THE KOKODA CAMPAIGN, JULY- NOVEMBER 1942, AN ANALYSIS Peter Damian Williams A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Charles Darwin University. July 2008 I hereby declare that the work herein, now submitted as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is the result of my own investigations and all references to ideas and work of other researchers have been specifically acknowledged. I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being currently submitted in candidature for any other degree. ……………………… ……………………. Peter Damian Williams Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge those who have aided me with this thesis. I thank my supervisor, Professor Alan Powell of Charles Darwin University, Dr. Steven Bullard of the Australia Japan Research Project, the staffs of the Australian War Memorial, the National Archives of Australia and the National Library of Australia. Frank Taylor guided me across the Owen Stanley Range and freely shared his knowledge of the campaign. My research in Japan would not have been possible without the help of Dr. Shindo Hiroyuki and Major General Yoshinaga Hayashi of the National Institute of Defence Studies in Tokyo. Sato Go, Sato Yukiko, Marutani Hajime, Yoshida Haruki, Akaboshi Yayoi and Nakagawa Naoko are to be thanked for their efforts arranging my visits to Japan, translating documents and locating Japanese veterans. Major Horie Masao, who fought the Australians for two years in New Guinea, gave freely of his time, his private papers and his hospitality. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Samantha, the pillar of support on which this thesis rests. TABLE OF CONTENTS THE KOKODA CAMPAIGN, JULY- NOVEMBER 1942, AN ANALYSIS ABSTRACT 2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 3 PART ONE- PRE CAMPAIGN CONSIDERATIONS CHAPTER ONE, INTRODUCTION. 6 CHAPTER TWO, JAPANESE STRATEGY IN PAPUA. 27 CHAPTER THREE, JAPANESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN PAPUA. 62 CHAPTER FOUR, THE NANKAI SHITAI ORDER OF BATTLE. 88 PART TWO-THE ENGAGEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF THE KOKODA CAMPAIGN CHAPTER FIVE, THE NANKAI SHITAI LANDING AND KOKODA-DENIKI. 119 CHAPTER SIX, ISURAVA. 146 CHAPTER SEVEN, EORA-TEMPLETONS 1. 178 CHAPTER EIGHT, EFOGI. 194 CHAPTER NINE, IORIBAIWA. 217 CHAPTER TEN, EORA-TEMPLETONS 2. 242 CHAPTER ELEVEN, OIVI-GORARI. 272 PART THREE- OTHER ISSUES OF THE KOKODA CAMPAIGN CHAPTER TWELVE, NANKAI SHITAI SUPPLY, THE SYSTEM AND THE CRISIS. 292 CHAPTER THIRTEEN, ALLIED AIRPOWER AND WEATHER. 330 CHAPTER FOURTEEN, THE ARTILLERY OF THE NANKAI SHITAI. 352 CHAPTER FIFTEEN,NANKAI SHITAI AND AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL PROBLEMS. 370 CHAPTER SIXTEEN, CONCLUSION. 393 APPENDIX A. 403 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 405 1 ABSTRACT With the exception of a few scholars who are familiar with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) collection, Japanese sources for the Kokoda campaign have not been closely examined by Australian researchers. These sources point towards a number of problems with Australian published accounts. Foremost, the Japanese did not outnumber the Australians and Papuans very often in their advance and when they did they did not outnumber them by much. In the subsequent Japanese retreat the Australians significantly outnumbered the Japanese. The second most important factor to emerge from Japanese sources is that the Japanese postponed their attack on Port Moresby in August 1942 and the plan was never revived. The Nankai Shitai’s advance into the Owen Stanley Range became more in the nature of a feint to distract Allied attention and resources away from Guadalcanal, the decisive battle of the war in the south west Pacific. The explanations offered in previous work for the various Australian defeats and victories in the Kokoda campaign have been based on an assumption the Japanese were always more numerous than they were and these works have not understood that the Japanese advance was not an attempt to take Port Moresby. As such their explanations for why the campaign turned out as it did are likely to fall short of a balanced account. Other reasons commonly given for Japanese failure concern poor intelligence, malaria and allied air interdiction of their supply line. None of these are satisfactory. It is rather that two other previously ignored factors are of more importance in understanding the course of events in the Owen Stanley Range from July to November 1942; the large number of artillery pieces the Japanese brought into the mountains and the unusually heavy rain of September 1942 which washed away their supply line. This thesis argues that in light of the above considerable revision is needed in current Australian accounts of the Kokoda campaign. 2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The six Japanese infantry battalions in the Nankai Shitai were in two regiments, 144 and 41. The three battalions in each regiment were numbered 1/144, 2/144, 3/144, 1/41, 2/41 and 3/41. All other infantry battalions in the text with a prefix 2/ are second Australian Imperial Force battalions. All other infantry battalions without the prefix 2/ are Australian militia battalions. ABBREVIATIONS AND OTHER TERMS AAF Allied Air Force AIF Australian Imperial Force AJRP Australia-Japan Research Project AMF Australian Military Force AMWP army mobile wireless platoon ANGAU Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit. ATIS Allied Translator and Interpreter Service BCC bridge construction company Bde brigade Bia battalion artillery Bn battalion BnHQ battalion headquarters Butai generic term for a military unit CC construction company Chutai company CIB Commonwealth Investigation Branch C in C commander in chief Coy company Daitai battalion DFH divisional field hospital DMI Director of Military Intelligence DNI Director of Naval Intelligence ER engineer regiment FA field ambulance 3 FRP fixed radio platoon FS the Fiji/Samoa operation FAAAB field anti aircraft artillery battalion FH field hospital GHQ General Headquarters Go unit of measurement for rice, 140 grams. Hikojo Daitai airfield battalion IHQ Imperial Headquarters IJA Imperial Japanese Army IJN Imperial Japanese Navy IJNHQ Imperial Japanese Navy Headquarters IJAHQ Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters IMTB independent motor transport battalion IWP independent wireless platoon ITP independent telegraph platoon IER independent engineer regiment IC independent company ICC independent communications company LDC land duty company LHQ Allied Land Forces Headquarters LOCH line of communication hospital MAR mountain artillery regiment MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFHQ Maroubra Force Headquarters MPC military police company MO the Port Moresby operation NAA National Archives of Australia Nankai Shitai South Seas detachment NGF New Guinea Force NGVR New Guinea Volunteer Rifles NIDS National Institute of Defence Studies NLA National Library of Australia NP naval pioneers 4 NSHQ Nankai Shitai Headquarters PCB patient collecting butai, a field ambulance PIB Papuan Infantry Battalion Ra mountain artillery RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAE Royal Australian Engineers RAN Royal Australian Navy Ria regimental artillery Rentai regiment RN Royal Navy RPC Royal Papuan Constabulary RHQ regimental headquarters Stanley shitai (Owen) Stanley (Range) detachment Shotai platoon SNLP Special Naval Landing Party SDC sea duty company SER shipping engineer regiment SWPA South West Pacific Area TR transport regiment USAAF United States Army Air Force USN United States Navy 5 THE KOKODA CAMPAIGN, JULY- NOVEMBER 1942, AN ANALYSIS PART ONE- PRE CAMPAIGN CONSIDERATIONS CHAPTER ONE, INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER TWO, JAPANESE STRATEGY IN PAPUA. CHAPTER THREE, JAPANESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN PAPUA. CHAPTER FOUR, THE NANKAI SHITAI ORDER OF BATTLE. CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION This thesis addresses the question: when Japanese sources are consulted, what problems arise for the traditional Australian account of the Kokoda campaign from July to mid November of 1942? The campaign is rapidly catching up with Gallipoli in popularity in Australia, as reflected in the number of books on it that have appeared in the past twenty years. As the events of 1915 pass into distant memory, it is possible it may come to rival Gallipoli as the iconic Australian military experience. While there are many positive aspects to this there is also an imbalance in Australian accounts of the campaign arising from a neglect of Japanese sources. Errors in the Kokoda story have had a tendency to be repeated until they take up the outward appearance of fact while other aspects of the campaign, often arising from wartime propaganda, have never been subject to investigation. An example of the former, the most distorting error of all and the centerpiece of the traditional Australian account, is the serious overestimation of the number of Japanese who took part in the actions and engagements of the campaign. 1 A central fact of land warfare in the Pacific against the Japanese is that it took a great superiority in numbers to defeat them. While the technical advantages of the Allies in eventually overwhelming the Japanese with many more and better aircraft, ships, tanks and artillery is known, it is not always appreciated that a large superiority in infantry was also required. Between 1941 and 1945, and when the Japanese had equal or superior numbers engaged, they rarely lost a battle. When they had inferior numbers, at least in the first ten months of the war, they were still often able to win. The Kokoda campaign fits this pattern. 1 Three examples are Brune, P. A Bastard of a Place, the Australians in Papua, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004, pp. 99 and 131; Ham, P. Kokoda, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2004, p. 163, and McAulay, L. Blood and Iron, The Battle for Kokoda 1942, Arrow, Sydney, 1992, p. 413. 6 The evidence from Japanese sources shows that from July to mid September 1942 the Australians along the Kokoda track were rarely outnumbered by their enemy. Where they were outnumbered it was not by a huge margin. While Australia’s 39 Battalion and the Papuans faced superior numbers in the July clashes, it was never as many as two to one.