ISRAEL’S DECISION TO GO TO WAR, JUNE 2, 1967 Ami Gluska* This article is adapted slightly from Ami Gluska, The Decisive Meeting in Planning the 1967 War, (Taylor and Francis, 2006). It appears in the series on military and strategic issues edited by Barry Rubin. Reprinted with permission. To order this book, click here. This article discusses the deliberations of Israeli government and army officials in the days preceding the beginning of the Six Day War. It illustrates the conflict and divide between the political and military echelons and the army’s mistrust of the civilian leadership. While the IDF pushed for preemptive offensive action, feeling this was a military must given the circumstances, the government was hesitant. Such delays were viewed by the IDF as potentially disastrous. Israel’s security policy, whose supreme aim had been deterrence and prevention of war, thus failed, resulting in the crisis and war in May-June 1967. However, good military planning and preparation won the war itself. On Friday, June 2, 1967, at 9:25 a.m., the “that for the time being things are going to expanded Israeli Ministerial Committee on ease up.”1 However, by the end of the Security met with the Israeli General Staff encounter, the general feeling was that the forum in the Pit war room. The government die had been cast.2 Two days later, the had decided five days earlier to hold off on Israeli government voted by a large a military response to the crisis created by majority to go to war the following day. the withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai, the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT shipping, and the Egyptian military build- CONSTITUTE THE MAIN OBSTACLE up. The intention was to give the U.S. TO OUR ACTION leadership a chance to solve the crisis diplomatically. The second meeting of the The chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, week between the military and civilian opened the June 2 meeting and said that the echelons (after the stormy General Staff aim was: “To display the picture to the meeting with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol government as it appears to the IDF on May 28, 1967) also developed into a [(Israeli Defense Forces)].”3 The chief of confrontation between the two sides. What intelligence, General Aharon Yariv, read the generals had to say instantly dispelled out the main points of the evaluation drawn the celebratory mood of the ministers, who up by the Intelligence Research Department only the evening before had raised their on May 31, 1967. Then he analyzed the glasses to the establishment of a American stand on the basis of reports from government of national unity. the Israeli embassy in Washington and from They were now faced with the demand media sources. His conclusion was that the for an immediate decision to send Israel to United States had no intention of taking war. Before the meeting, the prime minister serious action to lift Egypt’s maritime appeared relaxed and told the ministers blockade of Israel’s port of Eilat by force, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 1 Ami Gluska and, in fact, there was an increasing the initiative, particularly where the Israeli American awareness that Israel must act Air Force (IAF) was concerned, would be alone. The Americans had no desire to critical for the outcome. Provided the become entangled in regional hostilities, decision was made on that same day and and many members of the American not postponed, Rabin declared, the IDF administration would consider Israeli action could still do the job on the Egyptian front, as a convenient solution to the problem. In even if forced to limit its actions and suffer the United States, unlike in France, Israel some damage on the Syrian and Jordanian could wield influence on the fronts. administration.4 The chief of intelligence In response to a question from Prime concluded, on the basis of “hints,” that if Minister Levi Eshkol, Rabin reiterated that Israel acted judiciously and speedily, the every additional day of inaction “impedes “United States will not constitute the main the implementation [of the IDF plan] and obstacle to our action.” makes it more costly.” The commanding Rabin described the situation in all its officer of Southern Command illustrated gravity. He distinguished between the this viewpoint by sketching three situations: problem of keeping open the Straits of the situation on the day the Egyptian Tiran, which allowed Eilat to function as a blockade was announced (“if we had taken port and whose significance lay in the effect the offensive on that day it would have been on Israel’s deterrent capability, and what he a picnic”); the situation “on the day it was saw as the main problem, “the military and decided [by the government on May 28] not political situation evolving around us, in to carry out the attack;” and the present which time is not on our side.” He spoke in situation. Still, General Yeshayahu Gavish, terms of a dynamic process of growing head of the Southern Command, explained, military forces on the Egyptian and “An attack tomorrow would have a Jordanian fronts and increased inter-Arab different significance to an attack in four cooperation. He anticipated the possibilities days time when the situation will be much of Egyptian attacks, terrorist action, more serious.” Yariv backed Gavish, noting renewal of the water diversion work, and that “Cairo is urgently cramming forces into even prevention of the passage of the Sinai…. There are cases where for 48 hours fortnightly convoy to Mount Scopus. “This the troops have neither food nor water forum, and I first of all, and I am convinced because the urgency and disorder are so that most of the officers as well, don’t want great. That’s not bad for us and again it’s a war for its own sake,” Rabin stressed, but, question of time.” he added, the noose was tightening around Rabin summed up this section of the Israel, the enemy had announced that their meeting: “Mr. Prime Minister, we have aim was the annihilation of Israel and time presented the matter to you. The question was on their side. The country’s leaders is, what does the Prime Minister want to could not afford to wait until the enemy had happen here at this forum?” Eshkol did not gained decisive superiority, which would reply, and an open discussion ensued in have placed Israel’s survival at grave risk. It which the senior command again voiced was crucial to act immediately and to inflict their demands unrelentingly and “a resounding blow” on Nasser, which imperatively. Minister of the Interior Moshe would completely transform the situation in Haim Shapira, in a desperate attempt to the Middle East. The implications of taking gain time, further exasperated the generals 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) Israel's Decision to Go to War, June 2, 1967 when he posed a question that seemed to total annihilation of the Egyptian forces.” rebut all their explanations: If in any case The gravest issue, as he perceived it, was the Egyptians had already concentrated the loss of Israel’s deterrent capability, almost all their army in Sinai, “what which was weakening day by day because difference can there be [if we launch an of “the hesitations and foot-dragging [of the attack] now, in a week or ten days?... On government].” He tried to persuade the the other hand, we are liable to lose the ministers, who were afraid that the number political campaign… if we act of casualties would be great, that due to the immediately.” situation’s gravity, “there is moral justification for the decision-making SHARON: “WHO IS MORE echelon to approve an operation which will QUALIFIED THAN WE TO TELL entail more losses.” Sharon objected in YOU THAT THE ARMY IS READY particular to Israeli dependence on the FOR WAR?!” superpowers. He said: Brigadier General Avraham Yoffe, the Any link-up on our part with other first speaker in the discussion, emphasized powers is a mistake of the first order. the need to take the initiative: Our aim is to make sure that in the coming ten or twenty years or I have been sitting in the Negev for 14 generation or two the Egyptians will not days with the units and the reserve want to fight us. Any link-up on our forces…. Our feeling there… is that we part with other powers or action against have failed to take the initiative all marginal objectives [that is, to be along the front…. We must snatch the content with attacking Egyptian initiative from the Egyptians. If we airfields, conquering the Gaza Strip, and obtain the initiative by diplomatic the like] instead of the central objective means well and good ... but all our of destroying the Egyptian army will initiative has taken is in the form of the prove that we are weak. That was the Foreign Minister’s trip to the United main damage caused by the Sinai States…. Campaign. We could have gone it alone. The fact that we linked up with Yoffe did not rule out the idea of others showed us up as helpless. confining action to an IAF attack without bringing any other forces into play. The Sharon emphasized that only a resolute main thing, he said, was “to do something, stand in defense of Israel’s rights, one of to exploit our initiative and to change this which was freedom of shipping, could situation where we can see the clouds guarantee the state’s long-term survival.