CREATING AN AMERICAN WAY OF MOBILIZATION: THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND WARTIME MOBILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA DURING THE WAR OF 1812 Margaret C. Martin A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2014 Approved by: Wayne E. Lee Kathleen A. Duval Joseph T. Glatthaar Richard H. Kohn Harry L. Watson The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. ii ABSTRACT Margaret C. Martin: CREATING AN AMERICAN WAY OF MOBILIZATION: THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND WARTIME MOBILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA DURING THE WAR OF 1812 (Under the direction of Wayne E. Lee) This project is an examination of American wartime mobilization and strategic decision making during the War of 1812 using North Carolina as a case study. During the war, the young federal government sought to centrally control and direct its resources. Political culture, local security concerns, and the outcomes of battles and campaigns fought outside North Carolina throughout the course of the war informed public support for the war within the state, a process which in turn shaped federal control and planning. Because the federal government relied on the states for mobilizing militias, and to a lesser extent, for recruiting into the regular army, individual state governments’ support for the war effort, which was highly attuned to public attitudes within the state, directly affected the federal government’s ability to mobilize resources and therefore shaped strategy. By studying the federal-state relationship from the perspective of North Carolina, the challenges faced by a new, federal republic trying to wage war become apparent. In North Carolina, representative of other states, nationalism served as a substitute for coercive government mechanisms to effect mobilization. The federal government’s dealings with the challenges of mobilization during the War of 1812 established precedent for how the American federal system managed at least through the Civil War. iii To my family. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Research and writing can be a solitary endeavor, but the process of preparing a dissertation requires many players. I would like to thank the members of my committee for their support. My advisor, Wayne Lee, kept me on point with direct and pointed comments. Dick Kohn served as a never-ending source of encouragement. To the members or my writing group—Mary Beth Chopas, Sara Bush Castro, and Rachel Levandoski—thank you for helping me overcome my tendency toward procrastination. Your perceptive comments and enforced deadlines made this a reality. Other friends and colleagues, particularly Liz Lundeen, Tommy Sheppard, Ryan Peeks, Kris Dolan, John “Rocky” Rhodes, Liz Ellis, and Sarah McNamara, made course work valuable and helped me see the light at the end of the tunnel in the long days of research and writing. Jim Tucci, Steve Chiabotti, Tim Schultz, and Stephen “Wilbur” Wright, friends and mentors from SAASS, made my time at UNC possible. Jeanne and David Heidler, John Terino, and Ben Skipper, kept me focused and assured me the project was worth my efforts. I sincerely appreciate the support from folks at the North Carolina State Archives in Raleigh and the North Carolina Collection and the Southern Historical Collection, both at UNC. All of these folks have vastly improved my project, and any deficiencies are mine alone. v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1 CHAPTER 2: NORTH CAROLINA ON THE ROAD TO WAR……………………………...27 Politics and Party in North Carolina…………………………………………………......31 Heading to War…………………………………………………………………………..40 North Carolina: The General Assembly and the Populace………………………………43 Political Parties in North Carolina……………………………………………………….51 CHAPTER 3: MOBILIZING FOR WAR: DEMANDS, DISENCHANTMENT, AND DEPENDABILITY….................................................................................70 Demands of the War……………………………………………………………………..71 North Carolina’s Vulnerabilities…………………………………………………………81 Divergent Priorities……………………………………………………………………..106 The Politics of “Unanimity”: North Carolina Stays the Course………………………..110 CHAPTER 4: LEARNING TO SUPPORT THE WAR— ADJUSTMENTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF OCRACOKE…...……………122 North Carolina’s Security Concerns……………………………………………………125 Meeting Militia Expectations…………………………………………………………...133 The State Legislature at Work………………………………………………………….142 Mobilizing Against the Creeks…………………………………………………………154 Identifying with the Cause……………………………………………………………...168 The Threat Remains…………………………………………………………………….176 vi CHAPTER 5: 1814-1815: THE SECOND CALL FOR TROOPS AND FIGHTING IN THE SOUTHWEST……….........…………….………………178 North Carolina’s Priority—Coastal Defense……………………………..…………….184 Federal Priorities: The Defense of Norfolk………………………………..…………...192 Balancing Priorities: Managing Manpower for State and Federal Priorities……..…….195 State Priorities: Coast Concerns Revisited………………………………………..…....207 Federal Priorities: Norfolk, again—The Second Requisition, November, 1814…….....209 The Soldiers’ Experience of State-Federal Management: Winter…………..……….....211 The Last Mobilization……..………………………………………………………..…..222 Shaping Federal-State Relations……………..………………………………………....225 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION…………………..………………………………………..…...227 North Carolina Presses its Monetary Claims..……………………………………..…...228 North Carolina and the American Way of Mobilization…………………………..…...237 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………....……249 vii Chapter One: Introduction In the spring of 1812, as the United States edged toward war with Great Britain, Congress passed several resolutions to put the nation on war footing. The creation of nine military districts to oversee a national war effort required the appointment of district commanders to organize the effort. The federal government selected North Carolinian William Polk, a Federalist, to serve as the Brigadier General in charge of recruiting for the Sixth Military District, encompassing North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Upon receiving the appointment, Polk wrote John Steele, his fellow Federalist and Speaker of the House for the state’s House of Commons, asking for advice on whether to accept the appointment. As a Federalist, Polk opposed the nation’s move toward war. Still, an appointment as a Brigadier General in the regular army was something to consider. To Steele, he wrote, “Should I refuse the offer; it might be said & will I have no doubt, (should that be the course adopted) that I was actuated by party motives.”1 Polk believed his personal financial obligations, including his position as the President of the State Bank of North Carolina and management of personal lands in Tennessee, as well as his responsibilities to a wife and small children more than justified declining the appointment. Polk ultimately 1 John Steele and Henry McGilbert Wagstaff, The Papers of John Steele (Raleigh: Edwards & Broughton Print. Co., 1924), 672–673. 1 refused—his insistence on remaining headquartered in Raleigh an impossible condition to meet and a convenient mask for his political preferences.2 By October 1814, following the burning of Washington D.C., Polk’s attitude toward service had changed. Still a devoted Federalist, Polk was emotionally affected by the attack on the nation’s capital. Polk wrote to Governor Hawkins offering his services. In his own words, he acknowledged that he had turned down a position in 1812, but now observed that the situation was changed—that the country had been humiliated. He declared his willingness to “unite with the government” to compel the enemy to “respect our rights and bring the war to an honorable termination.” Polk, ever the Federalist, was careful to state that he did not necessarily approve of the cause of the war or its progress, but nevertheless felt compelled to serve given the current situation.3 Although William Polk was but one member of the Federalist Party, the minority party in the nation and in North Carolina, and only one of many proposed officer appointments to the regular army, his reluctance to serve and his eventual change of heart demonstrates the importance personal willingness to serve played in the early nineteenth- century American military system. The United States had a small regular army and relied on state militias to augment its forces. When Congress raised the nation’s military force for war against England, it also added a significant volunteer component. The United States military had to coordinate all these forces during the War of 1812. The United States lacked the physical or institutional power to compel military service. Instead, a tradition of semi-compulsory militia service, ideological ties to the 2 Instead, James Wellborn, a Republican, was appointed colonel and placed in command of the U.S. Army’s Tenth Regiment of Infantry, designed to be raised from North Carolina. 3 William Polk to William Hawkins, October 17, 1814, William Hawkins, Letter Books, North Carolina State Archives (NCSA), Raleigh, NC. 2 nation’s new political system, the pressure and influence of local elites (the remnants of a hierarchical social structure in which those who held political and economic