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War So Terrible War So Terrible: The Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare and the Determinants of Interstate War Outcomes _______________________________________ A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia _______________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Political Science _____________________________________________________ by MATTHEW T. KNUTH Dr. Stephen Quackenbush, Thesis Supervisor DECEMBER 2012 © Copyright by Matthew Knuth 2012 All Rights Reserved The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the thesis entitled: War So Terrible: The Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare and the Determinants of Interstate War Outcomes presented by Matthew T. Knuth, a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science, and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. Professor Stephen Quackenbush Professor Cooper Drury Professor Jay Dow Associate Dean Stephen Ferris DEDICATION This is dedicated to my wife, Leann, daughter Brianna, my parents, and my sister. Thank you for supporting me on this project. This is also dedicated to all those who go in harm’s way in defense of the United States of America. For as Winston S. Churchill’s stated, “Never… was so much owed by so many to so few.” ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the following people who over the course of the past two years have graciously responded to my numerous phone calls and emails about their work, and have greatly helped expand my understanding of politics and warfare. John Brence, Adjunct Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, US Naval War College Jeff Buker, Chief of Operations, National Simulation Center, Ft. Leavenworth Carla Martinez Machain. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Kansas State University Stephen Downes-Martin, Professor of Analysis & Research, US Naval War College Solomon Major, Professor, US Naval War College Stephen Melton, Professor, Department of Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth Joe Provenzano, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Douglas V. Smith, Professor of Strategy, Head of Strategy and Policy Division, US Naval War College Allan C. Stam, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan I would also like to thank the following people at the University of Missouri, who have helped guide and mentor me both in and out of class, and spent countless hours allowing me to debate and discuss various subjects linked to this thesis with them. Jay Dow, Professor of Political Science A. Cooper Drury, Associate Professor of Political Science Stephen Ferris, Associate Dean, and the J.H. Rogers Chair of Money, Credit and Banking Director, Financial Research Institute, Trulaske College of Business, and CDR, USN (SC), (Ret). L. Marvin Overby, Professor of Political Science ii Michael A. “Scar” Vizcarra, CAPT, USN, Commanding Officer, NROTCU Missouri And finally I would like to give a very special thanks to five important people. The first is to Stephen Quackenbush, Associate Professor of Political Science, and my thesis advisor, mentor, and good friend, who I have spent too many hours with to count debating the concepts and theories involved in political science and warfare. His knowledge of World War II is quite extensive, but I can give him a run on his money on it, through anything before World War II and I have him beat. Without him, this thesis would be significantly weaker and less scholarly. Thank you for everything. The second and third are to my parents, Alan Knuth, CAPT, USN (Ret.), and Joan Knuth, CAPT, DC, USN (Ret.), who imbued me with how to think on waging war, and who have spent many countless hours listening to me on the phone and in person and debated with me all of my thoughts of politics and war, and the state at war, and help watch my daughter. The fourth person is my wife, Leann Knuth, who has spent countless hours proofreading my thesis, and allowed me the time to work on this, and watch the fourth person I would like to thank, my one year old daughter Brianna. Thank you Brianna for being good to mom, and I hope and pray that my hard work here, and in the Navy ensures that you live in a better world, without war or deployments that will take me away from you in the future. iii War So Terrible: The Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare and the Determinants of Interstate War Outcomes By Matthew T. Knuth Dr. Stephen Quackenbush, Thesis Supervisor ABSTRACT This thesis puts forth a theory of how interstate wars are fought and how certain outcomes and their determinants occur. It begins with an overview of military theory and military science, followed by an overview of the relevant literature in political science. Next the Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare is put forth, along with its implications for how interstate wars are fought and won, lost, or fought to a draw. The theory and its several hypotheses are then tested qualitatively in two case studies, that of the Russo-Japanese War, and World War II. The theory and its hypotheses are further tested quantitatively using a data set that contains strategic level, operational level, doctrinal, economic, population, and political variables with an emphasis on ground, naval, and air warfare in order to determine how and why certain war outcomes occur, the determinants of those war outcomes, and the overall validity of the Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………….ii Abstract ……………………………………..………………………………..…………..iv Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………………v List of Tables and Figures ……………………………………………………………….vi Chapter 1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter 2. The Military Arts and Science in Theory and Practice ……………..………11 Chapter 3. The Study of War in Political Science ……………………………………...67 Chapter 4. Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare ………………………………...…..105 Chapter 5. Qualitative Analysis …………………………………………………….…139 Chapter 6. Quantitative Analysis ……………………………………………………...216 Chapter 7. Conclusion …………………………………………………………………254 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………...263 Vita ……………………………………………………………………………………..276 v Tables and Figures Figure 2.1: Levels of Warfare …………………………………………………………...19 Figure 4.1: Visual Representation of the Core of the State .…………………………...115 Figure 4.2: Exchange of Goods and Services between Pillars and the Core ……...…...119 Figure 4.3: Transaction Exchanges between the Shield & the Core …………….……..123 Figure 4.4: Graphical Representation of the State and Shield at War …………………129 Figure 4.5: Visual Representation of Dyadic Inter-State War …………………………134 Table 5.1: Case Study Hypotheses Outcomes Compared ………….………………..…215 Table 6.1: WL Population Models ……………………………….…………………….232 Table 6.2: WL Economic Models ……………………………….……………………..233 Table 6.3: WL Military Variables Models Part 1 ………………………….………..…236 Table 6.4: WL Military Variables Models Part 2 …………….………………………..237 Table 6.5: WL Simplified Military Variables Models ……………..…………………..238 Table 6.6: Composite Win-Lose Models ……………….……………………………...239 Table 6.7: WLDC Endings Best Fit Model #1 ……………….………………………..241 Table 6.8: WLDC Endings Best Fit Model #2 …………….…………………………..244 Table 6.9: Offensive Land Doctrine Cross Tabulation ……………….………………..246 Table 6.10: Maneuver Doctrine Cross Tabulation ……….…………………………….246 vi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 “It is well that war is so terrible- we should grow too fond of it” - Robert E. Lee, General, Confederate States of America “This war differs from other wars, in this particular. We are not fighting armies but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war” - William T. Sherman, General of the Army of the United States “The main thing in true strategy is simply this: first deal as hard blows at the enemy’s soldiers as possible, and then cause so much suffering to the inhabitants of a country that they will long for peace and press their Government to make it. Nothing should be left to the people but eyes to lament the war” - Philip H. Sheridan, General of the Army of the United States “The one great element in continuing the success of an offensive in maintaining the momentum.” - George C. Marshall, General of the Army, United States Army “The U.S.’s major strength factor and weapon is its economy. If you cripple it, you cripple the military.” - Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy “In war there is no substitute for victory.” - Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army 2 The Study of Warfare: Problems of Perspective This thesis is a study of the state at war. This thesis will attempt to expand the study of warfare both within political science and military science by combining the best both fields have to offer into a new combined view of the state. This new view is of the state at war, specifically through the lens of the state at the organizational and structural level. This thesis differs greatly from the current works within political science and military science. The study of warfare is study of different perspectives; however its study has been uneven in both its progress and its perspectives. Currently within political science, the study of warfare revolves around three main areas. The first area is that of the interaction of states within a larger international system. The second area is that of leaders in time of war. And the third are the factors and determinants to war onset, outcomes, termination, and duration. In each of these areas, the state is recognized as key actor in interstate war and has at its disposal the resources of the state to prosecute a war to achieve some stated political aim. However, while in each of these areas the state is the recognized actor, no theory really portrays the entirety of the state at war. Instead, the state is reduced to proxies, both in theory and in application and tests, with the hope that someday, all the various small proxies can be added up into some grand formula or view of the state, which in turn will produce the state in its entirety.
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