JAFFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005

The Disengagement: Also in this Issue An Ideological Crisis

The Election of Abu Mazen Yehuda Ben Meir and the Next Stage in Israeli–Palestinian Relations Mark A. Heller

n he idea of the Greater Land of Israel has been central to the ideological, public, and in many cases personal lives of a large number of Israelis for more than thirty years. For them, Israel’s disengagement plan repre- Israel and NATO: Tsents a moment of truth and a point of no return. This plan has unquestionably Opportunities and Risks triggered a profound crisis, challenging and destabilizing many of the truths underlying their world view. An important aspect of this crisis stems from the Zaki Shalom fact that the architect and leader of the disengagement is none other than Ariel Sharon, who until recently served as the community’s chief patron. The crisis n is likely to have far-reaching repercussions. This article will assess the scope of the crisis and its implications, primarily The Recent American for this community but also with an eye to Israeli society as a whole. The threat of civil war has been mentioned more than once, and government ministers, Intelligence Failures Knesset members, and public leaders from various circles regularly discuss the Ephraim Kam need to forestall this possibility. It is therefore important to emphasize from the outset that there is no danger of civil war. In some cases, use of the term n "civil war" reflects attempts to frighten and threaten the general public in order to reduce support for the disengagement. In other instances, it reflects dema- goguery and even ignorance. Yet there can be no civil war in the true sense of Non-Conventional Terrorism: the term without two armed forces, and this means that there can be no civil Availability and Motivation war without a split in the military. During the American Civil War, the military Anat Kurz units of the southern states deserted from the United States army and formed

Cont. on page 3 Editor’s Note As this issue of Strategic Assessment religious beliefs and aspirations, this Kam, evaluates the key findings of goes to press, the disengagement is community is searching for practical, the investigative committees formed four months away, scheduled to be- ideological, and religious means to in the United States to examine the gin in mid-July 2005. With the plan grapple with the disengagement. intelligence failures of the September officially approved by the Knesset, In his article, Dr. Mark Heller 11 attack and the war in Iraq. Though much of the focus is no longer on "if," explores some of the ramifications of fundamentally different intelligence but rather "how," and what will be the new Palestinian leadership. Arafat failures, taken together the cases testify the impact on the domestic scene. The has been succeeded by Abu Mazen, to recurring systemic problems in the calls for a national referendum, the but will Arafatism be replaced as intelligence community. Kam reviews legitimacy of refusing military orders, well with a new style of governance some of the suggestions proposed by and the various scenarios for evacua- and a rejection of terror? According the committees to correct these prob- tion sketched by the police, security to Heller, Abu Mazen has yet to make lems as well as the difficulties inherent forces, and opponents of disengage- clear how much he will confront the in their implementation. ment have assumed center stage in violent factions at home and firmly The final article of this issue, writ- the Israeli debate, with increasing quell the opposition to a new chapter ten by Dr. Anat Kurz, discusses what attention paid to the internal social in Israel-Palestinian relations. motivates or restrains terrorist orga- ramifications of the plan. Oded Eran, Israel's ambassador to nizations vis-à-vis their use of non- This is the backdrop for the open- the European Union, recently submit- conventional weapons. Kurz argues ing article, which focuses on one sub- ted a proposal to the NATO directorate that while access to non-conventional culture within the religious Zionist regarding Israel–NATO relations and weapons is clearly a fundamental pre- movement. Written by Dr. Yehuda enhanced cooperation between Israel requisite, it alone does not determine Ben Meir, the article describes the and the organization. In his article, Dr. whether an organization will or will evolution of the ultra-Orthodox na- Zaki Shalom examines the strategic not employ them. Rather, a major tional religious community, among potential for Israel of a closer asso- factor underlying terrorist activity is the sectors most profoundly affected ciation with NATO, and also reviews the organizational motivation for self- by the disengagement, and explores some of the risks to Israel should it preservation, and it is this factor that the deep sense of crisis overwhelm- be offered formal membership in the is crucially linked to the relatively few ing it. Faced with an imminent reality organization. attacks that have involved the use of that challenges much of its national The fourth article, by Dr. Ephraim non-conventional weapons.

Editor-in-Chief Managing Editor English Editor Graphic Design Zvi Shtauber Moshe Grundman Judith Rosen Michal Semo Volume 7, No. 4, March 2005

The purpose of Strategic Assessment is Strategic Assessment is a quarterly published by to stimulate and enrich the public debate the Jaffee Center for Stra­te­gic Studies at on the issues that are, or should be, on Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978 Israel Israel’s national security agenda. Tel: +972-3-640-9926 Fax: +972-3-642-2404 Strategic Assessment is written by JCSS Strategic Assessment is published in English and Hebrew. researchers and guests and is based, The full text of Strategic Assessment is available on the Center’s website: for the most part, on research carried out under JCSS auspices. The views http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ presented here, however, are those of the authors alone. © Copyright. All rights reserved. ISSN 0793 8942 2 The Disengagement: An Ideological Crisis – cont.

the Confederate army, taking their includes a variety of types of people. has the dominant voice. Most Yesha arms and command structure with The residents of Ma'aleh Adumim, Council leaders are associated with them. A similar split in the national Ariel, and Alfei Menashe are different the ideological settlement stream, and military was true of the civil war in from the residents of Elkana, Efrat, the Council’s positions are primarily Spain. Barring a split in the armed and Paduel, who are different from those of the ideological settlers. forces, therefore, there can be no civil the inhabitants of Ofra, Elon Moreh, The settlement movement, which war, and there is little if any possibility Kedumim, and Karnei Shomron, who stands at the forefront of the opposi- that IDF tank, infantry, artillery, or air in turn are different from those of It- tion to the disengagement plan and force units, with their weapons and amar, Har Bracha, Yizhar, and Tapuah. is officially represented by the Yesha commanders, will desert and join the Despite the many faces among set- Council, began to take shape during opponents of disengagement. tler sub-groups, we can draw two the first few months after the Yom However, the fact that the disen- major distinctions: the distinction Kippur War. However, its ideological gagement has not positioned Israel and emotional roots can be traced on the verge of a civil war does not Ideological settlers back to the euphoria that followed mitigate the crisis faced by the Greater Israel’s victory and conquest of Judea Israel proponents. Nor does it reduce are a minority among and Samaria in the Six Day War. This the seriousness of the ramifications of the overall settlement sense of euphoria was experienced disengagement, or ease the difficult by the country as a whole, but took challenges the plan poses to the state population of Judea, on almost messianic overtones in the and Israeli society. Samaria, and the national religious community. The Gaza Strip, but it is the decisive lightning victory of the sov- The Settlement Movement ereign Jewish army and the liberation The population facing this crisis of religious–ideological of geographical areas teeming with consciousness is known by a myriad group that has the national religious meaning (especially of names, including: the settlers, Gush Jerusalem, crowned by the religious Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful"), the dominant voice. and historical icons of the Western Yesha (the Hebrew acronym for Judea, Wall and the Temple Mount), in Samaria, and Gaza) Council, reli- between the religious population conjunction with the sense of “God’s gious Zionism, the national religious (which includes three ultra-Orthodox speedy redemption,” was understood community, the right wing, and the settlements) and the non-religious as the actualization of the religious Zi- extreme right wing. A better assess- population; and the distinction be- onist ethos – the perfect coalescence of ment of the situation and possible tween ideological settlements and “safra” and “sayfa,” the hand of God developments as the disengagement settlements that arose primarily from and military might. This approach progresses requires a more precise standard of living considerations and even led several religious Zionist definition of the population in ques- affordable housing opportunities. circles to propose canceling the Tisha tion. Most importantly, it requires an These two distinctions do not overlap B’Av fast, or at least the minor fasts understanding of the nuances that completely, but there is a significant that commemorate the destruction of characterize the different sub-groups correlation between the respective po- the temple. within this population. larities. Numerically, ideological set- These deep feelings, which were Indeed, the settlement movement tlers are a minority among the overall intensified by the direct physical en- in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, settlement population of Judea, counter with sites that religious Jews which now numbers some 250,000 Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, but it is had for centuries “visited” constantly people, is far from homogenous and the religious–ideological group that through their liturgy and Scriptures,

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 3 were not immediately translated into a large degree as a response to the power in 1977, enabled the settlement a clear political–ideological program intense trauma caused by the war. In movement to grow until it reached the obligating individual actualization. its nascence, the inner core of Gush critical mass necessary to perpetuate Despite the feelings of spiritual uplift- Emunim consisted of students of the itself. At this point, Gush Emunim ing during the first years following Merkaz Harav yeshiva, but also in- faded away and was replaced by two the Six Day War, the majority of the cluded activist circles from religious institutional organizations: the Yesha national religious public adopted a Zionist movements such as Igud Council and Amana, the settlement pragmatic approach to the political Hamoshavim, Hapoel Mizrahi, and movement organization founded by question of the future of the territo- Hakibbutz Hadati. The "young guard" Gush Emunim. Purely for the sake ries. On this issue, the community had within the National Religious Party of analogy, and acknowledging the not yet come to constitute the Israeli likewise supported the new group. significant differences between them, right wing. The union of Gush Emunim and the this transformation can be compared A small yet extremely close-knit Elon Moreh group created the settle- to the Zionist movement’s institution- and committed group within the ment movement, whose evolution alization and transition to the sover- national religious community called and development have had a major eign state of Israel. Both the Yesha for retaining all parts of the Land impact on the State of Israel. Council and Amana have for years of Israel at any cost, and strongly During the first phase of its ex- enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) large supported the physical settlement istence, the settlement movement allocations from the state budget, of the territories conquered during enjoyed great support throughout which has enabled them to build siz- the Six Day War. The inner core of the national religious population, able organizations, undertake major this group was made up of students especially among the youth and organizational and public relations and graduates of the Merkaz Harav young adults, despite the fact that it activities, and implement large-scale yeshiva in Jerusalem, primarily the constituted a minority of the religious projects that afford them extensive students of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, Zionist population as a whole. In the public exposure. the most zealous prominent figure one and a half generations between At the same time, the Merkaz in the religious Zionist camp with 1974 and today (and almost two Harav graduates and their associates regard to the absolute imperative of generations since the Six Day War), (including the late Rabbi Moshe Zvi maintaining Jewish control over the Israel’s national religious population Neria, the founder and head of the entire Land of Israel. has undergone far-reaching social, Bnei Akiva yeshivas, and Rabbi Haim This group’s first step was the cultural, educational, demographic, Druckman, current head of these partisan-style settlement in the Park and ideological changes. These pro- institutions) began expanding their Hotel in the heart of Hebron on found changes within the religious spiritual and organizational influence Passover 1968, a move that resulted Zionist movement lie beyond the within the Bnei Akiva youth move- in the establishment of Kiryat Arba scope of this article, but critical here ment and the educational system of outside Hebron and thereafter the are two processes that were formative the national religious sector (yeshiva Jewish settlement in Hebron itself. In for the movement. high schools for boys, religious girls' the years preceding the Yom Kippur The success of the Sebastia activ- high schools, yeshiva–military "hes- War, Kiryat Arba was the site of the es- ity in 1974 thrust Gush Emunim on der" programs, and pre-conscription tablishment of the Elon Moreh group, the political map, made the group a religious academies) until they domi- a group that in many ways served as force to be reckoned with, and led nated the system entirely. The Merkaz the catalyst for the settlement move- to government concessions toward Harav group is the religious Zionist ment as a whole. Gush Emunim was the settlement drive. This, and even equivalent to Habad (the activist, formed after the Yom Kippur War, to more importantly, the Likud’s rise to high-profile, evangelical Lubavitch

4 Hasidism movement) in the ultra- this population also differs from the rael became the center of life and the Orthodox sector, and, like Habad, is ultra-Orthodox sector in that they are primary essence of this sub-culture. also a missionary group of sorts. In integrated in the country’s workforce More important, the evolution of the the early 1970s, this group represented and support themselves, although ultra-Orthodox national sub-culture a small, closely knit, and extremely there has been a degree of erosion in has had a major influence on religious energetic minority within religious this context as well. But this popula- Zionism as a whole. Sub-cultures, Zionism. Most parents of Bnei Akiva tion does not differ fundamentally which are often rebellions against youth movement members and stu- from the ultra-Orthodox population their parent cultures and emerge as dents of the religious Zionist educa- in most other ways, such as its strict counter-cultures, typically undergo tional system were still far from this religious behavior; its emphasis on progressive radicalization. In the case group in terms of worldview and way the importance of studying Torah at at hand, this process had two results: of life. And in fact, at the beginning, the expense of more general studies; it moved the mainstream of religious the Merkaz Harav influence was Zionism to the right, to the point that limited. However, as years passed, religious Zionism as a whole came Merkaz Harav’s success in taking over The evolution of the to symbolize the right wing of Israeli the formal and informal educational ultra-Orthodox national politics; and it spawned some extreme systems of religious Zionism had a and uncontrolled offshoots, such as major impact. While this group still sub-culture moved the “noar hagvaot” (the hilltop youth) constitutes only a minority of the reli- mainstream of religious and movements along the lines of gious Zionist sector, it is a minority of Kach, the outlawed extremist politi- great importance that wields immense Zionism to the right, to cal party. influence. the point that religious The combined impact of the two The Existential Challenge Zionism as a whole came processes described above over the The disengagement plan hit the course of one and a half generations, to symbolize the right ultra-Orthodox national public and possibly compounded by other pro- wing of Israeli politics. religious Zionism as a whole like a cesses, resulted in the evolution of clap of thunder on a clear day, creating a new nationalist ultra-Orthodox the current deep identity crisis. For sub-culture within religious Zionism. its opposition to any type of gen- the ultra-Orthodox national religious This new sub-culture ("hardal" – the der-integrated activity; its tendency community, which includes most Hebrew acronym for ultra-Ortho- toward seclusion and introversion; of the members and institutions of dox national religious) comprises a its negation of the expressions of the religious-ideological settlement population very similar to the ultra- modern society (television, movies, movement and many other circles, Orthodox in worldview, customs, and other such articles); and its ac- the crisis is twofold: and lifestyle. The critical difference is ceptance of their rabbis’ authority in ■ A religious crisis of faith: Deep their position on the national issue, all areas of life. in the consciousness of this group is and their level of identification with The ultra-Orthodox community a belief that the settlement drive in the state and its symbols. The ultra- sanctified two values: a high birth- Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is part of a Orthodox national religious identify rate and the study of Torah. The divine plan and the ultimate redemp- with the state, serve in its army, fly its nationalist counterpart of this sector tion, and is therefore irreversible. It is flag, and observe its holidays (Holo- sanctified two values of its own: a a messianic belief, and for this reason caust Day, Memorial Day, and Inde- high birthrate and the Land of Israel. there are those who regard it as a pendence Day). The great majority of The ethos of the Greater Land of Is- transition from religious Zionism to

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 5 messianic Zionism (the Temple Mount large scale evacuation of all of Gush the hope that the threat will serve its Movement, and preparations for Katif and some settlements in Samaria purpose and restrain the prime minis- the rebuilding of the temple and for unilaterally, not even within the ter from implementing the disengage- resuming God’s work on the Temple framework of a comprehensive peace ment. So far, proponents of the tactical Mount are classic expressions of this settlement, means the total collapse approach have been careful not to belief). Implementation of the disen- of this conception and raises major cross red lines. They speak in obscure, gagement would be a major blow to uncertainties regarding the future of ill-defined terms regarding civil dis- the religious–ideological worldview the settlement project as a whole. obedience and a soldier's personal or call it entirely into question. The crisis is fundamental and deep. refusal to obey orders, but they rule ■ The crumbling of a cognitive The question at this point is: what will out organized refusal to obey orders cornerstone: According to this world- be the national religious population’s and organized violence. view, the establishment of as many response to this crisis? In this context, In contrast, those who employ this settlements as possible throughout it is important to distinguish between approach strategically (with the sup- Judea and Samaria, and the retention different sub-cultures within religious port of a large number of Yesha rabbis, of all the settlements in the Gaza Strip Zionism. One possible response is as well as rabbis located outside of (including the remote settlements to break all the rules by refusing to the territories) are willing to stay the of Netzarim and Kfar Darom), was accept the decision of the state and course and place their relations with supposed to ensure that no Israeli commencing a mass uprising against the State of Israel in question. This government would ever be able to va- implementation of the withdrawal group’s ideology is quickly evolv- cate settlements, and that there could plan. The most far-reaching expres- ing into an ideology similar to that never be a practical possibility of es- sion of this approach is adoption of of Neturei Karta, the ultra-Orthodox tablishing a Palestinian state with real the extremist approach that says: “if sect that has consistently denied the territorial contiguity. During the de- the State of Israel withdraws from the legitimacy of a pre-messianic Jew- bate that took place among settlement Land of Israel, then we are withdraw- ish state and refused to recognize it. leaders between captivating the hearts ing from the State of Israel.” And in While not precluding the validity of of the people versus actual physical fact, this approach of breaking all the a pre-messianic polity, the crisis of settlement, the leadership unequivo- rules enjoys significant and consis- the ultra-Orthodox national religious cally chose to regard physical settle- tently growing support throughout essentially invites a rejection of the ment as a priority. Their underlying the ultra-Orthodox national religious state in its present form. For now, the assumption was that it would be a left population. tactical approach remains dominant wing government that would want to At the same time, there are two dis- throughout this population, although vacate the settlements, and that this tinct variations of this approach. For a the danger always exists that propo- could never be carried out in face of portion of the ultra-Orthodox national nents of the tactical approach will the persistent combined opposition religious population (the majority, as be swept under the ideology of the of the national religious population, of today), this is primarily a tactical strategic approach. the ultra-Orthodox population, and approach, while for the remainder The settlement movement’s two the entire right wing of Israeli politics. of the population it is strategic. For major power centers are the Yesha The settlers never imagined that it those who employ this approach tac- Council and the Yesha rabbis. The Ye- would be a right wing government, tically, represented first and foremost sha Council is more pragmatic, while no less one headed by Ariel Sharon, by the public institutional leadership the rabbis lead the extremist line. that would threaten the existence of of the settlers (the Yesha Council), it Unseen tension exists between these the project that had been his own life’s is primarily a threat against the gov- two power centers. This is because the work. Sharon’s ability to carry out the ernment and Israeli society, based on Yesha Council is supposed to repre-

6 sent the settlements in the West Bank dangers of these groups, dangers that this population, who constitute the and the Gaza Strip as a whole and the more responsible members of the decisive majority of Israel’s religious therefore must take into account the settlement movement have still not Zionist population, is the issue of positions of non-ideological settlers. learned or at least not chosen to ad- refusing to carry out military orders The Yesha Council is also the force dress in any fundamental way. and, on a broader and more funda- leading the public political struggle, The critical question is whether mental level, the attitude toward the and it must consider constraints of the ultra-Orthodox national religious IDF. Indeed, the call to refuse orders, political parties and public opinion. public will be able to attract the in conjunction with acts of aggression Moreover, there are disagreements mainstream of the religious Zion- against IDF soldiers and officers (e.g., within the Yesha Council itself regard- ist sector as it has done in the past. attacks during the dismantling of the ing the direction the struggle should The situation is highly sensitive and Mitzpe Yizhar outpost, threats against take: one important indication of this complex: there are often family and religious officers, and demonstrations disagreement was the recent resigna- other ties between these two strands, outside the homes of senior religious tion of the Council spokesperson. In officers and General Security Services addition, some leaders of the Yesha officials), resulted in heated responses Council do not lead an ultra-Ortho- Religious Zionism not only from the mainstream, but dox national religious lifestyle and also from significant groups living in belong to the mainstream of religious for the most part will the settlements themselves. Zionism. not serve as a potential In this context, it is important to In contrast, many prominent note the petitions and letters of oppo- Yesha rabbis reflect the fundamen- partner for withdrawal sition against refusing orders, written tals of the ultra-Orthodox national from the state and and signed by senior religious officers religious culture and are, to a large and settlement residents, rabbis, and extent, its spiritual leaders – the avant- Israeli society. heads of military yeshiva programs garde leadership that sets the tone and pre-draft religious academies. of ultra-Orthodox national religious There have also been newspaper ar- culture overall. More ideological and as they both evolved within the same ticles written by figures well-known zealous than the Yesha Council, the population. There are many adults among settlers and the ultra-Ortho- statements of many Yesha rabbis are who belong to the national religious dox national religious sector, which growing increasingly extreme as the mainstream while their children and minced no words cautioning against withdrawal approaches. Finally, it is grandchildren identify with the ultra- religious Zionism’s withdrawal from also important to take into account the Orthodox national religious stream. the state and from the Jewish people. extremist elements of the settlers and It is unusual to find a religious Zion- One author decried the refusal to obey their supporters, such as the hilltop ist family without a relative, friend, military orders, the challenging of the youth, Kach-related movements, and acquaintance, or family member of a authority of Israeli national institu- the messianic stream within Habad. friend or acquaintance who lives in tions, and the attempt to move po- 1 While these elements represent only a a settlement. Nonetheless, all signs litical decisions to the street. Another minority of the settlers, it is a minority indicate that, at the present, the un- wrote that even if the state is making that consistently incites the popula- equivocal answer to this question the Jewish homeland narrower and tion and accepts the authority of nei- is that the mainstream of religious smaller, and perhaps using means ther the Yesha Council nor the Yesha Zionism is not considering any disen- that are questionable as far as their rabbis, not to mention the rule of law gagement, political or spiritual, from democratic mandate is concerned, the and the State of Israel. Herein lie the Israel or from the IDF. The red line for state should not be totally destroyed,

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 7 as this would bring down the roof on cultivated murder and destruction. community will get up and leave. Yet 2 everyone. It should also be recalled Nonetheless, both countries overcame in any event, religious Zionism for the that Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, one of the these groups, as many other demo- most part will not strike a blow at the most prominent and influential fig- cratic countries have defeated similar IDF and will not serve as a potential ures in the ultra-Orthodox national domestic challenges. The IDF will in partner for withdrawal from the state religious sector, has consistently re- the end undoubtedly be able to over- and Israeli society. Indeed, it is quite jected the calls for soldiers to refuse come these challenges and succeed in possible that the ultra-Orthodox na- to obey orders. carrying out the disengagement plan. tional religious population and the Even if 10,000 or 20,000 soldiers refuse mainstream of religious Zionism will Conclusion to obey orders – and it is extremely part ways, after walking together for The State of Israel is not on the brink doubtful that anywhere near such a more than thirty years. The split in the of a civil war, but it faces serious number of soldiers will do so – this National Religious Party is just the trends that are dangerous in and of will not stop the army from complet- political expression of this parting of themselves, such as the refusal to obey ing its task. ways, and perhaps the first indicator orders, civil disobedience, and mass Perhaps the intensive involvement of a deeper and more fundamental disturbances. Furthermore, extremist of Knesset members representing the social phenomenon. fringe groups will likely attempt to settlers (first and foremost that of Zvi carry out extreme acts. But no matter Hendel, who is also a resident and Notes how serious these fringe phenomena leader of Gush Katif) in amending 1. See the article by Rabbi Yuval Sherlo, head of the military-yeshiva ("hesder") may be, they remain for the most financial sections of the Evacuation program in Petah Tikva, Haaretz, Janu- part an operational problem for the and Compensation Law and search- ary 7, 2005. police and the IDF, and a problem of ing alternative sites of residence 2. See the article by Yisrael Harel,, one domestic subversion for the Israeli reflects an acceptance of the decree. of the founders of the settlement Ofra, former deputy chairman of the Yesha security services. Germany had the Perhaps at the end of the day, once Council, and editor of the Council’s Baader-Meinhof Gang and Italy had the disengagement becomes a fait journal Yesha Nekuda, in Haaretz, Janu- the Red Brigades, and both groups accompli, a minority of the settler ary 6, 2005.

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies expresses its deep gratitude to

Martin J. Whitman (New York) for the support he provided to the Center’s Outreach Program, in the framework of which Strategic Assessment is published.

8 The Election of Abu Mazen and the Next Stage in Israeli–Palestinian Relations

Mark A. Heller

t has been clear since the reconfiguration of enough stature and semi-mythical status as “the American foreign policy after September 11, father of the Palestinian cause” to block others 2001 that the wave of violence unleashed by who did aspire to reform. Very soon after his de- Ithe intifada would not be translated into tangible mise, it therefore seemed that most Palestinians political gains for the Palestinians. It has also been mourned him much more than they missed him, clear, at least since Operation Defensive Shield and the focus of public concern quickly shifted to of April 2002, that the Palestinians would pay a the issue of succession. rising price in both economic and human terms That issue actually involved two questions: for the continuation of the intifada. True, terror- “Who would replace Arafat?” and “What, if ists could still inflict casualties on Israel, but their anything, would replace Arafatism?” The answer ability to do even that diminished in the face of to the first question was rather straightforward. ongoing IDF operations inside Palestinian cities On January 9, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), and the progressive extension of Israel’s security the long-time secretary of the PLO’s Executive barrier. Finally, it became increasingly clear dur- Committee and former prime minister of the ing 2004 that the Palestinian leadership had no Palestinian Authority (PA), was elected chair- coherent political or military response to Prime man/president of the PA with a plurality of about Minister Sharon’s proposed “unilateral disengage- 62%. Despite widespread predictions that part ment” from Gaza and the northern West Bank. of Arafat’s political legacy would be chaos and Instead, Palestinian politics and society were a dysfunctional political system, the immediate mired in a morass of policy paralysis, diplomatic aftermath of his death played out according to impotence, economic regression and impoverish- constitutional norms, and the election proceeded ment, administrative chaos and corruption, and in a distinctly orderly fashion. And notwithstand- growing lawlessness. ing some complaints of irregularities by other candidates (e.g., distorted allocation of air-time by The Day after Arafat state-controlled radio and television, a last-minute As a result, the death of Yasir Arafat in November extension of voting hours, and permission for 2004 removed an already marginalized political unregistered voters to take part), the election met figure, one who had long since ceased to be a every reasonable test of political transparency. If source of inspiration for or reform of Palestinian nothing else, the very fact that Abu Mazen won politics and policy. Despite growing evidence by “only” 62% (in contrast to the (90+% approval of fatigue in recent years with the consequences ratings normally given to the establishment of his leadership, however, Arafat still enjoyed candidate in Arab elections) and that his closest

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 9 competitor received almost a quarter exercise in democratic choice and for matters of domestic reform, includ- of the votes attests to these being the resolution of issues like political ing issues of financial transparency free and fair elections by almost any succession through political, i.e., non- on which some progress had already standard. violent means. been registered at the prodding of Of course, the elections were held In this sense, the conduct and European donors and under the under the most intense scrutiny of the outcome of the election suggest a direction of Finance Minister Salam international media and international partial answer to the second ques- Fayyad. Abu Mazen also has a fairly election monitors. The United States tion, as well – voters registered their clear mandate to restore public order sent a high-level delegation of observ- clear rejection of Arafatism, at least by rationalizing the public security ers headed by former president Jimmy in domestic affairs. By most accounts, agencies and reining in the crimi- Carter, and the European Union also there was widespread voter dissatis- nal activities (including extortion dispatched about 260 monitors (in faction with the growing corruption, of businessmen) by various armed contrast to the barely thirty monitors cronyism, economic deterioration, gangs. The major obstacle will be the it sent for the first round of Ukrainian resistance of vested interests, includ- presidential elections). Nevertheless, ing those same gangs masquerading the conduct and outcome of the elec- Soon after Arafat's as "resistance groups," whose power, tion were primarily a testament to the independence, and personal prosper- desire of the Palestinians themselves demise, it seemed ity will be threatened. But efforts to to conduct their own affairs according that most Palestinians overcome this opposition will enjoy to the rules of democratic politics. For a fairly wide measure of public sup- example, voter turnout was over 60%, mourned him port, as evidenced by the general as high as in most democratic polities much more than they approval of Abu Mazen’s directive to where voting is not mandatory and security forces, shortly after his elec- about the same as in the 2001 prime missed him. tion, to demolish illegal buildings on ministerial election in Israel (which Gaza beach, and there is some basis the Palestinian election resembled for projecting that progress will be in the sense that it only involved the and breakdown of law and order in made on democratization and good direct election of a national leader; recent years. Thus, the demand for government – the first pillar of Presi- Legislative Council [parliamentary] greater adherence to legal norms in dent Bush’s vision, laid out in June elections are scheduled to be held politics that was implicit in the be- 2002, for Israel and the future state in July 2005). The turnout is even havior of voters was actually but one of Palestine. more significant given the decision dimension of the demand for broader of Hamas and Islamic Jihad not to transparency and accountability in Relations with Israel participate. On the other hand, the public affairs and greater attention Much more ambiguity attaches to the Islamists merely refrained from run- to economic needs after the election. significance of the election for external ning for office. Unlike opposition These demands resonated in the affairs, i.e., the future course of rela- elements in Iraq, they did not resort promise of all the candidates to bring tions with Israel. Here, the rejection of to violence or other forms of intimi- about change – an unstated but rather "Arafatism" is not so clear cut, either dation in an attempt to sabotage the obvious rejection of the way that Ara- in terms of ultimate Palestinian ends election or persuade voters to boycott fat had (mis)managed domestic affairs or the means by which they are to be the election. This stance almost cer- up to the very end. pursued. On the former, Abu Mazen's tainly reflected their appreciation of Abu Mazen's election gives him record suggests that he might be the widespread public desire for an the legitimacy to move forward on slightly more inclined to consider a

10 permanent status agreement along forced him to trim his message, to the terrorism track. Moreover, they leave the lines formulated in the "Clinton point of portraying himself as Arafat’s unanswered several critical questions: parameters" of December 2000 that protégé and successor despite the fact how long will Abu Mazen pursue his Arafat rejected. If so, that would not that he had not exchanged a word non-confrontational approach; what, contradict somewhat greater public with “the old man” for over a year fol- if anything, will persuade him that it receptivity to such ideas in the months lowing his resignation as prime min- has run its course if he fails to secure following Arafat's death. ister. In particular, he could not make voluntary compliance; does he have a But attitudes toward permanent an unequivocal commitment to deal fallback position; and what can or will status issues are of less immediacy forcefully with terrorists given the Israel do while this internal dialogue than are attitudes vis-à-vis de-esca- widespread popular conviction that plays itself out. lating the current situation in order violence against Israel – whatever its Because of Abu Mazen’s estab- to facilitate the resumption of nego- utility – does not qualify as terrorism lished record and known preferences, tiations. On this matter, Abu Mazen but is instead legitimate resistance in Israel (along with the United States would clearly prefer to act in keeping and most other outside parties) was with the second pillar of the Bush vi- inclined to look favorably on his sion, not to speak of Israeli conditions Progress by the candidacy. Many of his pre-election for a relaxation of military pressure statements were discounted by the and the resumption of political dia- Palestinian Authority Israeli government as campaign logue, and to establish a leadership on the democratization rhetoric (after all, Ariel Sharon’s own “untainted by terrorism.” Abu Mazen campaign slogans turned out to be has long been on record as opposed track of the Bush agenda poor predictors of his post-election to the armed intifada, insisting that may inhibit progress on policies), and Israeli action and inac- it is inimical to Palestinian interests, tion before and during the election and he persisted in this posture dur- the terrorism track. seemed almost designed to minimize ing the election campaign, refusing to any adverse impact on his domestic retract his condemnation of suicide credibility. Moreover, his election was bombings and mortar and rocket the cause of national liberation. Con- greeted by barely disguised expres- attacks on Israeli towns. Indeed, his sequently, Abu Mazen insisted that he sions of relief. Both the president of desire to rationalize the Palestinian would avoid coercion and rely only Israel and the prime minister sent security services in order to rein in on “dialogue” and “persuasion” to him messages of congratulations, and terrorists during his brief tenure as bring about a ceasefire, that Palestin- Sharon immediately announced that a prime minister in 2003 brought him ian security forces would not be used high-level meeting would take place into open confrontation with Arafat against terrorist groups but would soon, thereby hinting at the possibility and resulted in his resignation after actually protect them from Israeli pre- that Israel’s impending disengage- only three months in office. As a re- emption or reprisal, and that in any ment, already the subject of consulta- sult, there was every reason to expect event he would do nothing to provoke tions with the United States, Egypt, that Abu Mazen would not persist a Palestinian civil war. Since these po- and others, might not even be unilat- in Arafat’s policy of denouncing ter- sitions appear to be firmly within the eral with respect to the Palestinians. rorism for Western audiences while Palestinian consensus, that raises the Moreover, Israeli leaders focused their encouraging it in domestic rhetoric possibility, perhaps paradoxical, that initial expectations on matters such and back-channel subsidies. progress on the democratization track as incitement in the PA-controlled On the other hand, it was precisely of the Bush agenda for the Palestinian media that Abu Mazen could attend the exigencies of electoral politics that Authority may inhibit progress on the to without the concurrence of his do-

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 11 mestic opposition, and they signaled got his affairs in order, and it pressed its determination and ability to sup- some appreciation of Abu Mazen’s for some forcible response. The tenta- press violence were evident. At the need for time to confront the question tive resolution of this dilemma was to same time, Israel began to consider of terrorism. They even indicated an buy time by announcing a suspension measures of its own, such as prisoner understanding of the argument made of high-level political contacts with releases, that might further enhance by Abu Mazen’s defenders that he the PA and signaling that large-scale Abu Mazen’s domestic credibility. required Israeli help to consolidate his military action was imminent. This But in the absence of a more com- position and hinted at a continuation prompted more resolute declarations prehensive program, such actions of the technical coordination with PA of intent on the part of the PA and PLO provided few reliable guidelines for agencies and the easing of constraints leadership, orders banning public predicting future developments. Re- on movement within the West Bank displays of weapons on the streets, sistance to any plans by Abu Mazen to that were instituted in order to facili- and plans by the Palestinian Security reformulate Palestinian strategy, and tate election logistics. Service to prevent rocket attacks from especially to act on Israeli demands that he actually dismantle terrorist The Challenge of infrastructures, can be expected from Violence The functioning two main sources: the Islamist op- The honeymoon was brief. Within a position (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), week of Abu Mazen’s inauguration, of a Palestinian and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a barrage of rocket and mortar at- government is unlikely which are nominally an offshoot of the tacks and suicide bombings killed ten Tanzim (i.e., subordinate to Fatah) but Israelis and wounded dozens more to affect the substance in practice constitute an assortment of in settlements and military positions or timing of the Israeli small, loosely coordinated gangs that in Gaza, at the Karni cargo transfer answer to local warlords and are even facility on the border between Gaza disengagement. sometimes organized along clan lines. and Israel, and in the Israeli town of The former, especially Hamas, are Sderot, a few kilometers east of Gaza. relatively disciplined organizations One of these attacks actually took the northern Gaza Strip. These actions with political agendas, meaning that place on the day Abu Mazen arrived averted, at least temporarily, further they are responsive to public opinion, in Gaza to initiate direct discussions escalation of violence and a further including indications of a growing with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as if to complication of Abu Mazen’s task conviction that terrorism has become underscore by deed the defiant state- of asserting his authority through counterproductive. As a result, they ments issued by spokesmen of those political means. Indeed, opposition are potentially amenable to a ceasefire organizations. elements showed more receptivity to as part of a broader effort to stabilize These developments confronted Abu Mazen’s demands even as they conditions in PA-controlled territories, the Israeli government with a seri- insisted on far-reaching Israeli com- provided there is an incentive (e.g., ous dilemma. On the one hand, the mitments in exchange for compliance, power sharing) appealing enough entreaties of outside actors reinforced and the level of violence did drop dra- to override the inclination to reject its own calculus that self-restraint matically. As a result, security contacts a political agreement in the absence was best designed to help Abu Ma- between Israel and the PA intensified of a credible PA threat to use force. zen consolidate his authority. On the and political contacts were resumed, Against the backdrop of almost a other hand, public opinion rejected focusing first on modalities for an decade of fruitless on again–off again the notion that Israel should passively incremental handover of security re- PA–Hamas discussions, often encour- absorb casualties while Abu Mazen sponsibility to the PA in areas where aged by Egypt, there is little reason to

12 expect that current discussions will influence the modalities of the Israeli has been justified as a unilateral end differently unless new variables disengagement: a functioning govern- measure makes the outcome of the – the death of Arafat and the prospect ment able to enforce some measure settlers’ campaign relatively immune of Israeli disengagement – make a of public order in Gaza will make it to Palestinian intervention, one way critical difference. By late January, easier for Israel to coordinate with or another. Any hopes they still have expressions of PA confidence in the the PA and withdraw in an orderly of preventing the disengagement outcome were still rendered suspect fashion, which is its own preference therefore rest on the belief that while by Hamas’ ambiguous declarative and that of Abu Mazen (though not their opposition to withdrawal is firm, policy and its unambiguous actions of Hamas). But it is unlikely to affect support for it may be ambivalent and on the ground. And even if some the substance or timing of the Israeli might be swayed by some traumatic agreement were reached, it could not disengagement, which are almost event before or during the actual long endure unless the Islamists un- exclusively subject to internal Israeli evacuation of settlements. derwent a strategic transformation. variables. The question of disengage- But barring such a trauma, the Despite their ostensible subordina- ment has been constitutionally and le- Israeli road to disengagement is un- tion to Fatah, the Aqsa Brigades are gally settled by government approval likely to be affected by developments equally problematic. Their chaotic and Knesset ratification, and the de- in the PA. It is the post-disengagement structure makes them resistant to cen- cision is reinforced politically by the course that is hostage to Abu Mazen’s tral directives and the mixture of ideo- persistent support of approximately own fortunes. If he manages to make logical and instrumental motives that two-thirds of the public and the in- Arafatism simply a chapter in Pales- animates them makes them targets of a corporation of the Labor Party into a tinian history, that road may well lead “bidding war” between a PA tempted stable “disengagement coalition.” The to a serious political reengagement to co-opt them and outside elements settlers’ movement and its support- and a real prospect of conflict resolu- (Iran and/or Hizbollah) bent on sabo- ers continue to wage a campaign of tion. If not, the road may or may not taging any stabilization efforts. resistance, but they have failed thus pass through further unilateral ac- The degree to which these uncer- far to persuade the government or the tions by Israel, but either way it will tainties about the evolution of the Pal- public to reverse course. Furthermore, only lead to continued conflict along estinian Authority are resolved may the very fact that the disengagement a new set of frontlines.

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 13 Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks

Zaki Shalom

Introduction were invited to participate in the of the threats it confronted changed Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited Israel NATO sessions; for the first time further. For the foreseeable future the on February 23-24, 2005, in the first Israel received a formal invitation major threat facing the free world, official visit by a NATO secretary. The for its armed forces to participate in which NATO is supposed to defend, visit was intended to promote strate- multilateral NATO maneuvers; and comes from radical Islam, whose gic cooperation between NATO and Israel was also invited to participate primary sources of power lie mainly Israel, thus implementing a resolution in NATO security activities against in the Middle East. Iran's nuclear ac- passed during the NATO summit held terror threats, currently underway tivities have made a grave and more in Istanbul on June 28-29, 2004, calling in the Mediterranean. Israeli ambas- concrete contribution to the feeling 3 for increasing strategic cooperation sador to the EU Oded Eran recently of the threat facing NATO. between NATO and specific Medi- submitted to the NATO headquarters In order to neutralize or at least terranean countries, including Israel. a proposal for development of rela- reduce this threat, the growing assess- The issues intended in the context of tions between Israel and NATO. In ment among NATO member countries cooperation are activities against ter- this document Israel proposes raising is that it is important to increase mili- rorism; activities against weapons the level of its dialogue and coopera- tary cooperation with Israel as well of mass destruction; guaranteeing tion with NATO along bilateral and as with other Mediterranean states. 2 of borders; preparations for mass regional tracks. These states share the fear of radical disasters and states of emergency; These events clearly indicate in- Islam, and accordingly cooperation participation in NATO maneuvers; creasing interest on NATO's part in should be established more firmly consultations regarding defense re- greater cooperation with Israel than than in the past. It is therefore natural forms, including relations between in the past. The change in NATO's at- that Israel, which is vulnerable to the the political and military levels; and titude to Israel reflects the turnaround same threat and has earned much the prevention of arms and drug that has taken place in recent years experience in combating it, would be 1 smuggling. in the nature of the North Atlantic integrated in NATO activities. The final communiqué in Istanbul Treaty Organization, in its concept of Thus far formal membership in had concrete implications regarding the threats it faces and, consequently, NATO has not been proposed to Is- NATO's intention to deepen the ties its sense of who should be a member. rael. It seems that members of NATO with each of the Mediterranean coun- NATO was set up in order to confront hesitate to establish full relations with tries named, according to specific the Communist threat presented by Israel as long as the Israeli–Palestin- circumstances and needs. Official the USSR, a threat that decreased ian conflict continues and a political Israeli representatives, including significantly with the Soviet collapse. agreement is not in sight. However, the Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom Following the events of September 11, encouraging developments that have and Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, 2001, NATO's concept of the nature taken place recently in the Middle

14 East have increased NATO's interest it is proposed to Israel in the future. as it combats the terrorism threat. in expanding strategic cooperation Also included are the understand- However, this does not prevent them with Israel. These developments ings that Israel should conclude with from establishing broad cooperation include Israel's determination to NATO before it would agree to join with Israel in the military, political, implement the disengagement plan; the organization. and economic fields. As such, this the strengthening of Abu Mazen's denies legitimacy to actions that were regime in the Palestinian Author- Greater Cooperation and perhaps are still in effect on the ity; the growing recognition by the between Israel and part of the Palestinians and other Arab Palestinian leadership of the need to NATO countries, such as forceful activities prevent terrorism against Israel; the From Israel's point of view, strength- aimed at weakening Israel's strategic Sharm el-Sheikh conference; and the ening the security cooperation with posture or isolating it in the political strengthening of relations between NATO has important potential ad- and economic arenas. Israel and Egypt. vantages in four areas: diplomatic, Strengthening the cooperation This is the backdrop to NATO's with NATO countries will most current interest in establishing close probably enhance Israel's bargaining working relations with Israel, without The argument that ability in its contacts with the Ameri- far-reaching formal commitments. can administration and also with the This approach allows the NATO integration in NATO countries of the European Union, countries to observe from close up the will increase Israel's most of which are NATO members. development of the political process Until now Israel has acted with the between Israel and the Palestinians, deterrent capability is image of a fairly isolated country in and to upgrade relations, based on a true to only a limited the international community, whose timetable convenient both for them sole ally is the US. When cooperation and Israel, where at the end of the extent, if at all. with the NATO countries increases, process the option of Israel's formal it will become clear that Israel no integration in NATO might arise. If longer bases its security only on links a viable political process between strategic-defense, military-technologi- with the United States. A greater sup- Israel and the Palestinian Authority cal, and economic. portive environment makes Israel less does not begin, it will be possible From the diplomatic aspect, dependent on any one ally, and thus to reduce, or even totally halt the strengthening the security coopera- boosts its bargaining potential. cooperation, by relatively simple tion with NATO countries will consid- From the strategic-defense aspect, 4 "administrative" means. With this erably enhance Israel's political status. cooperation with NATO countries in mind, the essay that follows ad- It will be made clear to the Palestinian will enhance Israel's deterrence ca- dresses the various considerations Authority and Arab countries, in- pability regarding potential enemies that Israel must take into account cluding Egypt, that the international threatening it, mainly Iran and Syria. when deciding on the nature of its fu- community does not necessarily hinge Enemy countries will have to take into ture relations with NATO. The essay cooperation with Israel on broad po- account at least the possibility that presents the various considerations litical agreement. It is clear that most Israel will not stand totally alone in at two different points on the time NATO countries do not agree with Is- the event of a war with them, even if axis: the advantages latent in practi- rael on its obligations in a final status actual assistance is not obligated by cal strategic-military cooperation at agreement with the Palestinians, its the protocol. The more Israel's image the present time; and the pitfalls in activities in the occupied territories, is strengthened as a country facing formally joining NATO, if and when and many aspects of its defense policy enemies who attempt to attack it for

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 15 no justified reason, the greater will be be exposed to sources of information rael must take into account the danger the possibility that aid will be extend- and methods of operation that up to that increased practical cooperation ed to Israel by NATO. Furthermore, now have not been accessible. with NATO countries will entangle Iran and Syria will have to take into From the economic aspect, in- it in a mass of dependencies that will account the possibility that the in- creased cooperation with NATO not totally prevent, but will make it creasing cooperation between Israel countries will award Israel a special difficult to refuse, accepting an offer and NATO will strengthen Israel's status regarding arms deals – both in of full membership of NATO. links with Turkey, also a member of exports and imports. Although Israel NATO. Given Turkey's impressive already enjoys a significant status as Israel's Membership in 5 military potential and its geographic a major non-NATO ally of the US, NATO: A Problematic proximity to both Iran and Syria, it may be assumed that increased Option Israel's operational options against cooperation will expose the NATO At present the Israeli-Palestinian con- them, if and when it sees the need, countries to Israel's special military- flict constitutes the foremost obstacle could gain considerable strength. to Israel's membership in NATO. At the same time, increased practi- If and when there appears on the cal cooperation with NATO countries The inclination of horizon the possibility of a political does not excessively tie Israel's hands. settlement, even if only a limited one, As long as Israel is not a formal NATO members will be it may be assumed that the question of member of NATO, it can undertake to demand that Israel Israel's full and formal membership in a unilateral military initiative if it NATO will arise. Formal membership feels threatened or if its vital interests reduce even further in the organization will certainly en- are endangered, without necessarily the extent of its military hance the advantages discussed above being accused by members of the or- that are latent in cooperation with this ganization of a betrayal of trust. This operations. powerful strategic organization. Fur- would be the case if, for example, thermore, if additional Arab countries Israel were to decide to attack Iran's join NATO at the same time as Israel, nuclear facilities, or if it were to see fit technological capabilities, including this is likely to strengthen the fabric to initiate a military operation against methods of combating terror. The of cooperation in relations between Syria or the Palestinian Authority. result may well be the expansion of Israel and the Arab world in establish- Regarding the military-techno- export markets for Israeli weapon ing a solid peaceful atmosphere. logical dimension, cooperation with and combat systems. However, the question of Israel's NATO countries is likely to expose In the final analysis, the continu- formal membership in NATO – when Israel to advanced technologies and ation and strengthening of military this becomes relevant – obligates a military operational methods that cooperation with NATO countries different and more extensive set of will help it cope better with future serves the political-military-economic considerations than those regarding threats that it may encounter, both interests of Israel. It has significant the cooperation that is currently under in the event of war or during current potential gains with relatively few discussion. This set of considerations security activities. Joint maneuvers costs. The major issue that must raises grave questions regarding the with NATO countries will enhance be addressed regarding increased value of this step. IDF knowledge and experience in cooperation with NATO is the final The argument that integration in the large-scale operation of land, sea, product at the end of the road, i.e., the NATO will increase Israel's deterrent and air forces. In addition, as part of possibility that Israel will be offered capability is true to only a limited the war against terrorism, Israel may full, formal membership in NATO. Is- extent, if at all:

16 ■ The order of battle currently and the more immediate threat con- Even if we posit that an Arab– possessed by Israel awards it consid- fronting Israel now and in the fore- Israeli military confrontation is a real erable strength, permitting it to create seeable future is that of low-intensity possibility in the foreseeable future a reliable dimension of deterrence warfare, which might include the use and that it is worthwhile for Israel to against potential threats of a military of certain types of mass destruction have a NATO guarantee, the question confrontation. capabilities. Israel is therefore re- remains regarding the reliability of the ■ Israel possesses strong bilateral quired to find a deterrent capability commitments of member countries relations with the US, which in prac- against these types of threats, all the to come to Israel's aid if its security tice award it the status of an informal while aware that it lacks internal and or vital interests are endangered. ally. Since Israel's establishment, all external legitimacy for the use of its The history of the State of Israel US administrations have declared total capability and as such is com- contains not a few cases in which the their deep commitment toward Israel pelled to restrict its use of force. international community, including and to preserving its sovereignty and Consequently, it is doubtful if the the United States, preferred to ignore territorial integrity. its commitments, even when signed ■ Israel possesses a nuclear op- agreements and understandings tion, i.e., it enjoys a situation in which Israel would be existed. When put to the test, various the countries of the region, and in required to neutralize or considerations and interests are likely fact, the entire international com- to cause NATO countries to reach munity, regard it as a country having place under supervision the conclusion that it is preferable a nuclear capability without it itself its own nuclear facilities for them to avoid providing real aid ever having stated whether or not it in order to justify similar to Israel in order to minimize the possesses such a capability. damage incurred by honoring their ■ Practical cooperation with action against other commitments. NATO countries has already ex- states in the region. The NATO treaty, like many panded and will continue to expand international agreements, supplies Israel's deterrent capability. the member countries with a broad Thus the question that must be additional capability that may be range of legal and formal arguments asked is: will Israel's formal member- achieved by joining NATO will be that elegantly permits them to evade ship in NATO increase its deterrent of significance in increasing Israel's fulfilling their commitments. Vari- strength beyond that which it would deterrent capability against these ous terms that appear in Article 5 of already possess and likely possess threats. Moreover, it is difficult to the organization's convention – the in the foreseeable future? It seems assume that membership in NATO article defining the nature of the mu- that joining NATO will contribute will increase Israel's political ability tual guarantee – are terms capable of to Israel's deterrent capability only to use the entire strength it currently a variety of interpretations. As such marginally, if at all. possesses. On the contrary, it is rea- they can provide a wide range of Furthermore, the major threat sonable to assume that the inclination reasons justifying a failure to imple- confronting Israel currently and in of NATO members will be to demand ment the guarantee to supply aid in the foreseeable future is not that of that Israel reduce even further the the event of an attack. The capability an all-out war involving regular mili- extent of its military operations of each country to realize this option tary forces, for which the additional and avoid taking steps that might of evasion is of course conditional on strength of NATO would indeed be impinge on individual liberties or its relative strength in the organiza- significant. The possibility of such a norms of war within the international tion and its dependence on the other threat has decreased in recent years, community. member countries.

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 17 Another possibility that must be freedom of action at a time of crisis in- Israel had no alternative other than taken into account is that the NATO volving an Arab or Islamic state. The to develop an independent nuclear countries might wish to act as re- NATO convention does not formally option. If Israel did in fact join a quired by the treaty and aid Israel rule out unilateral action by one of strong and stable international de- in the event of its being attacked, the member countries taken in order fense treaty organization, in which but will be unable to do so because to defend its vital interests. However, the US is also a member, it could of objective, concrete reasons. For without doubt at least some of the se- easily be argued that it no longer instance, if member countries are nior member countries would expect has a reason to justify retaining the involved in another conflict at the Israel, which would rely on protec- nuclear option. same time, they may already be tion by the powers in the event of its Such a step would confront Israel obligated to allocate most of their being attacked, to consult with them, with a dangerous situation regarding resources elsewhere. Or, there may be or at least inform them before it took one of its major sources of strength. strong internal opposition to military action liable to drag them toward an At this stage and in the foreseeable involvement on Israel's behalf and it overall military confrontation with future Israel is unable to give up the will be necessary to achieve a broad another country. nuclear option. However, its demand national consensus for such a step. These circumstances would con- that nuclear threats by other coun- Such processes can take a long time front Israel with a grave dilemma. tries in the region be neutralized will and involve protracted negotiations If it decides to consult members of encounter demands to practice what between opposing elements. NATO before taking military action, it preaches. In other words, Israel From Israel's point of view, how- it must expect to encounter opposi- will be required to neutralize or place ever, the time element is liable to be tion from most if not all of them. If it under supervision its own nuclear critical in periods of strategic crisis, acts despite this, it will be regarded facilities in order to justify similar and aid that is not supplied immedi- as ignoring the views of its fellow action against other states in the ately may become irrelevant. At the members. If it acts without prior region. It is very doubtful if Israel’s same time, the American administra- consultation with NATO countries, leadership will be capable of with- tion, considered the major element in it will take the risk of prompting standing the pressures applied to it at Israel's defense, already demonstrat- angry responses by them because a time when an apparently generous ed its willingness to defend Israel at they have been presented with a fait and far-reaching proposal of formal a time when it faced grave danger accompli contrary to the atmosphere membership in the most powerful during the Yom Kippur War, without that is supposed to exist between the strategic alliance is extended. being formally obligated to do so as members of the organization. Another factor that should deter part of any defense treaty. It is there- Furthermore, Israel's member- Israel from joining NATO is the com- fore doubtful if the marginal addition ship in NATO would likely incur mitment made by every candidate of NATO membership will provide increased pressure to surrender the member according to Article 5 to a significant contribution to Israel's nuclear option it currently possesses. supply military aid to a NATO mem- 6 security, and thus it seems preferable One of Israel's major arguments justi- ber attacked by another country. for Israel to examine strengthening fying its nuclear option was that the Consequently Israel must consider its strategic links with the US in the Western powers were not prepared to the possibility, remote though it may direction of a bilateral treaty, rather provide it with "absolute" guarantees seem, that NATO membership may than joining NATO. for its defense as part of a permanent lead to pressure to send forces to Another consideration is the defense treaty, along the lines of the distant areas for a war in which it has risk that NATO membership would NATO alliance. Consequently, sur- no direct interest. This is a situation considerably restrict Israel's military vival considerations dictated that that Israel has not experienced, and

18 without doubt would spark broad The final consideration involves with a variety of forms of pressure. opposition among the Israeli public. the political dimension of the settle- The overall result might be a major re- The IDF, it will almost certainly be ment with the Palestinians. The Euro- duction in the status and weight of the argued, was established as an army pean countries play a dominant role US in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Such to defend the state and the people of in NATO, but their stance on a final a development is contrary to Israel's Israel, and it is therefore inconceiv- settlement is in general contrary to interests. It is therefore important for able that the lives of Israeli soldiers Israel's position. Israel's joining NATO Israel to ensure that the United States, should be endangered in missions is liable to award the European coun- rather than European states, continue that do not directly relate to Israel's tries greater legitimacy for involve- to lead the political process in the 7 defense. ment in the political process, along Middle East.

Conclusion

The Istanbul declaration provides a clear expression whether membership in NATO serves its interests. of a new marked tendency by NATO to upgrade its Now, however, is the time for Israel to deliberate the relations with Israel. The invitation to senior Israeli issue, particularly given the weight of the factors representatives to take part in varied sessions of the opposing formal NATO membership. Israel's overall organizational institutions and the invitation to Is- interest is to strengthen the strategic cooperation rael to participate in multilateral NATO maneuvers with member countries of NATO without crossing are among the clear indicators of this trend. Such a the threshold of formal membership. It is virtually process awards Israel important political, strategic- certain that in the foreseeable future NATO will have military, and economic advantages, and imposes no a similar interest, namely, to maintain or else enhance excessive restrictions on it. It permits each of the sides the strategic cooperation with Israel. to cooperate up to the level it finds convenient, on the If however, the option is raised of formal member- understanding that such a move will serve its inter- ship, it is essential that Israel achieve understand- ests. It is therefore not surprising that various circles ing with the leading countries in NATO regarding 8 in Israel regard this status most favorably. two major issues. The first is that NATO members Until now Israel has not been formally invited to will agree to the existing strategic understandings join NATO. It seems that the major obstacle to mem- between Israel and the US regarding the nuclear bership is the absence of a viable political process option. In addition, Israel's military freedom of ac- that could lead to a settlement between Israel and tion must not be limited by NATO countries if and the Palestinians. If and when such a process begins, when Israel feels that a real threat exists to it or to Israel may be required to address the question of its vital interests.

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 19 Notes Middle East," Deputy Secretary Gen- 7. For the official positions of the Eu- 1. The Istanbul declaration followed the eral’s Keynote Address at the Royal ropean Union regarding the Israeli- Mediterranean Dialogue initiative United Services Institute Conference, Palestinian conflict, see the European announced at the meeting of NATO November 29, 2004. Union and the Middle East Peace ministers in December 1994. At that 4. Amir Oren, "Don't Misunderstand Process, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ time strategic cooperation was dis- Us," an interview with the secretary external_relations/mepp/index.htm. cussed between NATO members and of NATO, Haaretz, February 24, 2005. On the disputes between Israel and the seven Mediterranean countries: Alge- 5. On the status of an ally that is not a EU, see Akiva Eldar, "Europe is Invest- ria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, member of NATO, see: Dore Gold, ing, Europe Wants a Return," Haaretz, Morocco, and Tunisia: http://www. Israel as an American Non-NATO Ally: April 22, 2004; Shlomo Shamir and nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-de- Parameters of Defense-Industrial Co- Aluf Ben, "A Crisis between Israel and cember/e1208c.htm operation, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Europe following the Condemnation 2. Amir Oren, "Muhammad, 30 Push- Strategic Studies, 1992. of the Fence in the UN," Haaretz, July ups," Haaretz, February 11, 2005. See 6. "The Parties agree that an armed attack 22, 2004; Natan Gutman, "The EU de- also Amos Harel, "They want an af- against one or more of them in Europe mands that Israel Halt Construction fair with the IDF, but not a marriage: or North America shall be considered of the Fence and Dismantle it. The US as part of the world struggle against an attack against them all and con- Opposes Transferring the Debate to terror NATO is vigorously courting sequently they agree that, if such an the UN," Haaretz, July 11, 2004. Israel and is inviting it to numerous armed attack occurs, each of them, in 8. See the announcement of the Israeli exercises. However, Israel's joining exercise of the right of individual or ambassador to the EU, Oded Eran, the organization is still out of the ques- collective self-defense recognized by regarding Israel's desire to expand tion," Haaretz, December 16, 2004. Article 51 of the Charter of the United its cooperation with NATO countries, 3. Chuck Hagel, "NATO Expands Its Nations, will assist the Party or Par- Mark John, Reuter's Agency, February Boundaries," USA Today, March 2004, ties so attacked by taking forthwith, 9, 2005. See also Amnon Abramovitz, pp. 54-57. See also Thomas L. Fried- individually and in concert with the "Israel is approaching NATO," Ulpan man, "Expanding Club NATO," New other Parties, such action as it deems Shishi, Channel 2 television, January York Times, October 26, 2004; and necessary, including the use of armed 28, 2005, from Yifat, Media Informa- "NATO, the Mediterranean and the force, to restore and maintain the se- tion, Tel Aviv. curity of the North Atlantic area.”

20 The Recent American Intelligence Failures

Ephraim Kam

eading Western intelligence solid information on the planning and A comprehensive report on the Iraqi communities are currently preparation of terrorist attacks joined case was also prepared by the Sen- 2 confronting a wave of intense obstacles that prevented the little in- ate intelligence commission, and Lcriticism following two serious intel- telligence information available from another investigation is supposed to ligence failures: one relating to the reaching the hands of experts who be conducted according to specific terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, might have been able to use it to warn government directives. The Iraq af- and the other relating to the war in of the attack. These factors produced fair prompted two smaller foreign Iraq. The most serious criticism is the defective intelligence assessments reports: one prepared by the British leveled at the American intelligence preceding the attack itself. In the case parliament, which examined the Brit- 3 community, in part because it was of Iraq, the main problem was one of ish intelligence community; and one involved in both failures but also, research and analysis: a lack of high prepared by the Knesset’s Foreign 4 and primarily, because the results of quality intelligence information, poor Affairs and Defense Committee. the failures were extremely damaging management, and organizational de- All the reports, but above all the to the United States. Critics perceive ficiencies meant that the fundamental reports published in the United States, these failures of the American intel- premise underlying the intelligence shed new light on the complex issue ligence community as symptomatic assessment was mistaken. The two of intelligence failures. This article of systemic, non-isolated defects. Ad- cases are thus fundamentally dif- examines how the findings enhance ditional – albeit less severe – criticism ferent, yet when examined together the understanding of intelligence is directed against the British and complement one another and provide failures on a strategic level, and con- Israeli intelligence communities, and a better understanding of the chal- siders what intelligence communities the calls for reform of these systems lenges facing the world’s intelligence around the world can learn in their match similar efforts elsewhere in communities today. efforts to minimize future strategic Europe. Some of these proposals have Three investigative reports on the surprises. To this end, selected issues far-reaching implications. intelligence system were prepared in in the American reports that have While the two intelligence chapters the United States in the aftermath of fundamental implications for the phe- reflect an overall systemic weakness September 11: a joint report by the nomenon of intelligence failures are within the American intelligence com- intelligence committees of the Senate explored. The analysis below is based munity, they also represent two dis- and the House of Representatives; a specifically on these reports, and tinct types of intelligence failures. The report by a national commission of therefore the article does not address failure of September 11 was primarily inquiry; and a report by the CIA’s other aspects of intelligence failures a combination of inadequate intel- inspector general (which remains or elements that bear on the American ligence gathering and organizational classified, with only some of its intelligence community alone. 1 problems. In other words, a lack of conclusions leaked to the media).

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 21 The Intelligence These pieces of the puzzle, howev- them from their personal or national Conundrum of er, did not mesh to yield a clear under- histories. This approach is clearly September 11 standing of the threat, and therefore inadequate when an event has no The investigative reports addressing did not facilitate issuing a warning. precedent or parallel, yet because the the September 11 attack highlight seri- Despite the feeling of an impending warnings leading up to September ous intelligence problems. The early attack, intelligence agencies had no 11, which were not based on solid warning puzzle that the American solid information clarifying the nature information, did not coalesce to form intelligence community attempted to of the threat or details such as time or a clear picture, analysts kept working construct in the period before the at- place. No one imagined that the attack along traditional lines, with scenarios tack had too few pieces. Furthermore, would involve crashing planes into of attacks outside the United States or the pieces that were present were buildings. There was no precedent attacks for the release of prisoners or not interconnected within an overall for such an attack, and it appeared other concessions. The possibility of a picture; their position in the scheme too fantastical to be logical. Agen- plane hijacked as a suicide attack was of things was not at all apparent; and considered low. The sense that some- they did not yield a clear early warn- thing drastic was imminent had little ing assessment. Because the warnings impact, nor do the reports sufficiently The pieces of the puzzle were as explain why American security agen- follows: since 1997, the American leading up to September cies did not mobilize to prevent even intelligence community clearly un- 11 did not coalesce to a familiar attack designed to extract derstood that al-Qaeda was more than some ransom. And, while the number just another terrorist organization and form a clear picture, and severity of warnings was unprec- that it was working to develop a new analysts kept working edented, the report concludes that even in retrospect it is still not clear if brand of terrorism. US agencies had along traditional lines. intelligence that al-Qaeda was plan- these non-specific warning signs were ning either a plane hijacking to secure related to the September 11 attack or the release of imprisoned Islamists, or to something else. a large-scale attack to be carried out cies therefore focused on the more The reports reveal that between against American targets, perhaps in "reasonable" familiar possibilities of January 2000 and August 2001 ten the United States. New York’s World an attack on American installations opportunities to begin understand- Trade Center was not an unfamiliar outside the United States and the use ing the preparations for the attack target, as Islamic extremists had al- of more standard forms of terrorism, were missed. Using intelligence ter- ready attacked it in February 1993. such as a plane hijacking to secure the minology, it can be said that at these Prior to September 11, intelligence release of prisoners. junctures, early warning indicators agencies uncovered slivers of infor- Although the reports fail to explain pointing at the nature of the imminent mation indicating that terrorists were why these warnings did not result in attack and the fact that preparations considering using planes as weapons, an estimation that planes might be were underway emerged from the along with another intelligence item hijacked and used for mass-casualty activities of those who eventually car- that mentioned the idea of blowing attacks, this can be partially explained ried it out. Some signals were related up a plane at CIA headquarters. To- by the manner in which intelligence to the entry of two of the hijackers wards the summer of 2001, there was analysts interpret information. When into the United States. However, ten a growing feeling that a large attack analysts face unfamiliar material, they indicators, some of them unrelated to was imminent, with preparations attempt to understand it by draw- each other, are relatively few, and it either complete or nearly so. ing parallels with events familiar to would have been difficult to generate

22 a meaningful understanding of the intelligence community before Sep- struction (WMD) represents a classic situation based solely on them. Before tember 11. Based on the information formula for a strategic surprise. This the Yom Kippur War, Israeli intel- at its disposal, American agencies formula has three fundamental com- ligence had hundreds of indicators, had almost no chance of generating ponents: yet it was still difficult to construct an an accurate assessment regarding the ■ evolution of a prevalent con- unequivocal early warning picture. attack. The only way to master such ception in part as a result of group In the case of September 11, all ten a problem would have been to obtain thinking opportunities were missed, whether much higher quality intelligence in- ■ reliance on problematic intel- because the intelligence analysts formation from within al-Qaeda itself ligence information did not realize the importance and by infiltrating its ranks, an unusually ■ adapting intelligence informa- meaning of the indicators or because difficult task. For this reason, FBI di- tion to fit the prevalent conception. the information was not passed on to rector Robert Mueller’s testimony The Prevalent Conception: Dur- those who might have been able to before the joint congressional inquiry ing the 1990s, the American intel- understand its significance. ligence community generated an In any case, the inquiry’s findings assessment that Iraq had an active reveal how weak these indicators actu- For intelligence program for developing weapons of ally were. FBI officials testified before mass destruction, and that this pro- the national commission of inquiry communities, the only gram was more extensive than the one that even if they had arrested one or constructive outcome of that had existed prior to the Gulf War. two of the hijackers, this would not This assessment, which remained un- have prevented the attack. The com- September 11 is that it shaken until the 2003 war, was based mittee itself did not reach a decisive presents a mega-attack on a number of premises: Saddam conclusion on this point. In one part Hussein had not changed his strategic of the report, the committee reasoned precedent. approach; Iraq had possessed chemi- that if two of the hijackers had been cal and biological weapons, long- arrested, it is possible that their inter- range missiles, and an active nuclear rogation might have led authorities to appears justifiable: “Looking at each program before the Gulf War; Iraq’s other hijackers, thus obstructing the of the areas that we could have done supply of scientific personnel had not attack. In another part of the report, better, I'm not certain you get to where been damaged, and the country knew the committee stated that arresting we stop these individuals.” For intelli- how to produce these types of weap- two of the hijackers would not have gence communities, the only construc- ons; Iraq did not provide satisfactory prevented the attack: the two individu- tive outcome of September 11 is that answers regarding what happened to als in question were hijackers and not it presents a mega-attack precedent, some of the weapons it possessed up pilots, and were therefore not of critical requiring analysts to focus more on to the Gulf War, and there was reason importance for the attacks. When other obtaining information, generating to suspect that the government had non-pilot hijackers were denied visas early warning scenarios, and taking hidden them; Iraq had a history of to the United States, al-Qaeda was able preventative measures against pos- concealment and fraud; the reports of to adapt to the situation and replace sible mega-attacks in the future. the UN weapons inspectors reinforced them with substitute operatives. suspicions against Iraq, and their ex- In retrospect it is clear that the low The Failure with Regard pulsion from the country in 1998 was quality of indicators and the lack of to Iraq perceived as evidence of Iraqi inten- a precedent for such an attack were The mistaken assessment that in 2003 tions to continue developing weapons critical problems for the American Iraq possessed weapons of mass de- of mass destruction.

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 23 The commission of inquiry found cause the intelligence information its assessment, and that the failure to that most of the key components of was of low quality, it was easily tai- uncover WMD in Iraq stemmed from this assessment were either not sup- lored to fit the prevalent conception. the difficulties of disclosure within ported by intelligence information or Intelligence analysts disregarded such a large area. were exaggerated beyond what the indications that dual use materials The assessment that Iraq pos- information indicated, due to flaws were meant for civilian or conven- sessed weapons of mass destruction existing primarily in the realm of tional military purposes, and not prompted intelligence gathering and analysis. In a number of important necessarily for non-conventional analysis that were mutually rein- instances, portions of the assessment use. Information that contradicted forcing. Information garnered from were based on old material, uncon- the prevalent conception was quickly human intelligence sources did not in- firmed with updated intelligence. rejected. For instance, when the UN clude questions such as did Iraq have The heads of the intelligence com- inspectors returned to Iraq in 2002 non-conventional weapons. Further- munity instructed their analysts to and reported that they found no more, questions were phrased based reassess neither the components of on the premise that Iraq did in fact the assessment nor their relationship possess such weapons and focused on to intelligence information. The assessment that uncovering the nature and location of Problematic Intelligence Infor- Iraq possessed weapons activity in this realm. Thus, analysts mation: The intelligence community never received information indicat- had no high quality, solid information of mass destruction ing that Iraq had ceased producing at its disposal with regard to the is- prompted intelligence weapons of mass destruction and as sue of weapons of mass destruction gathering and analysis a result, sources denying the existence in Iraq. It therefore relied on indica- of WMD production programs were tors or pieces of information on Iraqi that were mutually considered to be either deceitful or activities that could be interpreted in reinforcing. uninformed. different ways. A significant portion The report on the intelligence fail- of these signals were reports that Iraq ure regarding Iraq includes a detailed purchased dual use equipment and evidence of biological weapons in a and systematic analysis of pieces materials that could be used for legiti- suspected installation, intelligence of the information that were at the mate civilian purposes as well as for agencies claimed that the report disposal of the American intelligence WMD development. The intelligence resulted from a lack of experience community until the war. Today it has community chose to interpret these on the part of the inspectors in over- been officially determined that on the factors as stringently as possible, as coming Iraqi duplicity. The absence eve of the war Iraq did not possess indication of the existence of a mili- of high quality information should weapons of mass destruction, and the tary program. Retrospective analysis have encouraged the intelligence retrospective analysis of the informa- of this information by the commission community to reassess and challenge tion as presented in the report is cor- of inquiry reveals that the intelligence its longstanding prevalent concep- rect. But the report’s analysis is only did not explicitly indicate that the ac- tion. In practice, however, the ab- wiser after the fact, and does not help tivity in question was related to WMD sence of information was attributed address the analytical difficulties that development programs. Rather, this to Iraqi attempts at concealment and intelligence analysts faced during the was a conclusion of the intelligence therefore did not cast doubt on the period leading up to the war. These community, which lacked unequivo- conception. In fact, as late as the end difficulties included: cal supporting evidence. of 2003, months after the war in Iraq, ■ The construct of assump- Adapting the Intelligence: Be- the CIA announced that it still upheld tions that Iraq had weapons of mass

24 destruction appeared cogent, while The result was that even though the with the process. Apparently, this is no alternative assessments showing that information did not prove it explicitly, coincidence. During the last ten years, Iraq did not possess such weapons it made more sense to interpret the various suggestions have been made were less convincing. information in a suspicious manner. within the intelligence community, ■ It is true that the assessment After all, the commissions investigat- the political system, and academia strayed from the intelligence infor- ing September 11 were critical of the aimed at improving the analysis mation and was not fully supported. intelligence community for failing to process. Some of these suggestions However, that is the nature of intel- interpret suggestive factors in this are related to advanced methods of ligence information, especially when way. processing information and different dealing with strategic is- approaches to establishing sues. In such cases, intelli- and assessing premises. On gence information does not The commission regarding the one hand, implementing unequivocally determine September 11 criticized intelligence these suggestions may do no situations, but rather leaves damage and may even be them open for interpreta- agencies for not being creative enough useful at times. On the other tion and assessment. When in their interpretation of the existing hand, they address only the a dominant assessment peripheral problems and thus seems logical and is not signals to envision the unprecedented far have failed to inspire a contradicted by other in- possibility of planes being crashed significant breakthrough in telligence information, it is into buildings. this realm. difficult to dislodge it in real For example, the com- time. n mittees of inquiry offer no ■ There was more jus- In contrast, the commission on Iraq remedy for one of the main tification for interpreting difficulties in generating in- ambiguous information was critical of intelligence agencies for telligence assessments: how in a suspicious direction, being too creative, and for interpreting to interpret signals that do concluding that Iraq did not provide an unequivocal in fact possess weapons of the signals at their disposal in answer to a question and can mass destruction, than dis- an overall assessment that Iraq be interpreted in different missing the suspicions. For possessed WMD. ways. As there is no clear instance, intelligence infor- solution to this problem, the mation indicated that Iraq committees chose to look in had rebuilt or expanded other, sometimes contradic- installations that had in the past been Committee tory directions. Thus, the commission related to its biological weapons pro- Recommendations of inquiry regarding September 11 duction program, and that the country Although the intelligence failures criticized intelligence agencies for was undertaking studies that could surrounding Iraq and, to a degree, not being creative enough in their be applied to biological weapons September 11 were in the realm of interpretation of the existing signals production. At the same time, only assessments, the investigative com- to envision the unprecedented pos- a small number of reports held that mittees made no recommendations sibility of planes being crashed into Iraq’s activity was directly related aimed at improving the analysis buildings. In contrast, the commission to a program for the development or process. Instead, they made due with of inquiry on Iraq was critical of intel- production of biological weapons. pointing out some of the problems ligence agencies for being too creative,

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 25 and for interpreting the signals at their commission’s major organizational cessful. In the meantime, President disposal in an overall assessment that recommendation was to institute Bush has approved the recommended Iraq possessed WMD. closer integration among intelligence reforms and in mid-February 2005 Nonetheless, between the lines of agencies by: appointed John Negroponte, the the report of the committee of inquiry ■ establishing a separate position American ambassador to Iraq, as the on Iraq there is a contribution of sorts of director of national intelligence, director of national intelligence. The to an improvement of the analysis which until now was a job performed administration did express doubts process. The commission undertook by the director of the CIA. The direc- about some aspects of the reform, a comprehensive evaluation of the tor of intelligence is meant to hold especially the exercise of far-reaching degree to which the American intel- extensive powers, and his/her tasks budgetary powers by the director of ligence assessment on Iraq’s WMD are to include improving coordina- intelligence. However, it remains to be was based on hard intelligence infor- tion among the intelligence agencies, seen whether the director of national mation. It revealed the intelligence breaking down inter-agency barriers, intelligence will garner the necessary community’s systemic tendency to determining priorities for the intel- power to establish the position seri- generate assessments that were not ligence community as a whole, shap- ously, or whether the position will based squarely on intelligence in- ing intelligence community policy, not be taken seriously by the various formation. Therefore, it would make and determining budget distribution agencies and thus fail to take off. sense for intelligence communities within the community. On this issue, former CIA director – including the Israeli intelligence ■ establishing integrated intel- George Tenet opined that a director community – to initiate regular com- ligence centers for certain realms, first of national intelligence who is isolated prehensive assessments of important and foremost, a national center for from the CIA will be powerless. issues by means of internal bodies, the war on terrorism. This center will While organizational change is or even better, external bodies. While comprise a joint center for intelligence likely to help decrease certain prob- the type of investigation undertaken and a center for joint operations, and lems emerging from the intelligence by the commission of inquiry on Iraq will include representatives of all the process, it is also likely to damage served as a clear advantage when intelligence agencies. It will take the the system. Moreover, in some in- determining the after-the-fact assess- lead in strategic intelligence analysis stances it will not be clear at the outset ment that Iraq had no weapons of based on intelligence information whether the expected improvement mass destruction, similar inquiries can provided by all possible sources. will outweigh the damage caused. also be undertaken retrospectively in Next, integrated intelligence centers Therefore, the best approach towards order to shed light on the weak links in other realms will be established as implementing organizational reform in the system of premises underlying well, based on the center for the war within the intelligence community is intelligence assessments. on terrorism. careful, gradual change, and only to The bulk of recommendations of- ■ establishing a control body the extent necessary. In this context, fered by the American commission that will examine certain intelligence the conclusions of the chairman of of inquiry are organizational, and issues, identify problems and ways the commission of inquiry on Iraq are their major motivation was the failure of addressing them, assess the overall especially relevant. It is important, he surrounding September 11 and the intelligence community, and assist in stressed, that the proposed reforms conclusion that the compartmental- coordination, cooperation, and break- do not cause damage, that change is ization of information and the lack of ing down inter-agency barriers. not implemented simply for the sake coordination among and within the At the present, only time will of change, and that it is kept in mind various intelligence agencies played prove if the reforms within the Ameri- that many of the solutions under con- an important role in the failure. The can intelligence community are suc- sideration are unattainable.

26 The recommended increase in inte- intelligence assessments may be com- ligence agencies without substantial gration among the various intelligence promised as disagreements among integration, in order to preserve each agencies has generated concern that the agencies recede. As an example, organization’s independent thinking organizational changes might cause it is helpful to consider the issue of and operating style. damage. During the 1960s and 1970s, Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass The commissions that investigated the trend in the United States and destruction. The research units of the the events of September 11 pointed to Israel was to work towards pluralism State Department and the Depart- real coordination problems, such as within the intelligence community ment of Energy were less convinced information compartmentalization in order to provide decision-makers than other agencies that Iraq had and obstacles blocking the transfer with a wide spectrum of assessments. such weapons. In a more integrated of information within and among In this context, the intelligence agency structure, such atypical assessments the intelligence agencies. Compart- of the American Department of De- would be likely to disappear. mentalization has resulted from the fense (the DIA – Defense Intelligence legitimate desire to protect sensitive Agency) was established in 1961, intelligence sources, as well as from among other reasons, in order to cre- inter-agency power struggles. How- ate a counterbalance to the CIA. In It is important that the ever, it also has the potential to cause Israel, the Agranat Commission (1974) proposed reforms do damage, sometimes serious damage, recommended creating a counterbal- not cause damage, to the intelligence community’s as- ance for the monopoly in the realm of sessment capability. It would there- intelligence assessments enjoyed by and that change is not fore be a good idea for all intelligence Military Intelligence and strengthen- implemented simply for communities – the Israeli intelligence ing competing research and analysis community included – to reexamine bodies. Yet while pluralism likely (but the sake of change. and ease restrictions on information by no means definitely) facilitates flow to the degree that such changes a wider variety of assessments, it do not threaten source security. can also cause damage by allocating The tension between integration It is still too early to judge how resources in an imbalanced manner, and pluralism will continue to burden applicable the recommendations causing conflicts over budgets and intelligence communities, as each of presently considered in the United human resources, and bringing about these general directions can cause States are to Israel. After all, there a lack of coordination and cooperation damage in addition to the benefits are fundamental differences between between agencies. they provide. The tendency towards the two intelligence communities The reports’ recommendation to integration reflected in the American in structure, aims, and working increase integration suggests that per- inquiry reports is likely to increase methods. In any case, however, it haps they were aware of the damage coordination among intelligence or- is important to wait for outgrowths that pluralism can cause. It is not yet ganizations, but may also impede cre- of the reforms to see what they can clear how strengthening integration ativity, innovative thinking, and the reveal about the Israeli intelligence will affect pluralism. The major intel- expression of atypical opinions. This community, for good and for bad. It ligence agencies in the United States problem has no unequivocal solution, is also important to remember that – the CIA, the DIA, the FBI, and the and each intelligence community will organizational change for its own NSA – are large, strong organizations need to offer its own response, at times sake will not solve problems within that will strive to preserve their inde- through trial and error. In the Israeli the process of generating intelligence pendence. However, if pluralism does context, the solution may be found in assessments, which is the cause of one real damage, differentiation among enhanced coordination among intel- of the intelligence system’s main weak

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 27 points. The structure of the American assessments in order to identify weak warfare This is because the realm from intelligence community differs from links. which such intelligence information that of England and Israel, yet all Another important issue relates can be obtained is small, closed, and three communities were mistaken on to the relationship between intelli- difficult to penetrate. This is what the issue of weapons of mass destruc- gence systems and decision-makers. the two intelligence failures had in tion in Iraq. Still, of all the elements of The commission of inquiry on Iraq common – an absence of reliable intel- proposed organizational change, one discussed at great length the pos- ligence information that resulted in of the most important recommenda- sibility that officials of the American mistaken assessments. This challenge tions has been increased inter-agency administration attempted to influence demands the development of a fun- coordination and cooperation in the intelligence assessments of WMD damentally new approach to means war on terrorism. This is because in Iraq in order to justify a war that of intelligence gathering, closer coop- the task involves a large number of would topple Saddam Hussein’s re- eration within intelligence communi- actors and organizations, as well as gime. Although there was evidence ties, and more extensive cooperation an urgent need to acquire exact and of indirect influence in this direction, among different intelligence systems accurate information and to pass it on the commission did not identify an within the international community. quickly to those who need it. intentional attempt by administra- The reports also suggest two tion officials to influence intelligence lessons regarding the relationship assessments. Still, the issue is one of Notes 1. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community between intelligence communities great importance, as the relationship Activities Before and After the Terrorist and political leadership. One is that between the intelligence system and Attacks of September 11, 2001. Report the intelligence system should be political decision- makers must be free of the US Senate Select Committee on required to inform political officials of any such influence. Intelligence and US House Permanent of the degree to which its assess- Select Committee on Intelligence, ments are based on solid intelligence Conclusion Washington, DC, December 2002, www.gpoaccess.gov; The 9/11 Com- information: what does the informa- September 11 and Iraq represent mission Report, www.9-11commission. tion include, and what does it not the two relatively new paradigms gov. include? What is based on data and that intelligence communities need 2. Report on the US Intelligence Communi- what is based on assumptions? What to address today and in the foresee- ty's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on is certain and what is uncertain? An- able future: international terrorism, Iraq, www.globalsecurity.org. 3. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of other lesson is to encourage the trend which knows no borders regarding Mass Destruction, Report of a Com- now on the rise in the United States, the sovereign space of the countries mittee of Privy Counsellors, House of Europe, and Israel, namely, to increase within which it strives to operate and Commons, 14 July 2004, www.official- the political leadership’s supervision the number of casualties it strives to documents.co.uk. of the intelligence system by means cause; and radical states striving to 4. Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Com- of professional advisors. Expanded acquire weapons of mass destruction. mittee Report on the Committee of Enquiry into the Intelligence System in Light of the external supervision from both the Both challenges present intelligence War in Iraq (March 2004), The Knesset executive branch and the legislative communities with serious difficulties Foreign Affairs and Defense Commit- branch may motivate intelligence in acquiring exact, reliable, and un- tee, March 2004 - http://www.knesset. communities to undertake more in- equivocal information, perhaps more gov.il/committees/eng/docs/intel- depth evaluation of their intelligence so than in the realm of conventional ligence.htm.

28 Non-Conventional Terrorism: Availability and Motivation

Anat Kurz

To many people, the most frightening prospect for the future is that terrorist groups might gain access to and use weapons of mass de- struction, specifically, nuclear, biological or biochemical weapons. (Grant Wardlaw, 1982)1

he fear of convergence of the two extremes of asymmetrical warfare – ter- rorism and non-conventional weapons – existed well before precautions against mega-terror rose to the top of the international agenda. In recent Tyears the threat of non-conventional terror has grown to become the gravest aspect of non-conventional weapons proliferation.2 The usual estimate of the threat balances the frequency of spectacular attacks, the declared intentions of terrorists to implement a non-conventional option, and the access to materials that will permit the construction of chemical, biological, or nuclear devices. Yet the focus on these factors often marginalizes an additional important element of the threat potential – the rationale behind the activities of terrorist organi- zations, including those who are regarded as the prime candidates for using non-conventional weapons.3 On the assumption that access to weapons is a necessary but not sufficient condition for terrorist attacks in general and those involving non-conventional weapons in particular, this essay will evaluate the organizational motivation that lies between accessing non-conventional means and actually using them. This will form the basis for an attempt to answer the question: why as of today has non-conventional terrorism remained primarily a potential threat that has not been realized in a sweeping manner? The intention of the discussion is neither to argue that the situation will necessarily remain the same, nor to detract from the gravity of the non-conventional terrorist threat. Rather, the goal is to distinguish from the other factors underlying terrorist activities the organizational rationale that in many cases prevents terrorist organizations from striving to acquire non- conventional weapons or translating their potential into reality.4

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 29 The Question of Access added the attacks using sarin gas per- would be a non-conventional attack. According to the commonly-accepted petrated by Aum Shinrikyo (the most Moreover, additional showcase at- evaluation, terrorist attacks in which outstanding was the attack in the tacks perpetrated in recent years by non-conventional weapons are used Tokyo underground in March 1995), al-Qaeda, against a background of represent a clear and immediate and the wave of anthrax envelopes in militant socialization in the Islamic danger, unless preventive measures the US in the months following the world and the legitimization of ji- are taken on a broad international September 11, 2001 attack. These at- had in the Middle East and among scale and restrictive conventions are tacks, even though not causing mass many Muslims in Western states, implemented. This assessment is to fatalities, were taken to be a portent have made a significant contribution a large extent based on supply and of the future. to strengthening the threat percep- demand calculations. Apart from the Aum Shinrikyo tion. The difficulty in limiting the pro- incidents, none of these non-conven- It may be assumed that the warn- liferation of nuclear materials and tional attacks contained examples ing and defense systems developed technologies through conventions of diffusing gas in crowded places. and implemented over the years and and the possible leakage in states Although the list includes cases the efforts devoted to prevention of lacking close supervision form a basis unauthorized transfer of non-conven- tional materials and technologies have for the fear that these weapons will Operational choices reach terrorist elements. Further- arrested the spread of non-conven- more, in recent years evidence has of terrorist organizations tional terrorism, at least for the mo- ment. Possibly the struggle against the accumulated regarding the efforts are testimony to self- being made by terrorist organiza- smuggling, production, and imple- tions to purchase the materials and imposed constraints mentation of non-conventional ma- know-how required for the assembly whereby certain modes terials is effective to a commendable of non-conventional weapons. Thus, extent, especially when compared to evaluation of the threat potential fo- of action receive priority the struggle against smuggling con- cuses on explicit threats by terrorist over others. ventional sabotage materials that are elements, as well as the sources of widespread on both the black and free leakage, access to a range of weapons, markets, and the expertise for use that and inadequate securing of facilities of poisoning (some of which were is readily available. This may there- liable to be targeted for theft, illegal already recorded in the 1970s) and fore provide at least a partial expla- trading, or attack. indicates that terrorist elements nation of the relatively small number Far less attention is devoted to possess chemical agents, there is no of non-conventional terrorist attacks, the small number of non-conven- instance of a nuclear attack, which and even a basis for re-evaluation of tional terrorist attacks, particularly would be the gravest of all regarding the threat potential in the foreseeable in proportion to the overall number its psychological influence and the future. However, the effectiveness of of terrorist attacks executed. The magnitude of the response it would the efforts to prevent the realization of few attacks that have occurred are arouse. The September 11 attack it- an apocalyptic scenario should also be repeatedly cited as representative self, even though non-conventional assessed against the fact that a signifi- of an overall trend. They include weapons were not used, indicated cant number of conventional terrorist minor incidents that had no direct that a threshold was crossed in terms attacks involving many victims have strategic consequences but increased of casualties and destruction, as well not been thwarted, notwithstanding awareness of the danger of non-con- as in audacity and brazenness. This the far-ranging measures employed ventional terror. To these have been implied that a "logical" next step against terror, which include the de-

30 fensive and offensive steps taken after capabilities of organized bodies that organizations are more blunt and September 11, 2001. have financial and human resources provocative than others regarding Moreover, it is difficult to -ar at their disposal and enjoy varying the selection of targets for attack, gue with facts: numerous facilities degrees of popular support; also in- the frequency of attacks, the scale of throughout the world for the manu- cluded are elements whose strategy the planned damage, and the style of facture of non-conventional materials legitimizes mass killing by conven- action. However, in the majority of or facilities in which non-conventional tional or non-conventional weapons. cases, notwithstanding differences in materials are used are not controlled It is the rationale of action of these ideological or strategic imperatives, absolutely. The list detailing the organizations that can be identified the operational choices are testimony disappearance of materials from and analyzed. to self-imposed constraints. These nuclear installations has grown lon- constraints, which change over time ger in recent years. The knowledge The Question of in accordance with situational con- required to handle nuclear, biological, Motivation ditions, are designed to protect the and chemical materials has become Despite spates of terrorist attacks, it is organization against a destructive commercially available, and its easy possible to recognize in the activities counterattack on its infrastructure acquisition may compensate terror- and erosion of popular and national ist elements for the lack of necessary support. expertise among their members. Ob- Even the organizations The preservation of the organiza- stacles originating in and imposed by tional core is an aim in and of itself. the environment on the defensive are that turned suicide In recent years the terrorist threat has limited. Nonetheless, the list of non- bombings into the symbol been linked to sophisticated use made conventional attacks is still not a long by extremist Islamic elements of an one. If so, what prevents the terrorist of their struggle are not unsophisticated mode of action – sui- organizations from translating avail- themselves inclined to cide attacks. These spectacular attacks ability into implementation? were taken by many to indicate that The answer to this question should organizational suicide. a non-conventional attack was not far include an important element of the off. However, even the organizations threat potential, apart from availabil- that turned suicide bombings into ity: the organizational motivations. of terrorist organizations certain con- the symbol of their struggle are not The analysis of this complex factor straints that define the extent of their themselves inclined to organizational does not extend to the efforts of anar- struggle and their methods. These suicide, and as such are not immune chistic sects or alienated individuals constraints point to a framework in to the reaction that these terrorist at- to acquire chemical or biological ma- which certain modes of action receive tacks are likely to incur. terials, or to assemble a radiological priority over others. The implied orga- The fall of the Taliban regime does device based on instructions that nizational rationale indicates tactical not necessarily dictate that any mass- can be found on the internet. The and strategic choices made over the casualty massive-damage terrorist possibility that they may choose to course of time. These choices are not attack will be followed by military act using poisonous or environmen- a direct result of a balance between reprisals on a similar scale against tally destructive material may not be capabilities and intentions, since even the organization responsible. It will theoretically dismissed or prevented efforts to achieve specific capabilities not always be possible to locate the entirely. However, the widely ac- are a result of intentions. headquarters and the bases of the cepted evaluation of the threat is The constraints vary from one organization, as in Afghanistan, based mainly on the intentions and organization to another. Certain nor will the state that has been at-

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 31 tacked always find itself facing a weapons is not viable, as this would perhaps even with their backs to the backward state lacking the capabil- free the Israeli decision-makers from wall. Significant erosion of status and ity of resistance and isolated on the limitations that still circumscribe re- even a state of siege do not necessar- international scene, again such as taliation. In addition to efforts focus- ily lead to campaigns of revenge and Afghanistan before the invasion of ing on the perpetration of attacks, the indiscriminate attacks. Extremist fac- the US-led coalition forces. However, Hamas leadership in the territories tions in the IRA or ETA, for example, it may be estimated that the psycho- is deliberating participation in the did not escalate their struggle in order logical effect of a spectacular attack official Palestinian leadership. Turn- to thwart a process of compromise using non-conventional weapons will ing to non-conventional terror will that rejected their participation in sharpen sensitivities that perhaps remove this option from the agenda. the emerging political system, but became blunt during the period that In other cases, military pressure is concentrated on preserving their has elapsed since September 11, 2001. not direct but exists as a threat. The remaining assets. The fear of further As such, it would award further inter- Lebanese Hizbollah is already act- damage to the already weakened or- national legitimization to determined ganizational infrastructure deters the acts of punishment against states in Muslim Brotherhood from showcase which there is an infrastructure of Leaders of terrorist terrorist attacks in Egypt and Jordan, terrorist organizations, even when it organizations are aware and instead encourages non-violent is impossible to find solid evidence methods of persuasion in order to re- of their direct involvement in the that a non-conventional tain support from within and without planning or execution of the terrorist attack is liable to be very and build the forces that will, when attack. Concentrated military, dip- costly in terms of support the time comes, proclaim the victory lomatic, and economic pressure on of the Islamic revolution. This case states that have not participated in a by the public in whose also points to the importance of pop- systematic determined fight against name they purport to act. ular support for the entrenchment of terror will generally evoke at least the organizational core. some efforts to join the struggle. As By their very nature, terrorist a result, terrorist organizations are ing in the shadow of Israeli deter- organizations act in a hostile en- likely to be forced to seek alternative rence against the implementation of vironment where the balance of places of refuge in an already dwin- conventional capabilities both in its forces is decidedly not in their favor. dling list of locations. own country and on the international Consequently, popular support and It is possible that here lies part of scene. It is difficult to conceive of a positive public image may well the explanation why a terrorist attack objectives whose chances of being improve their capability of resisting using non-conventional weapons advanced by non-conventional terror pressure and heighten their chances (including mass poisoning using will, in the view of the leadership of of survival. Organizations striving chemicals, relatively simple to imple- the organization, override the danger for national liberation have better ment) has still not been perpetrated of retaliation. chances of achieving broad popular by extremist Islamic organizations. The motivation of self-preserva- support, and thus strengthening their Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic tion is not unique to organizations resistance and enhancing the chances Jihad have for some years been sub- that fear for their status and op- of the success of the struggle. Con- ject to ongoing military pressure. erational capabilities (i.e., those that versely, the demise of organizations The possibility that in such circum- have something to lose), but is also in the face of pressure on the part of stances these organizations will seek applicable to organizations lying security forces is frequently hastened expression using non-conventional in a state of retreat and difficulty, because of the lack of popular sup-

32 port. Typical examples of this are the Yet even state-sponsored organiza- a heavy price in terms of operational collapse of the Red Brigades and the tions are not likely candidates for assistance and a territorial foothold. Baader-Meinhof group. transition to non-conventional ter- The organizations close to Syria, for In any case, a reduction in popu- rorism. In general, states that sponsor example, have acted in recent years lar support is likely to encourage a terrorist organizations tend to shun against a backdrop of fear of a policy change in the modes of action, and activities that will involve them in change in Damascus, because of a not always in the form of escalation an international scandal, liable to decrease in the international toler- intended to demonstrate capability of produce economic or even heavy ance of support for terrorism. This action under difficult conditions. The military consequences. The wari- fear decreases the chances of non- erosion of the support in the Tamil ness of states regarding exposure of conventional provocations being diaspora for the Tigers, which in part their direct involvement in terrorism implemented, which would likely took the form of reduced financial implies that in matters related to the end the era of aid and hospitality. contributions, was one of the factors transfer of non-conventional tech- that in 2002 led to an end of the sui- The Case of al-Qaeda cide bombing campaign in Sri Lanka. Al-Qaeda's characteristics do not The Lebanese Hizbollah acts within In the case of al-Qaeda make it easy to explain its adher- a framework of conditional popular ence to conventional terrorist at- legitimacy that dictates restraint, par- and less provocative tacks despite explicit threats to turn ticularly since the Israeli withdrawal organizations, the to non-conventional terrorism. The from southern Lebanon. True, the strategic objective at which al-Qaeda casualties and the extensive damage potential of conventional is aiming – renewal of the Islamic to infrastructures caused by Israeli terrorism is still far from caliphate – places rapprochement reprisals following suicide bombings and compromise out of the question. did not reduce the popular Palestin- exhausted. For this reason al-Qaeda does not ian support for the organizations restrain its activities out of a drive to responsible for them. However, this create a positive image, which will does not guarantee that support for nologies and materials to terrorists, prepare the ground for its participa- the perpetrating organizations would they will be particularly cautious. tion in a political process. Moreover, remain irrespective of developments This estimate should reduce the the geographic dispersion of its ac- on the ground, for example, after the non-conventional terrorism poten- tivists makes it difficult to conduct adoption of non-conventional meth- tial associated with state-sponsored extensive countermeasures that ods. The response to the crossing of organizations because of difficulties would obliterate the conventional the threshold is liable to strengthen in access to means.5 and non-conventional threat latent doubts regarding the effectiveness of Furthermore, it may be assumed in this organization, its cells, and its the struggle, erode the status of the that survival rationale is what pre- imitators. militant organizations, and weaken vents state-supported organizations Nevertheless and notwithstand- the resistance to Israeli military pres- from making the effort to acquire ing the continuous terrorist drives, sure. It is hard to imagine that this what the sponsoring state does not it seems that cell leaders are doing risk will be ignored by the leaders of supply from other sources. Deviation their best to preserve organizational the organizations. from the framework dictated by the infrastructures. Without a doubt the Popular support, however, is not sponsoring state, and especially a defensive posture they have adopted the decisive prerequisite for organi- shift towards non-conventional ter- is a result of the global attack being zations that enjoy state sponsorship. ror, is liable to cost the organizations waged against the organization, but

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 33 the ramifications of the countermea- the next terrorist attack with steps a non-conventional terrorist attack? sures do not reduce the significance that infringe on civil rights heightens It may be assumed that the reprisal of self-preservation as a restraining the militancy within Islamic com- for such an attack will set back the influence, and even emphasize this munities. However, at the same time construction of the infrastructure motivation. Support for the evalua- it may be estimated that potential in Iraq and its consolidation as a tion that even al-Qaeda is not exempt ostracism will likewise propel these base for action on the international from operational considerations that communities to criticize inciting ele- arena, and thus weaken the status take reprisals into account lies in the ments. This will make the recruiting of al-Qaeda as the flag-bearer of the statement of one of the planners of of activists and the preservation of a Islamic revolution. Presumably such the September 11 attack, who related terrorist infrastructure increasingly a consideration explains the fact that that a plan to crash the plane into a difficult. the organization's efforts to overcome nuclear reactor in the US was rejected Al-Qaeda does not belong to the the limitations of availability and because of the fear of a reprisal that category of state-sponsored organi- operational expertise have not yet would undermine the organizational found practical expression in Iraq or infrastructure.6 Presumably the mag- on the international scene. The inter- nitude of the American response The escalation of mediate objectives guiding al-Qaeda to the September 11 attack itself far – intensifying the tension between exceeded that estimated in advance terrorism recorded in the Muslim world and Western by its planners, since the response recent years does not states, and between Western states was as unprecedented as the scale of themselves against the background the attack. necessarily indicate a of the dilemmas involved in the fight Al-Qaeda is not directly associated linear progression toward against terrorism; and interference with a geographical community and with the stabilization of the political is not based on a specific territory like a non-conventional era. system in Iraq and underscoring the the Lebanese Hizbollah or Hamas. problematic nature of the American It is reasonable to assume, however, occupation in the Iraqi and interna- that the leaders of the organization zations. Precisely for this reason it tional consciousness – are advanced are aware that a non-conventional is easy to isolate among the factors by conventional means. As far as al- terrorist attack, particularly if it in- influencing its range and nature of Qaeda is concerned, conventional ter- volves numerous victims, is liable activity organizational motivations rorism is neither a default option nor to be very costly in terms of support that do not involve considerations compensation for the difficulties of by the public in whose name they of a supporting government. The access to non-conventional weapons. purport to act. Such an attack would limitations of control by the coalition Apparently, in the case of this organi- intensify the opposition that has been forces in Iraq gave the organization zation, and even more so in the case developing for several years, mainly an opportunity to establish an alter- of less provocative organizations, the in the US and Western Europe, to the native stronghold to what it lost with potential of conventional terrorism is domestic cultural and social changes the downfall of the Taliban regime in still far from exhausted. emanating from the growth of im- Afghanistan. This theater of opera- migrant Muslim communities. To be tions is apparently free of political Conclusion sure, reactions to terror attacks with and operational inhibitions. Is it pos- The escalation of terrorism recorded measures such as blocking sources sible to infer from this that at the first in recent years does not necessarily of employment, preventing access opportunity al-Qaeda will carry out indicate a linear progression toward to educational institutions, or foiling its declared intention to perpetrate a non-conventional era. Terrorist or-

34 ganizations are walking on the brink is not derived from the frequency of – all of them extremist Islamic orga- and their attacks play a decisive role terrorist attacks but from the chain nizations: "With the same quantity of in heralding them as the bearers of a reaction triggered by spectacular HEU, al-Qaeda, Hizballah, or Hamas could do the same," G. Allison, "How political message and the leaders of attacks. As can be learned from the to Stop Nuclear Terror," Foreign Affairs the struggle. At the same time, violent developments following the events 83, no. 1 (2004): 64-74. provocations serve these aims up to a of September 11, a single combined 4. For various types of weapons – poi- limit only. If a red line is crossed, the offensive, on an unprecedented scale sons, germs, and nuclear materials chances increase of countermeasures regarding casualties and damage, is – there are typical requirements for that aim to destroy the capability of enough to revise concepts, intensify development, storage, transfer, and implementation. For each type there is these organizations. Caution not to sensitivities, and produce a change a corresponding risk potential. None- cross this brink, which differentiates in international relations and policy. theless, for the purpose of this essay, between maintaining the organiza- Consequently it is impossible to over- the materials generally implied by tions in the public consciousness, for state the vital need for international the term non-conventional weapons good or bad, and stimulation of a re- supervision of the development, are grouped together because precise sounding response, explains the fre- manufacture, and marketing of differentiation between them is not es- sential for the fundamental evaluation quently observed disparity between non-conventional weapons, and for of the factors that influence realizing ideological dictates and practice. This coordinated steps to prevent access their potential. gap, whether conventional or non- by unauthorized elements to these 5. In fact, both developed and failed conventional terrorism is concerned, weapons. states that support terrorism, includ- is not due solely to difficulties in ing those possessing non-conventional access to weapons. Often, profit and weapons, avoid supplying chemical and other materials to elements liable loss considerations prevent the use Notes 1. Quoted from Political Terrorism: Theory, to use them in an uncontrolled man- of conventional means. It may be Tactics and Counter-Measures (Cam- ner. Iran, which is first on the list of assumed that these same consider- bridge: Cambridge University Press, state sponsors of terrorism published ations guide the caution displayed 1982), p. 175. yearly by the US State Department, is towards the use of non-conventional 2. "The greatest threat before human- not an immediate candidate for trans- weapons. ity today is the possibility of secret ferring non-conventional weapons and sudden attack with chemical or to terrorists. Against the background If the efforts fail to thwart the biological or radiological or nuclear of the efforts made by its govern- realization of the non-conventional weapons," President Bush on weap- ment to resist international pressure threat, this will not necessarily inau- ons of mass destruction proliferation, aimed at delaying the completion of gurate a new era regarding the tac- February 11, 2004. its nuclear program, it seems highly tics of terrorist organizations active 3. Before the estimate of the Iraqi non- unlikely that Iran would risk inviting throughout the world. It is even likely conventional threat was lowered additional direct pressure by supply- and emphasis was diverted to non- ing non-conventional weapons to a that the response to a catastrophe of conventional terrorism (as expressed sub-state organization of any kind. this sort would create an opposing in the president's speech referred to North Korea supplies weapons and drift, which would take the form of a above), President Bush said, "If the technologies to the highest bidder. lower profile by other organizations. Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, Yet in any case, while terrorist orga- This effect of added caution impacted or steal an amount of uranium a little nizations can exploit this flexibility, access to weapons is not the sole key on the policy of the states involved bigger than a softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." to a realization of threats. in international terrorism following Graham Allison criticized the presi- 6. Yoram Schweitzer, "The Age of Non- the overthrow of the Taliban regime dent for ignoring the terrorist dimen- Conventional Terrorism," Strategic and the invasion of Iraq. However, sion of the threat and listed candidates Assessment 6, no. 1 (2003): 26-31. the strategic significance of terrorism for use of weapons of mass destruction

Volume 7, No. 4 March 2005 35 JCSS Memoranda 1998–

No. 75, March 2005, Uzi Eilam, L’Europe de la Défense [Hebrew]. No. 74, December 2004, Paul Rivlin and Shmuel Even, Political Stability in Arab States: Economic Causes and Consequences. No. 73, November 2004, Shaul Kimhi and Shmuel Even, Who are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers? [Hebrew]. No. 72, October 2004, Aviezer Yaari, Civil Control of the IDF [Hebrew]. No. 71, July 2004, Anat Kurz, ed., Thirty Years Later: Challenges to Israel since the Yom Kippur War [Hebrew]. No. 70, June 2004, Ephraim Asculai, Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. No. 69, January 2004, Daniel Sobelman, New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon. No. 68, November 2003, Ram Erez, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Israel: Influences and Restraints [He­brew]. No. 67, October 2003, Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003. No. 66, October 2003, Shlomo Gazit, Between Warning and Surprise: On Shaping National Intelligence Assessment in Israel [Hebrew]. No. 65, June 2003, Daniel Sobelman, New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Leba­non [Hebrew]. No. 64, May 2003, Shmuel L. Gordon, Dimensions of Quality: A New Approach to Net Assessment of Airpower. No. 63, January 2003, Hirsh Goodman and Jonathan Cummings, eds. The Battle of Jenin: A Case Study in Israel’s Communications Strategy. No. 62, October 2002, Imri Tov, ed. Defense and Israel’s National Economy: Exploring Issues in Security Production­ [Hebrew]. No. 61, July 2002, Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002. No. 60, August 2001, Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001. No. 59, June 2001, Emily Landau, Egypt and Israel in ACRS: Bilateral Concerns in a Regional Arms Con­trol Process. No. 58, April 2001, David Klein, Home-Front Defense: An Examination of the National Cost [Hebrew]. No. 57, September 2000, Paul Rivlin, World Oil and Energy Trends: Strategic Implications for the Middle East. No. 56, July 2000, Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2000. No. 55, March 2000, P. R. Kumaraswami, Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations. No. 54, November 1999, Shmuel Even, Trends in Defense Expenditures in the Middle East [Hebrew]. No. 53, August 1999, Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 1999. No. 52, August 1998, Abraham Ben-Zvi, Partnership under Stress: The American Jewish Community and Israel. No. 51, July 1998, Aharon Levran, Iraq’s Strategic Arena [Hebrew]. No. 50, June 1998, Shmuel Even, Trends in the World Oil Market: Strategic Implications for Israel [He­brew]. No. 49, July 1998, Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 1998.

Strategic Assessment is a quarterly published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978 Israel Tel: +972-3-640-9926 Fax: +972-3-642-2404 Strategic Assessment is published in English and Hebrew. The full text of Strategic Assessment is available on the Center’s website: http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ 36