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And During the (1998-Reformasi Era (1998—2006)

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And During the (1998-Reformasi Era (1998—2006) CHAPTER IV OPPORTUNISTIC SUBALTERN’S NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE NEW ORDER ERA (1974-1998) AND DURING THE (1998-REFORMASI ERA (1998—2006) What happened in West Kalimantan from early 1998 to 2006 was a distorted mirror image of what happened in Jakarta from early 1997 to 2004 (the return of the former government party Golkar, or at least its pro-development/anti-poor policies, to national politics). The old power, conveniently setting up scapegoats and places to hide, returned slowly and inconspicuously to the political theater. On the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI, or Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) anniversary on 5 October 1999, its Supreme Commander General Wiranto, a protégé of former president Suharto, published a book that outlined the new, formal policy of the Armed Forces (entitled “ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa” or Indonesian Armed Forces 21st Century: Redefinition, Reposition, and Re-actualization of its Role in the Nation’s Life). Two of the most important changes heralded by the book were first, a new commitment by the Armed Forces (changed from ABRI to TNI, or Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Soldier) to detach itself from politics, political parties and general elections and second, the eradication of some suppressive agencies related to civic rules and liberties1. 1 Despite claims of its demise when the Berlin Wall was dismantled in 1989, the Cold War had always been the most influential factor within the Indonesian Armed Forces’ doctrines. At the “end of the Cold War” in 1989, the Indonesia Armed Forces invoked a doctrine related to the kewaspadaan (a rather paranoid sense of danger) to counter the incoming openness (glastnost) in Eastern Europe. For the next few years and into the 1990s, this doctrine stated that special vigilance would be needed to guard against the infiltration of foreign values, especially communism and liberalism, into Indonesian life (Honna 2001: 62-63). Therefore, the internal security threat in the early 1990s the document concluded would be in the form of a “new-style communism” that might infiltrate the government and society. On 25 September 1998, the military-backed Habibie government (June 1998-Nov 1999) stated in 143 Following a short introduction, this chapter identifies some important landmarks in: (1) the creation and perpetuation of the subalternity of local indigenous and immigrant groups, (2) the subaltern groups’ negotiations (in economic and politics) during the Suharto regime in West Kalimantan, (3) the specific activities of the Pancur Kasih Foundation as a spearheading subaltern movement in a growing civil society, (4) the ecological consequences of the direct rule method imposed by Suharto regime (1967-1998) and used as the pretext for larger scale action within civil society and (5) the civil society of West Kalimantan after the collapse of the Suharto regime (1998-2006). The legacy of the oppressive system run for three decades under General Suharto still lingers on. The main subaltern group throughout this time has been the Dayaks, who are united either through their customary communities or their membership in schools, organizations or other groups under the aegis of Pancur Kasih Foundation. After 1999, however, the historically docile Malays of Sambas district learned violent tactics from the Dayaks and joined the anti-Madurese violence. This outbreak triggered a defensive reaction from the palace-related Malay groups in Pontianak, who regrouped themselves into a United Malay Group with many organizational wings. The celebrated “reformasi” era suddenly brought fresh impetus to the old demands to turn the centralized Republic system into a more federalized republic, in which the provinces, oppressed for long time, would be given greater autonomy to manage their own respective jurisdiction. Despite the Armed Forces’ new commitment to reform some of its suppressive agencies, it still had plans to increase the number of KODAMs (Komando Daerah Militer) at its Regional Military Command Headquarters at both the provincial and regional level (under two-star generals) from 11 in late 1999, to 17 in 2006 (Yulianto 2002: 356). This meant that the Armed Forces still had a crucial duty to maintain the integrity of the centralized system of a republic, vis-à-vis the clamoring demands for a united republic with a federal system. Thus, what happened immediately after the suppressive system was suddenly toppled in May 1998 was a series of struggles between two forces that between them Republika, a Habibie-controlled newspaper, that the Forum Kota (an alliance of protesting students from 37 universities) was a communist-oriented movement. 144 represented two diametrically opposed tendencies in the Fergusonian state and society paradigm: the central government, backed by the military and bureaucracy ranks clinging to a centralized governance system, on the one hand, against the provincial bureaucracies, representing populations yearning for more “freedom” and thus dreaming about a more decentralized governance system, on the other. This is not to say that the struggles were always fully oppositional. Sometimes, the provincial bureaucrats needed authority from the central government decision making structure, in order to take over some of the revenue-collecting licensing process for example, in the forestry sectors (logging, plantation development, or mining). The most ironic case in the struggle between the central government and the provincial bureaucracies took place when the former, in a move obviously made to calm the demands for “local autonomy”, granted rights to the latter (governors, or Gubernur and district leaders, or Bupati) to give forest licenses through a Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 6 of 1999, about Rights to Manage Forests or HPH and Rights to Extract Forest Products or HPHH) (Erma S. Ranik 2002a: 31). Apparently unable to wait any longer to “unleash” their new powers to grant forest licenses and dig for more sources of revenues authorized by the Minister of Forestry, the district leaders (allowed to issue forest concessionaires for forests sized smaller than 100 ha to individuals, farmer associations or cooperatives) in West Kalimantan rushed to issue around 300 of such concessions, creating confusion due to the overlapping boundaries of the concessionaire areas2. Having enjoyed these powers for around two years from 1999 to 2002, the provincial bureaucracies were then 2 In 1998, through the Ministerial Decision No. 677/Kpts-II/1998, the Minister of Forestry and Plantation issued the rights for the still unclearly defined “forest communities” to manage what the decision termed Hutan Kemasyarakatan (Community Forests), as long as these communities took the form of “cooperatives”. Adding to the confusion these “forest communities,” inter alia, were suddenly confronted by and overlapped with the areas under the jurisdiction of the newer Government Regulation No. 6 of 1999. The Governor of West Kalimantan, Maj. Gen. Aspar Aswin, however, commented lightly on March 2002 (Erma S. Ranik 2002a: 33) that the protests were normal. “If those district leaders rejected [the Minister’s Letter of Decision No. 541/Kpts-II/2002] they must deal directly with central government. We at the province have only accommodated the communication between central government and district leaders so far.” 145 dumbfounded when the central government suddenly revoked these rights for the district leaders, through a Decree by the Minister of Forestry (Surat Keputusan or Letter of Decision of Minister of Forestry No. 541/Kpts-II/2002). The ensuing protests from the district leaders in West Kalimantan (notably the “forested” districts of Ketapang and Kapuas Hulu) were merely symbolic because in the forests, forest extraction under the district leader-issued forest concessions went on unhindered, despite its revocation by the Minister of Forestry. At a different level of struggle, the long-suppressed and hidden friction between the state’s “development” (represented by the Madurese, the most aggressive migrant laborers from East Java) and the quietly grumbling locals (represented by the presumably docile Malays) reached a new and higher level. If previously the ethnic riots had taken place mostly between the allegedly ferocious Dayaks and the aggressive Madurese, then this time hardly a year after the fall of the suppressive regime of General Suharto, the unexpected actors among the Malay group took their deadly turn. This event was important because it took the inter-related debates at the national level down to the provincial level: between supporters of the post-Suharto state de-militarization and those who wished for increased militarization to counter “globalization”; between supporters of a federalized republic and believers in a unified republic and also; between pro-local autonomy groups and pro-centralized rule supporters3. 3 On 25 March 1999 the Armed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto visited the city of Sambas to see the riots and stated that the areas where the riots took place would not be declared Military Operation Areas (Daerah Operasi Militer), unless the anti- Madurese riots turned into anti-Republic Indonesia separatist movements (Kompas 26 March 1999). Bambang W. Suharto (no family relation to the former president Suharto), a member of National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM), triggered a new debate on a sensitive issue vis-à-vis the clamorous demands for post- New Order de-militarization.
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