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81 Advanced Pacific Theater of Operations-Book 2 80 81 Advanced Pacific Theater of Operations-Book 2 80 [ ix ] TABLE OF CONTENTS CREDITS [ i ] PART 4: AIR OPERATIONS [4.0] – [4.28] PREFACE [ ii ] TABLE OF CONTENTS [ ix ] TABLE OF CONTENTS [ iii ] PART 5: OFFENSIVE PHASE [5.0] – [5.22] FOREWORD [ iv ] PART 6: MOVEMENT PHASE [6.0] – [6.1] COUNTER SAMPLES [ v ] PART 7: SUPPLY AND REPLENISHMENT [7.0] – [7.17] INTRODUCTION [ vi ] PART 8: SEASONAL TURNS AND INCOME [8.0] – [8.13] GENERAL CONCEPTS [ vii ] PART 9: POLITICS AND PARTNERSHIPS [9.0] – [9.27] SEQUENCE OF PLAY [ viii ] PART 10: SPECIAL RULES [10.0] – [10.27] PART 1: WEATHER [1.0], [1.1], [1.3], [1.5] PART 11: OPTIONAL RULES [11.0] – [11.41] PART 2: STRATEGIC WARFARE [2.6], [2.22] APTO SUBJECT INDEX [ x ] PART 3: NAVAL OPERATIONS [3.0] Supplements PLAYER AIDS Rule Booklet #1 cover: The USS Rule Booklet #2 cover: The USS Franklin (CV-13) on fire after an Portland (CA-33) under repair in attack by a Japanese bomber, off Sydney, Australia (photograph is th of Japan (March 19 , 1945). The circa late-1942) after being hit by Franklin suffered very extensive a Japanese ship-launched torpedo damage, but did not sink. CV-13 near the stern. CA-33 was back in was towed back to Pearl Harbor. action in approximately 6 months. A Chance Vought F4U-1 Corsair on Majuro Atoll, photographed by Robert Tekulve sometime in 1944. Notice the 500 lb bomb slung underneath the fuselage; the Corsair operated quite extensively as a fighter-bomber...more than any other U.S. aircraft in the Pacific Theater (indeed, almost twice as many Corsairs were lost to Japanese anti-aircraft fire than to air combat). A comparison of the Corsair to the Fw-190 just after the war found both aircraft to be relatively equal performers: The Fw-190 demonstrated a superior climb rate at various altitudes, for example, but the Corsair proved to be more maneuverable, and could demonstrate tighter turning circles. The evaluating test-pilots deemed the Fw-190 to be an easier and more intuitive aircraft to fly, but ultimately regarded the Corsair to be the superior dogfighter of the two. Japanese pilots that encountered the Corsair considered it to be the best U.S. fighter. 82 Advanced Pacific Theater of Operations-Book 2 81 [PART 5] OFFENSIVE PHASE Offensive, however, all participating land units are committed for the duration of the current monthly game-turn, and thus cannot The Offensive Phase permits players to “Activate” (i.e., move move again or conduct any other actions or movements during and/or attack with) any eligible unit(s) by way of conducting the same monthly game-turn. Any such unit(s) are marked with “Offensives”. There are three types of Offensives that may be an “Active” chit to denote their activation status. conducted during the Offensive Phase: Air Offensives, Land Offensives and Sea Offensives (in no particular order). Naval Minor partner or allied major power land units may be Activated and Air Offensives are described under PART 3 and PART 4 in conjunction with a friendly allied major power’s land units (as respectively, although the rules governing Land Offensives are part of that major power’s Offensive), although at least 50% described here under PART 5. Offensives - themselves - exist (half) of the Activated land units must be of the same nationality quantitatively and may only be purchased or allotted during a as the Activating major power (i.e., the same nationality as the Seasonal Turn (see [8.13]), and are individually expended when Offensive being used to conduct the Activation). Commonwealth any type of Offensive is conducted during an Offensive Phase. land units (e.g., New Zealand) are considered UK units for the purposes of determining nationality. At the beginning of the Offensive Phase, the player that controls the Initiative (see [8.13]) may decide (and must declare) which Activation eligibility. side (i.e., Allies or Axis) will perform the first Offensive of the Each type of Activation is also limited to a specific number of Offensive Phase. Moreover, the player controlling the Initiative attacks (per Offensive conducted), regardless of the quantity of may choose to perform the first Offensive before all other allied participating land units. An HQ Activation is typically the most players, or he may confer the first Offensive to be performed to efficient Activation method; A Stack Activation is the least any particular allied player of his own choosing. If the player efficient Activation method. Each type of Activation is described controlling the Initiative allows the enemy side to perform the as follows: first Offensive, the onus is then upon the enemy player that began the season with the most Offensives as to which player Stack Activation will perform the first Offensive. A player may expend a single Offensive and declare a Stack Activation, in which all of the eligible friendly land units in the The mechanics of the Offensive Phase is such that each side same land hex (and within the same location) may be Activated (i.e., the Allies and the Japanese) must alternate conducting to conduct a Land Offensive as a single stack. As such, all of Offensives until either side has declared a “pass” (i.e., declining the Activated eligible friendly land units in that hex (only) may be any further Offensive actions), or until either side expends all moved normally (within legal movement limits) and/or attack Offensives, and has no Offensives remaining. Players may one legal enemy target hex. Multiple land units (Activated as a spend EPs to conduct Combined Offensives, allowing them to Stack Activation) may split up as they move, move together (as perform multiple Offensives simultaneously. Additionally, Joint a component or as an entire stack), or may simply decline Offensives allow players to perform two types of Offensives (for movement (collectively or individually). Regardless of the land example, Sea and Land) simultaneously as well. unit’s (or units’) movement posture, each Stack Activation may only foment one land attack. A Stack Activation cannot be part When any player declares a Land Offensive, the Activation and of any Combined Offensive. Command rules (see below) dictate how and what units may be “Activated”. Activated land units are eligible to move and/or General’s Activation attack, and may be coordinately supported by friendly air and/or A player may expend one Offensive and then declare a General naval units (if circumstances permit). Activation, in which all of the eligible friendly land units in the in any adjacent same hex (with the General game piece) and hex* (regardless of terrain) may be Activated to conduct a Land [5.0] Activation and Command Agents Offensive. As such, all of the eligible friendly land units in or adjacent to the General’s hex (only) may be moved normally To conduct or cooperate in a Land Offensive, all participating (within legal movement limits) and/or attack one legal enemy land units must be Activated via one of the following Command target hex per Step. Multiple land units (Activated via a General Agents: Activation) may split up as they move, intermix, move together (as components or as stacks), or may simply decline movement As a single Stack (i.e., a Stack Activation). (collectively or individually). Regardless of the land unit’s (or units’) movement posture, however, each attack (via a General By a General (i.e., a General Activation). Activation) must occur from the General’s hex or from a hex that is adjacent to the General’s hex (whether or not the General’s Via a Minor Nation Offensive (i.e., a Minor Nation own stack moves and/or attacks) at the moment of the attack(s). Activation). Via a Headquarters (i.e., an HQ Activation). *Including any eligible friendly land units that are presently embarked aboard transporting naval units After expending the requisite Offensive(s), the owning player in an adjacent coastal hex. must first specify which land unit(s) he intends to Activate during that current Offensive (and also via which activating Command A General Activation cannot ever Activate any other Generals, Agent). Each type of Activation is limited to a specific Activation although a General Activation may Activate any friendly land proximity (i.e., an area within a specific vicinity of the Command unit(s) in the same hex as another friendly General. In such a Agent), although a player need not Activate any particular land case, a stack of friendly land units with another General may be unit(s) simply because they may be Activated; the Activation of Activated normally by the Activating General (and may thus any unit(s) is never automatic or mandatory. Each land unit may move and/or attack normally as part of the General Activation), be Activated once per monthly game-turn only (i.e., during the although the other General cannot move, attack or otherwise Offensive Phase). participate in that same Offensive. Once Activated, all participating land units may move and/or A General Activation may Activate land units of an ally and/or a attack via that activating Offensive. Then, immediately after the minor partner, although at least 50% (half) of the total land unit 83 Advanced Pacific Theater of Operations-Book 2 82 chits Activated for that Offensive must be of the same nationality 50% (half) of the total land unit chits Activated for that Offensive as the Activating General. A General Activation cannot be part must be of the same nationality as the Activating HQ. of any Combined Offensive. *Including any land unit(s), if eligible, that are presently Minor Nation Activation embarked aboard transporting naval units in a proximal Each minor nation (i.e., any non-Commonwealth minor nation coastal hex.
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