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A joi 4c, / poll, JAPANESE MONOGRAPH *NO.. 45 USA COSO IT T AVER WORTH KN [3 UuiIO GCCESSION N0 e o REGISTR. HISTORY OF IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTE ARMY SECTION ( REVISED EDITION) HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY JAPAN ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, 33 FOREIGN HISTORIES DIVISION Jahpanlese M,'onograph (10. 45 History of In eria1 Qcneral Headquarters Army SectLion (fRovisecc1 Edition) HEADQIWLRTERS UITTED STATES ARMvY JAPAN Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 Foreign Histor'ies Division PREFACE This monograph is one of a series prepared under instruction from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 126, 12 Oct 1945). The series covers not on- ly the operations of the Japanese armed forces during World War II but also their operations in China and Manchuria, which preceded the world conflict. The original studies were written by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy under the supervision of the Historical Records Section of the First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaus of the Japanese Government. The manuscripts were translated by the Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command. The writers were handicapped in the preparation of the basic manuscript by the fact that many records normally used as source, material for a study of this type, were not available. Most of the important orders, howeverhave been reconstructed from memory (in many cases by the officers who wrote the original orders) and while not textually identical with the originals are believed to be accurate and reliable. The first Japanese manuscript was written hurriedly, much of it from memory. It was completed in November 1946. Since then Col. Takushiro Hattori and his colleagues at the Historical Research Institute have collected many valuable docu- ments pertaining to the Greater East Asia War. These have been made available to the Foreign Histories Division and have proved most helpful in checking and correcting information in this mono- graph. In addition, Lt. Gen. Monjiro Akiyana, Vice Chief, Air General Staff; Lt. Gen. Ichiji Sugita, Commanding General, 3d Army District; Col. Shiro Hara, Self Defense Forces; Col. Kengoro Tanaka, Self Defense Forces; Mr. (former Colonel) Susumnu Nishiura, Chief, History Section, Self Defense Forces and Mr. (Corner Navy captain) Toshikazu Ohmae, Chief, Military Operational Analysts, Foreign His- tories Division have made available many documents from their per- sonal libraries. iii Japanese Monograph No.45 tells of the establishment of Imperi- al General Headquarters and the many problems the Army Section of the Headquarters was faced with during the Greater East Asia War. Political and diplomatic aspects of the situation have been dealt with briefly in order to show Imperial General Headquarters rela- tion to other branches of the Japanese Government. Navy political and military strategy prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War are described in Japanese Monographs Nos. 144, 146, 14+7, 150 and 152, while details of the Navy'a armament plans for and during the Pa- cific War will be found in Japanese Monographs Nos. 145, 149, 160, 169, 172 and 174. The first edition of this monograph was published in August 1952 but, in the light of the tremendous amount of additional in- formation Foreign Hstories Division has developed in the inter- vening years, it has now been completely revised and rewritten.' Inaccuracies have been corrected and much pertinent data added. The editor received valuable assistance in research from Mr. Toshikazu Ohmae and Mr. Tadao Shudo, Military Operational Analysts with the Foreign Histories Division. Tokyo, Japan' 11 May 1959 Contributors to Original Japanese Manuscript The original Japanese manuscript which was used as a basis for this monograph was, in the main, written by the following former of- ficers of the Imperial Japanese Army: Col. Tekushiro Hattori, former Chief of the 2d Section (Operations) Army General Staff, Imperial General Headquarters Col. Keiji Takase, former staff member of the 2d Section (Operations), Army General Staff, Imperial General Headquarters Maj. Ryuhei Nakamura, former staff member of 2. Section '(Operations), Army General Staff, Imperial General Headquarters Other former officers of the Imperial Japanese Army contributed certain specific sections of the manuscript. These were: Lt. Col. Heizo Ishiwani, former Chief of.Japanese Army History Compilation Section, Army General Staff Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, former staff member of 26 Section (Operations), Army General Staff, Imperial General, Headquarters Maj. Toshimitsu Fukaya, former staff member in the Department of Inspectorate General (Army Training) Maj. Gen. Kikusaburo Okada, former Chief of the War Mterial Section, War Ministry Col. Susumu Nishiura, former Chief of Army Affairs Section, War Ministry Col. Shinobu Teakayamna, former Chief of Sub-Section (Logistics)of 2d Section (Operations), Army General Staff, Imperial General Headquarters Lt. Col. Michinori Ureshino, former staff member of 10th Section (Shipping), Army General Staff, Im- perial General Headquarters Lt. Col. Fumitada Shirai, former staff member of Sub- Section (Logistics), 2d Section (Operations), Army General Staff, Imperial General Headquarters TABLE OF CONTENTS Page' CHAPTER 1 - Japanese Mlitary Command Organization 1 Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conferences 7 Conference (Council) in the Imperial Presence 9 CHAPTER 2 - General Situation Before the Pacific War 12 Military Preparations 12 Training Programs 17 Expansion of National Defense Industries 24 Army Reserve Supplies 27 CHAPTER 3 - Preparations for the Pacific War 30 Preparations Against a Russian Invasion of Manchuria .31 Preparations Against the Economic Blockade by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands 33 Estimate of the Enemy Situation Prior to the Outbreak of War 34. Outline of Plan for War 39 Development of the Southern Operations Plan. 42 Orders of Battle for the Southern Operations 43 Missions and Objectives Assigned 45 Overall Operations Plan of the Imperial Japanese Arny 49 Plans for the Capture of. Hong Kong, Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago 52 vii CHAPTER 3 - (Cont'd) Page Air Force Operational Assignments 53 Lines of Communications (Logistical Support;) 53 China Expeditionary Army Operational Assign- ments 54 Proposed Southern Operation Military Admin- istration 55 CHAPTER 4 - First Phase of the War 57 Part 1 (Dec 1941 -Jun 192) 57, Decision to Go to War 57 Orders to the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army 59 Orders to the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army. 60 Orders to the CinC, China Excpeditionary Army and the Commander, Kwantung Army in Regard to the China Incident 61 Summary of Operational Progress During 1st Phase 61 Plans for Java Operation 65 Burma Operation 68 Navy Operations in the Indian Ocean 70 Coral Sea Battle 72 Situation Review and Tentative Plans 73 Preliminary Planning for the Chungking 77 Operation Aleutians, Midway and the Southeast Area 82 Operations Plans viii CHAPTER 4 ..(Cont'd) Page Progress of the Midway and Aleutian Operations 86. Defensive Adjustments of the Southern Army in Jun 19 e2 87 Army-Navy Central Agreement Specifying Responsibilities in the Southern Area 89 Establishment of Air Bases in Important Southern- Zones 91 Logistical Support 92 Chekiang-Kiangsi Operation 93 Part 2 (Jul ,-Dec 192) 96 Guadalcanal Operation 98 Counterattack by the 8th Fleet. 99 17th Army Reinforcements 99 Surprise EIemy Landing on Makin Atoll 100 17th Army on Guadalcanal .101 Situation Review and Plans (Oct 1942) 107 Southeast Area Operations (Nov - Dec 1942)* -.108 Changes in Other Areas 112 Miscellaneous Actions )uring the Second Stage 113 Line of Communications (Logistical Support) During First Phase 115 Page CHAPTER 5 - Second Phase of the War (Jan - Aug 1943) 117 Estimate of Enemy Offensive Potential 117 Orders and Operational Plans for the Southeast Area 119 General Operational Progress 123 Situation in the Central Pacific Area 130 Orders and Operational Plans for. the Southwest Area 131 Troop Activities in Southwest Area Operations 135 Troop Movements in Other Areas 136 Logistical Support During the Second Phase 138 CHAPTER 6 - Third Phase of the War (Sep 1943 - Jun 1944) 140 Part 1, First Stage (Sep 1943 - Feb 1944) 140 Situation Review and Estimate of Enemy Plans 140 Army General Staff Operational Plan Changes 145 Further Survey of the Situation 147 Southeast, North of Australia and Central Pacific Areas Operational Strategy 149 Army-Navy Central Agreement on Central Pacific Operations 153 Operational Preparations in the North of Australia Area 155 Efforts to Strengthen Shipping and Trans- portation 157 Strengthening Sea Bases 159 CHAPTER 6 - (Cont'd) Page Approval to Undertake the Imphal Operation ("U-Go" Operation) 160 Directives for "Ichi-Go" Operation 162 Directives for Various Areas 167 Additional Construction and Maintenance Plans for Air Bases 169 Part 2, Second Stage (Mar - Jun, 1944) 170 Situation Review and Estimate of Enemy Plans. 170 North of Australia Area Directives .175 First and Second Modifications of the Second Area Army's Front Line 177 Northeastern Area Directives I 178 Formosa and the Nansei Islands Directives 179 Unification of Southern Area Command System 182 Change of Mission of Southern Army 183 Central Pacific Area Directives 188 "A-Go" Operation in the Marianas Area 190 Plans to Strengthen Homeland Defenses .195 Logistical Support During the Third Phase .197 CHAPTER 7 - Fourth Phase of the War (Jul. 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