The British Flanders Expedition of 1793 and Coalition Diplomacy
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THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS WHAT, EXACTLY? THE BRITISH FLANDERS EXPEDITION OF 1793 AND COALITION DIPLOMACY Nathaniel W. Jarrett, B.A. Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS August 2013 APPROVED: Michael V. Leggiere, Major Professor Marilyn Morris, Committee Member Robert Citino, Committee Member Richard B. McCaslin, Chair of the Department of History Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Jarrett, Nathaniel W. The Enemy of My Enemy is What, Exactly? The British Flanders Expedition of 1793 and Coalition Diplomacy. Master of Arts (History), August 2013, 142 pp., 4 illustrations, bibliography, 113 titles. The British entered the War of the First Coalition against Revolutionary France in 1793 diplomatically isolated and militarily unprepared for a major war. Nonetheless, a French attack on the Dutch Republic in February 1793 forced the British to dispatch a small expeditionary force to defend their ally. Throughout the Flanders campaign of 1793, the British expeditionary force served London as a tool to end British isolation and enlist Austrian commitment to securing British war objectives. The 1793 Flanders campaign and the Allied war effort in general have received little attention from historians, and they generally receive dismissive condemnation in general histories of the French Revolutionary Wars. This thesis examines the British participation in the 1793 Flanders campaign a broader diplomatic context through the published correspondence of relevant Allied military and political leaders. Traditional accounts of this campaign present a narrative of defeat and condemn the Allies for their failure to achieve in 1793 the accomplishments of the sixth coalition twenty years later. Such a perspective obscures a clear understanding of the reasons for Allied actions. This thesis seeks to correct this distortion by critically analyzing the relationship between British diplomacy within the Coalition and operations in Flanders. Unable to achieve victory on their own strength, the British used their expeditionary force in Flanders as diplomatic leverage to impose their objectives on the other powers at war with France. Copyright 2013 by Nathaniel W. Jarrett ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I must thank my mentor and major professor, Dr. Michael V. Leggiere for his tireless support and patience. His guidance over the past couple of years made this thesis possible. My other committee members, Drs. Marilyn Morris and Robert Citino have also provided invaluable assistance and encouragement, and I owe the Chair of the Department of History, Dr. Richard McCaslin, tremendous thanks for his unfailing support for my work. I received generous financial support from the Department of History at UNT throughout my studies. I must also thank Dr. Alexander Mendoza for his support in this process and particularly for his assistance and advice in constructing the enclosed maps. I owe a broad debt of gratitude to my fellow graduate students in the UNT Department of History, particularly to Jordan Hayworth, who has provided selfless assistance to my efforts throughout the thesis-writing process. Outside of the University of North Texas, Dr. Frederick Schneid at High Point University provided my initial inspiration for pursuing a career in History and remains a valuable source of advice and encouragement. In addition, Dr. Huw Davies at King’s College London encouraged my research and contributed helpful suggestions. Finally, I owe thanks beyond measure to my wife, Kambria, and to my parents, Mike and Vicky Jarrett. My family has given me unconditional love and support throughout this process. I can never adequately express my gratitude for the sacrifices they have made on my behalf. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii LIST OF MAPS ...............................................................................................................................v Chapters 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1 2. IMBALANCE OF POWER, 1783-1793 ...............................................................11 3. “WE SHALL DO NOTHING” ..............................................................................34 4. FRIENDS IN LOW PLACES ................................................................................56 5. “SUPPOSED NECESSITY” .................................................................................88 6. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................122 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................136 iv LIST OF MAPS Page 1. Theater of Operations – 1793 ............................................................................................82 2. Battle of Raismes – 8 May 1793 ......................................................................................102 3. Battle of Famars – 23 May 1793 ......................................................................................105 4. Battle of Caesar’s Camp – 7-8 August 1793 ...................................................................111 v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On 25 February 1793, the British reluctantly dispatched a small expeditionary force under Prince Frederick, Duke of York and Albany, to support their Dutch allies against an invasion from the armies of Revolutionary France. York’s expedition marked the initial British commitment to participate in the War of the First Coalition (1792-97). Throughout 1793, the expedition defended the Dutch Republic and coordinated offensive operations with Austrian forces until defeated at Hondschoote on 8 September. Although it enjoyed only limited military success, the Flanders expedition served as an important tool in British efforts to end their diplomatic isolation and define the war aims of the First Coalition. The French declaration of war against Britain and the United Provinces on 1 February 1793 had caught the British unprepared for war and without a major continental ally to aid them. Instead, London faced the necessity of relying on a separate Austro-Prussian alliance already at war with France to obtain its continental objectives. The German powers’ pursuit of territorial indemnification conflicted with the British preference for the status quo. In negotiations to reconcile these competing objectives, particularly with Austria, the British used their military presence in Flanders as leverage to extract concessions from their prospective ally. Throughout the 1793 Flanders campaign, London directed the operations of its Flanders expedition to maximize its influence over Coalition forces. Frequently, historians view the War of the First Coalition in the context of the subsequent Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The very nomenclature of the sequentially numbered coalition wars between 1792 and 1815 encourages this comparison. Such a perspective contains an inherent danger of anachronistic analysis. Allied commanders, diplomats, and statesmen 1 often receive harsh criticism for their failure in 1793 to create the multi-national unity that yielded the downfall of Napoleon in 1814 and 1815. As a result, traditional military histories of the War of the First Coalition present a narrative of defeat and mistakes without critical analysis of the reasons for Allied decisions. The separation of Allied armies in Flanders in August 1793 to allow British-led forces to besiege Dunkirk remains one of the most notorious Allied missteps. Historians condemn it as a symptom of either an outdated mode of warfare or broadly-defined Coalition disunity. R. R. Palmer declared that “this gigantic blunder… saved the French Republic from extinction.”1 T. C. W. Blanning echoes this sentiment more moderately, calling the division a “miscalculation.” To explain it, Blanning cites “political reasons,” echoing J. W. Fortescue’s accusation that British ministers waged an “electioneering campaign.”2 Paddy Griffith and Gunther Rothenberg ascribe the decision broadly to diplomatic disagreements with little further explanation.3 Thus, general histories of the Revolutionary Wars criticize Allied operations in 1793 with little analysis of their cause and context. In their study of British foreign policy, A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch identify the acquisition of an alternative Austrian indemnification to replace the Belgium-Bavaria exchange project as the primary motivation for British participation in a campaign of sieges in French 4 Flanders. Jennifer Mori echoes this reasoning in her examination of Pitt’s response to the 1 R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of Terror in the French Revolution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 88. 2 T. C. W. Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 109; J. W. Fortescue, The British Army, 1783-1802: Four Lectures Delivered at the Staff College and Cavalry School (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1905), 39. 3 Paddy Griffith, The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789-1802 (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 278-79; Gunther Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 35. 4 A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch eds., The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1815 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922). 2 French