The Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the self-determination referendum in Catalonia held on 1 October 2017

Report by: Ferran Requejo (dir.) Gerard Martín Helena Mora Albert Morales

Linguistic adaptation from Catalan to English: Ander Errasti and Mireia Grau.

Barcelona, December 2020 © Generalitat de Catalunya. Government of Catalonia Institut d’Estudis de l’Autogovern. Institute of Self-Government Studies (http://presidencia.gencat.cat/iea) Design: Autonomous Entity of the Official Gazette and the Publications Dept.

Contents

1. Introduction. Purpose of this briefing ...... 07 2. Summary of the report ...... 10 2.1 The use of language in the Supreme Court’s decision ...... 10 2.2 Pleas of facts ...... 12 2.3 Individual and collective rights at stake ...... 13 2.4 The typology of the crimes ...... 16 2.5 The allocation of responsibilities and the prison sentences for the prosecuted individuals ...... 18 3. Four final remarks looking at the future ...... 19 3.1 Violation of rights and freedoms ...... 19 3.2 Criminal proceedings and political representation rights ...... 19 3.3 Infringement of the parliamentary inviolability and the undermining of the separation of powers ...... 20 3.4 Political conflicts require political solutions ...... 20 Annex I ...... 21 Annex II ...... 23

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6 The Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the self-determination referendum in Catalonia held on 1 October 2017

1. Introduction. Purpose of this briefing

This document summarises the report produced by the Institute of Self- Government Studies (Institut d’Estudis de l’Autogovern, IEA, Barcelona), about the Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the Catalan self- determination referendum held on 1 October 2017 (special case 20907/2017; Sentence, 14 October 2019).1

Over the last two decades, the political recognition and accommodation of Catalonia within Spain have been increasingly controversial issues. The calls for Catalonia’s recognition as a distinct nation, and the achievement of genuine self-government are part of a historical struggle that has persisted over the establishment of the Spanish democracy with the 1978 Constitution. Still, it was with the reform of the Catalan “Statute of Autonomy” (2006), the subsequent appeal of unconstitutionality against the later promoted by the Spanish conservative party, Partido Popular, and its undermining outcome in 2010 (i.e. the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court), that the conflict became more explicit and the political tensions began to scale. In spite the several attempts to reach a political agreement on the celebration of an agreed referendum, the lack of proposals expressed by Spanish institutions and political parties led to a dramatic increase in the Catalan citizens’ supports for secession.

In June 2017, the Catalan Government called on the Catalan citizens to participate in an independence referendum to be held on 1 October 2017. The Spanish Government tried to avoid the organisation of the referendum resorting to police action both before and during the day of the referendum. This option led to several cases of police use of force against non-violent citizens that were willing to vote on the referendum. Nevertheless, over two million citizens rallied together to participate in the voting. After the referendum, the Spanish Government maintained a restrictive approach to

1 La Sentència del Tribunal Suprem sobre el referèndum d’autodeterminació de Catalunya de l’1 d’octubre de 2017, Informe 1/2020. It is available at https://presidencia.gencat.cat/web/.content/ambits_actuacio/desenvolupament_autogovern/iea/publicac ions/14_IEA-Informes/informes_arxius-i-vincles/2020-informe-1.pdf.

7 International BRIEFING the case. This involved, at least, two actions: firstly, taking the matter further on the courts (resulting in the first preventive imprisonments of Catalan social leaders on 16th of October 2017). Secondly, right after the Catalan Parliament made a non-binding declaration of independence on 27 October, the Spanish government triggered article 155 of the Constitution and, as a consequence, it removed the Catalan government, dissolved the Catalan Parliament and called for elections. In practical terms, it meant suspending the Catalan self-government for more than six months.

Following these events, one of the most significant expressions of the conflict has been the prosecution of members of the Catalan government and parliament, civil servants, individuals from civil society organizations and individual citizens who had participated in the October 2017 events. In addition, apart from the trial at the Supreme Court, some other judicial cases on events surrounding the organisation and holding of the 1 October referendum, led to trials that were assumed by other courts. The High Court of Justice of Catalonia assumed the jurisdiction of the trial for disobedience of some members of the board of the Catalan Parliament (the Speaker, also prosecuted, was judged by the Supreme Court). The Audiencia Nacional (a special court for specific crimes, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, etc.) assumed the trial for rebellion, sedition and disobedience of the chief officer of the Catalan police force, and other political and police officers. Ordinary courts assumed the trials of politicians, high-ranking civil servants and individual citizens (see Annex I). As we will note further on, the dispersion of trials and jurisdictions had consequences on the right to due process.

At any rate, the most relevant case was the lawsuit at the Supreme Court against the former members of the Catalan Government, the former Speaker of the Catalan Parliament, the President of the cultural association Òmnium Cultural and the former President of the civic association Catalan National Assembly (Assemblea Nacional Catalana, ANC) for their acts allegedly linked to Catalonia’s self-determination referendum.

The relevance of the Supreme Court’s decision is not only restricted to criminal law and the impact on the rights of the defendants; it also has a bearing on the development of Catalan self-government. Additionally, the

8 The Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the self-determination referendum in Catalonia held on 1 October 2017 decision will most probably have an impact on legal interpretations and practical developments of Spanish democracy in the near future.

The decision of Supreme Court is the last internal judicial pronouncement on the case, as the Supreme Court is the court of last instance within the Spanish judiciary. However, it might not be the last ruling, as there is a margin for potential appeals before the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European and international courts for the protection of human rights. In addition, as mentioned above, other trials related to the 1 October events are pending. These circumstances made even more necessary to elaborate the report on which we base this briefing, as it refers to an open process that is still unresolved and that presumably will have a long judicial itinerary, a case that is fundamentally linked to Catalonia’s self-government, concerning both its present status and its future.

Briefing outline

The aim of this briefing is to sharing the main elements of the report made by the IEA to an international audience.2 It provides three elements of key importance for understanding the case: 1) several basic features that help to contextualise the case; 2) a summary of the critical components of a very long sentence; and 3) a comprehensive synthesis of the main conclusions of the full report.

Underlying the Supreme Court’s ruling there is the mentioned call for the recognition of Catalonia and its determination to freely decide its own future. This demand is quite common to territories in other multinational democracies (Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom). In the case at hand,

2 The full report includes one chapter analysing the decision from a linguistic perspective, five chapters on legal analysis, and a brief final comment. The linguistic chapter focuses on the main concepts and argumentative strategies used by the Court to try to legitimise its decision. The five legal chapters address two main thematic blocks: 1) they analyse the extent to which the individual and collective rights were violated during the judicial proceedings, and 2) they focus on the types of crime, the allocation of responsibilities and the subsequent sentences. Finally, the report introduces a comment on four potential consequences of this decision for Catalan and Spanish politics.

9 International BRIEFING this is a bid that has the support of the Catalan self-government institutions and a significant part of the society.

2. Summary of the report

2.1 The use of language in the Supreme Court’s decision

The report analyses the language used in the Supreme Court’s decision. The analysis is based on a lexicometric exploration, and on quantitative and qualitative analyses of the main concepts and discourse strategies used in the text of the decision. The text includes some linguistic features, which make it unique compared with other previous rulings issued by the same criminal section of the Court (specifically, those between 2012 and 2019). Due to the relevance of the trial and the decision – which the judges acknowledge qualifying the decision as “historic” – it is crucial to analyse whether it is, as is often stated, a decision with a political rather than a strictly legal character. The analysis compares the language used on previous criminal rulings which had the same reporting judge. In this sense, the chapter describes and analyses statistically the choice of “lexical families” with legitimising purposes. It also reviews some of the main “linguistic uses” included in the justificatory rhetoric of this legal decision.3

In general terms, the linguistic analysis concludes that:

 The text of the Supreme Court’s decision is unique compared to that of the other sentences analysed. This uniqueness is based on its length, the statistical index of the use of words and its linguistic features. The statistically anomalous use of some concepts makes possible to identify those words that appear more frequently than

3 More specifically, the report links this decision with the rest of decisions that the President of the Court signed as the reporting judge of the same jurisdictional organ, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, in the period 2012-2019. In total, it is a corpus of 299 decisions (from a total of 609 decisions, if we consider the global period 2007-2019). The analysis of the 2012-2019 period (299 decisions; more than 2.5 million words), which includes around 50% of this judge’s decisions, ensures that the report provides representative results. Compared to those decisions, the STS 459/2019 decision shows language use – positive and negative specificities and background vocabulary – with a remarkable statistical deviation, both regarding the lexical selection and the argumentative strategies. The report also identifies many terms that represent a specific use of specific semantic fields.

10 The Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the self-determination referendum in Catalonia held on 1 October 2017

statistically predicted. The anomalous frequency of these words is remarkable, as they are not linked to the trial’s specific topics.

 The statistical deviation of some lexical families was not predictable given the description of the legal documents in the discourse analysis. Lexical families linked with “mobilisation” and the “use of violence” show a highly positive specific use. Similarly, the Court’s decision refers to some legal lexical fields – such as the (un)constitutionality – and lexical uses – such as those referring to the notions of territory, sovereignty and indivisibility – beyond the predictable statistical threshold. This deviation derives from various discursive strategies. In some cases, the use of language contexts is quite explicit, and reveals an argumentative strategy addressed to justify the toughness of the long prison sentences.

 The discursive strategy is not always straightforward. The lexical analysis also detects an excessive use (statistically speaking) of adjectives. It could indicate that the underlying discursive strategy implies evaluating and presenting the facts as the ploy by the judged politicians and social leaders against the general population. The statistical deviation found in relation to some terms could indicate a discursive will to emphasize this view (e.g. decoy, dream, misleading trick, pretended conjecture, etc.).

 It is also remarkable the use of evaluative adjectives and other language uses that are not typical of judicial decisions. Although the use of these evaluative terms is expected in political speeches (e.g., excessive, scrupulous, strict, evident, genuine, uncontrollable, irrational, hypothetic, imaginative), it strikes its spread use in this decision. Compared with the other decisions of the period 2012-2019, the Court’s decision on 1 October referendum shows statistical uses of language that largely deviate from the standards because of the lexical choice and the argumentative strategies that they convey.

 In conclusion, the evidence drawn from the lexicometric analysis of the text of the Court’s decision seems to indicate that the Court could

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have had some political intentions. In any case, it seems addressed to support the legitimacy of the Court’s tough sentence by means of a very evaluative lexicon and argumentative strategies that do not remain hidden under the technicalities of the legal language.4

2.2 Pleas of facts

In the pleas of facts, the Court surprisingly included the relation of temporary releases from prison it granted to those accused who, at the time of the trial, were in preventive prison. In any case, it is surprising that the Court only mentioned the temporary releases from prison it granted, and completely omitted the petitions it rejected. From this perspective, one could wonder whether the Court wanted to highlight those proceedings that show its kinder face and a more open-minded nature, while omitting those others that could bring to light its more restrictive understanding of the defendants’ rights. The petitions of the accused that were rejected included demands for release from prison and temporary releases to exercise their rights of political representation (as some of the accused in preventive prison were elected in several electoral events that took place between their imprisonment and the Court’s ruling).

Thus, the Court included in the ruling a set of judicial proceedings that stressed its indulgent side but omitted its tougher decisions regarding the imprisoned individuals’ aspirations. It seems that the Court deliberately built a narrative aimed at emphasizing its softer profile by highlighting those decisions aligned with the defining elements of a fair trial and the guaranties of fundamental rights. Altogether, an emphasis in view of the predictable appeals to the decision that the accused, would bring to the Spanish

4 Extrapolating the observed tendencies and validating the hypothesis of discursive strategies in a more global sense may require widening the study sample with texts from other reporting judges from the same Court and period. Complementary studies of this lexicometric exploration (such as the analysis of the connecting words, metaphors, or the legal terminology and phraseology) will allow for a description of the linguistic uses, the argumentative strategies and the discursive construction of the facts judged at the Supreme Court in a more holistic way.

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Constitutional Court and, subsequently, to the European Court of Human Rights.

2.3 Individual and collective rights at stake a) The right to the ordinary judge predefined by law The right to the ordinary judge predefined by law (Article 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution) is a fundamental right. It is a protection vis-à-vis any irregular election of judicial jurisdiction that could be promoted by any institutional level (executive, legislative or even the judicial power). Besides, the right is endorsed by the legislation, the case-rulings of the Spanish Constitutional Court and the decisions issued by both European and international courts. In this regard, there are substantial legal reasons to suggest that the assignment of the case to the Supreme Court could have implied a violation of the legally established right to the ordinary judge. The core facts that the Supreme Court considered applicable to the criminal law clauses at stake, took place within the strict territorial limits of Catalonia. The possible sense of “extraterritoriality” that the Supreme Court perceived in the judged actions or their derived effects that justified its jurisdiction did not have the required relevance or dimension to bring the case to the Supreme Court.

The Court based its decision referring to Article 57.2 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. This article states that the High Court of Justice of Catalonia shall judge criminal cases against the members of the Catalan Parliament. However, when the facts under judgement occur outside of Catalan territory, the legal responsibility applies in the same terms before the Spanish Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber. In other words, the Supreme Court has to meet two basic requirements to use its jurisdictional power: 1) that the defendants are members of the Catalan Parliament; and 2) that the facts under the Court’s judgement would have taken place outside Catalan territory. As argued in the report, while the case meets the first requirement, if we focus on the facts connected with the criminal code’s

13 International BRIEFING clauses at stake, there are reasonable doubts about whether this case also meets the second requirement.

These reasonable doubts are not a trivial issue. This violation of the right to the ordinary judge predefined by the law has three main consequences:

(1) It makes harder to guarantee the right to a due process.

(2) It has generated a division on the exercise of the jurisdictional function in different courts and judicial processes judging the same facts. This division negatively conditions both the right of due process and the jurisdictional function of the other legal procedures. In fact, two courts have already reached decisions that differ from the Supreme Court.5

(3) The convicted individuals could not make their rights to a double criminal instance exercised. This is because, as said, the Supreme Court is the highest court in the judicial system and, thus, the court of last instance. In this trial, though, the Supreme Court worked also as a court of first instance. In this sense, this double character completely prevented any judicial appeal to its decision. b) The Parliamentary inviolability The Supreme Court decision also showed a rather uncommon understanding of the role of parliaments within a democratic political system. The cornerstone of this issue is the case of the former Speaker of the Catalan Parliament, Mrs. Carme Forcadell. The main facts that support the Supreme Court’s charges against her mostly refer to the fact she did not block the parliamentary debates on the bills of the referendum and of the legal “disconnection” of Catalonia from Spain. The charges against her, thus, were clearly related to the exercise of her role as a Speaker and member of the Catalan Parliament. In this sense, the charges against her and the crimes for which she was convicted to eleven years of prison, infringe the principle

5 On the trial to some former members of the Catalan Parliament Board, the High Court of Justice of Catalonia has sentenced the members of “disobedience” (involving disqualification for 18 months and a fine of 30,000 euros), a decision that is in clear contrast with the conviction of “sedition” (11 years in prision) decided by the Supreme Court against the former Speaker. On the other hand, the “Audiencia Nacional” decided (October 2020) to acquit the Chief Officer of the Catalan Police and other members of his team.

14 The Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the self-determination referendum in Catalonia held on 1 October 2017 of parliamentary inviolability that should have protected the decisions she made within the limits of her role. c) The principle of legality One of the main problems of the decision is that applies a codified crime, that of sedition, which is very vaguely defined in the Criminal Code. The legally vague definition of the crime implies a breach of the principle of legality, since its vagueness prevents just and fair law enforcement. In this sense, the Spanish legal definition of sedition implies an infringement of the Spanish Constitution itself and the European and international instruments of protection and custody of human rights. d) The rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and political participation The two factual elements of this trial refer to the demonstration in front of the headquarters of the Catalan Ministry of Economy and the citizens’ mobilization during the self-determination referendum on 1 October 2017. There are several pieces of evidence and relevant arguments to suggest that these two factual elements are legitimate expressions of the rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and political participation.

The demonstration that took place in front of the Catalan Ministry of Economy and the gatherings that took place on 1 October 2017 were all supported by an extraordinary number of citizens – several thousand people and over two million, respectively. This fact reveals that there was a collective awareness of people exercising what they understood as a legitimate right protected by the Rule of Law. It does not seem reasonable that this collective awareness should be disregarded, ignored or left out by the courts, particularly when interpreting a criminal typology. e) The rights of political participation: the rights of the political representatives and the rights of their voters Some of the accused persons were democratically elected members of several representative institutions during the trial: of the European

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Parliament, of the Spanish Congress and Senate, of the Catalan Parliament and of local city councils. The trial violated the rights to political participation of the accused as they were denied the right to exercise them and, consequently, the rights of their constituents to political participation.

The Supreme Court gave an absolute priority to the development of the criminal process over the preservation of the rights of political participation of both the accused persons and those of the represented citizens. These rights became ineffective, as they did not develop any other effect beyond the acquisition of the representative condition after the elections.

The Catalan Parliament and the European institutions (European Parliament and the European Court of Justice) have defended, within the scope of their powers and possibilities, the rights of the elected individuals to political participation. On the contrary, both chambers of the Spanish Parliament have been relatively inactive defending the political rights of the elected members that the Supreme Court prosecuted. Subsequently, this has also affected the rights of the citizens that they were representing.

2.4 The typology of the crimes a) The absence of the crime of rebellion Although the Supreme Court’s decision finally overturned the initial charges of rebellion, it provided a more than unreasonable interpretation of rebellion that included, as an essential feature, the concept of “severe intimidation” as linked to that of “violence”.

Additionally, from the moment they were placed in preventive detention, the accused, having been charged with “rebellion”, were suspended from their elected posts. As mentioned earlier, rebellion was finally overturned in the decision. However, during the entire trial, the charges of rebellion were significantly harmful both for the prosecuted individuals who were elected as representatives, and for the right of political participation of the citizens in their respective constituencies.

16 The Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the self-determination referendum in Catalonia held on 1 October 2017 b) The crime of sedition The Supreme Court’s ruling establishes that the demonstrations and large collective actions that took place on 20 September and 1 October (2017) should be interpreted within the criminal definition of sedition: a public and tumultuous uprising aimed at preventing, either using force or non-legal procedures, the enforcement of legal measures issued by the public authorities.

However, those demonstrations and gatherings may be understood through the lenses of fundamental rights and their exercise. This is especially evident in the case of the exercise of rights of a collective nature, such as the rights of freedom of assembly and demonstration, which cannot be taken as an expression of “tumultuous uprising”, but also, in the case of individual rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, re-interpreted in the Court’s decision.

In this sense, it should be pointed out that, in its decision, the Supreme Court did not take into account the objective dimension of fundamental rights and their role as essential elements of the legal framework. This objective dimension imposes on the public powers the duty of bearing in mind their constitutional content, impeding reactions that could imply their unnecessary or disproportionate sacrifice, or that could have a dissuasive or demotivating effect regarding their exercise. c) The crime of misappropriation of public funds The decision convicted the accused of misappropriation of public funds, because its relation to a crime of sedition. However, as argued before, the elements shaping the crime of sedition do not match the facts. Thus, charging and convicting for misappropriation as a direct consequence of charging and convicting for sedition when the latter is rather contrived, makes the decision even more questionable.

The accountancy criteria applied by the Supreme Court to define the amount of public funds embezzled are also questionable. The criteria set that public expenses are incurred when the parties recognise there is an

17 International BRIEFING obligation to make a payment, even if the payment is never made. In the cases where there was no evidence of payment, it would have seemed more reasonable to conclude that there had been no losses that could constitute a crime of misappropriation. d) The crime of disobedience According to the principle of legality and the interdiction to interpret extensively the definition of codified crimes, it seems rather controversial that, as the Supreme Court said, not complying with the Constitutional Court resolutions could imply the concept of criminal disobedience as described in the Article 410 of the Spanish Criminal Code.

2.5 The allocation of responsibilities and the prison sentences for the prosecuted individuals a) The allocation of responsibilities The Supreme Court decision neither argues nor justifies in a sufficiently convincing way, why it considers the convicted individuals to be the authors of the crimes. This is especially relevant because there was no proven evidence that the demonstrations and gatherings, as the essential elements defining the crime of sedition according to the Court, were organised by the accused. b) The prison sentences The decision barely justifies the severity of the prison sentences, which range from 13 to 9 years (see Annex II). For those convicted of sedition, apart from the aggravating circumstances derived from the status as public authorities of some of the prosecuted, there is no further justification for the long prison sentences.

The convictions of the two civil-society leaders, Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez, for sedition, each being sentenced to 9 years in prison, are of an extraordinary severity that neither corresponds with the facts nor is proportional to the actions the Supreme Court attributes to them.

18 The Spanish Supreme Court’s decision on the self-determination referendum in Catalonia held on 1 October 2017

Additionally, there is no proper justification for why those accused and convicted of the same crimes (sedition and misappropriation of public funds) received different prison sentences. Neither does the Supreme Court specify which of the years are attributable to sedition, and which to the misuse of public funds.

3. Four final remarks looking at the future

This decision of the Spanish Supreme Court sets an extremely dangerous precedent which may have an extremely negative impact on the quality of two of the main pillars of contemporary liberal democracies and their rule of law: the regime of human rights and freedoms and the separation of powers.

3.1 Violation of rights and freedoms

The decision demonstrates an undervaluation of the content of collective rights and their peaceful and massive exercise. The Supreme Court offers an approach that opens a dangerous path of the criminalisation of the practice of individual and collective rights linked to political and social demands that could be accomplished in the future and, meantime, could have a discouraging or even a dissuasive impact on those who may want to exercise those rights.

3.2 Criminal proceedings and political representation rights

The Supreme Court’s reasoning shows a prevalence, almost without nuances, of the finalities of criminal action over the legal values and rights of political participation of the prosecuted individuals and the citizens they represent. With this decision, the court establishes a dangerous precedent as this prevalence implies assuming a view in which the rights of political representation deserve a low standard of protection.

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3.3 Infringement of the parliamentary inviolability and the undermining of the separation of powers

Both the judicial proceedings of the trial and the decision of the Supreme Court are an explicit exponent of a situation where the principle of the separation of powers is negatively affected, insofar as the criminal jurisdiction assumes several decisions that interfered with and harmed the parliamentary activity, especially establishing which subjects can or cannot be debated in parliament. It is a judicial issue that, in the future, could legitimise preventive interventions on parliamentary activity.

3.4 Political conflicts require political solutions

With its decision, the Supreme Court reflects the extent to what there has been no political solution to political claims expressed by the Catalan institutions, which is also supported by a very significant part of Catalan society. The possibilities of finding a solution within the current constitutional framework have not been adequately deployed. They have instead been despised, blocked, and fought by the Spanish central political and judicial institutions. A comparative analysis of similar multinational democracies shows examples of institutions and decision-making processes that channel the territorial conflicts differently, increasing the quality of the democracy and the Rule of Law. This usually happens on states, such as Canada or the United Kingdom, which, like Spain, are also characterised by strong elements of national pluralism.

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Annex I

Criminal actions initiated by the Spanish state institutions:

 The complaint lodged at the Audiencia Nacional by the Public Prosecutor on 22 September 2017, based on the accusation of the crime of sedition for organising the gatherings and demonstrations of 20 and 21 September in Catalonia.

 Lawsuit presented at the Audiencia Nacional by Spain’s Attorney General on 30 October 2017, based on the accusation of the crimes of rebellion, sedition and misappropriation of public funds against all the Catalan Government’s members forced to quit their positions: Carles Puigdemont, President; Oriol Junqueras, Vice President and Minister of Economy and Finance; Jordi Turull, Ministry of Presidency; Raül Romeva, Ministry of External Affairs, Institutional Relations and Transparency; Antoni Comín, Ministry of Health; Josep Rull, Ministry of Territory and Sustainability; Dolors Bassa, Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Families; Meritxell Borràs, Ministry of Governance, Public Administration and Housing; Clara Ponsatí, Ministry of Education; Joaquim Forn, Ministry of Home Affairs; Lluís Puig, Ministry of Culture; Carles Mundó, Ministry of Justice; Santiago Vila, Ministry of Culture and, later, Ministry of Business and Knowledge; Meritxell Serret, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food.

 Lawsuit presented at the Supreme Court by the State’s General Attorney on 30 October, based on the accusation of the crimes of rebellion, sedition and misappropriation of public funds against Carme Forcadell, Speaker of the Catalan Parliament, and several members of the Parliament Bureau (Lluís Corominas, Lluís Guinó, Anna Simó; Ramona Barrufet and Joan Josep Nuet).

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Court’s decisions resulting in imprisonment:

 Court Order of the Central Court of Instruction number 3 at the Audiencia Nacional, on 16 October 2017, deciding the provisional imprisonment without bail for Jordi Sànchez, President of the civil society organisation Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC), and Jordi Cuixart, President of the civil society organisation Òmnium Cultural.

 Court Order of the Central Court of Instruction number 3 at the Audiencia Nacional, on 2 November 2017, deciding the provisional imprisonment without bail for Oriol Junqueras, Jordi Turull, Raül Romeva, Josep Rull, Dolors Bassa, Meritxell Borràs, Joaquim Forn and Carles Mundó.

 Court Order of the Central Court of Instruction number 3 at the Audiencia Nacional, on 2 November 2017, deciding the provisional imprisonment of Santiago Vila, avoidable through the payment of a 50,000 euros bail.

 Court Order of the Investigating Judge at the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court on 9 November 2017, deciding the provisional imprisonment, avoidable through the payment of 150,000 euros bail, of Carme Forcadell, and the interim release with a bail of 25,000 euros of the Catalan Parliament Bureau members Lluís Corominas, Lluís Guinó, Anna Simó and Ramona Barrufet, and the provisional release of Joan Josep Nuet.

 Court Order of the Investigating Judge at the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court on 4 December 2017 that keeps the provisional imprisonment of Oriol Junqueras, Joaquim Forn, Jordi Sànchez and Jordi Cuixart, and decides the detention avoidable through the payment of 100,000 euros bail of Jordi Turull, Raül Romeva, Josep Rull, Dolors Bassa, Meritxell Borràs and Carles Mundó.

 Court Order of the Investigating Judge at the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court on 23 March 2018, deciding the unconditional imprisonment of Carme Forcadell, Jordi Turull, Raül Romeva and Dolors Bassa.

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Annex II

Prosecuted Institutional or Time Crime Sentence individuals civil position imprisoned

Oriol Vice President From 2 Sedition and 13 years of jail and Junqueras and Minister of November misappropriation 13 years of full Economy and 2017. of public funds disqualification Finance of the from holding Catalan public or civil Government service positions.

(14.01.2016- 27.10.2017) Jordi Turull Ministry of From 2 Sedition and 12 years of jail and Presidency November misappropriation 12 years of full 2017 to 4 of public funds disqualification (14.07.2017- December from holding 27.10.2017) 2017; from public or civil 23 March service positions. 2018. Raül Ministry of From 2 Sedition and 12 years of jail and Romeva External Affairs November misappropriation 12 years of full and Institutional 2017 to 4 of public funds disqualification Relations and December from holding Transparency 2017; from public or civil 23 March service positions. (14.01.2016- 2018. 27.10.2017) Dolors Ministry of From 2 Sedition and 12 years of jail and Bassa Employment, November misappropriation 12 years of full Social Affairs 2017 to 4 of public funds disqualification and Families December from holding 2017; from public or civil (14.01.2016- 23 March service positions. 27.10.2017) 2018. Carme President of the From the 9 Sedition 11 years and 6 Forcadell Catalan to 10 months of jail and Parliament November 11 years and 6 2017; from months of full (26.10.2015- 23 March disqualification 27.10.2017) 2018. from holding

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public or civil service positions.

Josep Rull Ministry of From 2 Sedition 10 years and 6 Territory and November months of jail and Sustainability 2017 to 4 10 years and 6 December months of full (14.01.2016- 2017; from disqualification 27.10.2017) 23 March from holding 2018. public or civil service positions.

Joaquim Ministry of From 2 Sedition 10 years and 6 Forn Home Affairs November months of jail and 2017. 10 years and 6 (14.07.2017- months of full 27.10.2017) disqualification from holding public or civil service positions. Jordi President of the From 16 Sedition 9 years of jail and Sànchez civil society October 9 years of full organisation 2017. disqualification Assemblea from holding Nacional public or civil Catalana (ANC) service positions.

(16.05.2015- 16.11.2017) Jordi President of the From 16 Sedition 9 years of jail and Cuixart civil society October 9 years of full organisation 2017. disqualification Òmnium from holding Cultural public or civil service positions. (19.12.2015- nowadays) Meritxell Ministry of From 2 Disobedience 10 months fine Borràs Government, November with a daily 200- Public 2017 to 4 euro fee and 1 Administration December year and 8 months and Housing 2017. of special disqualification (14.01.2016- from holding 27.10.2017) elected public

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service positions or government functions.

Carles Ministry of From 2 Disobedience 10 months fine Mundó Justice November with a daily 200- 2017 to 4 euro fee and 1 (14.01.2016- December year and 8 months 27.10.2017) 2017. of special disqualification from holding elected public service positions or government functions. Santiago Ministry of From 2 Disobedience 10 months fine Vila Culture November with a daily 200- 2017 to 3 euro fee and 1 (14.01.2016- November year and 8 months 2.07.2017) 2017. of special disqualification and Ministry of from holding Business and elected public Knowledge service positions or government (3.07.2017 functions. 26.10.2017)

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