Digitized from Box 65 of the Gerald R. Ford Vice Presidential Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATI ONAL ARCHI VES AND RECORDS ADMINI STRATION I Pres identi al Libr a r ies Wi t hdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 03 584 7
REASON FOR WI THDRAWAL ~Natio nal sec uri t y rest riction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . ~ Memorandum of Co nve r sat i o n
DESCRI PTI ON Meeti ng wi t h Mos h e Daya n
CREAT ION DATE 12 / 08 /1973
VOLUME . 3 pages
COLLECT ION/SER I ES/FOLDER I D 00 230 1 00 2 COLLECTI ON TITLE GE RALD R. FORD VI CE PRESIDENTI AL PAPERS BOX NUMBER . 6 5 FOLDER TI TLE . December 8, 1973 -General Mo she Dayan
DATE WI THDRAWN 11/ 18 /2 011 WI THDRAW I NG ARCHIVIST WHM OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
"'6-BeR ~~XDIS
DeceITlber 7, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Meeting with General Moshe Dayan Saturday, DeceITlber 8th
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan will be calling as a courtesy and to inforITl you of Israel's outlook as it prepares for the peace conference. Moshe Dayan's popular iITlage was tarnished by the Israeli Defense Force's perforITlance in the October war, but he retains the confidence of the PriITle Minister and of a large nUITlber of conservative politicians froITl various political parties on questions of security. His asseSSITlent and advice, which tend to be pragITlatic, will reITlain critical as Mrs. Meir ITloves Israel into negotiations. His public support for Israeli cOITlproITlise would be an iITlportant factor in developing a national consensus behind any settleITlent, particularly aITlong conservative Israelis.
Dayan sought and received Cabinet approval for his ITleetings in Washington. He ITlay, therefore, be working under constraints as to the subject ITlatter he is authorized to discuss. We would expect hiITl to be preoccupied at this tiITle with Israeli's security and the U. S. perception of its role in assuring that security.
The probleITls the IDF encountered during the initial phase of the October war have probably not altered Dayan's basic ideas about his country's security needs. While Dayan has been a staunch advocate of the need for new borders for Israel, he has never been enaITlored of the popular tendency in Israel to equate security solely with territory. He has been ITlore
....sEeR EUEXDIS • . :J 2
inclined to define security in terTIlS of sophisticated weaponry designed to TIleet specific challenges. When the October war began, Israel lacked both cOTIlplete control of the sky because of the SAMs and an accurate stand-off weapon to blunt an arTIlor attack in the absence of that control. Israel had requested weapons (Lance, glide bOTIlbs, Maverick, etc.) froTIl the U. S. to TIleet these challenges but the requests were still under review at the tiTIle the war broke out. Thus, the war TIlight not cOTIlpel Dayan to revise his strategy except in terTIlS of the urgency of its full iTIlpleTIlentation, which depends on the U. S.
Dayan's eTIlphasis on sophisticated weapons and on TIleeting specific challenges perTIlits hiTIl a degree of flexi bility on security TIlatters not shared by TIlany Israeli civilians, nor by a nUTIlber of TIlilitary figures wedded to their particular branch. He was an early advocate (1970-71) of disengageTIlent through SOTIle Israeli pullback in Sinai under an interiTIl agree TIlent. His approach in the present KiloTIleter 101 negotiations and in the forthcoTIling peace conference has been and will be to seek strategic cOTIlparability. Whatever concessions Israel TIlakes in terTIlS of territory TIlust not reduce Israel's overall strategic security. Dayan does not appear particularly con cerned about how this is done, whether by Arab concessions such as thinning out of forces or by technological TIleans such as an effective long-range early warning systeTIl, provided Israel retains the deciding say in its own defense.
Secretary Kissinger is conducting intensive discussions with the Israelis and other parties to the peace conference. a\\~ Mike Dunn
....SEC~Eq;~EXDIS 8/8--7323364
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
VYa~,hjr.gton, D.C. 20520
December 7, 1973
~~/F.XDI8
ME MORAl\f DUM FOR Ki1.JOR GENERAL J-OHN M. DUNN OFI'ICE OF' THE VICE PHESIDENT
Subject: The Vice President's Meeting with General Moshe Dayan, Saturday, December 8.
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan will be calling on the Vice President- as a courtesy and to inform the Vice President of IsraelIs outlook as it prepares for the peace conference. Moshe Dayan's popular in!age was tarnished by the Israeli Defense Forcels performance in the October war, but he retains the confidence of the Prime Minister and of a large number of conservative politicians from various political parties on questions of security. His assessment and advice, which tend to be pragma.-tic, will remain critical as Nrs. Moir moves Israel into negotiations. His public support for Isr2s1i compromise would be an important factor in developing a national consensus behind any settlement, particularly among conservative Israelis.
Dayan sought and received Cabinet approval for his meetings in Washington. He may, therefore, be working under constraints 'as tb the subject matter he is author ized to discuss. We would expect him to be preoccupied at this time with Israel's security and the u.s. percep tion of its role in assuring that security.
The problems the IDF encountered during the initial phase of the October war have probably not altered Dayan1s basic ideas about his country's security needs. While Dayan has been a staunch advocate of the need for new borders for Israel, he has never been enamored cf th(-; Fopular tendency in Israel to equate security solely with territory. He has been more inclined to define security in terms of sophisticated \'Jeaponry designed to meet specific challenges. When the October war began, Israel lacked both complete control of the sky because of the 8AMs and an accurate stand-off weapon to blunt an
BEQ~'l'/EXDIS GDS- DECLASS!F1ED E.O 13"":"'- . J:> :;0 8y~:j;,,~: ."'..J ...../ /' -'--~.-/ 2
armor attack in the absence of that control. Israel had requ.ested weapons (Lance, glide bombs, Maverick, etc.) from the u.s. to meet these challenges but the requests were still under review at the time the war broke out. Thus, the war might not compel Dayan to revise his stra tegy except. in terms of the urgency of its full imple~ mentation, which depends on the U.S.
Dayan's emphasis on sophisticated weapons and on meeting specific challenges permits him a degree of flexibility on security matters not shared by many Israeli civilians, nor by a number of military figures \'ledded to their particular branch. He was an early advocate (1970--71) of disengagement through some Israeli pullback in Sinai under an interim agreement. His approach in the present Kilometer 101 negotiations and in the forthcoming peace conference has been and will be to seek strategic comparability. Whatever concessions Israel makes in terms of territory must not reduce Israel's overall stra tegic security. Dayan does not appear particularly con cerned about how this is done, whether by Arab conces sions such as thinning out of forces or by technological means such as an effective long-range early warning sys tem, provided Israel retains the deciding say in its own defense. Secretary Kissinger is conducting intensive discus sions with the Israelis and other parties to ·the peace conference. We do not reco~~end that the Vice President get into these details but for his background we are pro ...... :: 'vitling"::a srunmat"y ·of.. ;where-we'.stand;-.·on,·-s·ome,.:·of ·:..th.$' .key.. : .. :. :... :.... ; .... ,;..;.'" questions, as well as some suggerted talking points. fH i \ t ~ l:.li~ J fi~&lf h ):ttV l~~~ 'v,V V~ ~tt~1,t.-0~ Thdnas R. Pickerina \ Executive Secretary Attachments:
1. Issues and Suggested Talking Points. 2. Biographic information, Dayan - Ambassador Dinitz. 3. Cable from Tel Aviv (9895).
/<.: \{; ~lu (, .1- I! .. -.j '"
~~. :t;'" \<~;) .~. ',-// ~EXDIS Enclosure 1
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
1. Courtesy Talking Point: Ben-Gurion's Death
Dayan was a protege and close political associate of David Ben-Gurion.
Suggested Talking Point:
-- Express your personal sorrow at Ben-Gurion's death.
2. The Cease-fire and the Peace Conference
The Six-Point Agreement for the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was negotiated by Secretary Kissinger and has been implemented in all its major fea tures, except one: The Israelis and Egyptians have been unable to reach agreement on the disengagement of their forces. Their talks--their first real face-to-face negotiations since 1949--at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo Suez road have been suspended. The Kilometer 101 talks may be resumed, we just don't know at this time, or it may be necessary to transfer the disengagement issue to the top of the agenda for the Geneva conference. Israel has been willing to work with Egypt toward some form of limited disengagement in order to reduce tension on the front lines but has not been willing to go along with Egypt's tendency to link cease-fire-connected disengage ment to future Israel withdrawals from occupied territory.
Israel has agreed to participate in a peace conference but feels strongly that the talks with the Arab states should be direct and separate even though they may pro gress simultaneously. It is our interpretation of Security Council Resolution 338 that it calls for direct negotia tions, a goal long sought by Israel but not accepted by the Arabs until they accepted Resolution 338. Israel wants U.S. and Soviet participation to be as pro forma as possible. Israel will balk at Palestinian representa tion since it could imply the creation of a sep~rate Palestinian state, an idea Israel rejects .
.Qo13Cr Suggested Talking Points: -- The President is firmly committed to doing what ever is within our power to assure the present opportunity for peace,__ihthe.*ddla East_isHP.-O-t_~t. -- I think it would be useful for me to hear your views on the cease-fire situation and how you see the negotiations developing in Geneva. 3. Military Supply In the October war Israel felt the absence of a strategic reserve of equipment which forced it to pull or delay some of its punches for fear of further equipment losses. Israel is asking the u.S. to provide such a strategic reserve particularly in tanks, aircraft, and trucks. It is further asking the u.S. to provide an effective and rel atively risk-free counter to Arab SAM defenses. Israel is trying to negotiate an agreement with DOD to exploit captured Soviet equipment, such as elements of the SAM 6, which would give Israel the benefit of any technology and weapons developed as a result of this joint exploita tion. Israel continues to firmly oppose any attempt to relate weapon deliveries to political performance and is extremely sensitive to any hint along these lines. Suggested Talking Point: -- The U.S. is determined to see that Israel receives the arms it needs to defend itself both now and in the future. It is the policy of the Administration and the will of Congress that Israel's security be ensured. 4. Economi~ Support While Israel's economy has appeared to have come through the war in reasonable condition, it is still very early to have a complete picture of how the situa tion will develop. Israel has estimated the cost of the war at $5 to $6 billion, which is a total figure involving both direct and indirect costs such as exports and pro-. , duction foregone, housing and other construction not,~.. ~vl;,j < ~~EXDIS 3 completed. One Israeli estimate puts the loss of civilian production due to the war at $450 million and anticipates an eventual loss in the export of goods and services in 1973 of $200 to $250 million. Israel estimates its assistance requirement to be at about $3 billion and has indicated its hope that the entire $2.2 billion which the Administration has requested from Congress be in the form of grant aid. We have already shipped Israel arms worth about $1 billion in our war and post-war resupply effort which would be paid for out of this special appropriation. Suggested Talking Points: -- Both the Administration and Congress want to pro vide the financial assistance necessary for Israel to finance its strong armed forces while maintaining a high level of growth, absorbing new immigrants and helping the needy. We are hopeful that Congress will pass the neces sary $2.2-billion special appropriation which we have requested. It is unclear now to what extent Congressional action will give the President discretion to decide how much of our assistance will be grant and how much will be loans. 5. U.S.-Israel Security Treaty Note: We suggest the Vice President not raise this issue but Dayan may and the following is provided in the event he does so. Israel has more or less rejected out of hand any concept of external guarantees for its security and tends to lump the idea of a treaty relationship with the U.S. into this category. In the past weeks, however, an Israeli newspaper commentator (Dan Margalit) who is often identified as speaking for Dayan, wrote an article stress ing that Israel should look more closely at the possi bility of a treaty relationship, particularly in the context of a document ratified by the Senate and thus BEe~T1EXDIS " ~DIS ,r; 4 binding on future administrations. Israel's, and particularly Mrs. Meir's greatest concern is that the U.S. thinks of a security guarantee as a sub stitute for defensible borders for Israel. Suggested Talking Point: -- This is one idea that has been mentioned in the past which has its advocates in Congress. The important point, however, is that the U.S. has no intention of denying Israel the right and wherewithal to defend itself and does not want to assume the burden itself. At the same time, we want to keep an open mind about any forms of guarantees the parties may agree on which would bulwark a settlement. ..; ,,, ", "".CcP' ;) '~,' "'- / .,--..~~./ NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORD S ADMINISTRATI ON I Presiden tia l Librarie s Wi t hdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL I D 03 58 48 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL GNa tional s ecurity r estriction TYPE OF MATERI AL . . . GBi ography DES CRIPTION Concerning I sraeli offi cial CREAT ION DATE 11/30/ 1973 VOLUME . 1 p age COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER I D 0 02 301002 COLLECTI ON TITLE GERALD R. 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':0 J" :'J 1\ :") N 1\ ,:: I'·' !:J' 1" .1 II' I'" I (J (ll'':: i'~ L'I n) rl' ;J p~ tJ' 1'\ I', - , tJNCL..~SIFIED 2 ~erzog, Director General of the Prime Minister's Office, ~eC2-~e ir!c~e2.si~c~":l incapacitated, Dinitz assi.L.~.. ed nan~.T 0:;: -' ~ - his d<:ties. !J"90rl Herzog's death in April 1972; Dinitz :7-~S ~ar:;ea to t~e post. Du.ri~S' the early 1960's Dinitz attended several sessio!!3 of -:"'~e t.;~: Ger:.e::-al F-_3sC,;c.~ly. He accoILl:?anied Hrs. f·Ieir on visits to the G~ite::' States in Deca-IDer 1971 and ~·larch 1973. In }lay 1972 he tra-",-elec. ~qit..~ Hrs. Heir on her state visit to R:;::J.a~ia, and the £C)118~·iing mont..1. he attended the Conference of the Socialist Internatio~al held in Vien~a. ?~e ~7~aS3aGOr has been described as prag~atic, energetic a~c artic~l~te. lie is a very cordial and outgoing individ~al. Sis ·wife 1 ViviaI! ~ ;·;no ;'1as born in Cincinnati, is quiet a:ld char3~~g. Both the Dinitzr speak fluent English. The co~?le h~s ~~ree children: Doritr born in 1955; T&aar, born in 1956; arlQ ~·iichael, born in 1962. rj-:',:C~~SSI?IED _. ,- - 1- :,,' " __ :: " I Enclosure 3 0 Department of State TELEGRAM eO~~ID~All~ 041 PAGE 0t T!L AV ~g8ge 061427Z 44 ACTION NEA-12 INFO OCT.01 10-14 ISO ... 00 OMS-01 INR.te L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 SS-20 USIA.15 ACDA-1Q EUR .. 25 ORC.01 1150 W .P••·"••A ...... ·~ •••••• e81747 R 061122! DEC 73 FM AMEMBASSy TEL AVIV TO SECSTAT! WASHDC 781 INFO AMBASSy AMMAN 6632 AMEMBASSV BEIRUT USINT CAIRO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM USMISSION U8UN NEW ynRK ~ 9 N , lOY R T I A ~-TEL AVIV 98g! EIIO, 116!521 GDS TAGSI PFOR. PINT, IS SUBJI WH~RE DAYAN STANDS TODAY BEIRUT POUCH BAGHDAD t. DURING FIRST MONTH A~TER CEASEFIRE DAYAN !M!RGED AS STATESMANLIKE ADVOCATE OF R~AL!8M AND FLEXI8ILITY, ONE O"'I~" TOP ISRA~LI LEADERS TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY A PERSONAL VIEW THAT OCT08ER WAR MIGHT HAVE CREATED OPENING TO DURABL! PEAC! SETTLEMENT, DAYAN WAS ELOQUENT IN HIS APPR!CIATION FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, COGNIZANT OF IMPORTANCE 0' GOOO Ul·~8~'!L RELATIONSHIP AT TIME ~HEN ISRA!L STOOD VIRTUALLY ISOLATeD IN WORLD COMMUNITY, ANO CONSTRUCTIVE IN HIS VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE"REPARED TO MAKE EAR REACHING eONCESSIONS AT PI.eE eONFERENCE .. , 2, ACCORDING Tn PRESS ACCOUNTS, AT DECEMBER ! LA80RPART¥ eENTRAL COMMITTEE MEET1NG DAYAN RESTATED THAT ISRA!~ II GOING TO PEACE CONFERENC! PREPARED TO MAK~ TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS IN EXCH~NGE FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT, HE -eaNE! ee~~A.l.. L FORM ...... Department of State TELEGRAM eOfq~10!l'JtlIL PAGE 02 T~L AV 09895 061427Z REPORTEDLY SAID TMAT THERE WERE THRE~ INTERLOCKING ELEMENTS FOR DETERMINING FUTURE ISRAtLI BORDERS ••PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC DEPTH, STR!NGTH AND EQUIPMENT FO lOF, AND A US TREATY OR GUARANTEE. PRESS QUOTES HIM AS ADDING. "I 00 NOT EXCLUDE ANY OF THESE COMPON~NTS FRoM THE SUM TOTAL FOR DETERMINING ISRAEL'S FUTURE-BORDERS"~ HE ALSO IS SAID TO HAV! STATEO~ q I WOULD LIKE US TO BE IN THE PICTURE IN SOME WAV g t WOU~D NOT LIKE THEM TO PULL OUT ANO LEAVE ONLY THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR POEOPLE HERE Q " ~. AT SAME MEETING DAYAN ALeO STATED THAT HE ACCEpT EO LATEST LABOR PARTY PROGRAM (TEL Aviv 9619' BECAUSE IT OPPOSED RETURN 1:0 JUNE 4, 1987 BO~DERS AND REJECTED IDEA OF CREATING INDEPENDeNT PALESTtNIAN STATE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, EMERGENCE OF SUCH A STATE, HE SAID, WOULO SIGNAL BEGINNING OF DESTRUCTION· OF STATE OF' ISRAEL, 40 DURING PAST SEvERA~ WEEKS DASAN HAS ALSO MADE SEVERAL HEARDLINE SPEECHES REAFFIRMLNG MIS SUPPORT FOR PRINCIPLES OF GALILI DOCUMENT. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CHANGED HIS VIEWS ON LEGITIMACV AND IMPORTANCE OF JiWISM SETTLEMENT POLICY INCLUDING HIS PET PROJECT FOR CITY OF YAMIT IN RA'AM JUNCT10N AREA. HowEVER g HE 1S REPORTED TO HAVE SAID DEC 5 THAT CURRENT OICUSSION OF GALILI DOCUMENT'S VALIDITV IS MOOT. 5~ DAYAN'S MORE HARDLINE STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN IN PART AN EFFORT TO SHORE UP HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FORTUNES Q IN WAKE OF WAR, AND PARTICULARLV AS PUBLIC HAS BECOME MORE AWARE OF ~EAOERSMIP FAILURES CONC,RNING IOF PREPAREDNESS AND CONDUCT OF WAR~ OAVANo9 OO~£STIC POSITION HAS BEEN SIGNt 'FICANTLY WEAKENED a PO~LS SHOWED MARKED DROP IN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN HIM, S~VERAL COMMENTATORS AND MEMBERS OF LABOR PARTY CALLED FOR HIS RESIGNATION, AND ISSUE OF WHETHER HE SHOULO BE DROPPED FROM NEXT CABINET BECAME IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF LABOR PARTY OEBAtE ON HOW TO REGAIN PUBLIC SUPPORTM 6 a DAYAN'S FUTURE CLEARLY IS UP IN THE AIR. AT DEC 5 CENTRA~ COMMITTEE MEETING HE REPEAT~O HIS READINESS TO TENDER HIS RESIGNATION IF MRS MEIR OR ~ABOR PARTy ASKS FOR IT. HE ADDED THAT HE HAS NEITHER A$KED NOR BEEN ASKED TO PART OF NEXT CABINET. WHAT HAPPENS TO DAYAN (AS TO REST OF TOP FORM __ • __ .... Department of State TELEGRAM PAGE 03 TEL AV 09895 061427Z LEAOERSHtP' DEPENDS IN LARGt MEASUR! ON OUTeOM! OF ELECT!ONS· AND ON ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGR~SS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. MRS MEIR'S PERSONAL PREFERENCE DOUBTLESS IS TO K!EP HIM ON. BUT MER FREEDOM IN THIS REGARD wILL BE CONDITION!D BY WHAT HAPPENS ON DECEMBER 31g AS 0' NOW, NEITHER DUMPING OF DAYAN IN FORMING NEXT GOVERNMENT, NOR DRAMATIC COMEBACK BY HIM AS SECQND MOST INFLU~NTIAL PERSON IN GOI CAN BE EXCl.UDED. K!ATING "-1; Qf,'O' :'" <, l lj. , •.t .,.. II> ~. ';~J ''': ' ...---_.-.// ~nRU _____ ......