Sunyata, a Soteriology and an Instrument in Buddhist Thought Nagarjuna Stands As a Landmark

A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA *

1. Introductory remarks: sunyata, a soteriology and an instrument In Buddhist thought Nagarjuna stands as a landmark. His approach counterbalances the highly sophisticated analytical method of Buddhist scholasticism. For scholasticism, questions regarding human suffering were considered to find an adequate answer in a meticulous analysis of human existence into its various constituents. Soon these discrete constituents gained an autonomous status, each of them forming its own essence (or svabhava). The matter of man's salvation was suppressed by this speculation which found its criterion nowhere else than in its itself. It is commonly acknowledged that Nagarjuna's refutation of all essences underlying reality (or voidness, sunyata) precludes this form of pure speculation. What is said to be sunya and this characteristic itself, are not intended by Nagarjuna to enter into any debate about their metaphysical status. Instead, sunyata contains all elements of a genuine soteriology. Nagarjuna radically clears sunyata of all forms of speculation emanating from it or adhering onto it. Once freed from all speculative burden, salvation regains the space it deserves: as pure speculation on salvation tends to withdraw salvation from sight, a persuasive setting aside of speculative thinking fully restores sunyata's concern for all what relates to man's salvation. A close reading of Nagarjuna reveals how this soteriology takes shape through the subtleties of the text. Nagarjuna intentionally holds no thesis about man's salvation. For Nagarjuna Buddhist tradition had been prolific enough and did not need to be supplemented by his own opinion about man's salvation. Nagar- juna's soteriology therefore is an indirect one. What he discusses are categories which were developed in earlier attempts to systematize intuitive insights of Buddhism as preached by the historical Buddha. These were the categories of Buddhist scholasticism. From Nagarjuna's treatment of these categories, his soteriology can be reconstructed. One will search in vain for a clearly outlined soteriology in Nagarjuna therefore. Such attempts indeed have been undertaken, but these unavoidably have lead

* The Verbiest Foundation and its director Fr. J. Heyndrickx enabled me to finish this paper through a substantial grant. I hardly can express my indebtedness to prof. Winand M. Callewaert (Oriental Studies, University of Leuven). 80 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH to distorted images of Nagarjuna or seriously neglected his subtlety. Not sunyata itself is salvation, but the insights brought about by it are conducive to salvation. The way Nagarjuna applies sunyata to a category like form (rupa) for example, says more about man's salvation than any direct statement ever could have been able to. Through a certain open- ness with Nagarjuna's reader towards the subtle depth in his writings, Nagarjuna read in this way may sound all the more convincing. Ideas caught in an explicit theory (or as Nagarjuna would call it, a d®Ò†i), are less easily assimilated than the same ideas pervading the text throughout. In this paper I would like to concentrate on this aspect — the textual or material aspect — of Nagarjuna's soteriology. As for the formal aspect — what working-definition of soteriology can we devise that is precise enough to be relevant and yet abstract enough to encompass all facets of this soteriology called sunyata? I would suggest the following one. Crediting sunyata with soteriological value is justified inasmuch as it succeeds in restoring the relation between man's actual empirical existence and his authentic existence, or — in Buddhist terms — between saµsara and nirva∞a. No mention is made in such an understanding of soteriology of any stages to be left behind: this definition therefore may anticipate an improper use of terms like transcendence in connection with sunyata. Authentic existence does not fall beyond the scope of empirical existence nor does it simply coincide with it. What counts is the relation between both. The genius of Nagarjuna lies in his ability to focus on this relation, while at the same time avoiding to fix the status of one of both poles at the cost of the other. This relational understanding of soteriology can be applied to all Nagarjuna has to say about sunyata and it can be maintained throughout any questioning of it against its inalienable background of Buddhism as a way of salvation. Adequately considered, Nagarjuna stands the test of tradition: fundamental insights of the historical Buddha may and can be used as a criterion for evaluating Nagarjuna. The relation Nagarjuna has in mind seems to be one of identification. The term “identification” transcends identity (ekatva) as opposed to difference: salvation clearly cannot be situated directly in empirical human existence. Things are more complicated with Nagarjuna. “Identification” yet retains the idea of affinity implied in “identity”. “Identification” therefore seems to be the most suitable term for referring to this Nagar- junian relation between empirical and authentic existence. The Nagar- junian relation is twofold. First, from the viewpoint of empirical reality, A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 81 salvation is the attempt to confirm empirical existence in its own right. Such confirmation is achieved through sunyata's inherent aversion to any graded order of being. Inherent in the latter is that it reduces the relation of empirical existence to authentic existence to a mere question of inferiority-vs.-superiority. It is due to sunyata, that our present empirical existence is not inferior to some higher state. Secondly, as considered from authentic existence, sunyata correctly conceived can protect authentic existence for empirical reality. Conceptualizing belongs to the realm of empirical reality. Through sunyata it is neutralized in this conceptualizing function with regard to authentic existence. When characterizing Nagarjuna's ideas, preference should be given to methodology over philosophy. Nagarjuna is not a systematic thinker, but this does not contradict coherence of thought or plausibility of Nagar- juna's own specific logic. Sunyata, empti-ness is not one concept out of a variety of concepts and hence need not to be grounded in logically persuasive arguments nor simply refuted. Both justification and refutation are irrelevant to what can be said about sunyata. Resulting from the very nature of sunyata is the fact that it never can be an abstraction out of a particular characteristic sunya. Any monistic interpretation of sunyata as an absolutum1 therefore contradicts not only what is explicitly said by our texts, but primarily what they want to say. Elsewhere sunyata has been described in its transformative function2. The distinction between the descriptive and evocative/transformative nature of religious concepts, cannot fully capture the richness of Nagarjuna's sunyata. As I showed before, what man can expect from sunyata does not derive from any alleged nature of sunyata itself. Not some definition of sunyata as descriptive or evocative/transformative brings salvation. What does bring salvation is, not a redefinition of sunyata itself, but a redefinition by sunyata of other concepts (like nirva∞a). That sunyata can be used for this redefinition of religious concepts, may prove its religious nature and thus its treatment on equal terms with both functions of religious concepts, the descriptive function and the evocative/transformative function.

1 Implied in this interpretation is the concern to prevent sunyata (no view about reality) from turning into nihilism (no-reality view). See esp. T.R.V. MURTI, Saµv®ti and Paramartha in Madhyamika and Advaita Vedanta, in M. SPRUNG (ed.), The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta, Dordrecht 1973, 9-26. 2 S. KING, Concepts, Anti-concepts and Religious Experience, in Religious Studies 14 (1978) p. 445-458 [esp. p. 456]. Anti-concepts (like Otto's numinous or sunyata) have an evocative/transformative function, different from the usually descriptive function of nor- mal religious concepts. 82 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH

Two these two one therefore could add the instrumental function. Approaching sunyata as an instrument will prove to be most fruitful, even if only in an incipient stage as a mere working hypothesis.

2. Sunyata and nirva∞a There can be no doubt about the soteriological value of sunyata: one safely can assume that nirva∞a is fully dependent upon sunyata for its existence as a religious symbol. First, decisive for nirva∞a is whether or not sunyata is applied to this world. This does not imply a depreciation of saµsara, at the cost of which nirva∞a then spontaneously would dif- ferentiate itself as a subsequent state of otherness. Through Nagarjuna's Middle Stanzas3 (MulamadhyamakakarikaÌ [MMK]) leads the way to the insight that all attempts to catch saµsara in metaphysical categories are eventually vain and absurd. Though the conclusion may not be obvious a priori, a posteriori it appears as an evidence that only in this manner nirva∞a can be safeguarded. The matter had been raised by Buddhist scholasticism4: it appears that exactly in our way of conceiving saµsara nirva∞a turns out to be either relevant or redundant. Were saµsara thought to be finite, then nirva∞a would be degraded to no more than its evident outcome, for all sentient beings. Such conception of saµsara would discredit any effort whatsoever relating to nirva∞a. A rejection of quietism on speculative grounds? By no means, since the opposite extremity — an infinite saµsara — would transfer nirva∞a beyond the reach of the individual and so end in the fruitlessness of all religious practice. In a sense, nirva∞a here is still thought of as opposed to saµsara, as a goal that can be reached. That sunyata should apply to this dichotomy no more or less than any other dichotomy is totally justified. Yet it should be kept in mind that what is primordial here is a qualification of saµsara, a qualification in which nirva∞a per se is not involved. Secondly. Sunyata is a radical rejection of any notion of essence, svabhava. Without sunyata expectations regarding nirva∞a become illusory. This statement is not as unintelligible as it seems, provided one extends the reach of svabhava far beyond the concrete, clearly definable reality: in the MMK svabhava also concerns e.g. movement (in its second

3 Text and translation in D. KALUPAHANA, Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way, Albany 1986. 4 L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu, Bruxelles 1980, vol. 6, p. 266-267. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 83 chapter). Both empirical existence and authentic existence (nirva∞a) can be called states, mutually distinguishable yet not mutually exclusive. The svabhava that one would ascribe to empirical reality5, would imply its continuous subsistence at this actual moment and what chronologi- cally precedes and follows this moment. This rules out the possibility that empirical reality — a state which is, as such, not nirva∞a, their respective definition lies in what makes both specific — would show any change whatsoever in favour of nirva∞a. Forming a notion of the manner in which nirva∞a is realized thus would be impossible. What finally seems to be at stake then, would not only be some state of nirva∞a, but likewise the very conceivability of the proposition *nirva∞a is realized. Finally, through this perception of empirical reality as being devoid of essence the ultimate nature of nirva∞a is corroborated. Only then can ultimacy be reasonably associated with nirva∞a, when nirva∞a no longer is subject to chronological fixations. What remains is to recognize that nirva∞a always has been there and that the state from which nirva∞a formerly was assumed to be absent, in fact was no more than an illusion (see infra). Understanding saµsara or empirical reality (this state) in this sense, amounts to a total denial of any form of svabhava in it. And this is exactly what sunyata aims at. Another mechanism through which nirva∞a is safeguarded by means of sunyata is as follows. Nagarjuna's obstinate refusal to locate any form of svabhava in empirical reality seems to make it impossible for certain conventional designations ([sam]vyavahara) to assert themselves towards individual man and to lay claim on his behaviour. The threefold message of Buddhist salvation (buddha, doctrine and congregation)6 seems to lose its radically appealing character towards the individual person. Since we here touch upon the claims on truth of the Buddhist message of salvation in its core, another refined understanding is required of how something can prevail or — in the usual wording — how something can be truth (satya). This brings us to Nagarjuna's theory of twofold truth. An opponent in his Vigrahavyavartani [VV]7 objects against Nagarjuna that a statement declaring something sunya cannot be sunya itself, as

5 sarvam idam. The addition of idam, “this” to “sarvam”, “all” is significant (see e.g. MMK 24,1). 6 See KALUPAHANA (p. 330) for an elaboration of these conventional designations. 7 Sanskrit text edited by E.H. JOHNSTON and A. KUNST in Mélanges Chinois et Boud- dhiques 9 (1948-1951), p. 108-151. Reprinted with translation in K. BHATTACARYA, The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna, Delhi 19903. 84 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH long as this statement pretends to be a valid judgement regarding what through it is referred to8. These questions need not to be asked9, according to Nagarjuna. In no way does one deny any claim on truth, on the condition that the validity of the statement that something is sunya is assumed to be valid merely by way of convention. Without much sense of nuance, one could call this conventional truth, as if Nagarjuna had a plurality of truths in mind10.“Ma sabda vad” (Don't make a sound!) is used by both sides in the VV as an analogy for the statement that all is sunya. Nagarjuna's opponents, advocating a monolithic notion of truth, assume that the non-being of one or more sounds, resulting from the command, can only be the consequence of the existence (sat) of this one sound which is the command. Nagarjuna's opponents thus ignore the universal principle that all arises in causal connexion (pratityasamutpada), a principle which finally is but an expression of how sunyata is functioning: absence of svabhava due to a mere existence-in-interdepen- dency. This principle denies the command any character of real existence. Our command (or all is sunya) however, has a validity which can be held to be self-evident within a certain range allotted to it. This leads Nagarjuna to his notion of “conventional truth”. What then in Nagarjuna enables nirva∞a to put itself forward in its very own manner? For Nagarjuna nirva∞a by nature is ultimate. Taken as representing truth, nirva∞a is ultimate11. But from here onwards the ways part. Nagarjuna's principle of twofold truth is unique as it enables to abolish all clashes between divergent claims on truth. The ultimate character of nirva∞a does not detract from the truth assumed to be embodied in the conventional designations. This same nirva∞a is not less ultimate even though sunyata extends it reach, including over nirva∞a, granted that in nirva∞a a different side of truth is involved. Because sunyata is applied to these conventional designations, thereby granting them a status of truth by way of convention, could Nagarjuna maintain that “ultimate truth” is rooted in the conventional designations 12. What Nagarjuna seems to

8 VV 3 (i.e. in the objections). 9 VV 28 (i.e. in the refutations). 10 e.g. F. STRENG, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville 1967): “Two kinds of Truth” (p. 39). Nevertheless, Streng recognises that what is involved are mainly two ways of knowing, not two distinct objects of this knowing. 11 MMK 24.10b/VV 28: Paramartham anagamya nirva∞aµ nadhigamyate. 12 MMK24.10a/VV 28: Vyavaharam anasritya paramartho na desyate. Kalupahana's interpretation, p. 334-335. Streng's translation practical behaviour for vyavaharam is quite plausible. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 85 offer is a perfect symbiosis between nirva∞a and the conventional designations, designations which after all are no more or less than the beacons on the Buddhist path of salvation.

3. On the alleged identity of saµsara and nirva∞a Sunyata does not allow a mystical fusion of nirva∞a and saµsara. This would be a popular over-simplification, plainly contradicted even by the MMK's very patterns of reasoning. The essentialistic tendencies in Indian thought which Nagarjuna had in view with his sunyata roughly developed along two lines. One extreme position held that metaphysical problems best could be lead by the question of unity in being (sarupya). Elsewhere — and in opposition to this — it was assumed that only difference (viseÒa∞a) allowed metaphysical statements. Through the entire MMK sunyata is applied under the form of this couple sarupya/ viseÒa∞a, identity/difference. That nirva∞a or saµsara are devoid of difference (viseÒa∞ena sunyam), therefore does not imply the fading of the boundary they share, a mutual merging of one in another. Such a view suggests identity sarupya. Even if it would be possible to make metaphysical statements on the relation between two distinct entities, from more concrete examples it appears that identity should be excluded. The first chapter of the MMK is such a case that can be regarded as pro- totypical for the relation between saµsara and nirva∞a: the case of causality13. A closer look at the relation between what usually is called “cause” and “fruit”, shows that this relation never can be one of identity. Any assumed coincidence of a metaphysical entity “cause” and “fruit” is plainly contradicted by the ad infinitum and thus self-abolishing process which would proceed from it: once the “fruit” arisen it immediately would coincide with the cause of a next “fruit”14. Identity thus is to be discarded on logical grounds, also when further on the MMK explicitly raises the topic of nirva∞a and saµsara. This identity, so eagerly sought by the reader of Nagarjuna, has much to do with the preformed conceptions of his translators. Nagarjuna's a fortiori idea that nirva∞a resp. saµsara can be attributed no limit other than — if any at all! — the one they would have in common with the other of both15,

13 pratyaya-parikÒa (Investigation of Conditions). 14 According to Buddhapalita, P. WILLIAMS, Mahayana Buddhism: the Doctrinal Foundations, London 1989, p. 65-66. 15 MMK 25.20a: Nirva∞asya ca ya ko†iÌ ko†iÌ saµsara∞asya ca […]. 86 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH has lead to smoothly to the conviction that both then cannot but be merely identical16. What is more of a concern to Nagarjuna however, is that any form of speculation would slide between both. Nagarjuna is cautious not to leave the slightest space for that, so that even the need for an explicit refutation of speculative thought becomes less acute. Much as it may be beneficial to religious practice or plausible in its presentation, Nagarjuna obstinately opposes all. The intention behind this is clear. Nirva∞a can only benefit by a resolute affirmation that it does not derive any value whatsoever from the extent to which it can be caught in metaphysical categories. The latter easily can be avoided by considering sunyata as an instrument or in its evocative/performative function. Both functions ascribed to sunyata — unlike description — rule out any further possibility of reification17. One useful indication of the manner in which sunyata relates nirva∞a to saµsara is offered by Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Sunyata (suny- atasaptati [SS])18. Nirva∞a here unmistakably is presented as the expression of a changed view of empirical reality. In the text nirva∞a indeed appears in juxtaposition to all things in their most comprehensive total- ity, thought with our having disposed of their substance, or conditioned or not. The self-commentary svav®tti on the Seventy Stanzas however explicitly can be adduced against a misapprehension of this wording as formerly rejected (i.e. as a mystical identity). In the self-commentary the discontinuity between the empirical world and nirva∞a is bridged by the mediating category of santi (Tib. zhi), “appeasement”19. This emen- dation seems to be not unimportant, since it offers the advantage of allowing nirva∞a and sunyata to be thought of in a meaningful whole. It therefore may be useful to understand nirva∞a in Nagarjuna from this perspective. Moreover, whenever nirva∞a will be raised for discussion elsewhere in Nagarjuna, this will appear to be the most adequate manner in which nirva∞a can be viable as a symbol in religious practice. Santi has the advantage of supplying religious practice with contents, which seems to be more of a problem for nirva∞a. Santi succeeds in letting

16 MMK 25.20b: “[…] There is not the slightest difference between these two”. Trans- lation by F. Streng, p. 216. 17 On the distinction between both functions of religious concepts S. King, a.c. 18 Critical edition (Tibetan) and translation in F. TOLA & C. DRAGONETTI, Sunyata- saptati, in Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1987) p. 1-55 or ID., On Voidness, A Study on Buddhist Nihilism, Delhi 1995, p. 53-99. 19 SS 63: Gang brten gang skyes de de las//skyes de de med mi ‘byung ngo//dngos dang dngos med ‘dus byas dang//'dus ma byas shing (or: zhi) mya ngan ‘das. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 87 room for active striving in actual religious practice without detracting from the performance of sunyata. This is obvious from the Seventy Stan- zas20. Santi here mainly appears as a highly personal matter21. That it appeals to individual man also can be derived from the fact that santi originates as the reverse of faithful acceptance of an imposed doctrine (chos-bstan). The MMK finally removes all doubts22. As a state of santi, nirva∞a no longer is the preaching of any buddha. Moreover, analogous to what is made by sunyata of nirva∞a as a religious “goal” (see supra), sunyata likewise extends its performance over nirva∞a as taken in its being preached. All that is teaching relating to nirva∞a — included that of the historical buddha — refuses to get caught in a co-ordinates couple of location and “convert”. This shows how sunyata situates nirva∞a there where it rightly belongs: in man's own empirical situation. In the Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning23 (YuktiÒaÒ†ikakarikaÌ [YS]) these ideas are further elaborated. Man is thrown on his own resources. This is a fair conclusion from Nagarjuna's idea that nirva∞a can be brought about by the very manner in which one conceives saµsara. In order to prevent both from becoming identical, what should be realized is that a correct conception of saµsara presupposes sunyata. But simultaneously, in the latter the relation of saµsara to nirva∞a is given. None of both can put itself forward over the other as a superior state, as none of both can be conclusively proven to enjoy an existence independently of the other (or possess a svabhava). The correct conception of saµsara from the Nagarjunian point of view, thus only can be assessed from the form of saµsara's relation to nirva∞a. Or put another way, the correctness of our conception appears to be the quality of a relation. In order to make sense, varying degrees of quality however imply a certain autonomy for

20 SS 72: Dad ldan yang dag tshol lhur len//chos bstan gang la'ang mi brten gang//sgrub ‘dir rigs pas rjes nyer te //dngos dang dngos med spangs zhi. 21 It therefore is clear that the common translation of dad/sraddha as simply faith is not entirely adequate (see e.g. DRAGONETTI & TOLA (1995), p. 81). 22 MMK 25.24: SarvopalambopasamaÌ prapañcopasamaÌ sivaÌ; na kvacit kasyacit kascid dharmo buddhena desyate. Also see Nagarjuna's Catustava [CS] in F. TOLA & DRAGONETTI, On Voidness: A Study on Buddhist Nihilism, Delhi 1995 (See Niraupamyas- tavaÌ, 7). 23 Sanskrit and transl. in F. TOLA & C. DRAGONETTI, The YuktiÒaÒtikakarika of Nagar- juna, in Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 6 (1983), p. 94-123. ID., On Voidness: A Study on Buddhist Nihilism, Delhi 1995, p. 19-51. Integrated into the translation of Candrakirti's commentary by SCHERRER-SCHAUB in Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 25. Esp. YS 6: Srid-pa dang ni mya-ngan-'das//gnyis-po ‘di ni yod ma-yin// srid-pa yongs-su shes-pa-nyid//mya-ngan-'das shes-bar brjod. 88 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH the members of the relation. This suffices to make the thesis of identity an irrelevant one. In addition, since Nagarjuna solely refers to a-metaphysical categories when discussing saµsara and nirva∞a, thinking about both in terms of identity as a consequence seems to become one of the metaphysical opinions (the d®Ò†ayaÌ). The final stanza of the MMK cat- egorically opposes these opinions to the basic inspirations of Buddhism as expressed in an exemplary manner by the historical buddha. Sunyata is soteriology for it spontaneously embraces the relation of saµsara and nirva∞a, performing as what nowadays would be called a criticism of ideology. Still with regard to this issue of identity, special attention should be drawn to the danger of an exceedingly process-oriented approach to sunyata. “All things are sunyata or empty”24 betrays a serious misun- derstanding regarding the specific function of sunyata. From the earliest canonical traces of Nagarjuna's thought25 all things is understood to be all this: to what is directly given sunyata can be applied, beyond that sunyata does not serve any purpose whatsoever. In process-thought the particular thing is subsumed under the notion of creativity. In a Nagar- junian context the false impression thus might be given of sunyata as a standard existing apart from concrete things and with which these things need to be conformed26.

4. On suffering (duÌkha) 4.1. A simple identity of saµsara and nirva∞a does injustice to empirical reality and implies a reduction of nirva∞a to a rejection of empirical reality (exemplified in rupa/gzugs). In Nagarjuna rupa or form links authentic existence (nirva∞a) and suffering (duÌkha). In the investigation Nagarjuna executes on it, form stands for the whole of the five constituents that form the present individual (the five skandhas). As form is brought into discussion in the MMK (esp. in its fourth chapter), no conclusions can be drawn transcending the status of form in se. Buddhist

24 R. TAKEDA & J. COBB, MoÒa Dharma and Prehension: A Comparison of Nagar- juna and Whitehead, in D. GRIFFIN (ed.), Proceedings AAR Annual meeting, Nov. 8-11, 1973: Philosophy of Religion and Theology, p. 179-192 (esp. p. 184). 25 See L. GOMEZ, Proto-Madhyamika in the Pali Canon, in Philosophy East and West 26 (1976), p. 137-165. 26 J. STAMBAUGH, Emptiness and the Identity of Saµsara and Nirva∞a, in Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2 (1984), p. 51-64, p. 15-16: “[…] Selfless identity made possible through identity with emptiness.” A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 89 scholasticism had been deeply concerned with classifications of form. Inasmuch as these classifications had a hierarchical character, there was an imminent danger that they would touch upon the issue of a first and unchangeable cause. Sunyata (in the MMK) spontaneously neutralizes all speculative quests for a first cause. For such cause only then can be primordial, when it is thought to have an autonomous svabhava, but this at once contradicts its existence as a cause, including its existence as a first cause. What is called cause is merely a function of what is identified as consequence27. In a sense this may illustrate the soteriology of sunyata28, but Nagarjuna is more subtle than this. In this connection, the Heart Sutra (Prajñaparamitah®daya) succinctly indicates the course Nagar- juna's elaboration of his soteriology will take. Form is sunyata and vice versa. Both are not different29. That both share their semantic reach however does not mean that either of both no longer can be distinguished from the other. The bold assertion that sets the tone for what will follow in the Heart Sutra, is provoked by sunyata as it is understood outside the own tradition of Mahayana. In a superficial reception of Buddhist doctrine (“amongst sravakas”) sunyata is opposed to form. For sravakas nirva∞a is a static, solitary state. It annihilates form and would entail an autonomous status for sunyata30.Nagarjuna and the Heart Sutra share an equal concern regarding the hypostatisation of sunyata, but it is not herein that the full richness of Nagarjuna's sunyata is contained. Any represen- tation of the relation between form and sunyata which makes the former dissolve into the latter, closes an important pathway in Nagarjuna's thought31. As a sravaka has attained freedom from all bondage to form, he likewise has withdrawn from the constant need of identifying the object of his former attachment as such. Including in what it brings about in man. Man gets attached to form, not as a deliberate act due to his evil intentions, but by projecting ethical categories or categories of

27 MMK 4.3: Rupe∞a tu vinirmuktaµ yadi syad rupakara∞aµ//akaryakaµ kara∞aµ syat nasti akaryaµ ca kara∞aµ. 28 CHENG HSÜEH-LI, Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources, New York 1984: “This conviction [=agnosticism] is a religious remedy for the unenlightened” (p. 95). 29 Rupaµ sunyata sunyataiva rupaµ; rupan na p®thak sunyata, sunyataya na p®thag rupam. 30 This can be seen from e.g. Prasastrasena's commentary on the Heart Sutra. See D. LOPEZ, The Heart Sutra Explained: Indian and Tibetan Commentaries, New York 1988, p. 57-93 (esp. p. 66). 31 This is shown in YS 55-56. 90 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH enjoyment onto it. What brings nirva∞a therefore never can be an indif- ferent disattachment, but a continuous awareness of how this process is intimately connected with a certain perception of reality and thus is denied its claims of being itself reality. This brings us to the problem of suffering (duÌkha) in Buddhism. 4.2. If thought of too rigidly, sunyata finds itself in an ambivalent position when facing the problem of suffering. Generally, suffering is taken to endure as long as man remains in the illusion that his existence and all psychological characteristics associated with it, enjoy absolute status. Good and evil, joy (sukha) and sorrow (duÌkha) form a dichotomy which can define the suffering occurring to man solely as the frustration he experiences, when parallel with his longing and unsatis- fied striving for it, joy takes an independent nature (svabhava). In the SS the arising of this suffering is made explicit. As is the case with joy, it has no other ground than an object seen in dreams. Sketched in its origin and nature, this suffering (and joy) moreover seem to be most appropriate as an analogy for the imaginary nature of all that arises in causal connexion32. This may suggest a first problem: will this meet the — to an extent — very tangible appearance of suffering? Is it not rather the case that Sunyata a priori is prevented from functioning to the full as an instrument? Sunyata seems to be minimalizing or overlooking a problem to which it ought to provide an answer. In other words, does Nagar- juna take man's situation sufficiently serious? Man's suffering is the fruit of his ignorance (avidya). A notion of ignorance, which understands this ignorance as a mere “absence” of insight, does not fully acknowledge man's empirical situation. Elsewhere it has been contended that the ignorance (avidya) in this connection, should not be understood in a negative sense, but enjoys a certain right of existence by convention33. This already may grant some space to the very real nature man experiences in suffering. After the MMK the imbalance in it became clear: though never explicitly affirmed nor denied by the MMK, the latter seems more to apply to suffering as it appears in empirical reality34. Suffering

32 SS 14: Rmi-lam yul brten bde-sdug dang//yul de ‘ang med ltar brten nas gang//- 'byung-ba de yang de bzhin med//brten nas gang yin de yang med. 33 B.K. MATILAL, Ignorance or Misconception: on avidya in Buddhism, in S. BALA- SOORIYA (ed.), Buddhist Studies in Honour of W. Rahula, London 1980, p. 154-164. 34 S. ANACKER, The Meditational Therapy of the MadhyantavibhagabhaÒya,in M. KIYOTA (ed.), Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, Honolulu 1978, p. 84. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 91 is no more or less than any other state of existence a mirage, a dream or a city of gandharvas35.Nagarjuna's continuous anxiety to keep man's existence clear from vain speculation, easily can be understood as a nihilistic or agnostic conception of this same existence. The Madhyan- tavibhaga, which finds its raison d'être in this latent danger36, does not deny its deceptive character but resolutely opens with the thesis that something must exist which constructs conditioned existence37. The clarity of Vasubandhu's statement however does not detract from the functioning of sunyata aimed at by Nagarjuna. It reinforces sunyata. To Nagarjuna's non-substantialism it can add38 the empirical certainty that all man puts before himself, is not isolated from his consciousness cre- ating these objects. What produces suffering appears to man as if it were real, we said. At the same time it appears as something external to him, caused to him by other individuals. The point here will be whether or not the other can cause suffering to me. How through this moral categories could evolve, is irrelevant when Nagarjuna takes up the matter at a much more fundamental level, the nature of the acts which are at the basis of this suffering. And due to the very nature of these acts, thinking of an other person actuating the mechanism of suffering, turns out to be fallacious. Ascribing an independent nature to suffering, eventually transfers it beyond the continuous stream of human existence and would isolate it from its agent. This may explain why the Abhidharmakosa39 indirectly exculpates Devadatta. Blaming Devadatta for his heresy towards the historical buddha, even though resulting in an attempt at homicide40, would be equally heterodox. One may arrive at this conclusion on the basis of an assumed causal relation between act and agent, and thus implicitly acknowledge a certain degree of autonomy (svatantra) of an

35 MMK 7.34, YS 27, CS (LokatitastavaÌ) 3. (CS: F. TOLA & C. DRAGONETTI, Nagar- juna's Catustava [Four Hymns], in Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985), p. 1-54, or ID., On Voidness: A Study on Buddhist Nihilism, Delhi 1995, p. 101-133). 36 T. STCHERBATSKY, Madhyantavibhanga, Discourse on Discrimination Between Middles and Extremes (Bibliotheca Buddhica 30), St. Petersburg 1936, p. 16. 37 Abhutaparikalpa asti […]: “False ideation exists, […]”. 38 […] dvayam na vidyate: “[…] duality does not exist in it.” The Sanskrit has not nasti (“is not”) but na vidyate (“is not seen”), which in the MMK applies to the presence or absence of a referent of the statement. See G. BUGAULT, Nagarjuna, in Les Etudes Philosophiques (1983), p. 385-401. 39 L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Abhidharmakosa, vol. 6, p. 292-293. 40 For the sources of the Devadatta tradition: E. LAMOTTE, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, Louvain-la-Neuve 1976, p. 728-729. 92 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH agent (karaka) relating to his act (karma)41. Such a view may prove to be useful as an analysis of phenomena as they appear at first sight 42, but it is a straight negation of the basic insight of Buddhism, pratityasamutpada or origination in causal connexion43. The importance of this insight for a correct understanding of sunyata can be seen from the VV. Roughly, one could say that moral categories as good and evil cannot claim to be absolute, given their lack of an independent nature. But this assertion sounds too negative to be convincing. Rephrased in the light of origination in causal connexion, all further speculation about the metaphysical status of good and evil is cancelled out. Assuming of something that it possesses its (alleged!) autonomous good or evil nature (svabhava) never out of itself but always in causal connexion with something else, makes this autonomous metaphysical inconceivable. An autonomous metaphysical status thus always carries heteronomy and therefore is self-abolishing44. 4.3. That sunyata is applied to suffering, finally does not detract from the paradigmatical function of suffering in Buddhism. The qualification of reality as suffering, moreover is prior to any further clarification of the relation between man and his acts: any statement on this relation only then can be acceptable, when it allows to characterize human existence in this sense — as suffering. This again is taken up by Nagarjuna for further reflection45. Unless sunyata plays its assigned role, denying the acts (las) of man their own svabhava, can we reasonably think of suffering. Buddhism commonly accepts that the human body (lus) is constituted in these same acts. As soon as these acts are substantialized, the human body no longer can be understood as fundamentally duÌkha, suffering. Suffering in Buddhism is all but a static process, but it appears in such a way whenever man attributes a svabhava to his acts. What can be concluded from this as to the soteriological value of sunyata, seems to be this. Notwithstanding the infinite radius of action of sunyata,

41 karaka/karma terminology according to MMK 8.1. 42 “svatantraÌ karta” iti kart®lakÒanamacakÒate lakÒanikaÌ () (SWAMI DWARIKADAS SASTRI [ed.] Abhidharmakosa, Vara∞asi 1987, p. 1227 & Taisho Tripi†aka, T. 1558, p. 158b28). 43 The members of this series are enumerated in the Abhidharmakosa, with their contents (a reminiscence producing a desire etc.) and in their proper order. 44 VV 53: Yadi ca pratitya kusalaµ svabhava utpadyate sa kusalanaµ//dharma∞aµ parabhavaÌ svabhava evaµ kathaµ bhavati? 45 SS 35: Gal-te las ni rang-bzhin ‘gyur//de las skyes lus rtag-par ‘gyur//sdug-bsngal rnam-smin-can mi ‘gyur//de phyir las kyang bdag tu ‘gyur? A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 93

Nagarjuna not only succeeds in maintaining, but even in firmly consoli- dating suffering in its status of truth (arya-satya). So far sunyata has not been carried to its utmost consequences yet. The paradigm of suffering again is affirmed in an other way. What has been said about the refutation of a svabhava in man's acts, does not imply any nihilism. This indeed is true for the whole of Nagarjuna's thought, yet it should be noted that Nagarjuna explicitly presents the reality of suffering and a nihilistic view on reality as a priori mutually exclusive. Suffering originates in that which precedes it. Albeit a mere anticipation46 (or rather postcipation), this which is preceding must be allowed some conventional existence. Only then could it be presented in a meaningful causal connection with the suffering, which in this causal chain evolves from it. Ín it all essence can and must be denied, but a certain existence on its own of this postcipated must be retained. Only then can suffering be maintained: pertaining to the definition of suffering itself, is that it is the fruit of acts (las). Treating the latter in a nihilistic way, consequently would make it logically less plausible for a fruit to be associated with them. Suffering then no longer can be given the place it deserves. The need felt by Nagarjuna to show how only through sunyata this can be done, is in itself the evidence that in Nagarjuna the paradigmatical function of suffering is, more than safeguarded, consolidated. Suffering hence is preserved on all levels where Nagarjuna develops sunyata, including where he prevents sunyata from turning itself into exclusive metaphysical views (d®Ò†ayaÌ). One important remark should be added to this. That Nagarjuna applies sunyata to suffering as well, only then makes sense, when suffering is assessed on its therapeutic instead of its descriptive value. The qualification of reality as suffering implies parallel with it a change in man's understanding of reality. Apart from this intended effect in man, this qualification would be sheer speculation. Ascribing realness to what originates in a complex causal connection, has been labelled suffering. Canonical sources allow us to call this same misconception ignorance (avidya)47. This (i.e. in the SS) leads to Nagarjuna's most positive expression of the way of salvation in his MMK, in its 26th chapter on the twelve-membered chain of causality (dvadasanga-parikÒa). Ignorance

46 See the Abhidharmakosa as quoted earlier in this paper. 47 SS 64: Rgyu dang rkyen las skyes dngos-rnams//yang-dag-par ni rtog pa gang//de ni ston-pas ma-rigs-gsungs//de las yan-lag-bcu-gnyis ‘byung. 94 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH here gives raise to a process, the chain, leading in its twelfth and last stage over the incessant cycle of birth and death48. Here suffering is present under its most direct form and here also sunyata can be estimated most directly in its therapeutic usefulness. The sketch of the chain in which birth and death are assigned their proper place, thereupon is retaken in negative terms. Birth and death — by the MMK explicitly equated with suffering49 — thus is eliminated in a chain beginning with the replacement of ignorance by a view on reality as it really is (i.e. sunya)50. In sum, the qualification of reality as suffering, through our innate longing for its opposite, spontaneously leads to the conditions necessary for its existence and thus finally to its elimination.

5. On the place of “noble conduct” Does Nagarjuna's insight that all is sunya endanger religious practice? This feeling must have been not less predominant with Nagarjuna's con- temporaries than it is with his modern reader. Meant by noble conduct is an awareness of moral responsibility. But what remains that can urge man in his practical conduct, when categories never can exist absolutely? Here again Nagarjuna takes a radical stance. Whoever pretends to be able to find an essence in goodness and to derive his practical behaviour from this essence, makes all religious practice impossible. I already mentioned the problem of Devadatta as to the relation to his acts. The Devadatta case should be handled with utmost caution. As presented by Buddhism itself, it is no rejection of man's responsibility. Moral responsibility relates to acts. A one-sided view on the relation between agent and act ascribes an autonomous status to both, but — as Nagarjuna rightly points out51 — one sees that, prior to any ethical reflection on it, man experiences a certain affinity with “his” acts. This subjective feeling52 cannot be simply ignored. Not only can it be experienced in human existence, it moreover underlies and directs man's moral responsibility. Disregarding this feeling of fear and falling into the extreme view of absolute separation between agent and act, would be delusion, doÒa, an erroneous view which is given a name by Nagarjuna: lack of noble conduct (brahmacarya).

48 MMK 26.8. 49 MMK 26.8b: […] jara-mara∞a-duÌkha […]. 50 SS 65: yang-dag mthong; MMK 18.9/26.10: tattva-darsana. 51 MMK 17.23. 52 Bhaya in Sanskrit. In a Nagarjunian context bhaya stands for more than a simple translation of bhaya as “fear” may suggest. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 95

The logic used here by Nagarjuna, derives from his conception of suffering (duÌkha). (a) Relating to oneself. Religious life (in narrow sense)53 can invoke only one justification for its existence: the four Noble Truths. This is because religious life aims at acquiring the same insight as the insight proclaimed by the historical buddha with force of truth: that all is suffering, that this suffering has an origin and therefore can be exterminated, and that for this purpose a method exists. Without this formula, all religious practice is vain. It is the case that suffering by definition is origination in causality, and thus sunya. However, from the formula it appears that the extermination of suffering (the third truth) presupposes a suffering which — as a matter of course — first must have been arisen (and thus again is sunya), in order to be eliminated in religious practice. One may conclude from this that sunyata is a prereq- uisite for all noble conduct54. (b) Relating to the other. Suffering does not escape Nagarjuna's tetralemma. Method and aim are similar to other places where Nagarjuna discusses other Buddhist concepts, but the conclusion to be drawn from it globally resembles what I just said. Nothing can arise from itself, this much is obvious55. Suffering does not make an exception to this rule, as suffering too has no independent nature. But if absolutely nothing possesses an independent nature, it would be absurd to state that something exists solely by virtue of the essence of something else56. Seen in the light of concretely acting individuals pudgalaÌ57, this implies that suffering never can be done to me. An individual that does not directly cause his own suffering, but does cause mine, transferring it to me, even cannot be logically conceived58. This shows that sunyata locates suffering right there where it belongs — in man's most empirical situation of life — and thus again relates it to the direct moral responsibility of individual man. That our actual existence no more or less than anything else is devoid of any independent substance has important ethical consequences. This lack of substance, or if positively defined, merely arisen in causal

53 According to VV 54 VV Nagarjuna's commentary on § 55. 55 MMK 1.1. 56 Nagarjuna here uses the terms svabhava-parabhava (e.g. MMK 15,3-4): self-existent thing vs. other-existent thing (Streng, passim), self-nature vs. other-nature (Kalupahana, passim), intrinsic vs. extrinsic nature (Bhattacarya). 57 The individual other than myself can and may be abstracted. 58 MMK 12.6: Para-pudgalajaµ duÌkhaµ yadi kaÌ para-pudgalaÌ//vina duÌkhena ya k®tva parasmai prahi∞oti tat. 96 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH connexion (pratityasamutpanna) finds its most radical expression in the presence of other existences. These existences surround my actual existence, determine it and in turn are determined by the way in which this existence becomes what generally is identified as my existence. All that can be said about rebirth in Buddhism should retain this caution in its wording. The tendency to hypostaze moral categories into essences of good and evil, is characteristic of a non-rebirth belief. It is important to keep this in mind. Interrelationality defines the way in which distinct existences are mutually related. This of course includes the way in which empirical persons here and now are related to each other (as Devadatta and the historical Buddha). On this level one may suffice with the common notion of good and evil: concrete behaviour as extrap- olated from an idea of goodness. But once the other existence cannot be thought of but in a hypothetical sense, such an ideal good and evil are untenable. In a karmic rebirth belief 59 “good” and “evil” no longer can be related to a recipient of my present actions which is fully external to them. Acts hence only can be good or evil by virtue of the act itself. Nagarjuna's moral categories thus spontaneously emerge as qualifica- tions of concrete empirical practice. The MMK integrally can be reread from this angle. The pair dharma-adharma then perhaps may be related as closely as possible to practice, as in its original meaning, carrying connotations of merit, prestation60. Nagarjuna's ideas are coherent, though they may appear to be contra- dictory at first sight. First, the non-evidence of the association of agent and act has been demonstrated. This non-evidence of both does not affect their existence or non-existence: Nagarjuna keeps the middle way between both. It thus seems to be only natural that — in a second step — what regulates the relation between an (empirical) agent and his act, dharma and a-dharma, shares in this same non-evidence. Their non- existence thereby is an irrelevancy, not less than their existence as an autonomous entity is. But questions then arise as to whether man can feel urged any longer by moral rules. From what do they derive their characteristic universalizability? And can Nagarjuna be taken serious any longer, when closing his VV with the statement that dharma- adharma originate precisely in a well-conceived sunyata? The key to the

59 Rebirth merely as a label for the definition given to it. 60 KALUPAHANA (p. 183-184) uses the translation good/bad, which may create con- fusion. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 97 entire problem is the insight that all arises in causal connexion (pratityasamutpanna)61. Only this insight enables to realize that good and evil (as provisional translation for dharma-adharma) can function only inasmuch as their nature is not preinscribed in an essence of it62. In this case the fruit of man's acts would possess an intrinsic quality. The quality of the acts aimed at in the course of these same acts, thereupon would lose its causal relation with its results and the quality of these same acts be given at the very outset (*svabhavena). For categories as dharma- adharma to be logically sound, what is needed therefore is — again — sunyata. A substantialist's attempts at locating a svabhava in man's acts are relevant insofar as in this way a prescriptive character is ascribed to these acts. This position is not totally inadequate considering the fact that man's prime concern when acting, tends to be the relation between the quality of what originates in his acts — in Buddhism nothing is sup- posed to be excluded from this (see 4.3.) — and his concrete acts. In the appreciation of it, an act ought to be measured as well against the fruits of which it is the cause. For Nagarjuna however, such a view is prone to lead into aberrations63, for in a second stage the substantialist view enables acts in forming a svabhava to be completely modelled after the fruits they bring forth. This is most manifest in matters which involve a so-called absolute evil. On this level substantialist thought deprives man of his ability to make autonomous moral choices and delivers him up to what authorities deem to be a favourable or bad fruit. This svabhava furthermore opens the way to fatalism and determinism. The other person in his actions towards myself then is forced to do evil: homicide in all cases is determined by fate, never a deliberate act. For a substantialist, the choice to act the way he is acting — or put in Nagarjurnian terms — to be cause (hetu) of a result (phala), never can be a an act of free will. First, incorporated beforehand in the svabhava of this act is the result of this same act. In addition, the acceptance of a svabhava in the act would isolate the latter from the individual person. First there is an act, followed by its completion. The agent is preceded by his action and hence by the result brought forth by it. On logical

61 VV 70 comm.: Yasya hi sunyata prabhavati tasya pratityasamutpadaÌ prabhavati. Sunyata and pratityasamutpada are equated explicitly in MMK 24.18. 62 MMK 24.33. 63 See e.g. MMK 24.28: Svabhavenadhigataµ yat phalam tat punaÌ kathaµ//sakyam samadhigantuµ syat svabhavam parig®h∞ataÌ. Also see MMK 1.6 (on causality). 98 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH grounds this is unacceptable. In a Nagarjunian view, any description of an act in terms of its consequence, even before the action has been per- formed, is unacceptable. And the more Nagarjuna makes sunyata react- ing against this, the more clearly it appears that what occurs to man never happens by virtue of what the svabhava of the reality surrounding him commands this same reality to produce in a purely mechanistic way. This shows how in Nagarjuna's presentation of it, sunyata in its relation to man's acts, not only is morally directing these acts, but how in addition all these acts are fundamentally rooted in sunyata. It has been shown how through sunyata other existences no longer are determined in a positive or a negative sense by our existence here and now. That an individual other than myself would inflict suffering upon me, appeared to be untenable, but at the same time only sunyata accounts for the moral appeal issuing from the mere presence of the other. The argument adduced by Nagarjuna is as convincing as it is simple. Man evidently is not a divine being and hence mortal. Man's actual existence however becomes that of an immortal when thought of as in isolation from its surrounding existences. One extreme point of view postulating an I in this existence and an I in a preceding or a later existence, may not be substituted by its counterpart advocating an irrecon- cilable difference. This would grant actual existence a permanent character and exalt man to immortality. Precisely on this middle way of Nagarjuna the moral appeal is situated. The existences — of “myself” and “others” — which can be (a) distinguished (b) yet not opposed, force individual man's actions here and now in a certain direction. The middle way thereby leads over the twofold requirement that my own actions (especially when evil) in its inescapable results come to stand in a causal relation with, preferably (ad a) the actual existence of myself (ad b) rather than with those of other persons here and now (which somehow do share in the results of my acts, cf. b)64. Moral responsibility towards other persons thus seems to require a limited degree of both (ad b) identity (sarupya) as well as (ad a) difference (viseÒa∞a). Both are provided by sunyata, for only sunyata allows to think both as not mutually exclusive.

64 MMK 27.11: […] Gzhan gyis byas-pa'i las-rnams ni//gzhan gyis so-sor myong-ba […] (Skt. version lost, reconstructed in Mulamadhyamakakarikas [ed. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN], p. 580). Different interpretation in Kalupahana, p. 382-383. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 99

6. Private dimensions 6.1. What so far has been said about religious practice, remains merely a priori. To this the private longing for salvation should be added. Questions then can be asked as to which extent Nagarjuna's conception of sunyata leaves room within religious practice for the eschato- logical dimension. Or, how can individual man in his way of viewing a coming existence (a rebirth) find benefit in sunyata? It seems that a well-conceived sunyata has some important repercussions on the notion of rebirth. From sunyata however no conclusions can be drawn relating to rebirth a such. Premature conclusions in this sense65 claim that no place can be assigned to rebirth as an activity taking place after this existence. In the middle way Buddhism steers in its metaphysical attitude towards reality, no room is left for the continuation of a former in a following existence. The doctrine of the Middle Way roughly does not disapprove of the radicality of these ideas, but if so it would discard the entire tradition preceding it. The concern for orthodoxy aligns Nagarjuna with the tradition (MMK 27.30) and at the same time makes him enter into debate with this same tradition. It therefore would be incorrect to read Nagarjuna as a criticism of this false concept of rebirth, as we would put it in the mouth of his adversary in the MMK, Buddhist scholasticism. The performance of sunyata as a soteriological instrument has to be located elsewhere, it appears. Buddhist scholasticism itself already had been sufficiently aware of the problems entailed by the idea of rebirth. As appears from scholasticism, rebirth may not be reduced to a mechanistic event. Our existence here and now is not a mere function of the existence preceding it or following upon it. The Abhidharmakosa demonstrates that what in a a retributive way of thinking is identified as cause, only can be cause by way of anticipation66. My existence here and now is constituted by a complex whole of causes and conditions, from which it only in the second instance derives its status of cause of this or that retribution. 6.2. When in Nagarjuna the relation between a past and a future existence is treated, sunyata serves it soteriological purpose in a very specific way. The conclusions sunyata urges us to draw regarding the

65 E.g. K. INADA, Buddhist Naturalism and the Myth of Rebirth, in International Jour- nal for the Philosophy of Religion 1 (1970), p. 46-53. 66 DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Abhidharmakosa, vol. 6, p. 299 (the famous ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakosa, on the refutation of the belief in a personal entity pudgala). 100 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH probability of the preceding or following of one existence upon this actual existence, have a healing effect upon individual man. Nagarjuna first states that what conventionally is called I (ayam), cannot be simply equated with an existence preceding it67. Inherent in sunyata is that it offers a view on the radical interrelationality of all things and seeking an identity between both would annihilate this insight. Nagarjuna applies the same process when refuting the thesis holding a pure negation, in a nihilistic sense, of such an identity, but what Nagarjuna has in mind, is clear enough. When one state of existence turns out be untenable neither with nor without beginning or end, it becomes a mirage (sgyu-ma). Whether or not one can recognize this mirage as a mirage thus indirectly depends upon the extent to which one has sunyata operating. In other words, the illusion, or rather: the illusory, is able to protect individual man from desillusion. In the opposite sense, one may say that without sunyata this illusion creates a striving desire in man which thus unchains the mechanism of suffering. 6.3. Little can be found in Nagarjuna that can be directly related to institutionalized religious practice. On one occasion however, Nagarjuna seems to anticipate the matter of the significance of congregational life68. Some contradiction seems to exist between the way in which the bhikÒu acquires a high degree of authenticity or purity vis-à-vis his actual existence and the illusory character of it. If we want to avoid denying the bhikÒu's efforts any significant bearing upon his saµsara, then this decisive moment — to which terms as elimination69 etc. apply — seems to jeopardize the basic intuitions of Madhyamaka Buddhism. These intuitions set the bhikÒu's saµsara apart from the categorial (i.e. spatio-temporal). The paradox then roughly will be, how an end can be brought to something that never or nowhere has originated. The qualification itself which through sunyata is related to saµsara however, puts the bhikÒu's efforts in the only perspective from which it could derive right of existence. Nagarjuna does not offer plain answers, but this may cast some light on the paradox; tradition holds that nirva∞a lies in the

67 MMK 27.3b: […] yo hi janmaÒu purveÒu sa eva [=de-nyid] na bhavatyayam. 68 YS 13: Ngos-mongs zad-pa'i dge-slong gi//gal-te ‘khor-ba rnam-ldog na//ci-phyir rdzogs-sangs-rgyas-rnams kyis//de-yi rdzom-pa rnam-mi-bzhad? “If the saµsara of the monk, whose impurities have been destroyed, comes (really) to an end, why did the perfect buddhas deny its beginning?” (transl. TOLA & DRAGONETTI). 69 YS 13: 'dzad-pa. One should take care not to understand “institutionalized” in a clerical or ecclesiastical sense. What is meant here are individuals who as a group are distinct from others in that the religious goal they have in view, now is realized. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 101 disintegration of the temporary conglomerate of elements forming the phenomenon individual [YS9]. The bhikÒu's attitude towards this develops analogously with the way in which his metaphysics becomes a-metaphysics. The axiom of origination in causal connexion — as noted earlier — signifies that end and beginning lose their meaning, or — when still used — merely as antonyms within a same event70.In Nagarjuna, congregational life (as bhikÒu) seems to be spontaneously materializing. Previously elimination could be conceived in two ways: in secular life, as to be realized and as realized, in the case of the bhikÒu. In Nagarjuna this dichotomy loses its tension. One class of people can be called superior (dam-pa-rnams)71 without implicitly describing others as its negative pendant. The insight acquired by the former indeed is superior (yongs-su). But since this insight neutralizes ideas like beginning and end (yet does not contradict them), this superiority never can generate distinctions between individuals.

7. Moreover, sunyata a priori soteriological

7.1. The a priori soteriological nature of sunyata relates to its inherent preoccupation with the world and our activities in it. Ascribing a svabhava to nirva∞a for example, thus demarcating it from empirical reality, moreover appears to be a contradiction which only can be eliminated in favour of empirical reality. The more one attempts to derive the degree of realness of a particular “thing” from what makes this thing specific with regard to other things72, the more this same thing is withdrawn from causality. Now, when sunyata is entered into discussion by the substan- tialists, it will be clear that sunyata — once isolated from causes and conditions73 — no longer can be thought of as possessing a svabhava. Without the particular the universal cannot exist, since it is an abstraction of it, an abstraction which thereupon is represented in terms of an autonomous reality. In brief: no sunyata without sunya74. Just like sunyata can, and must, all other items of the MMK be examined.

70 YS 7: byung-ba bzhig-pa: origination-sive-destruction, beginning-sive-end. 71 YS 7[&8, for following]. 72 MMK 24.16a: Svabhavad yadi bhavanaµ sadbhavam anupasyasi. 73 MMK 24.16b: a-hetupratyayan. 74 I here rely upon Nagarjuna's stanza: “If you perceive the existence of the existents in terms of self-nature, you will also perceive these existents as non-causal conditions.” (Kalupahana, p. 339). 102 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH

What evidence can be found in Nagarjuna? Nagarjuna himself enti- tles us to relate his concern to affirm empirical reality in its intrinsic value, explicitly with the insights put forward by Buddhism regarding this empirical reality (and the religious practice evolving from it). This point is made clear only partially by Nagarjuna in his MMK and what is said about it, rather resembles a purely philosophical matter. As obstinate as the metaphysicists are in their attachment to an exclusive concept of sunyata, that convinced Nagarjuna is in his criticism. Whoever assumes that in statements about the being-sunya of something, something as well is said about the realness of it, handles sunyata improperly. Using a favourite simile: as a snake incautiously taken up. Discarding something as irrelevant because sunya, logically obliges to do the same with everything (sarva) which could be said to be sunya. These ideas of Nagarjuna would have been some among so many others, if they were not retaken that prominently at the end of his VV75. Since the VV wishes to be assessed primarily on its power of logical per- suasion and since it intentionally modifies the wording of the MMK, Nagarjuna seems to have more in mind than a simple refutation of sunyata understood in a Platonic sense, as formae76. “Things” are affirmed in their particularity by calling them no longer everything (sarva), but clearly delineated things (arthaÌ). The empirical again is affirmed in its particularity since the VV abstains from globally examining it in its conformity with the rules of logic. More precisely, Nagarjuna changes his terminology from √yuj in pra√bhu, from being logically acceptable into put itself forward. 7.2. Nagarjuna's conception of sunyata often has been denied its ability to function by representing it as a contradictio in terminis. One then objects to Nagarjuna, that the very statement denying the presence of an essence in something cannot be uttered without forming itself an essence77. Yet, Nagarjuna will succeed in averting this criticism, redi- recting it to those expressing it, and thus making sunyata emerge as a soteriological sine qua non. Nagarjuna launches his attack against the ignorant, who falsely holds that a thing in itself can be attributed realness. The ignorant is clinging to the existence of a Ding-an-sich. Such an extreme metaphysical position, cannot but create problems. The

75 VV 70. 76 Limited to this by KALUPAHANA (p. 337-338). 77 VV 1: SarveÒaµ bhavanaµ sarvatra na vidyate svabhavascet//tvadvacanamsvab- havam na nivartayituµ svabhavamalam. A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 103 negation of the Ding-an-sich after all is no more than a negative variant of it. Given in both cases is the Ding-an-sich. Even in the negative expression, the Ding-an-sich is. The negation of it is just a secondary operation which does not affect the svabhava of the Ding-an-sich. The negation of the Ding-an-sich in a substantialist way of thinking, makes the transition to authentic existence78 implausible and even for the substantialist inexplicable. For the reasons pointed out, the very same objection is valid as regards the recognition of the existence an-sich of (Dinge like) saµsara and nirva∞a. Sunyata enables us to transcend this dichotomy of existence and non-existence and therefore sunyata, and sunyata alone, leaves room for a notion of liberation.

8. Conclusion: soteriology of a-metaphysics 8.1. Finally, what can be said about the status of the articulation of the insights emanating from sunyata? A merely pragmatic view on a game of words with no further implications, does not seem appropriate. In Nagarjuna, statements of religious nature are safeguarded against an exclusively referential usage. Saying that nirva∞a is sunya, without substance and thus lacking an independent existence, is not tantamount to assuming that through the a priori nature of this characteristic (i.e. of being sunya) nirva∞a as well never could have been there or in other words, be irrelevant. This interpretation may proceed from a superficial reading of Nagarjuna and it perhaps explains the stress the VV puts on the crucial place of the articulation of these insights in reality. Sunyata here pre-eminently appears as a soteriological instrument. It only then functions, when appearing to us in our full self-awareness under the form of words79. Time and again it has to be expressed, for else sunyata would lose its meaning. This is all the more obvious from the observa- tion that between (a) the statement that something does not possess an essence and (b) the fact that it does not possess an essence, no corre- spondence of causality exists. Would the absence of essence be plausible only in and through a statement in this sense80, a fixed truth prior to this statement would be postulated. Nirva∞a then would be sunya a priori and ultimately could be thought of as in total isolation from any empirical

78 What commonly is called liberation (grol-ma). For this section, see esp. YS 3-4 (With DRAGONETTI's translation reconsidered and modified). 79 VV 64: ®te }pi vacanat prasiddhaÌ svabhavasyabhava iti tanna yuktam. 80 I.e. causality karoti. 104 P. VANHAELEMEERSCH religious practice81. But how then do these words or statements (=a) relate to the characterization of nirva∞a as sunya (=b)? Any statement denying nirva∞a its svabhava is a denial of a svabhava which needs to exists prior to its denial. What is said about nirva∞a by Nagarjuna, therefore does not pretend to say something about the nature of nirva∞a, but in the first place relates to oneself. Nagarjuna's persistence in propound- ing the absence of a svabhava in e.g. nirva∞a, does not proceed from the nature of nirva∞a itself, but from what his statements as to nirva∞a bring about with himself. They are not descriptive, but primarily intend to be inchoate insight82. Again this illustrates the soteriologically functional nature of sunyata: since it is clearly understood that the being-sunya of a svabhava is not constituted in and through the statement that it “is sunya”, the perspective and direction in which sunyata has to be conceived, is reverted and now starts where it makes sense: with man in his own empirical situation. 8.2. This leads us back to where we started our inquiry into the soteriological nature of sunyata. By now it has become clear that the last reproach that can be made to Nagarjuna's twofold truth is that it would be an artificial construction. On the contrary! Nagarjuna's ideas regarding the relation between statement and fact of the absence of svabhava, greatly facilitate our understanding of Nagarjuna's conventional truth. It once again seems to be affirmed in its own right. What in man's empirical situation can prevail as truth, leaves the outwardly antithetical conception of nirva∞a as ultimate truth, unaffected. What is firmly leading the Buddhist in his religious practice, the conventional designations ([sam]vyavahara), through sunyata has to be cleared of its svabhava. On the other hand, it belongs to the definition itself of nirva∞a to be merely sunya83. What then will remain of the Buddhist message of salvation, embodied in buddha, doctrine (dharma) and congregation (sangha), in the doctrine of retribution, briefly the so numerous conventional designations?84 Does nirva∞a

81 That Nagarjuna primarily is concerned with the path (marga) is obvious from e.g. MMK 8,6, where the decisive criterion for refuting a metaphysical statement is the redun- dancy of the path, produced by this statement. 82 VV commentary on §64: jñapayati. 83 Nirva∞a as a state of uninterrupted functioning of sunyata, as described higher (based on the alternative reading [see note 19] of SS 63, describing nirva∞a as the moment at which tensions are “pacified” (zhi) between positing and negating things an-sich, between what originates in causality and what does not). 84 On what belongs to these conventional designations, see before (§2). Cf. MMK 24.6 and Kalupahana (p. 330). A SOTERIOLOGY CALLED SUNYATA 105 signify that they are done away with for good? What is sunya by virtue of its definition (nirva∞a), seems to suppress that to which this qualification applies only a posteriori. Understood as intended by Nagarjuna however, this never can be the outcome of sunyata. Saying that in Nagarjuna salvific means again become means towards salvation, may sound little Nagarjunian. Such however, will be the final result.

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