Naval Aviation in m II Fighter Tactics in

s war clouds loomed on the transitioned to the two-ship ro& and even- virtual absolute superiority over Army Air horizon prior to the attack on tually brought the formation to the Battle Forces P-36, P-39, and P-40 fighters in A Pearl Harbor in December1941, of Britain where it was also adopted by the early days in the Pacific theater. A the Navy’s small fighter communitywas some of the British squadrons. Navy pilots notable exception was the famed faced with makingthe transition from poured over combat reports from the Bat- AmericanVolunteer Group (AVG), popular- nimble biplanes to heavier, but faster all- tle of Britain where the Royal Air Force ly known as the “Flying Tigers.” Although m&al monoplanesthat would dominate air (RAP)was evolving combattactics rang- not a part of the Army Air Forces,AVG combat in WW II. Paramountto achieving ing from squadron-sizeattacks in line flew the same P-40 into combat and success with the newly arriving F2A Buf- astern to line-abreasttactics. Fighting Two prevailed as the only notable success falo and F4F Wildcatwas the develop was officially designated to conduct trials against the Japanese in the first six ment of tactics to exploit their with the two-ship formation. Formations months of the war. effectiveness.Worldwide aeronautical also began to open in spacing to account The leader of the AVG, Claire Chen- technology delivered several potent adver- for greater speed and turning radius, Tac- nault, had been forced into retirementas a saries to Axis nations that Navy fighter tics centered around masteryof aerial captain partially due to his advocation of pilots would have to face. Mitsubishi had gunnery from various deflection angles. tactical thought, not in concert with the producedthe superb Zero fighter and Mes- The standard section called for the leader, prevailing bomber mentality.Well before serschmidt the Bf 109, both combat invariablythe most experienced pilot, to Pearl Harbor,Chennault was hired by the proven by 1941,and flown by skilled pilots, lead the attack with the wingman provid- Chinese governmentas an aviation ad- ’ The Zero had been introduced over the ing cover, Comparedto the Bf 109, the visor to aid their resistance against the skies of China and virtually swept away all British Spiffire enjoyed superiority in turn- Japanese incursion onto their soil, He flew opposition. ing performanceover the Messerschmidt their fighters and played a primary role in The greater speed of the late genera- and developed tactics to exploit that fact. assembling an air defense against the tion of monoplanefighters led to eventual Over the Pacific, the situation was reversed with the Zero having the better ‘turn performanceover allied fighters. As WW II engulfed the globe, the By LCdr. Dave Parsons

onslaught of the Japanese. He saw formations were gave the AVG the ability Zero fighter. It was obvious that it was firsthand how the tremendous to husband its scarce fighter force and only a matter of time before his F4F maneuverabilityof the Japanese fighters use it most effectively. Most importantly,it Wildcatswould have to take on this clearly could not be countered by existing allowed the Flying Tigers enough time to superior fighter. Since taking command, western aircraft. He formulated the idea of climb to an altitude advantage that was he had molded his squadron into crack dissimilar tactics coupled to an early warn- significant tactically. Chennault preached shots and superior airmen. Yet, he real- ing network in order to deal with the a diving hit-and-run attack that made the ized that even if the Zero’s performance overwhelmingJapanese aerial presence. most of the P-40’s one significant perfor- was half as dramatic as the reports said, He saw vindication of his theories as his mance advantage over the Zero - the his F4F wildcats would be at a severe dis- Flying Tigers ripped into the best of the dive. This was unorthodox for convention- advantage no matter how good his pilots Japanese attempts to annihilate his tiny al fighter tactical thinking. RAF pilots were. Conventional tactics wouldn’t be fighter force. stationed at Rangoon alongside the AVG able to counter the speed, climb, and turn- The Flying Tigers were repeatedly were threatened with court-martial if seen ing performanceof the Zero. He set out to pitted against the 64th Sentai of the “diving away” from a fight. They stayed in devise a tactic to counter the aerodynamic Japanese Army equipped with the nimble close with their Hurricanes and Buffaloes performancesuperiority of the Zero. ffayabusa that was similar to the Zero in and suffered far greater losses than the Following each day of flying, he worked size and performance,Chennault in- conventional and successful AVG pilots night after night on his kitchen table using *doctrinatedhis group of pilots recruited using dissimilar tactics. matchsticksto simulate the opposing from the ranks of the Navy, Army Air For- b “Thousandsof miles from the Flying fighter formations, experimenting with ces, and Marine Corps. The idea of Tigers, another tactics theoretician - various tactics to counter the Zero. He dissimilar air combat tactics was unor- Lieutenant CommanderJimmy Thach, eventually devised a weaving tactic, but thodox, but Chennault made believers of commandingofficer of Fighting Three (VF- needed to move the idea from the kitchen his pilots. The tactics worked. Eventually, 3) -was disturbed when he read the Fleet table into the air. In order to properly test Chennault was able to compare perfor- Air Tactical Unit Bulletin of 22 September his theories in the air, he needed a dis- mance of his P-40s against‘captured 1941. The attack on Pearl Harbor was similar opponent that would simulate the examples of his Japanese opponents. only months away and, like Chennault, relative differences of performancebe- ClaireChennault’s solution reflected a Thachreasoned that it was inevitable he tween the Wildcat and the Zero. As no land-based situation that allowed him to would have to face Japanese pilots in establish an extremely effective early combat. He Wassearching for any informa- warning net that gave him a significant ad- tion on Japanese fighter pilots and their vantage. Knowing where the Japanese tactics and aircraft. The bulletin confirmed After the toss of Lexington during the Battle of Coral Sea, fighter complements were increased to what initial reports coming out of China in 27 fighters, recognizing the need to protect the late 1940 had said concerning the perfor- carrier and strlke aircraft. mance of the still-mysteriousJapanese Naval Aviation in WW II I-

A Zero Is the victim of the Thach Weave in this painting titled “Thach’s Weave of Destruction,” by AT1 Greg Robinson of VFA-15 onboard Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).

slower Wildcats making a firing run every 20 to 30 seconds. Thach was able to deploy into the weave before the attacks began and lost the numberfour Wildcat as he led his division into a hard right turn trying to spoil the attack. The Zero pulled up passing in front of Thach, who let loose with a snap shot as the Zero flashed past. It burst into flames. Now, Thach had three Wildcatsleft. His wingman was familiar with the weave, but the remaining pilot was a new arrival from VF-42 and knew nothing about it. Even worse, his radio was out so Thach led the three ships in a line-astern formation, weaving to throw off the relentless attacks of the Zeros. He then directed his wingman to take an abeam position as if he were leading a section and commence the weave. aircraft in the United States had perfor- .piiots that needed schooling in the basics mance even close to the Zero, he came of gunnery before they could advance to up with a simple innovation to achieve the the weave. The Battle of Midway lay desired result as he later recalled in The ahead in the not-too-distantfuture. He Pacific War Remembered:“We [had] was faced with the daunting task of taking practice this, but who’s going to be the brand-new ensigns into combat with scant Zeros? How are we going to find airplanes time to train them in aerial gunnery let of that sort, that fast and with that high a alone his new tactic. He conducted a performance?. . . I told Lt(jg) Edward rigorous training programout of the base “Butch” O’Hare to take four aircraft and at Kaneohe and was able to instruct at use full power. I would take four and put a least some of the pilots he would lead at little mark on the throttle quadrant and Midway in the “weave.” Thach had the LCdr. John S. “Jimmy” Thach, VF-3 CO and never advance it more than halfway. That satisfaction of seeing his tactic work in the originator of the Beam Defense Maneuver, or gave him at least a superior performance, Battle of Midway. His improvised,in- “Thach Weave.” This tactic enabled Navy pilots maybe double, maybe not, but somewhat house, dissimilar air combat had been flying F4F Wildcats to counter the superior perfor- better.” crucial in validating his tactic and undoub- mance of the Japanese Zero. O’Hare was a recent addition to VF-3, tedly saved the lives of at least several but had rapidly proved himself to be a junior pilots. It was a big edge for the crack pilot graduating to the “shakedown” Wildcat pilots. (During Vietnam, A-l team of experienced flyers who were Skyraider pilots used a version of the charged with training fledgling pilots. His Thach Weave in 1965 when they were division put the weaving tactic to the test, jumped by a NVAF MiG-17. They shot it but was frustrated by the coordinated down.) defense of weaving Wildcats.Thach set Thach didn’t have to wait very long to out to refine the tactic and instruct the rest test his tactic in combat.VF-3 flew from of VF-3. He named his tactic the Beam Yorktownescorting the SBD dive and TBD Defense Maneuver. torpedo bombersagainst the cream of Deploying to the Pacific, Thach missed Japanese carrier aviation. The torpedo out on the Battle of the Coral Sea, sitting bombersbecame separated and were ut- out the battle at NAS Kaneohe on the is- terly decimatedon their own by the land of Oahu. His outfit, VF-3, had been defending Zeros. Thach’s Wildcatswere LCdr. Jimmy Thach and Lt. Butch O’Hare at the stripped of pilots to augment other at 5,500 feet when they were attacked by controls of VF-3 F4F-3 Wildcats F-l and F-13, squadrons. He was now in the curious 15 to 20 Zeros. The Zeros lined up and respectively. Thach and O’Hare were able to conducted sequential attacks on the “shakedown” the Thach Weave before they position of having a tactic, but with novice entered combat.

32 Naval Aviation News July-August 1993 One of the Zeros, seeing an apparent less attacks respondingto the weave only fielding of the F4U Corsair and the F6F breakup of the formation, made a pass on occasionally by aborting their firing passes Hellcat, both aircraft were still in develop- Ensign Dibbs and latched onto his tail. when the weave initiated. When a second ment and would not be available until the Dibbs radioed Thach, “Skipper,there’s a Zero attemptedto chase Dibbs through summer of 1943. Until then, the Wildcat Zero on my tail! Get him off!” Dibbs made the turn, Thach raked its fuselage with .5O- would have to be the front-line fighter a hard port turn into Thach in accordance caliber fire resulting in Thach’s third claim facing the Zero. with the Beam Defense Tactic BS Thmh for the dav. nthor codinn ncrnrt-

Naval Aviation News July-Auaust 1993 33 Naval Aviation in WW II

had saved many aircraft and would con- 40s were decimating the Japanese, vanced stages of training just prior to tinue to do so. another significant event occurred. Con- deployment. In late summer 1942, Marines went current with the attack on Midway, a Principally,the Zero was flown as an ashore at Guadalcanal beginning an epic Japanese task force attackedthe Aleutian “adversary” aircraft against the F6F and struggle for that island and the whole of Islands. AZero had been found virtually in- F4U to show the pilots “how it smelled in the Solomon Islands chain. The Japanese tact in 1942 on Akutan Island (part of the the air.” It was also made available to vigorously resisted this intrusion into their Aleutian Island chain). Its pilot had tried to squadron COs and senior pilots to fly territory by launching air attacks from their make an emergency landing on a bog themselves in order to acquaint them with fortress at Rabaul. Marines flying Wildcats after suffering battle damageduring the the Zero’s remarkablemaneuverability. from the barebonesHenderson Field on June 4, 1942, attack on Dutch Harbor. He Reportswere one thing, but there was Guadalcanal also adoptedthe Thach apparently mistookthe soft bog for a hard nothing like seeing the real thing in living Weave. The JapaneseZero pilots flying surface and tried to land with the landing color. Leonard had seen the Zero out of Rabaul were initially confounded by gear down. firsthand while flying a F4F Wildcat during the tactic and the Wildcat’stactic of hit- A VP-41 PBY Catalina spotted the Zero both the battles of the Coral Sea and Mid- and-run attacks. Tadashi Nakajimawas on July 10, 1942, lying on its back. An in- way and could attest to its Japan’s leading ace and commanderof tensive salvage effort requiring three maneuverability,especially at low speeds. the Lae-basedZero unit recalled to expeditions to the remote site was able to Leonardflew the Zero primarily against Rabaul to deal with the allied presencein retrieve the Zero and it eventually made air wings in their advanced stages of train- the Solomons. One of his pilots was its way to Naval Air Station, San ing just prior to deploymentto the Pacific Saburo Sakai whose score was already Diego, Calif., where it was restoredto combat zone. He also demonstratedit approaching 60 and was destined to be flying condition. By late September,it was against patrol squadrons. Unfortunately, Japan’s number two ace of the war and involved in a series of flight tests and com- the Zero was later lost in a taxiing acci- leading surviving ace. Both pilots were ab- parisons against the latest U.S. fighters. dent when a SB2C He//diverdidn’t see the solute mastersof their aircraft and aerial Instead of using matchsticksor sur- small fighter and chewed it into scrap with combat. Sakai relates their reaction to the rogates, an actual Zero was then available its propeller.A more up-to-dateZero was Thach Weave when they encountered to develop tactics for each allied aircraft. subsequently found as the Pacific offen- Guadalcanal Wildcatsusing it: “For the The Zero began to lose some of its mysti- sive began capturing island real estate first time Nakajimaencountered what was que. Although still deadly, the advent of littered with abandoned aircraft during the to become a famous double-team powerful new fighters like the F4U Corsair island-hopping campaign. This has maneuver on the part of the enemy.Two and F6F Hellcat gave Navy pilots some remained the first documentedexample of Wildcatsjumped on the commander’s performancemargin against the Zero with the use of an adversary aircraft in a train- plane. He had no trouble in getting on the superior speed. ing role. The programwas remarkably tail of an enemy fighter, but never had a visionary and it presaged much of what chance to fire before the Grumman’steam- SFirst Adversary Pilot we do today. mate roared at him from the side. After the testing establishmenthad As Leonard demonstrated,the best Nakajimawas raging when he got back to finished its evaluation, some farsighted way to be ready for an opponent is to be Rabaul; he had been forced to dive and and ambitious Navy fighter pilots suc- able to train against his aircraft, especially run for safety.” ceeded in getting the Zero releasedfor if the performanceis radically different use in San Diego against fleet units. One The Aleutian Prize from your own. This is what the F4F of the pilots was Rear Admiral Bill Leonard Wildcat pilots faced and it is to their credit While Thach was validating his tactic at (then a lieutenant) who was fighter train- Midway and Chennault’s shark-mouthedP- that they did as well as they did when they ing officer with CommanderFleet Air, first encountered the Zero. Of course, in’ USAF West Coast. His boss at the time was the war or peacetime,it is not always possible famed James Flatley who, along with to obtain flying examples of your potential Leonard, had fought the Zero in the early opponents. The Zero based at North Is- months of the war in F4F Wildcats.They land was only one airplane, not quite knew firsthand the Zero’s phenomenal enough to train the multitude of fighter maneuverability.Both pilots also knew its pilots under instruction during WW II. Lt. weaknesses,and the best way to survive “Boogie” Hoffman was one the pilots as- and win an engagement:allow pilots to signed to do initial comparativetesting of train against the real thing. They argued the salvaged Zero and returned to Pacific convincingly to secure the Zero (the exist- combatwith VF-31 where he shared his ence of which was still a closely held experiences. No other formal dissimilar secret) to use against fleet units in ad- training existed, but there were oppor- tunities for plenty of informal encounters. The vaunted Zero never lost its deadly Back in the days of WW II, anything in “acrobatic” superiority over Allied aircraft, but tac- the air was fair game. And if nothing could tics such as the Thach Weave allowed Navy pilots be found airborne, a pilot merely had to to prevail until high-performance fighters like the head for a neighboring field (preferably Hellcat and Corsair were introduced in 1943.

NavalAviation News July-August 1993 of Norfolk, Blackburn got to have a one- ful were those evolved from the dissimilar way conversation with Vice Admiral air combat arena, although the term dis- Bellinger, CommanderAir Force,Atlantic similar was still decades away from being Fleet, about the antics of his “hellions.” institutionalized. Whether pilots realized it Both parties were more than happy about or not, the informal bouncing of friendly the move to Manteo. Fun aside, this type aircraft provided the dissimilar opponents of training is, as Blackburn suggests, needed to hone air-to-air combat skills. In good training. Beating up rival service’s every theater, opponents placed high airfields and jumping their aircraft had a priority on capture of opposing aircraft for direct corollary with combat operations in exploitation and comparativetests from the Pacific. The pilots flying out of Guadal- which dissimilar tactics were devised. The key to success in air combat was superior canal had to be ready to engage Zeros at Both Allied and Axis air forces developed aircraft, well-trained pilots, and tactics. Here, VF- any time. The landing pattern wasn’t safe, specialized units to provide dissimilar air 16readies for air combat in late 1943 in the nor was the takeoff roll. There is sound combattraining after capturing sufficient Gilbert’s area. reason behind the Navy’s carrier break in examples of their opponent’saircraft. In which aircraft maintain combat speeds the postwar standdown, the utility of such belonging to a sister service) and “beat it until over the field, at which time the units did not lead to formalized dissimilar up” until an adversary took up the chal- aircraft goes into a “break”turn minimizing air combat training, although informal lenge. the time at slow speeds before landing, in bouncing remained as popular as ever. n If the skies around the local base were case a maraudingZero should happen to show. LCdr. Parsons is an F-l 4 Tomcat radar intercept bare, then some units took active officer currently assigned to Director, Air Warfare measuresto ensure opponents would Throughout the vast aerial battlefields Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He show. CommanderTom Blackburn, com- of WW II, the tactics that proved success- is a former editor of Approach magazine. manding officer of the fledgling Jolly Rogers (VF-17),was working his . squadron up in the isolated outer banks of North Carolina at Manteo and when he deemed his pilots ready, he sent out the following dispatch to all the squadrons in the Hampton Roads area: “Combat air patrol will be airborne over Manteo from 8 Jul: Casablanca (ACV 55), first of her 22 Jul: Since there had been no opera- 0800 until 1200 each weekday.Visitors class and first escort carrier designed and tional need for arresting gear and related welcome.” Blackburn got the visitors he built as such, was placed in commissionat equipment for landing over the bow of wanted inthe form of fighters, dive-bom- Astoria, Ore., Capt. S. W. Callaway com- aircraft carriers, the Vice Chief of Naval bers, torpedo bombers,and even some manding. patrol types. He got what he wanted, com- Operations approved its removal. menting, “I have a vivid mental picture of a 15 Jul: New designations for carriers 18 Aug: To give Naval Aviation section of dive-bomberspulling out of their were established which limited the pre- authority commensuratewith its WW II attack on the treetops at 300-plus knots vious broadly applied CV symbol to responsibility,the Secretary of the Navy with Corsairs, wingtips skyward, making Saratoga, Enterprise, and carriers of the established the Office of the Deputy Chief go-degreedeflection attacks at their level. Essex class, and added CVB (Aircraft Car- of Naval Operations (Air), charging it with “We were busy. We never had more fun riers, Large) for the 45,000-ton class “the preparation, readiness and logistic or better training.” being built and CVL (Aircraft Carriers, support of the naval aeronautic operating Blackburn’sremarks are particularly on Small) for the 1O,OOO-ton class built on forces.” By other orders issued the same the mark on both counts. Although air com- light cruiser hulls. The same directive day, five divisions were transferred from bat can be very debilitating, the contest reclassified escort carriers as combatant the Bureau of Aeronautics to form the between two aircraft is considered by ships and changed their symbol from ACV nucleus of the new office and VAdm.J. S. most to be fun, at least in training. An old to CVE. McCain took commandas the first DCNO adage goes, “If you’re not having fun, 18 Jul: The airship K-74, while on night (Air). you’re doing something wrong.” Of patrol off the Florida coast, attacked a sur- 29 Aug: The formation of combat units course, from a different perspective,a faced U-boat and in the gun duel which for the employmentof assault drone pitched battle at low level over a town followed was hit and brought down -the aircraft began within the Training Task doesn’t conjure up fun. only airship lost to enemy action in WW II. Force Commandas the first of three Spe- Blackburn’ssquadron had been pre- The submarine U-734 was damaged cial Task Air Groups was established.The viously based at NAS Norfolk,Va., right enough to force her return to base, and component squadrons, designatedVK, under the noses of numerousflag officers. after surviving two other attacks on the began establishmenton 23 October. When Ensign “Ike” Kepford had a dogfight way, was finally sunk by British bombers with an Army Air Forces P-51 which de- in the Bay of Biscay. scended below 500 feet over the citizenry

Naval Aviation News July-August 1993 35