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Home , Avraham Yoffe, Herzl Shafir, Israel Tal, Levi Eshkol, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon

ISRAEL’S DECISION TO GO TO WAR, JUNE 2, 1967 Ami Gluska*

This article is adapted slightly from Ami Gluska, The Decisive Meeting in Planning the 1967 War, (Taylor and Francis, 2006). It appears in the series on military and strategic issues edited by Barry Rubin. Reprinted with permission. To order this book, click here.

This article discusses the deliberations of Israeli government and army officials in the days preceding the beginning of the Six Day War. It illustrates the conflict and divide between the political and military echelons and the army’s mistrust of the civilian leadership. While the IDF pushed for preemptive offensive action, feeling this was a military must given the circumstances, the government was hesitant. Such delays were viewed by the IDF as potentially disastrous. ’s security policy, whose supreme aim had been deterrence and prevention of war, thus failed, resulting in the crisis and war in May-. However, good military planning and preparation won the war itself.

On Friday, June 2, 1967, at 9:25 a.m., the “that for the time being things are going to expanded Israeli Ministerial Committee on ease up.”1 However, by the end of the Security met with the Israeli General Staff encounter, the general feeling was that the forum in the Pit war room. The government die had been cast.2 Two days later, the had decided five days earlier to hold off on Israeli government voted by a large a military response to the crisis created by majority to go to war the following day. the withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai, the closing of the to Israeli THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT shipping, and the Egyptian military build- CONSTITUTE THE MAIN OBSTACLE up. The intention was to give the U.S. TO OUR ACTION leadership a chance to solve the crisis diplomatically. The second meeting of the The chief of staff, , week between the military and civilian opened the June 2 meeting and said that the echelons (after the stormy General Staff aim was: “To display the picture to the meeting with Prime Minister government as it appears to the IDF on May 28, 1967) also developed into a [(Israeli Defense Forces)].”3 The chief of confrontation between the two sides. What intelligence, General Aharon Yariv, read the generals had to say instantly dispelled out the main points of the evaluation drawn the celebratory mood of the ministers, who up by the Intelligence Research Department only the evening before had raised their on May 31, 1967. Then he analyzed the glasses to the establishment of a American stand on the basis of reports from government of national unity. the Israeli embassy in Washington and from They were now faced with the demand media sources. His conclusion was that the for an immediate decision to send Israel to United States had no intention of taking war. Before the meeting, the prime minister serious action to lift ’s maritime appeared relaxed and told the ministers blockade of Israel’s port of Eilat by force,

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 1 Ami Gluska and, in fact, there was an increasing the initiative, particularly where the Israeli American awareness that Israel must act Air Force (IAF) was concerned, would be alone. The Americans had no desire to critical for the outcome. Provided the become entangled in regional hostilities, decision was made on that same day and and many members of the American not postponed, Rabin declared, the IDF administration would consider Israeli action could still do the job on the Egyptian front, as a convenient solution to the problem. In even if forced to limit its actions and suffer the United States, unlike in France, Israel some damage on the Syrian and Jordanian could wield influence on the fronts. administration.4 The chief of intelligence In response to a question from Prime concluded, on the basis of “hints,” that if Minister Levi Eshkol, Rabin reiterated that Israel acted judiciously and speedily, the every additional day of inaction “impedes “United States will not constitute the main the implementation [of the IDF plan] and obstacle to our action.” makes it more costly.” The commanding Rabin described the situation in all its officer of Southern Command illustrated gravity. He distinguished between the this viewpoint by sketching three situations: problem of keeping open the Straits of the situation on the day the Egyptian Tiran, which allowed Eilat to function as a blockade was announced (“if we had taken port and whose significance lay in the effect the offensive on that day it would have been on Israel’s deterrent capability, and what he a picnic”); the situation “on the day it was saw as the main problem, “the military and decided [by the government on May 28] not political situation evolving around us, in to carry out the attack;” and the present which time is not on our side.” He spoke in situation. Still, General Yeshayahu Gavish, terms of a dynamic process of growing head of the Southern Command, explained, military forces on the Egyptian and “An attack tomorrow would have a Jordanian fronts and increased inter-Arab different significance to an attack in four cooperation. He anticipated the possibilities days time when the situation will be much of Egyptian attacks, terrorist action, more serious.” Yariv backed Gavish, noting renewal of the water diversion work, and that “Cairo is urgently cramming forces into even prevention of the passage of the Sinai…. There are cases where for 48 hours fortnightly convoy to . “This the troops have neither food nor water forum, and I first of all, and I am convinced because the urgency and disorder are so that most of the officers as well, don’t want great. That’s not bad for us and again it’s a war for its own sake,” Rabin stressed, but, question of time.” he added, the noose was tightening around Rabin summed up this section of the Israel, the enemy had announced that their meeting: “Mr. Prime Minister, we have aim was the annihilation of Israel and time presented the matter to you. The question was on their side. The country’s leaders is, what does the Prime Minister want to could not afford to wait until the enemy had happen here at this forum?” Eshkol did not gained decisive superiority, which would reply, and an open discussion ensued in have placed Israel’s survival at grave risk. It which the senior command again voiced was crucial to act immediately and to inflict their demands unrelentingly and “a resounding blow” on Nasser, which imperatively. Minister of the Interior Moshe would completely transform the situation in Haim Shapira, in a desperate attempt to the Middle East. The implications of taking gain time, further exasperated the generals

2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) Israel's Decision to Go to War, June 2, 1967 when he posed a question that seemed to total annihilation of the Egyptian forces.” rebut all their explanations: If in any case The gravest issue, as he perceived it, was the Egyptians had already concentrated the loss of Israel’s deterrent capability, almost all their army in Sinai, “what which was weakening day by day because difference can there be [if we launch an of “the hesitations and foot-dragging [of the attack] now, in a week or ten days?... On government].” He tried to persuade the the other hand, we are liable to lose the ministers, who were afraid that the number political campaign… if we act of casualties would be great, that due to the immediately.” situation’s gravity, “there is moral justification for the decision-making SHARON: “WHO IS MORE echelon to approve an operation which will QUALIFIED THAN WE TO TELL entail more losses.” Sharon objected in YOU THAT THE ARMY IS READY particular to Israeli dependence on the FOR WAR?!” superpowers. He said:

Brigadier General , the Any link-up on our part with other first speaker in the discussion, emphasized powers is a mistake of the first order. the need to take the initiative: Our aim is to make sure that in the coming ten or twenty years or I have been sitting in the for 14 generation or two the Egyptians will not days with the units and the reserve want to fight us. Any link-up on our forces…. Our feeling there… is that we part with other powers or action against have failed to take the initiative all marginal objectives [that is, to be along the front…. We must snatch the content with attacking Egyptian initiative from the Egyptians. If we airfields, conquering the , and obtain the initiative by diplomatic the like] instead of the central objective means well and good ... but all our of destroying the will initiative has taken is in the form of the prove that we are weak. That was the Foreign Minister’s trip to the United main damage caused by the Sinai States…. Campaign. We could have gone it alone. The fact that we linked up with Yoffe did not rule out the idea of others showed us up as helpless. confining action to an IAF attack without bringing any other forces into play. The Sharon emphasized that only a resolute main thing, he said, was “to do something, stand in defense of Israel’s rights, one of to exploit our initiative and to change this which was freedom of shipping, could situation where we can see the clouds guarantee the state’s long-term survival. He gathering and approaching and we are alluded mockingly to Foreign Minister sitting idle.” ’s mission: ‘‘Our scurrying Yoffe’s minimalist approach was about—and I won’t use the word anathema to . He started out by ‘shtadlanut’ [begging for help from declaring that “the IDF forces are readier rulers]—among the superpowers and than ever before in their ability to destroy pleading for rescue are not part of our and to repel an Egyptian attack.” The stance in protection of our rights.” Sharon objective, Sharon clarified, “is no less than rounded off his remarks by promising that

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 3 Ami Gluska the IDF was ready for action, equipped with bluntest of all in his attack on the a sturdy fighting spirit and decisive government. For two weeks—morning, superiority for directing an attack. “Who is noon, and night—he said, the army had more qualified than we to come and tell you been asserting that time was working that the army is ready for war?!,” he asked. against Israel. Yet the General Staff had not He warned that any attempt to postpone the received a single word of explanation for date of the attack in hope of receiving more the wait. “I can understand that we are tanks and aircraft would be a grave error. waiting for something to happen. If so, let “Today nothing can have any effect except us in on the secret and we will know why for a rapid and courageous, timely decision we are waiting!” Peled denied the on the part of the government. The rest can importance of international action for lifting be left to our forces. I can assure you that it the blockade: “We have heard something will be carried out in the best possible regarding Tiran, which lost its significance fashion.” long ago. It was not important to start with Minister of Defense then and is even less important now.” The entry took the floor. He said little, but it was of an Egyptian force into Sinai was nothing evident that he was siding with the General new for the IDF, having been anticipated Staff, although, ostensibly, he confined and planned for in various exercises and himself to a “technical explanation.” He war games. The only surprise, he stressed, explained to Moshe Haim Shapira the was Nasser’s audacity, since it was well connection between the enemy’s known that his army was not ready for war. consolidation and the high number of Peled had an explanation to offer for casualties to be anticipated in any attack on Nasser’s moves: their fortified positions. Dayan claimed that the IDF would have limited time at its In my opinion he was relying on the disposal until an anticipated international hesitation of the Israeli government. He intervention to halt the fighting. The greater acted in confidence that we would not the Egyptian entrenchment, the more time dare to hit at him…. Nasser moved an would be needed to defeat them. Dayan army which was not ready to the border added that even if everything went well, and he derived full advantage from the there would still be need for a second stage move. One thing is acting in his favor to conquer Sharm al-Shaykh and open the and that is the fact that the Israeli Straits, since this could not be achieved government is not ready to act against earlier. If the first stage was drawn out him. because of the Egyptian entrenchment, there might not be enough time for the Peled interpreted the questions the second stage, and the Straits would remain ministers had raised during the meeting and blocked when the cease-fire was imposed. on previous occasions as manifestations of a lack of confidence in the capability of the MATI PELED: “WE ARE ENTITLED IDF. “What has the IDF done wrong to TO KNOW WHY WE ARE deserve these doubts as to its capability? SUFFERING THIS DISGRACE” What more does an army need in order to win the confidence of the government but The chief of the Quartermaster Branch, to win every battle?!” Brigadier-General Mati Peled, was the

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As the officer in charge of logistics, intended to explain what we are going to do Peled permitted himself to brandish the tomorrow or the next day.” economic argument and the impact of the First he replied to Sharon, who had deteriorating economic situation in the denoted the diplomatic efforts to be morale of the troops: “scurrying about.” He lectured Sharon: “Everything we have vis-à-vis the material The economy is in an intolerable strength of our army came as a result of this condition. Food supplies scarcely scurrying about. Let us not forget that and manage to reach the places where they let us not regard ourselves as Goliaths as a are needed. How long will it be before result. Bare-fisted, unequipped and our soldiers in the frontline are affected unarmed—we have no strength.” He was by the situation in the home front?!... reluctant to place unqualified faith in the How long can they sit there when army’s evaluations. “With all the everything we left behind is evaluations and data of Intelligence there collapsing?!... The State of Israel does are several things of which it can be said not have infinite stamina. The IDF will that they could end in this way or that,” in be able to beat the enemy in three weeks particular what the was liable time as well, but I don’t know what will to do. happen within.… It is not clear to me if In a country of two million citizens, he the government has an accurate picture told the generals, a man needed to think to of what is going on internally. Meetings himself: with directors of government ministries are now almost routine for me and their Let us assume that we break the representatives know what is going on enemy’s might today. Tomorrow we internally. If you only knew … you need to start building up our power would ask why we are not acting faster. anew, because we too will have lost The enemy is digging in and growing forces … and then, if every ten years we stronger and the economy is growing need to fight we will have to consider weaker and all this for an aim which whether we have an ally who can aid nobody can explain to us. us…. Sometimes the difference of a day and an hour can be decisive in the sense Peled concluded on a sharp note: “We that there will be some in the world who deserve to know why we are suffering this will not be among those who attack us disgrace. Perhaps, on this occasion, we will like wolves. receive an explanation. Why are we waiting?!” Eshkol noted in particular the The prime minister hastened to sum up importance “of whispering in [U.S. the discussion and to defend the President] Johnson’s ear that he should not government. It was abundantly clear that claim that we cheated him because we may Sharon and Peled had infuriated him. still need him. Please God, we will not need Having already resolved to send the IDF him in the middle of the fighting.” At the into action, he did not want to be same time Eshkol hinted that there was a misunderstood. Hence, he began by limit to waiting, and the hour of action was declaring: “What I am about to say is not close at hand.

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The prime minister was apparently The impact of the meeting with the General deeply hurt by Peled’s remarks and Staff had decided the issue. However, it retorted: was agreed that the attack would not begin “before Monday [June 5].”7 I permit myself to think that you know no more than we do about what is going THE ARMY’S INFLUENCE: on in government ministries, what we LEGITIMATE, BORDERLINE have in this country and what our LEGITIMATE, OR ILLEGITIMATE? reserves are... in the civilian sphere. I don’t think we are less equipped now At this point, it is important to sum up than ten years ago [during the Sinai and evaluate the role that the army War] and perhaps even more. commanders played in persuading, or Therefore, it can be said that two days perhaps forcing, the government to decide more or one day less will not decide the to go to war. Was the pressure they exerted campaign.5 beyond the bounds of the legitimate constitutional framework, or did the IDF act The prime minister, as the most within the permissible framework in knowledgeable on economic matters, accordance with the rules of conduct in a insisted that the Achilles heel was not the “mature democratic political culture?”8 economic situation and that it was In order to answer the question, it important to preserve Israel’s relations with should be noted that, as has been shown, the its friends throughout the world so that the military perceived the situation as acute. IDF’s strength could be built up after the They feared that they were liable to face the war. A military victory would not end the difficult choice between constitutional dispute, “because the will still be loyalty, which dictated full submission to here,” he argued. the elected civilian authority, and a higher Rabin hoped that the government would loyalty to the very existence of the Israeli convene that same day and arrive at a state and their duty to protect it and the decision, but Eshkol declared that a lives of its citizens. Such a situation was government meeting would be held, as liable to evoke activist symptoms even usual, on Sunday. This was a similar among a professional officer class.9 concluding note to that of the meeting in the The General Staff was entirely Pit five days earlier. Eshkol may have convinced that the government was wanted thereby to express his resentment at endangering the country. From May 23, the IDF’s pressure, but in fact he had 1967, the date on which Nasser proclaimed resolved to wait no longer. the closing of the Straits of Tiran, the senior At noon, Eshkol conferred with a command was united in the belief that there limited forum consisting of Dayan, Eban, would be no escape from a military , the director-general of the confrontation. The government’s decision, PM’s office , and Rabin. It so it seemed, was encouraging Nasser to act was decided unanimously that the time had even more audaciously and granted his come to go to war. Dayan and Allon army time for organizing, consolidating, favored an immediate attack,6 as did Rabin. reinforcing, and reequipping its own army Eshkol was already leaning in this as well as rallying allied Arab armies direction, and Eban voiced no objections. around Israel’s borders. The most feasible

6 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) Israel's Decision to Go to War, June 2, 1967 assumption, based on “indicators,” was that the media (and in particular the charge that Nasser would direct an initial blow at the he was responsible for a “security mishap”), atomic reactor and IAF airfields. It was the deterioration of the security situation feared also that concentrations of due to increased terrorist activity, and population and infrastructure would be finally, his stammered address to the nation bombed, and that the Arab armies, enjoying that appeared to reflect helplessness, a plea air superiority, were subsequently liable to for outside rescue, and an affront to the launch a coordinated offensive Israeli ethos. simultaneously on all fronts, thereby The army believed that it held the forcing the IDF to split its defensive efforts. solution to the situation, that the nation was This nightmare scenario included the pinning its hope on its fighters, and only the possibility of wide-scale terrorist attacks government was delaying action and and an uprising of Israel’s Arabs. A casting doubt on the IDF’s ability to save situation might be created, the generals the country from disaster. Victory depended asserted plainly, whereby the IDF would to a critical extent on the IAF’s ability to not be able to win the inevitable fight. achieve aerial supremacy, and this in its Moreover, a crisis of confidence now turn was conditional on achieving the vital became apparent between the military and element of tactical surprise. Hence, the political echelons. On one hand, the government’s “delaying tactics,” and in government’s confidence in the army was particular the incomprehensible decision of shaken, due to the rebuttal of the May 28, 1967, were perceived by the army intelligence evaluation, the collapse of the as potentially disastrous. deterrent capacity, the unexpected During the severe crisis that ensued, the downward slide to the verge of war, and army could have been strongly tempted, in Rabin’s hesitations and breakdown.10 On light of its perception of the circumstances, the other hand, and above all, the army did to seize initiative and “intervene” to deliver not trust the government to act judiciously the nation from danger. The crucial fact is and considered it to be confused, panic- that this did not occur. The army was stricken, spineless, and incapable of making confronted with a supreme test of its loyalty decisions. It was not only the army that had to the laws and constraints of the lost confidence in the civilian leadership, democratic framework, and that framework but also the anxious general public at home was preserved and did not crumble. and the mobilized troops on the front line.11 Still, what did the army do, and to what The paternal, anti-charismatic, and extent—if at all—was there ever danger of irresolute image of Levi Eshkol did not illegitimate “intervention” on its part? answer the psychological need for confident First, it should be noted that the tension and persuasive leadership. The frenzied between the military and civilian echelons atmosphere in the Arab world—the blunt did not extend through the entire three- threats that Israel would be destroyed and week period of the crisis—May 15 to June its citizens slaughtered—had touched a very 4, 1967. It began only after Nasser’s sensitive nerve in the Jewish consciousness. announcement of the closure of the Straits Eshkol’s standing was at its lowest ebb due and the dispatch of Foreign Minister Eban to the economic recession that had created a on his diplomatic mission to seek support gloomy atmosphere,12 the savage criticism from the Western heads of state. The leveled against him by the opposition and government’s marathon discussions on May

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27 and 28 that resulted in a decision to wait Yet one may still ask whether there was three weeks, in total disregard of the army’s ever a danger—even if it came to nothing— view, created a situation that the IDF found of improper intervention by the IDF. unacceptable. The tension between military Ben-Gurion’s dread of unauthorized and government reached its peak during the action on the part of the army as the result four days that were marked by two highly of its lack of confidence towards the charged meetings in the Pit: between civilian leadership, an act which would Sunday evening, May 28, 1967—when the constitute “a stain on the State of Israel generals met with the prime minister—and from which it will never cleanse itself,”15 Friday morning, June 2—when they met the has already been mentioned. It is expanded Ministerial Committee on noteworthy that there is no evidence that at Security. Between these two dates, the any stage whatsoever the General Staff military echelon took the following steps: intended to take action against the First, immediately after the meeting government and overrule its decisions. with Eshkol in the Pit, Rabin ordered that However, the fact that several generals, in steps be taken to forestall inertia (a the course of charged encounters with the slackening of alertness) in the army and to political echelon, felt the need to emphasize maintain high morale, both through that the army was subordinate to the propaganda and through a strict military government,16 and the fact that the prime routine and an intensive training regime.13 minister felt it necessary to put the military Second, the Intelligence Branch issued a in its place, indicates that a certain air of very somber evaluation on the military and fear, however faint. diplomatic implications of a three-week The generals who led the Israeli army in wait. Third, several of the generals were battle in the June 1967 War are unanimous recruited for a “propaganda campaign” in in their view that there was never danger of order to persuade the political establishment a “putsch.”17 This conviction is clearly to change the government decision. To this verified by what the army did and by what end, several meetings took place between it refrained from doing. Nonetheless, Ezer senior officers and political figures.14 Weizman was quoted as having said that Of these three activities, only the third Israel was never closer to a military coup appears somewhat problematic, because it than on the eve of the Six Day War.18 seemingly points to IDF intervention in According to one source, the American politics, particularly when the demand had intelligence services estimated that such a been raised to relieve Eshkol of the defense danger existed.19 portfolio. However, even if several officers That the possibility was contemplated tried to influence the appointment of a new and actually broached out loud at the senior minister of defense, their impact was military level, during the tense and infinitesimal and in no way undermined the frustrating encounters with the political supremacy of the political echelon. The echelon, is attested to by only one member move to appoint Dayan to the post was of the IDF General Staff at that time—Ariel inspired by pressure of public opinion and Sharon. His exceptional testimony deserves the political establishment and not to be quoted in full: necessarily by the urgings of the senior command. …After the first meeting with Eshkol [in the Pit on May 28]… I must say that

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I myself, and I also discussed it with the radio] and broadcast an announcement Chief of Staff, for the first time had the [on a decision made by the army to go feeling, and this must be admitted, we to war]… they [the Ministers] would sometimes asked whether in the State of have accepted it with a sense of relief. Israel a situation was possible whereby That was my feeling.20 the army would seize power. Could there be a situation where the army Sharon’s testimony could be seen as the takes decisions without the expression of an individual line of thought government… and I always said that it or mood, which he shared with the chief of wasn’t possible, that in Israel such a staff and colleagues in the General Staff. It thing couldn’t happen. And here, after should be noted that this was not a unique the meeting on [May 28]… I told the belief, because Sharon raised it in the Pit Chief of Staff and the other people there twice within five days. However, it was an that in fact this is the first time where a aberrant expression, no more than “thinking situation had arisen where this was out loud.” A similar thought may have gone possible, and it would be accepted through the minds of other generals, but positively. That means that for the first Sharon was the only one who voiced it. time a situation had arisen in Israel Perusal of the documentation reveals no where seizing of power [by the army evidence that there was ever any practical was possible] not for purposes of desire outcome. for power but for decision-making. The The question of the limits of obedience basic decision [to go to war] could be of a soldier to the democratically elected taken without the government, for the civilian echelon is not a simple one.21 The first time. And I don’t remember existence of some kind of limit is accepted. whether he [Rabin] agreed or not, but I No soldier is called upon to “obey blindly,” think that he saw it like that as well. I and under extreme circumstances he will be don’t think that anyone talked of fulfilling a higher obligation if he gives practical matters, whether it was priority to moral or professional possible to carry it out, but from the considerations and to his ultimate viewpoint of the situation which responsibility towards the state and the existed… the first meeting on 28 May… security of its inhabitants. we didn’t finish discussing the subject. The outcome of the Six Day War has After the meeting on 2 June [with the clouded comprehension of the extreme expanded Ministerial Committee on situation at the time; because Israel enjoyed Security]... we [the generals] stayed decisive military superiority—which behind to talk afterwards, and I said that became evident only post factum—the if we had been at a certain stage, what claim of the General Staff that it would be we started talking about afterwards, we disastrous to wait was disproved. In fact, would have stood up and said [to the most of the generals later admitted that the Ministers], listen, your decisions are waiting period—in addition to its vast endangering the State of Israel, and diplomatic advantages—strengthened the since the situation is now very grave, IDF, enabling it to complete its operative you are requested to step into the next planning, lay out the logistic deployment, room and wait there, and the Chief of organize and train forces, and transform the Staff will go over to Kol Israel [national reserve forces as well into a kind of regular

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 9 Ami Gluska army. In retrospect, nobody claimed that the what it wanted, even if several days late and army had been correct in its evaluations. only after the existential threat loomed The way in which Eshkol and his larger. The General Staff did not need to government conducted the crisis came to be recourse to unconstitutional measures. This regarded, in the end, as political sagacity at possibility, even if contemplated for a its best. moment by one general or another, was This was not the way things appeared never actually on the agenda. before the war. The General Staff, as noted, was convinced that the government was RESTRICTING THE POWERS OF endangering the country. They raged, they THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE exerted pressure, they exhorted, but they did not take illegitimate or provocative Once Dayan was appointed, it was action in order to confront the political necessary to decide on the division of echelon with a fait accompli. There is no authority between the prime minister and way of knowing for sure what would have the minister of defense, in particular the happened if the government had persisted in restrictions on the latter’s freedom to issue its policy of waiting despite the orders to the army. The procedures were deterioration in the military situation (the formulated by Yigal Yadin, a former chief entry of Iraqi forces into the , of staff who was trusted by both Eshkol and further reinforcement and consolidation of Dayan:22 the Egyptian force in Sinai, and so on) in a manner that would have aggravated the a. The Minister of Defence will not act army’s dilemma even further. However, without the approval of the Prime there is no reason to assume that even in Minister as regards the following: that case the army would have acted of its own accord and not on the basis of the 1. launching general hostile action or decisions of the government. It is an war against any country whatsoever; incontrovertible fact that the IDF began to 2. taking any military action in the release reserve forces and to prepare for a course of war which oversteps the long wait. The shortening of that period bounds of action as determined by from three weeks to one was due to IDF the government; pressure, promoted by the change in the 3. launching military action against any composition of the government, and the country which has not, until that “yellow light” from Washington. Yet the moment, participated in hostilities; most important factor was the Hussein- 4. bombing important cities in enemy Nasser alliance and its strategic territory if the act has not been implications, which tipped the balance. preceded by bombing of Israeli cities On May 28, 1967, the Israeli by that same enemy; government (with the exception of Moshe 5. launching retaliatory action in Carmel) voted unanimously for waiting. response to incidents. Exactly a week later, on June 4, almost the entire government (with the exception of b. The Prime Minister can, with the two ministers) unanimously knowledge of the Minister of Defence, decided to go to war immediately. The summon the Chief of Staff, the Chief of army had brought pressure to bear and got Intelligence, the Director-General of the

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Ministry of Defence or the Assistant determine the outcome. This discussion was Minister of Defence in order to receive the decisive stage in consolidation of the information. ultimate operational plan “Nakhshonim,” which was implemented in general lines on This hastily drawn-up procedure can the southern front. scarcely be regarded as a comprehensive It is seemingly surprising that at this series of instructions for defining the late stage, almost three weeks after the subordination of the minister of defense to crisis had begun and after endless the prime minister. In any event, all the deliberations and planning, the IDF did not actions listed in Clause (a) were subject to yet have a definite operational plan for a the approval of the government plenum or ground offensive on the Egyptian front. The the Ministerial Committee on Security. This reasons lay in the rapid changes in the was not an orderly division of authority. situation that required flexibility and Rather, it was a document aimed at adaptation of plans as well as allocation of dispelling fears, which were not explicitly forces and tasks. Within Southern expressed, that the minister of defense Command, there was an ongoing struggle might make his own decisions and take between the divisional commanders. Ariel action after consulting the army, without Sharon was pressing and demanding informing the government and its head.23 expansion of his division’s assignments and Dayan himself ignored the agreed the aims of the war in general, while Israel procedure when he gave direct orders to the Tal, whose division was earmarked for the CO Northern Command on June 9 to attack main thrust, favored more modest the Syrians in the , thereby objectives. In the end, Avraham Yoffe, who contravening the government decision of was more passive, was left with a depleted the previous night not to launch such an division. His spearhead brigade (200th attack (in fact, at the government meeting Armored Brigade, under Yiska Shadmi) of June 8, Dayan was the most vehement fought in the breakthrough stage in opponent of an attack on ).24 Sharon’s sector with a brilliant incursion movement in Wadi Hareidin and should “PRESENTATION OF PLANS” TO logically have been under Sharon’s THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND command.25 MINISTER OF DEFENSE This was not the first time that operational plans had been presented to the That evening, the Southern Command’s civilian echelon but unlike Eshkol, plans were presented to the chief of staff, Dayan—as former chief of staff and the and a discussion was held with the man who had waged warfare in Sinai only a participation of the deputy chief of staff; decade previously—had something to say chief of intelligence; CO Southern about the planned moves and objectives. Command; and southern divisional The General Staff therefore was now facing commanders (85th Division), a new situation in which it needed to Sharon (38th Division), and Yoffe (31st persuade a minister of defense with Division). An hour later they were joined professional experience and background by the minister of defense, who also and to adapt the operational plans to his perused the plans, took an active part in the instructions. Until then, under Eshkol, the subsequent deliberations, and helped chiefs of staff had been “exempt” from all

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 11 Ami Gluska professional intervention, and the unnecessary effort for that purpose. Only government had never bothered to define the assistant chief of operations, Rehavam the objectives of the war. Its defensive tenet Zeevi, exceeded the purely operational and the ministers’ lack of military know- calculations and commented that “it would how (apart from Allon and Carmel), had be a pity to forfeit the headline: Gaza is left the General Staff devoid of strategic ours!”27 instruction and without definition of the Moshe Dayan was opposed to the objectives of the war. In its present plight, conquest of the Strip but not for military the government wanted only for the army to reasons. “The Gaza Strip issue is remove the threat. Beyond that, it devoted problematic because of the refugees,” he little serious thought to the tactics of said. He was afraid that the capture of the warfare and its possible outcome. Strip would force Israel to undertake the Moshe Dayan issued three basic burden of supporting the refugees, and he instructions for the General Staff stemming preferred to leave this to the UN Relief and from the political evaluation. It is Work Agency (UNRWA). Only in one noteworthy that they were not deliberated case, Dayan explained, would Israel be and decided by a government forum but obliged to occupy the Strip—if the originated in Dayan’s own personal Egyptians stationed foreign forces there. perception and were undoubtedly colored This would be a total violation of the by his experience as chief of staff and armistice agreements and an excellent inspired to some extent by Ben-Gurion. The rationale for Israeli action, but in this case issues were the Gaza Strip, the Canal, as well no action should be taken against and defining the minimal territorial gain the Strip in the first stage of the fighting, necessary. only later.28

The Gaza Strip The

The debate between the generals on the The Suez Canal was not defined as an need to conquer the Gaza Strip was based objective in the operative plans submitted entirely on military considerations. Tal by the Command, but reaching it was not feared that “if we do not deal with the Strip ruled out. Dayan now clarified this point: it will cause mayhem in our settlements.”26 “The Canal is not an objective. We must Gavish was concerned for the fate of the keep our distance from it after cleaning out settlements along the border with the Gaza the routes leading there. This is because of Strip, and Barlev insisted that the 60th its value to the entire world, with which we Brigade should be brought in for rapid must not enter into conflict.”29 When the action to capture the Strip—where two head of the operations department Palestinian brigades were deployed—within commented that “to sit beside the Canal two hours. Rabin, on the other hand, was could be a bargaining card for Sharm al- ready to forego the conquest of the Strip in Shaykh,” Dayan reiterated his opinion and order to focus the armored effort on the went on to explain: “A threat against the conquest of al-Arish and the destruction of Canal can only cause us harm. Those who the bulk of the Egyptian force. Ariel Sharon are capable of removing us from Sinai will thought that “the Strip will fall in any case,” not be the Egyptians [but the great powers] and that there was no need to invest and it is in their interest that we should not

12 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) Israel's Decision to Go to War, June 2, 1967 threaten the Canal. On the contrary, it Israel’s security policy, whose supreme aim would be a pretext for action against us.” had been deterrence and prevention of war. Dayan, therefore, was contemplating the Rabin considered himself responsible for post-war diplomatic campaign and this failure. However, while there may be estimated that Israeli presence on the banks some justification for blaming the military of the Suez Canal or near it would help to leadership for causing the crisis, intensify pressure on Israel to withdraw no fundamental defect can be perceived in from Sinai.30 the standpoint of the military during the crisis and in the pressure it brought imposed Defining the Minimal Territorial Gain on the government to launch a preemptive Necessary strike. The subjective sense of existential danger was authentic, and not unjustified. Dayan wanted to annihilate as many Nasser had crossed the “red lines” and Egyptian forces as possible, but he was posed an insupportable challenge to Israel’s highly aware of the limitations of deterrent capability, which was its main diplomatic time. He accepted the barrier against Arab hostile initiatives to assumption that within 72 hours, alter the status quo and carry out the international intervention would enforce a proclaimed intention of annihilating Israel. cease-fire and declared that in this period a The closing of Arab ranks around Nasser, minimal territorial gain should be the ecstatic bellicose atmosphere in the achieved—the conquest of northern Sinai as Arab world, and the gradual build-up of far as al-Arish—even if the blow against forces around Israel’s long borders the Egyptian armor was not complete.31 dramatized this danger and created The discussions in the General Staff that tremendous psychological pressure on night and the next day consolidated the Israel. The many expressions of sympathy final operative plan, which was code-named and support from world public opinion were “Nakhshonim.” It was based on Kardom no substitute for the absence of military 2—in other words, a main thrust along the guarantees on the part of the powers for northern axis to be executed by the 84th Israel’s security. The diplomatic efforts Division and the cream of the armored merely proved that it was impossible to forces but with an additional effort along place trust in external support. Under these the central axis, including a complex conditions, the decision to wait seemed breakthrough by the 38th Division and the disastrous, both because it granted the penetration of an armored brigade of the enemy respite for further troop build-ups, 31st Division to destroy the forward consolidation, and organization, and—and Egyptian deployment. Of the southern arm, this was the main point—because it left the which had been earmarked in Kardom 1 to enemy the initiative for striking the first the main thrust, there now remained only blow. The critical significance of the first one armored brigade, the 8th Brigade, facing blow under Israel’s geographic conditions Shazli’s force. at the time was self-evident. The balance of forces between Israel and the Arab states in CONCLUSION quantitative terms was considered potentially critical and liable to have a The slide into crisis and war in May- crucial effect on the course and outcome of June 1967 was due to the total failure of the war. The desire of the senior command

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 13 Ami Gluska to act first was, therefore, entirely justified. The war, in the final analysis, bore this out. Archive 192/74/1201. Compare to Eytan To conclude, one might note that the Haber, Ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama [Today military leadership, to a large extent, War will Break Out] (: Idanim, “entangled” the State of Israel (to quote 1988), pp. 204-12. Rabin) in escalation, which generated the 4 Reference was to the Jewish influence on crisis that culminated in an unpremeditated the administration. See Harry McPherson, war, a war which from the outset was “Ha-Bayit Ha-Lavan, Yehudei Artzot Ha- unwanted and non-essential. Yet from the Brit u-Milkhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamin [The moment the crisis erupted and the threat White House, U.S. Jewry and the Six Day emerged, the military’s advocacy of War], Shisha Yamim, Shloshim Shana [Six offensive initiative was correct. During the Years, Six Days] (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, war itself, the IDF, as is well-known, 1999), pp. 137-42. carried out its mission in the best possible 5 In practice this was an indirect admission fashion. that Israel should not wait more than a few days, even for economic reasons. *Ami Gluska is a lecturer of history and 6 There were, however, differences of political science at the Hebrew University opinion between Dayan and Allon. The and the Academic College, Israel. latter favored reaching the canal, He reached the rank of colonel in the Israel conquering the Gaza Strip, and transferring Defense Forces and was aide-de-camp, its refugees to Sinai. Dayan objected. See private secretary, speechwriter, and Moshe Dayan, Avnei Derekh [Milestones] spokesman to Israel’s fifth and sixth (Tel Aviv, Idanim, 1977), p. 422. presidents. He has also served in 7 See Efrat’s testimony about June 2, diplomatic capacities and was speechwriter 1967. to three prime ministers. He has held senior 8 For characterization of a political culture positions in the ministries of defense and as “mature,” where the level of military public security and was a member in intervention in politics is the lowest, see negotiating teams with the . Samuel Finer, Ha-Ish al Gav Ha-Sous [The Man on the Horse] (Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1982), pp. 24-182. 9 See Amos Perlmutter, The Military and NOTES Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 14. 1 Eshkol at a government meeting on June 10 Zeev Schiff, “1967—Ha-Matkal be-Einei 1, 1967. Ha-Memshala” [1967—The General Staff 2 The impact of their meeting with the in the Government’s Eyes], , June senior command on Friday was evident in 6, 1997. the remarks of the ministers at Sunday’s 11 Zerah Wahrhaftig, the minister for government session. Minutes of religious affairs in Eshkol’s government Government Meeting, June 4, 1967. and member of the ministerial committee 3 The content of the June 2, 1967 meeting on security, related that during a tour of the of the Ministerial Committee with the Gaza Strip border he conferred with General Staff forum as quoted below is representatives of settlements and the based on the minutes of the meeting, IDF deputy commanding officer of the 84th

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Division, . Offensive epithets 19 , Bereirat Shimshom were directed at the government “as if to [Samson’s Choice] (Tel Aviv: Yediot say: you are fools!.” Author’s interview Aharonot, 1992), p. 125. with Wahrhaftig, August 24, 1998. 20 Ariel Sharon’s testimony, IDF Archive 12 The economic recession and the 192/74/1038. A senior military deterioration in security in the second half correspondent heard from a certain general of 1966 and the first half of 1967 affected (apparently Sharon) that he thought it was the public mood and created an atmosphere possible to lock the ministers in another of depression throughout the country. Many room and carry out a clean coup. Zeev Israelis emigrated to Europe and America, Schif, “1967—The Senior Command in and a popular joke at the time was that “the Government Eyes,” Haaretz, June 6, 1967. last to leave is requested to switch off the 21 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the light at [later Ben-Gurion] airport.” State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 13 It was decided, as noted, that in order to Press, 1957), pp. 74-79. prevent slackening of tension, the release of 22 Dayan, Milestones, pp. 422-23. reserve units should be postponed, a 23 Another of Eshkol’s fears, which Dayan decision which was misinterpreted by the tried to assuage, was “beheadings” in the Prime Minister’s Office. Haber, Today War Ministry of Defense. See minutes of will Break Out, p. 193. meeting of ministers, June 1, 14 Shlomo Nakdimon, “Mered Ha-Alufim 1967. Eshkol Archive. Yisrael Lior 67” [“The Generals’ Revolt 67”], Yediot describes the situation differently. See Aharonot, September 15, 1985. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 145- 15 Shlomo Nakdimon, Towards the Zero- 85. Hour (Tel-Aviv: Ramdor, 1968), p. 184 24 Minutes of government meeting, June 8, 16 Remarks of Tal, Narkis, and Elazar at the 1967; Dayan, Milestones, pp. 474-75. stormy meeting with the prime minister on 25 IDF History Department, Supreme May 28, 1967. IDF History Department, Command Post A, p. 353. Supreme Command Post A, pp. 288-89; 26 Ibid. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 196- 27 Ibid. 97. 28 Ibid. See also Dayan, Milestones, p. 423. 17 In press interviews, Eshkol’s widow, 29 Ibid. Miriam Eshkol, used the word “putsch.” 30 The war did not proceed according to The members of the 1967 senior command Dayan’s instructions, and he himself reject her assertion and admit only that approved the seizing of strongholds beside there was a “sharp conflict” between them the Suez Canal in order to block the and the politicians, and no more. Egyptian escape routes from Sinai. Nakdimon, “The Generals’ Revolt 67.” Moreover, after the war, Dayan regretted 18 Weizman is quoted as follows: “I don’t not having ordered the IDF to hold on to the believe that a military coup could have west bank of the canal (and the east bank of taken place, but we were never closer.” See the Jordan). Dayan at a gathering to sum up J. Larteguy, The Walls of Israel (New York: the lessons of the war, February 28, 1968. Evans & Co, 1968), p. 75. IDF Archive 192/74/987. 31 Avraham Eilon’s notes of June 2, 1967, Archives of IDF History Department.

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