The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy John Arquilla s David Ronfeldt National Defense Research Institute R The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Networks and netwars : The future of terror, crime, and militancy / John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt. p. cm. MR-1382 Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3030-2 1. Information warfare. 2. Cyberterrorism. I. Arquilla, John. II. Ronfeldt, David F. HV6773 .N47 2001 303.6'25—dc21 2001041739 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover design by Peter Soriano © Copyright 2001 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2001 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 102, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] To Dick O’Neill, for his stalwart support and keen eye PREFACE The fight for the future makes daily headlines. Its battles are not be- tween the armies of leading states, nor are its weapons the large, ex- pensive tanks, planes, and fleets of regular armed forces. Rather, the combatants come from bomb-making terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, drug smuggling cartels like those in Colombia and Mexico, and militant anarchists like the Black Bloc that ran amok during the Battle of Seattle. Other protagonists are civil-society activ- ists fighting for democracy and human rights—from Burma to the Balkans. What all have in common is that they operate in small, dis- persed units that can deploy nimbly—anywhere, anytime. They know how to penetrate and disrupt, as well as elude and evade. All feature network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology at- tuned to the information age. And, from the Intifadah to the drug war, they are proving very hard to beat; some may actually be winning. This is the story we tell. This book also provides a further step in the elaboration of our ideas about how and why the information revolution is affecting the whole spectrum of conflict. Our notion of cyberwar (1993) focused on the military domain, and our first study of netwar1 (1996) on irregular modes of conflict, including terror, crime, and militant social activ- ism.2 The implications of these concepts for organization, doctrine, and technology across the spectrum of conflict were further elaborat- 1Our netwar concept predates, and should not be confused with, the U.S. military’s “network warfare simulation system” (NETWARS). 2For full citations of these and our other studies, please see the bibliographies for Chapters One and Ten. v vi Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy ed in our book, In Athena’s Camp (1997). More recently, we noted that many activists who practice netwar are helping to create a new ap- proach to strategy and diplomacy that we call noopolitik (1999). Next, we expanded on our idea that swarming (2000) will emerge as a 21st- century doctrine that will encompass and enliven both cyberwar and netwar. Here, we offer new analysis about netwar. The analysis in- cludes case studies about terrorists, criminals, and gangs; social net- wars in Burma, Mexico, and Seattle; and closing chapters on some of the technological, organizational, and doctrinal dynamics of netwar. U.S. policymakers and strategists will be interested in this book. It should also interest analysts in academia and research institutes con- cerned with how the information revolution is altering the nature of conflict. This book was prepared for a project on “Networks and Netwars,” di- rected by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. The project was spon- sored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), OASD/C3I, and was con- ducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI). NDRI is a feder- ally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies. Comments are invited. We can be reached via email at arquilla@ rand.org and [email protected]. CONTENTS Preface . v Summary . ix Acknowledgments . xiii Chapter One THE ADVENT OF NETWAR (REVISITED) John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt . 1 Part I: Violence-Prone Netwars Chapter Two THE NETWORKING OF TERROR IN THE INFORMATION AGE Michele Zanini and Sean J.A. Edwards . 29 Chapter Three TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS Phil Williams . 61 Chapter Four GANGS, HOOLIGANS, AND ANARCHISTS—THE VANGUARD OF NETWAR IN THE STREETS John P. Sullivan . 99 Part II: Social Netwars Chapter Five NETWORKING DISSENT: CYBER ACTIVISTS USE THE INTERNET TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN BURMA Tiffany Danitz and Warren P. Strobel . 129 vii viii Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy Chapter Six EMERGENCE AND INFLUENCE OF THE ZAPATISTA SOCIAL NETWAR David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla . 171 Chapter Seven NETWAR IN THE EMERALD CITY: WTO PROTEST STRATEGY AND TACTICS Paul de Armond . 201 Part III: Once and Future Netwars Chapter Eight ACTIVISM, HACKTIVISM, AND CYBERTERRORISM: THE INTERNET AS A TOOL FOR INFLUENCING FOREIGN POLICY Dorothy E. Denning . 239 Chapter Nine THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND ITS OPPONENTS Luther P. Gerlach . 289 Chapter Ten WHAT NEXT FOR NETWORKS AND NETWARS? David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla . 311 AFTERWORD (SEPTEMBER 2001): THE SHARPENING FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt . 363 Contributors . 373 About the Editors . 375 SUMMARY Netwar is the lower-intensity, societal-level counterpart to our earlier, mostly military concept of cyberwar. Netwar has a dual nature, like the two-faced Roman god Janus, in that it is composed of conflicts waged, on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals, and ethnonationalist extremists; and by civil-society activists on the other. What distin- guishes netwar as a form of conflict is the networked organizational structure of its practitioners—with many groups actually being lead- erless—and the suppleness in their ability to come together quickly in swarming attacks. The concepts of cyberwar and netwar encompass a new spectrum of conflict that is emerging in the wake of the informa- tion revolution. This volume studies major instances of netwar that have occurred over the past several years and finds, among other things, that netwar works very well. Whether the protagonists are civil-society activists or “uncivil-society” criminals and terrorists, their netwars have general- ly been successful. In part, the success of netwar may be explained by its very novelty—much as earlier periods of innovation in military af- fairs have seen new practices triumphant until an appropriate re- sponse is discovered. But there is more at work here: The network form of organization has reenlivened old forms of licit and illicit activ- ity, posing serious challenges to those—mainly the militaries, con- stabularies, and governing officials of nation states—whose duty is to cope with the threats this new generation of largely nonstate actors poses. Strategists and policymakers in Washington and elsewhere have al- ready begun to discern the dark side of the netwar phenomenon, es- ix x Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy pecially as manifested in terrorist and criminal organizations. This growing awareness is quite evident in recent official studies of this burgeoning problem: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 (State De- partment, 2000), International Crime Threat Assessment (Interagency Working Group, 2000), and Global Trends 2015 (National Intelligence Council, 2000). But strategists and policymakers still have much work to do to harness the brighter, civil-society-building potential of net- worked nonstate actors. Thus, a fundamental challenge in the coming decade will be to focus on the opportunities that may arise from closer cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other nonstate actors. For the U.S. Department of Defense, a range of possibilities opens up, from encouraging the early involvement of appropriate NGO net- works in helping to detect and head off a looming crisis, to working closely with them in the aftermath of conflicts to improve the effec- tiveness of U.S. forces still deployed, to reduce the residual hazards they face, and to strengthen the often fragile peace. In short, Ameri- can policymakers and strategists must continue to keep an eye on the perils posed by criminal and terrorist networks. But they must enlarge their vision and their practices to encompass the tremendous oppor- tunities likely to attend the rise of a network-based realm devoted to the protection of human rights, the spread of democratic values, and the formation of deep coalitions between states and civil-society NGOs. Netwar, the emergent mode of conflict of choice for networked nonstate actors, has two faces—and both matter very much. In this volume, we and our colleagues examine various types of net- war, from the most violent to the most socially activist. In so doing, we find that, despite the variety, all networks that have been built for waging netwar may be analyzed in terms of a common analytic framework.