The Real Institutional Turn in Deliberative Democracy, The

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The Real Institutional Turn in Deliberative Democracy,

the Inequality Problem and the Progressive Solutions of

Democratic Confederalism

Lotte den Hertog

10357351

June 2019

Supervisor: dr. Afsoun Afsahi

Second reader: dr. Enzo Rossi

Master thesis Political Science Specialization track: International Relations

“The excitement and beauty of today can only be measured by those who were able to carry it to this day and their ability to carry it further to the future.”

– Zîlan Diyar, a Kurdish women guerrilla fighter

Abstract

Deliberative democracy is gaining in popularity as the democracy theory to guarantee equal access to the political process. It relies on reasonableness, the public sphere, and rules concerning equal rights, as mechanisms to safeguard the equal access to deliberation.

However, it is confirmed that this equality does not include structurally marginalized groups

(Fraser 1990; Karpowitz 2014; Mendelberg 2014; Sanders 1997; Young 2001). This leaves deliberative democracy with an inequality problem. I introduce the real institutional turn as the solution to the inequality problem of deliberative democracy. This new turn is informed by the progressive solutions of the theory of democratic confederalism, a democracy theory that originated as a direct response to inequality (Öcalan 2017:46). The real institutional turn adopts the mechanisms of a decentralized power structure, jineology and representation through quotas, into deliberative democracy theory to guarantee the institutionalization of equality in the theory. The result is equal access to deliberation voor all citizens.

Keywords: deliberative democracy, inequality, access, democratic confederalism, the real institutional turn

Table of contents

Abstract 2

Introduction 4

Deliberative democracy and the inequality problem 6

What is deliberative democracy theory? 6

Criticism from a theoretical perspective 11

Criticism from an empirical perspective 16

Criticism from a system change perspective 19

The real institutional turn in deliberative democracy 21

The progressive solutions of democratic confederalism to the inequality problem 23

What is Democratic Confederalism ? 23

A theory and its context, separated or joint 32

Discussion 35

Conclusion 42

References 43

Introduction

In an era where democratic legitimacy is being challenged, with voter turnouts structurally decreasing1, deliberative democracy is gaining in popularity as a new theory on democratic legitimacy. Countries like Ireland, Estonia and Romania have picked up on this new political theory and have started to use deliberative methods in reviewing their constitutions

(Reuchamps and Suiter 2016). Deliberative democracy is presented as the democracy theory that gives people back their voice instead of just a vote in politics. The gap between the public and politics is narrowed through deliberation settings in which citizens are encouraged to participate in political will-formation and decision making. But most importantly, deliberative democracy is said to promote equal access to the political process2. For example it declares that all affected by a political decision should be part of the deliberative process.

Only reasonable arguments are accepted in deliberation to ensure all participants are treated equally and procedural rules are installed to protect equal rights. These safeguards give the impression that deliberative democracy ensures true political equality among all citizens.

However, the equality of deliberative democracy is not yet equality for all. It is pointed out by theoretical and empirical scholars that these safeguards fail to provide access to the deliberative process for structurally marginalized groups3 (Fraser 1990; Karpowitz 2014;

Mendelberg 2014; Sanders 1997; Young 2001). This is why deliberative democracy has an inequality problem. Although different turns in approaches to the theory have been made, none have succeeded in providing a comprehensive solution to this problem. It is therefore I insist that a new turn in deliberative democracy should be made, which I call: the real

1 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance provides a databank with voter turnouts of democratic elections around the world, showing a clear decrease in the overall voter turnout. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-view/521 2 Equal access to the political process concerns equal treatment within the process and equal possibilities to be part of that process. 3 With structurally marginalized groups I mean those groups who are structurally relegated to a powerless or power diminished position in society, often based on a shared identity (like race, gender, ableness, class and many others) that does not confirm to the hegemonic identity of the white, able, hetrosexual, upper class male (this list of adverbs can be extended).

institutional turn4. The real institutional turn is an advocacy for the institutionalization of equality within deliberative democracy and additionally provides the therefor necessary framework. In this framework, new mechanisms are adopted that have been proven capable of ensuring equal access to the political process. These mechanisms are borrowed from the theory of democratic confederalism. Democratic confederalism was created as a direct response to inequality, evolved by the experience of the Kurds, and stands for ‘the contrasting paradigm of the oppressed people’ (Öcalan 2017:46). The origin of this theory and its focus on equality has led me to believe that a solution to the inequality problem is best informed by democratic confederalism. I argue that deliberative democracy needs to adopt three mechanisms of democratic confederalism in order to overcome the inequality problem: a decentralized power structure, jineology5 and representation through quotas. These mechanisms constitute the framework of the real institutional turn, which will cause deliberative democracy to institutionalize equality and finally become equally accessible for all.

To provide a clear structure of this argument, I proceed as follows. First I present a review of deliberative democracy, after which I engage with theoretical and empirical criticisms on, and solutions to, the inequality problem. This section is then succeeded by an introduction to democratic confederalism and its progressive mechanisms. I present how the three mechanisms are implemented and their effects on the inequality problem in the discussion section. It is in this section that the true potential of the real institutional turn becomes clear and its feasibility evident.

4 One of the earlier turns in deliberative democracy was retrospectively named ‘the institutional turn’ by Simone Chambers (Dryzek 2010:7). During the institutional turn, scholars were mostly focussed on deliberation within institutions or secluded settings. The name I have given to this new turn is a play on words in relation to this earlier term but then with a focus on institutionalization instead of institutions. 5 Jineology stands for the science of women (jin) and is used in democratic confederalism to contest oppressive assumptions that privilege men over women in science, politics, economy and so on.

Deliberative democracy and the inequality problem

The problem deliberative democracy has with safeguarding equality is confirmed by a variety of theoretical as well as empirical scholars. The reason why I want to review their criticisms is twofold: to confirm the seriousness of the problem, and to point out that the problem has not yet been resolved by deliberative democrats. The latter supports my motivation to find solutions to the problem elsewhere, namely within democratic confederalism. To provide a clear overview of the different criticisms I have divided them into the categories of theoretical, empirical and system change related criticism. These categories represent specific turns within deliberative democracy and simultaneously specify the aspects within deliberative democracy that are up for scrutiny. Although the last category of system change stems from theoretical criticism, the particular angle of their criticism is best discussed as a separate category. Additionally, I look at some of the solutions proposed by all these scholars and suggest why those are not sufficient enough to solve the inequality problem. For every category I have selected the criticisms or solutions I believe contribute most to the inequality debate6. My objective here is to indicate some of the aspects in deliberative democracy that support the existence of the inequality problem. I start by giving a summary of the theory of deliberative democracy. Then I turn to the three categories of criticism where I will put emphasis on the arguments that contest deliberative democracy the strongest. Based on these arguments and the problems they signify I have selected the three progressive solutions from democratic confederalism, which I will turn to there after.

What is deliberative democracy theory?

In his work ‘Three normative models of democracy’, Jürgen Habermas introduced deliberative democracy as an alternative democracy theory to the liberal and republican

6 It should be noted however that there are many more interesting arguments and perspectives on this problem within deliberative democracy, but unfortunately too many for the scope of this research.

understanding of democracy and the democratic process (Habermas 1998)7. The theory of deliberative democracy was initially proposed as a theory for democratic legitimacy (Cohen

1996; Dryzek 2010; Habermas 1998). In the aggregative democracy model, mostly used in democratic societies, the voting mechanisms are the pivotal point of democratic legitimacy.

However, since their results are a mere aggregation of desires, they seem to fall short in providing a pure democratic outcome. Additionally, the aggregative model has a tendency to privilege the majority over structurally marginalized groups. It can therefore be criticized for failing to provide equal access to the democratic process, making its democratic legitimacy questionable. Deliberative democracy comes closer to the ideal of democratic legitimacy: where the people rule the people. This perspective on democratic legitimacy is captured by

Joshua Cohen’s classic formulation: ‘outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question’ (Cohen in Dryzek 2010: 23). In communication processes of opinion and will-formation the democratic citizen is formed and becomes active. Therefore it is necessary to focus on these processes which are best facilitated through deliberation, instead of focusing on voting as the main mechanism of democracy. Simone Chambers provides a general definition of deliberation. ‘Generally speaking, we can say that deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants’(Chambers 2003: 309). In this reciprocal process of deliberation, reasonableness or rationality is the requirement that determines which arguments are acceptable within deliberation. It is presumed that this requirement would safeguard equal

7 The term ‘deliberative democracy’ was initially coined by Joseph Bessette in 1980. With this term he indicated the failures of the existing democratic institutions, for they were not capable to reflect the citizens interests and desires (Barker, McAfee and McIvor, 2012). The term has since then gained prominence with democratic theorists and became most known by the work on the subject by Jürgen Habermas. His ideas and understanding of deliberative democracy are still essential to how deliberative democracy is perceived today. It is therefore that I refer to Habermas instead of Bessette.

treatment within the deliberation. An argument or opinion is considered reasonable when it is compelling to others in a ‘setting suited to free association among equals, where that setting is assumed to include an acknowledgement of reasonable pluralism’ (Cohen

1996:100). If only reasonable arguments are used among equals who are free to associate,

‘the unforced force of the better argument8’ will be the determining factor leading to the decision, making ‘reasonable discourse’ or rationality an essential element to deliberation

(Benhabib 1996; Cohen 1996; Habermas 1998). Habermas even formulated this into ‘the discourse principle’9, which he thought transcended moral discourse and should be considered an overarching principle. (Habermas 1990: 66, see also Barker, McAfee and

McIvor 2012:8).

A principle mentioned by both Habermas and Cohen in their definitions is the ‘all affected principle’ which implies that all affected by the decisions should have accepted it through the course of a reasonable discourse (Habermas 1998a: 365). The purpose of this principle is to generate equal access to the deliberation for everyone to whom it is relevant.

The principle ensures that participants in the deliberation not only consist of government officials and companies with interests, but also include ordinary citizens and social movements. This poses a difficult question: how does this principle translate to highly complex modern democratic societies? It is within the public sphere and public deliberation that the ‘all affected’ principle is largely achieved (Benhabib 1996). The public sphere can refer to two different conceptions within deliberative democracy and both are of importance in explaining how ‘all affected’ find access 10. The first is a sociological understanding that is

8 The unforced force of the better argument describes the dialectic interaction between arguments in a communicative discourse. (Habermas 1990; see also https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/ ) 9 ‘Decisions are legitimate if they could be accepted by all affected through the course of a reasonable discourse’(Barker, McAfee and McIvor 2012:8). 10 The concept of public sphere has went through some changes after the first formulation by Habermas received a fast amount of criticism. The bourgeois public sphere conception he used in his early work `The structural transformation of the public sphere’, was rejected. He based a new conception on his theory of communicative action.

‘a description of the actually existing complex of communicatively mediated networks of everyday argumentation’ (Dahlberg 2014: 24). This conception of the public sphere refers to content, place or medium. It is through these networks that the ‘all affected’ find physical or practical access to the deliberation. The second conception of the public sphere refers to ‘a norm implicit in all actual argumentation. [...] The communicative space constituted through rational-critical deliberation over practical problems, deliberation that leads to critically

(in)formed public opinion, which in turn enables the democratic scrutiny and guidance of official decision-making processes’ (ibid:24). Here ‘public’ is understood as a mode of communication. Where the first conception is considered the actual (is) the second is the normative (ought). It is in this second conception of the public sphere that procedural rules can facilitate in opening the deliberative process to be accessible to all citizens. Seyla

Benhabib lists some of these rules, necessary for a deliberative process to be open to all and therefore morally binding11.

1) Participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry: all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; 2) all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; 3) all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out (Benhabib 1996:70).

These rules are imposed to ensure that access to deliberation is not limited to participating in the discussion or debate, but also ensure power for the participants to influence the formation and content of the deliberative process12. Through the use of the public sphere, in both its definitions, the scope of participation in deliberation is not limited to an elitist group but can include all citizens.

11 I choose to refer here to the features listed by Benhabib, however it should be noted that she is not the only one who has ever written down such requirements. It is therefore not limited to these features. 12 Dahlberg refers to such procedures as ‘“functionally necessary” sociopolitical resources (or positive conditions) needed to enhance - in quality and quantity - rational-critical deliberation in everyday practical argumentation (Dahlberg 2014:25).

What can be expected to result from deliberation is still being debated between deliberative democrats. Some theorists in deliberative democracy follow the tradition that all deliberation ends in consensus. However, not all deliberative democrats are part of this tradition and some see the acknowledgment of reasonable pluralism as incompatible with consensus13. If consensus is the evident goal of deliberation it is difficult to sustain the conviction that a plurality of reasons exists and is accepted. A hostility between pluralism and consensus thus seems to exist. Theorists like John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer try to resolve this tension by promoting a reconciliation between pluralism at a simple level combined with meta-consensus on values, beliefs, preferences, and discourses (Dryzek 2010:114).

Consensus remains a questionable concept within deliberative democracy, especially if it is predetermined as the ending of a deliberative process. However, other forms of decision making are not banned from deliberative democracy. Forms of consent and voting are still used, like in the aggregative model, however they are used in a different manner. Deliberative democracy is centered around the process that comes before the final decision, making the actual vote more informed and considered. Chambers even claims ‘it [voting] is given a more complex and richer interpretation in the deliberative model than in the aggregative model’

(Chambers 2003: 308). Habermas equally recognizes that compromise is a useful form of decision-making in a society of cultural and social pluralism. Reasonable pluralism within deliberation may not lead to consensus but the process itself can still bring the different positions closer together and change presuppositions through rational discourse. A collectively accepted agreement can thus still be reached even if it is not through consensus.

The increasing interest in deliberative democracy over the last few decades has resulted in a growing body of concepts, explanations and interpretations. Within this review I

13 The term ‘reasonable pluralism’ originates from the writing by John Rawls. He makes a distinction between a mere plurality of position and conceptions on the one hand and a plurality of reasoned doctrines coming from citizens who acknowledge themselves to be part of the reasonable plurality on the other. The second conception is reasonable pluralism (Rawls, 2005).

have presented the most important and relevant concepts and arguments of deliberative democracy14. Throughout this review, the access to the deliberation process was touched upon a few times. I will now turn to the inequality problem to make clear why the accessibility for all is only imagined and not as evident as supposed in deliberative democracy theory.

Criticism from a theoretical perspective

There are many theorists who have written about the problems deliberative democracy faces when it comes to guaranteeing equality. In this section I will focus on the criticism that deals with reasonableness and the public sphere in both its conceptions, and show why they contribute to the inequality problem of deliberative democracy.

The first criticism is centered around the importance of reasonableness to deliberative democracy. Reasonableness is used as an objective requirement to protect equal treatment in deliberative democracy. This notion of reasonableness as objective is misleading. Monique

Deveaux argues for example that ‘models of public deliberation that stipulate norms of reasonableness and universalizability in moral argumentation often presuppose agreement upon what kind of arguments and procedures are fair and reasonable’ (Deveaux 2003:786).

Different cultures, social backgrounds, education and other influential variables can all have a significant effect on what one perceives to be (a good formulation of) a reasonable argument.

However, this diversity is often overlooked and normative presuppositions on what counts as an argument, or the better argument, hinder equal recognition of a diversity of arguments

(Sanders 1997: 353; see also Williams 2000). The groups affected by these covert preferences or assumptions are most often structurally marginalized groups who do not confirm or differ from the standards set by white male society. This argument resonates with what Lynn

14 The amount of interesting arguments is not limited to what I have reviewed. Other researchers might focus on other aspects of deliberative democracy but I have found these aspects to be most relevant in relation to the inequality problem.

Sanders calls the problem of disenfranchisement (Sanders 1997). According to her, mechanisms of exclusion based on fortune and birth are the reason why specific groups keep or are kept silent. Sanders additionally points to the reliance on abstract talk or reasonableness in deliberative democracy. Reasonableness (or abstraction) is considered necessary because it protects the value of the ‘unforced force of the better argument’.

Nevertheless, it creates a blind spot for systemic patterns that privilege groups who benefit more because of their particular interest (ibid: 353). Lois McNay also joins in on this debate and criticizes Habermas’s reliance on the conception of ‘speech act’ as an ‘untenable abstraction from the determinate content of social life’(McNay 2008:87). Rules and regulation might influence the structure and setting of communication, however it is nearly impossible to separate the influence of social life from ones speech act in a conversation, debate or deliberation. Deveaux, Sanders and McNay expose two major assumptions concerning reasonableness; (1) reasonableness can objectively be determined and (2) that it is a sufficient mechanism to decide what is tolerated in deliberative speech. The effect of these two assumptions is that structurally marginalized groups are excluded from the democratic process, resulting in unequal access to formative and decision-making power. As a response, deliberative democrats may point to the features listed by Benhabib and indicate that every participant has the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the discourse procedure and therefore has the tools to change this. Although this may seem as a solution, here the proponents of deliberation rely ‘on open arguments against prejudice to overcome it, and on the susceptibility of prejudice to reason’ (Sanders 1997:353). This is an assumption out of good faith or naivety, for it is really difficult to expect that in such a setting, prejudice can be challenged by its victims or the prejudiced themselves. In a society free from inequality, reasonableness might be an effective mechanism within deliberation to ensure everyone is treated equal, but in a society where inequality is still evident such a mechanism can easily

result in exclusion. A different mechanism is thus needed to ensure equal treatment within deliberative processes, something that the progressive solutions of democratic confederalism should resolve.

Some of these challenges and criticisms are acknowledged by proponents of deliberative democracy. They reply that deliberative democracy not only entails the force of argumentation and treating others as free and equal, but also publicity, accountability and inclusion. Iris Marion Young picks up on this defense and asks if formal inclusion is enough since structural biases and the power of privilege are not countered by these principles

(Young 2001). When others are able to steer the conversation and/or set the limits of its possible formation, by virtue of their primary position and power, it is questionable if deliberation even is an option to the powerless. Nancy Fraser takes this even a step further and points at the inequality that is apparent because of some of the protocols and styles of deliberative processes. ‘Insofar as the bracketing of social inequalities in deliberation means proceeding as if they don’t exist when they do, this does not foster participatory parity’(Fraser 1990:64). Declaring a space to be cleansed of power relations and social inequalities does not make it true.

Now I turn to the point of criticism that is concerned with the use of the public sphere in deliberative democracy. Let me start with the first conception of the public sphere which is concerned with the content, place or medium. Fraser points out that the concept of public sphere by Habermasian theorists is preferably used as singular. She argues that ‘seeing this

[the public as singular] as more democratic, is a normatively informed preference over a multiplicity of publics’ (ibid:66). There are other publics, subaltern counterpublics, constitutive of marginalized groups. In these discursive publics imposed identities and assumed needs can be challenged and refuted by the ones on which those identities were imposed. These processes are especially influential in the construction of opinion and will-

formation for structurally marginalized groups. By disregarding these discursive publics, because of a preference for a singular interpretation of the public sphere, deliberative democrats miss out on the opinion and will-formation processes that are happening in these publics. If the singular public sphere is used in deliberative democracy, there is a significant chance that structurally marginalized groups will be excluded because the ‘mediated networks of everyday argumentation’ that are looked at, will not equally represent all

‘mediated networks of everyday argumentation’15. The public sphere in its second conception, as a mode of communication, grants the possibility to impose procedural rules that can ensure the access to deliberation is open to all, according to Benhabib. Young makes a critical observation relevant to this mode of communication, that concerns the workings of discourses. Young finds that ‘it [deliberative democracy] lacks a theory of, shall we call it, ideology, as well as an account of the genealogy of discourses and their manner of helping to constitute the way individuals see themselves and their social world’ (Young 2001:686).

Young aims here at the constitutive workings of discourse on the will-formation of citizens that are not incorporated into the theory of deliberative democracy. Which leads deliberative democracy to fail to acknowledge the possibility of ‘false consensus’16. Especially hegemonic discourse can be formative when it comes to idea and will-formation. It also has an exclusionary power that sets the boundaries of what counts as legitimate arguments and communication. Poststructuralists like Dahlberg argue similarly, that it is necessary for deliberative public sphere theorist to incorporate discourse to contest the boundaries of the public sphere in communicative practices (Dahlberg 2014:34). The rules that Benhabib proposes enable participants to change the framework and content of the conversation,

15 These mediated networks are part of Dahlberg’s description of the perception of the public sphere, mentioned earlier. ‘The first is a sociological understanding that is ‘a description of the actually existing complex of communicatively mediated networks of everyday argumentation’ (Dahlberg 2014: 24). 16 Theorists of deliberative democracy have picked up on this critique and present-day writings by among others ‘Dryzek (2000) appropriate a Foucaultian sense of discourse and contestation between discourses’(Dahlberg 2014:35).

however it is questionable if rules can effectively counteract the workings of hegemonic discourse. If not, relying on rules to create access to the public sphere is not enough. People outside of the hegemonic discourse will not have equal access to the public sphere, which most often affects structurally marginalized groups. Relying on the public sphere to create access for all and to execute the ‘all affected principle’ in modern democratic societies is therefore unwanted. A different mechanism is needed to ensure that access for the ‘all affected’ is possible and protected. This is one of the main challenges faced within democratic confederalism, in which discourses are challenged and a multitude of publics is acknowledged with the purpose of equal access for all.

Some of the theorists have proposed solutions to problems they specified.

Young for example argues that ‘normatively emblematic democratic communication should shift from simply a willingness to give reasons for one’s claims and listen to others to a broader understanding of the generation and influence of public opinion’ (Young 2001:688).

Although I agree with Young on the importance of seeing the generation and influence of public opinion as part of the opinion and will-formation process, I am not convinced that incorporating this process into the perspective is going to resolve unequal conditions in deliberative processes. Seeing opinion and will-formation in a larger scope can definitely create more understanding on how these came to be. However, if this is the only alteration it will not directly empower structurally marginalized groups within deliberation processes. A different solution is formulated by Cohen and Rogers. They argue that ‘the absence of material deprivation is a precondition for free and unconstrained deliberation’ (Cohen and

Rogers 1983:157). According to them, unequal political capacities can be positively influenced by equalizing the material preconditions, for example by providing free education.

Nevertheless, I agree with Sanders that these preconditions will not fully tackle the problem of exclusion in deliberative democracy (Sanders 1997:353). Oppressive structures like

racism, sexism and ableism are ideological structures that inform the material inequalities.

Equalizing material preconditions will therefore not necessarily result in a deliberative setting that is cleansed from these oppressive structures..

I want to mention one last solution that deals with inequality, because it seems to share similarities with what I intent to propose for deliberative democracy. Archon Fung has listed several measures and strategies that are needed for deliberative activists to

‘successfully mitigate the effects of inequality upon deliberation and moderate the reluctance of powerful parties to act with deliberative reciprocity’ (Fung 2005:412). These measures vary from educational support to relocating authority to facilitation. What is comparable in our approach is that we advocate for multiple changes with similar subjects. Our difference however is that Fung focusses on ‘how it is possible to practice deliberative democracy in the face of inequality and hostility’ (ibid 2005:416), whereas my aim is to provide solutions that counter the inequality that is inherent within deliberative democracy.

I have explained the different criticisms that concern reasonableness and the public sphere. It has become clear that these mechanisms, despite their purpose to create equality, contribute to the inequality problem of deliberative democracy. New mechanisms are needed to ensure that access for the ‘all affected’ is possible and protected, and to ensure equal treatment within deliberative processes. This will be the task that the mechanisms of democratic confederalism need to accomplish.

Criticism from an empirical perspective

Within democracy theory, a diversity of viewpoints is highly valued as it encourages critical reflection and betters political discussion (Habermas 1996; Himmelroos, Rapeli and

Grönlund 2017). In deliberative democracy this diversity is necessary for the formation of well-informed decisions, that are accepted by all who are affected. Moreover, it is essential

for the ideal of deliberative democracy to promote diversity if it wants to be an inclusive democracy model for equal citizens. Informed by the earlier criticisms of theorists, it can be said that a diversity in physical representation in a deliberative setting does not automatically result in a decision that is equally informed by that diversity. It has been shown that there are different mechanisms at work in deliberation that do not create or protect equal influence.

Empirical researchers also encountered the inequality problem within deliberative democracy and have presented an interesting solution to politically empower the ones who are structurally disadvantaged, namely enclave deliberation17. In this section I solely focus on this solution, its complications and show that this too is ineffective against the inequality problem.

It is assumed that a diversity of viewpoints results in better deliberation. However, some studies have found that people prefer to engage politically in groups consisting of like- minded people (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002:203). An empirical study by Karpowitz and others has suggested that people from structurally marginalized groups (in their case women) are found to speak less in deliberative settings (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker 2012; see also Himmelroos, Rapeli and Grönlund 2017). They indicate a contingency between the amount of women in the group and their participation in the deliberative discussion18.

Education, economic resources, gender, profession and ethnicity are some of the categories that influence active participation in a deliberation. The solution of enclave deliberation combines these findings, and tries to create a space or setting that can empower structurally marginalized groups, by having them deliberate amongst each other prior to the general

17 Other names have been used to indicate this form of deliberation like among others, affinity groups, mini publics and forum deliberation. Eventually they all mean the same form of deliberation to which I will be referring as enclave deliberation. 18 This contingency also had to do with the kind of rule that was used in the end of the deliberation. When decisions were made through majority rule, women were disadvantaged when they constituted the minority group, but more empowered when they formed the majority in the discussion. When the final rule was done through unanimous rule this was the other way around. When they formed the minority, women would be protected through unanimous rule but this rule would work against them if they constituted the majority because they would be muted by the minority of men (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker 2012).

deliberation. Positive reasons for enclave deliberation include that enclaves ‘reinforce opinions and motivate participants to engage in collective action, offer a less contentious setting where necessary resources and capabilities can be pooled’ (Himmelroos, Rapeli and

Grönlund 2017:150) and ‘it may be safer for people to reconsider their views among their peers than in more diverse settings, where defending minority identities against the majority may be more salient’ (Karpowitz, Raphael and Hammond 2009:581). This empowerment should eventually lead to a strengthened position of marginalized groups in deliberative settings. Enclave deliberation should however, not replace all forms of deliberation but rather be a supplement to deliberative processes. It can strengthen marginalized groups by making them able to ‘oscillate between protected enclaves, in which they can explore their ideas in an environment of mutual encouragement, and more hostile but also broader surroundings in which they can test those ideas against the reigning reality’ (Mansbridge in Karpowitz et al

2009:579). The assets enclave deliberation can bring to marginalized groups are valuable and can indeed furnish some form of empowerment to these groups. Nevertheless, there are also implications when using enclave deliberation. One implication is that the lack of diversity of viewpoints in homogeneous group settings can negatively affect the critical reflection, but another trap lures in this deliberative setting. Instead of contributing to the empowerment of marginalized groups, enclave deliberation may result in group polarization which may lead to a greater sense of alienation (Karpowitz, Raphael and Hammond 2009:580; see also Sunstein

2002). Additionally, it can generate ‘illusions of unanimous opinions among members’ and

‘overestimation of a groups power’(ibid). It is therefore questionable if enclave deliberation would be beneficial for marginalized groups outside of the enclave deliberation. Most of the empowerment seems to happen within the secluded deliberation, whereas the need for empowerment is mostly in the broader deliberative settings. The positive reasons for enclave deliberation like safety, motivation to engage and a less contentious setting are all positive

aspects inside the enclave deliberation, but may not be so enduring when marginalized groups rejoin the broader deliberation. Although there is definitely value in having enclave deliberations supplement deliberation processes, it does not effectively increase the power of marginalized groups in the setting that holds the decision-making power. It is therefore unlikely that enclave deliberation can solve the inequality problem.

Criticism from a system change perspective

The systemic turn in deliberative democracy was (allegedly) initiated by Simone Chambers as a response to the institutional perspective that dominated deliberative democracy thinking

(Dryzek 2010:7)19. She claimed that earlier work on deliberative democracy always focused on deliberation within an institution or secluded setting, making it seem insusceptible to the influences and tendencies coming from the system in which the deliberative setting was taking place20. The system approach to deliberative democracy looks at this system as a whole, in which deliberative forums or institutions are just a part of that whole. ‘Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be judged as a whole in addition to the parts being judged independently’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012: 5). A system is defined as ‘a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree interdependent parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labour, connected in such a way as to form a complex whole’ (ibid:4). Proponents of the systemic turn point out that parts of the system can, although highly deliberative on their own, lose in their deliberative quality by virtue of their interaction with non-deliberative parts of the system. This goes both ways, with parts that have low deliberative quality also gaining in deliberative quality due to their interaction with

19 The terms ‘system change’ and ‘systemic turn’ are often used interchangeably as they signify the same perspective. The small difference between the terms is not significant to my research and I therefore see no harm in using these terms interchangeably as well. 20 Dryzek disagrees with Chambers and points to a variety of works in which the system as a whole was incorporated within the research before she started calling for a systemic turn in deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2010:7). Nevertheless, I choose to refer to the systemic turn starting from Chambers initiation, which has been responded to by scholars like Mansbridge, and Parkinson.

other parts of the system (ibid:3; Dryzek 2011: 227). Dryzek uses the following example to clarify how this works. ‘The exclusion of certain groups from the state has sometimes led to a lively public sphere, [...] made up of political actors excluded from aristocratic and monarchical states’ (Dryzek 2011:227). It is the exclusion of groups that is highly undemocratic, but the result could be a setting that is very efficient for a deliberation by virtue of the changed composition. The system change perspective contributes to the clarification of the inequality problem by making forms of exclusion visible, that were previously considered outside of the deliberative setting. ‘A systemic approach introduces into the analysis large contextual issues and broad systemic inadequacies that have an impact on individual sites and shape the possibilities of effective deliberation’ (Mansbridge et al,.

2012:5). However, it does not provide any further solution to the inequality problem. On the contrary, the system change perspective legitimizes the non-deliberative parts of the system if they ultimately lead to more deliberation in a different part. This can mean that highly unequal parts of the system are deemed acceptable if they benefit other parts that are deliberative. Another problem is that the system change perspective heavily relies, not only on the different parts of the system influencing each other, but also on informing each other in a positive way (ibid: 23). Like a system of checks and balances it is assumed that parts of the system can use reasonable argumentation (which has already been proven a problematic mechanism21) to converge the defecting parts22. Related to this problem is the concern about what happens when a ‘particular social interest or social class controls or exerts undue influence over many parts of the deliberative system’ (ibid:24). These problems are not countered with a solution coming from the system change perspective and are left unresolved.

The inequality problem is still present in the system change perspective and is even shown to

21 See section on criticism from a theoretical perspective. 22A system of checks and balances is a principle of government where a separation of powers is used to prevent one branch to dominate the others. The different branches check each other, therefore creating a balance between all of them.

be further reaching than initially thought. The insight I want to take away from this perspective is the importance of including the system into the analysis. Solving the inequality problem of deliberative democracy will be unachievable without paying attention to the system.

The real institutional turn in deliberative democracy

The problems identified by the different scholars form a serious concern about deliberative democracy’s capacity to foster and achieve equality, especially with regards to structurally marginalized groups. Theoretical criticism has shown that the reliance on reasonableness as the eventual mechanism to protect equal treatment is biased and therefore unsound.

Furthermore, it was proven that equal access to deliberation through the public sphere poses many challenges. Empiricists have proposed enclave deliberation to empower the ones who are most affected by this unequal treatment. However, this empowerment is limited to the enclave deliberation and therefore does not effectively increase the formation and decision- making power of marginalized groups. According to the system change perspective, all solutions that solely focus on isolated institutional changes are ineffective, since they overlook the influences coming from the internal interactions in the system in which the deliberation is situated. This last perspective has shown that the inequality problem is not a problem confined to the deliberative process, but is present in the interactions with other parts of the system. What all these scholars have done is point at a distinctive problem within deliberative democracy and formulate a solution to resolve that specific problem. The small adjustments have too little effect and none of the solutions have been all-encompassing for the inequality problem in its entirety. The solution I present deals with all the problems that I have pointed out so far. I want to persuade deliberative democracy to finally make a real institutional turn. This real institutional turn is my contribution to deliberative democracy.

By “an institutional turn” I do not mean the institutional perspective Chambers once argued against, which signified a period of specific focus on deliberation within institutions. The real institutional turn is an advocacy for the institutionalization of equality, enabled by mechanisms that have the sole purpose of safeguarding equal access to formation and decision-making power, equal treatment of all affected and the improvement of equality beyond deliberation processes. The real institutional turn in deliberative democracy is not just a promotion for equality but provides an actual framework that protects and enforces it. To achieve this institutional turn I believe it is wise to learn from democratic confederalism, as this democracy theory has been a direct response to inequality and includes different mechanisms to ensure and protect equality. The three mechanisms within democratic confederalism that can make this real institutional turn possible are a decentralized power structure, jineology and representation through quotas. With these purposes in mind, I will now turn to the theory of democratic confederalism and its progressive solutions.

The progressive solutions of democratic confederalism to the inequality problem

The problems that constitute the foundation of the inequality problem have been determined.

I have explained that new mechanisms are needed to safeguard equal access to formation and decision-making power, ensure equal treatment of all affected and support the improvement of equality beyond deliberation processes. I now turn to democratic confederalism and its progressive solutions to show what has led me to believe that a solution to the inequality problem is best informed by democratic confederalism. I start by giving an introduction to the theory and how this is practised in Rojava. During this introduction I will elaborate on the three mechanisms that follow from the ideological pillars of democratic confederalism: a decentralized power structure, jineology and representation through quotas. After this elaboration I will turn to the discussion chapter where I revisit the criticism on the inequality problem of deliberative democracy and advocate for the real institutional turn through the use of the three mechanisms.

What is Democratic Confederalism ?

In the northern part of Syria, in the Kurdish region named Rojava23, the theory of democratic confederalism is being practised throughout the community. The opportunity to implement this entirely new political system in this region occurred because of the power vacuum that was a result from the civil war in Syria and the war with Daesh (Shahvisi 2018). The theory was initially developed to support a new political strategy for the Kurdish liberation struggle that parted from the political goal of an own nation state and instead started calling for a stateless democracy (Knapp and Jongerden 2016). As exclusion and oppression were seen as

23 Rojava directly translates to ‘the West’ in Kurdish language. The area is the western region of Kurdistan which explains why this name was given by the Kurds.

inherent to states, longing for a separate nation state was in contradiction with the goal of gaining freedom and escaping exclusion and oppression. To increase the freedom of the people, a new strategy and democracy theory were needed to surpass the nation state and shift the power to the citizens (Nadje Al-Ali in Öcalan 2017) Abdullah Öcalan developed the new political theory of democratic confederalism on the Turkish island Imrali where he was imprisoned due to his political leadership at the PKK24. The term democratic confederalism was originally used by Murray Bookchin in his work on social ecology (Bookchin 1992).

Inspired by Bookchin, Öcalan started to use the concepts of democratic autonomy and democratic confederalism to create a democracy theory that did not entail forms of oppression, with ‘[democratic autonomy] referring to a status of people (that of determining their own future), and [democratic confederalism] to a bottom-up system of self- administration (through which self-determination is to be practiced)’ (Knapp and Jongerden

2016: 90). Having the political status of the people no longer defined by their relation to the state but by self-government, created the basis of a stateless democracy according to Öcalan: a democratic modernity (Öcalan 2017). ‘The relationship between a democratic confederation and nation-states should neither be continuous warfare nor assimilation of the former into the latter. It is a relationship of principles that rests on the acceptance of two separate entities that accept coexistence’ (ibid:46). In this new conceptual context the sovereignty of the state is not directly challenged through the autonomous organization of groups. Öcalan uses this notion of democratic autonomy to legitimize the call for Kurdish self-determination, as opposed to the old strategy of the PKK25 (ibid: 19; see also Knapp and Jongerden 2016).

24 Öcalan is serving a live long sentence on the charges of treason by the Turkish state, because of his leadership with the PKK. He was sentenced to death in 1999 but this sentence was changed when Turkey had to abolish the death sentence in order to join the European Union. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2296679.stm 25 It also creates the possibility to see self-determination and organisation across borders. The region of Kurdistan is divided over four different countries, namely: Irak, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Democratic confederalism changes our understanding of a nation into one that transcends country borders, and creates the possibility to organize more broadly as ethnic and social groups often transcend borders as well.

Democratic confederalism is an alternative and direct response to the state oriented

(centralized power) democracy structure which fosters inequality, ‘it is the contrasting paradigm of the oppressed people’ (Öcalan 2017:46).

Besides anti-statism, there are other central pillars to democratic confederalism.

Grassroots democracy for example, forms the foundational idea behind the decentralized power structure that is deployed in democratic confederalism (ibid:47). Decentralization should be understood as institutional decentralization rather than physical decentralization.

Confederalism does not promote a form of localism, but an interdependency between local communities. ‘Confederalism is thus a way of perpetuating the interdependence that should exist among communities and regions - indeed, it is a way of democratizing that interdependence without surrendering the principle of local control’ (Bookchin 2015: 122).

The way to guarantee local control in an interdependent system involves ‘a clear distinction between policy-making and the coordination and execution of adopted policies’ (ibid: 121).

In this structure, policy and decision-making processes are assigned to the most local political body. They in turn inform the higher administrative political levels, who are assigned with the coordination26. In other words, the higher administrative levels ensure that local decisions do not conflict and take care of the logistical puzzle that follows (Colasanti et al 2018). In

Rojava the commune is considered the most local political body of society. A commune consists of approximately 30 to 200 families and can comprise an entire village. In Öcalans drafts, the quarter counsels were appointed the decision-making positions27. Now they follow the decisions of the 7 to 30 communes they include. The early experiences in Rojava made the citizens change the decision-making position toward the commune, as they found that

26 I use the term higher to indicate that the political body represents a broader or wider area. It should not be interpreted as higher in rank or with more political power. A canton is a higher political level than a quarter counsel, however the quarter counsel has more formative power than the canton. 27 Quarter counsels are representative bodies that represent several towns or cities in one counsel. They are made up of coordination boards from the different communes.The coordination board is a body of the commune and is made up of representatives from every commission within that commune. (Colasanti et al 2018).

their interests were still not accurately represented because of the broadness of the quarter counsel (ibid: 810). The quarter counsels are in turn part of city councils who are part of a canton, which is an autonomous regions of Rojava (Dirik and Staal, 2015)28. When problems arise, the commune is the first level that tries to resolve them collectively. Only when issues transcend the commune or they cannot find a solution within the commune, these issues will be brought to a higher political level (Kongreya Star 2016:6). Every political level works with commissions and they most often consist out of: economy, politics, self-defence, women’s issues, the civil society, the free society, justice, administration and ideology (which refers more to education than to idealized theories)29. This decentralized power structure encourages citizens to participate and become political agents with formative power, opposing a representational structure that ‘separates people from power [and] turns politics from a public capacity into a private one, resulting in a separation of people from one another’ (Jongerden and Knapp 2016:105). Rojava is an example of a social contract that is between citizens separate and from the state, based on a sense of connectedness, interdependence and self-government. ‘This is a conceptualization of places and the people who live there not thought of in terms of discrete and separate entities, but as related to and thence comprising one another’ (ibid:107). A decentralized power structure thus has the institutional effect of relocating the formative power but also challenges our ideas about who may constitute as a political figure. In the discussion section I will show how these two effects influence the access to formation and decision-making power for marginalized groups in deliberative democracy.

Another central pillar of democratic confederalism is feminism. Gender inequality is not treated as secondary struggle that comes after the revolution. The liberation of women is

28 Originally there were three cantons: Afrîn, Cizîre and Kobanê. More recently the autonomous regions have been restructured and other autonomous regions have arisen. 29 This list is not limited and the final formation depends on the needs, desires and capacity of each commune.

perceived as a key challenge, since an equal democracy cannot be obtained when half of society is regarded unequal (Şimşek and Jongerden 2018:14; see also Öcalan 2017:58).

Öcalan describes the enslavement of women as the first hierarchical structure, the first form of slavery, of colonization, that is at the foundation of all other forms of slavery (Öcalan

201730) and ideological hegemony (Güneşer 2015:67). To fight and change the gender hierarchy, that is part of the foundation of modern society, requires more than open access to political decision-making positions. As Salih Muslim, former co-president of the PYD

(Democratic Union Party) stated: ‘It is a revolution for society’ (Salih Muslim in Biehl

2015:212). The women’s movements in Rojava are taking the lead in making the reforms and programs that support gender equality. A second network of communes was organized by them, in which only women participate. Their committees cover comparable subjects to the other commune network, but essentialize the position of women as well as provide to the specific needs of women. ‘Based on the principle of self-sufficiency, communes play an essential role in building the basis of an ethical society, just as the women’s communes form the building blocks of the women’s organisation’ (Kongreya Star 2016:8). Kongreya Star is a confederation of women’s movements that organizes these women’s communes31. Their education committees receive the most attention as they believe that education encourages emancipation, helps people reflect and organize in a democratic way, and is at the core of preventing violence against women. They focus on ‘furthering the education of women’,

‘spreading awareness of women’s topics in society at large’ and ‘transforming existing structures of education’ (ibid:10). It is not enough to increase the knowledge of, and about

30 Öcalan presents in his writings on women several assumptions about women’s relationship to societal life and women’s strengths that come from that position. Although he is making a very feminist argument about the oppression of women in history and the need for her inclusion in politics, society and science, it needs to be said that he is also guilty of generalizing who or what a women is or ought to be. ‘Woman’s link to life is more comprehensive than man’s, ant this had ensured the development of her emotional intelligence. Therefore aesthetics, in the sense of making live more beautiful, is an existential matter for women’ (Öcalan 2017:93). 31 Kongreya Star is comparable in size, influence and work with Tev-Dem (The Society for a Democratic Society), that is the umbrella organization under which the communes that have both men and women are organized.

women, which the first two objectives are aimed add. Institutionalized structures of oppression are still formative in how women are perceived and acknowledged. This is what the third objective refers to. However, the education and knowledge available through the social sciences were not deemed sufficient in defying these structures. Öcalan (2017) and the women’s movements (Kongreya Star 2016), have criticized this field of science for lacking in female perspective and for promoting a positivist perspective on society that favours a distance between the observer and the observed32. Jineology, is described by the freedom struggle of Kurdish women as ‘the creation of a women’s (Jin) paradigm’ (Kaya 2015:85). It is a redevelopment of the social sciences (Kongreya Star 2016:27) that questions our understanding of life and the formation of knowledge.

Because dominant knowledge production systems only serve to reinforce existing power relations, they have never been able to solve actual societal problems. [...] By delinking research and knowledge production from the power relations that cause these problems, jineology aims to address the problems that women face every day. It aims to simultaneously create new ways of thinking as well as implementing new ways of acting (ibid:29).

Jineology is used as a method to scrutinize knowledge and science, as it emphasizes women’s perspectives and practices that have been underrepresented and their contributions neglected33. It promotes revisitations of scientific data and interpretations since academic fields, like history, sociology and psychology, have not been immune to patriarchal informed biases (Kaya 2015: 92). Jineology is also an epistemological process that radically intervenes with the patriarchal mindset (ibid: 91), as it redefines women as active political agents and with that challenges the question: what is knowledge? Jineology rejects the hierarchy that results from professional authority as it values knowledge and science in a reciprocal

32 This may seem as a generalization of all social sciences, and I would partially agree to that. Feminism and postmodernism are theories within the Social Sciences that mostly reject the positivist approach. However, their contributions are only occasionally adopted and they do not constitute the foundation of the social sciences. 33 Jineology builds further on the extraordinary research that has already been done by many feminists around the world. It does not present itself as the first feminist movement but rather sees itself strengthened by the existing contribution to women’s research and women’s science. ‘It is one of the main objectives of jineology to build a bridge between these important achievements’ (Kaya 2015:90).

relationship. Ultimately, it is ‘a movement based on the science of women’ (Öcalan 2017:93).

Jineology has informed and strengthened the women’s movements in their challenge to redefine ‘ethics, including working to redefine the identity of women and in making women conscious and knowledgeable’ (Kongreya Star 2016:29). Jineology goes beyond education, beyond politics and co-creates the knowledge of the women in society. By using jineology to inform the different programs, the women’s movements strengthen communality and democratic capacity among women and society, they challenge and remove patriarchal structures and encourage the emancipation of women by making them owners of their own knowledge and identity. Deliberative democracy would highly benefit from adopting jineology as a mechanism into the theory. Jineology provides an interesting perspective on the working and framework of the public sphere(s), it breaks oppressive structures to promote equal access and is not limited to institutional reform but professes a societal and system change. However, there is still another mechanism to elaborate on. Without this mechanism a real institutional turn in deliberative democracy will not be complete.

Changing a political society, that was once based on structures of oppression and exclusion into a political society based on democratic equality, is a long and extensive process. It is not enough to rely on a decentralized power structure and jineology to have a direct impact on the reformation of these structures. Jineology may have an indispensable influence on how a democratic society is perceived, but it is naive to presume that the practice will immediately result in equal political participation. This is equally true when it comes to a decentralized power structure. Assigning formational power to the commune and proclaiming this political body to be open for all citizens of the commune will not directly result in equal participation. That equal rights do not necessarily imply equal access is exemplified by the disproportionately low number of female representatives in politics

around the world34. A different mechanism is needed to guarantee and enforce equal access for citizens. In democratic confederalism quotas are used in the political representative bodies to support and ensure equal access. These quotas are fixed in the constitution of the autonomous regions of Rojava, which is officially called: Charter of the Social Contract in

Rojava35. The most recent version of the charter (2016) notes that in every political body, the women’s communes excluded, both genders must have representation of at least forty (40) percent 36. This means that women have representation between forty and sixty percent on every political level. In addition to this quota, there is the principle of dual leadership. This means that every governing body has two presidents, of which one is male and one is female.

To ensure regular rotation and avoid centralization of power, presidents cannot be elected for more than two terms (Shahvisi 2018:10). According to Asya Abdullah, the current co- president of the PYD, the descriptive representation of women in leadership positions has had the positive effect of vast amounts of women participating at all different levels in the decision making process (Abdullah in Şimşek and Jongerden 2018: 17-18). There is a final quota that requires all ethnicities residing in a specific area to be represented by the corresponding political bodies. Although the revolution and struggle have often been viewed as Kurdish, it should be noted that this is incorrect and that the character and design of the theory, practice and participants are multi-ethnic and multicultural (Ferretti 2019; Colasanti et al 2018; Öcalan 2017). According to Colasanti et al, it is even a requirement that ‘in communes where different ethnic groups are present, this difference has to be mirrored in the

34 The Inter-parliamentary Union provides a clear overview of the amount of female representatives per country worldwide. Only sixteen of the 193 countries had a percentage of female representatives that was above or equal to 40% in their lower or single House. Although this table also numbers countries where women do not have equal rights to men, the majority of this list do claim to grand these rights. http://archive.ipu.org/wmn- e/classif.htm 35 https://ypginternational.blackblogs.org/2016/07/01/ 36 The article by Colasanti et al, mentioned that this number has been changed over the last few years, and that the quota is now set at fifty percent (Colasanti 2018: 814). They are not the only ones referring to this number. However, official communication channels of the major organization (PYD, YPG, Kongreya Star) have not mentioned this percentage and the majority of articles of the last five years have referred to the forty percent quotas. I therefore choose to use the forty percent quota.

ethnicity of the co-presidents, so that equal representation is ensured’ (Colasanti et al

2018:814). The regulation of representation through quotas is an institutional safeguard to support the access of women and non Kurdish ethnicities to political decision-making bodies.

This is the only practical mechanism that through its implementation immediately breaks with oppressive structures and creates access for marginalized groups. The necessity of such a mechanism in revolutionary struggles (or democratic reformations) is well articulated by political philosophers Hardt and Negri. According to them ‘democracy [is] not only an aim to be achieved but also a fundamental principle according to which the whole organizational structure is governed’ (Hardt & Negri 2015:166). If the aim of democratic confederalism is to create a democratic nation, then the process leading up to it should be fueled by democracy as well. This is why the mechanism of representation through quotas is crucial to the achievement of equality in democratic confederalism and can be of equal value to deliberative democracy37.

The mechanisms of a decentralized power structure, jineology and representation through quotas have shown to be effective in protecting and ensuring equality within the democratic processes. Their effects are not exclusively meant for the Kurdish population, rather they are designed to serve the needs of all people (Öcalan 2017). This has led me to believe that these mechanisms can be useful for the improvement of equality in deliberative democracy theory as well. Before I show how this belief is feasible, one question still needs to be answered. Is it even possible to separate a theory (or parts of a theory) from the context

37 There are aspects to democratic confederalism that others may highlight as more significant to the theory than the ones I have pointed out. Ecology is for example one of the pillars that is significant for democratic confederalism, and according to some it has been the most neglected pillar up to now (Hunt 2017: 16). Bookchin related ecological destruction and patriarchy to the same problem, that of hierarchical ordering creating an imaginary of legitimate subjugation of women and nature (Bookchin 1982). Öcalan saw ecology as equally important to the establishment of a society free from exploitation and oppression, therefore integrating ecology as a mutually reinforcing aspect (Öcalan in Hunt 2017:4) Another one of the aspects that may be highlighted as significant is the anti-capitalist agenda that constitutes a substantial part of Öcalans analyses. Although I will not question the importance of the anti-capitalism to the theory of democratic confederalism I think that the aspects I am highlighting are of a more direct response to inequality in political participation.

in which it was constructed, especially when a significant part of the theory has been informed by that specific context?

A theory and its context, separated or joint

Although Öcalan has created the ideological and philosophical groundwork of the theory, the practical formation and revisions have come from the Kurdish experiment. I see great value in the dialectical exchange between the theory and the empirical, and think it would be foolish not to pick up on this knowledge gained through experience. Therefore I address the programs and mechanisms that are created out of the experience of the Kurdish experiment, equally as parts of democratic confederalism. It is through adapting and having a decentralized power structure, jineology, and representation through quotas interact, that deliberative democracy can start challenging their problem of inequality. The adaptation of one or two will not be enough, as it is the interaction of the three that can create the real institutional turn in deliberative democracy. However, the dialectical interaction between the theory and the Kurdish experiment has its strengths but bears some concerns as well. This poses a difficult question. Are these mechanisms specific to the Kurdish context in which the theory is deployed or are they fundamental to democratic confederalism? I think it is necessary to evaluate a comparable case in which a theory was strongly related to a specific context, and has nevertheless been successfully used in other contexts as well.

The case I want to use in this comparison is the theory of intersectionality, a term coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw. The theory of intersectionality originated from the black feminist movement and explains how different compositions of marginalized categories, create different experiences of oppression.. ‘[...] The intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately’ (Crenshaw 1991:1244). A major

debate between intersectionality theorists is about the range in which this theory can be applied and, whether this should even be desired (Alexander-Floyd 2012; Hancock 2007; Hill

Collins 1990). Two arguments stand out that are of equal importance in the case of democratic confederalism. The first argument stipulates that this theory can be very valuable for other multiple-marginalized people and that we are therefore obliged to share such an empowering tool with our fellow suppressed (Hill Collins 1990). A similar argument can be made for democratic confederalism. If the aim of this theory was to ‘formulate a paradigm for the oppressed people’, the possible use of the theory should not be limited to the Kurdish liberation struggle but be useful to all people dealing with oppression. The second argument in the intersectionality debate is focused on protecting the political goal of de-marginalizing women of color. When this goal is ignored, power structures would be reaffirmed ‘[...] that undermine black women and other women of color and intersectionality’s potentially transformative power’ (Alexander-Floyd 2012:15). This equally applies to democratic confederalism, as the political goal of its creation was to provide the Kurds with a political strategy and theory that could support a form of self-determination. Neglecting to refer to the

Kurdish struggle and its objective when using the theory of democratic confederalism, would also be a reaffirmation of an oppressive power structure.

It is important to be aware of the interaction between a theory and the context in which it is used. Different circumstances will ask for different formations, as culture, history and social contexts all co-inform the necessary programs and mechanisms alongside the political theory of democratic confederalism. The purpose is not to separate usable aspects from the theory and neglect the ideas out of which they were constructed, since that would only result in separate parts rather than parts of a theory. ‘Without theory, practice can easily become myopic; without practice, theory cannot be tested or refined. [...] “much is determined by the reality on the ground”. Those at the forefront of movements must

constantly reflect on the gap between the two’ (Shahvisi 2018: 18). Because of this, I am not of the opinion that the mechanisms of decentralized power structure, jineology, and representation through quotas are specific to the Kurdish context. These are mechanisms fundamental to the realization of democratic confederalism but the way in which they operate and how their details are finalized is context dependent. Informed by the case of intersectionality and with caution for the interaction between theory and practice, I now return to deliberative democracy and the inequality problem. The problems of deliberative democracy that constitute the inequality problem were: the lack of access to formative and decision-making power for marginalized groups, which is reinforced by the reliance on the public sphere for equal access, reasonableness as a mechanism to safeguard equal treatment, and by the inability to contest the inequality problem within the system beyond the confines of the deliberative process. I will go over these separately while explaining how they lose their significance when the three mechanisms of democratic confederalism are adopted in the theory of deliberative democracy. If this is proven to be effective, the solution to the inequality problem will be the real institutional turn in deliberative democracy.

Discussion

I have made clear how democratic confederalism deals with inequality through the use of its mechanisms. There is one remaining question: how should these mechanisms be implemented and used in a deliberative democracy? Let me start with clarifying how these mechanisms can be implemented within deliberative democracy.

Representation through quotas is the easiest mechanism to envision the implementation off. The ‘all affected’ principle already defends the representation of different groups in deliberation processes. What it does not defend however, is an equal representation of identities. What kind of identity categories should be represented in such processes requires an entire separate research. For now I simply propose an implementation of a slightly adjusted version of the quotas used by democratic confederalism, which let me remind you, is a 40-40% gender division, dual leadership and representation of as many ethnicities as possible. This last quota was originally formulated to include all ethnicities in democratic confederalism, however this may be difficult to live up to when it concerns a bigger population, especially in metropolitan cities or countries hosting a large variety of ethnic identities. The adjusted version still pushes for a high representation of ethnicities and if possible all ethnicities should be included, but it also leaves room for exceptional or complicated situations where a representation of all ethnicities is almost impossible. I remodeled the gender quota to the description Arianne Shahvisi gave about the quota system used in Rojava38. She described the system as a 40-40% divide, where the last 20% is ‘for anyone receiving the largest share of the remaining votes’ (Shahvisi:2018:2). I want to follow this ascription to the quota, but instead of dividing the remaining 20% only among men and women, a part of that percentage should be reserved for people who do not identify with the

38 Shahvisi described the quota mechanism a bit different from other authors who wrote about Rojava. Because there was more agreement between the others articles I used the percentages of 40-60% gender representation. This divide in percentages was also given in the Charter.

gender-binary standards. In this way gender representation can be more inclusive. With regard to the representation of non-binary gendered people an addition could be made that requires the dual leadership to be a triple leadership. This however completely depends on the composition of the participants and is a specification that is interesting to include in the research into what kind of identity categories should be represented in deliberation processes.

These three quotas can be implemented in every deliberative setting without much trouble since they should work in a similar way as the all affected principle, but ensuring representation of all.

The mechanism of a decentralized power structure should not encounter too much friction within deliberative democracy because it would strengthen the legitimacy claim of deliberative democracy, earlier formulated by Cohen as: ‘outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question’ (Cohen in Dryzek 2010: 23). Relocating the formation and decision-making power to the authentic deliberation process would be in agreement and in support of Cohen’s formulation. The use of a decentralized power structure would be comparable to its use in democratic confederalism, but then with deliberation processes becoming the most local political body: the communes of deliberative democracy.

Higher political bodies are entrusted with the administrative tasks and logistics. The relocation of formation and decision-making power protects deliberation processes from becoming informative processes and redefines them to support the democratic legitimacy of deliberative democracy.

The mechanism of jineology is the most difficult mechanism to see fully implemented in deliberative democracy because its practices and consequences go beyond the deliberation process. Jineology is a mechanism that functions separately and in collaboration with the political democratic process, with the goal to achieve both political change and societal

change. The adoption of this mechanism will require deliberative democracy to establish and facilitate settings or institutions outside of the deliberative process, that carry out, practice, teach and research jineology. Jineology has to bring about change outside of the deliberative process, educating and informing society to become more equal in general. This way deliberative democracy can contribute to defying inequality in the system in which it operates. This would eventually result in deliberative settings where participants are increasingly treated more equal. Furthermore, participants should be required to follow courses in jineology prior to the deliberation, to advance the acknowledgement of oppressive and marginalizing structures by all participants. Finally, jineology needs to be used to inform the deliberative process itself. One of the qualities of jineology is that it questions presuppositions that are the product of (white) patriarchal society. This mechanism could therefore be highly effective to distinguish what aspects and concepts in the deliberative process are fueled by such presuppositions and to change these to be inclusive.

Reasonableness would be an example of a concept that would be up for scrutiny.

Having sorted how the three mechanisms should be implemented, I now want to revisit the problems of deliberative democracy that constitute the inequality problem. The lack of access to formative and decision-making power for marginalized groups is the main problem that is reinforced by reasonableness as a mechanism to safeguard equal treatment, the reliance on the public sphere for equal access and by the inability to contest the inequality problem beyond the confines of the deliberative process within the system. Let me start by explaining why the public sphere loses its significance as gatekeeper to the deliberative process. The public sphere as envisioned by Benhabib is receptive to rules that could guarantee equal access to the deliberation process for all citizens39. However, it does not acknowledge the influence of discourse on the will-formation of citizens and that it sets the

39 To revisit Benhabibs argument see chapter one, the section on ‘what is deliberative democracy’.

boundaries to what constitutes as a legitimate argument and communication. Additionally, discursive publics and therewith the opinion and will-formation process of marginalized groups are excluded, creating an unequal representation of the mediated networks of everyday communication. The responsibility to provide access to deliberation no longer rests with just the public sphere, because of the use of the three mechanisms. Through the public sphere citizens find their access to deliberation, however the regulation of equality in this process is supported by the three mechanisms as well. Representation through quotas provides equal descriptive representation, accommodating physical space for marginalized groups in the deliberative settings. Although this directly influences the access to deliberation by ensuring their presence, this one mechanism is not enough to ensure equal access since it does not deal with the barriers set by hegemonic discourse. The effect discourse has on the access to deliberation is challenged by the workings of jineology. In the deliberative process jineology indicates which aspects reinforce (white) patriarchal informed biases that can result in exclusion. What is interpreted as valuable knowledge is an example of such a bias. In

Rojava it was indicated through jineology that knowledge through experience was devalued in comparison with scientific knowledge, which resulted in a predetermined disposition for women in commune debates as their knowledge was often based on experience. Through the use of jineology this disposition was straightened. It is not unlikely that comparable biases are active in other cultures as well, resulting in unequal evaluations that can be tackled by jineology40. The work of jineology will slowly but systematically break with such biases that affirm exclusion in society. This will eventually result in equal access that is reinforced through society itself. However societal change is a long term process and is not enough reassurance that equal access will be created. A decentralized power structure is the

40 Jineology could be the ideology on discourse that Young thought, deliberative democracy was missing. ‘it [deliberative democracy] lacks a theory of, shall we call it, ideology, as well as an account of the genealogy of discourses and their manner of helping to constitute the way individuals see themselves and their social world’ (Young 2001:686).

mechanism needed to finalize equal access to deliberation. The other mechanisms provide the rights and change former barriers to access the deliberation process. What a decentralized power structure creates is the ability for marginalized groups to formalize and change these structures from the inside out. Now that the formation and decision-making power lie with the deliberative setting, in which marginalized groups are equally represented and oppressive biases are being dismantled, these groups are enabled to influence and improve the equal access to deliberation themselves. This would truly empower structurally marginalized groups as they become co-creators of equality. Through the use of all three mechanisms there is no longer a need to solely rely on the public sphere to provide equal access. It is the interaction of three mechanisms combined with a public sphere that connects the public to the deliberative process, that can create equal access to deliberation.

The next problem that constituted part of the inequality problem was the reliance on reasonableness to safeguard equal treatment in deliberation. What is regarded as reasonable however depends on normative presuppositions which are often misrepresented as objective.

This makes reasonableness inadequate as a mechanism to safeguard equal treatment in deliberative settings as it privileges one form of reasoning over the other. Although reason should not be shunned from deliberation it should also not determine what arguments are condemned or approved. To protect equal treatment in the deliberative setting it is important to determine what arguments and forms of communication counteract equal treatment.

Instead of excluding particular arguments in advance because they do not conform to a fixed mold like reasonableness, arguments should be excluded based on whether or not they profess inequality. The mechanism equipped to determine this is jineology. Informed by jineology, deliberation can produce well-informed opinions that are not only informed by reason but also through experience and other forms of knowledge as well. Would this place the unforced force of the better argument, which causes deliberation to come to a decision, in

jeopardy? If there is an agreement that arguments can come from different origins and are accepted as part of the ‘pluralism of reasons’, there is no need to question if the unforced force of the better argument could still lead to a decision41. The mechanism of representation through quotas contributes to the equal treatment in deliberative settings by providing the space for a diversity of arguments to be raised. The repudiation of reasonable arguments as the only accepted form of arguments is strengthened when other forms of argumentation are actively promoted and used in the deliberative settings. A decentralized power structure supports equal treatment in a deliberative setting in a similar way as it supports equal access to the deliberation processes. When the deliberative process is ensured with the formation and decision-making power, the people can make actual changes themselves. If forms of communication appear to conflict with the purpose of a specific deliberation, the participants of that deliberation together have the power to enact changes that would favor that deliberative process. This can be different in every deliberation as long as the change does not profess inequality in access.

The last problem that constitutes part of the inequality problem is the inability of deliberative democracy to contest the inequality problem within the system, beyond the confines of the deliberative process. As long as inequality is present in society and not actively opposed, deliberative democracy will have a problem defending and securing equal access and equal treatment. Through the use of the three mechanisms, deliberative democracy can start broadening its perspective and practices, to incorporate the objective of societal change as well. The institutions and settings that research, practice and teach jineology will be important in achieving this objective. Knowledge on equality should be made available and distributed without the need of having it directly benefit the deliberative process.

Through the jineology institutions and their interaction with society, further knowledge on

41 This is a reference to Joshua Cohen’s use of reasonable pluralism. Since I am trying to steer away from the use of reasonableness, I thought it would be confusing to use that same term in this sentence and (by lack of a better term) named it pluralism of reasons for the time being.

inequality within society can be obtained and processed in deliberative democracy as well.

The mechanism of a decentralized power structure contributes by bringing power and people together again, which encourages citizens to become political agents and see politics not only as a public occupation but also a private one. The mechanism of representation through quotas in collaboration with decentralized power structures forces society to acknowledge the diversity of people that have formation and decision-making power. All three mechanisms help to redefine who constitutes as a political agent, providing a vision of democracy for society that is based on equality. Creating societal change is the part of the inequality problem that will not lose its significance as it is the most difficult to resolve, but at least deliberative democracy will now be equipped with mechanisms to actively oppose it.

The lack of access to formation and decision-making power was the main part of the inequality problem which was reinforced by the three problems discussed above. In explaining how all three of these problems lose their significance due to the presence of a decentralized power structure, jineology and representation through quotas, I have shown that equal access to formation and decision-making power for structurally marginalized groups can be achieved. Additionally, I have shown how these mechanisms not only improve equal access but more so, they empower the people to become self-formative and active agents in the pursuit of equality. The solution I have presented to the inequality problem of deliberative democracy is all-encompassing and comes down to an institutionalization of equality. This is the real institutional turn that deliberative democracy should take.

Conclusion

The inequality problem of deliberative democracy is a problem not easily resolved. Earlier solutions provided by theorists and empiricist have been limited to specific aspects but never tackled the entirety of the inequality problem. I have shown what is needed for deliberative democracy to resolve the inequality problem, by construing the real institutional turn. The implementation of a decentralized power structure, jineology and representation through quotas is feasible and their consequences are effective. A real institutional turn can and should be taken by deliberative democracy to finally become the democracy theory that not only promotes equal access to the political process but ensures it.

I have not argued for the replacement of deliberative democracy with democratic confederalism. Democratic confederalism presents a promising new form of democracy that breaks with hierarchical political structures and enables citizens to become the real force behind democracy. However, the changes in the political structure that are needed for such a reformation are too divergent from the current formation of most democratic states. My intention has been to provide deliberative democracy with a framework that can resolve the inequality problem. It is important to acknowledge that different political regions may benefit from different democratic reformations. The benevolence of some countries like Ireland,

Estonia and Romania to adopt deliberative methods may indicate that deliberative democracy corresponds most to the needs of those political regions, for now. As the popularity of deliberative democracy grows, so does the need for the theory to take on the inequality problem. Implementing deliberative democracy in its present design may improve the political influence of some. However it would neglect the possibility to become a democracy theory that ensures political influence for all citizens. My research has contributed to this prospect as it enables deliberative democracy to advance and protect equality, through the real institutional turn.

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