<<

chapter six

The alliance renewed

6.1 The Prospect of War

The Treaties of Lunéville (9 February 1801) and (27 March 1802) had restored peace in Europe. Under the terms of the 1795 Treaty of The Hague the alliance but for the anti-British union had expired. French troops were to leave the . As discussed before, the French government hesitated to abandon military control of the Low Countries. In spite of repetitive Batavian demands and requests and subsequent French promises, French troops were still present a year after the Treaty of Amiens had been concluded. Initially, French troops were said to leave once the expedition for was ready to depart.1 The Staatsbewind was adamant to get rid of the burden to its country caused by the presence of French troops, though, and had ceased paying and furnishing them. In November 1802, Schimmelpen- ninck finally left for London without having settled any of the issues the Batavian Republic wanted to terminate. At least Britain restored the colonies it was to abandon to the Batavian Republic. The Cape of Good Hope, in particular, was not evacuated as speedily as Bonaparte desired, but the Batavian government had actually asked the British to wait until a Batavian garrison had reached the Cape. By the end of the year, Batavian troops arrived and measures were taken to fix the presence of both Batavian and British troops until the Cape would be finally handed over shortly afterwards.2 By then, Franco-British relations had already deteriorated signifi- cantly. Since France had returned to mercantilist policies and was in control of the North Sea coasts, peace had not brought the com- mercial benefits the London City had anticipated.3 Bonaparte was right in accusing London of disregarding treaty obligations by not

1 deutsch, 1938, p. 87. 2 2 January 1803, Articles of agreement between the Batavian Republic and Great Britain (Cape of Good Hope); CTS vol. 56, pp. 449–455 3 droz, 2005, pp. 226–227; Deutsch, 1938, pp. 98–99. 466 part ii, chapter six

­evacuating . On the other hand, the British government could not be expected to reconcile itself with French domination of Western Europe and the Low Countries in particular, even though the Treaty had kept silent with regard to continental matters.4 The tragedy of the Amiens Peace was that Bonaparte could extend his hegemony over Western Europe and interfere in neighbouring states without violating the Treaty,5 while Britain had to violate the Amiens Treaty to respond to challenges to its security and commercial interests.6 British discon- tent was augmented by the French annexation of Piedmont (2 Septem- ber 1802) and Bonaparte’s interference in Swiss politics (resulting in the Mediationsakte of 19 February 1803).7 Moreover, the British government did not trust the government in Paris to abandon its Egyptian schemes. A report by Colonel Sebas- tiani, who had travelled throughout the eastern Mediterranean during the fall of 1802, published in the Moniteur aroused British distrust even more. In response, London refused to evacuate Malta.8 Hence, by March 1803, the peace that was greeted as the restoration of tran- quillity and stability in Europe in March 1802, turned out to be the ephemeral truce it has been taken for by most historians ever since. In those circumstances, Bonaparte bluntly refused to evacuate the Bata- vian Republic as long as Britain held on to Malta. In February 1803, Paris objected to the British not having left Malta yet.9 The British government answered that Malta was considered to be compensation for French extension on the Continent.10 Bonaparte was not a man to tolerate someone else to disregard an agreement. This is not the place to discuss whether or not the Peace of Amiens was bound to fail from the start. Schimmelpenninck, at least, had his doubts. Only a month after having placed his signature, he wrote to Van der Goes stating that in his opinion Europe was still ‘very far

4 englund, 2004, p. 261. 5 deutsch, 1938, pp. 92–93; Kagan, 2006, p. 38 and p. 41. 6 englund, 2004, p. 259. 7 laurent, 1867, pp. 313–314; Geyl, 1965, p. 55; Kagan, 2006, p. 42. On the Media- tion in the , see: Oechsli 1899 and 1903; Strickler 1898, 1899, 1902, and 1903; Dunant 1901; Böning, 1905; Zaeslin, 1960; Rufer, 1974; Aubert, 1974; Nab- holz, 1921; AN 29AP Roederer 21, 22, and 23 (Médiation Suisse an XI); The Act of Médiation can be found, e.g., in: AAE CP Suisse 480 and Strickler, 1866–1903 (1903 IX), no. 160 pp. 941–981. 8 deutsch, 1938, pp. 109–110 and p. 121. 9 deutsch, 1938, p. 116 and p. 118. 10 deutsch, 1938, pp. 126–127.