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Who Are the Candidates in Tunisia's 2019 Presidential Elections?

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Who Are the Candidates in Tunisia's 2019 Presidential Elections? Bawader, 5th September 2019 Who are the Candidates in Tunisia’s 2019 Presidential Elections? → Souha Drissi With the death of President Beji Caid Essebsi on 25 July, Tunisia’s presidential elections were moved up and will be held on 15 September 2019. By the end of the eight-day process of accepting nominations – from 2 to 9 August – the Independent High Authority for Elections (IHAE) had received 97[1] requests for nomination which include 75 independents and 11 female candidates. On 31 August, the IHAE released the final list of candidates for the presidential race, accepting 26 nominees, including two women, and rejecting 71 applications for failing to meet candidacy requirements. The IHAE is considered one of the achievements of the 2011 Revolution. It is a nine- member permanent body based in Tunis which enjoys administrative and financial independence. Its mission is to “ensure democratic, pluralistic, fair and transparent elections and referendums”[2] and supervise and oversee all related processes. The election campaigns started on 2 September and will continue until 13 September, with 17 September as the deadline for the announcement of the preliminary election results and 21 October for the announcement of the final results. In case of no absolute majority vote, a second round will be held after two weeks.[3] What is at stake in these elections? Presidential elections are vital to the democracy-building process that began with the fall of the Ben Ali regime, not only because they are a cumulative step towards greater consolidation of democracy in Tunisia, but also as a significant test of the quality of Tunisian democracy itself. The founding phase of Tunisia’s fledgeling democracy began with the holding of the 2011 election of the Constituent Assembly, which later drafted the Constitution, and the election of a president by parliamentary majority. The 2014 legislative and presidential elections were thought to usher in the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia after years of democratic transition. The last five years have been marked by a politics of consensus between the secular party Nidaa Tounes and the Islamist/religious Ennahdha Movement. This period saw developments ranging from multiple political crises to the failure to realize the Revolution’s demands for employment, social justice, and the elimination of corruption. Therefore, the upcoming elections 2 Who are the Candidates in Tunisia’s 2019 Presidential Elections? represent a test of popular satisfaction with the post-2011 political establishment entrusted with realizing the principles of democratic governance such the rule of law, the values of citizenship and a civil state, the separation of powers and checks and balances in government. Today, the electoral landscape is crowded with independent and partisan political figures jockeying for the Presidency of the country. According to the 2014 Constitution, the President of the Republic is the symbol of state sovereignty and the guarantor of stability and respect for the Constitution, and enjoys “unilateral” powers and others “shared” with the Head of Government or the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (parliament). The preamble of the 2014 Constitution and its various chapters enshrine political consensus between the ruling elites and create overlapping powers in order to prevent the rise of new forms of despotism. This was evidenced by the reduction of presidential prerogatives to a range of limited powers compared to the Head of Government: representation of the state, presidency of the National Security Council, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, ratification of state treaties, appointment of the Mufti of the Republic and the higher positions of the presidency, as well as the right to propose amendments to the Constitution and pass legislative initiatives. However, nearly five years after the inauguration of the first president directly elected by the people in a free and fair election in the political history of the Tunisian state, it has become increasingly prevalent how difficult it is to achieve and sustain such a “hybrid” political system, as described by the late President Essebsi himself in a press interview in 2017: “The political system emanating from the current constitution suffers from several weaknesses, and is a system that has, almost nearly, paralyzed government work. Its hybrid nature does not help the government, any government, or the executive authority in general, to carry out its duties in managing the state and achieving development goals within a democratic society in which the values of freedom and dignity are realized. The Constitution put in place a system in which powers overlap, not only between constitutional institutions, and this has in itself become a factor that hinders the work of these institutions.”[4] This paper profiles the political backgrounds of the most prominent candidates in the Tunisian presidential race based on their ranking by the national press and 3 Who are the Candidates in Tunisia’s 2019 Presidential Elections? observers of Tunisian affairs as candidates of well-known political or public status that would add value to the presidency. It relies on their stated preliminary electoral programmes and their past statements. Their candidacy also filled the qualification requirements set by the IHAE, including receipt of full endorsements, financial guarantees and required documents, as well as the absence of final court rulings against the candidate in Tunisian courts.[5] . The Arab Reform Initiative does not endorse or support any candidate. The profiles presented below are in the order they appear on the final candidates' list published by the IHAE on 31 August. Profiles of the Candidates Mohamed Abbou (born 10 May 10, 1966in Tunis) - He is running for President on behalf of the social democratic party, the Democratic Current party. He was formerly a leader of the opposition party, Congress for the Republic under Ben Ali’s rule. He served as Minister of Administrative Reform after the 2011 elections and resigned months later, accusing the ruling parties at the time of not incorporating his reform plan and systematic call to fill Tunisian institutions with supporters of administrative reform. Abbou is known for his anti-corruption positions and his criticisms of the complacency of the post-revolution governments in pushing for administrative reform, establishing constitutional institutions or formulating clear strategies or policies to reduce poverty and unemployment. He considers that, “the state is obliged to lift citizens out of poverty, and push for the formulation of projects, not policies of assistance and charity.”[6] He strongly criticized the policies of indebtftness and borrowing from international financial institutions which were pursued by successive governments. He also deplores the selectivity and compromise he sees as having marred Youssef Chahed’s campaign against corruption. He considers that the President of the Republic is the “faithful guardian” with great powers to push the Head of Government and the parliament towards real and fundamental reforms. Abir Moussi 4 Who are the Candidates in Tunisia’s 2019 Presidential Elections? (born 15 March 1975 in Monastir) - She is a candidate for the Free Destourian Party, which she presides, as an extension of the history of Bourguiba and the achievements of the Ben Ali era. An active member of Ben Ali’s ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally, she continues to defend the former regime and is known for her denial of the success of the 2011 Revolution, and her dissatisfaction with the semi-parliamentary system. She explicitly pledges that if she wins the presidency, she will change the “Constitution and the political system.”[7] A number of observers consider her a populist phenomenon that reflects nostalgia for Ben Ali’s regime because of the lack of confidence in the new political elite. She is also known for causing stirs in the political and media circles with her anti-Islamist statements and for occupying top positions in opinion polls for several months. In most of her statements and rallies, Moussi considers that her top priority is to send Ennahdha figures back to prison, saying, “Tunisia is a civil state, and the Ennahdha Shura Council is a shame on all of us because it is linked to the caliphate and to suspicious organizations, and a consolidation of Islamic allegiance (bay’aa).”[8] She accuses the ruling elite of attempting to exclude her from the presidential race by passing amendments to the electoral law. She recently stated that she was the “rampart” against the deceptive 14 January (post-Revolution) regime, and represents the national structure (post-independence to the Ben Ali era), saying, “history is recording the tremendous efforts of Destourians (followers of the Free Destourian Party) to enact radical change.”[9] Her critics – among Islamists and the Tunisian left – consider her an extension of the old exclusionary regime, spreading hate speech and provoking people with anti-democratic sentiments and opposition to the gains of the Revolutionary. In her electoral programme, Moussi focuses on security, and says that she will promote Tunisia as a stabilizing factor in the fight against terrorism in the region and internationally. She also emphasizes the need to review the debt policy and national security issues, while ensuring the continuation of Bourguiba’s diplomatic approach. Nabil Karoui (born 1 August 1963 in Bizerte) - He is known as the owner of Nessma TV, one of the most prominent businessmen in Tunisia, and the most influential supporter of President Essebsi’s campaign for presidency and of Nidaa Tounes in the 2014 elections. In June 2019, and in reaction to the “amendment of the electoral law”, 5 Who are the Candidates in Tunisia’s 2019 Presidential Elections? Karoui founded the party “9alb Tounes” (Heart of Tunisia). By founding the party, Karoui sought to meet the legal requirements to run for the presidency on the one hand and emerge as a politician with the support of a political party in order to abate the criticism of his use of charity and media for political purposes, on the other.
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