I said earlier, Africa’s future is up to Africans are standing up for this future. Africans. The people of Africa are ready to claim Here, too, in Ghana we are seeing you help that future. And in my country, African point the way forward. Ghanaians should Americans—including so many recent take pride in your contributions to peace- immigrants—have thrived in every sector keeping from Congo to Liberia to Lebanon, of society. We’ve done so despite a difficult and your efforts to resist the scourge of the past, and we’ve drawn strength from our drug trade. We welcome the steps that are African heritage. With strong institutions being taken by organizations like the Afri- and a strong will, I know that Africans can can Union and ECOWAS to better resolve live their dreams in Nairobi and Lagos, conflicts, to keep the peace, and support Kigali, Kinshasa, Harare, and right here in those in need. And we encourage the vision Accra. of a strong, regional security architecture You know, 52 years ago, the eyes of the that can bring effective, transnational forces world were on Ghana. And a young preacher to bear when needed. named Martin Luther King traveled here, to America has a responsibility to work with Accra, to watch the Union Jack come down you as a partner to advance this vision, not and the Ghanaian flag go up. This was just with words, but with support that before the march on Washington or the suc- strengthens African capacity. When there’s a cess of the civil rights movement in my genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, country. Dr. King was asked how he felt these are not simply African problems—they while watching the birth of a nation. And he are global security challenges, and they said: “It renews my conviction in the ulti- demand a global response. mate triumph of justice.” And that’s why we stand ready to partner Now that triumph must be won once more, through diplomacy and technical assistance and it must be won by you. And I am particu- and logistical support, and we will stand larly speaking to the young people all across behind efforts to hold war criminals Africa and right here in Ghana. In places like accountable. And let me be clear: Our Ghana, young people make up over half of Africa Command is focused not on esta- the population. blishing a foothold in the continent, but on And here is what you must know: The confronting these common challenges to world will be what you make of it. You have
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the power to hold your leaders accounta- Opportunity won’t come from any other place, ble, and to build institutions that serve the though. It must come from the decisions that people. You can serve in your communities, all of you make, the things that you do, the and harness your energy and education to hope that you hold in your heart. create new wealth and build new connec- Ghana, freedom is your inheritance. tions to the world. You can conquer disease, Now, it is your responsibility to build upon and end conflicts, and make change from freedom’s foundation. And if you do, we the bottom up. You can do that. Yes you will look back years from now to places like can because in this moment, history is on Accra and say this was the time when the the move. promise was realized; this was the moment But these things can only be done if all of when prosperity was forged, when pain was you take responsibility for your future. And it overcome, and a new era of progress began. won’t be easy. It will take time and effort. This can be the time when we witness the There will be suffering and setbacks. But I can triumph of justice once more. Yes we can. promise you this: America will be with you Thank you very much. God bless you. every step of the way—as a partner, as a friend. Thank you. ❏
Obama.indd 13 1/12/10 12:01:03 PM Stay Out Why Intervention Should Not Be America’s Policy
James Wood Forsyth Jr. B. Chance Saltzman
he wars in Iraq and Afghanis- world stem from the greatest powers, tan dominate security dis- the smallest from the smallest ones. And course. With thousands of lives make no mistake; intervention opera- lost and billions of dollars tions to rid the world of terror are a Tspent, few issues merit more attention. short-run concern. In the long run, the Yet it is worthwhile to remember that balance of power among states in the these wars, like all wars, will end. And world poses the greatest challenge to when they do, policy makers will come US security and, in this regard, the Uni- to terms with a harsh, albeit forgotten, ted States is in a precarious position. reality: The ruling of distant peoples, as Large-scale economic changes, together George Kennan so aptly put it, is not with ongoing wars, have placed the Uni- “our dish.” The United States should ted States in a relatively weaker position steer clear of “an acceptance of any sort with respect to its rivals than it was eight of paternalistic responsibility to anyone years ago. In economic terms, the costs be it in the form of military occupation, have been staggering, with estimates as if we can possibly avoid it, or for any high as $3 trillion. In military terms, period longer than is absolutely neces- even if the United States were to achieve sary.”1 Simply put, intervention might its war aims, American forces are less have been our fate, but it should not be capable than they were in 2000.2 Conti- our policy. nual deployments, along with the accom- From a practical perspective, the US panying wear and tear on personnel and experience with intervention has not equipment, have left the American mili- been a happy one. Guatemala, Iran, tary in desperate need of replenishment. Cuba, and Vietnam add up to a bad sco- As the new administration has made recard, and recent events have conti- clear, coming to terms with these struc- nued this negative trend. What is exceptio- tural challenges will be demanding.3 nal about America’s recent interventions, Harder still is trying to find another case however, is how well they have camoufla- that rivals or even approximates the Uni- ged a fundamental truth about internatio- ted States’ relative decline, the pitch and nal politics: The greatest dangers in the speed of which appear unusual.
James Wood Forsyth, Jr. PhD. Professor of Political Science and National Security Policy. School of Advanced Air and Space Studies B. Chance Saltzman. Lieutenant Colonel, USAF. National Security Fellow, Harvard University
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While the decline is real, it is important ther way of saying that the history of to stress that the United States remains world politics is primarily a history of the most powerful nation in the world, inequality. Policy makers would do well and the choices it makes today will affect to recognize this, lest the United States it in the future. As recent history illustrates, finds itself intervening to right wrongs in global change can come quickly and only interesting places throughout the world somewhat predictably. The dramatic end of to no avail. the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union serve as stark reminders of the timing and tempo of international Curbing the Demand life. The strategic insight of those events for Intervention should not be lost on policy makers: Curbing the demand for intervention Great powers rise slowly but can fall quic- hinges on several factors, not the least of kly. As the United States positions itself which is the choices statesmen make for the coming years, it is worth noting regarding international order. In esta- that there are potential challengers on blishing and sustaining international the horizon. With the world’s largest order, great powers have two options. population and a promising economy, They can dominate rivals, or they can China is the dominant power in Asia. In accommodate them. Should a state Europe, it is Germany. Both dwarf regio- choose to dominate rivals, making its nal rivals and have the capacity to domi- security contingent on its ability to sur- nate them should they ever decide to do pass all others, it will enter into what has so. With respect to its neighbors, India is historically proven to be a poor game, in equally strong, while Russia’s power, which the costs of domination are severe. especially if measured in terms of mega- Should a state choose to accommodate tonnage, is matched only by the United rivals, making its security is contingent States. In the world of tomorrow, Ame- on its ability to balance against others, it rica might rue the day when it chose to will enter into what has proven to be a make intervention its most pressing secu- somewhat less poor game, in which the rity concern. How the United States res- costs of balancing are less. Statesmen ponds to pressures to intervene could know this in advance, which is why shrewd determine the fate of the nation. states seek accommodation. The debate about intervention will continue to be fueled by those who International Order and Failed States believe liberty and wealth can cure the world’s ills. Concerns will also be heard Few issues threaten international order from those who shy away from the use of more so than failed states. That is the force unless it is used to right a wrong. It central claim of Thomas Barnett’s popu- is important to stress that while liberty is lar book, The Pentagon’s New Map. Bar- preferable to all other options and nett argues that the United States cannot poverty remains a scourge on the human be made safe at the expense of others. In race, neither fostering liberty nor ending this increasingly interconnected world, poverty can secure world peace. The “our vulnerability is not defined by the facts are these: Democracies have fought depth of our connectedness with the many wars, and the wealthier ones tend outside world but by the sheer existence to fight more than most, which is ano- of regions that remain off-grid, beyond
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the pale, and unconnected to our shared What Barnett and the founders of fate.”4 These regions are the same ones AFRICOM overlook is that some states where we find failed states. Barnett’s pose severe security concerns while others answer to the failed-state problem is do not. Failed states are located far away daring and audacious: serve as bodyguard from the United States. They tend to be to the rest of the world. The task is not poor with scant natural resources and perpetual war, as some might have it. few, if any, powerful friends. Somalia, Rather, the United States is to “serve as Sierra Leone, and Sudan are good exam- globalization’s bodyguard wherever and ples. Since international security is deter- whenever needed throughout the Gap.” mined by the global distribution of mate- Due to the enormity of the task and the rial capabilities, expressed in terms of associated risks if things go poorly, one economic and military power, it stands to had better pause and ask why. reason that those interested in internatio- That failed states are a reality comes as nal order ought to concern themselves no surprise. The number of states has with states that have the capacity to upset been steadily increasing for the past 50 the distribution of material capabilities. years. In 1958, the United Nations reco- And failed states have little chance of doing that. The 2008 Failed States Index gnized 81 states in the world; by 2008 6 that number had grown to 192.5 In eco- lists 20 states that are critically unstable. nomic terms, more firms means more Of those, only two, Pakistan and North failures—in a competitive world, one Korea, pose serious security concerns. The typical failed state has a GDP of $39 should expect nothing less. That states billion, which equates to about 1 percent are failing, however, is not the problem. of Germany’s GDP, 10 percent of Norway’s, The problem is, failed states are a non- and approximately 50 percent of Myan- problem getting too much attention. mar’s. If we were to add up all 20 GDPs of The recent stand-up of the US Africa the states on the index, the combined Command, or AFRICOM, is an indicator GDP would be slightly higher than that of that US leaders take Barnett’s call to the Netherlands.7 intervention seriously. Established in Nonetheless, the idea that failed states February of 2008, AFRICOM is designed pose a threat to international order to solve regional issues before they remains durable. In large part, this is become more acute, recognizing that due to the popular wisdom that correla- “peace and stability on the continent tes failed states with terrorism. Failed affects not only Africans, but the inte- states, the logic goes, are related to ter- rests of the United States and the inter- rorism in that they serve as safe havens national community as well.” It will do for terror groups. There is, however, little this by building partnership capacity and evidence to support this. In fact, the serving as the lead coordinating agency ideal conditions in which terror groups with considerable involvement from the flourish are found in those states with Department of State and other agencies severe political and religious repression, concerned with the future of Africa. As growing economies, and uneven econo- lofty as it sounds, AFRICOM is an unneces- mic development.8 Furthermore, those sary extension of US power and resources states with a declining economy (poor into an area of the world that is, from a and getting poorer) are the least condu- security perspective, not terribly important. cive for harboring terror organizations.
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In other words, low-income states with suggest that all failures are the same. growing gross national incomes are While it is true that should some states fail nearly four times more likely to support they would pose grave challenges to inter- terror organizations than those with national order, few, aside from Egypt, are declining economies. This is especially in Africa. A failed Russia, because of its so when uneven income distribution size and resources, immediately comes to accompanies growth. Under such cir- mind. Pakistan and North Korea would cumstances, the tension between the life also pose immense challenges. What these people live and the one that they might states share in common, however, is not a expect appears stark. Over time, this special propensity for failure but nuclear relative deprivation leads to an increase weapons, which are more than capable of in frustration, making conditions ripe upsetting the distribution of material for terrorist exploitation. This point is capabilities throughout the world. In worth stressing: poor states with growing these instances the United States, as lea- national incomes bear watching; those der of a coalition, might have to intervene with falling ones do not.9 In the case of failed states that have to secure nuclear materials and weapons been exploited by terror groups, there are should the governments collapse, which a number of extenuating circumstances is another way of saying that the interna- to consider. Afghanistan illustrates this tional community must get serious about point when one considers that the counterproliferation. The point is small, contemporary history of Afghanistan is the implications enormous. Some states not a trite history of a failed state that pose substantive challenges to internatio- chose to harbor terrorists. It is a complex nal order, others do not. history involving two great powers that, through intervention, neglect, or the International Order and Terrorism combination of both, assisted in the rui- Terrorism is the second issue thought ning of a country and their relations with to threaten international order. Terro- it. As a result, the Taliban government rists think strategically, as evidenced by came to power and got cozy with some the fact that they play their deadly bad people for reasons that one may game to win in the long term. They never understand. Other states might be offer a glimmer of hope to the forlorn tempted to do the same. But will they? If successful states tend to imitate others, and destitute, while attempting to force that does not appear likely. Afghanistan states to come to terms with their is one of the poorest states in the world. demands. They also live in secrecy, With a per capita GDP of $800, a life which is another reason why they are expectancy of 42 years, and a mortality so problematic. No one can trust them, rate of 250 per 1,000 live births, it is the not even those who hide and comfort brand name for failure. Why would any them. In short, terrorists pose strategic state want to imitate that? problems for states, but terrorism has Moreover, it is hard to imagine how never significantly upset international AFRICOM or any international organiza- order. From this perspective, terrorism tion could have prevented such failure. is a domestic security issue, not an States, like firms, succeed and fail; one international one, as the term homeland should not be surprised. That is not to security suggests.
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When thinking about the terror pro- seen before. Prior to America’s interven- blem, however, it has become common to tion, there were no reports of suicide ter- exaggerate its importance by downplaying rorism in Iraq. In 2003 there were an what has been the traditional problem for estimated 25 attacks. By 2004 that num- states, namely, war. During the past 200 ber had grown to 140 and in 2005 had years, war has decimated empires, laid waste ballooned to an estimated 478, claiming to countries, and claimed millions of lives, an untold number of lives. By the end of while terrorism, its horrendous nature 2005, there were an estimated 200 attacks aside, has claimed far fewer lives. In way of and by the following year, that number comparison, 625 people died as a result of had increased another 50 percent to international terror in 2003; 35 were Ameri- almost 300. cans. This figure is less than the 725 killed That intervention yields terror comes during 2002. As these numbers make clear, as a surprise, and it is too soon to conclude terrorism is a weapon of the weak; and while that there is a causal argument to be terrorists have incredible will, they do not made. Nonetheless, while more research wield incredible power. This is not meant to downplay the in this area is required, one analyst has importance of deterring acts of terror or shown how terror can be thought of as a stopping terrorists from acquiring weapons reaction to the presence of occupation of mass destruction (WMD). However, forces. More specifically, it has been used should the day come when terrorists gain successfully to compel democracies to access to WMD, they will, in all likelihood, withdraw their forces from territories that acquire them from men or women who terrorists claim as their homeland. In this live in states. States remain the most regard, suicide terror appears to be an important actors in international life effective punishment strategy, and inter- because they monopolize the most des- vention, with its accompanying boots on tructive power in the world. How states- the ground, merely creates more targets men choose to use that power when dea- for the terrorists. Nevertheless, it is impor- ling with terror is yet another important tant to stress that even in those cases challenge that they face. where terror has been effective, it has It has become common to suggest that altered the order of local politics, not terrorism cannot be deterred, but a international ones. growing consensus is emerging around the notion that, in fact, it can. But what of International Order and Genocide intervention—does the evidence suggest it can solve the terror problem? On the Since 1945 the international commu- contrary, a positive relationship appears nity has vowed to end genocide, but as to exist among terror and intervention. Cambodia, Rwanda, and Darfur attest, That is, as intervention increases, so do the international community is painfully terror incidents. As far back as 1997, the slow to act against states that commit it. Defense Science Board noted a correla- This is as true today as it was when Hitler’s tion among what it called an “activist Germany launched an all-out attack on American foreign policy” and terrorist Europe’s Jews. In this regard, the Holo- attacks against the United States. Ten caust remains a hard test for all arguments years later, this became more apparent as regarding genocide, particularly the idea suicide terror rose in places it was never that intervention can stop it.10
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In a peculiar way, Raul Hilberg reco- in this regard, to suggest that interven- gnized this and wrote about it in his mas- tion can stop it trivializes its nature. Any sive account of the destruction of the attempt to end the lives of a group of European Jews. As he noted, “The task of people because they are different is a destroying the Jews put the German crime and should be dealt with accordin- bureaucracy to a supreme test,” and the gly. The crime is one of aggression, technocrats solved this problem by pas- because in the face of aggression, neither sing the test.11 Meticulous in detail and peace nor rights can exist. The wrong majestic in scope, Hilberg’s interpreta- that the perpetrator commits is to force tion forces readers to come to terms with men, women, and children to flee or the perpetrators. What makes them so fight for their lives, which legally puts disturbing is not found in their extraor- genocide into the domain of war. Geno- dinary nature but in their ordinary one. cide might be civilization’s fatal flaw in “We are not dealing with individuals who that it does not upset the material basis had their own moral standards,” he of international order, but its presence argued. The bureaucrats’ moral makeup makes a mockery of international com- was “no different than the rest of the munity. Policy makers would do well to population.” How to explain the large- understand that to rid the world of geno- scale killing operation that put to death cide, states must be willing to go to war; more than six million? “The Germans nothing short of war can stop it once it overcame the administrative and moral has begun. obstacles to a killing operation.”12 It was in their bones, and intervention was no match for its ferocity. A World without Intervention Before it was all done, the Germans Suppose, as the result of a cataclysm, all had constructed a massive bureaucracy, of our scientific knowledge about interna- along with a language that had meaning tional politics were lost, save for one sen- across all levels of authority that dehu- tence to be passed on to the next genera- manized the victims and rationalized tion. What would it say? It would read as killing. To suggest that an intervention follows: States, regardless of their internal com- could have stopped them from doing so position, goals, or desires, pursue interests they seems dubious. How could force be used judge best. In pursuing interests, shrewd sta- to destroy a bureaucratic structure that tesmen understand the important diffe- existed not only in the minds of the par- rences between international and domes- ticipants but in their bones as well? It tic factors, especially when it comes to would seem that intervention, in this establishing and maintaining international case, could do little to end the killing. It order. In international politics, material might have halted things momentarily, factors and historical forces shape and but because genocide was in the perpe- constrain the behavior of states, not domes- trators’ viscera, ending the genocide in tic ones. This has been missed by interven- Europe took a war that was as brutal as tionists who have sought to reshape inter- anything we have to compare it with. national politics by meddling in the To recognize genocide, condemn it, domestic politics of countries as diverse as and hold perpetrators accountable Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, and Vietnam. through the enforcement of internatio- Why? Interventionists fail to see the great, nal law is vital for the civilized world, and albeit tragic, continuities of international
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life, which is a life of inequality, conflict, by the United States to address its nuclear and occasionally, war. Instead they arsenal and posture reflect a growing downplay reality, attempt to transform it, consensus that there are more important or both by choosing to ignore these harsh, things to deal with than intervention. yet real, concerns. The intervention in Similarly, policy makers would do well to Iraq, which was billed as something that pay attention to the changing nature of the would not only reshape the politics of that international political economy to gauge country but the politics of the Middle East how the US economy might stack up in the and hence the world, has failed to do so. new world of winners and losers. An affor- For these reasons, policy makers would do dable force structure that is balanced and well to embrace reality and eschew inter- capable of deterring and compelling will vention. What might this mean for policy? prove to be more useful in the long run Moving away from an interventionist than one primed for counterinsurgency. foreign policy would allow policy makers to Lastly, by recognizing the limits of inter- focus on security issues that have been vention, a renewed sense of humility might neglected for the past several years. Failed be brought back into security discourse. Per- states, terrorism, and genocide are serious fect security can never be achieved, but states problems worthy of attention, but they have can squander their power in its pursuit if they never upset international order and pose are not prudent. Kennan had a deep unders- no serious threat to do so in the immediate tanding of this: The ruling of distant peoples future.13 Nuclear weapons, however, do is not “our dish.” Let us remove it from the pose such challenges, and the recent move menu in the years ahead. ❏
Notes
1. George Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: Uni- terrorist organizations, it was found that the convergence versity of Chicago Press, 1984), 19. of repressive politics, a homogenous religious population, 2. The United States can afford to spend more than and a growing, albeit uneven, economy produced condi- most and assume more risks than others because of its tions most supportive of terrorist organizations. relative power. However, the more often a state uses its 9. B. C. Saltzman, Liberty and Justice for All: The Democ- force, the weaker it becomes. racy Project and the Global War on Terrorism, masters thesis, 3. Defense secretary Robert Gates’ new budget priori- School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, ties clearly reflect this idea. 2005. 4. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War 10. Some of the most creative thinking regarding the and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’s use of force and genocide stems from the work of Dr. Sons, 2004), 298. Douglas C. Peifer. See his Stopping Mass Killings in Africa 5. United Nations, “List of Member States,” http:// www.un.org/members/growth.shtml.[ 12 ] Strategic (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2008) for an Studies Quarterly ◊ Summer 2009 interesting argument regarding airpower and genocide. 6. Fund for Peace—A Nonprofit Research and Educa- While I am sympathetic with the spirit and intent of his tional Organization, 2008 Failed States Index, http://www research, I remain skeptical as to its practicality. .fundforpeace.org/web/. 11. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews 7. World Bank, 2007 World Development Report—Gross (New York: Franklin Watts, 1961). Domestic Product, http://econ.worldbank.org. 12. Ibid., 205. 8. In a detailed analysis of the political, religious, and 13. The obvious exceptions being a war to end geno- economic factors most prevalent in states affiliated with cide or a terrorist with WMD, as previously stated.
E-Forsyth/Saltzman.indd 20 1/12/10 12:01:39 PM The Iraqization of Africa? Looking at AFRICOM from a South African Perspective
Abel Esterhuyse
Introduction taries with questionable success in fighting small wars. In the past, US policy and mili- he South African government has tary communities implied sub-Saharan openly expressed its opposition Africa when they referred to “Africa.” North towards the creation of the US Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Africa Command (AFRICOM).1 andTunisia) was treated as part of the Mid- TWhat’s more, South Africa presents its dle East and Europe rather than as part of position on AFRICOM as representative of Africa. American constituencies concerned the country as a whole, but particularly on with Africa tend to focus on sub-Saharan behalf of a group of African countries—the rather than on North Africa. This divide Southern African Development Commu- exists even in the minds of most Americans. nity (SADC)—which holds an aversive Many Americans refer to themselves as stance towards US plans in this regard.2 “Afro-Americans” as if Euro-Africans or This does not represent a radical change Arab-Africans do not exist, and as if Afro- in South Africa’s ruling African National Americans have closer ties with the African Congress’s (ANC) general policy stance continent than their fellow Americans. The towards the United States over the last 10 division between North and sub-Saharan or more years. While this is not the place to Africa has created some problems for the dissect South Africa’s policy towards the US armed forces in recent years, especially United States in general, it is important to in countries such as Chad and the war-torn ask critical questions about the legitimacy Sudan that straddle the regional divide.3 of the South African government’s posi- Within the context of this reality, it became tion—and that of some other African increasingly difficult for the US armed for- countries—towards AFRICOM. The dis- ces to deal with Africa in its totality. The cussion is an effort to examine some of the divide between North and sub-Saharan considerations that underpin this scepti- Africa made some geographical sense, to cism about US motives towards Africa. the extent that a desert is often more of an From a military operational perspective, obstacle than even an ocean. In most cases, Africa presents a geographical challenge, the Mediterranean represents an easier especially for conventionally minded mili- obstacle to negotiate than the Sahara.
Dr. Abel Esterhuyse is a senior lecturer at the School for Security and Africa Studies, Faculty of Military Science (South African Military Academy), Stellenbosch University. He earned a master’s degree in security studies from Pretoria University and a doctorate from Stellenbosch University. As a lieutenant colonel in the South African Army, his experiences included tours of duty as an intelligence officer for the 61st Mechanised Battalion Group and the South African Army Rapid Deployment Force. He also served as an officer instructor at the South African Army Combat Training Centre and the School of Intelligence.
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Africa did not feature in the US military operational success on the African conti- command structure until 1952, when seve- nent. In view of possible vital US interests ral North African countries were added to in Africa, the creation of AFRICOM would the responsibilities of the US European be of strategic importance to the United Command because of their historic rela- States, and it would not necessarily have to tionship with Europe. The rest of Africa consult with Africa or anyone else about was not included in any US command the creation of such a command. This structure until 1960, when US concerns would allow the United States the luxury over growing Soviet influence in Africa led of building and structuring the command to the inclusion of sub-Saharan Africa in according to its own needs. Of course, a the Atlantic Command. In 1962 sub-Saharan realist approach is inherently unilateral, Africa was given to Strike Command. When nationalistic, and competitive by nature, Strike Command was transformed into and there is a very real danger that it may Readiness Command in 1971, its responsi- be perceived as aggressiveness by the Uni- bility for Africa was resolved. In 1983, Cold ted States within Africa. In addition, realist War priorities led the Reagan administra- thinking contains the risk that Africa may tion to divide responsibility for Africa view the creation of AFRICOM as a poten- between three geographical commands— tial threat to the extent that it may under- European Command, Central Command, mine US interests in Africa. and Pacific Command.4 On 6 February The truth is that there is doubt about 2007, the US president announced the for- US interests in Africa among African lea- 6 mation of a US Africa Command as part of ders. Indeed, Africa is perhaps the only the Unified Command Plan.5 AFRICOM is sizable inhabited geographical region that to be established by 30 September 2008. has not recently been considered as vital to An initial operating capability would have US security interests. To state it bluntly, been in place in Stuttgart, Germany, by until very recently the United States had August 2007, well before the official star- hardly any concrete, material interests in 7 ting date. Of course, what the actual “ope- the continent. This highlights the need to rating capacity” will entail is subject to the downplay the realist approach and for the advancements of the establishment of the United States, on the one hand, to be command by that time. much more cautious in dealing with Africa and, on the other hand, to have a more consultative approach with Africa in the Is This Something development of AFRICOM. This also Mutually Beneficial? requires the US polity and bureaucracy to cultivate support within the United States There are a number of ways to think for the creation of AFRICOM. A more about the creation of AFRICOM. The most consultative approach is rooted in the obvious would be to look at its creation notion that while clear identifiable inte- from a realist perspective. Such a perspec- rests provide policy with a solid foundation tive accepts that the United States has vital and coherence, a lack thereof normally and other interests in Africa to protect or leads to ambiguity, debate, and vulnerabi- extend. For the extension or protection of lity to changing political moods. these interests, the US military needs to For years, there have been discussions develop command, control, communica- within the US Department of Defense tions, computers, and intelligence (C4I) about the merits of some kind of Africa and other capabilities to ensure military Command.8 By the middle of 2006, the
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previous secretary of defense, Donald The second is the crisis in Sudan, where Rumsfeld, established a planning team to UN figures estimate that more than advise him on requirements for esta- 400,000 people have died from ethnic blishing a new unified command for the cleansing in the Darfur region.15 The deci- African continent. He made a recommen- sion to create AFRICOM reflects—without dation to President Bush, who then autho- any doubt—a rise in US national security rized the new command on the same day interests on the continent. Rumsfeld left office.9 During the announce- There are numerous examples where ment of the establishment of AFRICOM, the direct military involvement of a super- the new secretary of defense, Robert M. power in a particular region had been Gates, outlined the function of the com- accepted because it was based on a mand as “oversee[ing] security coope- mutually beneficial relationship. US ration, building partnership capability, involvement in Europe during the Cold defense support to non-military missions, War is the most obvious example. It is the- and, if directed, military operations on the refore important to distinguish between African continent.”10 Gates alleged that two sets of benefits. Firstly, there are the the command would enable the US mili- minor, almost secondary, benefits for tary to have a more effective and integra- Africa that may flow from the establish- ted approach than the current command ment of AFRICOM to serve primarily US setup in which three geographical com- security interests. Secondly, there are the mands are responsible for Africa. He geostrategic mutually beneficial payoffs called this three-command structure an for Africa and the United States in the “outdated arrangement left over from the creation of AFRICOM that should be Cold War.”11 Some scholars therefore clear from the outset. However, from an argue that AFRICOM will shift US involve- African perspective, this mutually bene- ment in Africa from a reactive to a proac- ficial relationship in the creation of tive commitment.12 AFRICOM is not apparent. Consequently, The US government is facing increasing the US decision to create AFRICOM is domestic and international pressure to saying more about its own fears and geo play a more prominent role on the world’s strategic position than about its interests most troubled continent. The creation of in Africa. This particularly relates to US AFRICOM received strong support from concerns about the growing Chinese both parties in the US Congress, and there involvement in Africa, the US war on ter- is an increase in interest groups lobbying ror, and the growing US need for oil from for support for African countries in the Africa. A more detailed analysis of these United States.13 Since the 1993 “Blackhawk three considerations provides a clear Down” incident in which 18 US service- indication that the US decision to create men were killed, the US government in AFRICOM is driven by negative conside- general has arguably resisted the pressures rations from Africa rather than by positive to provide tangible military support to interests in, or spin-offs for, Africa. peacekeeping or other missions in Africa. According to the independent global Two recent challenges were instrumental organization, Power and Interest News in drawing the attention of US politicians Report, Sino-African trade has risen from and bureaucrats to “the globe’s most about $3 billion in 1995 to $55.5 billion in neglected region.”14 The first is the failed 2006.16 On a macro level, there are state of Somalia, which has a tradition of increasing trade, defense, and diplomatic links to Islamic militants, such as al-Qaeda. relations between African countries and
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China. The economic and security support Though China is an alternative to US for the Mugabe regime is but one example influence in Africa, the judgement is still in this regard, with China’s investment in out on the nature of Chinese involvement Sudan’s oil industry and the cozy rela- in Africa.21 Africa’s preference is saying as tionship with its regime as another.17 These much about Africa as it is saying about two examples are also a demonstration of China, and can most probably be linked to what China is willing to do (or turn a blind issues such as the militarized image of US eye to) in order to advance Chinese foreign policy in Africa and the availability influence in Africa. The macro relations of Chinese support without too many are augmented by interaction of a micro attached labels. The US military has always kind in the sense that almost every small been an important part of US foreign town in the most remote places in Africa policy to the extent that the military is in these days can boast about its Chinese some circles often seen as the leading US shop! In 2006, for example, China hosted foreign policy agency. From this perspec- a conference in Beijing, which drew 43 tive, the creation of AFRICOM could be African heads of state and representatives seen as an important first step in increasing from five other African nations—more US foreign policy presence and capabili- African leaders than would normally ties in Africa as a means to counterbalance attend an African Union summit on the growing Chinese influence. Steven Morri- continent. The Chinese president toured son, the director of the Africa program at Africa during February 2007 at the time of the Center for Strategic and International the announcement of the creation of Studies, for example, argues that through AFRICOM. It was his third visit to Africa in the creation of AFRICOM, the United Sta- as many years. tes is trying to gain a foothold on the conti- It may be true that China’s policy moti- nent for “intensifying competition with vations and intentions are typical of a large China, India and others for influence and and growing superpower and that, because for access” and because of “rising commit- of this, the United States does not regard ments with respect to global health in China’s emerging interest in Africa as a Africa.”22 security threat.18 It may also be true that The world has changed dramatically the United States does not have many inte- since 9/11 and the rise of the threat of rests in Africa. However, China is reemer- international terrorism in the West. How ging as a major economic, diplomatic, and ever, in view of the strategic situation facing military entity on the world scene, with a US forces and their allies in places like particular geostrategic interest in African Afghanistan and Iraq, the strategic effecti- resources and markets. The United States veness of the war on terror and the strate- is obviously very much concerned about gic competence of those conducting the the growing interaction and cooperation war are still in doubt. This doubt is linked between Africa and the “dragon with a to the question as to whether the Western heart of darkness.”19 China is obviously not world in general, and the United States in very interested in encouraging democracy, particular, is, indeed, more secure because good governance, and transparency on the of the war on terror thus far. In Africa, the African continent. Consequently, the creation of AFRICOM is seen as “the offi- recent agreements on defense, economic, cial arrival of America’s ‘global war on ter- technical, and other forms of cooperation ror’ on the African continent.”23 The Uni- between China and Zimbabwe will be ted States is obviously looking towards under scrutiny in Washington.20 Africa as a potential source of internatio-
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nal terrorism. The intelligence communi- mely important to note that though ties of most Western countries are scanning poverty, instability, and volatility do not the world—including Africa—for new necessarily breed terrorists, nations with international terrorist threats. African weak civil societies, poor law enforcement, countries in general are uncomfortable and a weak judicial system are vulnerable about the possible conduct of both overt to penetration and exploitation by inter- and covert US intelligence operations national terrorist groups.25 within their borders. Of course, the US It is the increasing US interest in Afri- government and its allies are also looking can oil that underpins the often heard for coalition partners in the war on terror argument in Africa that the United States in Africa. The creation of AFRICOM will is using the war on terror as an excuse serve both purposes to the extent that it to get access to African resources.26 It is will provide easier access for the United true, however, that the attacks of 9/11 States to Africa in the conduct of intelli- and the consequent wars in Afghanistan gence operations and the cultivation of and Iraq had a definite impact on the strategic partners for the war on terror. relations between the United States and The bombing of the US embassies in the Arab world. A recent report by retired Kenya and Tanzania serves as a stark US Army general Barry McCaffrey on reminder of the international terrorist the war in Iraq notes that the “disaster threats that the United States is facing in in Iraq will in all likelihood result in a and from Africa. The threat of inter widened regional struggle which will national terrorism in Africa and its links endanger America’s strategic interests with the al-Qaeda movement again came (oil) in the Mid-East [sic] for a genera- to the fore with the more recent suicide tion.”27 The slumbering tensions between attacks in Algeria and Morocco.24 The the United States and Iran are a mani- volatility of the African continent provi- festation of this growing regional strug- des fertile breeding grounds for extre- gle. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006 mists, criminals, and, ultimately, interna- should also be evaluated against what tional terrorists in terms of recruiting, had happened in Iraq and the change training in uncontrolled areas, and provi- in the balance of power in the Middle ding a sanctuary from where they may East brought about by it. Clearly, a gene- operate. This volatility of the African ral situation of distrust and suspicion continent is rooted in challenges such as has been created between the Arab extreme poverty, corruption, internal world and the United States—rooted in conflicts, border disputes, uncontrolled the 9/11 hostile action by members of territorial waters and borders, warlords, the Arab world and the military action weak internal security apparatuses, natu- by the United States in Afghanistan and ral disasters, famine, lack of dependable Iraq, as well as the continued US sup- water sources, and an underdeveloped port for Israel. infrastructure. It is easy to convince indi- It is against this background that the viduals to support terrorism against the United States is looking at the oil reserves West if they face a bleak future in these of the world in general, and specifically in kinds of environments when it is contras- Africa, to lessen its dependence on oil ted with the situation in most Western production from the Middle East. The countries, in general, and the United Sta- diversification of the US oil interests over tes, in particular, using the old method of the last 10 years made Africa’s oil increasin- relative deprivation. However, it is extre- gly more important. This concerns the oil
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production of the continent itself, but specifically in the absence of any serious particularly of the west coast of Africa. US interests in Africa. Policy, in many cases, Africa owns about 8 percent of the world’s is nothing more than a declaration of known oil reserves, with Nigeria, Libya, intent by politicians.32 Ultimately, it and Equatorial Guinea as the region’s depends on the energy and support within leading oil producers. Seventy percent of the wider public and bureaucratic environ- Africa’s oil production is concentrated in ment for the transformation of an inten- West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea, stretching tion into action (i.e., the execution of such from the Ivory Coast to Angola. The low a policy). sulphur content of West African crude oil From this perspective, the declared makes it of further strategic importance.28 intention of the Bush administration to The Gulf of Guinea, including Angola create AFRICOM is dependent on the US and Nigeria, is projected to provide a bureaucracy, in general, and the military quarter of US oil imports within a decade, bureaucracy, in particular, to transform surpassing the volume imported from the the intention of an Africa Command into a Persian Gulf.29 By 2003, sub-Saharan workable US military C4I structure. If Africa was providing the United States there is no strong support in the bureau- with 16 percent of its oil needs.30 This has cracy for a declared policy intention, it risen to 20 percent in 2007.31 may slow the process down by not infusing The rise in US energy needs is bound it with the necessary energy. In some cir- to continue. At the same time, the war in cles the creation of the Africa Command is Iraq will, in all likelihood, result in a seen as a policy initiative of the Bush admi- widened regional struggle that will nistration as a whole and of Rumsfeld, in endanger America’s strategic oil interests particular. There are, therefore, serious in the Middle East. This will impact the doubts in these circles as to whether the strategic importance of African oil for creation of AFRICOM will survive the Bush the US market. administration. There are also some ques- tions as to the amount of support there is within the US military for the creation of Difficulty of Understanding such a command.33 the US Politico-Military The other side of this truth, however, is Bureaucracy that bureaucracy has staying power and that once AFRICOM has been created, it One of the major challenges for Africa will become increasingly difficult to change in dealing with the United States about the direction. This is of primary concern to creation of AFRICOM is the difficulty of the US military’s organizational or institu- understanding the nature of US politics, tional interests in AFRICOM. Once US especially the unique intricacies that are military personnel have started to build found in any political-bureaucratic system. their careers on the availability of certain This particularly concerns the role and career paths for “African specialists,” the personalities of individual US politicians military bureaucracy will develop a vested and bureaucrats. It is this factor that very interest in maintaining such career paths. often leads to doubts about how much In practice, this means that once military political and bureaucratic support there is personnel have reached general rank by for a particular US policy initiative in Africa being African specialists, it will become and, consequently, how serious the United very difficult to change direction. Bureau- States is about a given policy direction— cratic interests can, indeed, be a very
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important factor for the generation and with its envisioned interagency character, development of national interests in a will without a doubt positively influence region, and it is often very difficult for out- US policy coordination in Africa. Not only siders, Africans in particular, to develop a will it ensure greater efficiency, it will also clear understanding of the role of the US definitely contribute towards higher effec- bureaucracy in this regard. tiveness of US policy initiatives in Africa— Until now, US policy concerning the benefiting both the United States and majority of African countries was to a large African countries. The promise that the extent the responsibility of the bureau creation of AFRICOM will result in infor- cratic middle echelons in Washington med, consistent, coherent, and sustained practicing the art of bureaucratic conser- engagement by the United States in Africa vatism. These bureaucrats operated within is something that ought to be welcomed a framework of three guidelines: don’t throughout the continent. spend much money; don’t take a stand that might create domestic controversy; and don’t let African issues complicate Providing Military policy towards other, more important, Support to Africa parts of the world.34 This bureaucratic approach to US policy formulation led to Many (perhaps most) of the US actors a situation where the United States very involved in setting up the new command often lost interest in Africa and, indeed, believe that AFRICOM will be significantly had to “rediscover” Africa at several junc- different from other combatant com- tions during the post–Second World War mands. It will have a much more robust era.35 However, there is the potential that “interagency complexion.” From the out- high-level military bureaucratic concerns set, the planners have had a much greater about maintaining interests in Africa may interest in “soft power” issues such as have a definite influence on the nature health, infrastructural rehabilitation, the and sustainability of US policy towards environment, economic development, Africa. This becomes even more impor- security-sector reform, conflict attenua- tant considering the reality that the US tion, and other human security angles.37 military is often the leading US foreign This arrangement is rooted in the belief policy institution. that diplomatic, informational, and econo- From a US policy implementation pers- mic actions will be more critical in achie- pective, the US bureaucracy is perhaps no ving US foreign policy objectives in Africa different than any other bureaucracy in than the use of military force.38 However, it the sense that its structures and programs also raises a question about a more proac- have a very “stovepiped” nature. An expert tive and preventative approach in protec- on African affairs in the United States, Dr. ting and extending US security and other Dan Henk from the USAF Air War College, interests in Africa, in contrast to the very for example, noted that US engagement cautious and defensive approach that has with Africa has often reflected rather diffe- defined the US security involvement in rent approaches and intensities between Africa until now. AFRICOM, though, is not the US Department of State, the US Agency planned as the typical combatant com- for International Development, and the mand. Such an approach is appreciated, US Department of Defense. This very often given the often very destructive nature of results in some confusion about US inte- outside military involvement on the conti- rests, objectives, and motives.36 AFRICOM, nent in the past. However, it should be
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recognized that there are also some dan- placing the emphasis on the soft-power gers to an approach that underplays the issues in the creation of the command?40 role of the military in Africa. How long will the soft-power approach last The image of US foreign policy in many before AFRICOM shows its true character parts of Africa is informed by US military and Africa or certain countries in Africa actions in other parts of the world, espe- will be “Iraqed”? cially in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is an These questions should be viewed image that is strongly associated with the against the urgent need for hard-core US military in general and the aggressive military developmental and other forms use of military force in particular. This very of military support in Africa. It is a widely aggressive and “militarized” image of US recognized fact that one of the biggest foreign policy stands in stark contrast to challenges African countries face since the efforts by everybody involved in the independence is the lack of military pro- creation of AFRICOM to downplay the fessionalism. This often reveals itself in hard-core military role of US military for- challenging civil-military relations to the ces in Africa and to highlight the nonmili- extent that coup d’états have colored the tary and soft-power roles of AFRICOM. political landscape of many African coun- This raises two kinds of questions in Africa. tries since independence. Military unpro- Firstly, will the US developmental and fessionalism in Africa is linked to a num- humanitarian assistance to Africa be mili- ber of causations, such as subnational or tarized through a deliberate effort to put ethnically based recruitment, military the military in charge of these activities? corruption, the development of parallel Related questions include, should the security apparatuses such as presidential creation of AFRICOM be viewed as much guards, and domestic military deploy- more than interagency cooperation? Does ments.41 From this perspective, it will be AFRICOM represent a militarization of disastrous if AFRICOM does not take the nonmilitary US support to Africa? Where need for the development of military pro- is this militarization of humanitarian and fessionalism in Africa seriously. However, other human security actions leading? one of the primary causes of military These types of questions should be linked unprofessionalism in Africa has been the to the difficulty of understanding the US influence of foreign military support in bureaucratic and military jargon in Africa. times of crises. In many cases, external What, for example, is implied by “stability support translates into a lack of urgency operations” in Africa?39 Secondly, is the within African militaries because of the United States sincere with Africa about the guarantee of a bailout that is provided creation of AFRICOM? The general image by foreign military powers. This reality of US foreign policy in the world does not leaves an open question pertaining to the correspond with the declared intention of kind of soft-power military support that the United States with the creation of AFRICOM will provide to African militaries. AFRICOM. This should be linked to the It serves as a warning against an over question as to why AFRICOM should be emphasis of nonmilitary angles of military different than all the other US geographi- support in the creation of AFRICOM. cal commands in other regions of the AFRICOM, in supporting African mili- world. Is this not a form of discrimination taries, should place the emphasis on the or disparagement? What about the argu- creation of capacity, not the provision of ment that the US military is ensuring a capacity. In developing capacity, it is impor- “soft landing” for AFRICOM in Africa by tant for the US military not to come to the
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table with blueprints by being prescriptive industrialized countries of the world, the or dogmatic—what had worked in America United States in particular, as a major moti- and other places in the world will not vation for involvement in Africa and other necessarily work in Africa. In short, Afri- parts of the world. The economies of sup- cans may be uncomfortable with the enfor- plier countries are further developed while, cement of US military doctrine on Africa. in many cases, destruction is exported to There are relatively well-developed doctri- Africa, increasing African dependency. nes within Africa—in most cases an interes- In addition, it is important for AFRICOM ting blend of old colonial doctrines combi- not to be seen by Africans as an effort by ned with those of the United States and the the United States to replace the continen- former Soviet Union. This specifically rela- tal, regional, and military structures—the tes to insurgency and counterinsurgency regional standby forces in particular—that doctrines since Africa has been involved in have been created by Africans themselves these kinds of wars for the last 50 years or or are in the process of development. In more. The challenge for the US military is fact, the United States can play a major to capture these doctrines through an role by enhancing these structures on a understanding of the African historical tra- continental and regional level and exploi- dition. It is seen as a history from below, 42 ting these structures for capacity building rooted in a strong oral tradition. In view in Africa and its different regions. Africa of the strategic situation confronting the may benefit from the development of inte- United States in Iraq and elsewhere, learning roperability within regional structures. The from the African unconventional experience United States, when working through in an unconventional way may be not such regional and continental structures, will be a bad idea. In return and in exchange for able to follow a multilateral approach by ideas, Africa may benefit from more engaging the militaries of several African conventional US military expertise, hard- countries simultaneously and by being a ware, and simulation technology in the silent partner.44 Being the silent partner building of African military capacity.43 may not always serve the media-orientated However, this brings another important consideration to the fore, namely the lack approach of the US military. However, of enthusiasm of African militaries towards silent partnership may serve AFRICOM’s outside military support. This pessimism higher-order strategic objectives in Africa. towards military support is linked, in many This may imply, for example, that AFRICOM cases, to the exploitation of Africa’s lack of provides logistical platforms or opportuni- military resources. A shortage of resources ties for training and education while is a critical vulnerability of most African exploiting the availability of well-trained 45 militaries. Outside military support may and educated African instructors. provide African militaries with vital resour- ces. However, their sustainment, in most Confronting African Challenges cases, remains in the hands of those who supplied them since African militaries There is increasing pressure from don’t necessarily have such technological within Africa to allow it to solve its own capabilities and skills. Africans cannot problems. There are even suggestions of a maintain the military resources that are “United States of Africa”—though this provided, and a culture of dependency is may sound, and most probably is, a bit far- created. Consequently, many Africans see fetched.46 However, the underlying mes- the military-industrial complexes of the sage is one of “we want to take ownership
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of our own destiny” and that for too long AFRICOM, and aforementioned arguments Africa’s future has been dictated by out have undoubtedly been raised in initial siders. This especially concerns the roles deliberations. This is most probably the of Britain, France, and Portugal during reason why the focus of AFRICOM will pre- the Colonial era and the United States dominantly be on antiterrorist operations and the former Soviet Union during the and humanitarian aid. AFRICOM, it is sta- Cold War. It further translates into an ted, would focus far less on preparing increasing uneasiness of the people of troops for major combat in its area of res- Africa with Western and other influences ponsibility. The emphasis would rather be (sometime interferences) in general and on military training programs to help Afri- US influences (or interferences) in parti- can governments secure their borders, to cular. The image of the United States, in guard against crises such as Darfur, and to particular, as a bully of the small, the weak, contain deadly diseases such as AIDS and the defenseless, or the underdog has been malaria. This is also the most likely reason strongly reinforced by the US invasion of for why the four-star general commanding Iraq. This is linked to the view of the Uni- AFRICOM is to have a civilian counterpart ted States as part of the “haves” and Afri- from the State Department to help coordi- can people as the “have nots.” nate the nonmilitary functions of the US These views should, however, be tempe- government in Africa. red with the reality that one of the biggest The people of Africa know that where- challenges Africa and other parts of the ver you find the antelope, you will most global community dealing with Africa face probably also come across its most serious is African solidarity. African solidarity most adversary, the African lion. There is fear probably reached its apex with the creation in some circles on the African continent of the African Union (AU) where, unlike that Africa will be Iraqed—that is, that US the European Union, being part of Africa is the only qualification to become a mem- efforts to protect itself against internatio- ber. This does not mean that there are no nal terrorism from the African continent differences of opinion in the AU. However, will, in fact, exacerbate the problem. This its formation is a reflection of solidarity, fear is rooted in the notion that a strong especially as far as issues such as anticolo- US military presence in Africa will draw nialism and Africanism are concerned.47 the attention of its enemies and that, as in Nonetheless, the road to African solidarity the Cold War, Africa will once again is rife with pitfalls. Africa’s inability to become the battlefield for the power and address the Zimbabwean issue properly is military struggles of the great powers—the but one example of the dangers of African United States and China, for instance, solidarity. African solidarity very often and particularly the US military and its results in a tendency to be very critical international terrorist enemies.48 This about what Western governments in parti- argument should be linked to the plan cular—including the United States—are eventually to locate the command head- doing on the African continent. Yet, at the quarters of AFRICOM somewhere on the same time, Africans in general and African African continent. There is no question governments, in particular, look forward to that the country or countries that will host how they can benefit from Western and US the headquarters of AFRICOM, or parts involvement on the continent. thereof, will also expose itself or themsel- The US government has clearly thought ves to the kinds of threats that presently long and hard about the creation of face the United States.
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The US way of war and the African way notion that it will only become involved in of war are diametrically opposed. US mili- a region if it can gain economically, the tary doctrine is rooted in winning decisive general image of the US military in Africa battles through overwhelming use of is one of disdain. The US military lacks cre- conventional military technology. As in the dibility in some parts of Africa and very case in Iraq after the battle for Baghdad, often is seen as a legitimate target. In the the US military often finds itself in a situa- past, this frequently resulted in the US tion where the decisive battle or battles military becoming the victim of bad publi- have been won, but not necessarily the war. city in Africa. AFRICOM may become an The result is that in at least two occasions important vehicle to sustain US involve- during the last 50 years, the US armed ment in Africa and, by doing so, to contri- forces were sucked into indecisive, low- bute towards a more positive image of the intensity wars.49 Most conflict in Africa is United States and its military in Africa. As unconventional by nature, being fought by a result, the creation of AFRICOM may be second-or third-generation technology. This the first real test for sustainable US involve- often results in indecisive, drawn-out, anar- ment in Africa. chic types of community wars with no deci- The creation of AFRICOM is eventually sive outcome.50 It is precisely this kind of closely linked to the question as to whether conflict that the US armed forces steer there is recognition by the US government away from, especially since their expe- and its military that the future of war in the rience in Vietnam and, even more so, after “age of terror” would primarily be irregu- their more recent experience in Iraq. It is lar. During the 1990s, the United States also the kind of conflict that in 1993 was in the exceptional position that, as the resulted in the Somalia syndrome after the world’s only remaining superpower, it catastrophe in Mogadishu and most proba- could choose where and for whatever bly led to US reluctance to become milita- reason to intervene militarily. There was at rily involved in Africa. In Africa this reluc- the same time no lack of opportunity to act tance contributes to a “runaway” image of as the world’s policeman since widespread the US military. This image was reinforced conflict of an anarchic nature appeared all by the United States’ unwillingness to over the globe, from the Balkans to Central become involved in human tragedies such Africa, the Middle East, and the former as the Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Darfur Soviet Union (Chechnya). In most cases, crises. Compare that, for example, with US these conflicts did not really impinge on political and military efforts during the vital US interests, nor did they have the 1990s to solve problems in the Balkans—a potential to ignite the outbreak of a third geographical region in which, it is belie- world war.51 As a result, there was no real ved, the United States also did not have conflict that was important enough for the much political and economic interests. United States to act decisively. That was Reluctance to contribute in solving com- until 9/11—the day on which the United plex emergencies in Africa reinforces the States became part of the “coming anar- view in Africa that the United States is chy.”52 It may be good to remember that quick to showcase its successes and contri- the initial article on the coming anarchy by butions to African security. However, the Kaplan in the Atlantic Monthly was prima- United States is not seen as a power with rily based on his experiences as a journalist the courage to commit itself to deal with in Africa.53 This led to an obvious conclu- complex security and other challenges in sion for this argument. If the United States Africa on a sustainable basis. Linked to the really wants to be successful in its war on
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terror, Africa has to be part of the solution. vours in Africa and the world over. There is In the end, Africa’s problems—whether no question that antagonism may develop the United Sates and its military like it or in certain parts of Africa as a result of a US not—have indeed became America’s pro- military presence on the continent. Jud- blems. The creation of AFRICOM may be a ging by the recent comments by the South small recognition of this reality. African minister of defense, these antago- nisms may have their origins in certain African countries and regional structures Some Implications that, for historic reasons, are very critical Africa presents a challenge to any of what the United States is doing in the 54 modern conventionally minded military world, and particularly in Africa. These force. The creation of AFRICOM makes antagonisms may also have their origins military sense if the US military wants to outside of Africa. This specifically relates be successful in its military endeavours on to the growing Chinese diplomatic and the African continent. There are also other economic involvement in Africa. A cloud strategic advantages for the United States of vagueness surrounds Chinese military and its military in creating AFRICOM. involvement in Africa, and more so the For the United States, the most obvious extent to which it is undermining US mili- tary involvement in Africa. The question is advantage will be the close interaction whether African political and strategic with African realities as well as with the culture will allow African leaders the room people of Africa. It is hoped that such to exploit the best of what China and the interaction will translate into a better United States bring to the African table. understanding of African dynamics and The creation of AFRICOM will raise intricacies both in the US bureaucracy Africa’s strategic profile in the United and amongst the US public at large. It will States as well as other parts of the world. most definitely allow the United States the African militaries are to benefit from the ability to develop a better intelligence pic- creation of AFRICOM in terms of military- ture of Africa. Included in this intelligence diplomatic opportunities and the transfer picture will be a better interpretation of of military expertise and other more tangi- the threats that confront the United States ble military means. This includes help that in and from Africa. the US armed forces may provide in the The most obvious advantage that flows development of a unique military profes- from the United States having a better sional ethos in African militaries, the trans- intelligence picture of Africa is the oppor- formation of African defense management tunity to exploit market and other oppor- to be more accountable and transparent, tunities that arise. Furthermore, it will be and the further enhancement of African able to better secure itself through a pro peacekeeping and post-conflict recons- active, preventative approach to inter truction capabilities. national terrorism in Africa—dealing with The US military has to overcome a num- problems before they arise. US military ber of obstacles in the creation of AFRI- presence on the African continent will COM, both in Africa and the United States. empower the United States to better com- On one side of the Atlantic, the United municate with Africa on a military- States has to deal with an aggressive, milita- diplomatic level and, in doing so, will rized image of US foreign policy linked to ensure greater understanding in Africa the history of unsustainable US military and African militaries of US military endea- involvement. This image is rooted in a very
Esterhuyse.indd 32 1/12/10 12:02:16 PM THE IRAQIZATION OF AFRICA? 33
real fear in certain parts of Africa that it Somalia syndrome may still dictate US mili- may become the victim of Iraqization. This tary thinking and attitudes. Fortunately (or undermines US military credibility and unfortunately), this is the world of strategy makes it a legitimate target. On the other where policy, emotion, and change side of the Atlantic, given the bad publicity reign.55 ❏ of the US military in Africa in the past, the
Notes 1. The author would like to thank Dr. Dan Henk from 15. Bryan Bender, “Pentagon Plans New Command to the USAF Air War College for reading and commenting Cover Africa,” Boston Globe, 21 December 2006, http:// on earlier drafts of the article. www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2006/12/21/ 2. Wyndham Hartley, “Southern Africa: More U.S. Sol- pentagon_plans _new_command _to_cover_africa. diers Not Welcome in Africa, Says Lekota,” Business Day 16. Simon Tisdall, “US Moves in on Africa,” Guardian, (Johannesburg), 30 August 2007, http://allafrica.com/ 9 February 2007, http://www .guardian.co.uk/usa/ stories/ 200708300344.html. The ambiguity or dualism, to story/0,,2009098,00.html. be precise, in the South African government’s position 17. Gary Leupp, “We’re Taking Down Seven Coun- towards the US military is, of course, reflected in the reality tries in Five Years: A Regime Change Checklist,” Dissident that at the same time that the minister of defense was mak- Voice, 17 January 2007, http://www.dissidentvoice.org/ ing these statements, the South African Navy was involved Jan07/Leupp17.htm. in exercises off the South African coastline with a contin- 18. Jim Fisher-Thompson, “U.S. Official Dispels gent of the US Navy. These exercises between the South ‘Alarmist Views’ of China in Africa,” USINFO, Bureau of African and US militaries follow in the wake of the International Information Programs, US Department of announcement on the creation of AFRICOM. State, 16 February 2007, http://usinfo.state.gov/xar- 3. Michael Clough, Free At Last? US Policy toward Africa chives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=Febr and the End of the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign uary& x=200702161420311E JrehsiF0.6760828. Relations Press, 1992), 1. 19. Philippe D. Rogers, “Dragon with a Heart of Dark- 4. Lauren Ploch, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests ness? Countering Chinese Influence in Africa,” Joint Force and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, CRS Report for Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 22–27. Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 20. This was confirmed in a presentation by Amb. Service, 16 May 2007), 10. David H. Shinn, adjunct professor of international affairs, 5. The White House, “President Bush Creates a Depart- George Washington University (lecture, South African ment of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa,” Military Academy, Saldanha, 28 August 2007). Office of the Press Secretary, 6 February 2007, http://www. 21. M. Rossouw, “Mbeki Verdedig China se Involved whitehouse .gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html. in Afrika,” Die Burger (Cape Town, South Africa), 4 June 6. Ibid. 2007, 6. 7. Clough, Free At Last? 3. 22. Northam, “Pentagon Creates Military Command 8. For example, see Richard G. Catoire, “A CINC for for Africa.” Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command 23. Hartley, “Southern Africa.” Plan,” Parameters 30 (Winter 2000–01): 102–17. 24. J. Ferreira, “Terrorisme Beleef Oplewing in 9. Jackie Northam, “Pentagon Creates Military Command Noord-Afrika,” Die Burger, 13 April 2007, 6. for Africa,” NPR (National Public Radio), Morning Edition, 7 25. James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, “US Mili- February 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story tary Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution,” The Heri- .php?storyId=7234997. tage Foundation, 15 October 2003, http://www.heritage. 10. US Department of Defense, “DoD Establishing org?Reasearch?africa/bg1697.cfm. US Africa Command,” DefenseLink, American Forces 26. Lt Col Gary Lloyd (chief military observer for the Press Service, http://www.defenselink.mil/News/News- African Mission in Sudan), interview by the author during Article.aspx?id=2940. visit to the South African Military Academy, Saldanha, 23 11. Ibid. August 2007. 12. Northam, “Pentagon Creates Military Command 27. Gen Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, retired, to Col for Africa.” Michael Meese, professor and head, Department of Social 13. Jim Lobe, “Africa to Get Its Own US Military Com- Sciences, US Military Academy, West Point, NY, internal mand,” Antiwar.com, 1 February 2007, http://www.antiwar memorandum, subject: After-Action Report: Visit [to] .com/lobe/?articleid=10443. Iraq and Kuwait, 9–16 March 2007, (submitted) 26 March 14. Sally B. Donnelly, “Exclusive: The Pentagon Plans for 2007, http:// media.washingtonpost.com/wp-rv/nation/ an African Command,” Time, http://lib.store.yahoo.net/lib/ documents/McCaffrey_Report_032707.pdf. realityzone/UFNAfricancommand.mht. 15. Bryan Bender, 28. Chietigj Bajpaee, “Sino-US Energy Competition “Pentagon Plans New Command to Cover Africa,” Boston in Africa,” Power and Interest News Report, 7 October 2005,
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http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report& 47. For an excellent exposition of the tension in South report_id=378&language_id=1. African foreign policy between democracy on the one 29. Tisdall, “US Moves in Africa.” hand and Africanism and anticolonialism on the other, see 30. Carafano and Gardiner, “US Military Assistance Laurie Nathan, “Consistency and Inconsistencies in South for Africa.” African Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 2 31. Lobe, “Africa to Get Its Own US Military Command.” (March 2005): 361–72. 32. See, for example, the discussion by John Garnett, 48. L. Scholtz, “Sal Afrika se Gras Weer Trapplek “Defence Policy-Making,” in John Baylis et al., Contempo- Word?” Die Burger, 9 February 2007, 8. rary Strategy II (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987), 2. 49. See the discussion of this phenomenon in Thomas E. 33. This particular point was raised by a number of Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (London: US delegates at the 33rd International Congress of Mili- Penguin Books, 2006), 129–33. tary History in Cape Town, 13–17 August 2007, where an 50. CAPT Larry Seaquist, US Navy, retired, “Community earlier draft of the paper was read. War,” Proceedings, United States Naval Institute, August 2000, 34. Clough, Free At Last? 2. 56–59, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/seaquist_community_war 35. Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward .htm. Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change (Cambridge: 51. Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2. An Introduction to Strategic History (London: Routledge, 36. See the discussion of this phenomenon in Dan 2007), 223. Henk, “The Environment, the US Military, and Southern 52. Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shatter- Africa,” Parameters 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 98–117. ing the Dreamsof the Post ColdWar (New York: Random 37. Dr. Dan Henk, Air War College, e-mail message to House, 2000). author, 30 July 2007. 53. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How Scar- 38. Bender, “Pentagon Plans New Command.” city, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are 39. Testimony by Mark Malan, “AFRICOM: A Wolf in Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,” The Sheep’s Clothing?” before the Subcommittee on African Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44–76, http:// Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, at the www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/199402/ anarchy. hearing entitled Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and the 54. The South African minister of defense stated New Strategic Relationship with Africa, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 1 explicitly that more US soldiers are not welcome in Africa. August 2007, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/ See Hartley, “Southern Africa.” The roots of this anti- MalanTestimony070801.pdf. American sentiment by the South African government 40. A concern that was expressed by Col Johan van der are not very clear. It may have an ideological connection Walt (senior staff officer, Peace Support Operations [UN] with the ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, having its of the South African National Defense Force), telephonic roots firmly “on the other side of the hill” during the Cold interview by the author, 28 August 2007. War era. It may also have a historical dimension with the 41. Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces US support to Euro-African minorities clinging to minor- in African States (London: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2001), ity rule in many African countries during the Cold War. chap. 2. Current policies may also be of influence with the US 42. Mluleki George, South African deputy minister of strategy of preemption and other more aggressive and defense (speech, official opening of the 33rd International militarized approaches in its foreign policy that are seen Congress of the International Commission for Military as neo-imperialism in Africa. From an economic perspec- History, Cape Town, South Africa, 13 August 2007). tive, it is possible to argue that South Africa may view 43. Lloyd, interview. growing US influence in Africa as unfair competition. 44. The US military, fortunately, does understand the From an international political perspective, South Africa importance of working through regional and continental has some strange “friends” and is clearly aligning itself structures. For an example in this regard, see “Africa: U.S. with countries that the United States will not be comfort- Military Command to Seek Value-Added Capabilities for able with, including Cuba and Iran. Africa,” The News, 4 October 2007, http:// allafrica.com/ 55. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael stories/200710040767.html. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- 45. Ibid. sity Press, 1976), 89. 46. Liesl Louw, “Verenigde State van Afrika: AU Begin Praat,” Beeld, 2 July 2007, 10.
Esterhuyse.indd 34 1/12/10 12:02:17 PM Do We Want to “Kill People and Break Things” in Africa? A Historian’s Thoughts on Africa Command Robert Munson, Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR
common mantra within the mili- to a maternity clinic run by the Catholic tary is that the mission is “to kill Church on the outskirts of Abuja. When it people and break things.” The came time to open the project, I helped military is ultimately a heavily the diocese of Abuja arrange a large Aarmed organization dedicated to the pro- grand-opening celebration with the local tection of the United States by killing ene- archbishop as one of the speakers. At the mies and destroying their means to wage end of his speech, the archbishop grab- war. This certainly played out many times bed not only the audience’s attention but during World Wars I and II, but what mine as well when he explained how he about Vietnam or even Iraq right now? had never thought the US military “did Was Vietnam won by completing this mis- anything except bomb people. I now know sion? Can Iraq be won this way? While this you also build clinics to help people.” slogan motivates the military, the task to Break things or help? This is a significant “kill people and break things” is not the mis- question to consider in light of the forma- sion the US government gives the military tion of the new Africa Command (AFRI- most of the time. COM). President Bush gave Secretary of Let me juxtapose this view with a poi- Defense Robert Gates the responsibility for gnant insight from my time in West Africa creating the new command and Gen at the US Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria. In William E. Ward was named the first com- December 2001, during the military ope- mander. AFRICOM became fully operatio- rations in Afghanistan, I worked in the nal as an independent unified command Office of Defense Cooperation. Besides on 1 October 2008. Break things or help? the military cooperation aspects of my These two views on the mission of the US job, I oversaw the completion of two military must ultimately agree on one all- humanitarian assistance projects started encompassing goal—the new organization under my predecessors. One of these pro- should, in all cases, support the attainment jects entailed building a small extension of US foreign policy. The archbishop’s view
Robert Munson is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force Reserve currently serving an active duty tour as Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala- bama. He has served multiple tours in Europe and Africa. His PhD from Boston University is in African history, with a dis- sertation analyzing landscape changes in colonial Tanzania, and his MA from Universität Leipzig, Germany, is in the fields of African studies and political science. He has published articles on African and Tanzanian environmental history.
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illustrates how US policy will be better ser- ditional ties with Europe, the growing ties ved by a new AFRICOM, which is based on to Asia, and the conflicts in the Middle East. multilateral operations with the African Since this is not likely to happen, the best conditions in mind rather than relying on we can hope for is that Africa would be an the long-standing, somewhat erroneous important element within the realm of view of the US military as an armed instru- expanded American interest abroad. Cer- ment only to wage the big wars. To support tainly an AFRICOM that coordinates the these multilateral operations, the command military policy across the continent is valua- needs to truly be an interagency construct ble, but this is only one small element of the rather than a military organization with a whole US interaction with Africa. few actors from other agencies included for In the March 2006 National Security Stra- effect. It is imperative that the policymakers tegy, former President Bush emphasizes recognize this and shift the organization’s that in Africa “our strategy is to promote emphasis during the initial stages of AFRI- economic development and the expansion COM’s development before it becomes a of effective, democratic governance so that solidified military organization with a life of African states can take the lead in addres- its own—hence, on a path not easily altered. sing African challenges.”1 These goals rest on effective interaction through many ele- ments of foreign policy, not just the mili- Why? and How? tary. African countries that are democratic The two important questions that need and economically prosperous will not to be answered are “why” and “how” the require as much security assistance and complete organization should be created will make better American partners when and structured. From the beginning, the we need support, political or otherwise. goal should be to establish an organization Thus, AFRICOM’s sole concentration on that not only supports American foreign Africa should help weave many disparate policy but that also takes into consideration elements of US foreign policy into one the unique African conditions. We cannot more-coherent package, but this is only simply adapt a structure or method of ope- possible when AFRICOM’s structure inclu- rations from another part of the world with des all important elements of this policy.2 minimal alterations (e.g., recreating Euro- How do we establish an AFRICOM? The pean Command or Pacific Command) most important issue here is consideration without looking at regional history, culture, of current and future financial means. The and diversity. Only then can we propose a whole US government has a limited bud- coherent, logical structure. get, and a new command in a less strategi- Why do we need an AFRICOM? The simple cally important area of the world (at least answer is “to support American policy in from the American standpoint) would not Africa.” US African policy, across the govern- likely be any different. The importance of ment, has been disjointed in the past due to Africa will likely fluctuate based on the the fact that few officials in the US govern- policies of the day, but for consistency and ment felt the continent was strategically planning purposes, we should make the important. While this may change in the realistic assumption that financial means future, we should not anticipate a great will be limited. Therefore, it will be impe- transformation of policy. Such a transfor- rative to maximize efficiency and coopera- mation would mean that the United States tion with other nations. These would would shift its emphasis away from the tra- include our European allies and our histo-
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rically close friends like Senegal and Kenya, a true interagency command, not remain as well as the regional powers of Nigeria merely a military command with a few non- and South Africa, which quite consciously military trappings. This command would follow their own interests. have three equal main components: the With these two facts in mind, I would military, a political element, and a section propose two principles (or “realities”) on devoted to development. Despite the mili- which AFRICOM should be structured: tary title of “command” and the current focus of the secretary of defense on AFRI- Principle 1: American interests and COM, we must refocus the effort to include efforts must coincide with those of our all important elements of foreign policy traditional allies and partners in Africa. equally. If there were a better word to Principle 2: The military effort must be replace “command” in AFRICOM, it should integrated with the political and develo- emphasize the nonmilitary missions and pmental efforts across the continent. deemphasize the military aspects. Perhaps one should begin with the organizational In general, the second principle emerges model of an embassy rather than a military from the first based upon the realistic organization! While this may not be easy at assumption of constrained financial resour- this stage of the game, congressional or pre- ces. This assumption is especially valuable sidential action could enable the formation for it forces the new command to work of a new type of organization with a larger synergistically within the US government or even dominant civilian role. Higher-level and with foreign partners. action is imperative sooner rather than later, for the longer the command’s bureau- Interagency Command cracy is in place, the harder changing the structure will become.3 With these two principles in mind, my Within the AFRICOM structure, other first proposal is for AFRICOM to evolve into offices that deal with such issues as trade,
AFRICOM Civilian Commander (dual-hatted as US ambassador to the Africa Union)
Military Component Political Component Developmental Commander Director Component Director (general officer) (ambassador level) (USAID regional director)
Figure. Proposed AFRICOM Organization.
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legal, or environmental cooperation will much to allay this accusation. Resources are likely be included, but at a lower organiza- important, but most governments— tional level than the three main branches of regardless of political persuasion—will military, political, and developmental. For continue to sell to the highest bidder. This example, the emphasis on business rela- is especially true with resources available tionships (e.g., in the guise of Department from multiple suppliers. Thus, we can of Commerce attachés) would fit well under regard access to oil and other natural the umbrella of the developmental organi- resources as merely a second-tier priority zation. The private interests would buttress and not emphasize it. On the other hand, development and expand it into many sec- African countries are generally interested tors that the government cannot hope to in guaranteed markets for their agricultural enter with its limited means. Similarly, an products, something we can potentially assist organization such as the Environmental with, but outside the military structure. Protection Agency working within the deve- Based upon and expanding from the lopmental component would be able to two stated principles above, six factors assist with environmental problems accom- clearly call for this proposed macro- panying African industrial development. organization of AFRICOM: budget, access, Ultimately, the military component trust, operations, example, and history. must understand that it supports the poli- Each of these factors clearly argues for a tical goals in US foreign policy, and in true interagency command synergistically AFRICOM these goals (referring to Princi- combining the strengths of each of the ple 1 above) will likely be tempered and three main elements—military, political, shaped by those with whom we work. For and developmental. example, fighting terrorism is one of our 1. Budget. This will be constrained; thus, top priorities, but most African countries all attempts should be made to make opera- see terrorism as less pressing, and many do tions as synergistic as possible (Principle 1). not see it as an important issue—in most We must be ready to work with allies more instances development trumps everything than in name only in actual operations, else. Although the developmental efforts basing, and planning. On one hand, we must of the US government currently fall under coordinate our activities with NATO allies the State Department in the guise of the traditionally active in Africa. This would pri- US Agency for International Development marily be the French and, to a lesser extent, (USAID), one must consider giving the British, along with other allied European USAID’s efforts equal footing with the nations increasingly devoting resources and political efforts. This move would give manpower to the continent. In general, USAID its full significance in a place where many American interests in Africa, such as it can achieve maximum impact and do promoting stability and democracy while the most good—for the African countries providing emergency humanitarian assis- and thus, by extension, for US policy. tance, parallel those of European nations. A second example concerns the US need On the other hand, we should work closely for resources. The United States is concer- with our African partners, accepting their ned about access to raw materials in Africa, assistance and guidance at appropriate times. particularly oil. This is a hot-button topic This will not only help to conserve our for the rest of the world; much of the world resources, but working with our African par- believes we are in Iraq only for the oil. tners will help us to assist them in furthering Unfortunately, US politicians have not done their own interests.
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A good example here would be US coo- ted as warmly or willingly (except with large peration that facilitates peacekeeping ope- payments—see budget point above) as rations (PKO). As in many past PKOs someone who will help them solve what under the United Nations or other organi- they see as their problems. zations, African nations tend to be willing Additionally, working closely with the to contribute troops but need assistance French or other partners would give us with logistics—equipment, supplies, and access to networks that we might normally transportation. The United States could find difficult to join. The French, over the potentially save money by getting African years, have developed personal networks in nations to contribute in support of US- French-speaking Africa, which could be favored PKOs, but only if we reciprocate by useful in the achievement of American assisting in PKOs that African nations foreign policy goals if we partner with them. would like to undertake themselves but are For example, the various American antiter- not as important in US foreign policy. If we rorism operations in the Sahel have been look back at the West African peacekee- fairly effective in cooperation with the local ping operations in Liberia beginning in governments, but their effectiveness would 1990, the US military directly assisted in likely have been increased had we had long- airlifting troops into Liberia only in 1997 term relationships with the African partners in preparation for the elections.4 Arguably, and the French, all of whom have been in the West African peacekeepers could have that region much longer than the United been more effective had they had more States has even shown interest. Similarly, direct access to reliable logistical support. easy access to nonmilitary organizations, An interagency command could assist specifically nongovernmental organiza- budgetary efforts by combining the short- tions, would likely be eased with significant term military efforts with the long-term civilian participation in the command. efforts of other US government organiza- 3. Trust. Not only will frequent contacts tions. In the realm of peacekeeping, over long periods of time increase inter- USAID has often been involved in post- personal trust and, by extension, trust of conflict demobilization and reintegration, US motives in Africa, but an organization something which naturally follows from that is not purely military will inspire trust the PKOs and would more efficiently use by bringing different American viewpoints funds if all the stages, from initial deploy- and capabilities to the table. The US mili- ment of troops to final reintegration of the tary is known for coming in, solving a pro- combatants, were planned together. blem, and then leaving. Numerous Ameri- 2. Access. For any operations we need can military operations in Africa have been access to people, facilities, and partners’ short-term and only partially solved the willingness. The French have established problems. For example, in Somalia the US air bases in central and western Africa that military quickly left after a small number they have used in the past; we could likely of US Army Rangers were killed in Octo- use these if we would cooperate with the ber 1993. In 1994 the US military helped French. Furthermore, access to ports, other evacuate Western nationals from Rwanda airports, and additional infrastructure but withdrew rather than intervening in would be eased when we work alongside the genocide. In 2003 American Marines our African partners in helping to solve briefly landed in Liberia to provide secu- their problems. An America which appears rity but left after only two months. The to be a neo-imperial power will not be gree- American military, while effective at the
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designated mission, provided little lasting America and the less overt governmental assistance to the local people. changes supported by the United States, If we look at the period from 2001 to the such as the US- supported coup in Iran in 2007, US European Command (EUCOM) 1953 that brought the Shah to power. Simi- conducted 14 exercises and seven different larly, US military capabilities for sur- named operations in Africa to support Afri- veillance (i.e., spying) are publicly known can nations.5 Six of the exercises were short- and raise eyebrows with the suspicion that term medical assistance missions (e.g., they might be directed at our African par- MEDFLAG), which provided needed assis- tners. In a commentary for the US milita- tance but ended after a short period of ry’s journal Strategic Studies Quarterly, in the time—hardly the basis for establishing rela- previous article and in this issue of ASPJ tionships for long-term cooperation. Simi- Africa and Francophonie, the South Afri- larly, EUCOM’s two earthquake-relief ope- can Abel Esterhuyse echoes the very real rations (to Algeria and Morocco) certainly fear within some circles in Africa that the assisted people but established no long- creation of AFRICOM could signal the term contacts. On the other side of the militarization of American policy in Africa coin, the number of military-to-military trai- and emphasizes the charge that the Uni- ning operations (two) and exercises (six) ted States is using the war on terror to get provided a limited amount of contact, access to African resources.6 These are two which would neither allow relationships to fears that a military organization cannot fully develop nor continue over time, except easily dispel. in very limited circumstances. EUCOM Conversely, the civilian State Depart- similarly had a number of ongoing efforts ment and USAID are known more for their with African nations (such as humanitarian long-term focus and the training of their assistance projects and humanitarian mine action, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism personnel to work with foreign partners, Initiative, and other basic support to regio- including the acquisition of better lan- nal organizations), providing limited addi- guage skills, than those within the military. tional contact. One could argue that a mili- Both of these agencies are comfortable in tary-dominated AFRICOM might expand taking time to build personal relationships these efforts, but with the budget constraints, with other officials, and they tend to this would be unlikely. remain in the region longer, maintaining Not surprisingly, officials in many coun- these personal bonds and facilitating work tries are inherently suspicious of American between nations on a civilian basis. The military capabilities. We have the military military can capitalize upon the long-term capability to do much, ranging all the way perspective of the other American ele- from the large land operations of the first ments to gain and maintain the trust of its Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom to African partners and expand contacts from precision strikes launched from B-2s flying just military-to-military (Principle 2). In halfway around the world, to small, covert many countries, the military is not always operations. While we may not have the very popular due to the history of coups, desire to intervene in African nations in military rule, or civil wars (e.g., Congo, such ways, a purely military organization Uganda, and Liberia) so US-African ope- brings up images of past US operations. rations will often be met with skepticism For example, many Africans know our his- without the trust generated by the civilian tory of overt military interventions in Latin US officials working alongside.
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4. Operations. Historically, very few US society and would help to discourage mili- operations in Africa have been strictly force- tary interventions. On the more practical on-force fighting but instead have been side, when the US military’s operations operations of mixed character, such as are closely coordinated with the American humanitarian assistance, noncombatant political and developmental components, evacuations, or training (as discussed the span of contact within the partner above). All of these mixed operations have African government will be wider, a significant political and developmental strengthening the other governments component to them; thus, the military against the power of their own militaries. needs to work with other sectors of the US During the 1960s and 1970s, many government and also diverse sectors of our within Africa and abroad saw the military partners’ governments (Principle 2). An as a modernizing force in African society. AFRICOM built to integrate the three Ame- Thus, segments of African populations rican components will maintain coherency supported military coups, and the United in the operations and serve the interests of States often looked away when they occur- the local African partners without much red. Subsequently, the militaries proved more cost on our part. Furthermore, the not to be as capable at governing as belie- military can, and often does, function as an ved. Currently, the US military is very pro- enabler of the other two elements of Ameri- ficient at accomplishing even civilian tas- can power—politics and development kings (e.g., policing, distributing food (especially with, but not limited to, airlift). assistance, providing medical services, advi- Ultimately, the military’s structure must be sing governments). Despite this capability, built to support American foreign policy, we do not want to encourage African mili- not just to operate autonomously. taries to believe they can do everything Somalia in 1993/94 provides a good alone and thus potentially encourage poli- example to support this point. Operation tical intervention. An AFRICOM with a Restore Hope began as a humanitarian civilian leadership will show the proper assistance mission, carried out by the mili- place of the US military in society. tary, which then became a military mission 6. History. Unlike in Europe after World of hunting down clan leaders. The military War II where the United States was esta- mission failed and President Clinton essen- blishing a command (the eventual EUCOM) tially cancelled the whole mission. Unders- in a defeated Germany, the United States tanding the situation better and being will be attempting to work with many proud, more willing to talk to the clan leaders, independent African governments. To suc- both diplomatic tasks, might have preven- cessfully base US forces in Africa, the United ted the escalation of military violence, States must approach the Africans as equals which led to eventual mission failure. and work with them so that the relationship 5. Example. On a continent with a his- is mutually beneficial (Principle 1). The tory of military coups we do not want to United States cannot be seen as an occu- demonstrate that a pure or overwhelmin- pying power as the colonial era still remains gly military structure in Africa can work fresh in the minds of many Africans. Addi- alone (Principle 2). An American military tionally, the images of Operation Iraqi Free- organization locally subordinated to a dom and the ongoing counterinsurgency in civilian boss and working with civilian Iraq will remain relevant in Africa for a long organizations provides an American time, illustrating suspected American colo- example of the place of the military in nial intentions. Thus, the best plan combi-
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nes political and developmental operations Location: Addis Ababa that deemphasize the military component. We must remember that struggles and Focusing on the recent history of inde- wars of liberation remain fresh in the pendent Africa, at least the headquarters of AFRICOM should be located in Addis minds of many African leaders, and the Ababa, Ethiopia. Intra-African squabbles United States often stood on the “wrong aside, this city has been the focus of the side” of the conflict. During the Cold War, African pursuit of independence and the United States supported the white- unity. Ethiopia was never colonized, and majority government in South Africa, the red, yellow, and green of the Ethio- afraid that the African National Congress pian flag are recognized as the Pan-Afri- (ANC) had communist sympathies. Now can colors. Addis Ababa best embodies the democratically elected ANC is in power, the concept of “Africa” as a single conti- and many within the party remember our nent with its own unique African interests. support of the other side. Similarly, the The African countries themselves chose United States supported Portugal in its ill- this city as the headquarters of the Orga- fated attempt to quash the liberation strug- nization of African Unity in 1963 and its gles in Mozambique and Angola and then successor organization, the African Union supported unpopular but “anticommu- (AU), at its establishment in 2001. Ameri- nist” insurgent movements: RENAMO in can policy supports the regional and Pan- Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. The African efforts of the AU, including its generations of African leaders are chan- attempts at peacekeeping. ging, but the United States is remembered On the practical side, relations between more as a supporter of the colonial status the United States and Ethiopia are good, quo rather than as an anticolonial power. which would help to ease establishment of The South African Abel Esterhuyse a nascent headquarters. Certainly one makes the point that the US creation of could argue that the infrastructure in AFRICOM “is driven by negative conside- Ethiopia would not easily support a large rations from Africa rather than by positive command structure, but the headquarters interests,” which includes a potentially does not necessarily have to be a large organization—only big enough to provide renewed great-power competition in effective interaction with the African Africa between the United States and Union. Addis Ababa is already the location China, harkening back to the Cold War 7 of many embassies; therefore, another days. This fear just reemphasizes the embassy-sized structure would not place importance of an AFRICOM with the too much additional burden on this city. emphasis across all three pillars—military, The civilian commander of AFRICOM political, and developmental. Competi- should be the US ambassador to the African tion between the United States and China Union. Not only is this diplomat already in the developmental (and perhaps politi- representing the United States at the conti- cal) realms could be used by African nental level but, as discussed above, is also a nations to advance their own aspirations civilian and would emphasize the American and improve their economies, while mili- tradition of civilian control of the military. tary competition would likely just lead to While the appointment of this diplomat to militarization and destruction as during lead a partial military organization may call the Cold War proxy conflicts. for congressional or presidential action and
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the change to US laws, it is hardly a new South African Developmental Community concept since both the president and secre- [SADC], etc.) to support partner operations. tary of defense, the two top leaders of the If the United States were to permanently military, are both civilians. base C-130 transport aircraft in Africa, it While the headquarters of AFRICOM would make sense to station them with ano- would be in Addis Ababa, the various diplo- ther air force operating the same aircraft. US matic, military, and developmental subcom- and African personnel could share expe- ponents could be spread throughout the rience and training and assist each other continent, closer to the more functional during periods of high operations.8 This regional groupings. All military subcompo- would be valuable for both the US and Afri- nents would necessarily be colocated with can air forces. US forces could perhaps pro- diplomatic and developmental elements, vide a greater quantity of equipment and emphasizing cooperation and civilian over- higher technical proficiency, while the forces sight. At the lower levels, the military com- of the African nations would provide lan- ponents would ideally be paired with coun- guage skills, regional knowledge, and an tries where similar capabilities exist to enthusiasm for operating in the local area. encourage cooperation (Principle 1). Taken as an example, the air subcompo- nent should be headquartered in a country Conclusion with a robust capability to support Ameri- The formation of AFRICOM is currently can and partner operations, probably a underway, but as it evolves in the years ahead country with its own operational air force. it must come out from under the purview of This headquarters could simply be a mini- the secretary of defense (hence, a military- mally-manned standby base like those in centric organization) and become a true Eastern Europe or have a small number of interagency organization. It will hopefully permanently stationed aircraft. Above all then be an organization that meets not only else, the air subcomponent would need American needs but also those of our par- transport aircraft to best support the poli- tners in Africa—a true multilateral effort. cies of the United States and its partners. What sort of perception of the United Transport, instead of fighter or reconnai- States do we want to give to Africa? In the ssance aircraft, would emphasize coopera- spring of 2003 during military operations in tive projects and deemphasize militariza- Iraq, I was in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and tion. Needless to say, the number of talked to many regular Tanzanians while American assets stationed in Africa would doing my own historical research.9 One sub- likely be very low at any time, but perma- ject which often came up was the impending nent basing of some sort would cement the US military operations in Tanzania. Many US relationship with the African countries, believed the new, very spacious US Embassy signal our intention to remain involved over under construction was meant to be a mili- the long term, and enable the command to tary base. While my observations were har- operate independently. dly scientific, I got the impression that many Expanding from this central hub, the air Tanzanians saw the United States as a poten- subcomponent should perhaps have repre- tial threat. Tanzania is an area of the world sentation in each regional area (i.e., West where we would objectively have little reason Africa in cooperation with the Economic to interfere. However, the Tanzanians from Community of West African States [ECO- their perspective saw their country as, natu- WAS] or southern Africa working with the rally, very important to the United States
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and a potential target! Policymakers and ped to establish many of these organizations AFRICOM planners must never forget that to contain the Soviet Union; but through popular consciousness and local percep- the often nonmilitary focus, it generated tions will always overrule announcements good will and achieved other-than-military and press releases. objectives, thus advancing American secu- As we move away from Operation Iraqi rity policy. For example, the Marshall Plan Freedom and the international perception led to exactly the result we wanted—a sta- of the United States as a unilateral actor, we ble, prosperous, democratic Western should try to return to the American image Europe. This prosperous Europe could, produced after World War II. After this cata- incidentally, support the United States in clysm, the world did not see the United the security realm through NATO. While States as a conquering behemoth, intent on the situation is not quite the same in Africa imposing its views on the rest of the world, today, our expanding relationship with Afri- but instead as a country willing to work mul- tilaterally to solve the world’s problems. The can countries deserves the same dedication United States earned this reputation across the spectrum of the government so through its participation in the establish- that it expands positively into the future. As ment of many consultative and functional the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism bodies with representation from many (September 2006) declares: “In the long nations. Above all, the United Nations ser- run, winning the War on Terror means win- ved as a beacon of hope, but so too did ning the battle of ideas.”10 In this vein, we international financial institutions such as want the African countries to see the United the World Bank and International Mone- States as coming to help, not to break things, tary Fund, military alliances, and the Mars- for only in this way will the relationship grow hall Plan in Europe. The United States hel- and stay strong in the years ahead! ❏
Notes 1. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the all important questions to be addressed but do not detract United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, from the argument here for a true interagency organization. March 2006), 37. 4. See the historical summary of US European Command 2. See Abel Esterhuyse, “The Iraqization of Africa? operations at http://www.eucom.mil/english/Operations/ Looking At AFRICOM from a South African Perspective,” history.asp. Air and Space Power Journal Africa and Francophonie, Inaugu- 5. Ibid.; and http://www.eucom.mil/english/Exercises/ ral Issue (Winter 2009): pp. 21-34. Esterhuyse looks at the main.asp. Note: I have not counted the two 2002 noncomba- realist perspective of the creation of AFRICOM. This per- tant evacuation operations (Central African Republic and spective is key since policymakers usually sell new initia- Côte d’Ivoire) since they are designed to rescue Americans tives like AFRICOM to the American public on how it will and not to assist the African countries. benefit the United States (e.g., the importance of Nige- 6. Esterhuyse, “Iraqization of Africa?” 21. 7. Ibid.,21. rian oil to the US economy). This is perhaps unavoidable, 8. The basing pattern here could mirror the experience but we also must realize that military officials tend to gained in the USAF’s “Total Force Initiative” in which the share this realistic perspective; thus, they will approach USAF stations various active duty, reserve, and Air National the construction of the new command to serve these ends Guard units together. In this way, for example, the active and therefore emphasize the security issues. duty units benefit from the experience resident in the 3. I realize that this simple schematic will likely raise reserve forces. many more questions than it answers. Similar diplomatic 9. That I was doing historical research on a topic posts in Europe, for example the US Mission to NATO unrelated to military or defense issues is important since and the US Mission to the European Union, already offer I did not initiate the conversations about the US military some insight into the possibilities and challenges this pro- or US-Tanzanian relations. posal for AFRICOM might face. Additionally, an important 10. Executive Office of the President, National issue not discussed here includes AFRICOM’s relationship Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: to the various US embassies throughout Africa. These are Office of Homeland Security, Septemebter 2006), 7.
Munson.indd 44 1/12/10 12:02:53 PM Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa
Stephen F. Burgess
tabilization, peacebuilding, and and conflict on famine, destabilization, sustainability in an unstable and and conflict. It examines efforts, especially famine-prone region like the Horn in Somali pastoral areas of Kenya and of Africa are predicated on a holis- Ethiopia, to mitigate environmental Stic approach that addresses environmen- degradation and conflict as well as extre- tal degradation, conflict, and their inter- mism and terrorism. Thus, a sustainability relationship.1 They posit a set of options and stabilization assessment is used to intended to bring sustainable develop- examine environmental degradation, ment as well as security from conflict and conflict, and their interrelationship and struggles over scarce resources. This what can be done to overcome degrada- approach is especially salient in the Horn tion and conflict. of Africa because the region combines high levels of environmental stress (mani- fested in periodic famine and struggles The Horn of Africa Region over diminishing arable farm and grazing The “core” of the Horn of Africa refers lands) and conflict (interstate wars, civil to the area adjacent to where the “Horn” wars, and communal clashes).2 The juts into the Arabian Sea and Indian region is also one in which environmental Ocean and includes Ethiopia, Somalia, disasters (especially famine) and conflicts Eritrea, and Djibouti. The core features a have been interrelated. cultural clash between “lowland” Islamic This article addresses the problems of pastoralists from Somali, Oromo, and peacebuilding, sustainability, and stabili- other ethnic groups and “upland” Ortho- zation in the Horn of Africa and the inter- dox Christian farmers from Amharic and relationship of environmental degrada- Tigrayan ethnic groups. The struggle tion, instability, and conflict. It assesses between uplanders and lowlanders has the extent to which degradation causes been going on for several hundred years instability and focuses on the spiraling and has centered on control over land effect of natural disaster, degradation, and wealth.3
Dr. Stephen F. Burgess is associate professor of international security at the Air War College and associate director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His areas of expertise include African regional and cultural studies, peace and stability operations, and South Asian security issues; he has conducted field research and published numerous journal articles and book chapters on these subjects. His books are South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction; The UN under Boutros-Boutros Ghali; and Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe.
45
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Figure 1. Political map of Horn of Africa region. (Borders of the disputed regions of Dar- fur, the Ogaden, Somaliland, and Puntland indicated here are approximate and are included for orientation purposes only. Some overlap exists between the claims of Somaliland and Puntland along their shared border. The inclusion of such labeling does not represent or imply recog- nition by the author or by any agency or department of the US government.)
Burgess.indd 46 1/12/10 12:03:25 PM STABILIZATION, PEACEBUILDING, SUSTAINABILTY 47
The larger Horn refers to countries of the population of the region and who live that have close relations with or are on semiarid land with a lack of water.4 rivals of the core states, especially Sudan All of the states mentioned came and Kenya, and to a lesser extent together to create the Intergovernmen- Uganda. Sudan is especially important tal Authority on Drought and Develop- because of its rivalry for the past century ment (IGADD) in the mid-1980s to deal and a half with Ethiopia. Sudan features with famines, which were afflicting the a core group of Arab-speaking Muslim region.5 In the mid-1990s, the IGADD farmers from the banks of the Nile and became the Intergovernmental Autho- surrounding areas who have managed rity on Development (IGAD) and to control (often with force) vast out- became a peacemaking body, playing a lying sections of the country composed role in the end of conflicts in southern mostly of nomadic pastoralists and some Sudan and Somalia and authorizing the farmers. The struggle between Sudan development of an early warning system to prevent or stop environmental degra- and Ethiopia began with the Mahdi in 6 the late nineteenth century and resu- dation and conflict. med in the 1950s with the independence The Horn is greatly influenced by of Sudan. Ethiopia tended to back Egypt, which has had long, close rela- southern Sudanese rebels who were tions with the region. Egypt’s primary fighting against Sudanese government concern has been guaranteeing the attempts to “Arabize” and “Islamize” free flow of the Nile for national survi- val and ensuring navigation through them. Sudan tended to back Eritrean the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Saudi separatists who were fighting for indepen- Arabia has influence over Sudan and dence and against Ethiopian annexation. Somalia and has exported its version of Kenya fits into the Horn because of its “Wahhabist” Islam to the Horn. Yemen relations with Somalia, Ethiopia, and is just across the strategic strait (the Sudan. Kenya was a British settler colony Bab el-Mandeb) from the Horn and from which the British projected power takes an interest in its affairs. Yemen during the colonial era and attempted to has also been a crossing point for al- control pastoralist areas in the north of Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula to the country (including Somali pastora- the Horn. lists). Kenya has been a peacemaker in Islamic extremism exists in the Horn the region, especially in Somalia and of Africa and has flowed down from the Sudan. Uganda fits into the Horn because Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden of its relations with Sudan and Kenya and was welcomed to Sudan in the early its pastoralist population (in the northeast) 1990s by Islamist leader Husain al-Turabi who move across borders. In addition, and built al-Qaeda there. In 1996 the the Blue Nile and White Nile both flow Sudanese regime asked bin Laden to through the region. leave. In 1993 Islamic extremists arose The Horn of Africa features pastora- in Somalia in opposition to US, UN, and lists, drylands, and semiarid topography Western intervention. Today extremism (80 percent of the more than five mil- persists among some members of the lion square kilometers). Sixty-two per- Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and foreign cent of land in the Horn of Africa is Islamic fighters have been fighting the occupied by pastoralists, who are 12 percent Ethiopians. However, it is uncertain if
Burgess.indd 47 1/12/10 12:03:26 PM 48 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE
al-Qaeda has made serious inroads into pastoralism). Before the European colo- Somalia. In Kenya and Tanzania, the nial powers arrived, there were only two discontent of coastal Muslims who have significant states extant—Amharic- been neglected by regimes dominated Shoan Ethiopia and Mahdist Sudan.14 by non-Muslims from the interior led Boundaries drawn and colonies created some to join al-Qaeda and participate in in the late nineteenth century have the 1998 embassy bombings and the remained sources of contention. The colonial legacy is one in which relatively 2002 attacks on an Israeli hotel and air- liner in Mombasa.7 At issue is the degree strong states (e.g., Ethiopia, Sudan, and of al-Qaeda presence today, especially in British settler Kenya) were surrounded Somalia and coastal Kenya and Tanza- by nonstate groupings (mainly pastora- nia. In previously religion-tolerant lists). Indirect colonial rule in Uganda Ethiopia, reports have asserted that both and Sudan meant little integration of Islamic extremism (especially Wahha- ethnic groups, especially pastoralists. The division of Somalis into five colonial ter- bism) and Orthodox Christian funda- mentalism are growing.8 ritories helped to accentuate clan fissures.15 In the Horn of Africa, pastoralists resisted state intervention and controls Stabilization Challenges and State such as boundaries, fencing, and pest Failure in the Horn of Africa eradication programs and did not need states as much as farmers did.16 In gene- State failure in the Horn of Africa has ral, there was little environmental provided considerable material for control or agricultural extension and 9 research and literature. Somalia is the livestock control in the region. Thus, 10 most obvious case. State disintegration there was little positive institutional in Uganda under Idi Amin in the 1970s interaction between pastoralists and sta- and Milton Obote in the early 1980s is tes. Therefore, the tasks of post-inde- 11 also well known. In Sudan, the central pendence state building and regional government has tried to “conquer, Ara- integration were difficult in the vast bize, and Islamize” the South for most of lowland expanses of the Horn.17 half a century, as well as ethnically cleanse In the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia Darfur and subdue other outlying annexed Eritrea—which led to war—and regions, instead of seeking to build came into rivalry with newly independent legitimacy—this has constituted state Sudan and Somalia, which set the stage failure in those regions.12 Less obvious for a range of destabilization activities. cases of “partial failure” include Ethio- Ethiopia supported rebels in the southern pia in the Somali Ogaden, Kenya in the Sudan, while Sudan supported the Eri- Somali Northeast, and Uganda in the trean liberation movements. Somalia laid Acholi North (facing the Lord’s Resis- claim to the Ogaden in Ethiopia, which tance Army).13 led to an invasion and war in 1977–78. At the macro level, the Horn of Africa Somalia’s defeat and subsequent Ethio- is a difficult region in which to build and pian subversion contributed to state sustain states. There are widely differing decline, failure, and collapse. These riva- topographies (mountains, savanna, and lries paved the way for state failure, espe- desert) and modes of production (com- cially for Somalia and Sudan, regime mercial and smallholder agriculture and change in Ethiopia, and the indepen-
Burgess.indd 48 1/12/10 12:03:26 PM STABILIZATION, PEACEBUILDING, SUSTAINABILTY 49
Figure 2. Topographical map of Horn of Africa region
dence of Eritrea. After Eritrea became shriveled in Somalia and Sudan in the independent in 1993, it quickly came 1960s and 1980s, leading to state failure. into conflict with its erstwhile ally, the In Kenya under Pres. Daniel Arap Moi Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Demo- (1978–2002), patronage networks shrunk cratic Front (EPRDF) regime in Ethiopia. and ethnic conflict over land intensified, At the intermediate level, all states in bringing warnings of possible state failure.18 the region have suffered problems with In the 1960s Ugandan president Milton institutional viability and state weakness. Obote shut out the predominant Buganda Patronage networks developed and then kingdom from patronage networks and
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removed the Kabaka as head of state, which took northern and southwestern Somali led to Idi Amin’s 1971 military coup and areas and Ethiopia took the western Oga- state disintegration.19 den region.24 The Italians did little to build At the micro level, all states in the colonial administration and infrastructure region have suffered from shocks of from 1900 to 1941, while the British put various sorts—including famine, econo- little into the north (Somaliland) from mic downturns, and revolution—which 1900 to 1961 and the south that it gover- contributed to state failure. The Ethio- ned from 1941 to 1961. pian famines of 1973 and 1984–85 contri- From independence in 1961 until buted to regime changes (the overthrow 1969, small elites struggled to create a of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and successful Somali state but were unable Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991). In the to control contention and political late 1970s, the revolutionary Dergue chaos. They established patronage regime instituted land reform and attemp- networks that drowned in a sea of cor- ted to radically reorganize farming, which ruption. They promised the recovery of disrupted traditional agricultural systems Somali lands in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Dji- and productive capacity.20 The disruption bouti but were unable to bring about the and famine gave impetus to the Eritrean irredentist promise of a larger Somalia. People’s Liberation Front and the The military coup of 1969 and the Siad Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which Barre dictatorship were reactions to the came to power six years later. The Somalia weakness and corruption of the new Somali famine of 1991–92 was partly the result of state and the civilian elites’ inability to state failure and conflict. The rise of clan bring promises to fruition. The Barre warlords, who used food to empower them- regime made a concerted effort to selves, made the reconstitution of the Soma- strengthen and extend the state’s reach lian state all but impossible.21 (e.g., they attempted to transform pastora- lists into fishers) and build the Somali Stabilization Challenges in Somalia nation. The adoption of “scientific socia- lism” helped to bring Soviet assistance, The case of state failure and collapse in including large amounts of military aid. In Somalia (1990 to the present) is the 1977 and 1978 Somalia used that military most pronounced of any in Africa and aid to invade Ethiopia and take the Ogaden. the world and has been examined tho- Defeat in 1978 dealt a blow to the Barre roughly by a number of scholars.22 At regime from which it never recovered. the macro or structural level, the princi- At the intermediate level of institutional pal problems have been pastoralist clans viability and state weakness, dictator Siad who have long contended for resources, Barre established patron-client relations the colonial misdivision of Somalis, and in the 1970s (with the help of Soviet aid) the resulting irredentism. Pre-colonial with the various clans. However, after the Somalia was characterized by pastoralist defeat in 1978, the switch from Soviet to clans who contended over water holes, American patrons, and economic down- grazing lands, and livestock and who rai- turn in the 1980s, the regime narrowed ded sedentary agriculturalists—poor the range of clan clients until only Barre’s social capital for the building of nation-sta- sub-clan of the Darod clan was benefi- tes.23 In the scramble for Africa, Italy took ting.25 In April 1978 the Somali Salvation southeastern Somali areas, while Britain and Democratic Front launched guerrilla
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operations in southern Somalia with the United States and the UN Operation Ethiopian support. In 1981, the Somali in Somalia (UNOSOM II) tried to gain National Movement launched a campaign agreement on rebuilding the state. The in the north that would lead to the nomi- special representative of the UN secre- nal independence of Somaliland in tary-general and chief of mission, ADM 1991. Repression by the regime’s secu- Jonathan Howe, and his advisors were rity system did not prove effective and determined to take a “bottom up” approach actually backfired, increasing violent to reconstituting the Somalian state. In opposition. Siad Barre refused to nego- March 1993, they negotiated an agree- tiate with the opposition and reacted ment with a range of local leaders to build by narrowing his power base to three local governments, then provincial sub-clans of the Darod clan.26 governments, and then the central state. At the micro level, the United States However, Howe and his colleagues suddenly withdrew aid to the Barre attempted to circumvent the powerful regime in 1988 as the Cold War was warlords after already agreeing in princi- coming to an end. The evaporation of ple to a “top down” power-sharing arran- resources crippled the state and ena- gement among them. The warlords bled the rebels’ advance, which led to rejected the bottom-up approach and regime failure in the course of 1990 and mounted an insurgency that eventually collapse in January 1991. Siad Barre drove the United States and the United continued to refuse to negotiate, even Nations out of Somalia.28 as opposing rebel groups closed in on After US and UN withdrawal, the war- the capital, Mogadishu. lords continued fighting each other in After the collapse, the inability of and around Mogadishu for more than a opposition movements and clans to decade. In contrast, peace prevailed in reach agreement led to the failure of Somaliland (in the north of Somalia), the Somalian state and the rise of the which declared independence in May warlords.27 The failed state and clan war- 1991 and held democratic elections in fare in Somalia immediately had ramifi- 2003. However, Somaliland has failed to cations for environmental sustainability win recognition as a sovereign state. In and the welfare of Somalis. The great 1998, Puntland (in the northeast of Somalia famine of 1991–93 was a direct Somalia) declared autonomy from result of state collapse and the conduct Mogadishu under Pres. Abdullahi Yusuf of the warlords. Warlords seized food Ahmed and has remained relatively from Somali farmers and relief agen- peaceful (though there have been clashes cies and used the proceeds to buy wea- with Somaliland forces over the contes- pons, provide patronage, and grow in ted Sool region). In 2004, Yusuf was elec- strength. With no state, fights over gra- ted by his peers as president of the Tran- zing lands and water holes went unre- sitional Federal Government (TFG) for solved. As clan warfare intensified, there all of Somalia. Elections were held in was no state to step in to resolve dispu- Puntland in January 2005, and Mohamed tes. The interconnectedness of state Muse Hersi was voted president. failure, warfare, and environmental After 1993, peacemaking in Somalia degradation and famine became clear. fell to the IGAD under Kenyan and Dji- Efforts were mounted to reconstitute boutian leadership. In 2004 the TFG and the Somalian state, but all failed. In 1993, Somali Transitional Federal Parliament
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(TFP) were formed and elected President the prospect of Ethiopia holding Moga- Yusuf. Each of Somalia’s four major clans dishu for the TFG and even more so was allocated 61 seats in the parliament, about the Ethiopian army being replaced while an alliance of minority clans recei- by AU peacekeepers or a new Somalian ved 31 seats. The TFP and TFG agreed on army.29 Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US a charter for the reconstitution and gover- defense attaché to Kenya, observed that ning of the Somali state. A split occurred the longer Ethiopia meddles in Somali between President Yusuf’s group (based affairs, the longer it will take the TFG to in the Darod clan) and a Mogadishu- become independent.30 based faction (mainly the Hawiye clan). At the beginning of 2006, the split ended, Stabilization Challenges in Sudan and the TFG moved to Baidoa, Somalia. In early 2006, the Islamic Courts Union Sudan is a state that has failed though it arose as an armed group and by June has never collapsed. Since indepen- defeated the warlords in and around dence in 1956, the government in Khar- Mogadishu. By September the ICU toum has been unable to achieve legiti- controlled much of Somalia outside macy in vast outlying areas of Africa’s Somaliland and Puntland as well as Bai- largest country. Instead, the regime has doa, where the Ethiopian army protected mostly engaged in repression, which has the TFG. In December 2006, the Ethio- devastated the South and other areas. pians launched a counteroffensive and The civil war in the South, 1955–72 and drove the ICU out of Mogadishu and 1983–2005, has contributed to massive other major centers. In February Uganda dislocation of farmers and pastoralists sent 400 troops as an advance contingent and to famines that have killed hun- of 1,600 peacekeepers to Mogadishu as dreds of thousands of people (as well as part of the African Union Mission to livestock). Planted landmines have inhi- Somalia (AMISOM); Nigeria, Ghana, and bited agricultural and pastoral activities Malawi failed to send peacekeepers in many parts of the South. Genocide in because of continuing violence. In March Darfur has brought even greater dislocation the TFG moved to Mogadishu, which was and death in a shorter period of time.31 rocked by violence that drove tens of At the macro level, the slave trade thousands out of the city. Eritrea, in its (especially in the nineteenth century) by feud with Ethiopia, has armed and trai- the Arab North in the African South ned the ICU as part of a coalition dedica- (and other regions) created hegemonic ted to driving the Ethiopian army and the relations that have endured until today.32 TFG out of Somalia. At issue is whether or In the 1880s and 1890s, the Mahdist state not the TFG can survive and the Ethio- fought against nonbelievers in outlying pian army can be replaced by African regions that it claimed. The British inhe- Union (AU) peacekeepers. rited the tensions and minimally mana- Francois Grignon, Africa director of ged Sudan as a “condominium” of Egypt, the International Crisis Group (ICG), with the goal of protecting the Nile and finds that the conflict in Somalia is a the Suez Canal. For much of the period, greater challenge than the conflict in the North and the South were separate the African Great Lakes region (inclu- entities. However, as independence ding the Democratic Republic of the approached in the early 1950s, they were Congo). He has been pessimistic about thrown together by the British. In the
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early 1950s, the northerners’ old hege- pastoralist militias who were already monic tendencies reemerged as they struggling with Darfur farmers over attempted to spread Islam as the religion diminishing land37—to ethnically cleanse and Arabic as the language of instruction Darfur so that various rebel movements in the South.33 would lose their base of support. Also, In the two North-South civil wars, the the janjaweed militias have many merce- rebels were supported at various times naries.38 The result has been a genocide by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and other in which hundreds of thousands have states.34 At the institutional level, the been killed or raped and millions displa- Sudanese government excluded the ced since 2003–04 and in which widespread South and other regions from patro- atrocities have continued ever since. As in nage networks that were established the case of the South, the intervention of under successive dictators and during international peacemakers has been brief electoral democratic interludes in required to put an end to Khartoum’s the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. From abusive behavior.39 1972 to 1983, peace prevailed—the only Francois Grignon finds that the CPA period in which Sudan emerged from between North and South Sudan is in state failure. In the late 1970s and early danger. Darfur is a dramatic humanita- 1980s, growing indebtedness led to state rian catastrophe, but it is really a smokes- decline.35 During the 1980s, a series of creen for the real power struggle economic shocks and the resumption of between North and South. However, if the North-South civil war in 1983 led Khartoum loses Darfur, it stands a good Sudan to sink back into state failure. In chance of losing the South.40 Solomon 1989, Gen Omar al-Bashir staged a mili- Gomes of the AU Peace and Security tary coup, which deepened state failure. Commission finds that the Northern The Islamist military regime intensified Sudanese are “playing for time” and its war against the South, with help from that the AU and international community growing oil revenues in the late 1990s, must be wary of Khartoum-sponsored but was unable to defeat the Sudanese militia groups in southern Sudan and People’s Liberation Movement and must be prepared for the secession of army. The impasse and intervention by the South followed by a resumption of international peacemakers in the early hostilities by Khartoum. If the South 2000s led to the negotiation of the Com- secedes, Darfur will seek the same prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), route.41 Gomes notes that Khartoum which went into effect in July 2005 and accepted aspects of the Darfur Peace which promises a referendum for the Agreement and now the hybrid UN/AU South in July 2011 to decide whether to force. However, the problem now is per- become independent or remain part of suading the government and the fractious Sudan. The future of North-South rela- Darfur rebel movements to meet and dis- tions remains uncertain.36 cuss. In the meantime, the violence and The same symptoms of state failure humanitarian catastrophe continue. that the Khartoum regime had exhibited In regard to stabilizing Somalia and towards the South could be observed in Sudan, Gomes observes that the Peace its relations with Darfur and other out- and Security Commission (as the “loco- lying regions. In 2003 and 2004, the motive” for action) has the responsibility government dispatched the janjaweed— to inform the Peace and Security Council
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and the entire AU membership regarding especially since the 1998–2000 war with the “pulse” in conflict zones. However, Eritrea. The lack of autonomy helps to the commission is understaffed and limi- explain the revived insurgencies of the ted in taking action. It provides reports, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) for example, from Sudan and Chad but and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). cannot take action. Another problem is a Basic government distrust of Oromos and lack of authority; for example, the AU Ogaden Somali pastoralists continues in has called on all rebel movements to spite of ongoing projects for the lowlands leave Chadian territory but has been and pastoralists by government and inter- unable to enforce its request. Gomes national development agencies and non- believes that the AU should leverage sup- governmental organizations (NGO). port for Chad’s interests from France Meanwhile, the number of people and and the European Union (EU). The livestock continues to grow, as do sustaina- diplomatic track on the Chad-Sudan bility and stabilization challenges.45 conflict has been slow to materialize and The ONLF and OLF continue to ope- has only come to fruition lately through rate against the government and its for- French leadership.42 ces. The killing of nine Chinese oil wor- kers and 65 Ethiopians by the ONLF Stabilization Challenges in Ethiopia’s showed a level of sophistication that Ogaden Region points to Eritrean involvement.46 The Since annexing the Ogaden in the late escalation of hostilities in the Ogaden 1800s, the Ethiopian state has traditionally has created a humanitarian crisis in failed to reach out to pastoralists in the which pastoralists are finding it increasin- 47 Somali Ogaden region and to other pas- gly difficult to survive. The massacre of toralists, including Oromo and Borana oil workers has led Ethiopia to increase herders.43 The problem of weakness and its military operations, made aid pro- failure has been based upon the bias of grams difficult to sustain, and caused the Ethiopian state in favor of highland problems for government officials and Ethiopian Orthodox farmers versus international aid agencies. The Interna- lowland Islamic pastoralists. Also, Ethio- tional Committee of the Red Cross has pian suspicions about the loyalties of Oga- been experiencing trouble, and the United den Somalis rose in the 1960s, reached a Nations Development Program (UNDP) crescendo during the 1977–78 Ogaden has been considering pulling out of the war, and have persisted ever since. Ogaden, even though the humanitarian 48 In 1991, the Tigrayan-dominated Ethio- situation has deteriorated rapidly. pian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front regime took power and instituted a Stabilization Challenges in Pastoral Areas of Kenya and Uganda system of ethnic federalism that promised autonomy and self-rule to the Ogaden Kenya has had particular problems rela- Somalis, Oromos, and others.44 If properly ting to Somali pastoralists in eastern instituted, ethnic federalism would have Kenya. In the 1960s, Somalis fought enabled the various ethnic pastoralist against incorporation into Kenya and groups to look after their own develop- were regarded as either nationalist seces- ment needs. However, the EPRDF regime sionist guerrillas (by Somalis) or merely has kept a tight rein on the federal regions, bandits (by the government). In the
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colonial era, the British did not incorpo- global war on terrorism (GWOT) has rate Somalis living in Kenya into the pre- further marginalized them.52 vailing order. At independence, the Bri- tish reversed previous colonial policy Stabilization Challenge: The Ethiopia-Eritrea and decided to force unity among dispa- Confrontation rate ethnic groups (including Somalis) A fundamental problem for the EPRDF in Kenya. In 1961 the establishment of regime is the fact that it is based on the the Republic of Somalia inspired Somali Tigrayan ethnic group, which is less than political leaders in Kenya to rally for 10 percent of the population.53 In the secession from Kenya and incorporation May 2005 elections, the regime was sur- into Somalia. Subsequently, the Soma- prised by the strength of the opposition lian government supported the Shifta and, according to EU observers, rigged (“the lawless”). Eventually, the Shifta the results.54 The confrontation with Eri- depended too much on Somalia and lost trea is another problem for the EPRDF its internal drive for self-determination.49 regime, and thousands of Ethiopian The Shifta war has colored Kenya’s rela- troops remain in the vicinity of the fron- tionship with pastoralists from the 1960s tier. The war ended in 2000, and the onwards and helps to explain (along Boundary Commission’s decision was with a number of other factors) state rendered in 2002. However, Ethiopia has failure to deal with growing populations refused to accept the awarding of the vil- and development problems that have lage of Badme and contested territory to threatened the way of life and ecosystems Eritrea, which threatens a resumption of in much of the north of the country.50 hostilities if resolution is not achieved.55 The same hostility applies in Uganda’s Eritrea is playing a destabilizing role in National Resistance Movement regime’s the Horn of Africa, supporting the Isla- relations with the Acholi and pastoralists mic Courts Union and other movements in the north of the country, due partly to that oppose the Transitional Federal the two-decade-long struggle with the Government and the Ethiopian presence. Lord’s Resistance Army.51 Ethiopia has thousands of troops tied A fundamental problem for both down in Somalia trying to protect the Kenya and Uganda is that the regimes TFG. Eritrea has moved thousands of are based around ethnic groups engaged militias and troops into the demilitarized in farming in the south of their respec- zone bordering Ethiopia, thereby tive countries that have trouble relating increasing the chances of an incident with other groups, especially pastoralists. escalating into another all-out war. In Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US defense regard to Sudan, Ethiopia has become attaché to Kenya, notes that the Muslim very dependent on Sudanese oil and will population there has been marginalized be cautious in relations with Khartoum.56 by the government. For example, the The conflict between Ethiopia and Swahili population along the coast has a Eritrea remains the major stumbling special passport, which is a mark of block in the stabilization of the Horn of government distrust. The vast majority Africa according to Grignon of the ICG.57 of Muslims are not extremists but have Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and felt oppressed by the Kenyan govern- Security Commission asserts that the AU ment. US-Kenyan cooperation in the views Ethiopia-Eritrea as the most serious
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crisis that it currently faces.58 The animo- dents are not responding. The local sity between the Eritrean president and population is not turning extremists over the Ethiopian prime minister is a major to Kenyan government authorities or to obstacle to peace and impacts the whole US personnel. Islamists are thriving on region. The Eritrean president is isolated, the protection of the local population. which renders peacemaking difficult. They are securing funds and can travel Gomes observes that in attempting to freely between Kenya, Somalia, Yemen, stabilize the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff, and the Gulf states (e.g., Oman). The the commission and the AU Peace and security situation in Kenya is no better Security Council have not done enough. than at the time of the 1998 embassy The AU heads of state have tried quiet bombings, in spite of the East Africa diplomacy, without success. The Alge- Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). rians mediated from 1998 to 2000 but The Pakistani population in Nairobi is cannot be called on again. Libya’s beha- also a source of concern. In the ranks of vior has been erratic in attempting to the irredentist Somali movements (e.g., mediate. South African president Thabo the ICU and the ONLF) are radical Isla- Mbeki and Ghanaian president and cur- mists trying to defeat Ethiopia and esta- rent AU chairman, John Kuofour, have blish an Islamist state. Eritrea is backing tried to mediate without success. At the the Islamists against Ethiopia. However, moment, the IGAD is an organization in Eritrea would not try to stage an Islamist name only due to politics, and Eritrea’s attack on the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti like withdrawal from the body has undermined the attack on Chinese and Ethiopian oil its credibility. Pres. in the Horn of Africa workers in the Ogaden.60 Mwai Kibaki of Kenya is not well enough The situation in Nairobi and Mombasa to mediate. Tanzania and the United is better than in 2006, when there was a States should both do more. The United stream of reported threats. Nine years States signed the Algiers Agreement in since the embassy bombings, the region 2000 as a guarantor and is obliged to do is as volatile as ever. Zanzibar remains a more. At the moment, the United States problem. Kenya has not made much is too focused on Somalia and the war headway—the border is porous, and nor- on terrorism. The United Nations Mis- thern and coastal Kenya are largely igno- sion in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) red by the central government. The bor- forces have been reduced, while Ethio- der is closed in the northeast; it is difficult pia and Eritrea have lots of forces near to handle Somali refugees, and there is the temporary zone and Eritrea has sent little international pressure on Kenya to militias into the zone.59 do something about them. There are no terrorism laws on the books in Kenya yet Radical Islamist Stabilization Challenges because of the December 2007 elections.61 Radical Islamists are said to be hiding and operating on the Kenyan coast and in Peacebuilding-Sustainability- Somalia. Combined Joint Task Force Stabilization Challenges Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) civil affairs personnel are conducting projects on Taken together, peacebuilding, sustai- the Kenyan coast to try to win hearts and nability, and stabilization manifested in minds and assuage fears, but Islamic resi- the interrelationship between war and
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famine have been devastating in the Horn is plenty of conflict over land and resour- of Africa. Already noted was the close rela- ces and strong and continuing ethnic tionship between famine, conflict, and tensions. In the area where Somalis and the undermining of regime legitimacy in Oromos border each other, there is lots Ethiopia in 1973–74 and 1984–85 as well of conflict and fighting.66 as in Somalia in 1991–93. Drought and Some disaffected Somali pastoralists dependence on foreign aid, along with in Ethiopia have supported continued corruption, undermine sustainability and destabilization of the Ogaden by the legitimacy. Global warming is affecting ONLF against Ethiopian security forces. the region, but direct evidence of war- The sustainability and stabilization crises ming causing conflict is difficult to in the Ogaden could open the door to confirm. For example, a study of the Tur- safe havens for Islamic extremists and kana in northern Kenya did not find a could conceivably generate recruits. The direct link.62 same could be said of some Oromo pas- Among pastoralists, sources of conflict toralists and support for the OLF. include scarce resources such as water Conflict appears to be decreasing in holes and grazing lands, particularly northeastern Kenya, but structural during times of extreme hardship.63 problems remain. With good rains, Desertification (caused in part by climate there is less conflict over natural change) has contributed to conflict resources. There have been drought and among pastoralists. There is conflict famine over the past two years.67 Drought between neighboring ethnic groups in has caused a recent spike in pastoralist pastoral areas that often crosses borders, unrest. Pastoralists have restocked their mainly because of cattle raiding.64 Pre- livestock after drought by raiding other vious analysis has discussed the under- livestock from farming areas to the south. lying reasons for conflict, including a Somali pastoralists in Kenya identify lack of infrastructure to support pastoral more with Somalia than with their livelihood.65 In addition, promoting country of residence.68 Historical neglect sedentary agriculture can cause alienation at the pastoral level compounded by lack among pastoralists who are being forced of understanding by elites leads to conflict. to give up a generations-old lifestyle. Land titling is unpopular with pastoralists In regard to pastoralists and sustainabi- and has led to a groundswell of political lity and stability, their level of support for dissent. In the meantime, irrevocable Islamic extremism/terrorism is open to damage has already been done.69 question. In Somalia (and to a lesser In Moyale, on the Kenya-Ethiopia bor- extent Sudan), it could be said that sustai- der, local politicians are being divisive and nability and stabilization challenges have have helped to create new political divi- created dissatisfaction among Muslim sions among pastoralists along ethnic lines. populations and have opened the door Previously, several generations had lived to at least tolerating Islamic extremism/ peacefully together and intermarried.70 terrorism even if not supporting it. Coastal populations have been discri- In Ethiopia, desertification and decli- minated against by the central govern- ning grazing lands have led to impoveris- ment. The problem goes well beyond hment of Somali and Oromo pastoralists, environmental sustainability. Political disaffection, and declining legitimacy of factors alienate the population. This is a the state. In areas with large clans, there region with a rapidly growing popula-
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tion maintaining the same practices. In stabilizing the Horn of Africa at the Therefore, the people will become macro or structural level, the Horn is the increasingly alienated, and it is uncer- only region in Africa where the structural tain what will they do. As for al-Qaeda, it solution of secession (i.e., Eritrea, is a mystery not well understood, espe- southern Sudan, Darfur, and Somali- cially in East Africa.71 land) seems to be a realistic option that In Sudan, population displacement, could make matters more peaceful rather lack of governance, conflict-related than increasing bloodshed (e.g., Nige- resource exploitation, and underinvest- ria). The question is: Should secession ment in sustainable development, all be allowed to run its natural course? Or, produce sustainability and stabilization should the international community challenges. There are five million inter- encourage compromise solutions (e.g., nally displaced persons (IDP) and inter- federalism or confederation)? Thus far, national refugees (Sudan has the largest secession has only been allowed in the population of IDPs).72 Competition over case of Eritrea, where the Eritrean Peo- oil and gas reserves, the Nile River waters, ple’s Liberation Front won military vic- and timber, as well as land use issues rela- tory and where a friendly (at that time) ted to agricultural lands, are factors in Ethiopian government agreed. the instigation and perpetuation of At the intermediate level, building state conflict in Sudan. Confrontations over capacity and institutional viability remains range lands and rain-fed agricultural an ongoing process in Ethiopia, Kenya, lands in the drier parts of the country and Uganda, involving international aid demonstrate the connection between agencies and NGOs. The three states have natural resource scarcity and conflict. In a long way to go before they can provide northern Darfur, high population services to all of their people. In Somalia growth, environmental stress, land degra- and Sudan, the issue is one of reconsti- dation, and desertification have created tuting the state through either peace- the conditions for conflicts, which have building or neotrusteeship. Thus far it been sustained by political, tribal, or eth- seems that neotrusteeship is too costly for nic differences. This is an example of the the international community and will be social breakdown that can result from perceived as neocolonial in Africa. Thus, ecological collapse.73 a gamble will be made on lower-cost pea- cekeeping and peacebuilding. In regard to managing micro-level chal- Stabilizing and Peacebuilding lenges (short-term shocks), the IGAD in the Horn of Africa (Intergovernmental Authority on Develo- pment) has developed policies for sustai- In overcoming state failure and stabili- nability, food security, conflict resolution zing the Horn of Africa, the approach mechanisms, and an early warning system must be sophisticated—managing macro, that is intended to ameliorate the impact intermediate, and micro levels and for- of state weakness and failure and environ- ging a range of partnerships from the mental disaster.74 However, the IGAD United Nations to African regional orga- early warning and prevention capabilities nizations and from states in the region to are only in their initial stages. Problems NGOs and to the United States and the with the IGAD early warning system European Union. include the fact that three key countries
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(Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia) are not the European Union. A Marshall Plan for involved and the system remains focused Africa is needed to overcome this deplo- on low-level pastoral conflicts in northern rable situation.78 Uganda and northern Kenya. Further- According to Marcel LeRoy of the EU, more, measures for resolving conflicts the EU provided €243 million in support to over resources in Uganda and Kenya have the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) not been implemented.75 in Darfur from 2004 to 2007. The AU The Golden Spear Disaster Manage- deployed AMIS with hope and heart, not ment Center provides early warning to 11 with plan. The EU cannot withdraw sup- African states. Regional organizations port, which would lead to the collapse of and governments need to have the politi- AMIS and massive looting. The switch to a cal will to act and fund early warning and hybrid AU/UN Darfur mission may help, prevention.76 but there will still be problems. The EU is more reluctant to fund AMISOM in Soma- Standby Capability lia and the AU Peace and Security Commis- 79 Member states of the IGAD and the East sion because of the AMIS experience. African Community (EAC) are building Stabilizing Somalia and Peacebuilding the East African Brigade of the African Standby Force (ASF) to intervene to stop Top-down and bottom-up approaches to state failure and its consequences. overcoming state failure have been However, the “Eastbrig” has fallen behind implemented in Somalia. Since 1993, its western and southern counterparts one bottom-up approach has NGOs wor- because Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda king with Somali groups and civil society.80 have been slow to cooperate and imple- A second bottom-up approach was under- ment prior agreements. In fact, the taken by the “Islamic Courts.” Islamism Southern African Development Commu- arose in the 1990s and was manifested in nity (SADC) brigade of the ASF, led by the Islamic courts that were founded to South Africa, has already deployed to administer sharia law and justice in an Darfur ahead of the Eastbrig. In any event, anarchic environment. They formed the the UN will play the lead role in Southern Islamic Courts Union, defeated the war- Sudan and appears to be assuming lea- lords in May 2006, and established control dership in Darfur.77 of Mogadishu and large swaths of southern The ASF’s biggest problems are logis- Somalia until being defeated by Ethiopian tics and sustainability within the AU fra- forces backing the Transitional Federal mework. Within the African Union, there Government in December 2006.81 is little vision regarding where the ASF is Another approach has been multila- headed. For example, the military plan- teral and top down, with the IGAD, led ning cell has drafted terms of reference by Kenya, bringing various Somali elites for its missions, but AU administrators do together to establish the TFG and then not seem to know that the planning cell sending them back to Somalia to assume exists. Thus, a sustainable ASF remains a control with Ethiopian assistance.82 It is dream. African states contribute less than uncertain whether this approach will suc- one percent of their defense budgets to ceed or if bottom-up approaches will pay fund the ASF and support staff. Most sup- dividends. It is also uncertain whether port comes from the United States and Somaliland will ever become part of
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Somalia again or if it will become inde- and clinics are the answer to the cross- pendent, as appears to be the prevailing border dilemma. Somalis and other pas- sentiment. Reconciliation talks between toralists live for movement. Therefore, the TFG and the Islamic Courts were held regional integration is very important. twice in 2007, but no progress was made. An IGAD framework has been set up to The problem of Ethiopian troops as a enable the informal sector to benefit “lightning rod” in Somalia remains. from regional integration, especially pas- According to Solomon Gomes of the toralists, and to make a contribution to AU Peace and Security Commission, environmental sustainability. Somalia is high on the AU list of coun- The TFG is not the permanent solu- tries to stabilize. The AU did not want to tion for Somalia. The reconstruction of go into Somalia until the UN Security Somalia is an ongoing process in line Council guaranteed logistics. However, with the tasks given by the 2004 charter. Uganda jumped into Somalia, while Reconciliation talks between the TFG Ghana, Nigeria, and Malawi did not. If and the ICU must be used as a spring- four countries had sent four battalions, it board to the next stage. The internatio- would have sent a visible message, but nal community must push for a settle- the situation on the ground makes it dif- ment in Somalia and needs to bring ficult for the Ugandans to sustain peace- other countries and organizations into keeping operations. In the peace process, the process.85 a “carrot and stick” approach is needed, Interpeace is continuing to conduct and the ICU must be made stakeholders.83 extensive public consultations, workshops, Peacebuilding in Puntland, Somaliland, forums, and stakeholder dialogue on and Somalia requires a longtime horizon. issues essential to peace-building and state Shifting political, military, and social dyna- reconstruction. As there was no central mics demands up-to-date knowledge and government, it adopted a regional understanding of the situation on the approach—setting up projects in Punt- ground to facilitate peacekeeping. Institu- land (Garowe), Somaliland (Hargeysa), tions that the NGO Interpeace helped and south-central Somalia (Mogadishu). build in Puntland and Somaliland have In Somalia, the Center for Research and helped keep peacebuilding going. Ingre- Dialogue, with the help of the traditional dients for success include bringing stake- elders, has sucessfully facilitated a number holders together, creating institutional of reconcilitation processes among major dynamics, and providing technical assis- clans in the region. Work is being carried tance and support. Pastoralists must be out on the ground by three nonpartisan made part of the stakeholder process. partner organizations that promote peace For example, nomads were consulted and reconciliation in Somalia. After before the date was set for the recent months of reconciliation and power sha- Somaliland elections.84 ring among clans, people of the Bakool An early warning system has been esta- region went to the polls to vote for local blished all over Somalia consisting of and regional authorities, including the partnerships with organizations that have governor, district commissioners, and contacts and offices throughout the regional and district councilors. The country. Since Somali nomads are found region became the second area in Somalia all over Somalia and in parts of Ethiopia to elect its officials through a community- and Kenya, mobile education systems based, participatory process.
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According to Francois Grignon of the Ghana decided that the situation was too ICG, reconciliation negotiations must volatile and is not sending a force. The open the door to legitimate claims by clan Burundians are sending more than 1,000 representatives. A third-party facilitator is troops, but they need to be trained and needed to negotiate between the TFG and equipped. In regard to building the capa- the ICU. Trade control is a factor in the city of the AU Peace and Security Commis- negotiations. A disarmament process has sion to do military planning, there are to be included in negotiations. Since fear 1,000 positions, only 500 personnel, and is entrenched in Mogadishu, confidence- 350 quality people. With AMIS and AMI- building measures need to be agreed 86 SOM plus operations planned for the upon and implemented. Comoros, Chad, and the Central African In Somalia, Islamic activists have taken Republic, the AU has its hands full. The advantage of the absence of a central AU has no expertise in large-scale peace- government and ascendancy of the ICU. support operations. The EU wants to have For now, a possible Islamist onslaught has a voice but is not giving sufficient funds. been pushed into the background. A num- 88 ber of things are needed to prevent people The AU has a lack of fiscal capacity. from joining Islamist movements. There In Somali areas, the various streams of should be no guarantee that the lifestyles Islam and Islamist movements are affec- of protagonists will be maintained if and ting the entire Horn. What happens in when peace comes. The Islamists will be Somalia provides opportunities for Isla- victims of peace and will continue to act as mism to emerge in different forms and spoilers. At the moment, Djibouti is playing spread. In Somalia, the sources of Isla- the mediator role. It is difficult to see if mism include Wahhabi extremism due to Somalia’s problems can be overcome. Saudi funding. Wahhabists have been There is a need for the international com- taking students to Saudi Arabia and Yemen munity to strike a fair balance to help stabi- in the last 15 years. In dealing with Isla- lize Somalia. Reconstitution of the state is mism, there must be a recognition that crucial, as is political will. Then the United Islamism is not going to stop. Thus, a States and others can come into support, long-term approach must be taken. The playing a facilitative role.87 moderate voice within Islam must be It appears that the US Department of enhanced, for example, with investment State is providing support for the TFG in moderate madrassas.89 government because US policy makers do not want to be involved in Somalia again. Stabilizing Sudan With no presidential directive, there has been no US action. Western partners are The future of Sudan remains just as uncer- waiting for the United States to act. Somali tain as that of Somalia. Whereas it seems reaction to Ethiopian intervention has difficult if not impossible to reconstitute been strong and negative. Intervention in the Somali state, the problem with Sudan Somalia is costing Ethiopia politically and is the concentration of power in Khartoum. economically. Ugandans want their peace- As the oil boom continues, Khartoum will keeping force to be Africanized and brought continue to reap the lion’s share of the under the UN umbrella so that resources benefits, will grow in power, and will can start to flow their way. Nigeria failed to become increasingly capable of preventing send a force because of internal problems. the South and Darfur from seceding.
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Popular opinion in the South and nal security architecture would help in Darfur indicate that the optimal approach Sudan and Somalia. The IGAD supported would be to allow the South to secede in negotiations in Sudan and Somalia, but it 2011 and provide the same option for needs to be strengthened to promote dia- Darfur. The two regions have been bruta- logue in the region. There is no good lized by Khartoum, and it is hard to visua- alternative to a regional peace process lize their remaining part of even a confe- because of the connectivity of conflicts.94 deration. The problem is that Khartoum will not allow secession without a strug- Stabilizing Ethiopia vs. Eritrea gle. As for the rest of Sudan, federal Resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea confronta- arrangements would be most suitable, tion is a daunting task, especially now that but it is difficult to see how Khartoum the two countries are fighting in Soma- could be persuaded to accept constitu- 95 tional changes.90 lia. Even if the border issue is settled, According to Gomes, peacebuilding the confrontation will not end because efforts are ongoing in southern Sudan. the pride of national leaders and their First, there is a need to disarm all militia survival is the main issue, not borders. groups in the South. Second, the interna- Pres. Issaias Afwerki had exaggerated tional community must take seriously the expectations that Eritrea would be the possibility of the South seceding.91 Singapore or Malaysia of the Horn of International actors need to think Africa and would become a dominant ahead to the 2011 Sudan referendum and political, economic, and technological the possibility of southern Sudanese inde- center. He assumed that the Eritrean pendence. The Saudi government is wor- Defense Force was invincible. As a result king to influence actors in the region to of dashed expectations, Eritrea has not 96 help to stabilize Sudan. In Sudan, the been flexible. ruling Congress Party and the associated The US role has been and will continue National Islamic Front are making conces- to be crucial in Eritrea-Ethiopia talks. sions for peace, but it is uncertain if they Unfortunately, the US preoccupation with will follow through. The Bashir regime its alliance against terrorism has relegated has sidelined the Wahhabi faction that the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation to the used to dominate the government but is background. The Boundary Commission also reluctant to yield to international decided to “virtually” demarcate the boun- pressure.92 dary, as neither side would allow access for If Khartoum gets the lion’s share of physical demarcation. This decision led resources, it may be prepared to let Eritrea to demand the withdrawal of southern Sudan become independent. UNMEE peacekeepers from its territory, The Sudanese “Arab” mind-set has been which began in March 2008.97 to make peace when it suits them; otherwise, According to Grignon, the internatio- they wage war.93 nal community should not attempt to Grignon, of the ICG, says there is a reengage via Libyans and other actors that great need to stabilize Somalia and Sudan have been associated with Eritrea in nego- and to create a level where differences tiating an end to the confrontation. Ins- can be regulated. Peacemakers must find tead, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia centers of gravity and create equilibrium should be called upon to put pressure on in the region. A new (or revitalized) regio- the two parties. Peacemakers have to take
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into account Ethiopia’s internal dynamics accept change in Darfur, Kenya remains and constraints on the regime.98 Prime engaged.101 Minister Meles Zenawi cannot make major Peace in Somalia is the main focus of concessions because of pressures from Kenyan military engagement. Some parts Ethiopian nationalists. Gomes believes of Somalia have been stabilized. The role that peacemakers should be using back of the Kenyan military is to participate in channels. Uncontested areas along the line with AU rules of engagement to border should be demarcated, with dispu- advise, train, coordinate, and liaison. ted areas left until later.99 Kenya is working with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to limit collateral damage in Kenya as an “Anchor State” in the Mogadishu as well as to control the influx Horn of Africa of terrorist groups and with the United States on Somalia, antipiracy operations, Kenya is an industrializing state and is and sea lanes regulation. Kenya is willing relatively stable and democratic. Accor- to train Burundian peacekeepers for ser- ding to noted scholar and development vice in Somalia. However, Kenya cannot expert Michael Chege, the democratic send its own peacekeepers because it bor- Kibaki regime has made great strides; for ders on Somalia and because peace has example, helping to reduce poverty by 10 not been secured. Djibouti is trying to percent between 2003 and 2007. He belie- defuse the Somali conflict as well as the ves that Kenya is becoming an economic Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation.102 dynamo as well as a center of peace and In regard to the Eastbrig of the ASF, stability. There are concerns about the Kenya is hosting the planning elements possibility of Sudan and Somalia dissol- and the independent mechanism for ving into even greater chaos. However, coordinating security and socioeconomic Kenya will probably follow the reactive development. The headquarters of East- stance that it assumed in the past, even if brig is in Ethiopia, and, according to Bri- its interests in southern Sudan are har- gadier Walugu, Kenya enjoys good par- med. Finally, Islamic extremists on the tnership with Ethiopia. Kenya is ready to Kenyan coast remain a cause for respond to contingencies thanks to US 100 concern. and EU training and support. Kenya has Kenya remains engaged in the diplo- peacekeepers in UNMEE, alongside Jor- matic process, including Darfur negotia- danian forces, the only forces remaining tions, recognizing that the region is very between Ethiopia and Eritrea.103 Kenya unstable. According to Brigadier Maurice does not want to be in Somalia because Walugu of the Kenyan Ministry of Defense, “frontline states” are not supposed to ope- there are two levels on which Kenya deals rate there. As for the Ugandan peacekee- with Sudan—the political level of negotia- pers, Walugu believes they were not ting with the Sudanese government and deployed too early in Somalia; just too few the practical military level—as the peace troops and not enough support. The pro- process (e.g., the Comprehensive Peace blem is deploying into Somalia. It takes a Agreement between North and South) lot of time and considerable risk.104 does not guarantee results in reducing As for dealing with Kenyan pastoralists conflict or the number of internally dis- and communal conflict, Walugu likened placed people. Although the Sudanese the Kenyan army to the 7th Cavalry in the government does not seem willing to western United States. It takes time to
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educate and change the culture of people nalists want universal recognition of (i.e., pastoralists). The drilling of boreho- Somaliland as an independent state (with les and the development of water resour- the ulterior motive of further dividing ces and pastures can help to contain the Somalis). They want a united democratic conflict.105 federal Sudan and believe that secession In the operations against the Islamic of the South is destabilizing. They demand Courts Union, the Kenyan military joined that the United States induce Egypt to with the Ethiopians on occasion, which negotiate with Ethiopia over sharing Blue caused tensions. The Ethiopians were not Nile water.110 easy to deal with and blamed the Kenyans Ethiopian moderates note that, following when something went wrong. The plan- 11 September 2001, the Horn of Africa ning cell is on Kenyan real estate.106 attracted more attention as a region percei- ved to be a base for radical Islamists and Ethiopia as an “Anchor State” terrorists. Ethiopia was thought to be a tar- in the Horn of Africa get, and Somalia and Sudan were suspected Besides intervening with troops in Soma- of sponsoring terrorists. One of the pro- lia, Ethiopia has sent peacekeepers to blems has been governance failure in most three different peacekeeping operations of the countries in the region. For example, and is prepared to send more. At the Ethiopia cannot build national consensus. Sudan has improved since the CPA in 2005, moment, cordial relations exist between 111 Ethiopia and Sudan, partly because Ethio- but Darfur remains a disaster. pia is importing oil from Sudan.107 EU and US policy towards the EPRDF Regional Organizations as Partners regime is necessarily “nuanced.”108 After Stabilization and peacebuilding in the the rigging of elections and shooting of Horn of Africa have involved considerable students in May 2005 and the trial of efforts at peacemaking by IGAD states, opposition leaders in November 2005, the the AU, the UN, and the United States. EU and the United States downgraded The UN has mounted peace and stability some ties. With the 2006 intervention in operations between Ethiopia and Eritrea Somalia, full relations have been restored. and in Somalia (which failed in 1993–94) However, Congress recently sanctioned a and southern Sudan, and the African number of regime leaders for the 2005 Union has done so in Darfur and Somalia. events. Ethiopia is disappointed at not In the Horn of Africa, the IGAD must be being compensated by the United States rejuvenated as a forum in which disparate for its intervention and peacekeeping role member states air their differences (aiding in Somalia in 2007.109 In fact, Ethiopians stabilization efforts) and work to prevent cannot leave Somalia without a guarantee humanitarian disasters by addressing sus- of security, so the costs continue to tain-ability challenges. The East African mount. Community has demonstrated even grea- Ethiopian nationalists believe that the ter potential to build cooperation for sus- best approach to stabilizing the Horn of tainability and stabilization. The Common Africa is to bring Eritrea under control— Market of East and Southern Africa through regime change if necessary. They (COMESA) has been working on econo- want the United States to support the TFG mic and sustainability challenges and is in Somalia with billions of dollars. Natio- moving to work on issues of stabilization.
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According to Ambassador Wane of the Promoting Sustainability, African Union Peace and Security Com- mission, a regional approach is needed, Stabilization, and Peacebuilding given the interconnection of conflicts. Policies that could promote sustainabi- The problem is that the IGAD is dysfunc- lity, stabilization, and peacebuilding tional due to political differences.112 include the development of federalism, According to Walter Knausenberger, the improving the lives of pastoralists, and COMESA is more dynamic and promising regional early warning and intervention. than the IGAD.113 Programs include expanding and The IGAD has been playing a mixed strengthening the IGAD-CEWARN early role in stabilizing the Horn of Africa for warning and action system and programs two decades. The Intergovernmental that aim to build links between pastora- Association on Development was founded lists and governments in Addis Ababa, in the wake of the 1984–85 Ethiopian Nairobi, and Kampala, including the buil- famine, and a main priority was dealing ding of wells, schools, and clinics and the with drought and desertification that hel- provision of marketing centers for the ped to bring about famine and instability buying of herds. International aid pro- in the region. In the early 2000s, the IGAD grams are enabling the building of scho- played a role (along with Kenya and the ols and clinics and helping to extend the United States) in the resolution of the presence of states in previously ungover- North-South conflict in Sudan and in ned regions. Stakeholders include state negotiating a transitional federal govern- and nonstate actors, international govern- ment for Somalia, which moved back to mental organizations (e.g., the IGAD), the country in February 2006 and attemp- and NGOs. A participatory approach to ted to establish authority from Mogadishu project development and implementation in 2007. A conflict the IGAD does not should be promoted, and local pastoralist have the capacity to resolve is the conti- institutions such as trading associations nuing confrontation between Ethiopia and peace committees should be built. and Eritrea in the wake of the 1998–2000 Pastoral self-governance should be war, which has spilled over into Somalia strengthened.117 and has affected the entire region.114 Only Moderate forces exist among the Soma- UN peacekeepers are preventing a lis; they need to be understood, strengthe- resumption of hostilities, while Saudi Ara- ned, and supported. Somalis as a group bia and Algeria are being suggested as are not susceptible to extremist philoso- possible mediators. phy, but if forced to choose sides, they will The COMESA has helped to reduce go with the Islamists, even though Somalis tariffs among member states and boost are not strict Sunnis. The key is to provide intraregional trade, which has helped economic growth equitably and to engage Kenya and several other states prosper. with people who know the area.118 Trade in livestock and animal products The Kenyan government requires a has been demonstrated to help pastora- mind-set change in relation to Somalis lists become more prosperous in the Horn and other politically marginalized groups of Africa.115 The biggest problem conti- to move towards sustainability stabiliza- nues to be the low level of African trade. A tion. The government needs to be pro- second problem is the plethora of organi- perly engaged but thus far has taken a zations to which states belong.116 divisive approach, making issues political
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as well as resource based. Pastoralists must and boundaries do not constrain groups. be assisted in managing the excessive The task for RELPA is to make steps growth of population and animals. Ways forward. Thus far, there have been procu- must be found for herders to move to rement issues and delays. RELPA needs other pasture and water areas so that more than two years’ funding to be effec- conflict can be avoided with sedentary tive. Thus far, livelihood interventions agriculturalists. Visual tools, including have not had the impact desired, as they ones that show ethnic overlay, trade rou- have not addressed or understood under- tes, and markets, have been developed to lying conflict dynamics among pastora- assist pastoralists and enable them to deal lists. In any case, it is unlikely that the with resource and pasture access issues. RELPA approach and “alternative liveli- Access to the political process is essential hoods” programs can mitigate support for to providing pastoralists with voice and Islamic extremism and terrorism.122 participation at the national and provin- A consortium of groups has formulated cial levels. Fifty percent of the GDP in a cross-sectoral program across borders. Kenyan agriculture comes from pastoral Case studies in Ethiopia and Kenya indi- activities throughout the country; so, the cate that there is now better reporting res- marginalization of pastoralists is partly ponse regarding conflict, early warning, due to misperceptions. Marginalization is and drought (this is difficult to do in Soma- now being overcome by technology—with lia). The Integrated River Basin Manage- cell phone access (cell phone towers in ment Project works with the private sector. the rural areas), pastoralists now have There is a need for resources to provide access to market information. Alternative access to safe water. In addressing issues of access means rural banking and livestock education and health, mobile schools and sales can develop. Funds can go into other clinics have been proposed in pastoral entrepreneurial areas besides livestock. areas. The health issue is vital—a quarter Therefore, providing access to economic of the pastoralist population has acute mal- resources and development is the best nutrition compounded by a lack of stable counterterrorism initiative.119 health service and good hygiene.123 The RELPA (Regional Enhanced Live- The IGAD-CEWARN early warning lihoods in Pastoral Areas), managed by mechanism holds promise for preventing the Nairobi regional office of the US conflict among pastoralists as well as Agency for International Development famine. The IGAD-CEWARN, established (USAID), is attempting to promote sus- in 2001, has lacked strategic direction; tainability and stabilization in pastoralist however, state-of-the-art software is its areas with a number of NGO partners.120 strength. There are 52 sets of selected indi- One such partner is the NGO “Pact,” which cators of communal variance, areas repor- works with partner NGOs and the USAID ted, media reporting on conflict, and envi- for conflict mitigation and provides conflict ronmental context. Field monitors provide resolution training to deal with pastoralist weekly reports on specific incidents as they water disputes and subclan conflicts.121 happen. Information flows to the national RELPA represents sound thinking, is a level and to the IGAD-CEWARN, but lack step forward, and is intended to use a of government action is a major weakness. joint programs approach. It is regional, The well-established response mechanism integrated, and comprehensive, which is needs to be programmatically designed essential because pastoralism is regional and developed. Another problem is the
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diverse source of funds (60 percent from The macro-level or structural factors the USAID, 30 percent from the German are important in explaining sustain-ability GTZ, and only 10 percent from member and stabilization challenges. The clan- states).124 based Somali society made state building The Ugandan government has used difficult in the 1960s, made state collapse daily reports from the IGAD-CEWARN to possible, and is making state reconstitu- deal with problems of drugs, arms, and tion even more difficult in the 2000s. In human trafficking by pastoralists. The Sudan, long-standing historical and cultu- Ugandan government adopted a disarma- ral differences between Khartoum and ment strategy with NGO funding. The outlying regions led to state failure from Ugandan army was used to disarm the pas- the outset. In Ethiopia, Kenya, and toralists. Many community members died Uganda, the center of power has rested in as a result (Karamojong in the Karamoja agricultural centers, with pastoralists the region).125 The IGAD-CEWARN needs to outsiders. The intermediate or institutio- work at early warning and conflict manage- nal level also helps in explaining sustain- ment among pastoralists at a lower level. ability and stabilization challenges. Cer- Then, it can be developed to manage bigger tainly, in the case of Somalia, institutional conflicts and disasters involving states.126 mismanagement and state weakness Interpeace partners in Somalia, Punt- contributed to failure. In Sudan, discrimi- land, and Somaliland have initiated various nation against outlying regions was impor- efforts to prevent environmental devasta- tant, but the impulse to subjugate those regions was even more significant. State tion, notably uncontrolled tree cutting for weakness helps to explain why pastoralists charcoal. This began during the late 1970s in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda did not by refugee influxes from the Ogaden in receive adequate attention, but the struc- neighboring Ethiopia but was further tural divide was more important. aggravated by a lack of governance fol- 127 The Horn of Africa is one region of the lowing years of prolonged conflict. world where short-term shocks have played a significant role in creating acute Conclusion sustainability-stabilization challenges. The susceptibility of the region to drought, The Horn of Africa is one of the world’s overpopulation, and famine has brought most fragile regions; only West and Cen- several cataclysmic events that have contri- tral Africa surpass it in terms of state failu- buted to state failure. Sudden changes in res and instabilities. This article underli- conflicts, such as the rebel success in nes the importance of a regional focus on Somalia in 1990, led to state collapse. The the problem of state failure and the dan- sudden defeat of Somali forces in 1978 in ger of conflict spillover. In regard to a the Ogaden had a crushing effect on the sustainability assessment, clearly failed Siad Barre regime. states cannot deal with environmental Clearly there is a gap on the continuum degradation and disaster. Disasters (e.g., of state failure between (1) state collapse famines) and the lack of sustainability in Somalia, (2) failure by Khartoum to contribute significantly to state failure. deal with its outlying regions in a peaceful State failure means that struggle over and fair way, and (3) failure of Ethiopia resources occurs in a state of anarchy and and Uganda, and to a lesser extent Kenya, results in a downward spiral. to relate to and provide services to pasto-
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ralists. State failure and sustainability and Threats in the Horn of Africa from sus- stabilization challenges in the Horn have tainability and stabilization challenges are been distinctive and unusual. moderate in severity. Certainly, the threats This article has extensively examined from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border sustainability challenges, including cli- region and from Iraq and Iran are much mate change, population growth, and greater. The 1998 bombings of the US desertification, as well as water shortage, embassies in Kenya and Tanzania indicate famine, and rivers that are linked with that there are threats and that actions to conflict. It has demonstrated that there is build peace and bring greater sustainabi- a degree of interrelationship among eth- lity and stabilization to the region will nic conflict, weak states, and interstate advance wider security. Somalia and Soma- lis are the focus of efforts to prevent ungo- rivalry, as well as extremism, terrorism, verned areas and underdeveloped pastora- and sustainability challenges. It has lists from being used by extremists. The focused on a specific problem of sustain- development of a coordinated approach ability stabilization—the challenges facing among diplomats, development experts, Islamic pastoralists who may be attracted and defense personnel to bring sustainable to Islamic extremism and terrorism—as development to Somalis and to help well as solutions. reconstitute the Somalian state could bear This article has offered solutions at the fruit if sustained over the long run. macro level (e.g., the reduction of green- In this regard, this article has identified a house gases and improving education and range of intervention policies and programs employment to reduce birthrates) and at as well as tools and technologies that could the micro level (e.g., development pro- increase sustain-ability and stability and delay, jects for pastoralists, farmers, and women, defer, or prevent failure. The article also iden- tified the range of stakeholders, including as well as the development of market state and nonstate actors (intergovernmental infrastructure, local governance, and tree organizations and NGOs). The article deter- planting). Stabilization measures were mined their likely reactions to stabilization also examined, including early warning and sustainability efforts, as well as their willin- and preventive action, peacemaking, and gness to accept constructive roles in the pro- peace and stability operations, as well as cess of sustainable development or the likeli- peacebuilding, development and trade, hood that they will oppose efforts. The task of winning over partners to assist the Horn of and the role of anchor states and a range Africa in achieving sustainable development of organizations. The article confirmed and stabilization is very difficult and requires the utility of peacebuilding and stabilization an ongoing effort to change structures and and promoting sustainability together. attitudes. ❏
Notes
1. Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival: Environ- 2. See Mapping Climate Vulnerability and Poverty in mental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Inse- Africa: Where are the hot spots of climate change and curity (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996); Thomas Homer- household vulnerability? Report to the Department for Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, International Development submitted by the Interna- NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Nils Petter tional Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Nairobi, Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Cri- Kenya, in collaboration with The Energy & Resources tique of the Literature,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. Institute (TERI), New Delhi, India, and the African Cen- 3 (May 1998): 381–400. tre for Technology Studies (ACTS), Nairobi, Kenya, May
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2006, http://www.acts.or.ke/pubs/books/docs/Map- tutions, and Government (London: Pluto Press, 2001), ping_Vuln _Africa.pdf. See also Stephan Faris, “The Real 134–44. See also Paul Spencer, The Pastoral Continuum: Roots of Darfur,” Atlantic Monthly 299, no. 3 (April The Marginalization of Tradition in East Africa (Oxford, UK: 2007). Faris points to global warming and resulting Oxford University Press, 1998). desertification as major causes of the conflict between 17. Robert H. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The janjaweed pastoralists and Darfur farmers. Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge, 3. Stephen F. Burgess, “African Security in the 21st UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 73–92. Only a few Century: The Challenges of Indigenization and Multilat- states, such as Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s, reached out to eralism,” African Studies Review 41, no. 2 (September provide services to farmers and pastoralists. 1998): 37–61. 18. Eric E. Otenyo and Philip O. Nyinguro, “Social 4. Mebrate Woldentensaie (research and training Movements and Democratic Transitions in Kenya,” officer, the Conflict and Early Warning Response Mecha- Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, no. 1 (February nism [CEWARN] of the IGAD, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), 2007): 5–24. interview by author, 31 May 2007. 19. Juma Okuku, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democ- 5. History of IGAD, http://www.igad.org/.Eritrea ratisation Process in Uganda (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic joined the IGADD in 1993 at independence and withdrew Africa Institute, 2002), 19–20. from the IGAD in 2006 for political reasons (differences 20. Jason W. Clay and Bonnie K. Holcomb, Politics and with Ethiopia over Somalia). the Ethiopian Famine, 1984–1985 (New Brunswick, NJ: 6. IGAD Strategy, October 2003, http://www.igad Transaction Publishers, 1986), 42–48. .org/about/igad_strategy.pdf. 21. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: 7. Alexander de Waal, ed., Islamism and Its Enemies State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies of in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington, IN: University of Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings Insti- Indiana Press, 2004). tution, 1995), 7–24. 8. Stephanie McCrummen, “Cherished Interweaving 22. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse; Lyons and of Christians, Muslims Shows Signs of Fraying,” Washing- Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse; Clarke and Gosende, ton Post, 13 May 2007, A-15; and Tewolde Ezgabier “Somalia: Can a Collapsed State”; and Matt Bryden, “No (Ethiopian Environmental Protection Agency, Addis Quick Fixes: Coming to terms with terrorism, Islam and Ababa), interview by author, 29 May 2007. statelessness in Somalia,” Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 9. Jennifer Milliken, ed., State Failure, Collapse, and 2, (Fall 2003), http://www.lib .unb.ca/Texts/JCS/Fall03/ Reconstruction (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). bryden.htm. 10. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the 23. I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland: From Threat of Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 364 (Oxford, UK: Nation to State (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004); and 18–98. Walter S. Clarke and Robert Gosende, “Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself?” in Robert I. Rotberg, 24. Ibid., 95–165. ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror 25. I. M. Lewis, “The Ogaden and the Fragility of (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation and Washing- Somali Segmentary Nationalism,” African Affairs 88, no. ton, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 101–28. 353 (October 1989): 573–79. 11. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “State Collapse and Recon- 26. I. M. Lewis and James Mayall, “Somalia,” in James struction in Uganda,” in I. William Zartman, State Col- Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991–1994: United lapse: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 33–48. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 104–6. 12. Gerard Prunier and Rachel Gisselquist, “The 27. Ismail I. Ahmed, “The Heritage of War and State Sudan: A Successfully Failed State,” in Rotberg, ed., State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level Effects, Failure and State Weakness, 101–28. External Interventions and Reconstruction,” Third World 13. Kevin Ward, “ ‘The Armies of the Lord’: Christian- Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999): 113–27. In 1991, the Somali ity, Rebels, and the State in Northern Uganda, 1986– National Movement seized control of the north and estab- 1999,” Journal of Religion in Africa 31, no. 2 (May 2001): lished “Somaliland” that became an unrecognized but de 187–221. facto state. The “bottom up” approach of local organizing 14. Harold Golden Marcus, A History of Ethiopia and initiative helped in building the Somaliland state. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 63–76; 28. Stephen F. Burgess, The United Nations under and Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopia and Somalia,” in Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Conflict in Africa, Adelphi Paper 93 (London: Interna- 2002), 74–76. tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), 3–23. One 29. Francois Grignon (Africa program director, Inter- could also count Buganda and other kingdoms in what is national Crisis Group, Nairobi, Kenya), interview by author, now Uganda as significant pre-colonial states. 8 June 2007. 15. Burgess, “African Security.” 30. Lt Col Scott Rutherford (defense attaché, US 16. Mustafa Babiker, “Resource Competition and Embassy, Nairobi), interview by author, 4 June 2007. Conflict: Herder/Farmer or Pastoralism/ Agriculture?” 31. Alexander de Waal et al, War in Darfur and the in M. A. Mohamed Salih, Ton Dietz, and Abdel Ghaffar Search for Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Mohamed Ahmed, eds., African Pastoralism: Conflict, Insti- 2007); and International Crisis Group, Darfur: Revitaliz-
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ing the Peace Process, Africa Report No. 125, 30 April 2007, dent NGOs such as Save the Children UK have been http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. cfm?id=4769&l=1. working successfully in the Ogaden. 32. Francis Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities 49. Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border, The Last Frontier in the Sudan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, in the Search for Somali Unity (Trenton, NJ, and Asmara, 1995), 33–96. Eritrea: Red Sea Press, 2005). 33. Ibid., 135–84. 50. M. M. Okello and J. W. Kiringe, “Threats to Bio- 34. Ibid., 347–84. diversity and their Implications in Protected and Adja- 35. Bodour Abu Affan, “A Missed Opportunity: cent Dispersal Areas of Kenya,” Journal of Sustainable Sudan’s Stabilization Program, 1979–1982,” in John Obert Tourism 12, no. 1 (2004): 55–115. Voll, ed., Sudan: State and Society in Crisis (Washington, 51. Ward, “‘Armies of the Lord’,” 187–221. DC: Middle East Institute, 1991), 108–22. 52. Rutherford, interview. 36. John Young, “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process 53. Lahra Smith, Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty Leading to a Flawed Peace,” Review of African Political in Ethiopia (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, August Economy 32, Issue 103 (March 2005): 99–113. 2007), 1–20. 37. Faris, “The Real Roots of Darfur.” 54. Wong, interview. The Carter Center found that 38. Marcel Leroy (political advisor to the EU special there were significant flaws but not enough to change the representative, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), interview by outcome of the elections. The EU cut direct aid to Ethiopia author, 31 May 2007. 39. de Waal, War in Darfur; and International Crisis because the elections were found to be unfree and unfair. Group, Darfur. 55. Terrence Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of 40. Grignon, interview. Africa (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 41. Solomon Gomes (AU Peace and Security Com- 2007); and Wong, interview. mission, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 31 May 2007. 56. Wong, interview. The Carter Center found that there Another problem in Darfur is that Libyan and Eritrean were significant flaws but not enough to change the out- soldiers seem to be autonomous from the AU peacekeep- come of the elections. The EU cut direct aid to Ethiopia. ing force. 57. Grignon, interview. 42. Gomes, interview. 58. Gomes, interview. 43. John Helland, “Participation and Governance in 59. Ibid. the Development of Borana: Southern Ethiopia,” in M. A. 60. Rutherford, interview. Mohamed Salih, Ton Dietz, and Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed 61. Ibid. Ahmed, eds., African Pastoralism: Conflict, Institutions, and 62. Joan Kariuki, Andrew Adwerah, and Elvin Nyukuri Government (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 56–80. (ACTS, World Agroforestry Centre [ICRAF], Nairobi), 44. Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Ethiopian Federalism: interview by author, 7 June 2007. Autonomy Versus Control in the Somali Region,” Third 63. John K. Livingstone, A Comparative Study of Pastoralist World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004): 1131–54. Parliamentary Groups: Kenya Case Study, Natural Resources 45. Ben Watkins and Michael L. Fleisher, “Tracking Institute/Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Pastoralist Migration: Lessons from the Ethiopian Somali Africa (NRI/ PENHA), Research Project on Pastoralist Par- National Regional State,” Human Organization 61, no. 4, liamentary Groups funded by the British Department for (Winter 2002): 328–38. International Development’s (DFID) Livestock Produc- 46. Eric Wong (deputy political and economic coun- tion Programme and the CAPE Unit, African Union’s selor, political affairs, US Embassy, Addis Ababa), inter- Interafrican Bureau of Animal Resources (AU-IBAR), view by author, 30 May 2007. The ONLF has not been May 2005, http://www.nri. org/projects/pastoralism/ declared a terrorist organization by the US government in kenyappgmayfinal.pdf. spite of the attack on the Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers. 64. Philip Dobie (UNDP Drylands Development 47. Kaleyesus Bekele, “Ethiopia: Humanitarian Situation Center), interview by author, 6 June 2007. According to in Ogaden Raises Concern,” Reporter (Addis Ababa), 29 Dobie, Darfur and other conflicts over pastoral land are September 2007. A recent United Nations interagency development failures, not meteorological disasters. mission to the Somali Regional State observed that humanitarian conditions within the conflict areas have Local populations have been adept at dealing with climatic deteriorated substantially over the past several months. fluctuation for hundreds of years. Government restrictions of commercial and livestock 65. Woldentensaie, interview. trade aimed at preventing contraband activity have markedly 66. Graham and Wondimkum, interview. In Somali aggravated an already fragile food security and livelihood areas with small clans, there is no conflict. However, in situation. Livestock prices have fallen by as much as one- Gambella is another area where the USAID has been third due to a drastic reduction of export trade from the assisting with conflict- mitigation work, even though envi- areas of military operations. Food reserves at the house- ronmental issues are not relevant in such a lush and hold level are nearly exhausted among the communities sparsely populated area. visited. Moreover, food aid operations in the zones affected 67. Simon Richards (Pact director for African by military operations have been seriously delayed. Region), interview by author, 5 June 2007. 48. John Graham and Yacob Wondimkum (USAID), 68. Dobie, interview. interview by author, 31 May 2007. In contrast, indepen- 69. Ibid.
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70. Walter Knausenberger (senior regional environmen- 92. Courville and Wong, interviews. tal officer, USAID, East Africa Regional Mission, Nairobi), 93. Amb. David Kikaya and Prof. Moses Onyango interview by author, 5 June 2007. (International Relations, US International University, 71. Ibid. Nairobi), interview by author, 6 June 2007. 72. UN Environment Program, Sudan: Post-Conflict 94. Grignon, interview. Environmental Assessment, June 2007. 95. Lyons, Avoiding Conflict; and Wong, interview. 73. Ibid. 96. Wong, interview. 74. Susanne Schmeidl and Cirû Mwaûra, Early Warning 97. Ibid. and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa: Protocol on the 98. Grignon, interview. See also Lyons, Avoiding Conflict. Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 99. Gomes, interview. for IGAD Member States (Trenton, NJ, and Asmara, Eritrea: Red 100. Michael Chege, interviewed in Nairobi, June 7, Sea Press, 2001); and IGAD- CEWARN personnel, Addis 2007. Ababa, Ethiopia, interview by author, 31 May 2007. 101. Brig Maurice A. Walugu (operations director, Min- 75. IGAD-CEWARN personnel, interview. istry of Defence, Nairobi), interview by author, 4 June 2007. 76. Col Don Zimmer (director, Kenya-US Liaison 102. Ibid. Office [KUSLO], US Embassy, Nairobi), interview by 103. Ibid. author, 4 June 2007. 104. Ibid. 77. Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, Progress with the 105. Ibid. African Standby Force, ISS Paper 107, May 2005, 1–21. 106. Col Don Zimmer, interview by author, 4 June 2007. 78. Maj Gen Benon Biraaro, Ugandan Peoples 107. Wong, interview. Defence Force (director, strategic planning, African 108. Ibid. Union Peace and Security Commission, Addis Ababa, 109. Ibid. Ethiopia), interview by author, 1 June 2007. 110. Kinfe Abraham, interview by author, 31 May 79. Marcel Leroy (political advisor to the EU) 2007 80. Maruga Peter (coordinator, Peacemaking, Healing 111. Prof. Berhanu Kassahun (Department of Political and Reconciliation Programme, Nairobi Peace Initiative Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa Univer- [NPI]–Africa, Nairobi), interview by author, 8 June 2007. sity), interview by author, 1 June 2007. NPI and Interpeace officials interviewed in Nairobi, 7 June 112. Amb. Wane (African Union Peace and Security 2007, have adopted extensive bottom-up programs to end Commission, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 1 June 2007. state failure and build a new state and society. 113. Knausenberger, interview. Also, COMESA is tied 81. Cedric Barnes and Haran Hassan, “The Rise and Fall into the New Partnership for African Development, which of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,” Journal of East African Studies is attempting to hold states accountable in areas of gover- 1, Issue 2 (July 2007): 151–60. For background, see Roland nance, accountability, and development. Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil 114. Lyons, Avoiding Conflict. War,” in de Waal, ed., Islamism and Its Enemies, 114–45. 115. Stephen Karingi (chief, Trade and International 82. Ken Menkhaus, “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Negotiations Section, UN Economic Commission for Thoughts,” Review of African Political Economy, no. 97, Africa, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 29 May 2007. (2003): 405–22 116. Joseph Atta-Mensah (director, UN Economic 83. Gomes, interview. Commission for Africa, Regional Integration Office, New 84. Abdurahim Raghe (senior program officer, Partnership for African Development Unit, Addis Ababa), Somali Program) and Johan Svensson (regional director, interview by author, 29 May 2007. East and Central Africa, Interpeace, Nairobi), interview 117. Ann Muir, Customary Pastoral Institutions Study by author, 8 June 2007. (Washington, DC: USAID, March 2007). 85. Ibid. 118. Knausenberger, interview. 86. Grignon, interview. 119. Ibid. 87. Amb. Cindy Courville (US Mission to the African 120. USAID, A Better Way of Working: Creating Synergies Union), interview by author, 31 May 2007. in the Pastoral Zones of the Greater Horn of Africa (Nairobi: 88. Col Timothy Rainey and Bob Cunningham (advisors RELPA RFA-Support Documents, November 2001). to the US Mission to the African Union), interview by author, 121. Richards, interview. 31 May 2007. 122. Ibid. In discussion is a broader regional conflict 89. Richards, interview. In discussion is a broader mitigation program. Security is needed for NGOs special- regional conflict mitigation program. Security is needed izing in conflict mitigation and work in conflict zones. for NGOs specializing in conflict mitigation and doing 123. Knausenberger, interview. work in conflict zones. 124. Woldentensaie, interview. 90. ICG, A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in 125. Ibid. Sudan, Africa Report no.130, 26 July 2007, http://www 126. Paul McDermott (office director, Regional Con- .crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4961&l=1. One flict Management and Governance Office, Regional Eco- contested area of high value (rich oil deposits) is the nomic Development Services Office, East and Southern Nuba Mountains, which lie between North and South on Africa, USAID, Nairobi), interview by author, 7 June the west bank of the White Nile. 2007. 91. Gomes, interview. 127. Raghe and Svensson, interview.
Burgess.indd 71 1/12/10 12:03:34 PM Saving Darfur Seductive Analogies and the Limits of Airpower Coercion in Sudan
Timothy Cullen, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
y any measure, the humanita- terrorize civilians with bullets and “barrel rian crisis in Darfur is a tragedy. bombs” filled with explosives and metal In 2003 an unexpected rebel- shards.4 The atrocities and tactics of the lion in the remote states of Dar- government of Sudan have received signi- Bfur drove the Sudanese government in ficant attention from the media, humanita- Khartoum to initiate a brutal counterin- rian organizations, and a plethora of Hol- surgency campaign destroying thousands lywood celebrities, yet the international of villages and killing hundreds of thou- community remains focused on diplomacy sands of Darfuris, many of them women rather than decisive actions.5 Many of the and children.1 In a region of over 6 mil- community leaders in al-Fashir, the capital lion people, nearly 2.7 million Darfuris of Northern Darfur, have shaken the hands remain “internally displaced persons” of more than a dozen heads of state, yet with an additional quarter of a million the United Nations (UN) struggles to pro- eking out their existence in refugee vide half of the 26,000 authorized peace- camps across the border in Chad.2 Thou- keepers for the embattled region.6 sands of humanitarian workers risk hijac- Unilateral sanctions and engaged king, abduction, and attack from armed diplomacy were the primary methods assailants to care for and feed those affec- used by the Bush administration to ted by the conflict.3 confront Sudan’s president Omar Has- Although the level of violence has decli- san al-Bashir, but America’s involvement ned drastically since 2004, attacks on villa- may escalate due to the election of Pres. ges in Darfur by janjaweed militia and Barack Obama. Like Pres. George W. government forces continue. Campaigns Bush before him, President Obama has in the region have been especially brutal, called the actions of the Sudanese with the government using helicopter government in Darfur “genocide” but gunships and Antonov cargo aircraft to added that the United States should set
Lt Col Timothy “Astro” Cullen (BS, US Air Force Academy; MS, George Washington University; MA, Air Command and Staff College; MA, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies) is a PhD student in the Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. An F-16 pilot, Colonel Cullen flew 84 combat missions in support of Operations Deliberate Forge, Deliberate Guard, Allied Force, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch. He also deployed twice to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom as an assistant director of operations for the 682nd Air Support Operations Squadron and coordinated fire support for Task Force Dagger during Operation Anaconda. His last flying assignment in the F-16 was as an instructor pilot for the Egyptian air force and commander of Peace Vector IV, Gianaclis Air Base, Egypt.
72
Cullen.indd 72 1/12/10 12:04:07 PM Figure 1. Le Soudan. (Réimpression à partir de http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/ sudan.pdf.)
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up a “no-fly zone” over the area.7 Mem- immense shift, however, in the nature of bers of the former Clinton administra- the Sudanese conflict and the overar- tion and foreign policy advisors for the ching geopolitical landscape, a no-fly Obama campaign have also compared zone and air strikes are unlikely to pro- the intransigence of al-Bashir to the vide the justice or response desired by actions of former Yugoslavian president the Obama administration. On the Slobodan Milosevic. In 2006 Susan Rice contrary, military actions under current (the current US ambassador to the UN) conditions have the potential to drasti- argued that al-Bashir’s refusal to accept cally increase the level of human catas- UN peacekeepers called for the destruc- trophe in the region and implicate the tion of the Sudanese air force and like- United States in a conflict it will find dif- ned the proposed air campaign to the ficult to escape. 1999 victory in Kosovo.8 A coalition of NATO countries did establish no-fly zones and conduct air strikes for huma- The Darfur Crisis nitarian operations in Bosnia-Herzego- Darfur’s massive political, security, vina and Kosovo, but are those conflicts and humanitarian crisis is the complex helpful analogies for the current situa- product of armed factions from Chadian tion in Darfur? How should the air cam- civil wars, the civil war between Arab paigns in the former Yugoslav republics Muslims in North Sudan and African guide the new administration’s strategy Christians in South Sudan, and local in Darfur? Wars, specifically the most conflicts over dwindling resources due recent wars, have traditionally domina- to overpopulation and desertification. ted the minds of political leaders.9 The The flashpoint for the conflict occurred purpose of this analysis is to examine in April 2003 when an alliance of Islamic America’s most recent humanitarian rebel movements and African tribes led interventions where no-fly zones facilita- coordinated attacks on an air base and ted peacekeeping operations and to other military outposts in Darfur. The explore how they could shape courses of rebels blew up government transport air- action, theories of success, and potential craft and helicopters, captured the base policy options for Darfur. commander, and executed 200 Sudanese After a brief introduction to the his- army prisoners despite their surrender.10 tory of the Darfur crisis and the role of The timing of the attacks was deliberate analogies, airpower, and coercion in and costly for the predominantly Arab humanitarian interventions, this article Sudanese government, which was nego- compares the presumptions, likenesses, tiating a power-sharing agreement with and differences of the current conflict to the liberation movement in South Sudan three seductively similar humanitarian after two decades of civil war. The Afri- operations in the 1990s: Operation Pro- can movement in Darfur hoped to gain vide Comfort in northern Iraq, Opera- its fair share of national wealth and secu- tion Deny Flight in Bosnia-Herzegovina, rity after decades of cyclical drought, and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. years of neglect from the central govern- Not unlike the atrocities initiated by Sad- ment, and violent encroachment of far- dam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, mland by former Chadian rebels and the actions of al-Bashir from 2003 to Arab herders.11 The government did not 2004 are truly horrific. Unless there is an anticipate the threat from its poor Wes-
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tern relatives, and the repression of the in the International Criminal Court uprising was brutal and swift. Al-Bashir’s (ICC), and deploying underequipped, regime could not rely on the Sudanese outnumbered African Union (AU) and army to crush the insurrection because United Nations peacekeeping forces.18 most of the recruits and noncommissio- Executing a clear and coherent strategy ned officers were from Darfur.12 Instead, in Darfur was difficult given the sheer size the government made a deal with armed of the region, scope of the conflict, and bands and Arab tribes in the region. The the multiplicity of actors and objectives. camel-herding tribes could pursue their territorial ambitions in Darfur in return for suppressing the rebellion.13 What fol- Similarities of the Darfur Crisis lowed was an ethnic-cleansing campaign with Dominant Analogies or “counterinsurgency on the cheap.”14 From 2003 to 2004, janjaweed militia The conflict in Darfur is a problem routinely surrounded and burned rebel that regional experts, policy makers, and villages after Sudanese aircraft had bom- humanitarian organizations have strug- bed and strafed the inhabitants. In the gled with for years. Understanding and process of clearing villages, militiamen describing the underlying context of the often raped girls and women, killed lives- crisis is difficult. Gérard Prunier, a prolific tock, and tossed small children back into author, historian, and expert on East burning houses.15 Africa, warns readers in his book on Dar- fur that “everything does not make Nongovernmental organizations 19 (NGO) and the international community sense.” As President Obama begins to reacted with horror to the atrocities, but a shift his focus from domestic to interna- response to the outbreak in violence was tional issues, his administration will difficult to coordinate. Many feared the attempt to make sense of the situation in conflict could derail peace negotiations Darfur. Public comments from his foreign- for the civil war in the South, which had policy advisors suggest that his adminis- killed over two million people over the tration will use historical analogies to previous two decades.16 The United States facilitate analysis of the conflict and to and NATO countries could not commit advocate forceful action.20 the large number of troops or accept the Unfortunately, there are identifiable casualties and commitment necessary for and systematic biases in the use of histori- a ground operation in Darfur because of cal analogies.21 In many cases, decision the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the makers fail to analyze key presumptions international community pursued a wide behind historical analogies and are pre- range of diplomatic initiatives targeting disposed to “plunge toward action” and al-Bashir’s regime from 2004 to 2007.17 advocate misguided policies that adminis- Major efforts included improving the trations could have avoided with closer access of humanitarian organizations, inspection.22 Operations Provide Com- orchestrating the 2005 Comprehensive fort, Deny Flight, and Allied Force are Peace Agreement (CPA) between North irresistible and dangerous analogies for and South Sudan, negotiating the 2006 the Darfur crisis because the conflicts Darfur Peace Agreement between the have many similarities, some of which are government and rebel factions, seeking inherent to humanitarian interventions. the prosecution of leaders for war crimes The campaigns in northern Iraq, Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, and Kosovo addressed grie- tary campaign. Sudan is no longer a terro- vances common to many intrastate rist threat. The government of Sudan conflicts in the 1990s: the rebellion of once welcomed Osama bin Laden to its marginalized peoples denied their share country, but since the 9/11 attacks, the of political power and wealth of the state. regime has cooperated with intelligence They also featured incompetent govern- agencies and supported US counterterro- ments that used racial or ethnic divisions rism efforts.27 US interests in Darfur are to divide and suppress the rebellion, with predominantly humanitarian, and an the United States and its allies using air- intervention in Sudan must overcome the power and military force to confront the stigma of America’s experience of ano- suppressors.23 In 1997 the Clinton admi- ther humanitarian operation in Somalia. nistration called this type of humanitarian That intervention killed 18 service mem- intervention “complex contingency ope- bers, compelled the administration to rations” and specifically distinguished the remove US forces from the country in six campaigns in Bosnia and northern Iraq months, and affected the administration’s from other low-level military actions like calculus of subsequent interventions in hostage rescues, counterterrorism mis- the Balkans.28 Obtaining broad public sions, or interventions due to natural support for an intervention in Darfur will disasters.24 be difficult because of the lack of strategic interests in the region and the potentially Common Coercive Challenges high political cost of military operations in Africa. Coercion was a major component of these Competing Coalition Objectives. If the “complex contingency operations,” yet United States is to intervene militarily in the characteristics of humanitarian inter- Darfur, it will most likely participate as a 25 ventions made coercion difficult. Coer- member of a coalition to provide the legi- cion is the use of force, either threatened timacy, ground troops, and donors neces- or actual, “to induce an adversary to sary for military action and humanitarian 26 change its behavior.” Coercion was support. While the participants in the necessary in northern Iraq and the Balk- operations in northern Iraq and the Balk- ans to deter belligerents from disrupting ans were primarily from NATO countries, aid organizations and to compel the the UN peacekeeping forces in Darfur oppressive governments to remove under- consist of soldiers provided by member lying causes of the conflict. To be success- states of the African Union and combat ful, the enforcement of a no-fly zone in engineers from China.29 The overexten- Darfur would have to overcome three sion of the US military in Iraq and Afgha- common challenges of executing a coer- nistan increases the imperative to obtain cion strategy during humanitarian opera- broad international support for additio- tions: low strategic interest, competing nal operations in Darfur. The United Sta- coalition objectives, and nonstate actors. tes will have to manage the competing Low Strategic Interest. One of the interests and objectives of potential donor major challenges for a military interven- countries if the campaign is to be as effec- tion in Darfur is that the United States tive as Operation Provide Comfort and has little or no strategic interest in the the NATO campaigns in the Balkans. region, which could result in tentative Nonstate Actors. The nature of the domestic support for a prospective mili- belligerents was also a major factor in
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the Balkan conflicts and is especially powerbase erosion. Both mechanisms important in Darfur. Many of the perpe- could play a large role in the enforcement trators in intrastate conflicts are nonstate of a no-fly zone in Sudan. actors and have loose connections with Denial. Nullifying an opponent’s stra- governments that may or may not sanc- tegy by reducing its ability to accomplish tion their tactics. Due to the disintegra- its objectives is denial. Some denial strate- tion of the Yugoslav army, Milosevic’s gies “thwart the enemy’s military strategy regime and political leaders recruited for taking and holding its territorial objec- gang members, soccer hooligans, and tives, compelling concessions to avoid criminals to help government forces eth- futile expenditure of further resources.”33 nically cleanse Balkan communities.30 In This was the case for Operation Deny Flight, Darfur, janjaweed militias provide a simi- which tried to deny Bosnian Serbs the abi- lar service. The word janjaweed origina- lity to terrorize and conquer Bosnian ted in the 1960s as a pejorative term used Muslim and Croatian villages during the to describe poor vagrants from Arab tri- Bosnian war. After Bosnian Muslims and bes.31 Now it describes a makeshift orga- Croats voted to secede from the Yugosla- nization of more than six different armed vian Federation in 1992, Bosnian Serb groups that receive support from Sudan’s irregulars attacked Bosnian Muslim and military intelligence agency. Few agree Croat villages with air support from the 34 on the precise makeup of the janjaweed, Yugoslavian air force. The Bosnian Serbs and the organization is difficult to locate hoped to force Muslim and Croat civilians and identify, especially from the air in an out of Serb-controlled territory and esta- area the size of France. Limits on the use blish a Serbian Republic of Bosnia. Ope- of force during humanitarian operations ration Deny Flight established a no-fly combined with lax ties between the cen- zone over the battlefield to prevent the tral government and perpetrators make Bosnian Serbs from using their ground- coercion difficult, even when the culprits attack fighters and helicopter gunships to are easy to find. support their ethnic cleansing campaign. Sudan also has fighters, bombers, and Common Coercive Mechanisms helicopter gunships, and as late as May 2008, the Sudanese government used an An effective strategy in humanitarian ope- Antonov medium bomber to strike a vil- rations requires coercive mechanisms or lage in North Darfur.35 A robust no-fly processes by which threats generate zone over Darfur could prevent such concessions from the adversary.32 Com- attacks and enforce a 2005 UN Security mon mechanisms include eroding the Council resolution forbidding “offensive powerbase of the targeted government, military flights in and over the Darfur creating unrest within the population, region.” 36 decapitating leaders of the regime, weake- Powerbase Erosion. The other common ning the strength of the country as a mechanism used by the United States and whole, and denying adversaries the ability its allies in northern Iraq and the Balkans to accomplish their objectives. The chal- is powerbase erosion. This mechanism lenges of humanitarian operations invali- attempts to undercut the control and date many of these options, however. The leadership of a regime by attacking the campaigns in the Balkans and northern political elites and cliques that support Iraq successfully used two: denial and it.37 During Operation Provide Comfort,
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Saddam Hussein was extremely sensitive campaign for Operation Allied Force las- to air strikes against high-value targets in ted 78 days with zero battlefield casualties. Baghdad, and the coalition maintained a Airpower can also contribute to denial squadron of long-range attack aircraft in and powerbase reduction strategies and Turkey to act as a credible threat to his has the ability to expand or contract the regime.38 In Operation Allied Force, level of destruction to suit the needs of NATO attacked military-related indus- the coercer. Because airpower is cheap, tries, utilities, and other targets in Bel- flexible, and seemingly successful, air stri- grade to foster elite discontent and erode kes have become a standard form of inti- popular support of Milosevic. Some argue midation for the United States. Former that mounting pressure from political eli- Clinton advisors Susan Rice and Anthony tes, civilian oligarchy, and army leadership Lake cite the administration’s 1998 cruise contributed to Milosevic’s yielding to missile strike in Khartoum as a primary NATO demands.39 Obama’s advisors sug- reason why al-Bashir’s regime cooperates gest similar threats could coerce Sudan’s with the United States on counterterro- leadership and that the “credible threat rism.43 Airpower is a seductive component or use of force” is the “one language of many analogies for the Darfur crisis Khartoum understands.”40 because of perceptions that it is effective and easy to use. Common Coercive Instruments Economic Sanctions and Political Isola- tion. Coalition air forces in northern Iraq The United States has numerous tools at and the Balkans did not operate in isola- its disposal to trigger coercive mecha- tion from other coercive instruments. nisms and to begin the process by which Sanctions and diplomatic measures rein- threats generate adversary concessions. forced air threats by imposing costs and Examples include air strikes, invasion, denying benefits for the regimes of Sad- nuclear retaliation, economic sanctions, dam and Milosevic. A comprehensive eco- political isolation, and insurgency sup- nomic embargo of Iraq and an internatio- 41 port. The high cost of many of these nal coalition of countries that included instruments makes them unsuitable for Arab nations completely isolated Saddam humanitarian operations, however. The during Operation Provide Comfort.44 The strategies for Operations Provide Com- UN passed a series of economic sanctions fort, Deny Flight, and Allied Force relied against Bosnia and Serbia during the Balkan primarily on three: airpower, economic conflicts, and the International Criminal sanctions, and political isolation. Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indic- Airpower. No-fly zones and air strikes ted high-level Bosnian Serbs and Milose- are common military instruments for US vic during the respective air campaigns in humanitarian operations because of their Bosnia and Kosovo.45 flexibility and relatively low cost. As Eliot If applied for Darfur, airpower in Sudan Cohen remarked, “Air power is an unu- will also operate within the context of sually seductive form of military strength, economic sanctions and indictments by in part because, like modern courtship, it the International Criminal Court. In appears to offer gratification without 1993, the United States designated Sudan commitment.”42 US air strikes, including as a state sponsor of terrorism, which sub- the northern Iraq and Balkans conflicts, jects the country to restrictions on foreign rarely result in friendly casualties. The air assistance. UN Security Council Resolu-
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tions (UNSCR) 1556 and 1591 prohibit Operation Provide Comfort the transfer of arms to the government of Operation Provide Comfort was one of Sudan in Darfur as well as to rebels in the the most successful humanitarian opera- area.46 UNSCR 1672 targets sanctions tions in history. After the Iraq War, a Kur- against four individuals: two rebel leaders dish uprising and subsequent government and two representatives of the Sudanese repression drove over 400,000 refugees government.47 In 2007, President Bush into the mountains along the Turkish- expanded the 1997 sanctions imposed by Iraqi border.50 In response, coalition for- the Clinton administration. Both regimes ces successfully defended the Kurdish applied unilateral restrictions on imports refugees from Iraqi forces, aided their and exports, restricted financial transac- return to a safe zone in northern Iraq, tions to and from Sudan, and froze assets and airlifted massive amounts of humani- tarian supplies to the region. A key pre- of the Sudanese government. The ICC also sumption emerges from the campaign: a indicted several mid-level antagonists in similar operation could aid Darfuri refu- the conflict for genocide and recently gees in Chad and “save Africans.” The issued a warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest for circumstances surrounding Operation war crimes and crimes against humanity.48 Provide Comfort were exceptional, howe- Any military action in the Darfur crisis will ver, and the United States will find it diffi- have to operate in conjunction with a cult to recreate two conditions that made myriad of economic and diplomatic measu- the return of Kurdish refugees in Iraq a res attempting to coerce the government success: a strong strategic interest to solve of Sudan. the refugee crisis and a demonstrated abi- lity to apply force in the region. Differences in International Interests. Differences of the Darfur Crisis Unlike Darfur, the return of refugees to from Dominant Analogies their homeland in Iraq was of vital interest to the United States and key allies. The The surface similarities between Ope- Kurds are a large, disgruntled minority in ration Provide Comfort, the Balkan Turkey, and an influx of hundreds of conflicts, and Darfur suggest possible air- thousands of Kurdish refugees was a signi- power solutions to the crisis, prospects for ficant security threat. Turkey publicly invi- success, and anticipated challenges. ted the allies to intervene in the crisis and However, “more often than not, decision- closed its borders, trapping the refugees in the mountains in the middle of win- makers invoke inappropriate analogues 51 that not only fail to illuminate the new ter. A month earlier, Pres. George H. W. Bush had urged the Iraqi people to “take situation but also mislead by emphasizing 49 matters in their own hands” and “force superficial and irrelevant parallels.” The Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step remainder of this article anticipates irre- aside.”52 Material support of the subse- levant parallels between the analogous quent rebellion by the United States was conflicts and the Darfur crisis and exami- nonexistent, however, and the Iraqi mili- nes key presumptions that sustain them. tary crushed Kurdish guerrillas with the Figure 2 (p. 91) summarizes the findings. help of helicopter gunships and fixed
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wing fighter bombers flying in defiance of Differences in Credibility. One primary UNSCR 686.53 The security needs of an reason why Operation Provide Comfort important ally and media images of Kur- was able to deter Saddam’s regime from dish suffering compelled the administra- disturbing the return of Kurdish refugees tion to respond with air-dropped supplies was because the United States and its allies only seven days after the crisis began. credibly demonstrated the “skill and will” Within weeks, coalition forces established to apply force.59 The operation began a security zone in northern Iraq. Within only two months after Operation Desert seven weeks, the humanitarian operation Storm, which included a devastating air completely repatriated the Kurds from campaign that crippled Saddam’s forces. the Turkish border region.54 Many of the weapons, soldiers, and proce- In contrast, the motivations for inter- dures were still in place to threaten the vention in Darfur are almost completely regime. Ground forces were also available humanitarian. The 250,000 refugees on to distribute supplies, provide security, the border with Chad are only a security and expand the safe zone for the eventual threat for the region itself, and media return of Kurdish refugees. The United coverage of the human suffering is light. States inserted 5,000 troops into the Ninety-six percent of the deaths in the region, and the commander of the combi- Darfur crisis occurred between 2003 and ned task force, LTG John Shalikashvili, 2004, and news of the genocide almost met personally with Iraqi military repre- disappeared after North and South Sudan sentatives positioned along the border of northern Iraq to dictate the terms of the signed the CPA in January 2005, ending intervention and the scope of the safe 21 years of civil war.55 There was an uptick zone.60 A day after the meeting, Marines in coverage prior to the 2008 on the ground directed mock air strikes Summer Olympics in Beijing and the on Iraqi positions and compelled Iraqi 2008 presidential elections, but the most forces to leave the area.61 NATO aircraft recent coverage focused on the impen- 56 and 2,500 troops on alert in southeastern ding indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC. Turkey also provided a deterrent when The population of refugee camps has sta- UN agencies and NGOs assumed respon- bilized, but the security associated with sibility for delivering humanitarian aid.62 them remains an issue. Since January The weakness of the Iraqi military and the 2008, bandits and assailants have killed 11 credible integration of air and ground humanitarian workers, abducted 170 staff forces by the United States and its allies members, and hijacked 225 vehicles in against a conventional foe were critical to 57 Darfur. Despite the violence, major the success of Operation Provide Comfort. powers have not committed military The history of military intervention resources to secure refugees and humani- and coercion in Darfur does not include tarian personnel in the region. Perhaps skill and resolve in the application of the lackluster support of the one million force, especially against the myriad of Kurdish refugees who fled to Iran instead nonstate parties to the conflict. Twice the of Turkey is more revealing. Iran received UN has authorized peacekeeping forces just over half the total international assis- for the Darfur crisis. In June 2004, a UN tance for Kurdish refugees despite its pro- Security Council resolution created the tection of a refugee population almost AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), a force of triple that of Turkey.58 7,500 soldiers and police from African
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nations tasked to monitor a verbal cease- Flight, and Bosnian Serbs took advantage fire agreement and to “provide a safe and of the UN’s indecisiveness to gain territory secure environment for the return of and terrorize the civilian populace.67 The internally displaced persons and refu- fall of Muslim safe area Srebrenica, use of gees.”63 Unfortunately, the mission’s man- UN hostages to deter NATO reprisals, and date, rules of engagement, and numbers potential for a UN withdrawal from Bos- were completely inadequate to complete nia prompted the United States to lead an the task. Outgunned and underresour- escalated air campaign against the Bos- ced, the mission could not even challenge nian Serbs from August to December rebel roadblocks as they tried to protect 1995.68 Covert supply of Bosnian Muslims 34 refugee camps, some with over 120,000 and air strikes strategically timed with inhabitants, in an area the size of France. Bosnian Muslim and Croatian ground The UN approved a second “hybrid” pea- offensives shifted the balance of territory cekeeping force of 20,600 AU and UN in the region. Territorial losses and the forces in August 2006 to augment AMIS prospect for removal of sanctions compel- with greater numbers and a stronger man- led Milosevic to negotiate terms to end date, but the group had difficulty protec- the conflict.69 The indictment of Radovan ting itself, let alone refugees.64 In Septem- Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for war crimes ber 2007, AU forces ran out of ammunition also enabled a US envoy to isolate the Bos- as hundreds of rebels in trucks overran nian Serb “spoilers” from cease-fire talks, their base in eastern Darfur, seizing tons which helped Americans negotiate and 70 of supplies and heavy weapons.65 For employ the Dayton peace accords. future military instruments to be success- A key presumption that emerges from ful in Darfur, they will have to overcome Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate pessimism created by years of unwillin- Force is that timely air strikes and the gness by the international community to indictment of war criminals can facilitate move beyond neutral peacekeeping and negotiations and the development of a mediation in Sudan. viable cease-fire agreement. Two diffe- rences in the Darfur conflict make this Operation Deny Flight generalization unlikely if the United Sta- tes uses a similar strategy against the UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia Sudanese government. For one, the Dar- also suffered from a deficit in credibility, furis seek security guarantees and a grea- but the United States and NATO were ter share of national wealth, not inde- able to overcome the impotence of Ope- pendence from a greater Sudan. Second, ration Deny Flight with Operation Delibe- a coercer must factor the related and rate Force. Beginning in the summer of potentially more destabilizing North- 1992, Serb aggression and support of an South conflict into any strategy for peace ethnic cleansing campaign by Bosnian in Darfur. Serbs inspired the UN to impose compre- Differences in Objectives. Indepen- hensive sanctions against Serbia, deploy dence was the objective of the parties in UN peacekeepers, and task NATO to the Bosnian conflict. On 1 March 1992, a enforce a no-fly zone within Bosnian airs- parliamentary majority of Muslim and pace.66 The use of force, however, even in Croatian delegates followed the lead of defense of UN peacekeepers, was “highly Slovenia and Croatia and voted for inde- circumscribed” during Operation Deny pendence from Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs
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rejected the referendum and, dreading community fears an independent Darfur subjugation by Bosnian Muslims and because of the massive amount of aid and Croats, executed their contingency plan sponsorship it would require to sustain for self-determination and seceded.71 The the region. Independence is not a viable expansion of regional boundaries and option for major players in the Darfur control of territory became the primary conflict. Ultimately, the long-term survival goal of the three belligerent groups. The of Darfuris depends on the cooperation United States and its allies successfully and support of the Sudanese government, coerced the Bosnian Serbs into accepting making it difficult to apply pressure to the the terms of the Dayton accords, because ruling regime. combined air and ground offensives If the United States seeks to coerce al- denied them the ability to achieve their Bashir’s regime with airpower, the impen- goal. The effects of economic sanctions ding indictment of the Sudanese presi- and indictments by the International Cri- dent for war crimes is also problematic.76 minal Tribunal also isolated the Bosnian The International Criminal Court’s arrest Serbs from their primary source of mili- warrant gives Sudan’s president additio- tary strength, Serbia, and compelled Milo- nal incentive to consolidate power and to sevic to act as a third-party coercer.72 The resist demands that remotely threaten the objectives of independence and the stability of his regime. Since his indict- control of territory were important aspects ment by the court, al-Bashir has expelled in the dynamics of coercion in the Bos- 13 aid organizations he accuse of abetting nian war. the international case against him. 77 The The objective of the Darfuris is not leader of Sudan’s intelligence service independence but physical protection, recently called for the “amputation of the political access, and a greater share of hands and the slitting of the throats” of national wealth. The rebellion is a reac- Sudanese people who support the char- tion to the negligence of the Sudanese ges.78 Al-Bashir’s loss of control or his government, which failed to secure Dar- apprehension by a UN operation could furis from violent abuse by Arab tribes result in prosecution and humiliation at even before the government’s tacit sup- The Hague. The objective of al-Bashir is port of the janjaweed.73 This negligence to remain in power, and the source of his and “the hegemony of the northern and power and influence—oil—is not suscep- central elites to keep Darfur and other tible to airpower.79 In the case of Darfur, peripheral regions marginalized” form criminal indictment by the ICC conflicts the core of Darfuri grievances.74 Darfur, with coercion strategies that seek conces- landlocked and overpopulated, has few sions by al-Bashir and his government. natural resources and cannot survive as Differences in Priorities. Regional an independent country without signifi- issues were certainly important factors in cant help. Some argue the region is poo- the negotiations to end the Bosnian war, rer today than it was in the late 1800s due but a resolution to the Bosnia conflict to years of drought and overgrazing.75 remained the priority of the United States Ruling Arabs in North Sudan do not favor and international community. Richard an independent Darfur because they need Holbrooke, the lead US negotiator at the predominantly Muslim population in Dayton, was sympathetic to the plight of the North to balance the Christian popu- Albanians in Kosovo but believed addres- lation in the South. The international sing the topic was counterproductive to
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achieving a peace agreement.80 Granted, Force.86 Military solutions for the Dar- Croatia’s 1995 offensive in Krajina played fur crisis risk reigniting the North-South a large role in America’s strategy to end civil war. the Bosnian conflict. Territorial gains “strengthened Croatia as a strategic coun- Operation Allied Force terweight to Serbia” and helped NATO “forge a Croatian-Muslim alliance as a The third and final analogy examined for military counterweight to the Bosnian the Darfur crisis is Operation Allied Force, Serbs,” but the United States directed its which for many is one of the most succes- coercive efforts against Serbia for a reso- sful air campaigns in history. In response lution in Bosnia, not satellite conflicts in to the violent persecution of Albanians in Croatia or Kosovo.81 Kosovo, NATO initiated the air operation In contrast, the Darfur conflict has his- to coerce Milosevic into accepting the torically been subordinate to the civil war terms of failed negotiations at Ram- in Sudan. In 2004, despite the violence bouillet. The terms were “the Serbs out; and atrocities in Darfur, the policy of US, NATO in; the refugees home; a cease-fire British, and Norwegian negotiators was to in place; and a commitment to work for a proceed with the CPA between North and peace settlement.”87 The operation lasted South Sudan while the Darfur crisis remai- much longer than expected, and NATO ned unresolved.82 The 2005 agreement aircraft were unable to stop the Serbs’ established a “confederal system” of two ethnic cleansing campaign; yet, after 78 regional governments: one in North days of air strikes, Milosevic succumbed to Sudan dominated by al-Bashir’s National NATO’s demands. NATO was ultimately Congress Party and a semiautonomous successful because air strikes demonstra- government in South Sudan controlled ted an ability to threaten the powerbase of by the Sudan People’s Liberation Move- Milosevic’s regime, and the Serbians were 83 ment. The agreement includes a timeta- unable to inflict any substantial costs on ble for multiparty elections in 2009 and a the United States or its allies. The Kosovo referendum on southern independence 84 conflict is a seductive analogy for propo- in 2011. The agreement also requires an nents of military intervention in Darfur, equal distribution of oil revenues from because the United States led the opera- the North to the South, which controls tion “to confront a lesser humanitarian the vast majority of oil-producing territory. Last year, skirmishes along the border and crisis” against “a more formidable adver- sary” and “not a single American died in the suspension of oil-revenue payments 88 almost sparked a full-scale war, but cooler combat.” The key presumption is that it heads prevailed.85 Upsetting the military is possible for US airpower to extract balance between North and South Sudan concessions from an authoritarian regime with an intervention in Darfur could with modest costs and without a strong result in a larger, more deadly civil war commitment to ground forces. Two major with even greater humanitarian repercus- differences between the Kosovo and Dar- sions. Perhaps an aspect of the Bosnian fur crises make this presumption faulty: conflict that is more enlightening is how the source of power for al-Bashir’s regime the Dayton peace process and perceptions is revenue from Sudan’s oil industry, not of neglect by the Kosovo Albanians led to an industrialized economy, and interna- violence in Kosovo and Operation Allied tional interest in Sudan’s oil reserves will
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make it difficult to isolate and coerce the state, but unlike Milosevic in 1999, al- regime. Bashir’s regime uses billions of dollars in Differences in Powerbase. To maintain oil revenues to tend and influence its order when under air attack and econo- elite constituency.93 Sudan’s five billion mic hardship, dictatorial regimes often barrels of proven oil reserves and poten- use the media and repressive police and tial for much more also insulate the security forces to maintain order. Serbia’s country from international economic leadership was no exception during Ope- pressures.94 Despite harsh unilateral ration Allied Force, and Milosevic used sanctions by the United States, Sudan’s Serbia’s political machine, media, and economy grows almost 10 percent a security forces to stoke Serb nationalism, year.95 Since 1998, al-Bashir has focused eliminate independent media, and place on developing Sudan’s oil wealth, and disgruntled military leaders under house his vision has helped the regime accom- arrest.89 The engine for Milosevic’s power- plish its primary objective of staying in base and influence was Serbia’s industrial power. Sitting on top of a fortune while economy, which was especially vulnerable facing criminal indictment abroad and to systematic air strikes by an advanced air retaliation at home, al Bashir’s regime is force.90 The economically advanced “prepared to kill anyone, suffer massive society suffered years of economic sanc- civilian casualties, and violate every inter- tions due to the Bosnian war, and the national norm of human rights to stay in prospects for reconstruction were meager power.”96 Unless strikes are concurrent because of international isolation. After a with an oil embargo supported by the NATO summit in Washington, where lea- rest of the international community, the ders of the organization celebrated its government of Sudan will prove extre- 50th anniversary and renewed their mely difficult to coerce with airpower, resolve to win the Kosovo war, NATO because air strikes and no-fly zones do expanded its coercion strategy and targe- little to threaten Sudan’s most valuable ted the powerbase of Milosevic’s regime.91 natural resource. By the end of April 1999, air strikes cut Differences in Political Isolation. In Serbia’s economy in half, and on 28 May, addition to economic vulnerability, diplo- 80 percent of Serbians lost electrical matic isolation prevented Milosevic and power due to the destruction of power his regime from executing an effective facilities in Serbia’s three largest cities.92 countercoercion strategy against NATO NATO’s willingness to escalate the conflict during Operation Allied Force. Despite and severely threaten Serbia’s industrial the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian economy played a large role in the coer- war, and years of economic sanctions, cion of Milosevic and the success of Ope- Milosevic probably expected the plight of ration Allied Force. Serbia to arouse sympathy in Russia, a fel- Al-Bashir’s National Congress Party low Slav and Orthodox country. To Milo- and northern elites also use an extensive sevic’s dismay, Russian president Boris party organization, politicized national Yeltsin never gave him anything beyond civil service, and hundreds of thousands verbal support during the Kosovo war for of agents and informants to maintain several reasons. Yeltsin and other Russian security and power in Sudan. A bureau- officials did not personally like Milosevic. cracy of over two million Sudanese They were tired of his making promises control the day-to-day operations of the he could not keep and never forgave him
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Likenesses
to a Military Key Synopsis of Intervention in Differences from Presump- Conflict Darfur Darfur Conflict tions
Return of Darfuri A broad coali- refugees is not a vital tion of states interest to the United defended Operation States and its allies. Provide Kurdish A similar operation refugees from could aid Darfuri The international The international com- Comfort Iraqi forces refugees in Chad. coalitions con- munity has not dem- (Iraq) and aided their fronted incompe- onstrated the desire safe return to tent governments or ability to apply force Kurdistan. that used racial or ethnic identities to effectively in Sudan. divide, control, and oppress their popu- The objective of the Economic lations. Darfuris is not inde- sanctions, legal, pendence but physical indictments, protection, political and air strikes Low strategic in- Timely air strikes access, and a greater Operation strategically terests, competing and indictments share of national Deny timed with coalition objec- could aid cease- wealth. Muslim and tives, and elusive Flight fire negotiations Croat ground nonstate actors (Bosnia) in Darfur. Concerns about the offensives com- posed significant Darfur conflict are pelled Milosevic challenges in the subordinate to the to negotiate coercion of the resolution of the with NATO. targeted govern- North-South civil war. ments.
Sudan does not have The coalitions used an advanced industrial While suffering two coercive mech- economy that is sensi- zero combat Airpower can anisms: denial tive to air strikes. casualties, a extract conces- and power-base Operation erosion. Allied massive air sions with mod- Sudan in 2009 is not operation com- est costs and as politically isolated Force pelled Milosevic without a strong as Serbia in the (Kosovo) to withdraw commitment of The coalitions used 1990s. Serb forces ground forces. three coercive from Kosovo. instruments: air- power, economic sanctions, and political isolation.
Figure 2. Similarités et différences entre le Darfour et des opérations humanitaires analogues.
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for his support of the 1991 coup against of China. The countries have had a good Yeltsin and Soviet president Mikhail Gor- relationship ever since, and in 1994, al- bachev.97 Russia’s reputation and eco- Bashir invited Chinese companies to nomy were also too weak to risk a costly develop Sudan’s nascent oil sector.101 confrontation with the West or provide China accepted the offer and nurtured a Serbia with advanced antiaircraft missiles relationship with Sudan beneficial to both to “massacre” NATO aircraft.98 Both Yelt- countries. China used Sudan as a bridge- sin and Milosevic expected the NATO head for investments in the rest of Africa. coalition to fracture as the war dragged Sudan rapidly developed its oil industry on, but NATO’s resolve hardened, along and used the proceeds to strengthen state with talk of NATO expansion. Three security and procure weapons. China’s $8 weeks into the air war, Yeltsin appointed billion in pipeline, refineries, and basic Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former premier infrastructure is a substantial incentive to with strong ties with the United States, to support a strong and stable Sudanese negotiate an end to the war. He was not government. China uses its position on fond of Milosevic, and after negotiating a the UN Security Council to soften initiati- peace plan with the G-7, Chernomyrdin ves that could weaken al-Bashir’s regime traveled to Belgrade and coldly told Milo- and to abide by Beijing’s philosophy of sevic to accept the proposal or air strikes noninterference in the domestic affairs of would escalate.99 NATO’s growing strength sovereign states.102 and ability to attack Serbia with impunity Mismatches between the rhetoric and compelled Milosevic’s only ally to act as a enforcement of UN resolutions after the third-party coercer on behalf of NATO. Darfur atrocities highlight the difficulty Russia’s abandonment of Serbia and Ser- of using economic sanctions and politi- bia’s isolation from the rest of the interna- cal isolation as instruments to erode al- tional community were critical to Milose- Bashir’s powerbase. The first UN resolu- vic’s acceptance of G-7 demands. tion written specifically for Darfur is Al-Bashir has stronger ties with the Resolution 1556 (30 July 2004), which international community, primarily required the Sudanese government to because of extensive foreign investment disarm the janjaweed in 30 days. The in Sudan’s oil sector and the potential for only enforcement mechanism in the billions of dollars in additional develop- resolution was to impose an arms ment. Despite extensive economic sanc- embargo against the Darfur region, not tions by the United States, numerous against Sudan itself. Little changed in countries invest in Sudan, including Arab March 2005 when the Security Council countries and several of America’s allies. passed Resolution 1591, which applied France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi travel bans against four antagonists on Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, the United both sides of the conflict but did not Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom condemn or extend sanctions to the all have equity stakes in Sudan’s oil Sudanese government or the oil indus- blocks.100 India and Malaysia also have try.103 China, Russia, and the Arab Lea- large investments in the country, but gue opposed America’s stronger propo- Sudan’s most powerful political and diplo- sals because of economic self-interests matic partner is China. and skepticism of humanitarian argu- In 1959 Sudan was the fourth African ments that the United States and others nation to recognize the People’s Republic could use to encroach on their national
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sovereignty.104 Unless the security and to the Darfur crisis because of potential humanitarian situation changes drasti- damage to the North-South peace pro- cally in Sudan, the United States will find cess and the threat to humanitarian aid it difficult to apply effective coercive operations. Due to conditions internal measures against al-Bashir’s regime, and external to the Darfur conflict, the especially since the international com- United States will have to expend consi- munity was unwilling to condemn the derable amounts of political capital, Sudanese government immediately after significantly more than in the 1990s, to the height of atrocities in Darfur. secure UN or even NATO approval for a humanitarian intervention using mili- tary forces. Policy Implications for Darfur Theoretically, the United States could Operations Provide Comfort, Deny act unilaterally and hope a large portion Flight, and Allied Force are seductive of the international community or the analogies for proponents of a humanita- UN blesses the operation retroactively, as rian intervention in Darfur because these in Kosovo. Perhaps President Obama and campaigns featured suffering refugees his secretary of state believe a true no-fly and the successful coercion of a malevol- zone and nothing more is sufficiently ent dictator with a preponderance of benign to resist international criticism, airpower. Using these operations as ana- yet is imposing it enough to prevent the lytical tools to determine the political Sudanese government and its proxies initiative required for a humanitarian from terrorizing villages in Darfur?106 A response in Darfur is imprudent, howe- small demonstration of American air- ver. The wide range of actors, competing power compelled Iraqi security forces to interests, relatively low priority of the leave Zakho in Kurdistan; why would not Darfur crisis, and the unfavorable geopo- a similar demonstration work against the litical landscape make it tough to gene- janjaweed in Darfur?107 The problem in rate the international consensus neces- Darfur is that a no-fly zone would provide sary for a legitimate military intervention. no compelling reason for the janjaweed Several influential nations, including to leave. The offensive advantages provi- China, invest heavily in Sudan’s oil indus- ded by explosive 50-gallon drums kicked try and prefer a strong and stable Suda- out the back of a cargo plane are relati- nese government to ensure a reasonable vely minor, even against defenseless villa- return on their investments. Compelling ges. It is easy enough for the local Arab powerful China in 2009 to turn its back tribes, militia, and Chadian rebels that on its gateway to the African continent comprise the janjaweed to remain where will be much more difficult than convin- they are, with or without American air- cing the comparatively weak Russia to craft flying overhead. Their only alterna- ditch Milosevic in 1999. The hypocrisies tive is to become refugees themselves. A of US intervention in Iraq and its subse- no-fly zone is not imposing enough to quent overextension in the Middle East convince people to leave what they per- also propel lesser powers and the Arab ceive to be their homeland. League to oppose international activism Maybe the “no-fly zone” advocated by and the abuse of the “responsibility to President Obama is more than that. protect” to justify interventions.105 Still Perhaps he intends to follow the advice others are opposed to military solutions of the US ambassador to the United
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Nations and sprinkle air strikes on Khar- expulsion of relief organizations that toum and on air bases to compel al- provide 40 percent of the aid in Darfur Bashir’s regime to reign in the destabili- and lack of response by the United zing janjaweed.108 The problem is who Nations is a relevant example.111 The will do the reigning in? The regime enlis- desire to recycle airpower strategies in ted the help of the janjaweed in 2003 to Darfur and the execution of counterstra- conduct its counterinsurgency campaign tegies by al-Bashir’s regime could spin because it did not have the military for- Sudan out of control and put the Obama ces to do so itself. There is no reason to administration in the unenviable posi- believe it does now, either. Maybe the tion of having to explain to the American advocates of extensive air strikes believe public how a few good intentions led to a that the devastation could be costly catastrophe.112 enough to compel al-Bashir to try a little Instead of risking escalation and disaster harder. If so, their hopes are unfounded. to reconcile past injustices, America’s Sudan’s extensive oil reserves are per- strategy in Sudan should focus on the fectly safe underground, and air opera- future. In accordance with the 2005 tions targeting the janjaweed, when they Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan can be found, will do little to threaten will conduct multiparty elections in 2009 the regime. In addition, the indictment and a referendum in 2011 to determine of al-Bashir for crimes against humanity whether South Sudan will secede. Should and overtures for “regime change” fail to South Sudan split from the rest of the assure the president that the cost of capi- country, which most likely it will, North tulation is acceptable, no matter how Sudan will lose 80 percent of its proven devastating the air attacks. Unless it is oil reserves, a vastly more credible threat prepared to remove al-Bashir with brute to al-Bashir than air strikes.113 Blocking force using friendly ground forces or South Sudan’s vote for independence, rebel proxies, the United States will have contesting the results, or suspending oil to offer the president a credible alterna- revenues is tantamount to war, and the tive to surrender for an air campaign to subsequent carnage could dwarf that of be successful.109 the Darfur conflict. The United States In addition to the meager prospects of needs to provide positive inducements success, the costs associated with the and assurances that the 2009 and 2011 employment of coercive airpower in Dar- elections are in the best interest of the fur could be enormous. The Sudanese Sudanese government. Allowing China will execute counterstrategies to neutra- to pass a Security Council resolution to lize threats and to create problems for defer the indictment of al-Bashir is a the United States and opposing forces.110 good place to start. The indictment is The presence of thousands of humanita- counterproductive and does little to rian aid workers, two million displaced deter the parties in the conflict from persons, a precarious peace with South conducting operations they deem neces- Sudan, and extensive economic ties with sary for their survival.114 The United Sta- China provide Sudan an excellent deter- tes could also offset the losses in revenue rent. If deterrence fails, the regime has anticipated by the secession of South numerous ways to create pandemonium Sudan by lifting sanctions, allowing and threaten the efficacy and domestic Sudan access to US oil refining techno- support for the intervention. The recent logy, and facilitating Sudan’s exploitation
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that is resistant to the effects of airpower in unlock the gates of hell.”117 This is hardly the the long term. When threatened, al-Bashir objective of airpower for peace enforcement, can use the tentative peace of Sudan’s civil and the United States does not have the desire war, upcoming elections, and two million or capability to play games of brinkmanship internally displaced persons as a deterrent. with al-Bashir. The United States needs to give US military intervention and the failure of al-Bashir tangible assurances that cooperation that deterrent could spark another civil war, with the international community will result and in the words of one African diplomat, “If in his survival, a pledge that American air- the North and South return to war, it will power cannot provide. ❏
Notes 1. US Government Accountability Office 9. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in Inter- (GAO), “Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demon- national Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University strate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Press, 1976), 266. Credibility Could Be Enhanced,” (Washington, DC: 10. Gérard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Geno- GAO, November 2006), www.gao.gov/new.items/ cide, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, d0724.pdf, 8, 17. 2008), 96. 2. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humani- 11. Ali Haggar, “The Origins and Organization tarian Assistance (BDHA), Sudan—Complex Emergency, of the Janjawiid in Darfur,” in War in Darfur and the Situation Report 8 (Washington, DC: US Agency for Search for Peace, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge, MA: International Development, 27 January 2006). Global Equity Initiative; Justice Africa, 2007), 70. 3. Katherine J. Almquist, The Continuing Crisis in 12. Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 97. Darfur, Testimony before Senate Committee on Foreign 13. Alex de Waal, “Darfur and the Failure of the Relations, 23 April 2008. Responsibility to Protect,” International Affairs 83, 4. Human Rights Watch and Leslie Lefkow, Dar- no. 6 (2007): 1040. fur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan (New York: 14. Alex de Waal, “Darfur: Make or Break for the Human Rights Watch, 2004), 17; and Human African Union,” Africa Analysis, no. 453 (2004). Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by 15. Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 100. Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan (New 16. BDHA, Sudan—Complex Emergency. York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 24. 17. James Kurth, “Legal Ideals Versus Military 5. Jim Wallis, “Truth and Consequence,” Sojourn- Realities,” Orbis 50, no. 1 (2006): 87; Prunier,Darfur: ers Magazine 36, no. 8 (2007); and Alex de Waal, “The A 21st Century Genocide, 8; and de Waal, “Darfur and Humanitarian Carnival: A Celebrity Vogue,” World the Failure,” 1043. Affairs 171, no. 2 (2008). 18. de Waal, “Darfur and the Failure,” 1043. 6. de Waal, “Humanitarian Carnival,” 5; and 19. Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 1. United Nations, “If Given Adequate Support, 20. After the Sudanese government expelled 13 Robust Deployment of African Union–United Nations humanitarian relief organizations from the region, Hybrid Force Could Contribute to Security in Darfur, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, “This Security Council Told,” US Fed News Service, Including US is a horrendous situation that is going to cause untold State News (2008). misery and suffering for the people of Darfur, par- 7. Straus Scott, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” ticularly those in the refugee camps. The real ques- Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005); and Robert G. Kaiser, tion is what kind of pressure can be brought to bear “Iraq Aside, Nominees Have Like Views on Use of on President Bashir and the government in Khar- Force,” Washington Post, 27 October2008, A-4. toum to understand that they will be held responsible 8. Susan E. Rice, Anthony Lake, and Donald M. for every single death that occurs in those camps?” Payne, “We Saved Europeans. Why Not Africans?” Peter Baker, “Adding Pressure to Sudan, Obama Washington Post, 2 October 2006, A-19. Will Tap Retired General as Special Envoy,” New York
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Times, 18 March 2009; and Rice, Lake, and Payne, 32. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 48. “We Saved Europeans.” Chapter 3 describes the five most common forms of 21. In Analogies at War, Yuen Foong Khong coercive mechanisms. examines how decision makers use analogies to 33. Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing to Win: Air order, interpret, and simplify policy options and Power and Coercion in War, Cornell Studies in Secu- argues that the psychology of analytical reasoning rity Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, makes it difficult but not impossible to use analogies 1996), 69. properly in foreign affairs. Khong finds that decision 34. George D. Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air makers often persevere with incorrect analogical les- Presence: Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and the Future of sons despite contradictory evidence because they are Airpower in Peace Enforcement, thesis for the School unable to ignore “enormous similarities.” Yuen Foong of Advanced Airpower Studies (Maxwell AFB, AL: Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, Air University Press, 2001), 40–41. and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: 35. Opheera McDoom, “Sudan Bombs Darfur Princeton University Press, 1992), 13, 257. School and Market, 13 Killed,” Reuters, 5 May 2008. 22. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May propose a 36. UNSCR 1591, 29 March 2005. “mini-methods” technique to separate the “known” 37. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 59. from the “unclear” and “presumed” when contem- 38. Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air Presence, 25. porary problems compel decision makers to use 39. Benjamin S. Lambeth et al., NATO’s Air War fuzzy analogies to facilitate analysis and advocate for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa action. This study uses their technique to analyze the Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 70–71; and Daniel L. similarities and differences between recent examples Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the of no-fly-zone enforcement and the crisis in Darfur. Great Air Power Debate,” International Security 24, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking no. 4 (2000): 19. in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New 40. Rice, Lake, and Payne, “We Saved Europeans.” York; London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 41. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 1986), 33, 273. 88. Chapter 4 describes strengths and weaknesses 23. Daniel Byman and Stephen Van Evera, of coercive instruments. “Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of 42. Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Contemporary Deadly Conflict,” Security Studies 7, Power,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994): 109. no. 3 (1998): 4. 43. Rice, Lake, and Payne, “We Saved Europeans.” 24. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (White Paper), The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Man- 44. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 62. aging Complex Contingency Operations (Washington, 45. Kenneth A. Rodman, “Darfur and the Limits DC: White House, 1997). of Legal Deterrence,” Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 25. Ibid. 3 (2008), 538. 26. Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, The 46. UNSCR 1556, 30 July 2004; and UNSCR 1591. Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the 47. UNSCR 1672, 25 April 2006. Limits of Military Might, RAND Studies in Policy 48. This is the first arrest warrant issued by the Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, court against a sitting head of state. Marlise Simons 2002), 1. Chapter 7 analyzes the challenges of apply- and Neil MacFarquhar, “Warrant Issued for Sudanese ing military force in humanitarian interventions. Leader over Darfur War Crimes,” New York Times, 18 27. Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, March 2009. 184. 49. Khong, Analogies at War, 12. 28. Benjamin Miller, “The Logic of US Military 50. Thomas George Weiss, Military-Civilian Inter- Interventions in the Post-Cold-War Era,” Contemporary actions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, New Mil- Security Policy 19, no. 3 (1998): 73. lennium Books in International Studies (Lanham, 29. Patrick Paterson, “Darfur and Peacekeep- MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 50. ing Operations in Africa,” Military Review 88, no. 4 51. Ibid., 54. (2008): 18; and “Xinhua: Chinese Follow-up Engi- 52. Maureen Dowd, “Bush, Scorning Offer, neering Troop Arrives in Darfur,” World News Con- Suggests Iraqis Topple Hussein,” New York Times, 15 nection, 18 July 2008. February 1991. 30. John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War,’ ” 53. Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air Presence, 20. International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 42–43. 54. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, 53, 60. 31. Haggar, “Origins and Organization of the 55. Andrew S. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” Foreign Janjawiid,” 113–14. Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 93.
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56. Stephen J. Morrison, “Will Darfur Steal 82. de Waal, “Darfur and the Failure,” 1040. the Olympic Spotlight?” Washington Quarterly 31, 83. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” 83. no. 3 (2008). 84. The Comprehensive Agreement between the 57. BDHA, Sudan—Complex Emergency. Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the 58. S. J. Laizer, Martyrs, Traitors, and Patriots: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples’ Kurdistan after the Gulf War (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Liberation Army, 26 May 2004, 4, 8, 20, 24, 54. Zed Books, 1996), 25. 85. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” 81. 59. Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional 86. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 124–25. Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970, Cornell 87. “Interview: General Wesley Clark,” Jane’s Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Defense Weekly (1999): 40. Press, 1988), 14. 88. Rice, Lake, and Payne, “We Saved Europeans.” 60. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, 54. 89. Byman and Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great 61. Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air Presence, Air Power Debate,” 21. 22, 23. 90. Barry R. Posen, “The War for Kosovo: Serbia’s 62. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, 56. Political-Military Strategy,” International Security 24, 63. UNSCR 1547, 11 June 2004; and Paterson, no. 4 (2000): 73. “Darfur and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa,” 17. 91. Lambeth et al., NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, 64. United Nations Department of Information, 38–39. “If Given Adequate Support, Robust Deployment of 92. Steven Erlanger, “Production Cut in Half, African Union–United Nations Hybrid Force Could Experts Say,” New York Times, 30 April 1999; and Contribute to Security in Darfur, Security Council Lambeth et al., NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, 42. Told,” news release, 28 October 2008. 93. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” 87. 65. Paterson, “Darfur and Peacekeeping Opera- 94. Energy Information Administration, Country tions in Africa,” 18. Analysis Briefs: Sudan, 2007. 66. UNSCR 757, 30 May 1992; UNSCR 781, 9 95. European Coalition on Oil in Sudan et al., October 1992; and UNSCR 816, 31 March 1993. Sudan’s Oil Industry: Facts and Analysis, April 2008, 67. Steven L. Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in www.ecosonline .org/back/pdf_reports/2008/dossi Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International er%20final%20groot%20web.pdf, 8. Intervention (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 129. 96. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” 82. 68. Ibid., 325. 97. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 272. 69. Ibid., 327. 98. Ibid. 70. Rodman, “Darfur and the Limits of Legal 99. Ibid., 278. Deterrence,” 538. 100. International Crisis Group, China’s Thirst for 71. Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Oil, Asia Report no. 153, 9 June 2008, http://www 117, 3. .crisisgroup .org/home/index.cfm?id=5478&l=1, 24. 72. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 82. 101. Daniel Large, “Sudan Issue Brief: Arms, Oil, 73. Mohamed Baraka Mohamed Nurain, “The and Darfur,” in Small Arms Survey (Geneva, Switzer- Decline of Darfur,” Peace Review 20, no. 2 (2008). land: Human Security Baseline Assessment, 2007), 1. 74. International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising: 102. International Crisis Group, China’s Thirst Sudan’s New Crisis, Africa Report no. 76, 25 March for Oil, 21, 23. 2004, 19. 103. Rodman, “Darfur and the Limits of Legal 75. Prunier, Darfur: 21st Century Genocide, 3, 4, 167. Deterrence,” 547. 76. Rodman, “Darfur and the Limits of Legal 104. Ibid., 543. Deterrence,” 549. 105. Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Pro- 77. Marlise Simons and Neil MacFarquhar, tect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and “Sudan’s Leader Scolds the West and Assails Aid Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,” Ethics & Groups,” New York Times, 6 March 2009. International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 33. 78. Simons and MacFarquhar, “Warrant Issued 106. In a January hearing before the Senate for Sudanese Leader over Darfur War Crimes,” New Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Clinton said York Times, 5 March 2009. that the Obama administration might enforce a no-fly 79. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur.” zone in Darfur. Mark Landler, “Clinton Pledges 80. Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Tough Diplomacy and a Fast Start,” New York Times, 14 Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 124. January 2009. 81. Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 107. Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air 327. Presence, 22.
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108. Rice, Lake, and Payne, “We Saved Euro- 112. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” 88. peans.” 113. Ibid., 90. 109. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence 114. Rodman, “Darfur and the Limits of Legal (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 74. Deterrence,” 529. 110. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coer- 115. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” 88. cion, 194. 116. Baker, “Adding Pressure to Sudan.” 111. Neil MacFarquhar and Sharon Otterman, 117. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” 82. “U.N. Panel Deadlocks over Taking Any Action on Sudan,” New York Times, 7 March 2009.
Cullen.indd 92 1/12/10 12:04:16 PM Regime Change: A U.S. Strategy through the Prism provoked a more violent and damaging reac- of 9/11 by Robert S. Litwak. Johns Hopkins tion than the initial disturbances would have University Press, 2007, 424 pp., $65.00. suggested. Professor Litwak is a knowledgeable poli- This first-class historical narrative belongs tical historian concerned with mass move- to a unique literary genre that can be called ments, security, and international relations. “the history of the present.” As post–9/11 As such, he did not construe his subject events have continued to unfold, pheno- narrowly; rather, his narrative style shows a mena rarely visible in early 2002 now appear flair for devising imaginative or innovative routinely in the world press. Litwak has rekin- critiques with accurate and effective ways to dled the glow of the immediate past, skillfully fulfill the major requirements of analysis. The discerning the underlying contour of an age author works in a somewhat information-rich of crisis and confrontation. But Regime Change environment. His references come from an does not idly chase each day’s events, a domain unusually diverse set of sources. The key ideas rightly reserved for journalists and commen- here are coherence and narrative guiding the tators. Instead, Litwak has distinguished his organization of his observations into meanin- work from a mere anecdote. What makes it gful structure and pattern. history is his placement of events in relation Litwak traced the origin of regime change to a global process, charting both continuity as an acceptable international relations and change as US policy makers confronted conceptual framework to two exceptional ins- an unfamiliar strategic context. tances—Vietnam’s 1978 intervention in Cam- The author’s motivation for the current bodia to overthrow Pol Pot and Tanzania’s treatment of this topic was the 11 September 1979 incursion into Uganda to help opposi- 2001 terrorist attack by al-Qaeda and the war tion forces oust dictator Idi Amin. Both cases in Iraq. Echoing the paradoxical conjunction involved archetypal rogue, outlaw, or pariah of US primacy and vulnerability, he shares states of the pre–1980 period. The internatio- the belief that the United States, as the single nal community, according to him, turned a remaining superpower somewhat gifted with blind eye to violations of the norms of natio- the responsibility for global leadership, can- nal sovereignty and the violation of state bor- not have a “stand alone” perspective. Instead, ders; ironically, by contrast, the United States effective strategic decisions must flow from a was unable to get international backing for its managed process that produces a perspective 2003 military action to override Iraqi soverei- through consensus that is broader than any gnty and overthrow Saddam Hussein and his single nation might possess. regime. In spite of the near successes of the The Bush administration’s policy of uni- current endeavors, it still implies that a very lateralism, preemption, and regime change different political game is in the making and has been likened to Newton’s third law of is already, to a large extent, practiced. motion, which states that if a change is intro- On preemption, the author linked two ins- duced into a system—from the outside or tances from the Cold War era associated with inside—that change unsettles its stability, and preemptive use of force in counterprolifetra- a counteraction is triggered by the powerful tion policy: the US consideration in the early mechanisms of conservation. Specifically, 1960s of a preventive strike on China’s nuclear these policies have provoked considerable weapon facilities and Israel’s June 1981 bom- counteraction from conservative forces, and bing of Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor. But, how as Sunni insurgency actions in Iraq now indi- has the global community responded to these cate, efforts to impose change by force have pioneering approaches? On the negative side,
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there are a variety of problems inherent in the political scientists. Above all, the US regime treatment of regime change and preemptive change experiment in Iraq has shown that military strikes. Litwak poses a lot of questions the amount of information available is grea- for policy makers that are as good as biblical ter in hindsight than in foresight. The author catechism of old. contends that collective efforts rather than Nevertheless, the concept has become a way unilateral actions, such as those toward Iraq, to overcome the troubling external behaviors are essential for combating al-Qaeda and for of rogue states and to develop international effectively addressing the ongoing crises with order that promotes responsible behavior, North Korea and Iran. escaping the diplomatic logjam that often cha- Regime Change does not address why US intel- racterizes the pursuit of bilateral relationships. ligence agencies, particularly the CIA, understood Taken together, the new course depicts a the North Korean and Iraqi political landscape so new historical drama on a global stage, like poorly and as such could not initiate the US ons- laught in Iraq when they were called to act. On a three-act play that may be repeated many the other hand, Litwak offers clear insight on the times with different sets and casts. Barring any nonstate sponsors of terrorism that hardly demand likely constraint, the global community has further explanation. However, the dimension and only three prototypes—preemption, regime potential of this nexus of terrorism, especially its change, and behavioral change—from which political aspect, is still poorly understood. For to choose. instance, while the Pakistani government restricts The author examines the circumstances US intelligence officers’ access to its self-acclaimed under which nations attribute behavior either father of its nuclear technology, A. Q. Khan, for to stable disposition of leaders or to historical political reasons, he has been linked to the trans- characteristics of the country. Accordingly, fer of uranium centrifuges to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. But one thing is clear: the global the decision to terminate Libya’s WMD pro- antiterrorism war needs a structure that can match grams in December 2003, just eight months its complexity. In many ways—sometimes overt, after the fall of Baghdad, offered an example sometimes covert—the contemporary intelligence of apparent bias in causal attribution. The network has evolved a strong system pressuring the Bush administration was quick to attribute “nuke” black market economy. the Libyan course change as a vindication By surveying the longer stretch of historical of its muscular nonproliferation strategy. policy developments in these key states, professio- Disagreeing with this assumption, Litwak nals who seek profound understanding of the call sought to demonstrate that when a country’s of our time will find Litwak’s Regime Change an irresistible compendium of materials to undertake actions are consistent with US desires, the the complicated task of understanding the challen- most obvious explanation in the absence of ges of the historical era that began in the recent strong evidence to the contrary is that US past. policy effectively influenced the decision. In analyzing the reason why Libya acted the way it did, the author offered that the basis for Aliyu Bello Qaddafi’s change in proliferation intention Publisher and editor, Space Watch was the Bush administration’s willingness to Abuja, Nigeria eschew regime change in Libya and instead offer a tacit assurance of regime survival. On the whole, Litwak’s analyses were in Electoral Systems and Democracy edited by Larry some instances handicapped by the lack of Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Johns Hopkins adequate information. Observations confined University Press, 2006, 245 pp., $18.95. to the top of the decision-making hierarchy cannot not yield much insight into regimes’ Electoral Systems and Democracy is an trajectories. In Iraq, the most dynamic events anthology of selected articles from the quar- are taking place outside the Ba’ath party, in terly, Journal of Democracy. Larry Diamond the social sphere, well beyond the view of is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute of
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War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford Uni- policy positions in support of nascent demo- versity, and Marc Plattner is vice president for cracies. This book illustrates why there is no research and studies at the National Endow- one best approach to elections and describes ment for Democratic Studies. Diamond two major camps of political scientists who and Plattner also serve as co-editors of the see the same evidence in very different ways. journal. This is the 18th in a series of Journal That difference of opinion is the focus of the of Democracy books, which usually publish second section. papers from a specific gathering. This book The question, Is proportional representa- is different, spanning a 15-year period from tion best? is the focus of the second section, 1991 to 2006 to explore electoral systems—a but underlies the entire book. The core topic of continuing interest in the journal. of this section is a pair of articles labeled Diamond and Plattner have assembled in a “classic” by the editors in their introduction. single source a firm foundation for reflection “Constitutional Choices for New Democra- and further research on electoral systems. cies” by Arend Lijphart and “The Problem It is clearly aimed at the political scientist with PR” by Guy Lardeyret come from the and assumes a high level of familiarity with Winter 1991 and Summer 1991 editions the subject at the outset. The central theme of the journal and present two sides of the winding through each chapter is comparison question. Much like Friedman’s and Ramo- of the two major approaches to electoral net’s “Dueling Globalizations” in Foreign systems—plurality and proportional repre- Affairs (Fall 1999), these articles both argue sentation. The field is moderately technical, with each other and past each other. Three and this book has some jargon sprinkled articles follow, each referring to these argu- throughout. The layman will have difficulty ments. Unfortunately for the reader looking following the intricacies of the opening argu- for a simple solution, much is left unresolved, ments, as the authors assume the reader’s reflecting the reality of the state of the art. familiarity with various electoral schemes Just when you think you cannot stand any such as first-past-the-post, single transferable more of the same back and forth between vote, single nontransferable vote, and list- squabbling PhDs, the book shifts to speci- proportional representation, among others. fic country examples. Here the academic Electoral Systems is arranged in three arguments are brought to life, even as the sections: I. Electoral Systems and Institutio- squabbling continues, albeit somewhat aba- nal Design; II. Is Proportional Representa- ted. Having trudged through the two weighty tion Best?; and III. Country and Regional preceding sections, even the lay reader will Experiences. It begins with an excellent 16- get a lot out of this section. It opens with two page introduction that clearly lays out their articles dealing with Latin America, the first approach to the topic. As a well-developed sin- focusing on Uruguay and the second on the gle-source resource, the book describes the entire region. The next article, entitled “Why various approaches to planning and conduc- Direct Election Failed in Israel,” provides a ting democratic elections, highlighting fascinating look at the intricacies of Israeli objectives election planners may choose democracy that seldom make the newspaper. to pursue and the tension between those It does a very good job of presenting a his- objectives. Examples include representation torical look at how and why direct election that closely mimics the voting of the popula- came to Israel and what actually happened— tion, keeping radical fringe elements out of and why the original thinking was wrong. legislatures (or ensuring they have a voice), The next article compares the experiences and encouraging moderation in policies to of Japan and Taiwan, showing similarities appeal to the widest audience. Understan- and differences while highlighting the rela- ding these diverse objectives and the inhe- tive uniqueness of their journeys compared rent tensions among them will be important to the rest of the democratic world. As one to military officers working in governmental might expect, the book closes with articles
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about Afghanistan and Iraq—the most visi- developing democracies, there is nevertheless ble ongoing democratic conversions—which ample evidence of recent electoral change in provide a useful behind-the-scenes look at established democracies as well. the theory and maneuvering in recent elec- Electoral Systems will not likely turn up in tions in both countries. aircrew alert areas or base libraries. As a book This is a timely book. At the time of this by specialists for specialists, its application to review, the United States is working its way the military professional is limited. Neverthe- through the 2008 presidential primaries, less, for individuals destined for a year in an and this book unintentionally calls to mind Iraqi or Afghani governmental ministry, this the strengths and foibles of the US electoral might be a good use of preparatory time. system. In the longer term, given the Bush For the reader interested in the pitfalls and promise of democracy as part of life-long lear- administration’s focus on democratization, it ning, this may prove invaluable. reminds the reader that democracy is more than elections, and elections are more than simply scheduling a campaign and a vote. Col Walter H. Leach, USAF Largely focused on electoral approaches for US Army War College
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