In the First Half of the Seventeenth Century, Korea Was Swept up in The

INTRODUCTION

George Kallander

n the first half of the seventeenth century, Korea was swept up Iin the shifting geopolitics of Northeast Asia. At the end of the sixteenth century, thanks to the assistance of China, Korea successfully defended the peninsula against invasion from Japan, but China paid a heavy price for the help it provided Korea as this endeavor, along with other costly expenditures, weakened China militarily and economically. At this crucial transition point in East Asian history, the Chosŏn dynasty (1392– 1910), a politically stable and culturally vibrant kingdom that was among the most enduring dynasties in the world, ruled the Korean peninsula, while the Ming, one of the most powerful and long-lasting dynasties in Chinese history, ruled China. In accordance with the tributary system that had long governed the diplomatic relationship between China and Korea, Korea accepted subordinate status and paid tribute to China as a “superior.” Yet Ming’s weakening state eroded its superior status and created a vacuum into which stepped the Jurchen, a tribe residing in Northeast Asia that had ruled China in the past. Uniting under Nurhachi (1559– 1626) and adopt- ing the name “Manchu,” these mounted warriors would battle xi the Ming for domination of China, capture the capital of Beijing in 1644, and found the Qing dynasty (1644– 1912).1 Before advancing toward Beijing, the Manchu went south to deal with Korea. The second Manchu leader, Hung Taiji, attacked across the Chosŏn frontier in 1627, demanding that Chosŏn’s King Injo sever diplomatic relations with the Ming. While this move forced Chosŏn to formally ally with the Manchu, the Chosŏn dynasty never fully accepted the Manchu as a replacement for the Ming and continued their support of China. King Injo even openly refused to honor the promise he had made in 1627 to be loyal to the Manchu and rejected official communication from them. He also allowed Ming generals into Korean territory and welcomed Ming envoys at his court, which exacerbated the situation. To punish the Chosŏn dynasty for breaking their oath, a much more formidable Manchu army attacked the peninsula in 1636– 1637. In contemporary North and South Korean historiography, the first attack is known as the “invasion of the cyclical year 1627” and the second as the “invasion of the cyclical year 1636– 1637.”2 These attacks were seismic events in Chosŏn history, with long-term consequences. They fortified anti- Manchu sentiment, stimulated proto-national consciousness, and began a process that would turn Koreans away from the over-glorification of Chinese civilization to focus their attention on cultural developments in Korea.3

Narrating Korea’s Manchu Experience: Na Man’gap and The Diary of 1636

The Diary of 1636 (Pyŏngjarok) is one of the best-known Korean accounts of the second Manchu assault (the invasion of the cyclical year 1636–1637). 4 Written by a demoted member of the court who was living in exile and was a keen observer, Na Man’gap’s

INTRODUCTION Diary details the unprecedented domestic and international cri- xii ses faced by the Chosŏn dynasty. At roughly forty- three thousand INTRODUCTION xiii

n, the the n, ŏ ), which n Dynasty ŏ Sillok n court over war n court over n resistance, King ŏ ŏ n, and the political and mil- ŏ Veritable Records of the Chos the of Records Veritable ; hereafter referred as to l), and used he his skills professional writ- when ŏ n (1612– 1645), and other members the royal of fam-1645), n (1612– my ŏ ŏ n wangjo sillok ŏ There are multiple Korean records of the of Manchu records wars. Korean are multiple OneThere Chos characters, Na Man’gap’s work is the longest known is the nonofficial longest work characters, Man’gap’s Na on the wrote thesource Manchu first invasion. Na half of the diary witnessed he events narrativeday of by- during the attack, as a day- the the Manchu include These honor demands thatdirectly. Korea Chos the at debate the allegiance, of oath 1627 or peace, theor Manchu military attack and Chos Namhan retreat to Mountain, the of fortress, theInjo’s siege the Chos thenegotiations, surrender of ing the diary. known is the source well- Manchu treatment of prisoners of war, and the post- invasion invasion Manchu prisoners andwar, treatment the of of post- and the Manchu Confucian proper collusion over debates etiquette in diary Koreans timesdemanded The of war. particular of is of training andinterest his because Na’s detailed of attention. At one inpoint his served career, he as a diarist theRoyal Office for of Decrees (K itary In the consequences second defeat. the half which of diary, of he most likely composed and edited between 1641 and 1642 from oral stories and written documents added Na collected after 1637, praising, sometimes sometimes and nuance political commentary, criticizing on the those battlefield fought who or argued at the the to king. loyalty alsocourtmoralistic He offered over of tales narratesindividual deception. Here, Na or bravery the war and aftermathits in Namhan the of areas Mountain outside Fortress, Crown Prin-where including the capture Kanghwa of Island— 1646), was the who Crown wife of cess Consort Minhoebin (1611– Prince Sohy ily and had fled.ily of themilitary elite are stories Also included campaigns along the northern and western regions Chos of provides theof court officialdaily government provides affairs, records debates, discussions, the a collectionalongside of major decisions, and actions the of king and Other his bureaucracy. ( primary sources include the Records of the Royal Secretariat (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi) and the Records of the Border Defense Command (Pibyŏngsa tŭngnok)— official government chronicles that frequently reflectSillok materials. Beyond the court, the trauma of the Manchu attacks compelled witnesses to record their involve- ments, and a number of diaries navigate the experiences of those who lived through these events as they attempted to make sense of the chaos of war.5 For instance, the Collected Works of Nagŭm (Nagŭm munjip), by Nagŭm, the brush name of To Kyŏngyu (1596– 1636), describes the period from the 1627 attack through 1636. One of the scholarly officials who attended the crown prince on the 1627 retreat south, To Kyŏngyu was serving the government when he was struck by a bullet and killed during the second attack. The work he left behind was not published until 1906, after it had emerged as a valuable resource for researchers. Mun Chaedo (1575–1643), a military officer who fought in 1627 and 1637, wrote Namhan Recorded by Hand (Namhan surok), a piece about his experience of the first attack, compiled in theCollected Works of Hyu Hŏn (Hyu Hŏn munjip). The official Sŏk Chihyŏng (1610– ?) composed the Historical Records on Namhan (Namhan haewirok) and The Diary of Namhan (Namhan ilgi). Another valuable resource is the diary by Nam Kŭp (1592–1671), known by such titles as The Diary of Namhan Mountain Fortress (Namhan ilgi), The Record of 1636 (Pyŏngja ilgi), and The Diary of Nalli (Nalli ilgi). Nam man- aged the palace kitchen (saongwŏn pongsa) and accompanied King Injo to Namhan Mountain Fortress in 1637. His diary cov- ers a period of four months, including various events on Kang- hwa Island and the activities of important scholars and officials. At least two other diaries were written by people living outside the capital: Record of Kanghwa Island (Kangdorok), a short anony- mous description of the Manchu assault of the island, and The Diary of Kanghwa Island (Kangdo ilgi) by Ŏ Hanmyŏng (1592– ŏ INTRODUCTION 1648), which provides insights on Chos n reactions to the attack xiv and the defenses of the island. Taken together, these sources INTRODUCTION xv

6 n- era scholars. Most n- ŏ ngik (1736– 1806) included ngik (1736– ŭ by Chos is described the historian by Kim is an important source of unoffi- of source important an is yasa This makes it clear that clear This makes the it diary cir- yasa 7 when composing his composing historical when compila- yasa , a notion Na humbly, a notion Na dismissed. Distinct from Diary of 1636 of Diary n dynasty. ŏ yasa n dynasty the power. circles and from inside outside of n- era writers diary certainly as an unofficial accepted Na’s n- ŏ ŏ ngsu as historical personal that sources an record author’s ŏ Na Man’gap’s Na may have also underestimated the the have which may extent diary to Na portray and politics society a transitional in for the moment Chos cial history, or the didactic sterile or dynastic that records chronicled the daily matters the of bureaucracy, Ky theviews, day. of issues and events often about contentious tion of the Chos the of tion Chos instance, For the scholarhistory. Yi K in his it section of culated among handful a scholars, of although the reception of death in 1642 is uncertain. immediately afterthe work Na’s As he with had the free- it, the wrote Na he court favor when of was out political retribution of fear without events and explore to dom thereby offer could an alternative from view officialthe sources. allNot diaries considered were likely a number factors contributedlikely of the to privileging some of others: in the the theover nature offi- work, covered the of events cial the writer of position in and the his government political reputation, the literary quality the of writing, and the passing of time. As disappeared, sources and witnessed those who the events that remained the works became the importantpassed away, for Namhan at position Mountain Fortressretelling the of past. Na’s as witness the to invasion, and his familiarity deep with the political and military situation, contribute the to significance of his diary. work Manchu The and Chinese serve for ascould a source history. and expansion describes Manchu development period the of early around the activities and personalities Manchu key figures— of and his family members accompanied him who as such Hung Taiji who Manchu and Korea, generals top to Ingguldai and Mafuta— appear frequently throughout the diary. Of course, New Qing History contests the notion of “Manchu” identity today, especially regarding the formative period in the early decades of the seventeenth century.8 Na did not use the term “Manchu.” He refers to them politically as the Jin and the Qing dynasties and, less cor- dially, as the enemy or barbarians. Still, he describes a time when the Manchu struggled with identity— when to act more Confu- cian and when to act more Jurchen— as they moved beyond their homelands and collided with other groups, most importantly the Ming Chinese–oriented worldview of the Chosŏn. The diary shows some key concepts that appear to be unique or specific to their Jurchen or Manchu culture, such as the forced intermarriage of the Manchu and Korean elites, the stealing of horses, and the interior arrangement of Hung Taiji’s military tent. However, it also reveals that, as early as 1636, the Manchu began deftly adopt- ing Confucian rhetoric and concepts in their diplomatic correspondence with the Chosŏn dynasty, whether or not they actually believed in them. Along with this was Hung Taiji’s insistence that Korea erect a victory monument, the Samjŏndo stele, near the main battle- fields outside of Seoul. Composed in Manchu, Mongol, and literary Chinese, the writings etched in this stele were an early usage of what Pamela Crossley dubs the “imperial simultaneous,” that is, messages composed in several languages as a “simultaneous expression of imperial intentions in multiple cultural frames.”9 The Manchu empire was divided into constituencies that included various groups and tribes based on language, lineage ties, and geographic proximity under the umbrella of the early khan’s leadership. This concept of inclusion extends to interaction with the Chosŏn dynasty. Korea was an integral part of Jurchen-Manchu expansion and imperial identity. To create emperorship, the khan needed recognition by the Korean court and the inclusion of the ŏ INTRODUCTION Chos n dynasty into his expanding empire. The Manchu achieved xvi this in the 1627 agreement with the Chosŏn, but King Injo’s INTRODUCTION xvii n ŏ n dynasty n dynasty. ŏ ŏ n military men ŏ n dynasty had a defined frontier along ŏ tended language to have skills, education, wealthor n courts. ManchuJudging from acceptance the Chi- of n court consider those who traveled to then to peninsula traveled those court who consider sub- Sillok ŏ ŏ Harder to tease out is whether key Korean figures Korean key whether is tease coop-Harder to who out who had fought with the Ming in the northeastfought regions. had Some who of these men remained in Jurchen-Manchu lands,Manchu, between the Qing and served later as and envoys learned to speak Chos nese and other tribal as thepeople, Manchu created their empire, them extend to been a stretch this for have process of not would it people become part of the Qing empire as Manchu or did the the did or Manchu as empire Qing the of part become people Chos jects the of dynasty? This as is hard know their to histories have been neglected. individuals in such sources noted Those largely the as that allowed them to move across political and linguistic themthat move to allowed bor- describes these in of his people diary. some Man’gap Na ders. As will be theshown Manchu, in the decades thebelow, early of Chos of number a captured century, seventeenth withdrawal from this arrangement demanded action. Breaking the only a militarypeace was not threat, was also it an ideological Allowing thedanger to emperorship. Manchu the Chos to break away challenged the entire order and challenged posed the threat a entire break away to order to Manchu expansion into China. and to those defected who erated with the 1636— Manchu before actually Manchu. themselves considered the Manchu side— theUnlike amorphous area the north the seven- by of frontier, the Chos century, teenth the Yalu and Tumen rivers, combined with a distinct and Tumen political the Yalu extendingidentity several back hundred liv- least. years at Those subjects theing were of south rivers the of Chos Those who lived across the the to lived rivers north Jurchen, who were Those Khitan, and Han moved Mongol, Chinese. who Koreans Those political other across the northern appeared have to border diaryidentities. is that the conflict Man’gap’s from Na Apparent as refugees as or move to the people frontierhad forced around war and back captives forth peninsula. the to Korean Chos Did assimilation and border crossing to those born on the Korean peninsula. There probably were Koreans who moved across the frontier and took Manchu identities. Na’s diary serves as a sup- plement to the works of New Qing history scholarship by helping to untangle issues of identity in the early period of the Manchu empire. In Chosŏn times, Na Man’gap had gained some popularity because of his disputes with the court, his exile, his return to his hometown, and his death in the countryside.10 Na was part of the Korean elite, or yangban, with a family origin (pon’gwan) of the village of Anjŏng, and his clan had developed strong ties to the bureaucratic class in the capital (sadaebu). Na Man’gap’s courtesy name (cha) was Mongroe, and his brush name (ho) was Kupo. Born in Naju, South Chŏlla Province, Na Man’gap was the only son of Na Kŭp (1552– 1602), who served as the first tutor in the Crown Prince Tutorial Office (Seja Sigangwŏn Podŏk), and the grand- son of Nam Yunch’im (1527– 1578), who became a third proctor (hagyu) at the Royal Confucian Academy (Sŏnggyun’gwan).11 Na’s father, Na Kŭp, was a talented artist and poet. His contemporary, Yi Sik (1584– 1647), described Na Kŭp’s poetry as equal to that written by poets of Han dynasty China. Though Na Man’gap lost the collection of his father’s essays in the waters around Kanghwa Island when escaping the mainland with King Injo at the time of the 1627 Manchu attack, he was able to preserve his father’s poetry.12 Na Man’gap’s mother was the daughter of Kim Hosŏn (of the Kwangju Kim family); Kim Hosŏn served as the bailiff for the Seoul magistrate hans( ŏng ch’amgun). Na himself married the daughter of literato Chŏng Yŏp (1563– 1625), an illustrious official respected by King Injo. These social and political connections of his in-laws accelerated Na Man’gap’s career, affording him greater opportunities at the court. Little is known about Na’s formal education, but, as the only son, he

INTRODUCTION brought fame to his clan when he passed the chinsa (licentiate) xviii exam in 1613 at the age of twenty-one, which qualified him for INTRODUCTION xix ) ). ). ng- 13 ŏ ) in the ngnang l ŏ ŏ my chongsagwan ŏ k t’ongd ) after passing the njo (r. 1567– 1608), 1567– (r. njo ŏ such’an ) of the Royal Visitation Mun’gwa Examina- the Mun’gwa Visitation ) of Royal ngjong (r. 1469– 1494). This was most likely an an likely most was This 1494). 1469– (r. ngjong n surrender andn surrender returned the to capital, likely most ŏ nggwa ŏ ŏ py ng Mun’gwa), after a variety held he which higher of Mun’gwa), ng ŏ In 1614, to consolidate power, King Kwanghaegun (r. 1608– King Kwanghaegun (r. power, In 1614, consolidate to Na returned serviceNa through government to and moved a Na gainedNa the King attention and of their Injo, relationship had In 1624, acquired he writer of the ( job third tier ( Office of RoyalOffice Decreesof and thenas theritual for the caretaker the wife and1474), queen con- (?– Queenroyal Konghye tomb of S King of sort honorary to post without many was duties. Later promoted Na “gentleman of the position for virtuous service” ( posts, in the positions including powerful Office. Censorate tion (Als tion civil office,Royal Confucianentered he and the elite Academy in the capital. Prince Y brother, the orchestrated killing his half- of 1623) ch’ang (1606– 1614) and imprisoned Queen Inmok (1584– 1632), the1632), and imprisoned1614) Queen (1584– Inmok (1606–ch’ang queen King his consort father, former of S on Kanghwa Island. queen was The confinedtotalof ten a for scholar other many like officials, renounced years. Man’gap, Na the fratricide of his post in and protest the the queen of treatment and returned with Dethroned his live to his mother. to hometown the of to seat 1649) 1623– King that (r. in brought a coup Injo Kwanghaegun was banishedpower, the to distant islandCheju. of positions,number of first as the third diarist ( both privileges and its challenges. its At the Man- time the 1627 of attack,chu was the Na administrative chief officer ( accompanying King Injo when theaccompanying King court when Kanghwa retreated to Injo Island. continued serve He to in important positions government after the Chos because of the royal favors he had earned he during thebecause royal favors of the first war. these because of or connectionsDespite the to king, was he not theimmune to strife court permeated politics. of Factionalism collided Na century. incourt the and life seventeenth bureaucratic with Westerners, the powerful officialof the Yu, leader the Kim a political group with many members in high bureaucratic positions.14 Kim began attacking Na first in 1625 and again in 1629. After a lengthy debate at court over a variety of charges against Na, including unfilial behavior and immorality in office, King Injo reluctantly agreed to exile him. Hints in court discussions also suggested that Na’s life had been threatened by other members of the court who perceived him to be a criminal.15 Shifting power constellations facilitated Na’s pardon and return to government service in 1631. He served as a third censor counselor (hŏnnap) of the Censorate Office before being promoted to the magistrate of Hongju (Hongsŏng, South Ch’ungch’ŏng Province) in 1634 and then to minister in the Ministry of Justice (Hyŏngjo ch’amŭi) in 1635. Na had taken too many liberties with King Injo, for example, when he submitted a lengthy petition criticizing the myriad problems facing the dynasty, including the decline of virtuous debate and the rise of vulgar discussions at the court. The audacity of such a petition was met with royal disapproval, and he received his second dismissal from the court.16 This misstep was forgotten in the context of growing tension between the Ming and the Qing when the Manchu invaded, and Na soon returned to King Injo’s inner circles. After the retreat from the capital to Namhan Moun- tain Fortress, with the path to Kanghwa Island cut off, Na participated in the defense of the fortress as the chief commissary official responsible for army rations. His earlier experience on Kanghwa Island in 1627, as well as his reputation with supportive sadaebu and the king as an upright and efficient government official, provided him unprecedented access to power. Na later served as mediator between the king and a number of government scholar-officials. It was around this time that he began writing his diary. Na’s successes during the second Manchu invasion did not

INTRODUCTION shield him from the intensified political strife in the wake of the xx 1637 attack. After the peace agreement with the Manchu, Na was INTRODUCTION xxi

19 p n k, k, ŏ ŏ ŏ ngd ng Y ŏ n (1570– ŏ ŏ Only two two Only 21 ngju, where l (1607– 1689) 1689) l (1607– 22 ŏ n and Manchu ŏ ŏ nghae (near Y nghae (near dating the to Chos ŏ ) swept up in the up political strug-) swept gak the Archives at Royal Acad- ŏ Scholars and the public consider He was He released from banishment 24 17 The edition held in theNational 23 The Diary 1636The of kwijung chisin kwijung The illustrious The scholar SongSiy Upon Na’s death, King Injo restored Na’s offi- Na’s restored Injo King death, Na’s Upon 18 20 ngsang Province). ŏ , claiming King attacked because the Injo Na king intensely Today, two copies of of two copies Today, san, purchased a military and his a corrupt slave from Na boat ŏ for the thirdfor and final favor of remained he yet out 1639, time in with the court his and remaining spent in Y days inhe 1642.died heralded Na as one whose virtues as whose heralded one Na Confucianism to and devotion unparalleled. distantwere of that people “the Song concluded willgenerations all Man’gap.” learn the Na of grave of accused misdeeds—while funeral of his in traveling to mother’s S navy officer—forhe which was to Y exiled North Ky 1652), another revered official, of whom more official, another revered willwhom be discussed of 1652), Kim served the court the both at time Manchu attacks of below. of actions bothto and sides the took that seemingly were offensive so, Kimbattle. was Even lionized both Chos by sentiment. Manchu forunwaveringanti- officershis (1563– 1625), a well- respected official,and Kim Sangh a well- 1625), (1563– people of that of generation,people Song wrote, Ch Na: matched Other scholars claimed attacks these politically motivated were against a century Na. In 1727, after the first attack,Manchu Na’s reputation was after restored was he recognized scholars by as an outstanding official ( time. the of gles dynasty exist; is housed in one the National Library Korea, and of the in other resides the Changs Library and upon appears is the version be the to complete most thiswhich translation relies. disproved of officials who were shallow and frivolous— a broad broad a officialswere shallowand of who frivolous— disproved assertionwith againstcourt.favor made the of officials many out cial government titles, but rumors about his actions clouded Na’s cialNa’s titles, government rumors but clouded about his actions on King blame placed reputation. rather some Injo Later, than the sadaebu emy of Korean Studies. Korean texts of The emy are similar with but in content stylistica few differences. The Diary of 1636 by Na Man’gap as a reliable primary source, but the authenticity of Na’s diary has not gone unquestioned, as his descriptions of events occasionally differ from Chosŏn and Qing government sources.25 In times of war, such narrative discrepan- cies are not signs of historical deception, but rather of the fluidity of knowledge and the tendency to interpret events as they unfold.26 Regardless of these debates, both versions of the diary offer unprecedented details and insights into early seventeenth- century politics during a transitional period in Korean and Northeast Asian history. Na Man’gap’s diary is composed of eight sections, including a brief epilogue. Each section of the diary has its own rhythm, style, and complexity. He wrote one section during the war, but the other sections were composed and edited after 1637. Each section appears to be intended for a different purpose.The Diary of 1636 can be read as a narration of the Manchu invasion of Korea and the political and social aftermath of a premodern society at war. However, much is happening below the surface of the text. As a deft writer, Na subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, critiques the contemporary politics of the Chosŏn dynasty through the structure, tone, and context of his stories. Na’s critiques range from the decision to go to war to the acrimonious environment of political retribution in which many officials were expelled from the center of power, including himself. Na Man’gap describes how the outcome of the attack redefined the relationship between the center and the periphery—those who held power in the court and those who resided in the countryside and did not. He was in contact with people in Seoul even during his exile and after his move to the countryside, demonstrating that exile did not necessarily mean political and social isolation, at least in Na’s case. Instead, he continued to hear the latest news from the capital and receive details from beyond the frontier. As he was gently agitating against the

INTRODUCTION outcome of the war and the fall from power of many officials, xxii including himself, he reminds readers of the rippling impact the INTRODUCTION xxiii

ngja ŏ year py n diplomatic n diplomatic ngch’uk ŏ ŏ n. Loyalty was ch ŏ , “Early Complications,” Complications,” , “Early n envoys. Few, if any, allu- if any, Few, n envoys. ŏ The Diary 1636The of n military supported men the Manchu. Korean ŏ n loyalty to theto Ming.n loyalty Ming Chinese soldiers ŏ “Daily Records After Urgent Reports from the Frontier,” the“Daily After Reports Records from the Urgent Frontier,” The firstThe sectionof invasion had on power relations in Northeast Asia.on power had invasion war The disrupted ties between dynasties and fractured all at loyalties redirected (K. Korea Mukden relations to levels. Shimyang, C. Shenyang), theManchu capital, and away from Beijing, challenging Chos the joined inva- theQing. for Mongols switched and sides fought Chos force. sion officials split between pro- peace and pro- war, and even a hand-and war, pro- peaceand pro- officials between split serves with as a preface inci- short its description the of major Na, the Chos thatdents preceded the invasion. To snub of a Qing emperor’s letter in the spring of 1636 was problematic. One is struck the conflict way by with the Manchu appeared this Perhaps inevi- war. inevitable because favored opinion public narrativetability strategy: was the blames part he out- Na’s of conflictbreak of partly on unnamed officials, toorder in further the king.exonerate Also striking is the balanced fairly descrip- thetion of events, particularly concerning the Manchu. seems Na unwilling and the fully to events Manchu for blame leaders instead points a finger Chos at inept agreement, break the to decision 1627 the appear to sions Korean that chilleda move relations with the Manchu. recounts the Na that criticize agencies politicians and the government of words Manchu, deftly withholding his own while judgment recording either war peace. advocated the others or who support of second section, is the heart the This section, diary. of the longest narrationday the of inva- by- and straightforward, most is a day- a fluid concept. ful expatriate Chos alongside of fought Japanese sion, beginning in the the middle of twelfth the month of year (solar date January 7, 1637) with the January 7, surprising date 1637) the news of (solar year Manchu strike weeks across ends roughly later, the five It frontier. theat start the of second lunar the month of (February 1637), with the departure of the crown prince to Muk- den, the return of the king to the capital, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the dynasty. Na most likely wrote this part during the siege of Namhan Mountain Fortress and edited it later while in exile. His tone is supportive of Chosŏn efforts but, interestingly, he included events from multiple perspectives. Present at many of the key conversations over war strategies and debates over peace, Na was certainly well positioned to witness and record these events. He hoped to appear objective, especially during the heated exchanges between officials at the court in Namhan Mountain Fortress. This seems to be a strategic move. Na briefly describes some of his roles in the fortress— managing the rations for the troops, for instance, or supporting relatively benign decisions such as rewarding Chosŏn soldiers for killing enemy troops. Apart from these few instances, Na is largely a quiet observer throughout the invasion. He understood that rivalries and personality conflicts among officials were exacerbated by the life- or- death situation of the siege. While relatively safe in the fortress, the inhabitants were subjected to constant artillery fire and the possibility of Manchu capture. Na remained acutely noncommitted in his support of the war while reporting on the dangers around him, especially the food shortage and the actions of those in the fortress. He chose to wait and watch most of these debates play out. One of the final conversations he records in this section is held with the crown prince before the departure of the king’s son to Mukden, a heartbreaking farewell that reinforced the humiliation of the Chosŏn dynasty. Na hints that defeat was avoidable. In considering the aftermath, he attributes the loss to a number of factors, from an army suffering from low morale and poor leadership to a single corrupt official, Kim Kyŏngjing, whom Na and others blamed for the fall of the country. This was an exaggeration to say the least, but a rela-

INTRODUCTION tively safe accusation in the postwar environment that sought to xxiv assign blame. INTRODUCTION xxv n Army was was Army n ŏ Na acknowledges a number of Koreans for their exploits on the their exploits a number for acknowledges Koreans Na of battlefield in “Record of Loyalists Everywhere,” battlefield Everywhere,” the of Loyalists third in “Record section. pre- (the arquebus the as such well, fought troops these of Some rifles)day teams and individual cursor and muskets modern- to commanders andarmy everyday units the of from all levels term success on national and local military. Others short- found thelost battlefield to ground ultimately but were the invaders and killed captured, or theyidentifies fled. Na or Koreans who, Here, still andhaving died the defending were fought country, criticized and the punished court by and other officialsfor their apparent soldiers failures. writes Korean actions about Na by the heroic theunder constant punishment. threat government of of Some these commander and units One company performed admirably. of law in- his troops, instance, in battle for the defeated brother- a significantKorean ultimately but the Hung Taiji, achievement, scattered, thissoldiers which commander was for a loss summar- the court. by In another instance, removed ily subtly critiques Na dismissingthe court after for a commander who, successfully ral- lying his troops fight to Manchu,the retreated because had he exhausted his arrows another and In incident, other yet supplies. describes afterNa a commander, when initially a moment defend- Mongol and- ing a mountain fortress, twice fell a Manchu- for feigned retreat andthe withdrew enemy their military ruse— troops, pulling a trap, into they where coun- the forces Korean terattacked. in his Short on supplies fortress, the commander his troops, struck the resupply attempted to enemy but again, cap- turing him and his horses. this Throughout section and in other partsin the describes diary, Na logistical issues as an underlying militaryreason for losses. suggests He that the Chos inadequately supplied in many of these battles— an understand- an battles— these of many in supplied inadequately able critique the coming to tended rations from Na, who and sup- during Namhanplies at the Mountain siege Fortress. While loyal theto king, these troops and their eventually commanders were and their actionsdefeated criminalized the court. by This same theme of loyalty appears in the fourth section of the diary, “Kanghwa Island Records.” In this section, Na turns to the personalities and events of Kangdo (Kanghwa Island). Traditionally a safe haven for the royal family and the capital’s elite during foreign invasions, Kanghwa Island became a military snare in 1637. The Manchu, crossing the water to Kanghwa with relative ease, overtook the defenders, and the island fell quickly before the surrender of Namhan Mountain Fortress. In one of the most dramatic sections of the diary, Na narrates scenes from near Kanghwa Island during the Manchu attack. High and low, men and women, all faced hardship as they escaped Seoul, traveled west, and gathered at the coast hoping to reach the safety of the island. A chaotic moment at the harbor is particularly gripping. The rapid Manchu strike against the capital threatened the refugees, including the crown princess, who, calling out from her palanquin, openly chastised Kim Kyŏngjing, the official responsible for the evacuation. In this dramatic entry, Na juxtaposes this scene of the crown princess carried by servants with the thousands of commoners traveling by foot and amassing along the shore, all fearing the rapidly approaching enemy cavalry. Moments like these fortified the concept of status. Those with official positions and ranks reached the island, while the masses were left behind to be killed or kidnapped into slav- ery by the Manchu. Na’s descriptions of Kanghwa Island reinforced tropes of Con- fucian loyalty: faithful troops dying to protect the royal family; scholar officials committing suicide in the name of the king rather than surrendering to the enemy; mothers and daughters killing themselves to preserve their chastity when threatened with Man- chu capture and forced concubinage or sexual violence. Na’s understanding of loyalty is gendered, as he names the husbands of many wives who killed themselves (women’s names were not

INTRODUCTION used in public works of this nature). “There were countless num- xxvi bers of women who died to maintain their chastity,” Na writes. INTRODUCTION xxvii n officialsblamed the Manchu ŏ In “Records of Several People Who Rejected and Who In Several Died Peace “Records of People “It is regretful“It that all them cannot of deaths Their be known.” are a distressing part the Confucian of chastity, female of code instance,For amplified here foreign by invasion. the wife and official of daughter failing Yiwere commit cap- to Min’gu, suicide, high, of women tured Na, the of the descent Manchu. by For virtuous birth and marriage barbarian to was men shameful. Na’s take in did not their who lives tell a cautionarywords tale. Women confronted women andthreatened actions be such thethe must family, of reputation insecurities the of “Kanghwa The posterity. Island section Records” for recorded some highlights also early they only were vulnerablemodernNot Korea. during war, also they threatened were within from but and society laws by social that norms subordinated them their to husbands and their families.husband’s the fifthRighteously,” section,Na narrates the aftermathof the war and the Chos consequences for for resisting peace. Stories of Hong Ikhan and O Talche, whom the resisting whom Ikhan Hong for peace. of Stories and Talche, O the to court Qing dispatched as punishment, throughare told and notes letters the scholars king— for composed petitions— Hong and O wrote while in Manchu captivity. Na humanizes and Na O wrote while inHong Manchu captivity. these two officialsby including the poetry composed while they their theimprisoned of Manchu, by that spoke emotional works thesadness country for and their longing reunite with to close sacrifice are bodies dedication and of examples self- These family. male as was an official Yun Kye. description Yun reinforced of in Na’s well as having challengedwho, the Manchu, was killed and his body possession dismembered, a detail that underscored the brutality the sexual Man- of with retaliation.chu Manchu their violated The victims’ bodies— bodies female through decapitation, both acts an affrontto Confucian norms more them that demanded parents. respect the as a gift of body from one’s compares he one, In gruesomesuch accounts, appears sympathetic Na to Despite passages. other in Manchu the favorably to the people of Korea. They are curious and courteous in their demeanor, he insists, and admire Chosŏn officials for their steadfast refusal to surrender. The sixth section of the diary, “Miscellaneous Notes Concern- ing What Happened After the Upheaval,” begins in the early months of 1636 with the dramatic exile and death of the deposed King Kwanghaegun. Here, Na implicates a number of army officials who used their proximity to a top military commander at Namhan Mountain Fortress to advocate for the killing of the ousted king. More than just a story about the affairs of these army officers, the incident with King Kwanghaegun serves as a foil to critique the shifting political allegiances and loyalties of soldiers and officials not just in Korea but throughout Northeast Asia. With the exile and death of King Kwanghaegun as a backdrop, Na traces the Manchu demands after the peace settlement in 1637. Submission to the Manchu meant frequent requests from Mukden in the form of letters and the repeated visits of the Manchu, Mon- gols, and pro-Manchu Chinese envoys. Some of Hung Taiji’s representatives demanded that the Chosŏn military support them in campaigns against the Ming, Na explains, while other Manchu envoys inspected Namhan Mountain Fortress to ensure that Korea did not rebuild its defenses. Namhan Mountain held strategic and symbolic meaning for Chosŏn and the Qing. The Manchu, looking upon the mountain as a symbol of Korean resistance, prevented the court from rebuilding its defenses. Aware of this legacy, the only new structure the Manchu allowed the Chosŏn to erect— and in fact demanded it— was the Samjŏndo stele nearby. Na does not hold back his disdain for this monument. Striking are the repercussions the war had on the Chosŏn dynasty, most significantly the new political, military, and social connections forged with the Qing. Na relates a number of stories about the aftermath of the war and people responding to the large

INTRODUCTION geopolitical shifts around them. Na suggests the invasion had a xxviii far-reaching impact on Koreans and non-Koreans alike. These INTRODUCTION xxix m’s Slandering,” m’s ŭ ng ŏ m, the brush name Kim of ŭ ng ŏ n, particularly his refusal accept rewards to ŏ n. the Many of arguments based on Confucian were prin- n, comparing him those accepted rewards to who and hon- ŏ ŏ In the section, seventh Ch’ of “Record Na composed the composed eighthNa and final section, “Humiliation Sangh the diary turns factionalism the to after toxic politics in Korean peace was secured. frames Na this section around the post- in the environment which countryinvasion assign to sought juxtaposed Na the actions his com- of 1637. of the events for blame in sections the patriots laid earlier without following the events the conflict, of the disastrousthe Despite war. outcome courtthe part took who alive— or whether dead many people—promoted in it, while punishing rebuke issues others. of a gentle Na Here these suggesting people, that Na they deserve promotion. did not thisdevotes section Ch’ to ors. Na mentions Kim mentions ors. Na a minimum times 130 in the of more diary, indirectlythan King Na for any other individual Injo. except praises Kim Sangh actions dis- that harmed for Na and advancements the country. cusses others how attacked Kim his because failure of perform to the expected duties Confucian of officialsat for of times warand making the countrynot save to mili- from decisions better policy greattary to lengths goes Na transcribe to defeat. the petitions of officials of who dozens forarguedand against punishing Kim Sangh notes end with notes a discussion aboutnumber a scholars of the court peace alignment and tried later to exiledtheir because anti- of rehabilitate, hinting the to back opening the section of and the King returned of removal Kwanghaegun, never power who to exile. in died and ciples of duty to king and country. In passionate language, offi- language, passionate In country. and king to duty of ciples lasting actions, effectswhileoth- of Kim’s cials lament the long- his deeds asthaners lessothers offensive defended many of those during that time. in the from 1642, his Qing,” death.Received Despite before just his exileand subsequent retirement, receive continued to he information from Seoul and copies of petitions from the highest levels of the state about the ongoing interactions along the frontier and even from outside the country. This section includes Na relating the story of Chosŏn officials dispatched to the Manchu as punishment for rejecting peace, including Kim Sanghŏn. Kim’s plight reveals some important aspects of the post- invasion reali- ties Korea confronted. One was the relationship forged between the Manchu and Chosŏn courts, a humiliating tributary relationship in which the Manchu had many demands— such as the dispatch of hostages. It was an arrangement that weighed heavily on the state and the minds of government officials. Na also briefly describes personal diplomacy, a new form of person-to- person relations that turned humiliation into opportunity. Na relates how Kim Sanghŏn developed real connections with Manchu individuals who had come to respect him for the way he fearlessly confronted punishment and possible death. Another Chosŏn official who encountered new political opportunities was Pak No. Pak was sent to Mukden and became close friends with Ingguldai and Mafuta, two Manchu generals. Such personal bonds between the Manchu and Koreans hinted at the possibility for more collegial relations between the two courts. These personal relations also held the potential to transform the Manchu. Remaining steadfast to the moral principles of Confu- cianism, Kim Sanghŏn won over the Manchu. Kim’s story was unfinished when Na passed away; Na was unsure if Kim would return to Korea or die in foreign lands. Na believed that, despite the humiliation of defeat and the hardships and suffering under the Qing, in time Chosŏn would convince the Manchu of the superiority of Confucian norms and win them over. This optimis- tic message of respect and coexistence was obscured by the trag- edy of defeat, but it was true that the transformation went both ways. Through these new relationships, some Korean officials

INTRODUCTION realized that the Manchu were more trustworthy than once xxx believed. The close relations formed with the Qing leadership INTRODUCTION xxxi n, n, ŏ Even though section two of the diary— the main and longest though section the two diary— of Even Duty the telling and of most are obligation some subtexts of opened up new opportunitiesnew up opened and travel experiences foreign for of lands. and Another benefit was prestige the relationships— from with influence. Manchu of intermarriage—even is a straightforward description the of invasion, Na section— than the is more of a chronicle attack. just work felt Na Man’gap’s write to thecompelled additional seven sections set the to record straight and shape a particular the legacy In of war. them, he details peace.for the foror actions officials war of advocated who attaching theThis includes sensi- politically names of many to tive transcribedroyal petitions he summarized. or As mentioned energy spends much discussing Kim Man’gap above, Sangh Na the official criticized afterthe warand accusedover of misconduct the question the his to king loyalty of and the crown prince. Kim was a centralnumberkey posts. figure a of held who 1637 in He was a scholar official who, Na, like accompaniedthe king to a unlike held Na, who Namhan Mountain Fortress. However, secondary the at court, role Kim was a leading official went who great lengthsto express to his resistance tearing peace by to a up the the to royal letter surrender Manchu, engagingof draft with Qing camp, in theattempting (he enemy suicide wasenvoys and, after the Na), truce, by only leaving his seek post to saved family membersout in the was he countryside. dis- Eventually Kim openly defends Manchu by Na as a prisoner. the to patched calling the attacks against By naming him slander. names here, Na settled far too in attack- had gone againstscores those felt he ing Kim his over loyalty. this responsibilities finaldoes one’s Where section of the diary. rest? Especially they times should war, at be focused on a sense of nationalof obligation and the the protection of country and the king? times, At other the threat when the to country has passed, defined obligations by loyaltyfilial to parents,are one’s family, old clan, and this village? pushed Manchu invasion The age- theoretical debate into practice, and Na’s work highlights the slipperiness of loyalty. In some sections he spotlights the scholars and soldiers who fought for and, in some cases, died for the king. In other sections, he admires officials who demonstrated their loyalty to the Ming by committing suicide rather than shifting allegiance to the Qing. But, according to Na’s narrative, many more officials remained alive than were taken captive. Na relays how pro-peace officials shifted their loyalty from the Ming to the Qing and how Na and other officials had questionable loyalty as well. Decades earlier, these individuals had not remained loyal to the ousted King Kwanghaegun, and most of them remained loyal to King Injo despite the king’s capitulation to the Manchu and his rejection of the Ming. Questions can be asked about Na’s own loyalty. Na’s actions during and after the invasion did not amount to a great deal. While he recorded the loyalty of his colleagues, some as righteous literati negotiating with the enemy outside the walls of Namhan Mountain Fortress and others nobly fighting enemy troops, he was not among them. He remained within the protective walls of Namhan Mountain Fortress. Even when the court appointed him officer in charge of provisionskwallyangsa ( ), there was little for him to do: food supplies were low, and acquiring more was impos- sible because of the Manchu siege. In his diary, Na depicts himself as a pragmatic realist who presented the opinions and actions of those on both sides of the debate over war or peace with the Manchu. From the viewpoint of his contemporaries, however, his actions and words may have seemed opportunistic, even cow- ardly—he never expressed any of his own strong views in the early days of the invasion, but he was willing to criticize others in hindsight. He was someone swept up in the course of events, unable, or unwilling, to take much action or put his life at risk to protect the king and the country. This was his real weakness; he

INTRODUCTION was unable to act decisively and make hard decisions during the xxxii war. When he composed the later sections of the diary, he was INTRODUCTION xxxiii had yang- class. yangban yangban n dynasty, stalwart ŏ , often exerted real authority n’s questionable loyalty, Na Na questionableloyalty, n’s ŏ sadaebu were often at odds with odds often at were another, in which one was the upper echelon of the elite the was of elite the echelon upper n court and central bureaucracy in Seoul governed n saw little need to defend itself. Theoretically, the Theoretically, itself. little defend n saw need to sadaebu ŏ ŏ sadaebu were the scholarly and the military scholarly were qualified elites, who office for The certain privileges, as impoverished such tax were most exemptions, ban if they passed examinations. the government While the Representing only a small the of population, percentage the The Chos matters the of state through a Confucian lens. Confucian doc- trines the war little paid to attention importance or a well- of so influentialfunded military and in were the fifteenth century Chos that the the atop socialruler kingdom full over held hierarchy. power the firsthundredyears For one of Chos the Military and Political Affairs in and Political Military Century the Late Sixteenth kings checked bureaucratic power, but, beginningkings bureaucratic checked power, in the sixteenth thecentury, bureaucracy grew cunning based decisions and made on allegiances, exerting the rulers. greater over control Kings these tried stop who political not to competitions.could Those the aside. bureaucracy pushed over were control much too exercise Within the court, rulers often and sat watched as members the of bureaucracy matters battled great each other and over small. in the theThose bureaucracy, because kings them upon run depended to the Mem- government. thebers of tarnished accusations by impropriety of in the aftermath the of conflict.defending By Kim Sangh turn political, generated factional, or strife. belatedly took an active stance, took belatedly while during the actual moment had mostly been an Hishe inaction observer. a time at national of crisis him allowed document to around the him. events Writing shape his to own himself. legacy Na and defend was for a way and held little power. The sadaebu, on the other hand, were the governing group of the court; they continued to succeed in the highest examinations—which gave them access to government positions—and held political control. Below them, the yangin, or commoners, mostly poor peasants, were the majority of the population and carried the burden of paying land taxes and providing corvée and military service. The commoners were the ones who were largely responsible for funding the treasury of a government run by scholar bureaucrats— officials who attacked excess and surplus as supporting immoral choices that would harm the liveli- hoods of the people. The sadaebu and other yangban should have, in theory, paid taxes, but many yangban did not; it was a tradition that increasingly burdened the commoners. At the bottom of the social hierarchy, nobi, or slaves, were exempt from taxes or other obligations, but they had no privileges. They were considered “base” and “low” (ch’ŏn); their lives were not their own. The Chosŏn court controlled diplomatic relations with its neighbors, including the Japanese before and after the Imjin War (1592– 1598), tribes north of the frontier, and China. Among these networks, the most important relationship was with the Ming dynasty. After the founding of Chosŏn, uncertainty strained relations with the Ming, as the newly formed Chinese dynasty gauged Korea’s intentions. Soon after, however, Chosŏn entered a hierarchical tributary relationship— a diplomatic and ritual relationship between Korea and China that demanded a variety of rituals, including the dispatch of an ambassador to Beijing representing the king of Korea who hid his face from the Chinese emperor, kowtowed nine times in front of him, and accepted the graces of China. China also ratified Korean succession and con- firmed the king. Other requirements were the acceptance of the Chinese calendar and a tribute of Korean goods. Despite these demands, China usually gave more in gifts, trade, and military

INTRODUCTION assistance than it received on tributary missions, although China xxxiv never gave human tributes, such as slaves or women, back to INTRODUCTION xxxv n ŏ families and njo was forced n dynasty had ŏ ŏ yangban iju, theiju, farthest point , and the central gov- Ŭ yangban n court by suppressing localn court dis- by ŏ n’s defenses. Hereditary defenses. military clansn’s ŏ began in see the to Ming the symbol Confucian of njo and other government officials and other government north,njo retreated dis- ŏ n troops fled returnedand to families.their govern- The Hoping to conquer China to Hoping and install his son as emperor, yangban ŏ 27 King S King By the sixteenth the the century, military neglect of in the era the Japanese leader Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537– 1598) invaded invaded 1598) (1537– Hideyoshi Toyotomi leader the Japanese landingKorea, These (Pusan) 250,000 in 1592. troops Tongnae at capturedforces the Hanyang capital in of (Seoul) three and weeks then continued north, advancing Manchuria. toward Chos The military could not contain the enemy forces as demoralized military contain forces not the could enemy Chos repel neither the could internal invadingment control army nor reached Seoul, the Japanese When civil insurrectiondisorder. had startedagainst slaves out; the fires state had already broken in the capital, in an burn to attempt registries the slave in the held PunishmentsBoard of building. patching the a message to assistance Ming ask to for and warn thethem the invasion. of Ming Initially, the fathom court did not con-gravity incapable of Japan the situation; believed of some quering China, while wary others were a unified of Korean and rumors spread pirates had previously Japanese attack—Japanese thisto effect. sending Chinesedelayed The troops forgovernment several months. During this deliberation, King S sents andsents piracy along the coasts. interest This in lack of military affairs eroded standing the military elite of Chos weakened further civilization. peace meant that a large relative standing The army guardto the frontier was unnecessary. Instead, a small military the Chos protected adequately Korea. In time,Korea. between relations the two countries strengthened the as to withdraw north, to the border town of lost statuslost the compared to scholar weakened the army— a weakness during revealed the Imjin theweakened army— War. ernment limited nonmilitary diverted resources to matters. after peace relative the theof founding of Chos a monarch could retreat to without violating the Confucian belief that the king must not leave Chosŏn territory. With King Sŏnjo determined not to cross the Yalu River until the last moment, a Chinese envoy traveled to Ŭiju to ascertain the veracity of the situation. Unfortunately, the Ming army was stretched thin, engaged in wars against the Mongols to the north and in distant Burma and Thailand to the south. One Ming military contingent stationed in Manchuria protected the northeast passage into China. The Manchu leader Nurhachi offered to defend the Ming. He secured this region for the Chinese, which allowed Ming forces to advance into Korea, battling the Japanese at P’yŏngyang. The arrival of Ming troops and Manchu support prevented the Japa- nese from advancing further, and the war began turning into a stalemate. Ultimately, the regular stationing of Ming troops was crucial to the survival of Chosŏn. Official Ming military support strengthened King Sŏnjo by demonstrating the extent of his political backing from his strong neighbor, the legacy of which would influence Korean state structures and military engagement over the ensuing decades through the tributary system. During the war, the Chinese interfered constantly with the Korean government. The Chinese army required a large amount of supplies and logistical support. The Ming generals were sympathetic to the Chosŏn king, but they also pressured the court through Confu- cian mores. Korea was a Confucian country, hence the relationship to China had to be approached with sincerity. With Korea full of Chinese troops, the Ming generals approached King Sŏnjo directly to discuss matters that concerned their troops, even down to mundane issues of armor. The Ming officials were personable and authoritative in their dealings with the king. King Sŏnjo responded politely, except when he went on strike in protest of heavy- handed Chinese behavior.28 But subtle influences arose. ŏ INTRODUCTION King S njo was the only official in Korea the Ming wanted to deal xxxvi with because doing so would allow them to circumvent the INTRODUCTION xxxvii 29 iju, on the Yalu River, River, iju, on the Yalu Ŭ njo a tremendous amount of leverage leverage amount of a tremendous njo ŏ n perspective, Ming actions fit did not the ŏ n military, its communications,n military, its and infra- its ŏ n strategy to destroy Japanese forces in strategy and Korea, Korean n forces Japanese destroy to ŏ The Imjin War raised important War political questions Imjin The about the Given the Ming and commitment Given the resistance, Korean a Jap- njo. Beijing debated withdrawing debated Beijing njo. troops, the Ming but ŏ bureaucracy, which gave S whichgave bureaucracy, over the bureaucrats. scholarly over through Instead working of schol- officials,arly the Chinese generalsdictated wartime to decisions S nature the of Chos officials feared return.day Japanese one might the Chos structural vulnerabilities. instance, For anese Still, victory was military unlikely. this a major was not was that as Chinese mostly Korea, it had triumph power for on land.stopped the invasion Japanese On the eastern and central often bribed fronts, forces Chinese Japanese with besiegers and swords, horses,silver, and the back until Chinese hold would this the view, Chinese retreated south.the of From point Japanese strategy was successful The saved. because Chinese were lives thousandsMing fighting tens of men had lost of Korea, in and others as war, to go to the decision politicians in where Beijing, war was problematic politically the over criticized heavily were questioned the necessity fighting of Korea. Chinese in generals suffered heavy casualtieswho on exe-battlefield would be the Chos the From cuted. remained in Korea untilremained Hide- in retreat following the Korea Japanese the fact Despite that death the in emperor 1598. Mingyoshi’s Wanli regular hold did not with audiences his twenty- bureaucracy for years, five personallyhe maintainto intervened Korea.troops in had been a logistical bottleneck during the the preventing war, to the supplies front.of In addition, roads movement efficientthe transporting capable of the to not capital car- were or vehicles alsoriages. facilities. docks lacked and outcome pier Korea The the spend- warof inspired the greater king defensive consider to ing on infrastructure. also solidified It a special relationship with the Ming with and greater engagement the political factions in the Chosŏn court. For the next century and a half, Korean officials showed their appreciation for the Chinese saving them from the Japanese by holding on to the memory of the Ming.

The Chosŏn State and the 1627 Manchu Attack

In the years following the Imjin War, court officials began to improve the economy and build up defenses.30 This included passing early taxation and revenue reforms. Thousands of Koreans had died in the war, and their loss resulted in a severely damaged agricultural system— the base of government taxation and of the livelihood of the people. Routine farming had ceased for six to eight years, devastating food production. It was imperative to maintain rice paddies, as rice farming is an intricate process requiring constant work to maintain the artificial irrigation system. The entire process deteriorated quickly. Unlike China’s canal systems, agriculture in Korea depended upon seasonal rainfall and the release of water from dikes or other waterways. Agriculture relied upon the solidarity of villages, but many of the village workers had been dispersed, killed, removed, or imprisoned in Japan. Rebuilding the agricultural infrastructure was King Kwang- haegun’s responsibility, and he did so by implementing tax reforms that increased government revenue to fund military improvements. The Chosŏn court argued it should be able to undertake defensive buildup alone without having to rely on the Ming. King Kwanghaegun, a formidable king and a dedicated and skillful ruler, rebuilt the military, the agricultural system, and the economy in the wake of the Imjin War. Fearing another Japanese invasion, Chosŏn officials were disturbed and encouraged the Ming army to remain in Korea. The Ming agreed to leave three or four thousand troops, who contributed to the efforts to rebuild and train ŏ INTRODUCTION Chos n forces until 1601. Further improvements included the xxxviii establishment of the Institute for Military Training (Hullyŏn INTRODUCTION xxxix njo even- ŏ ), and while this was not p n Togam included an elite an elite included n Togam ŏ ŏ ch’ njo’s other two sons were the other tworightful sons were njo’s ŏ njo appointed Kwanghaegunnjo as crown ŏ ), supported the decision. King S Taebugin ), who advocated waiting. advocated ), who An opposing faction, the Great in However, domestic andinternational issues interfered with the The Manchu were nomadic tribes supported nomadic were Manchu were lives The whose ŏ S Togam), the key institute responsible for developing and stock- the developing institute key responsible for Togam), rockets,piling and explosives, firearms,well as as training personnelthem. use to Hully The unit trained to use state- of- the- art funded King weaponry, by theof- trained unit use state- to Kwanghaegun. rebuilding process. First, political questions arose surrounding his proximity by complicated legitimacy—King Kwanghaegun’s that clashes to with led the the Manchu)— (aka theto Jurchen official bureaucracycoupand a that culminated in his scholar- King obtaining Injo, nephew, the throne Kwanghaegun in 1623. was the a secondary son of wife ( prince, angering the of political one factions, the Westerners ( always acceptable,always the distin- royal family consistently not did guish between primary and secondary wives, particularly when there a primary was son by no wife. This was especially true at times ensuring war when of succession was paramount. During amidst concerns that thethe War, king Imjin without die a could S King heir, legitimate heirs, rumors that threatened Kwanghaegun’s kingship.heirs, rumors King that threatened Kwanghaegun’s assassinated,brothers were likely most two half- Kwanghaegun’s supporters, Kwanghaegun plunged which into Kwanghaegun’s by wasdeep trouble. in It this fraught political context that the Man- arrivedchu on the scene. hunting,by trapping, and fishing. envi- forest cameSome a from ronment, others the from plains. the In addition to Manchu, other in the tribes region lived Jurchen north the of Mongols and some tually neither differentwas 1601, had two but sons by in wives as the children declaredimmediately crown prince. However, began people whispering more thatgrew, Kwanghaegun was ille- S King that and gitimate Northerners ( Chosŏn frontier. Originally of Jurchen origin, one tribe coalesced around charismatic and militarily powerful leaders, grew into a major federation, and gained the notice of the Ming.31 By the 1590s, Nurhachi, their leader, emerged as a rising military power and, inspired to revive the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115– 1234) heritage, sought to conquer China for its wealth and resources. Exploiting a weakened Ming, Nurhachi expanded his power into Manchuria in the late 1610s. Based on geographic proximity, Korea was an early concern for the Manchu. As their main objective was China, they had to ensure Korea did not become a hindrance. In 1616, the Ming acted against the Manchu and began preparing for a counterattack, requisitioning thirteen thousand troops from Korea, three thousand of which were part of Hullyŏn Togam, the special arquebus group. The number of troops— required because of tributary obligations— put Korea in a delicate situation between honoring Chinese wishes and potentially losing its elite firearms unit in a Manchu victory. In response, Kwanghae- gun developed a scheme to avert total disaster. In 1619, the Korean troops arrived at the front and reported to the Ming generals, but immediately thereafter they surrendered to the Manchu. Thirteen thousand Korean men yielded to the Manchu, while the Ming suffered the loss of forty-five thousand troops.32 King Kwanghae- gun’s policy cunningly honored the Ming request for military assistance while saving Korean lives and placating the Manchu. The failed Ming campaign had the added effect of defeating Chinese power in Manchuria. After this loss, the Ming could no longer support Korea, a fact Nurhachi keenly understood. In 1621, all the other towns in Manchuria were captured from the Ming, making the situation even more politically tenuous in Korea. Political factions within the Chosŏn court used the threat of an invasion to gain power and vilify competing parties. The Westerners abhorred the thought of peace with the Manchu,

INTRODUCTION considering them barbarians, while the Southerners urged negotia- xl tion. King Kwanghaegun, increasingly criticized for authorizing INTRODUCTION xli

34 Man- 33 n army who leaders ŏ n armies in Hwanghae Hwanghae in armies n 36 ngyang, fifty- eight hun- eight ngyang, fifty- ŏ ŏ n territory, which the which Chinesen territory, ŏ iju had fallen to the enemy. The The the had fallen to enemy. iju Ŭ n troops appeared to resist engagement. resist to appeared troops n ŏ Another complained, “It has been days since has Another the been days complained, “It 35 n response. Reports spoke of great Manchu momen- n response. of Reports spoke ŏ ngan hundred provinces, troops, amounting seventeen to ŏ version of events depicts a rapid Manchu a rapid attack depicts events and cha- of version King was Injo a weak king the dominated by bureaucratic offi- Several sympathetic the Koreans to Manchu the cause joined enemy invaded and not one [of our soldiers] has cut the throat of soldiers] our [of one and not invaded enemy and claimeda reward.” soldier an enemy dred troops fortified the cityfortress, and while archers from surrounding villages the entered the castle city. defend to tum. As part the response, of the Chos took advantage of to construct to of advantage islands basestook on Korean along the uneasy with Manchunorthwest coast. were The the Ming pres- cross- of days Within 1627. in Korea into army an sent and ence the court learned River, had fled those from who ing the Yalu thatsouth of town the border Sillok otic Chos P’y and the north. defend to ordered Inwere P’y the execution of his two half- brothers and for not supporting not thebrothers and for the his two of execution half- backedMing, was exiled Island Cheju to after Westerners– the 1623 gov- died in he in With power, 1641. where thecoup, Westerners Ming stance. ernment shifted policy a pro- to politicians belligerent a group of cials had enthroned who him— thetoward Manchu the and of Ming. supportive granted They Chos to access generals Chinese One official criticizedthe inactionof the troops,“As reporting, deter- advances,the person one forward enemy comes not bravely mined to die.” attack the One of Manchu generals force. other was than none the Chos of one 1627), Kang Hongnip (1560– had surrendered to the Manchu in 1619 and was the takenhad surrendered to Manchu in captive. 1619 By 1620, almost all the prisoners of Korean had been released, but Kang remained. learned speak He to and grew Manchu well chu troopschu advanced quickly along the main roads. Many reports the strengthof the reached the court. Manchu of forces In the face of Chos advance, this sympathetic to the Manchu cause. Later, in 1624, an internal rebellion broke out in the Chosŏn court. Yi Kwal, a powerful and respected military commander whose forces temporarily occupied the capital, led the rebellion and declared himself the ruler of a new dynasty until the government crushed the rebellion, and King Injo returned to Seoul. One survivor of the short-lived rebellion, Han Yu, fled to Manchu territory where he convinced General Kang Hongnip into believing that his family members had been killed by the state, presumably for his defec- tion to the Manchu. In 1627, Kang led Manchu troops to Korea, reportedly to seek revenge against the dynasty, but he later learned that his family had not died, and that Han had deceived him. Han was subsequently beheaded.37 Another Korean defector was Yi Yŏngbang, a former Chosŏn officer who, like Kang, had participated in the 1619 surrender to the Manchu. To help the Manchu win loyalty, Yi married one of the daughters of Nurha- chi’s many sons, assuming familial ties with the Manchu. Pak Nanyŏng (?–1636) joined Kang Hongnip on the expedition that assisted the Ming in 1619. The Manchu captured him and held him prisoner. Returning in 1627 with the Manchu army, Pak repatriated to the Chosŏn dynasty and later returned to Mukden several times as the Chosŏn envoy after the 1627 peace settlement. O Sinnam (1575– 1632) was another Chosŏn military official captured in 1619. He was held in confinement and returned to Korea with the 1627 invading army, where he took part in the peace negotiations, helping the Manchu. Seeing these men’s work with the Manchu as a betrayal to the state, some officials argued for the punishment of their families, but King Injo refused to act against them.38 Kang was branded a traitor by the Chosŏn government but was rehabilitated later. O Sinnam returned to Muk- den as a Chosŏn diplomat in 1630. Such decisions by the court may have been made to placate Manchu anger while making use

INTRODUCTION of officials who spoke Manchu and were well versed in Manchu- xlii Jurchen customs. INTRODUCTION xliii But these But actions 40 The approaching threat The 39 Officials continued to try 43 41 n troops. court had anticipated The this Manchu ŏ He may have resisted taking have may He this a number rea- step of for 42 Abandoning the capital only meant ensuring not the safety of During the assault, of days thethe early court struggled with to persuade Injo to south, move pressing him to the point that he compelled King Injo to consider moving to the safety of Kang- of safety the to moving consider to Injo King compelled Island.hwa army had already The retreated Namhanto Moun- tain Fortress, leaving the capital King undefended. thought Injo the him was fortress,it defend best to for while other officials even or as the River places such Imjin of argued the defense for the insisted capital, that Injo Namhan but was lose. valuable too to With Manchu troops in the country, organization down, broke hastilyand address to were decisions made the unanticipated rapid Manchu was advance. recognition a genuine There the of weakness Chos of assault as early as the previous year andassault as year the had begun as early previous stockpiling the fortress. for and reinforcements provisions failed the stop to Manchu. After the hesitating,mil- ordered Injo itary abandon to Seoul and fortify Kanghwa Island and Namhan Mountain all Fortress. the also He ordered children of and wives withdraw to Kanghwa the to soldiers of Island and had the ances- tral shrines transferredthere as well. the royal line, in particular the crown also prince, indicated but that the military situation was untenable. King feared the Injo crown prince, was who fifteen at the time,to young wastoo move. basic militarybasic and decisions Officials troop deployment. requested that soldiers reposition themselves so as to impede the rapid Man- advances.chu One strategy was cut off to passage acrossthe the the better to capital. River defend Imjin sons, as such the potential dangers the to crown prince and the failure defend to the the to sign population court’s clear of made it insurrection. spark could which the country, Officials insistedthe Island,crown location off Koje to prince a remote be sent should the southern coast, the king but that reiterated his son was too a great such travel distance. to young grew angry at their repeated requests; he finally acquiesced and approved their appeals.44 The court dispatched the crown prince on the twenty- fourth day after the initial attack. The flow of information into the court slowed because of the rapid advances of Manchu forces. Lacking information, the court dispatched scouts to ascertain conditions. Reports came back detailing the captures and deaths of top Chosŏn officials. Many troops were wiped out, while others fled; fortresses were captured. The situation was precarious: “It is said that all the common people who are captured have had their throats cut.”45 At one point, the king insisted that the Ming should be notified about the situation and requested the Southern Army (Namgun) and “rocket carts” (hwagi), or cannons, from the Chinese, “like during the Imjin War.”46 This is a good example of the court’s reluctance to come to terms with Chosŏn’s weak military position. The king’s request evinces the misunderstanding of the military situation. Based on the precedence of the Imjin War, part of the Chosŏn strategy relied upon Ming assistance in times of national survival. Injo requesting Ming intervention suggests the court had no other options. Officials such as Yi Sik understood the hopelessness of these requests and bluntly stated, “The situation is not the same [as the Imjin War].”47 The decision to leave Seoul took three weeks. On his departure from the capital, King Injo composed a letter of sorrow, blaming his flight on the arrival of enemy troops and partly criticizing Ming general Mao Wenlong for demanding excessive military rations from the common people.48 While King Injo was decid- ing whether to abandon the capital, some officials argued for diplomacy. The Manchu demanded peace negotiations, but the court responded slowly.49 On the twenty-third day, King Injo inquired into the dispatch of the Chosŏn response letter to the Manchu and found that it had not been sent because the debate 50

INTRODUCTION over the letter was as yet unsettled. A discussion broke out about xliv answering the Manchu demand for a state letter. The official Yi INTRODUCTION xlv 54 nggil, for n govern- ngjin sug- ŏ ŏ ŏ Sin Ky 51 Some of the debate revolved the revolved of debate Some nggu (1564– 1635) as the envoy as the envoy 1635) nggu (1564– 55 n dynasty had served the Ming ŏ ŏ ) be sent with the letter, apparently a ploy with) be sent the apparently a ploy letter, n officialthe who spoke same language and ŏ ng) be burned (presumably so the Manchu noja ŏ 53 Other officials My opposed move. this Ch’oe 52 nik (1547– 1634) suggested with that be concluded peace the nik (1547– Talk about opening with negotiations the ManchuTalk dragged on. The court received a letter from Kang from a letter court received HongnipThe that reported ŏ around the the location of meeting. Yi insisted, “If the Manchu the enter fortress, reason no to thenenvoys have they would W instance, suggested sending a letter written Chang Man by (1566– Chos the that argued who 1629), two hundred years. continue canfor following not “How we them?” The court decided to select Yi Ch court to decided The the Manchu receive delegation.to the arrival of three Manchu envoys. The direct involvement of of the arrival direct The involvement three of Manchu envoys. Kang, Chos a former held the same customs, must have been part of the Manchu effort reach a quick settlementto with and positive the Chos gested that a slave ( gested that a slave could not identify the slave envoy), and sent the slave to Kang- to the and sent slave envoy), identify the not could slave Islandhwa with This rationalization the been an letter. have may insertedexcuse retroactively the explain into to sources the burn- theing by slaves, during of office as done was Imjin allegedly the War. to prevent potentially losing a more valuable official. a more potentially losing The king prevent to Tagaccepted Registry this that the idea, ordered Identification (Hop’aech’ Office Manchu, a proposal supported by Yi Kwi (1557– 1627), who argued who 1627), (1557– Manchu, a proposal Yi Kwi supported by that the military situation wasand dangerous stated that a letter the to and Manchu. sent be composed should ment. The court King thement. deliberated The decided letter. Injo over that Kanghwa retreat to had to he Island, considering the Man- Armychu had already arrived. Only then, after the king was safe, the accept be chosen to Manchu envoys. a representative should be allowed suggested should that theChang Manchu envoys Yu Kanghwa to crossto over Island and be greeted there, Injo but the to refused island the and move next decided to day. attack. What about meeting them outside Your Majesty’s Tem- porary Quarters?”56 Some of the discussion centered on the demeanor of the Jurchen- Manchu representatives. King Injo inquired about their disposition and tone. Chang Yu asked if the court could refuse the representatives if they acted respectfully. The king believed that the location of the site was unimportant. More pertinent was the courteous manner in which Chosŏn should receive the envoys. He decided that Chinhaeryu, the entrance to Kanghwa Island along the shore, was a good site.57 King Injo proceeded to cross over to Kanghwa Island, passing through Chin- haeryu, where the envoys would soon arrive. Once safely on the island shore, he asked about the Manchu. Ch’oe Myŏnggil replied that they only wanted to know if there would be peace or not. Yi Kyŏngjik opposed this view, however, adding that because the Manchu demanded that Chosŏn officials and the king must kowtow to them, “this was not the way to come to cordial terms with each other.”58 One Manchu envoy appeared, wanting to deliver a diplomatic letter to the court. An official argued that since the previous envoy, Kang Hongnip, was originally from Chosŏn and therefore bowed to the court, there was uncertainty about the reception of this new envoy who was calling himself a Manchu general. The king decided this envoy should be received outside the fortress and not allowed to enter.59 The rapid advance of Manchu troops to Seoul and Kanghwa Island forced the court to sever relations with the Ming. As part of this formality, on the third day of the third lunar month, two months into the war, King Injo swore “an alliance of friendship with the Great Jin dynasty,” noting that if Chosŏn broke the pledge, and the Manchu troops invaded again, disaster would befall the dynasty.60 The surrender ritual was elaborate. The oath was made over a sacrificial horse and a black ox presented as ritual offerings.61 In front of a number of Chosŏn officials and eight

INTRODUCTION Manchu envoys on Kanghwa Island, the court official Yi xlvi Haengwŏn (1592–1648) read the oath of allegiance as the Manchu INTRODUCTION xlvii n movement n movement ŏ The government built up up built government The 62 n acceptance the Qing new of ŏ 1637 Manchu Invasion n court recognized the military disadvantages of n representatives refused to convey a letter to the a letter to refusedn representatives convey to ŏ n officials mistreated Qing envoys. A Mongol n officialsrep-Mongol A mistreatedenvoys. Qing ŏ ŏ Another consequence of the defensive buildup and buildup Another consequence the defensive of and the 1636– 63 n had not severed its ties the its to severed Ming.n had not n had produced the appropriate outcome. the appropriate n had produced ŏ ŏ Na Man’gap begins his diary Man’gap Na with the Chos defenses along thedefenses troops frontier the to and and west moved northwest. reign permanently title and ending Korea relations with the Ming. sending theby let- Believing protocol the Manchu prince broke ter directly King to officials Injo, at courtthe refusedpresent to shared theirthe attitude the letter to king. andMan’gap admit- Na ted that Chos treated occasion on one and, on resenting theManchu was ill- another, Chos pro- Ming stance was that, in time, Mingpro- bases returned Korean to indicated All the to these Manchuterritory. of that developments Chos toward wartoward the and the situation Manchu resolve attempts to is rife description Manchu with The diplomacy of mis-peacefully. haps and misunderstandings. Sensing agreement was the 1627 threatened, the King Manchu to tenth a letter prince dispatched peace between the histwo for desire reiterated in he which Injo countries. on Chos depended Peace the 1627 attackthe and 1627 strengthened as the such defenses, cav- key arquebusalry, soldiers, and archers. Upon recommendation by the King on recommendation Westerners, by reneged Upon Injo duringthe made promises the alliance ritual and resumed relations with the Ming the once Manchu troops retreated. In the years Chos the after, The Diary The collected the blood of thecollected of animals the blood in a vessel General in front of Ming a former militarydefected and who officer 1630), HaiLiu (?– was fighting for the Manchu.of At the conclusion ritual,the Gen- eral Liu quickly departed, satisfied likely that Manchu effortsin Chos figure 0.2 Map of Chosŏn Korea with important locations mentioned in The Diary of 1636. INTRODUCTION xlix n n ŏ ŏ ge to the funeral è n frontier. Asn frontier. they left the ŏ (1594–1635). The Chos wanghu . n Korea, including important locations n Korea, l ŏ ŏ n royal guards near the Manchu tents, Ingguldai The Diary of 1636 ŏ ceremony of Queen Iny slight occurred when the Manchu sent a cort a sent Manchu the when threatening A more court diplomatic the from Qing emperor. occurred slight mentioned in figure 0.3 Detailed map of central Chos and his men— fearful an ambush of and infuriated Chos by and his men— court decided to set up the Manchu tent outside the palace com- the outside set up court Manchu to tent decided want the neardid not thepound. outsiders They palace, most security because of likely reasons, also officials’ because of but dis- the the Manchudain “barbarians.” for included This entourage famed military Ingguldai. commander a tense moment Following Chos with northrode the toward Chos slights— capital, they stole horses, a Manchu custom of retaliation after a show of disrespect that was most likely viewed by Chosŏn officials as another example of barbarianism. The letter from the tenth prince and the condolence visit had little impact. By 1636, while some Chosŏn officials advocated peace, many encouraged war. Na described the sentiment of resistance: “Popular opinion called for war and agreed that the establishment of tributary relations [with the Qing] was an erroneous view. There were no dissenters.” Voices to resist only grew louder. While the debate at court over peace or war persisted, “the argument for war still dominated.” The incident with Ingguldai marked the end of Manchu attempts at negotiations. In early winter of 1637, roughly fifty thousand Manchu troops crossed the frozen Yalu River and attacked. Unlike in 1627, Korean commanders did not lead the assault. The top Manchu generals, Ingguldai and Mafuta, as well as Emperor Hung Taiji, directed the campaign, indicating the seriousness of Manchu resolve to settle the Korea issue permanently. Like the previous invasion, Manchu troops were unstop- pable. The Manchu struck rapidly and within four days reached Seoul. Na Man’gap believed this rapid Manchu advance was made possible because the Chosŏn commander, Kim Chajŏm, failed to heed the fire beacons, giving Manchu troops time to strike south before the court could respond. Even after the forces had crossed the Yalu River, word of the attack was slow to reach the capital as Qing soldiers had by then captured the messengers Kim Chajŏm had dispatched south. Consequently, this delayed King Injo’s retreat from the capital, cut off his escape routes, and forced him to Namhan Mountain Fortress, where he, elements of his military, and other officials— including Na Man’gap— retreated. Manchu emperor Hung Taiji anticipated King Injo’s attempt to seek safety again on Kanghwa Island, as Injo had done in 1627, and mocked the move as insufficient to save the kingdom.

INTRODUCTION The rapid strike and delayed announcement of the invasion l threatened a quick Manchu victory, provoking a sense of fear. The INTRODUCTION li n ŏ n dynasty would ŏ n and the remain Manchu would intact, n resistance dissipated by the day, as did n resistance the day, by dissipated ŏ n troops launched small assaults against the ŏ ŏ n. ŏ the food and other supplies for the and men their for horses.the and Man- other supplies food The surroundedchu the fortress in areas, most though small bands of familiar more were Koreans, withwho the terrain, secreted in and Namhan. of out Chos court, residing in now temporary quarters within Namhan Moun- tain Fortress, the understood precariousness the of situation. the Manchu fortress blockaded The and, after several weeks, began starving the Confronted seasoned defending forces. out by troops,Manchu Chos Manchu besiegers, finding success, some but the efficacy of these attacks on Manchu lines diminished. rapidly Discussion in the fortress turned negotiating to the Chos best terms surrender. of tary leaders, hoping to end the attacks, to provide some breath- letters Manchu to mili-bureaucrats a number sent some diplomatic of provide to attacks, the end to hoping leaders, tary troops the defending ing fortress, for space Manchu and probe to that court the contention hoped Korean of point major intent. The was the embarrassing resolve to King surrender terms and for Injo the crown in the prince. court various Factions to ways debated peace fac- letters, written diplomatic Early thesurrender. anti- by in respect-couched tion, assurances sought the from Manchu— that theful Chos diplomatic terminology— existcontinue to as a kingdom, the subordinate nature the of rela- betweentionship Chos and King and the be required Injo crown not prince would to the from the Manchu.emerge fortress before Requir- and kowtow ing was the a humiliation,king kowtow to the courtargued, in result continued animosity would which against the Manchu, Qing The undermining surrender. complete the Manchu hope for back down from theirleadership did not demands. insisted They that King and the Injo crown prince, rather than other officials, from theemerge fortress Continued and resistance surrender. to these terms, the the Manchu suffering replied, prolonged of the scale warfare against the and threatened full- people Korean Chos Na Man’gap was privy to many court debates on Chosŏn diplomatic overtures and defensive tactics. These discussions, while seeming to demand quick responses, strung out for days under threat from the Manchu military generals and the blockade of the fortress. The crisis that pushed King Injo into accepting the Man- chu demands was the defeat of Kanghwa Island and the kidnap- ping of the crown princess, other royal family members, and sadaebu officials and their families. In the early days of the attack, King Injo and the crown prince hoped to seek refuge on Kang- hwa Island. With their route to the island cut off by Manchu troops, the royal entourage proceeded to Namhan Mountain. Dat- ing back at least to the Koryŏ dynasty, kings, queens, and other royal family members retreated to Kanghwa Island when faced with invasions from the north. In 1234, when Mongol armies crossed the frontier to punish Koryŏ for the death of a Mongol emissary and for severing diplomatic ties with the newly rising Mongol empire, the court and the military leadership retreated to Kanghwa Island from Kaegyŏng, the dynastic capital, near modern-day Kaesŏng. On the island, the Koryŏ leadership successfully resisted Mongol demands to return to the mainland and dispatch the crown prince, as well as the sons and daughters of other court officials, to Beijing as an act of surrender. The Koryŏ court and the ruling military clan, on the other hand, simply refused to leave the island. With limited experience of amphibious warfare, given that their military skills had been developed on the steppe, far from the sea, the Mongols were unable to reach Kanghwa Island and secure complete submission. While the distance between Kanghwa Island and the mainland was geographically insignificant— they were within sight of each other—the seas around the island held some of the roughest and most powerful tidal changes in the region, especially before the introduction of dikes to control tidal surges. That said, with the

INTRODUCTION founding of the Yuan dynasty and with the help of Chinese and lii Koreans, the Mongols were able to launch two massive seaborne INTRODUCTION liii

ŏ court returned ŏ The Manchu may have been aware of this history. The 1637 1637 The this been aware of history. have Manchumay The invasions of Japan and one of Java. Most likely, Mongol leader- Mongol likely, Most Java. and of one Japan of invasions isolatingship the was court Korean Kanghwa on content Island assembling investing resources into timewithout or and launch- scale the of island. invasion Instead, ruled the Mongols ing a full- the peninsula decades, on horseback leaving for behind military detachments and returning with larger numbers after year year, devastating the countryside in an punish to attempt the Kory court. the Rather island, of than invasion against a coup a Mongol the ruling military Korean clan the ended stalemate. In the 1270s, after almost forty resistance, years of the Kory theto mainland and submitted With the the to Mongols. rise the of dynasty, the Kublai leader KhanYuan demanded the destruction theof temporary royal halls and residences constructed on the island as another act solidify to submission. attack against Kanghwa Island certain demonstrated military Manchu The the territory. Manchu of on Korean advancements possessed a better understanding amphibious warfare of and strategies on the necessary island, defenses Korean includ- defeat to ing Ming two former Chinese the to had defected generals who experiencedManchu and were in naval warfare. King had Injo retreated Kanghwa to IslandManchu attack, in the 1627 earlier and the court quickly Manchu mili- demands to under relented tary and political pressure, experiencing without a Manchu assault on the the island. swift In 1637, Manchu advance down the pen- the kinginsula prevented and crown prince reaching from Kang- For- while themforcing Namhan to Mountain Fortress— Island—hwa Mountain Namhan the retreated to at island.during the Westerners of the most invasion defenses diary describes others committing Man’gap’s Kim suicide. Na and location Sangyong famously himself blew up on a pile gunpowder. of The geographical resistant Manchu more to tress attacks proved than Kanghwa this thethe mountain island before well fell defenders time around— reported, almost allsurrendered. the Man’gap As Manchu of Na troops crossed the channel to Kanghwa Island on their initial assault— they “arrived like the wind.” Manchu strategy was to circumvent the towns and fortresses on the island and directly attack the royal compounds. Sensing imminent capture, commanders and officials on the island surrendered. The announcement of the capture spurred King Injo to immediately accept the Manchu demands. The suffering of royal family members as prisoners of war must have weighed heavily on King Injo and the crown prince. They also had to consider the added military threat to Namhan Mountain as the capture of Kanghwa Island freed up Manchu forces to concentrate on the fortress. With Namhan surrounded and Kanghwa Island under Man- chu control, King Injo had no other alternative but to concede and accept Qing demands, but now Chosŏn was in a less favorable position than before. The 1627 and 1637 surrenders differed con- siderably. The 1627 attack was meant to bring Korea into an alliance as a willing, albeit junior, partner. The 1636–1637 invasion punished Korea for reneging on their earlier promise and established a purely subservient relationship. Chosŏn officials were not required to carry out the more humiliating rite where the king was to emerge from the fortress with jade in his mouth while carry- ing an empty coffin, acts of both humility and courtesy, but the king and crown prince did have to exit the fortress and kowtow in front of the Manchu leaders. Further, the Manchu emperor demanded Chosŏn raise a stele to memorialize the defeat, another humiliating act intended to remind Chosŏn people of the invasion after the withdrawal of the Manchu armies. From the Manchu perspective, Korea was untrustworthy because of their actions— severing the bond of brotherhood formed in 1627 and realigning with the Ming— both of which slowed the Qing advance into China. Part of the 1637 surrender formalities punished Chosŏn by forcing monetary tribute. Korea had to accept a long and oner-

INTRODUCTION ous list of tributary demands to stop the Manchu army from raid- liv ing the country and taking the fortress. Several officials expressed INTRODUCTION lv n ŏ n elite families. Even court families. min-n elite Even ŏ n obedience the to Manchu. Manchu used The a ŏ In addition, as part of the surrender terms, senior- rankingIn men addition, as part the of surrender terms, senior- princes in Manchuria collaborated with the Manchu, others Manchu sentiment. In the about negotia- debates expressed anti- different lens to view these demands. HungTaiji dictated the families “all kingKorean ministers order of and inside out- that the marry relationship make ours good our to [to] the courtside . . . kidnapped Many leading children bureaucrats were of and solid.” taken Manchuria to as hostages. them Many of suffered tremen- dously. Some died in Manchu prisons. While some of the Chos significant anxiety consequences about the economic of the Qing demands. faction and their families, the Westerner of along with three princes, taken Manchuria were to while hostage other and held marriedprisoners were Manchu into clans. This hostage-taking ensured Chos tions for the hostages,tions members for the some court of desired a reduc- monetarytion of tributary demands, the official but Yu Kim his of own pocket, out a thousand gold pay, insisted would he hiswife and have to pieces daughter released. Other officials furious hiswere arguing offer, by that requesthis undermined that the send as tribute to country argument had little gold the payment. on thisensure compliance, the second invasion Man-To thethe crown of dispatch prince and his entou- demanded chu marriage ordered alliances Mukden, and to rage Taiji Hung between the Manchu and Chos sters were required to enter intorequired enter sters thesewere to alliances as part of the humil- appear surrenderdemands terms. Onsuch the hand, one iating, marriage as the provide had to partners subjugated people theto victorious Manchu. On the in other, Korea, this pattern of historical the roots from before well deeper had intermarriage 1630s. Marriage alliance was an of important building element among Northeast Asian and Eurasian tribes and From polities. Europe to East Asia,Western ruling members intermarried across large geographical areas. In the Silla case Korea, and of Koryŏ founders took daughters to help placate defeated regions. The marriage alliance between Kublai Khan of the Mongol Yuan and the Korean Koryŏ dynasty brought the two ruling courts closer together, guaranteeing cooperation and safety, especially regarding military expansion into China. The Manchu once again raised the importance of marriage alliances to the Chosŏn. The relationship between the Manchu and Korea did not develop as deeply as in the Mongol era, when the crown prince married the daughter of the emperor, lived in Bei- jing with the imperial family, and raised children there until called to Korea upon the death of his father, the king. Four centuries later, marriage alliances remained a custom for securing peace in Northeast Asia, but the pattern of those alliances shifted away from the royal family to other leading families in Seoul. The daughter of one elite yangban was chosen as a concubine for Hung Taiji. She, and her father, helped relieve some of the rice tax tribute the Qing demanded of the Chosŏn. From the Manchu perspective, what Na and others perceived as humiliating surrender rituals, including the dispatch of the crown prince and other powerful officials, were practical acts that would solidify strong relations between the two countries. The Diary of 1636 also functions as a sourcebook illustrating Chosŏn and Manchu military tactics. The Chosŏn court mobi- lized able-bodied men to defend the country against the Manchu, including Buddhist monks, Japanese expatriates— presumably captured along the Korean coasts or elderly Japanese soldiers captured during the Imjin War— and slaves. The majority of the Chosŏn army consisted of troops from the capital guard and regional soldiers. All were ill-prepared for the Manchu assault, despite the government program to better train and prepare troops for an anticipated attack. Some units and individuals fought well, as Na narrates, but the Manchu forces, which included large num-

INTRODUCTION bers of experienced Jurchen and Mongol troops, overpowered lvi the Korean military within a matter of days. Korea’s long coastline INTRODUCTION lvii n society. Inthe n society. ŏ n countered by set- n countered by n had needed a flex- n had needed ŏ ŏ n defenses, the level of of n defenses, the level ŏ also contributes an to understanding of n dynasty, the Chos ŏ Diary of 1636 of Diary Written during andWritten the expanded siege in the aftermath of proved to be a military to theproved Koreans. disadvantage Since the for the Chos of founding ible army to defend the against coast hav- army andible defend therefore to piracy, ing significantnumbers of military personnelat to ready fightthe armiesmassive attacking the from north part was their not of the construction included defenses mountain of Korea’s strategy. defen- maintaining than rather country the throughout fortresses from the lines place along the an If took frontier. invasion sive north, the strategy the of population retreat as to to much was for safety within the fortified mountain areas. Once the peoplewere within the fortress, the military was the have the to idea wait for pass to and the then from enemy fortress emerge and attack from the Because rear. ascending these mountains was difficult,defending straightforward. them was relatively knew Koreans their country and easily well and entered exited these mountain fortresses. this But turned strategy be a poor to out as the fortresses and far few between too and often had insufficientwere supplies. encir- entailed Fortress Mountain Namhan on attack the of Part with barricade.cling it Manchu a wooden metal added The plates alerted noise along Koreans the whose to Manchu fence soldiers attempting to cross over the barricades to attack or to escape. TheManchu around also part a moat dug the of perimeter the of fence, consuming time- crossing more made lineswhich even the siege the troops. Korean and for Chos dangerous face of defeat and the collapse of Chos of collapse the and defeat of face crime and punishment times at war of in Chos ting partsthe barricade of on fire response.in Another military like cart. horse– Trojan wastactic a wooden the Manchu deployed Other the successful repeated operations involved Manchu siege of attacks the walls squads the soldiers, over deployment by of heavy cannon fire into compound,the waiting simply and and starving the out. defenders Na’s defeat, punishment the Korean court and military officials unleashed on Korean commanders and foot soldiers was heavy. Flogging was common for crimes such as the failure to carry out military com- mands. Execution was also ordered when soldiers contradicted or ignored superior officers or attempted to deceive the court. One such story of deception is relayed in the diary. As an example of the way some soldiers deceived the court, Na Man’gap suggested monetary rewards be given to troops who cut off the ears of enemy men to help motivate troop morale. One soldier was executed when officials discovered that a head carried back from the battlefield turned out to be that of a fellow comrade. Also, according to Na, military officers and scholarly officials recurrently had their posts shuffled. Sometimes this was out of necessity, to cover for the death of an officer, for example; at other times it was to provide incentives through promotion or other inducements to men who would agree to attack the Manchu. The positive impact this had on the campaign appeared negligible, and the frequent reorganization of official titles seemed to have the opposite effect and slow military decision- making. In short, the rigid Con- fucian military and scholarly bureaucracy was unprepared to respond to the shifting military tactics of the Manchu. Na recounts much of the immediate political fallout from the attack and the surrender during the year 1636–1637. He relates how the Qing did not wish to meddle in Chosŏn internal politics. They permitted the continued presence of Japanese traders at the Japan House in Tongnae, Pusan, for instance, hoping to use the Chosŏn relationship with the Japanese as a means to open communication with Tokugawa. However, the Manchu demanded restitution for the delay in attacking the Ming, calling on the court to punish those Chosŏn officials who had advocated for war. Na Man’gap expressed interest in discussing the anti- peace and pro- peace political factions and made no attempt to hide his disdain for ŏ INTRODUCTION certain officials. Ch’oe My nggil was one such official who was a lviii target of Na’s contempt. Ch’oe, one of the central figures of the INTRODUCTION lix n dynasty con- nggil.” He alsonggil.” He n dynasty could ŏ ŏ ŏ n dynasty. Hwisang Cho ŏ ngjing, the prosecuting officialof thewho capital ŏ Like in other diaries the of Manchu wars, appear emotions events of 1636– 1637, was advocating the a practi- leading voice 1637, 1636– of events cal, realistic the to Qing. approach was He the firstto call on the the to Manchu frontlines,king envoy a peace an dispatch to that earnedapproach him the enmity those hardline of officials advocating war againstthe the Ming. of Manchu and Na defense cunningnesslike My of the “rat- despised Man’gap blamed Kim Ky have survived if it had only maintained its alliance with the East No Mingis counterproductive. Asian withstand could polity the theManchu, Chinese. even not is understandable Of course, it that witnessed those who and survived looked surrender the 1637 scapegoats, in was trying exception and no for Na blame. lay to the of political thatMuch debate erupted in the aftermath the of especially the character attacks against the officialssurrender— resistedwho the with presented Manchu when and a copy who, revolved the at court— the up surrender document,of it tore blame. around especially work, describing when resistance,throughout Na’s sur- and blame. Diariesrender, like this the to expres- are conducive their because highly of emotions of personalsion nature and their painful subject appears It that matter. in the Chos assumed Kanghwa command of Island during the retreat rapid from Seoul. While Kim was accusations corrupt and selfish, Na’s military of unfair a multitude from resulted were and as the defeat and indi- one after blame political before decisions the attack. To the mili- the Given events. of the complexities vidual overlooks tary the of Manchu, power arguing that the Chos veying emotions was an acceptable form of historical writing. writing. historical of form acceptable an was emotions veying is another historiography through emotion lens The of to which during courtgauge politics the Chos thatposits emotional expressions through the written petition sys- in alike, elite a war words become of andtem, the non- elite by the thewhich of king the suppress used power the help system to Confucian bureaucracy. One drawback was that it would “exag- gerate trivial squabbles into serious problems” through the power of emotive language. But if, as Cho argues, “emotional expressions, even if they were excessive, were justified and even honored if they dovetailed with such Confucian values as loyalty and filial piety,” then Na’s diary perfectly demonstrates these values.64 Through the lens of emotion, Na’s sense of loss, suffering, and pain surfaces throughout the diary and constructs a narrative of blame to explain the humiliating surrender. The litany of hardships recorded in the diary is extensive: blaming officials for underreported causality figures; listing the officials who exagger- ated the reports of victories by Chosŏn forces; and detailing how troops deceived the court by collecting dead bodies of comrades and claiming they were the enemy for rewards. In highly emotive language, Na blames the prosecuting official Kim Kyŏngjing directly and indirectly for his immoral actions on Kanghwa Island. Na wrote in defense of the king, guarding him from accusations of incompetence while blaming anyone other than Injo. Officials emotively asserted that King Injo had no knowledge of their anti- Manchu agenda, most likely an attempt to shield him from blame and hope that this excuse satisfied the Manchu enough to withdraw. The official Yi Sŏnggu clearly blamed Kim Sanghŏn, who destroyed the draft letter of surrender, for the failure of the initial peace negotiations. Yi called on him personally to surrender to the Manchu and accept blame. Kim understood the gravity of his actions. Out of fear of punishment or despair for the Manchu victory, he refused to eat. Na’s accusations against all of these “villains” were based on emotions. While the decisions of Kim Sanghŏn and other anti- peace officials brought the Manchu back to the Chosŏn, the actions of other individuals led to the suffering and hardship of the king, his family, and the Korean people. The Diary of 1636 is a record of the epistolary battle between ŏ INTRODUCTION Chos n and the Manchu. The diplomatic correspondence and the lx exchange of letters during the peace negotiations was not only for INTRODUCTION lxi n, in ret- ŏ n was a coun- ŏ n— which they n leaders arguedn leaders ŏ ŏ , and other works , and other works n may have claimed have n may ŏ Analects of Confucius of Analects , n dynasty the from Chos Japanese. ŏ Great Learning Great , While this was a major military defeat for theWhilethis Chos military for was a major defeat the sincerity their Confucian of and heritage linkages the to Ming, especially regarding the the helping Ming owed obligation for the Chos save practical purposes, as a means discuss providing such to surren- fight to both also sides became it with paper for a way but rice der, and brushes. than diary The fewer no ten letters records exchanged during the invasion. explain attempted Each to side position its basedon moral Confucian high ground. Chos claimed was an un- Confucian characteristic— and the building Confucian characteristic—claimed was an un- militaryof and the defenses capture land along the of and people northern a country of suggestive of frontier were knowledgeable Confucian court deploying at was Korean adept sym- The war. denigration and historical jus- to references bolism, including self- try scholarship of dispatch that Korean know war, one did not argued, while another court letter suggested the main reason for Qing anger from emerged a misunderstanding history of and Confucian dictates. Manchu letters such responded The to force- arguingfully, that the the of Chos duplicity rospect, the invasion of 1636– 1637 was not as was militarily not 1637 damag- rospect, 1636– the of invasion on philosophy and moral values that China, Korea, Japan, and and Japan, China, that Korea, values moral and philosophy on the Man- but scholarshipVietnam for and adopted governance), chu, through their interpreters and letter writers, an equal proved challenging in their written Korea of responses. war proved on the The battlefield, letters, of exchange the through also fought as powerful surmount. Manchu were to with The the Korea for brush as with they were the sword. tify actions. its seem surprising may What is the deftness and complexity of Manchu-Qing responses. Chos ing and less material saw destruction than inva- the Japanese assertsalthough Na 1598— in 1592– sions during the War Imjin greater Confucian legitimacy based lengthy its on history of engaging with like the books Confucian were Classics (these Mencius otherwise because of his own experiences in 1637, and he did not witness the war with Japan. Politically, however—and Na’s diary speaks to this—the invasion of 1636–1637 was much more destructive. During the Imjin War, the country united against the Japanese, while in the case of the Manchu, the Korean bureaucracy and army split. Many officials remained devoted to the Ming, while civil and military leaders argued that the country should support the Manchu. Compared to the Imjin War, the Manchu wars, while not as physically destructive, were devastating in terms of politics and national morale. The Imjin War did not change Chosŏn politics, though it did wash away all of the earlier objections Chosŏn literati held against the Ming, such as their criticism for Ming support of Wang Yangming Neo- Confucian thought or Korean resentment against Ming tribute demands. The Manchu wars, on the other hand, were so rapid and were conducted with such a small and nimble military— which moved quickly in and out of Korea— that Chosŏn appeared to have been struck by lightning. Unlike the Japanese in the Imjin War, the Manchu stopped once they captured the Chosŏn capital, signaling defeat. These rapid invasions severed Korean contact with the Ming on both occasions. After the first oath of allegiance was broken, the reprisal of the second invasion was more consequential. All of the princes in line for the throne and the sons of leading officials were transported back with the Man- chu as hostages. They were released later, but by then these people had established connections and lines of communication with the Manchu, learned their customs and politics, and sometimes even the language. To some, this was a positive result and a way to further communications with the Manchu, but others thought that these hostages were too closely aligned with the Manchu and could pose a threat. What Chosŏn defeat meant for China, Korea’s direct neighbor, was evident. The Manchu were an ascending

INTRODUCTION power in Northeast Asia, heralding the end of the revered Ming lxii INTRODUCTION lxiii n politics n politics ŏ began writ- n from “late” ŏ n dynasty. This ŏ yangban In heightened ways, the wars fueled ways, the wars fueled In heightened 65 n distinctiveness. Manchu rulership The of ŏ n government produced a document not intended for for intended a document not produced n government ŏ n Legacies of the Manchu Wars ofn Legacies the Manchu n. These included then. rise the included These vernacular of lan- Korean ŏ ŏ The Manchu’s delegitimization China of as ruler a foreign Manchu’s The stim- In several important ways, a key the marked Manchu invasions Chos “early” separating history, Korean in date Chos and thetransformation Northeast of Asia and Chos and society. ulated late Chos late ulated glorification China began turning from the away over- Koreans Chineseof civilization them on internal focus and to encouraged instead. Society begandevelopments opening and up broadening throughout culture: artists began depicting a wider segmentof and groups than other society, male elite public notice,public the material was in dated the Ming reign year. political intrigue and struggles as in the decades that followed continuedWesterners to exert influence Western-over the court. of maps used they Ming; the to ers’ the resentment of Manchu persisted after well 1644, as is evi- affinity cultural their in denced Ming China and continued use the to Ming calendar dating, a for rejectionsymbol Qing of the imperial of Westerners’ rule. When Chos the Chos guage, and military calls economic for reforms, and shifting political in identities the the wake Manchu of one, wars. earlier For unityJapanese among ruling circles during the War Imjin anti- fractured with the Manchu disagreement response to impe- over rial aspirations. Manchu subjugation The and of the Qing defeat the Ming had lasting the consequences Chos for event transformedevent the political Korean landscape, and scholars still discuss impact its today. ing their personal stories. Genre paintings one daily were life of example of this. Vernacularization of the written language was another. Very early on, Korea borrowed literary Chinese writing and used it for government documents, scholarship, and poetry, as it was thought to represent a civilized society, one centered in an ancient Chinese past steeped in Confucian learning. While some women learned to use literary Chinese, especially in the houses of the elite, it was a gendered script, mostly used by a small percentage of the male yangban who had the time and wealth to learn to read and write it. In general, women were not given the opportunity to learn literary Chinese. After the invention of the vernacular script in the fifteenth century, later known asHangul , Korean monks relied upon it for the translation of Buddhist sutras and poems. Women learned the vernacular and began writing in it, while men learned it but also continued to use literary Chinese. Little had been composed in the vernacular up through the early seventeenth century, but, right around the time of the Manchu wars, this began to change and writers began composing more and more in Hangul. Around the same period in Western Europe and other parts of Eurasia, similar patterns of vernacularization appear in novels, a trend that also occurred in Korea.66 In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, more and more works in the vernacular were written, such as novels by Kim Manjung (1637– 1692), a writer of popular fiction who composed Cloud Dream of the Nine (Kuunmong) and Record of Lady Sa’s Southward Journey (Sassi namjŏnggi). Both tales take place in China and have complex plots and characters. Other literary works retold the hardships of the Imjin War and the Manchu attacks.67 This was the beginning of a rich tradition of writing novels in the vernacular and translating popular Chinese litera- ture into the Korean language. In the wake of the invasion, visible scars on the landscape and the immediate memory of the violence fueled antipathy toward

INTRODUCTION the Manchu. The Manchu Wars hit certain parts of the country lxiv harder than others. The north suffered the brunt of the destruction INTRODUCTION lxv n terri- Earlier, Earlier, ŏ 68 p reforms p reforms ŏ n, fractured ŏ n (1612– 1645), was 1645), n (1612– ŏ p, or the Great Equalization the Great p, or Law. ŏ n polity. At the time the Manchu of invasion, threen polity. ŏ nggi Province in 1608 and then in other provinces, provinces, other in then 1608 and in nggi Province p was a heavy but innovative taxationp was innovative a heavy but system that led ŏ ŏ The policy of deference to the Ming, complicated by the rise the by to Ming, complicated deference of policy The princes were alive, two of whom grew militarily whom alive, twoprinces of were hostile toward the Manchu. Crown oldest, Prince The Sohy unleashed the changes, time Korean steady to led for a prosperous eighteenth century. and an orderly economy, theof Manchu and their two attacks on the Chos Ming officialsandwho those grew sympa- betweenrelations pro- thetic the to Manchu. clashes These reached the echelons upper of the Chos Korea into a period of economic growth economic a period of into cen- in the seventeenth Korea in contrast the to stagnation economic tury, the of sixteenth century. and As as controversial revolutionizing the plan was, agree so they began not on turningpoliticians could law, into it enactingby the in various reforms regions across the dynasty, Ky in first until the plan was fully established throughout the Chos tory one hundred years later. Like the pro- war and pro- peace peace war and pro- Liketory hundred one the years later. pro- the spurred law and political dis- tensions 1637, indebates 1636– putes. While controversial, the the Taedongb forces disposed collaborate with to he Korea, the Qing. While outside on expeditionswent with Manchu generals and accompanied Qing military is that campaigns. the One possibility his involvement for during the 1637 battles, but King Injo’s decision to surrender less- to decision during the battles, 1637 King but Injo’s ened the military impact and on the the people land. lead- Korean the the to Manchu—ers their the understood cause defeat of root a national lack of surplus and the cash necessary military for theypreparations. when began Scholars the enact- solution found ing the Taedongb King Kwanghaegun had begun the changes to implementing revenue system, continued which in the aftermath the of Manchu enabled reform the attacks. revenue plan for This economic in taxes, money collect more to permittinggovernment eco- The and a diversificationof the economy. development nomic Taedongb Manchu hoped to nurture a special relationship with the future king to cement relations between the two countries, connections the Manchu had fostered with Koreans in the past, like Kang Hong- nip and other Chosŏn military men following their surrender to the Jurchen- Manchu in 1619. After the Manchu captured Beijing in 1644, Sohyŏn grew interested in Catholicism after meeting the famous Jesuit Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666), but little is known about their encounter. When Sohyŏn returned to Seoul in 1645, he brought back religious scriptures, novelty Western items, servants, and eunuchs from the former Ming court, some of whom had converted to Catholicism. Probably the most knowledgeable Korean on Catholicism at the time, Sohyŏn, who was under suspicion for his pro- Manchu ties, died mysteriously six weeks after returning to the capital. All of his Chinese servants were repatriated to Beijing. Perhaps the West- erner faction members felt threatened by the close relationship he had built with the Manchu, and the idea that Sohyŏn was to become king while holding a strong pro-Manchu, pro-Catholic stance was too great a threat to the ruling elite in Seoul. When Korean princes stirred trouble, the state could do little against their misconduct because of their royal status. For non- royalty, crimes such as treason impacted the whole family. The accused were executed, their wives and daughters were dispersed and made into slaves or commoners, and family property was con- fiscated. Because officially accusing Sohyŏn of treason was difficult, his punishment may have been carried out in a secreted manner.69 Crown Prince Sohyŏn died in bed, but very little source material remains as many of the records of the events surrounding his death are missing. The Westerners blamed the Manchu, but most likely the political implications of his potential rulership were so threatening that he was assassinated. The death of Crown Prince Sohyŏn undercut Manchu designs ŏ INTRODUCTION for closer relations with the Chos n court, exacerbating an anti- lxvi Qing sentiment that echoed throughout subsequent reigns. King INTRODUCTION lxvii ). The Korean hostages held hostages held Korean ). The l ŏ n— and had not been put through been put and had not n— pukp ŏ n freedom from the from n freedom Qing, were who ŏ Ordinary Confucian that the views king when held died, a from 1637 until 1644— individuals King began Hyojong to mobi- until 1637 from 1644— the strike,lize for party including royal princes and Westerner Ming and the led charge against pro- heatedly were members— the Manchu. While the king thought an attack be success- could ful, his northern strike materialized, never and his great army death after in 1659, a short reign, came be.never to Hyojong’s was the state. As experi- for soon as died, he omen a good Korea not theenced devastatingmost political crisis the seventeenth of century. a certain mourningperiod of take for had to place number of years, depending on the time king’s as principal ruler and his posi- the wastion King in first not the of royal family. Hyojong son Hyojong (1619– 1659; r. 1649– 1659), King1659; r. 1649– second Injo’s Hyojong oldest (1619– son, ascended thethrone harboring against resentment the Manchu after suffering captivity Mukden. in After relations with the Qing settled and hostages returned and he others Korea, dreamed to raised was not King as the revenge. Hyojong crownof prince— Sohy brother unlike his older loyalists. Ming pro- fighting China southern in down bogged the militaryPlanning develop to and designed he exact revenge, Ming Chinese and a strategy pro– were contact who to Koreans coordinated a militarycampaign against the Manchu in the 1670s, dubbed the “northern strike” ( the training rigors of and him education, had provided which while mobility ingreater Manchuria of freedom as a hostage. After Chinese and some returning spoke he captivity, Manchu from Manchu and experienced had firsthand of countriesoutside the knowl- an kings experience Korean that had— few Korea— his mind. broadened which of His reignedge was stable and politically secure, realized he but the military rebuilding needed to mili- the of supporter avid an As country. the defend effectively wastary, King on using intent the his army Hyojong defeat to Manchuand win back Chos King Injo but his second, and this unusual situation spurred a crisis over the question of mourning: how long should the queen dowager, his stepmother, mourn her deceased stepson? The West- erners argued Hyojong should not be granted the full three-year mourning period and instead just one year, but the Southerners argued three years were required. Even though the Southern- ers were not in power and the Westerners dominated the government at this time, the Southerners still held some influence over the bureaucracy, reasoning that King Hyojong had been a full king and had succeeded as the second son of his father. Some ritual prescriptions stipulated that a second son should have a three-year mourning period. The argument of the illustrious scholar Yun Hyu (1617–1680), the leader of the South- erner party, was overtly political and asserted the legitimacy of the king. Hyojong, he averred, should be honored with a full three- year mourning period— the greater number of years would strengthen the morale of the state. The king, a national figure, was legitimized by heaven itself and through his struggle against the Manchu. The debate, which raged for over a year, ended with the triumph of the Westerners, who won the first round, but their opponents won the second.70 The victory for the Western- ers enhanced their power over Hyojong’s royal successor, but resulted in intense political fallout and a determined political struggle for the next thirty to forty years. While factionalism predates the Manchu Wars of the 1620s and 1630s, the invasions gave these factions new material to argue over. Debates— led by anti- Manchu political groups such as the Westerners over the minutia of Confucian ritual—intensified in the late seventeenth century. Responding to the founding of the Qing, Chosŏn grew more concerned about Confucian norms than other countries, including the Qing. Confucianism extolled, as the greatest virtue, unity with the ruler and, theoretically, called for

INTRODUCTION harmonious behavior over loyalty to a king or national polity. lxviii Korean Confucians argued against subjective understanding, INTRODUCTION lxix

fam- yang- sadaebu yangban claiming to be from yangban n parties’ politi- of extreme displays ŏ n court debates as unproductive issues of issues of n courtas unproductive debates ŏ ) shaped the political center, in which the in which fam-) shaped the political center, n society. ŏ n dynasty. By the nineteenth century, power poli- By the nineteenthn dynasty. power century, ngch’i ŏ ŏ sedo ch families a select number official competing of for positions— The Manchu Wars continued through reverberate to Manchu the Wars The end such as the Ming- era Chinese scholarship of Wang Yangming era Chinese Yangming scholarship Wang of as thesuch Ming- individualistic too seemed who in his Confucian1529), (1472– writings. Confu- these Despite thecalls over unity, debates for cian ritual serious matters. were scholarship Korean usually self- critiques these Chos “factionalism.” Chos The cal infighting of struggle and the was representative power for proximity the to king, in had resulted which parties and clans having powerful in positions Seoul. Seoul many to was home ban less than two located thousand in were the jobs government ranking practical and involved low- capital, were which of most as century, importance. the By political seventeenth little of work the dynasty matured, thenumber of powerful these clans while of most grew fam- steadily; however, ilies had land, growth they prestige. The had no of ilies coincided with fightingilies coincided increased of political bouts between parties. of the Chos tics ( tics central the Kim elite, Andong family began assert to their domi- usingnation their by relationship the to throne all control to appointments, especially state council members. This and other the changing of powerfulpolitically families examples were structure Chos late of ily of the of ily queen obtained a strong tracing dominant by position their legitimacy actions in their anti- the to back family’s 1637 was 1834) of Manchu 1800– struggle. King wife of The (r. Sunjo the Andong Kim the backbone “Old family, the or of Noron, Manchu. Because of anti-Doctrine” intensely were who party, the martyrsthey had gained in their family, political success in the the A powerful family thatcountry. grew in dominant Seoul— base of theirand national became power— part of the One of the most visible displays of the Manchu influence on later Chosŏn politics were the shrines constructed for the Ming. The Westerners had suffered much at the hands of the Manchu and took it as a matter of faith that they owed their existence to the Ming for helping the Chosŏn dynasty win the Imjin War. The scholar and leader of the Westerner party, Song Siyŏl, and other Westerners believed that the Wanli Emperor (r. 1572–1620), the Ming leader who had personally intervened to dispatch troops to save Korea, deserved a special shrine. The Mandongmyo Shrine, constructed in 1707 in Ch’ungch’ŏn Province, symbolized the continued reverence Chosŏn held for the Ming while keeping alive the burning memory of the 1637 Manchu invasion. Another shrine, the Altar of Great Gratitude (Taebodan), was erected on the royal palace grounds in 1704. These shrines, built of the Chosŏn’s own volition, were displays of Korean dedication to China, established rituals memorializing a foreign power. The Chosŏn state held regular services at both locations from the early eighteenth century through the nineteenth century, when they became the subject of a major political debate. Orthodox Neo- Confucian leaders continued the upkeep of the shrines and the performance of the rituals in the royal palace until 1894.71 While these shrines and their rituals inhibited the relationship with the Manchu to a certain extent, the Qing dynasty was not overly domineering regarding such symbolism by then, because it had grown to trust the court to follow their lead. Na Man’gap’s The Diary of 1636 narrates the violent beginnings of what turned into a strong relationship that lasted until the Qing (like the Ming) waged war against Japan, over the Chosŏn, in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). However, unlike the Ming war, this conflict had a very different outcome. The Westerners faction continued to condemn the Qing in an era when the Chosŏn dynasty had prospered and had benefited from the stability Qing

INTRODUCTION rulers had brought to China and the strong economic relationship lxx INTRODUCTION lxxi n ŏ n had built a n had built ŏ n dynasty, the Chos ŏ n dynasty the under modern impact of in 1910, ŏ held withheld the Ming two revered decades by and formally ended Chos the with imperialism, violence, of forms and colonialism. Located twenty- five kilometers south of of Seoul,Namhan south five kilometers Moun- Located twenty- tain discusses Fortress, that Na a place in great detail in his diary, is a popular destination hikers, for bikers, mountain climbers, and subways,sightseers. is easily accessible It through South Korea’s buses, and highways, and in is frequently tourist guide- mentioned the north, view of an the impressive fortressdelivers books. To constel- breathtaking a night— at especially cityscape, Seoul the lights, of lation skyscrapers, bridges, roadways, and various air- crafts is a It flying view that overhead. highlights peace the and position a far cry Korea’s from today, prosperity South Korea of Namhan Mountain Fortress Namhan that had developed with the Qingthat developed had in the In eighteenth century. Qing threatened Korea. trib-Qing longer no the Manchu-reality, only a fraction demands were theute what Ming of had required. best interest, but was what in Korea’s idea had no Westerners The convincing thethem benefits of of the Qing, as harkened they was century, a chal- the seventeenth of the Wars to Manchu back By the thelenge. end of Chos sensible, civil relationship with the Qing, a relationship that regional to and Korea global influences,opened good both and Qingbad. The capital contact served Korean as the for gateway science and Catholicism,with including Western as the well West, the growing of Europeans of andas knowledge presence other tradingoutsiders the with Qing of in China. defeat Japanese The and in ushered new worldview centered 1895 the ended China- Qing. relationship The that the Manchu- eventuallyforces toppled that began outlasted with in the 1637 special violence bond Chos in the winter of 1637, when Chosŏn troops clung to the mountain ridges and walls defending the court from the Manchu attacks below. The most impressive view of Namhan Mountain is from Seoul. Looking south from virtually any spot in the capital that is unob- structed by high- rise buildings, one can see the mountain in the distance, rising nearly 1,650 feet (500 meters) above the city, which explains why this mountain was recognized as an important defensive site. From the earliest indigenous societies on the peninsula, and from the Three Kingdoms era (circa the sixth century CE) to the Koryŏ dynasty (918– 1392), the mountain played a defensive role several times. Its importance magnified dramatically when the Chosŏn dynasty established its new capital in nearby Seoul at the beginning of the fifteenth century. In Chosŏn times, writers composed a myriad of essays and poems about Namhan Mountain Fortress, extolling its beauty and defensive nature.72 Following the Imjin War, King Kwanghaegun expanded and fortified the fortress defenses, a task King Injo extended in 1624. Thick battlement walls, roughly five meters high and twelve kilometers long, encircle an area of more than two hundred million square meters, a suitable space for government and military buildings and the temporary compounds of the court in times of war and invasion. The mountain’s height and terrain made it a natural choice for both a defensive position and a quickly reachable hideout for officials in the capital. Even for those who knew the terrain, the journey across the Han River south and up the steep hillsides and rocky crevices was rough, whether one was on foot, on horseback, or in a palanquin. For invading foot soldiers and cavalry units uncertain of the area, the path was formidable. Man- chu troops assaulted the fortress but never succeeded in captur- ing it. From 1910 to 1945, the Japanese colonial government

INTRODUCTION neglected Namhan, while during the Korean War (1950– 1953), lxxii stray bombs and shells damaged the fortress. The Park Chung INTRODUCTION lxxiii high- Diary Na’s Na’s 75 on to theon to environmental move- n in the minds rising in of powers ŏ should be celebrated as be celebrated a victory should over helps in this reimagining by breathing life life breathing by reimagining this in helps The transformation The like Namhan sites of Moun- 76 While the country the transforms While around it, Namhan 74 Diary of 1636 of Diary The Diary 1636The of Namhan remains in the popular imagination through 73 The rethinkingThe Namhan of as a cultural is part the site of long The transformation of historically painful sights into places of remains steady. Manchu invasion. Na 1637 reimaginingprocess of the 1636– Man’gap’s and humanizing events andinto died on fought who the people been a humiliating have may surrender 1637 both The sides. as critics argued,defeat, have and transmis- the composition but of sion since departed. long thatthe have forces ment. the preservers of Korean cultural memory, thus legitimizing his his designated the fortress1979) as a cultural legitimizing Hee government (1961– thus memory, that the and idea were he his convey government to cultural site heritage Korean of preservers the popularity fortress’s as a cultural The Korea. South of rule des- Site Heritage withsymbol the exploded UNESCO World ignation in 2014. While summarizing the history the of Namhan area, the application spotlighted the natural the beauty of mountain and important its contributi works of fiction of works Koreanand films of depictheroism that the national boost to helped stories that and have images defenders— intime a society when has patriotism— and Southpride Korean changedrapidly of through, the forces and been threatened by, globalism. lights the importance of Chos of importance lights the tain is part a wider pattern recreating of of history make to it economically important as as well providing another symbol of Nam- identification such as The heritage sites of national identity. tourism and turnshan promotes these areas history and even Northeast Asia and gives voice to the to Asia many individuals andNortheast in voice gives the of some status, and low andelite Manchu— Korean fortress— domestic anddomestic international recognition step is one in reclaiming a traumatic past. whom were often overlooked in history. often overlooked were whom itself into a commodity to be packaged, sold, bought, and con- sumed. Simultaneously, such designations raise awareness in the public sphere and among scholars, and thereby promote critical debates among specialists about the role private and gov- ernmental groups play in creating heritage tourism.77 As Lauren Rivera notes, “Management of the past is thus not only a matter of national cohesion but also an international and economic affair.”78 The South Korean government has reimagined the difficult past of the fortress by reframing the debate around patriotism, nationalism, and self-sacrifice. These values are under- standably important, given Korea’s twentieth-century history with Japanese colonialism, the political division of Korea into North and South, both Koreas’ experiences with the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, and the disastrous Korean War (1950–1953). While the 1636–1637 invasion is often viewed negatively, the site of this reputation-damaging event has become an important part of South Korea’s national heritage. Reading Na’s Diary of 1636 gives us unique ways of thinking about the mountain and the historical heritage of South Korea and its place in the region and beyond. INTRODUCTION lxxiv