The Complex Dynamics of the Catalan Independence Movement
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Crameri, K. (2015) Political power and civil counterpower: the complex dynamics of the Catalan independence movement. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21(1). pp. 104-120. Copyright © 2015 Taylor & Francis, LLC A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge Content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s) When referring to this work, full bibliographic details must be given http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/101014 Deposited on: 16 March 2015 Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk Political Power and Civil Counterpower: The Complex Dynamics of the Catalan Independence Movement Abstract Civil pro-independence associations are playing an increasingly significant role in Catalonia’s independence movement, putting pressure on the Catalan government to work decisively towards independence. This has led many Catalans to characterize the movement as a “bottom-up” phenomenon. This contribution analyses the shifting power dynamics within mainstream Catalan nationalism over the last decade, challenging simplistic notions of “top-down” and “bottom-up” pressures for change. In fact, the movement is now inherently multidimensional – partly thanks to the pivotal role of the cultural elites and their grasp of the power of new media – and this in itself accounts in large part for its success. Catalan nationalism has historically concerned itself with Catalonia’s place within Spain, but this stateless nation has recently seen a momentous shift towards mass support for independence. This has now gone so far as to become what Viva Ona Bartkus would define as a “secession crisis”, meaning that support for secession is widespread enough to have forced the Spanish government to react to Catalan demands – if only by a determined refusal to grant them any legitimacy.1 The reasons for this sudden crisis are complex and it is not my intention to address them here.2 Instead, the focus of this contribution is on the remarkable role now being played by civil groups in the independence movement. Civil associations have been the principal protagonists at key moments in the evolution of Catalonia’s recent progress towards majority support for secession. For example, on 10 July 2010, a million people participated in a demonstration in Barcelona in support of Catalonia’s new Statute of Autonomy, which had been the subject of an unfavorable ruling by Spain’s Constitutional Court. On 11 September 2012 (Catalonia’s national day), that figure was beaten by a march – this time for independence – that is estimated to have drawn 1.5 million.3 Even larger numbers participated in events organized to mark the same day in 2013 and 2014. All of these activities were coordinated by civil groups, as – in the end – was the unofficial vote on independence held on 9 November 2014. 1 Apart from these grand-scale events, the civil contribution to pro-independence activism has also included lipdubs, flashmobs, concerts, traditional cultural events, websites, videos, books and international publicity campaigns. There is no doubt that the success and visibility of these activities are a testament to the strong feelings of many Catalans in favor of Catalonia’s “right to decide”. The dynamism of these civil groups has led many Catalans to characterize the independence movement as a “bottom-up” phenomenon (as opposed, for example, to a “top-down” Scottish equivalent).4 Furthermore, it is assumed that the apparent “radicalization” of Catalonia’s main nationalist party Convergència i Unió (CiU, Convergence and Union) since 2012 is substantially attributable to civil pressure. 5 The major partner in the CiU federation – Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya – has certainly shifted from a long-standing tendency to respond positively to territorial accommodation, to an explicitly pro- independence position. Nevertheless, as Richard Gillespie reminds us in the introduction to this collection, nationalist political parties “place emphasis on changing strategic options at different times and in different contexts”.6 However difficult it might appear for CiU to step off the path to independence at this point, the party’s historical desire for accommodation within the Spanish state remains part of its identity, and may re-surface if circumstances change. Similarly, however useful the label “bottom-up” may appear as a shorthand way of referring to the rise of the civil independence movement in Catalonia, it may actually obscure as much as it reveals. Manuel Castells reminds us that all power networks are in fact multidimensional and reliant on “the interactive production of meaning”.7 We therefore need to be alert to the complex mechanisms by which this production of meaning occurs. The aim of this contribution is therefore to examine the place and influence of civil associations within the overall drive for Catalan independence. It begins with a brief analysis of the shifts that have taken place in the last decade, during which independence has unexpectedly come to dominate the political agenda thanks to a change in the focus of Catalan nationalism that can be attributed both to the political elites and to an ever-growing subset of Catalan civil society. In trying to unravel the networks of influence that have come to propel the Catalan polity towards a clash with the Spanish state, the discussion 2 also considers the role of the cultural elites, since their ability to articulate the arguments for independence and to disseminate these through both traditional and new media has been central to the success of the civil pro-independence movement. The Shifting Dynamics of Catalan Nationalism Studies of nationalist movements generally stress the role of intellectual and political elites in formulating nationalist projects, for which they then recruit supporters from different parts of society.8 The study of Catalan nationalism has been no different, painting it as primarily a bourgeois phenomenon that has depended on the intellectual elites at times when Catalonia had no autonomous government of its own, and on the political elites since the re-establishment of the Catalan parliament in 1980.9 Certainly, the twenty-three year period of government by Jordi Pujol and CiU from 1980-2003 saw the consistent top-down dissemination of discourses designed to convince Catalans (and others) that Catalonia was a nation and therefore deserved special treatment.10 José María Aznar’s attempt to clamp down on concessions to Catalonia during his second term as Spanish prime minister from 2000-4 therefore increased Catalans’ hostility to the Spanish state, not just because of the practical effect of this attitude but also because of his attempts to promote a common Spanish national identity.11 It was in this context that discussions first began about reforming the Catalan Statute of Autonomy that had been in force since 1979.12 The process, led by the new president of the Generalitat Pasqual Maragall, was a tortuous one during which an initial consensus in the Catalan parliament disintegrated in the face of changes to the text imposed by the Spanish government. The effects of this were far-reaching, finally leading to the collapse of the three-way coalition that had kept Maragall in power.13 Not only this, but when the revised text was put forward for approval by the Catalan people in a referendum, the turnout failed to reach 50%. Although there was no requirement to reach this threshold, and 73.2% of the voters were in favor, the low turnout was seen by many as an indicator of public apathy towards the Statute and a reflection of the top-down nature of the reform process.14 It was not until four years later that it became 3 clear that this apathy had mutated into an unprecedented level of public engagement, as evidenced by the mass demonstration of July 2010, whose aim was specifically to protest against the changes to the Statute imposed by Spain’s Constitutional Court. This level of civil commitment would not have been possible without top- down stimuli such as the nationalizing project of Jordi Pujol and the growing sophistication of the pro-independence discourse of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, Republican Left of Catalonia), which had begun to concentrate its arguments for secession on citizens’ welfare and life opportunities rather than the Catalan nation per se.15 However, in the last few years the mobilizing power of political leaders has apparently been eclipsed by that of the civil pro- independence organizations. Is this a chiastic process by which political parties have gradually lost influence while civil organizations have gained it, or has the Catalan independence movement simply become more multidimensional? In an article written to dispute the common perception that Spain’s transition to democracy in the 1970s was almost exclusively a top-down process, Monica Threlfall examines the concept of “co-construction”. She defines this as “a dynamic of change akin to a round of forceful tugs-of-war between opponents”, that can be analyzed as “a narrative of transactions”.16 In other words, the concept of co-construction allows for a more nuanced view of this kind of political process and directly addresses the multidimensionality of power networks highlighted by Castells. It spans both collaborative and antagonistic interactions, but also allows for the possibility of a stable outcome.17 In this