Social Aftershocks: Rent Seeking, State Failure, and State-Civil Society Relations in Turkey

SOCIAL AFTERSHOCKS: RENT SEEKING, STATE FAILURE, AND STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

Hande Paker Department of Sociology McGill University, Montreal June 2004

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy

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The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission.

ln compliance with the Canadian Conformément à la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privée, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. ••• Canada Abstract:

This research emerged from the beHef that merely economic explanations of rent seeking were too narrow and an interdisciplinary approach was needed to understand historical structural factors that contribute to particularistic exchanges.

Rent-seeking and particularistic ties are almost always explained from a strictly neoc1assical perspective which tend to be reductionist approaches that fail to explain why sorne states will be rent-seeking while others will not. Moreover, other frameworks that analyze state-civil society interaction do so without taking into account particularistic state-civil society interaction. Thus, there is a need to explain such particularistic ties in a comparative institutional framework. My dissertation research was undertaken on two associations in Turkey, namely the

Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) and AKUT (a search and rescue team), in order to understand the dynamics of the relationship between a particularistic state and civil society associations. The TRC was chosen because it was involved in particularistic exchanges and functioned as an institution of the state, which meant that it partook in the state failure the state in Turkey faced in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in 1999. The Marmara earthquake was devastating not only physically in terms of the damage it caused, but also socially in terms of the extent of the failure of state institutions it exposed and the extent of criticisms it unleashed. The immediate chaos that ensued in the aftermath of the earthquake was marked by the "absence of the state". The failure of the state provoked an unprecedented civil reaction and mobilization. AKUT, the second case of the research, also became the focus of public attention, albeit for completely the

11 opposite reason. It was revered for the successful rescue work it carried out in the earthquake while the TRC was severely criticized for its failure to deliver services.

My dissertation research has shown that in cases of state failure, the state can only establish particularistic ties creating a multilevel chain system of particularized exchanges and fails to deliver public goods and services universally. Thus, the state co-opts a civil society organization into this chain system, demonstrated both by the TRC and AKUT. Furthermore, in cases of state failure, a civil society organization that has developed independently of the state becomes over-missionized with filling the gap created by state failure (AKUT), with public expectations and demands from AKUT far exceeding their self defined goals and capabilities. Thus, ineffectiveness of the state does not translate into well-working civil society organizations. The absence of a capable state affects the nature of civil society organizations adversely. This finding is a direct contribution to the more general debate on the effectiveness of state institutions and the voluntary sector. More importantly, my research effectively shows that much of the dichotomous discussion of the state on the one hand, and civil society on the other, needs to be discarded. Such dichotomous thinking does not capture the complex interactions between the state and civil society organizations, as 1 have shown in the case of Turkey.

iii Résumé:

Cette recherche émane de la pensée que les explications purement

économiques de la poursuite de rentes étaient trop limitées, et que ainsi une approche interdisciplinaire était nécessaire pour comprendre les facteurs historico structurels qui contribuent aux échanges particularistiques. Les poursuite de rentes et les relations particularistiques sont strictement expliquées dans une perspective néo-classique qui est souvent réductionniste et n'arrive pas à expliquer pourquoi certains états finissent par poursuivre des rentes alors que d'autre non. Par ailleurs, d'autres cadres théoriques qui prennent en compte l'interaction entre l'état et la société civile ne se prennent pas en compte les liens particuliers entre

état et la société civile. Donc il y un besoin d'expliquer ce type de lien dans une perspective institutionnelle comparée. Ma recherche de thèse a été entreprise dans deux associations en Turquie, notamment le Croissant Rouge Turc (Kizilay) et

AKUT (une équipe de sauvetage), pour comprendre les dynamiques de la relation entre un état particularistique et les associations de société civile. Le CRT a été choisi car il avait des liens particularistiques et fonctionnait comme une institution

état, ce qui veut dire qu'il faisait partie de la faillite de état après le tremblement de terre dévastateur de 1999. Ce séisme était dévastateur non seulement dans ses dommages physiques, mais aussi socialement dans l'étendu de l'échec des institutions états et de ses critiques qu'il a entraîné. Ainsi, le désordre immédiat a la suite du séisme a été marque par "l'absence de état". Cette défaillance a entraîné une réaction et mobilisation civile sans précédent. Le second sujet de recherche, AKUT, est lui aussi devenu le centre d'attention, mais pour des raisons

IV bien différentes. AKUT était respecte pour son travail de sauvetage durant le tremblement de terre alors que la CRT fut critique pour son inhabilité a fournir des services.

Ma recherche démontre que dans les cas de défaillances de état, ce dernier ne peux que créer des liens particuliers générant ainsi une chaîne d'échanges particularisés et n'arrive donc pas a livrer des services et biens publiques d'une manière universelle. Ainsi, état coopte un organisme de société civile dans ce système de chaîne, comme le CRT et AKUT le démontre De plus, dans les cas de défaillance de état, la mission d'un organisme de société civile devient celle de combler le vide crée par cette faillite, les demandes et attentes publiques d' AKUT dépassaient les buts et capacités de cet organisme. Donc, les inefficacités de état n'impliquent pas le bon fonctionnement des organismes de société civile.

L'absence d'un état capable affecte ces organismes négativement. Ce résultat représente une contribution directe au débat plus général sur l'efficacité des institutions état et du secteur volontaire. Plus important encore, ma recherche démontre que la plus part du débat qui voit une dichotomie avec état d'un cote et la société civile de l'autre doit être rejeté. Une pensée dichotomique n'arrive pas a discerner les interactions complexes entre état et la société civile, comme je l'ai fait pour le cas de la Turquie.

v Acknowledgements:

Research, contrary to popular view, is a collective process. As such, 1 have accumulated many debts over the three years 1 have done my research and written this thesis. First of aIl, 1 would like to thank aIl the participants whom 1 have interviewed who have contributed their time and knowledge to the research.

1 have John A. Hall to thank for a smooth process of writing who, as my supervisor, not only provided invaluable comments, feedback and guidance but also much needed encouragement and support. Most importantly, he believed that it would be a good thesis at a time when it was hardly a thesis for which 1 am grateful. 1 would also like to thank the members of my committee: Donald Von

Eschen generously gave his time and comments to improve the thesis. Philip

Oxhom provided insightful criticism and productive directions from which 1 benefited greatly.

1 have also benefited from financial assistance the Department of

Sociology has provided. In the final stage ofwriting, the 'Finishing dissertation fellowship' awarded by the Department of Sociology has allowed me to focus only on the dissertation. 1 would like to thank the administrative team at the

Department of Sociology and especially Sharon Barqueiro, who enthusiastically endeavored to solve aIl problems, small and large. The Alma Mater traveling grant of McGill University has enabled me to present sorne findings of the research in the European Sociological Association conference. Numerous people have read and commented on different parts of the thesis including participants of forums 1 have presented in, such as the thesis workshop at the European

VI University Institute in Florence, Bilgi University in Istanbul, Center for

Developing-Area Studies at McGill University and the Department ofSociology. ln particular, 1 would like to thank Caglar Keyder, James Ron and Dietlind Stolle.

During one stage of the writing which 1 was doing in London for a short while, 1 have benefited from office space and logistical support provided generously by the Center for Civil Society at the LSE.

1 have also benefited infinitely from the support of my friends: 1 am deeply grateful to Oksan Bayulgen, who gave me constant encouragement, insightful comments, invaluable friendship and in general shared the trials and tribulations of PhD life while doing one herself. 1 am thankful to Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu for her encouragement, friendship and generosity. 1 would like to thank Devrim Yavuz and Engin Dalgic for their solidarity and sense ofhumor. Thanks are also due to

Ergin Dalgic, Turgut Kisinbay, Efe Postalci for making life enjoyable even while doing a PhD. 1 would also like to thank my friends at the Department of

Sociology, in particular Y oko Y oshido, Howard Ramos, Kathleen Rodgers, Josée

Lecomte, and Berna Turam.

My gratitude to Fikret Adaman (Bogazici University) cannot be expressed with a few words in an acknowledgements section of a thesis. Still, at the risk of sounding inarticulate and most definitely inadequate, 1 would like to thank him for all he has done for me: not only has he inspired me to do academic work in the first place but he has also never once failed to give his assistance, ideas, support, encouragement and friendship from the beginning till now.

1 would like to thank my mother, Derya Feyzioglu and my sister, Gamze

Paker whose love and solidarity 1 cannot appreciate enough and who have

VII provided the most important kind of support by never doubting that 1 would turn out something worthwhile, even when 1 doubted it. 1 would also like to thank my grandfather, Bedi Feyzioglu for his support and my grandmother, Ferhan

Feyzioglu for her patience while 1 ventured into aeademie pursuits that did not eapture her interest.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Baran Vneu, who has been with me throughout the thesis and everything that is important in life.

Hande Paker

Montreal, 2004

V111 Table of Contents

Abstract ii

Résumé iv

Acknowledgements vi

Table ofcontents ix

List oftables xii

List ofcharts xiii

List of abbreviations xiv

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Corruption in Turkey 2

Main arguments 6

Chapter Outline 20

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 22

Neoclassical Explanations of Rent Seeking 22

Problem of Modemization 35

State-Civil Society Interaction 37

Chapter 3: Setting the Scene 55

The state tradition in Turkey 55

The historical ties of Kizilay to the State 62

Selection of the cases 69

Why Kizilay? 69

ix Selection of the cases 69

Why Kizilay? 69

Why AKUT? 70

Data and methods 71

Chapter 4: An extension of the state: the case of Kizilay 74

The earthquake: State Failure 76

Relationship to the State 83

Kizilay: an extension of the state 83

Politicized ties 89

Organizational Dynamics 92

Aid approach 92

Closed structure 95

Centralized and hierarchical structure 97

Outcome of change: the restructuring process 104

Failure in the State: Corrupt exchanges 108

Concluding Remarks 113

Chapter 5: The epitome of civil society? The case of AKUT 115

The earthquake: An emergent civil society? 117

Institutionalization: An organization in transformation 119

Activities and Relationship with the state 125

Outcome of change 131

The question of how to institutionalize 131

The question of relationship to the state 137

Failure in the State: Too much to handle 140

x Conclusion 144

Chapter 6: Comparative perspectives: International NGOs,

Global civil society and humanitarian work 147

Organizational factors 148

Humanitarian work as part of Global civil society 160

Interaction with a universalistic state 167

Disaster Context 172

Concluding Remarks 177

Chapter 7: Conclusions 179

Explaining particularistic ties in a historical structural context 181

Dispensing with dichotomies 184

Types of state power 186

Directions for change 192

References 196

xi List of Tables

1.1 Selective examples of corruption in Turkey 5

4.1 Activities and resources of Kizilay 75

6.1 State structure and type of interaction 158

XlI List of Charts

4.1 Organizational structure of Kizilay 114

5.1 Organizational structure of AKUT 146

xiii List of abbreviations

TRC Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay)

AKUT Turkish Search and Rescue Association

NGO N on-governmental organization

CSO Civil society organization

CCC Civil Coordination Center

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

MSF Médecins Sans Frontiers

WB WorldBank

WVI World Vision International

DRC Danish Red Cross

xiv Chapter 1: Introduction

Corruption continues to be a problem, be it as the occasional scandal in the developed northern and western parts of the world or as the all

encompassing problem which affects standards ofliving, level of inequality

and quality of democracy in the developing southern parts of the world. Not

only is corruption crucial because of its dire consequences such as increasing

inequality and exclusion, deteriorating public goods and decreasing

accountability and democratic participation; but also because in a more

integrated and inter-connected world, the adverse effects of corruption are

transported. Furthermore, it is also crucial for supra-national organizations

such as the EU which are evolving toward confederations with many more

partners. How new members will be integrated is one of the most important

questions facing the EU, precisely because the new members and the existing

members differ in terms of the degree of particularistic ties that pervade their

societies. Since many new members and candidate countries suffer from

prevalent corruption, we need to understand the mechanisms involved in

particularistic interactions in order to analyze how the integration process will

be affected. It was with this aim of unraveling mechanisms underlying

particularistic ties that this research was undertaken.

Corruption is an occasional problem everywhere; however, my concern

in this research is pervasive, systemic corruption which requires systemic

analysis. This type of corruption is qualitatively different than the odd scandal

that makes the headlines here and there; in the former, particularistic ties

become the regular feature of all types of interaction between state and

society. My research on the relationship between two civil society

1 organizations and the state in Turkey shows that all organizations; civil society

or other, are vulnerable to the particularistic ties the state establishes. That

they become a part of the state machine is evidence of such pervasiveness. In

studying corruption and particularistic ties, the broader aim is to understand the role of a particularistic state in society and how the lack of a universalistic

state capable of providing public goods and services affects social pro cesses.

Corruption in Turkey:

, An arrest warrant is issued for the owners of a 'prorninent' business

conglomerate. The police is 100 king for the father and one son as weIl as the

CEOs ofvarious companies of the group. The Uzan family is on the run as

public authorities find corruption on massive scale in the inspections of more

than 80 companies of the group among which are a TV station, a newspaper

and a bank. The bank clients desperately try to get their money back as the

bank passes to state control. It tums out that the other son, who had run in the

recent elections as the leader ofhis new party, has issued at least 7000

'nameless accounts' during the election campaign.' This is not the script of the

latest political thriller but a case of corruption that has absorbed public

attention in the last few weeksl in Turkey. The investigations of the banking

regulatory body have exposed the dimensions of corruption in the bank in

question. The bank, offering high interest rates, had about 300,122 clients who

have applied to the state to be compensated. Corruption in this bank alone has

cost the public immensely, 6 billion USD being the latest figure pronounced.

Among the methods of corruption were: keeping transactions off-the record, thus avoiding paying taxes; transferring resources to off-shore accounts;

1 During the writing of the dissertation in 2003.

2 underreporting the amount of deposits held in the bank; selling non-existent

state bonds to bank customers. Apparently, the abuses in the bank go back to

the 1980s when the bank was taken under surveillance. However, it was

removed from surveillance in 1990 despite the lack of improvement in the

bank's situation. There was a parliamentary commission on this, to investigate

the c1aim that the former prime ministers YIldmm Akbulut and Mesut Ytlmaz

and former state ministers of economy Güne~ Taner, Hüsnü Dogan, Adnan

Kahveci abused their office by providing privileged treatment to Imar Bank

(Radikal, 8 August, 2003; Radikal, 18,20,23 August, 2003).

Recently, the Economist described 'corruption on a colossal scale' as

the most important problem Turkey faces, defining it as perhaps the single

biggest reason for the relative failure ofTurkey to keep up with countries such

as Spain which had a similar per capita GDP 50 years ago (The Economist,

August 2-8, 2003: 27). Indeed, the parliamentary commission established by

the AKP government (who had promised to tackle corruption if elected) to

investigate corruption has recently presented its report whose details make the

headlines everyday. The report has confirmed what was already known:

dimensions of corruption in Turkey are so big that it permeates aH

institutions/every type of interaction. In every story from the report that makes

the headlines, it is possible to find a basic plot from which there are only small

divergences. What happens is that the state dispenses rents in the form of

privileges to organizations/persons to which it has particularistic

ties/connections. This usually occurs through a public contract awarded

without competition; unwarranted increases in estimated costs ofprojects or overpricing. The key sectors where corruption is most commonly found are

3 energy, health, transportation (road construction), and banking according to

the deputy head of Investigation of Corruption commission. 2 In the energy

sector, for instance, $29 million was paid for natural gas pipes that were not

constructed (Radikal; 5 August, 2003). Grants for unwarranted increases in

estimated costs in land-use plans have co st the State Water Department at least

$2 billion whose grants for increases in land-use plans have gone up

significantly in the 1998-2002 period. Only 2 were given in 1990 and 6 in

1997. It went up to 16 in 1998 and 25 in 2002 (Radikal; 4 August, 2003).

Also, 29 projects for the construction of dams and hydroelectric power stations

were contracted, without bidding, to firms inexperienced in dam construction

(Radikal; 4 August, 2003). In the health sector, medical equipment and

supplies are being purchased from certain firms within a price agreement since

1992. There is no bidding for contracts so even if other firms offer cheaper

prices, they are not able to sell the supplies to the state (Radikal; April 15,

2002). These examples are summarized in Table l.1.

2 This parliamentary commission started investigating corruption on February 19,2003. 8 members of the commission belong to AKP, the party in power, and 4 members belong to CHP, the opposition party. The commission obtained an documents related to corruption cases in the last 5 years, and investigated 600 files. The commission listened to 51 people for 120 hours. It has finally presented a comprehensive 1 100-paged report, with 110 files attached (Radikal; July 24, 2003).

4 Table 1.1: Selective examples of corruption in Turkey

Time period Method Estimated cost of Project corruption 1999-2002 Awarding $215 Million';+ Ministry of Public contracts by Works, highway invitation to a $577 Million and road selected few; construction projects without contract bidding; unwarranted · . mcrease m estimated costs 1998- Payments for $29 Million + Ministry of pipes that were not Energy, natural constructed; over- $75 Million gas pipes pricing 2000 Replacement of a $25 Million New sulphuric $50 Million acid complex in contract by a $75 Bandirma Million contract Unwarranted At least $ 2 State Department mcrease· m . ofWater Works, estimated costs Billion dam construction (700%) 1998 Unwarranted Road construction · . mcrease m estimated costs (499%) 1992- Purchases without Social Security contract bidding; over-pricing 1999 Awarding Ministry of Public contracts by Works; invitation to a reconstruction in selected few the earthq uake inexperienced areas firms (Sources: Radikal, 4-5, 8 August 2003; 15 April, 2002; Cumhuriyet, 1

December 1999).

A first glance at this picture may give the impression that the current

(neodassical) wisdom that too much state involvement and restriction of competition leads to corruption seems to hold. However, these are by no

3 Based on the exchange rate on August l, 2003 which was 1,438,211 Turkish liras/$.

5 means the only are as where particularistic ties have permeated. In fact, the

state in Turkey can only establish particularistic ties, not only in these sectors

but also with civil society organizations. particularistic relations change form

and multilevel, chain systems of particularized ties are created in which

restriction of competition may only be one factor. In particularistic states,

other mechanisms exist through which particularized benefits pass from the

state to not just private business but also civil society organizations. Thus, one

of the central arguments of this thesis is that rent seeking and dispensing can

only be understood in a historical structural context. 1 exp Iain why in the next

section.

Main Arguments:

Corruption is generally targeted as a problem in the neoclassical

agenda as part of the bigger campaign against the role of the state which must

be uniforrnly minimized. This is a standard prescription offered to aU states

since the size of the state/public sector determines whether there will be

particularistic, rent-seeking ties (the bigger the state, the more rent-seeking

there is). One of the central arguments ofthis thesis is that this type of approach is precisely what is misleading in analyzing corruptionlparticularistic ties. Offering such a simplistic, one-size-fits-all formula has more than one

drawback which 1 will present in detail in the theoretical chapter; but most importantly, this type of standard formulation do es not explain why sorne contexts will be rent-seeking while others will not. Not all big states/public sectors lead to systemic rent-seeking, particularistic relations. Instead of the neoclassical formula, 1 argue that we need to understand the historical structural factors at work in order to analyze the mechanisms of rent-

6 dispensing. Neoc1assical analyses are devoid of context as they offer an abstract idea of the state. 1 have undertaken this research with the aim of avoiding this error. A voiding the reductionist approach of neoc1assical

analyses requires the use ofwhat Evans (1995) has called the 'comparative institutional approach'. An institutional approach looks beyond explanations

based on utilitarian calculations of individuals to the patterns of relationships

(Evans 1995). My research aims to do precisely this; that is, analyze the

pattern of state-civil society interaction that gives rise to particularistic

exchanges. Such interaction emerges out of a historical specifity. Using the

comparative institutional approach puts the context back into the picture. It

also treats the state as a social actor, and not an aggregation of the interests of

individual office holders (Evans 1995).

The historical structural factors at the core of the thesis are the nature

of the state, the nature of civil society and their interaction. The state in

Turkey has become unable to deliver public goods on a universal basis and can

only establish particularistic ties and deliver selectively on this particularistic

basis. In this sense, we can talk about astate failure since it is unable to

provide universalistic public goods/services, one of the basic functions and

distinctive features of the modem state. When 1 refer to state failure, 1 do not

mean astate that is on the brink of collapse, a state-on-paper which is the general sense it is usually used. These states usually have a failing bureaucracy

controlled by a plundering elite and they have lost monopoly of violence and

control over territory (Kaldor 2003: 120). The state in Turkey, on the other hand, has complex institutions, a running bureaucracy, an efficient army,

monopoly of violence and a parliamentary democracy. However, it do es fail in

7 one of the basic functions of the state, that is, in providing universal/public goods. This study shows that the state has created a multilevel, chain system of particularized ties or corrupt exchanges by co-opting one of the biggest associations in Turkey. This association, the Turkish Red Crescent (hereby referred to as Kizilay), acts and is treated like an extension of the state. Since the state is prone to rent-seeking behavior, the association becomes a part of the multilevel, chain system of particularized ties. It could possibly be argued that state failure would not be so negative after all since state failure could mean enlargened space for civil society and a possibility for the latter to do what the state was incapable of doing. In fact, this is just what was widely believed and expected in the aftermath of the big earthquakes in 1999 as a small rescue association (AKUT) rose to prominence as the civil organization capable of doing what the state could not. However, the ineffectiveness of the state does not translate into well-working civil society organizations as closer investigation of AKUT, the second case study ofthis research, shows. The absence of a capable state affects the nature of civil society organizations adversely.

Both associations are affected adversely by state failure because first, the state cannot provide universal services so it substitutes particularistic ties instead. It has co-opted Kizilay and set up chains of corrupt exchanges through which particularized benefits travel from the state to Kizilay to third parties in contact with Kizilay. It has also started to establish particularistic ties with

AKUT although AKUT is not involved in corrupt exchanges. Secondly,

AKUT's transformation from a small, informaI, voluntary association to a bigger, more institutionalized organization with increased ties to the state has

8 been burdened with over-missionization because of state failure. Over

rnissionization is defined as public expectations and demands from AKUT far exceeding the self-defined capacity and mission of the organization. AKUT has suddenly become the one and only organization trusted to do anything and

everything as they are expected to compensate for state failure. Over

rnissionization is accompanied by a dynamic of prestige that was blown out of

proportion. AU of this is a result of state failure which ultimately caused

problems for the association. Members quit over dis agreements on how to

institutionalize and how to organize relations with the state. Both of the cases I

studied show that state capacity (or its lack thereof) is crucial in shaping civil

society. Thus, largue that the nature of the state, whether it is universalistic or

particularistic, is the historical structural factor that explains the type of interaction between the state and civil society organizations.

A comparative examination ofNGOs as well as dis aster contexts in

universalistic states also shows that outcomes differ according to different types of state structures. In a universalistic state, civil society organizations

may have close ties to the state but only in a particularistic state do they

become part of the state machine. One crucial point that needs to be made

before furthering arguments is that both a universalistic state and a

particularistic state are ideal types and are used as such for analytical purposes.

States can be placed on a continuum which would have, at one end, a completely particularistic state and at the opposite end, a completely universalistic state. Using such ideal types is not to suggest that corruption, bribery or networks ofparticularized exchanges do not exist in universalistic

9 states or that universalistic interactions are impossible to find in particularistic states.

Nor is it my intention to suggest, by referring to ideal types, that states are single, unitary, homogenous, and coherent entities. States are fragmented structures with multiple departments, bodies and organizations which usually work in an ill-coordinated, chaotic fashion. Mann argues that the state does not have a final unity or consistency because "state institutions are differentiated, undertaking different functions for different interest groups" (Mann 1993: 56).

According to Mann, states have crystallized as capitalist, representative, national and militari st but this is a non-systemic development, with these crystallizations entwined in institutionally specific ways in each case. Thus, the state is also "cock-up" or "foul-up" (Mann 1993). Others have emphasized the non-unitary nature ofstate structures (Farrington and Bebbington 1993;

Evans 1995; Inse11996; Navaro-Yashin 2002). This fragmented structure is recognized by citizens who have had to deal with state failure. In the chaos that followed the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey, state failure was the single, all-encompassing factor that marked the aftermath of the earthquake.

Still, participants emphasized a difference between administrative staff and political elites of the state who were completely useless and the army which, amidst aU confusion and disorganization, offered more efficient and effective

(at least in comparison to other state organizations) rescue and relief. At the same time, there is conflict among state elites between the civil bureaucracy and the army as to who gets credit (Author interview 30; December 8,2001).

Thus, particularistic and universalistic states are, first and foremost, conceptualized as ideal types for analytical purposes and not as one-to-one

10 empirical representations of actual states. In other words, neither astate which is mainly particularistic nor astate which is mainly universalistic is a pure homogeneous uniform entity. For instance, Della Porta and Mény (1997) point out that in a number of countries seen as solidly democratic (and closer to the universalistic end of the continuum) corruption no longer appears to be a marginal or an exceptional problem, especially beginning with the 1980s. This is true in France, Germany and to a certain extent, even the UK which is widely perceived as the 'model of the non-corrupt industrial democracy'

(Della Porta and Mény 1997). What stands out as a foremost issue in these cases is the funding ofpolitical parties where flows offunds from private actors to political parties may lead to intervention in public decisions since parties have penetrated public bodies and may use their power in ways that are detrimental to the cornrnon good (Della Porta and Mény 1997). For instance, in Germany the worst scandals have emerged in relation to party funding

(SeibeI1997: 86). In the UK, it appears that the distribution in the honors system is linked to party funding (Adonis 1997). Thus, corrupt exchanges, especially related to party funding, are found in what is conceptualized as universalistic states, confirrning the earlier point that no state is a pure, homogeneous entity. AlI that said, however, a difference between states conceptualized as universalistic and states conceptualized as particularistic, real in its effects, exists. As O'Donnell points out, differences arnong cases with regard to how much each case approximates either the one or the other end of the continuum may justify their separate classification and analysis

(O'Donnell 1996). In what follows 1 will delineate these differences in terms of prevalence and scale, costs and capacity for reform.

11 Astate is particularistic if corruption is systematic. Della Porta and

Mény (1997) define corruption as a hidden exchange between the political

and/or administrative market and the economic and social market. This type of

exchange relationship violates public, legal and ethical norms and it sacrifices the common good to private interests, be they personal, corporatist or partisan

(Della Porta and Mény 1997: 4). A corrupt exchange provides private actors

unfair access to public resources such as contracts, financing, decision-making

as there is no transparency or competition. Thus, corrupt exchanges are

exclusionary. The broad category of corrupt exchanges is analyzed in

economic literature in terms of rent seeking activity. Analysis of rent seeking is a limited account because it specifically refers to rents created by the state through the restriction of competition. Restriction of competition diverts

private actors from pursuing productive ends to the unproductive end of

capturing rents created by the state. As 1 will show throughout the dissertation, particularistic state-society interaction is not limited to and thus, cannot be explained solely by restriction of competition.

ln general, patron-client or c1ientelist relations are also put together with corruption as they particularize universalistic channels or as Della Porta and Mény put it, they "imply utilization of access to political authority as a private resource" (Della Porta and Mény 1997: 175). However, these should be carefully differentiated. For instance, Della Porta and Mény argue that one difference is the medium ofbarter. While political corruption compromises public decisions for money, clientelism offers protection in exchange for consensus. Secondly, only in the case of c1ientelism can we identify a patron with subordinated clients. Thirdly, the patron-client relationship is based on a

12 generalized exchange of unspecified services while political corruption involves a well-defined financial exchange (Della Porta and Mény 1997: 173).

A good example of patron-client relationships based on a generalized

exchange is ethnic-religious immigrant networks at the city level in the U. s.

where native-born skilled workers held considerable power in patronage

relations, to the expense of newer immigrant workers (Mann 1993). Of course,

clientelistic networks may involve the trading of votes in return for patronage

in which case the services are specified. Finally, there is a difference in the

degree of illegality (Adaman et al. 2001; Della Porta and Mény 1997). Corrupt

exchanges are illegal and therefore, hidden whereas clientelistic practices

occur in a more grey area not necessarily considered to be illegal. This brings

us to the most important difference between corrupt exchanges/rent seeking

and clientelism which is not mentioned by Della Porta and Mény but crucial

nonetheless. In the former, the state plays a central role whereas in the latter,

the patron may be an actor other than the state. This is crucial because the state

is the provider/regulator of public goods and it is the public good that is

compromised in corruption. This is also why it cannot be a grey area like

clientelism. Clientelism, on the other hand, is stuck somewhere between

blatant abuse of the common good and networks of trust and reciprocity.

According to Mény, three elements are needed for systematic

corruption: the political party (the ultimate beneficiary); the politician (the intermediary) and a body WÏth funds to spend which, in collusion WÏth the

political party and in return for payment, turns over to the intermediary the task of selecting the contracting party from which to buy products and services

(Mény 1997: 13). This description of corruption, though accurate, is restrictive

13 because it focuses on party politics. As discussed above, this dimension of

corruption is the most common in universalistic states. As such, Della Porta

and Mény (1997) base their analysis of corruption on party politics and

consider the structure of political parties and the party system as possible

factors in the development ofpolitical corruption. However, particularistic ties

can exist outside of party politics. My research documents the existence of

particularistic ties between the state and civil society organizations. Thus, the

difference between a particularistic and a universalistic state can be c1arified

by thinking about the dimensions of corruption ofwhich there is more than

one. 4 One dimension is the prevalence of particularistic ties in party politics.

The second dimension is the prevalence of particularistic ties between state

organizations and private business. Finally, the third dimension is the

prevalence of particularistic ties between state organizations and civil society

organizations. These multiple dimensions reflect the fragmented structure of

the state. The more dimensions there exist in a given state, the more

particularistic it is. In other words, the more parts of the state are involved, the

more pervasive particularistic ties are so that particularism is the defining

attribute of state-society interaction. This calls for an expansion of the

definition of a particularistic state that 1 started out with. Astate is

particularistic not only if corruption is systematic but also, when particularistic

ties are more pervasive than horizontal ties inc1uding ties with civil society

organizations and not just public bodies or private businesses. Thus, analyzing

a particularistic state is not studying corruption per se but ultimately analyzing

the type of state-society interaction.

4 Not ail particularistic ties are corrupt exchanges as we shaH see in the case of AKUT. However, they are all based on exc1usionary, one-to-one exchange relationships in which one party (civil society organization) is co-opted by the other (state).

14 When aIl ofthese dimensions are considered together, universalistic

and particularistic states can be differentiated with respect to prevalence and

scale. Even though corrupt exchanges exist in universalistic states,

particularistic ties do not have a defining role. Particularistic ties become

defining when all three dimensions of corruption exist together in a given

state. This is not the case for universalistic states. For instance, despite

concems ofparticularistic ties with respect to distribution ofhonors in

exchange for funding in the UK mentioned above, Adonis emphasizes that on

any comparative scale of political corruption, the UK is at the lower end and

serious breach of the common good by using state resources for self or party

enrichment is relatively rare (Adonis 1997: 104-5). High standards of public

conduct and tight monitoring have meant that breaches, when identified, have

been dis crete and not systemic affairs (ibid.). Thus, the UK, the example at

hand, is at the universalistic end of the continuum.

In addition to prevalence and scale, universalistic and particularistic

states differ in terms of the costs of corruption. First of aH, there are the

obvious financial costs. As scale increases, so do material costs, at the expense

of the public interest. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, there are social

costs of increasing inequality and exclusion. Della Porta and Vannucci (1997)

show how corrupt exchanges in the awarding of public contracts in Italy lead to the exclusion of efficient firms in favor of under-qualified firms with

particularistic ties to state agencies or political actors. This results in further social costs such as po or quality work and inflated final costs of public works.

Such exclusion increases to culminate in a pool of separate, productively inefficient firms with which the public administration regularly works (Della

15 Porta and Vannucci 1997). The number offirms in that pool increases as the

possibility of capturing rents creates overcrowding but this leads to increased

demands on the public administration which generates further delay and

increases incentives for corruption (ibid). Thus, a vicious circle is created in

which corrupt exchanges create maladministration which creates further

incentives for corruption. 5

The same type of vicious circle exists for citizens who use services at

the lower levels of public administration. As preferential treatment becomes

increasingly possible through the purchase of entitlements, the rest of the

public is subjected to increasing delays since the time and effort of officiaIs

are a limited resource. 6 As Della Porta and Vannucci point out, corrupt

politicians and civil servants have an interest in presenting public

administration as inefficient and malfunctioning because then, they can offer

protection (in ex change for bribes). Such protection is, of course, selective

(Della Porta and Vannucci 1997: 114). In this way, a demand for corruption is

created (ibid: 115). Thus, analyses that portray sorne corruption as beneficial

because it overcomes administrative inefficiency disregard an important social

cost: that of a vicious circle in which corruption contributes to inefficient,

overburdened public administration. This, in effect, invalidates the 'benefits'

of corruption. 7 The vicious circle also means that awareness of systematic

5 For a detailed discussion ofvicious circles involving corruption, please see Della Porta in Della Porta and Mény (ed.), Democracy and Corruption in Europe, 1997. 6 Added to this is the transaction costs of corruption. Time and energy is spent in keeping these corrupt exchanges secret. Catching and punishing corrupt agents also require resources (Della Porta and Vannucci 1997). 7 Even ifwe assume for a moment that this is not the case, corruption would be beneficial (still on a selective basis) only in one type of corrupt transaction: in cases where citizens resort to bribery to obtain services that they are legally entitled to but cannot receive because of maladministration, too much bureaucracy, etc. However, there is a second type of corrupt transaction where citizens resort to bribery in order to obtain services they are not legally entitled to (Adaman et al. 2001).

16 corruption leads to the beliefthat only through such ties can anything get done

and as such, reinforces efforts to benefit from it (Della Porta and Vanucci

1997). Yet, atthe same time, since corrupt exchanges are exclusionary, the

rest of the public is left outside ofthese ties who increasingly distrust state

institutions. In Turkey, the percentage ofthose who believe that citizens are

treated equally by the state (both central and municipallevels) in receiving

services is ne ver more than 25% (Adaman et al. 2001). 58% at the central state

level and 52% at the municipallevel believe that they are not at all treated

equally (ibid). Thus, added to increasing inequality and exclusion is the

eroding trust in state institutions and the provision of the common good.

Not all approaches which recognize particularistic ties as a deep-rooted

aspect of sorne societies consider it necessarily beneficial. For instance,

O'Donnell, criticizing teleological approaches to democratic consolidation

which equate formal institutionalization with consolidation, emphasizes that

democracies (or more accurately, polyarchies), which are designated to be

unconsolidated are in fact also institutionalized, albeit not through the

expected formal and complex organizations but through particularism

(O'Donnell 1996). O'Donnell defines an institution as "a regularized pattern

of interaction that is known, practiced, and accepted (if not necessarily

approved) by actors who expect to continue interacting under the rules

sanctioned and backed by that pattern" (O'Donnell 1996: 36). As such,

particularism is an institution as weIl so that there are polyarchies which are

informally institutionalized. This is not to say, however, this type of institutionalization do es not carry the costs 1 have been discussing. O'Donnell

recognizes this when he points out that informally institutionalized polyarchies

17 largely lack horizontal accountability, that is, the controls that state agencies exercise over other state agencies (O'Donne1l1996: 44). This, in tUffi,

reinforces and increases existing inequalities as policy making and implementation becomes further biased in favor ofthose who are in the

particularistic circles (ibid: 45). As 1 have argued above, a particularistic state lacks horizontal accountability not just among state organizations but between

state organizations and civil society organizations as weIl. What 1 aim to show in the following pages is precisely how the state establishes particularistic ties

with civil society organizations, pre-empting horizontal channels of

accountability.

Finally, the moral cost of corruption increases as it becomes more systematic, and what Mény calls a "culture of accommodation and rule

bending" becomes entrenched (Mény 1997: 17). As corruption becomes more

prevalent, attitudes towards it become more lenient, making the violation of norms of public conduct easier and more widespread or spreading and strengthening the sense that corruption is not unethical (Adaman et al. 2001).

Particularistic and universalistic states differ in terms of the costs they suffer.

Even though universalistic states suffer financial costs and waste of public resources, it is particularistic states which suffer the additional social and moral costs of corruption at full force since only in these states, particularistic ties are all-encompassing and vicious circles ofincreased inefficiency, inequality and distrust exist.

Once these costs and the distinctions between blatant abuse of the public good and greyer areas of clientelism discussed above are recognized explicitly, particularistic ties cannot be considered productive. One reason why

18 clientelism falls within an ambiguous area is because they are closely related to networking and reciprocity which can also lead to productive interactions which facilitate the provision of public goods. Evans's (1995) concept of

embedded autonomy refers to such productive state-society relations. Indeed the whole debate on social capital, defined as networks of trust and

reciprocity, revolves around how it gives rise to collective goods. However, these analyses assume a universalistic state at hand. As 1 will show, the nature

of the state shapes the type of state-civil society interaction. In a particularistic

state, state-society interaction is a cooptive rather than a cooperative

interaction. Rather than putting all networks of trust and reciprocity together

as leading to productive ends, they must be differentiated with respect to

structural factors that affect the type of network such as the role of the state.

For instance, the debate on social capital has begun to differentiate networks

on the basis oftype of trust. Accordingly, bonding ties refer to thick ties, trust

among individuals who are well-known to each other, such as family members

while bridging ties refers to relations between individuals who are not similar

in background. It is the latter type of trust which leads to generalized

reciprocity and productive interaction. The former type of trust, i.e. thick ties,

most likely characterizes particularistic networks. 1 argue that factors which

affect the type ofnetworks likely to emerge such as the nature of the state,

must also be similarly differentiated. Such differentiation will help us account for different end-results, i.e. productive networks reinforcing public goods and

particularistic networks compromising public goods through corrupt

exchanges and exclusion.

19 The final grounds on which to differentiate particularistic and universalistic states is capacity for reform. In universalistic states, precautions are taken against the forms of particularistic interactions that exist such as the funding ofpolitical parties discussed above which prove to be effective. For instance in France, the scandals in the 1980s have brought about new legislative initiatives to reform the ways in which parties and electoral campaigns are financed as weIl as administrative procedures. These initiatives made for effective change (Mény 1997). The greater capacity for reform might be related to a difference O'Donnell perceives between his informally institutionalized and formally institutionalized cases. This pertains to the boundary between the public and the private spheres. According to O'Donnell, the boundary is blurred everywhere; however, in formally institutionalized polyarchies, the notion ofboundary is widely accepted and vigorously reinforced when it is breached by public officiaIs acting with particularistic interests (O'DonneIl1996). In cases where particularistic ties are pervasive, the notion of separation of the public and the private spheres is weaker and harder to enforce (ibid). Hence the greater capacity for reform in universalistic states.

Chapter Outline:

The following chapters build up the arguments and cases introduced here. In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework is constructed making use of two sets ofliterature: one analyzing the question of why rent seeking exists and the other analyzing state-society interaction in general. 1 argue that in order to be able to answer the first question, the problem needs to be re-conceptualized as state-society interaction within a historical structural context. Chapter 3

20 presents the general background of the study, both in terms of the historical formation of the state in Turkey and Kizilay' s historical ties to it as well as the methods used in the research. Chapter 4 analyzes Kizilay' relationship to the state and shows how, as an extension of the state, it is involved in corrupt exchanges with it. In Chapter 5, the in-depth analysis of AKUT is presented, which shows that des pite being an association quite different from the first case, it similarly enters into the type of state-civil society interaction established by a particularistic state. Chapter 6 evaluates the arguments of the dissertation from a comparative perspective, comparing the two cases to similar organizations such as NGOs in general and NGOs working in the field of disaster relief. Chapter 7 offers conc1uding remarks and discusses directions for further research.

21 Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

The most familiar explanations of rent seeking are found in

neocIassical economics. There are also other cIues as to why rent seeking or

more generally, corruption occurs which exist here and there but which must

be more systematically considered. 1 believe that this is an urgent need; the

more so because the purely economical analyses ofrent-seeking are

inadequate as they offer standardized formulations which cannot explain why

sorne contexts will be rent-seeking while others will not. 1 argue that the

existence of rent-seeking relations must be related to historical structural

factors such as the nature of the state and civil society and the nature of their

interaction. One such set of explanations see the problem of rent seeking and

particularistic relations as a problem of modemization. Particularistic relations

provide a convenient medium for a late-developing state which has to find an

expedient solution to the problem of integrating large masses into a

modernization project carried out from above. This provides an essential

insight to the problem; however the question ofwhy rent-seeking relations

persist even after a substantial period of modemization still remains. This

requires us to understand the exact nature of the relationship between the state

and society which necessitates considering approaches that make state-society

interaction central to their analysis.

Neoclassical explanations of rent seeking:

The standard definition of an economic rent in economic theory is a receipt in excess of the opportunity cost of a resource (Tollison 1982;

Buchanan 1980). Rent seeking is the expenditure of scarce resources to capture an artificially created transfer (Tollison 1982: 578). As such, rent

22 seeking activities create social waste rather than produce social value. The

institutional setting is such that individual efforts to maximize value generate

social waste rather than social surplus (Buchanan 1980: 4). The example of

monopoly rents demonstrates the costs involved in rent-seeking activities. The

competition that monopoly rents become subject to constitutes the social costs

involved in the rent seeking process. AU efforts that go into trying to capture

the rents (that is rent seeking) are wasted resources from society's point of

view. They add nothing to social product and their opportunity cost, that is the

cost of wasting resources in rent seeking which could have been employed

productively elsewhere, means lost production for society (ToUison 1982:

576). This is why rent seeking activities have also been caUed directly

unproductive, profit-seeking activities as they are me ans ofmaking income by

undertaking activities that are directly unproductive (Bhagwati 1982: 989).8 1t

is clear from this discussion of the concept ofrent seeking that a consensus

exists in neoclassical analyses as to the consequences of rent seeking

activities, that is, they entail welfare costs, generating social waste (Tollison

1982; Posner 1975; Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974).

Regarding the question of what causes rent seeking, neoclassical

analyses pose the issue mainly as govemment-related. Govemment actions

create rents through various restrictive measures to the market such as tariffs, import licenses, quotas, perrnits, franchise assignments which then lead to

8 It is important to note that a crucial distinction is made between rent seeking and profit seeking. The latter also involves economic rents; however, these are created as a result of innovative entrepreneurial activity which leads to economic growth. These surplus profits constitute incentives and rewards for entrepreneurs who introduce a new product or a new process. Furthermore, they are temporary in a competitive market as they will attract followers and the surplus profits will disappear in the adjustment process (Buchanan 1980: 5; Tollison 1982: 575). As such, they must be differentiated from rent seeking activities which always generate social waste.

23 competition to obtain these exclusive rents (Buchanan 1982; Tollison 1982;

Bhagwati 1982; Krueger 1974). Krueger further argues that even competition for entry into govemment services can become a part of competition for rents.

This competition takes place through attaining the appropriate credentials for entry into govemment services and through accepting unemployment while

making efforts to get appointments (Krueger 1974: 293). According to neoclassical analyses, the single causal factor underlying rent seeking emerges

as government restriction of competition in the market which leads to the

creation of rents. Buchanan explicitly argues that if governmental action moves beyond the limits of the minimal or protective state and the govemment

starts to interfere in the market adjustment process, rents and attempts to capture these rents will come into existence. If supply is arbitrarily restricted, rents accrue to those who obtain the rights to engage in the activity. Thus, rent seeking activity is directly connected to the scope and range of govemmental activity in the economy and to the relative size of the public sector (Buchanan

1982: 9).

In a similar vein, rent-seeking is analyzed in a rational choice perspective, using the principal-agent mode!. This model postulates that given the possibility of rent-seeking, agents will engage in these activities as long as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. In this model, there is a principal which embodies the public interest and an agent who may or may not remain faithful to the public interest. This model simply says that since information is asymmetrical the agent will be corrupt if [bribe taken-moral cost ofbeing corrupt-(probability agent is caught and punished * the penalty for it» agent's pay + satisfaction gotten from not being corrupt] (Klitgaard 1988:71). Thus,

24 Klitgaard suggests that policy measures should be built around selecting

agents, changing rewards and penalties, gathering information, restructuring

the principal-agent-client relationship and changing the attitudes about

corruption. In this model, the notion of the principal is problematic since

Klitgaard limits the problem to bureaucratic corruption where it is assumed

that there is a benevolent principal which embodies the public interest and can

punish individual agents. However, the problem ofrent seeking is more

pervasive in the sense that it is the state which is entangled in these

particularistic relations. Thus, who exactly is the benevolent principle becomes

the crucial question since we lose the state as the princip le in the context of

rent seeking.

Neoc1assical analyses of rent seeking raise several questions. First of

all, these analyses do not take into consideration the effects of rent seeking

activity on distribution. Even ifrent seeking is competitive in the sense that

resources are wasted in the effort to obtain rights to obtain a position to which

rents are attached, it is important to note that this competition is bound to take

place within a very restricted and privileged circ1e. Rent seeking relations by definition are particularistic which implies that most groups in society will be exc1uded from these activities even though social costs generated by them will be born by society at large. Secondly, minimizing the state and relying completely on the market which is the neoc1assical solution to rent seeking is not a feasible ideal state (even ifwe hypothetically disregarded the distributional issues the market is bound to generate) since in reality states will occupy a central position in both the economic and the political realm. As

Krueger points out, all market economies have sorne rent-generating

25 restrictions (Krueger 1974: 302). In the very least, states have to assume

regulatory functions and provide sorne public goods. States can create

differentially advantageous positions when performing their regulatory tasks if

they are situated in rent-seeking contexts even though they are not restricting

competition. Thus, it is not adequate to exp Iain rent seeking by the extent of

restrictions states impose on markets. Furthermore, there is no one-to-one

relationship, which neoclassical analyses assume, between state activity and

rent seeking in the sense that more state will necessarily lead to more rent

seeking and less efficient outcomes. In fact, it has been empirically shown that

the larger states tend to be the better performing ones (La Porta et al. 1999).

This brings us to the final and most crucial shortcoming of neoclassical

analyses which is that this line of analysis cannot account for why in sorne

states there will be rent seeking while others will refrain from such activities.

Neoclassical analyses pro vide a one-size-fits-all formula which dictates that

the bigger the size and the larger the scope of governmental activity, the more

pervasive rent seeking will be. Yet, many states exist where this is not the

case; in fact, empirical evidence suggests just the opposite. Thus, we need to

go beyond neoclassical analyses and locate the historical and structural factors

at work in order to answer the question why sorne states will be involved in

rent seeking activities.

That it is not adequate to exp Iain rent seeking by the extent of

restrictions states impose on markets has been dramatically confirmed in the

Washington consensus era of market reforms. This is because rent seeking and corruption has persisted in the context of market reforms- the very solution proposed by neoclassical economics to eliminate rent seeking! The

26 Washington consensus that came to pre-dominate post-1980 economic policy

advocates trade liberalization, austere fiscal policy, privatization, deregulation

and reducing the role of the govemment in the economy. These policies have

been implemented in many countries (most notably Latin American and post-

communist countries but also many developing countries) under market

reforms. The implementation of market reforms, however, has not produced

the desired outcome of elimination of rent seeking and corruption. In other

words, the causality established by neoclassical econornics that the restriction

of competition by the state leads to rent seeking has not proved robust as the

removal of restrictions and the reduction of the role of the state did not

eliminate rent seeking. In fact, as Manzetti (2003) points out, by the early

2000s, market reforms and corruption were seen to be perfectly viable together

by many in Latin America which is quite the opposite ofwhat the Washington

consensus had envisioned.

Comparative cross-national analysis of Latin American and post

communist countries as well as case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela,

Chile, Mexico show that particularistic ties and corrupt exchanges persist

under market reforms, tools of market reforms (privatization, deregulation)

often creating new resources for and new forms of corruption (Manzetti 2003;

Schamis 1999; Saba and Manzetti 1997; Manzetti and Blake 1996).9 However, these unexpected findings are still not taken as a need to search for alternative

explanations but rather as a need to modify or extend them (Manzetti 2003;

Schamis 1999). Hence, Schamis argues that even if the fact that market

reforms do not eliminate rent seeking is a critique of the neoclassical

9 Please see Manzetti (2003) for detailed incidents of corrupt dealings in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.

27 framework, it is in so far as " to assume too hastily that the problem of

distributional coalitions is invariably resolved by liberalization", an error

rectified easily by extending the neoclassical conceptual framework to include

market reforms (Schamis 1999). Manzetti (2003) argues that if market reforms

are carried out within a politY where accountability institutions are weak, then

corruption collusion and patronage will continue. However, the question of

why accountability institutions are weak in the first place is not considered.

One factor that is mentioned as shaping political systems of low corruption is

the nature of government activity which provides little opportunity for corrupt

exchanges (Manzetti and Blake1996). Nevertheless, why certain states are of

this nature and others are not and how they come to be so is not a matter of

investigation which brings us back to the most crucial shortcoming of

neoclassical analyses which is that they do not provide an account of why

sorne states will be rent seeking as they do not differentiate between state

types. AlI ofthis again underlines the obvious gap and the urgent need for a

historical institutional analysis of social actors such as the state and civil

society organizations and their interaction.

A new approach that builds on the framework of neoclassical

economics but that aims to rectify its certain shortcomings is the new institutional economics (NIE). The NIE is relevant to our discussion because,

unlike neoclassical analyses, it takes into account institutions. Douglass North, the most pro minent proponent of the new institutional economics, defines it as

"an attempt to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics" (North

1995: 17). The NIE retains the methodological individualism ofneoclassical economics but rejects the neoclassical notion of the market. This notion of the

28 market (that perfectly competitive markets will provide the most efficient

allocation) can be upheld only ifthere are no transaction costs. In such a

conception of the market, large numbers of autonomous, fully-informed units

(individuals, households, firms) with the aim ofutility-maximization come

together in an abstract platform where they can enter and leave freely and

carry on impersonal economic exchange voluntarily on an equal basis (in

Harriss, Hunter and Lewis 1995: 3). It is the assumptions ofthis conception of

the market that the NIE challenges. First and foremost, transaction costs do

exist in the real world. Transaction costs such as finding out what the relevant

priees are, negotiating and concluding contracts, and monitoring and enforcing

them exist because information is rarely complete. Hence, by taking into

account transaction costs, the NIE discards the neoclassical assumption of

perfect information. Although fundamental assumptions in neoclassical

economics of scarcity and competition are maintained, the assumption of

perfect, costless information cannot be upheld because as North simply puts it,

it is costly to transact (North 1990). Subsequently, institutions are defined as

means ofreducing information and transaction costs (North 1995; North 1990;

Harriss, Hunter and Lewis 1995).

NIE also gets rid of the assumption ofrationality in neoclassical

analyses which assert that values are constant and that individual economic

agents select the most efficient means of maximizing rationally chosen ends

(Harriss, Hunter and Lewis 1995; North 990). In other words, utility or wealth

maximization is not the only factor entering decision-making; altruism, self imposed constraints, fairness and justice also enter the utility function and change the choices people actually make which cannot simply be postulated as

29 wealth maximization (North 1990). Furthermore, North argues that there is

limited mental capacity by which to process incomplete information (North

1995: 17). Individuals have what North calls mental models with which to

interpret the world around them and which are in part culturally derived, in

part acquired through local experience. 10 As a result, mental models vary

immensely and so do perceptions ofhow the world works (North 1995: 18).

Individuals make choices on the basis oftheir mental models and varying

mental models means that there is no one determined equilibrium that will be

achieved but that multiple equilibria are possible (ibid). Imperfect information

and limited mental capacity by which to process information establishes the

cost of transacting which leads to the formation of institutions (ibid). North

also argues that institutions are formed in order to reduce uncertainty in human exchange. According to North, the major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human interaction

(North 1995; North 1990: 6).

As Harriss et al. (1995) point out, the recognition of imperfect information and transaction costs implies that markets are only one type of social device for settling transaction costs and that the performance of markets may can be evaluated against that of others. This also allows for the acknowledgment of market failures which have long been recognized by scholars of development but not by neoclassical economists who have emphasized government failures. The NIE corrects this omission by recognizing market failures. According to Harriss et al. (1995), the recognition

10 According to North, eulturally derived mental models are formed as a result of intergenerational transfer ofknowledge, values and norms whieh vary substantially among different ethnie groups and soeieties. This, however, is only part of a mental mode!. The other is formed through local experienee derived from a specifie environment whieh again varies greatly with different environments (North 1995: 18).

30 of market failures makes the NIE relevant to the study of developing

economies because market failure has been important in these contexts. One

source of market failure is the creation of extemalities. A negative extemality

is created when the activities of one imposes costs on another whereas a

positive extemality is created when the actions of one provides benefits for

others. The NIE explains the creation ofproperty rights (an institution) as a

response to the problem of extemalities. For instance, when there are negative

extemalities, the creation ofproperty rights allows the agent bearing the costs

to obtain compensation (Bates 1995). A second source of market failure is

public goods. As the consumption of a public good does not diminish the

utility of its consumption by another and as its provision cannot be excludable,

individuals free ride. In other words, they do not contribute to the cost of

providing the public good, instead taking advantage of its non-excludability

(Bates 1995). As there will be no public goods created in the market, a

demand is created for the creation of non-market institutions. Thus, the state as

an organization with powers to tax replaces decentralized exchange (ibid).

The NIE makes a much-needed amendment to neoclassical analyses by

modifying sorne ofits assumptions and by recognizing the importance of

institutions as weIl as the role of the state in explaining divergence in

economic performance specifically and in broader social processes more generally. However, as Bates points out, the new institutionalism takes only the very first step in what must be a more comprehensive process of institutional appraisal and design (Bates 1995: 41). NIE, as much as it is refreshing for the criticism and modifications it brings to neoclassical analyses, still fails to account for how institutions work because it presents

31 institutions as a general context, a background against which individual

entities exercise choice. For instance, North argues that variations in

institutional mix lead to diverging economic performances (North 1990). In

other words, if the right institutional mix is there in a given case, we also get

economic development and vice versa. This, however, does not explain how

institutions play a role in economic development (Toye 1995).

"The main weakness of the NIE as a grand theory of socio-economic development is that it is empty. As a critique of other theories which altogether ignore the role of institutions in the long-run change and growth, it is welcome. Institutions (cultures, ideologies, property relations, particular organizational forms) are important determinants of economic performance. But when it cornes to new general insights about how that determination works, the theory adds nothing to what we already have" (Toye 1995: 64). The same can be said of state-society interaction. Precisely what

mechanisms are involved in state-society interaction cannot be explained by

an approach that treats institutions as context. Rather, we need a sociological

approach where institutions are understood as social actors and not as

framework. Thus, the state does not merely establish the institutional

framework as the NIE argues but as a social actor, enters into interaction with

other social actors and has a crucial role in determining the type of interaction

that results. This is one of the central arguments of this dissertation. This is

how the comparative institutional approach differs from the NIE as the latter

does not treat the state as a social actor. As 1 will show, the state has a defining

role in the particularistic ties that prevail between the state and civil society

organizations. Setting up a framework as the NIE do es in which the state is

part of the institutional structure cannot enable us to explain the role of the

state as a social actor in state-society interaction. This is because power

relations are ignored unless the state is taken into account as a social actor.

North (1995; 1990), for instance, distinguishes between institutions which are

32 the rules of the game of a society that structure human interaction and organizations which are the players. Institutions are formaI mIes (statute law, common law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics ofboth (North 1995: 23). Organizations include political bodies such as political parties, city councils, regulatory bodies; economic bodies such as firms, trade unions, cooperatives; social bodies such as churches, clubs, associations; and educational bodies such as schools, colleges, vocational training centers (ibid).

Setting up the institutional structure as such, however, ignores power relations between social actors. This analysis treats an organization of the state and a civil society organization the same, as ifthey are not endowed differently in terms of social power. In the NIE, all organizations are subject to the same package of institutional constraints which constitutes a general framework. However, organizations are endowed with unequal social power.

Seeing particularism as an institution, as NIE would, cannot explain how particularistic ties persist in state-society interaction because particularism is an over-arching institution affecting all organizations similarly.

This is also why the NIE is criticized for offering a functionalist/tautological perspective which can be summarized as transaction costs leading to the emergence of institutions which arise to minimize transaction costs. For instance, the NIE suggests that the type ofproperty rights which will prevail depends on the costs of transaction (Harriss et al.

1995). Transaction costs become an all-purpose tool brought in to solve any and every puzzle but in fact deprived of explanatory power (Toye 1995: 65).

33 Thus, the question of which institutional forms will prevail or how they are

determined still remains. In other words, the question ofwhich type of

property rights is likely to prevail is not answered by the NIE because it

ignores the centrality of politics (Bates 1995). Bates suggests that we put

politics back in. That is, the type of institution that will prevail would depend

on the structure ofpolitics in a given case. According to Bates, property rights,

contract law and other economic institutions are created by the state (Bates

1995).11 Furthermore, 1 argue that state as social actor is endowed with

differential social power compared to civil society organizations, for instance,

and that power relations must be taken into account to exp Iain what type of

institutions prevail under what conditions. Thus, as 1 will show, the state, as a

social actor, establishes particularistic ties while civil society organizations are

vulnerable parties in this interaction. Only by taking into account power

relations through a sociological analysis of organizations as social actors can

we account for patterns of interaction, whether they be particularistic or

uni versalistic.

There is also one analysis in which the concept ofrent has been

undertaken sociologically, outside purely economic analyses. According to

Sorensen, rent provides the key concept in a structural theory of inequality

because rents attached to positions in social structure provide advantages

obtained independently of the efforts of persons occupying these positions

11 Bates also criticizes the NIE for a basic internaI contradiction. The NIE argues that when people encOlmter a social dilemma, that is a situation in which the choices made by rational individuals produce outcomes that are socially irrational, they create new institutions to transcend the dilemma. For instance, since public goods are not provided in the market, state institutions are created to ensure the provision of public goods. Bates, however, argues that the creation of the institution itselfis a public good and as such, would generate incentives to free ride. That is, rational individuals would not he willing to incur the costs of its provision. This constitutes a basic contradiction for the NIE (Bates 1995).

34 (Sorensen 1996: 1338). Rent-generating resources have properties such that

the benefit of rent can be obtained without any effort by the recipients and

therefore, these resources can become organized in social structure in such a

manner that they provide advantages for incumbents of social positions that

are independent of the characteristics of the incumbents. 12 As a result,

inequalities created by rents may become inequalities created by social

structure (Sorensen 1996: 1361). The interests generated by the acquisition

and protection of rents will be conflict-creating. As such, rent is the basis for

the formation of classes, in the general sense of conflict groups (Sorensen

1996: 1362).

Problem of modemization

If we move outside of the neoclassical approach, it is possible to find

that rent seeking and more generally, particularistic relations such as

clientelism have been treated as part of a historical structural context.

Mouzelis (1995) makes the important point that it is the actual structure of the

state that helps to account for the differential performances of late-developing

countries. The problem is one ofintegration of masses ofpeople dislocated by

the process of modemization. People leave the countryside as a result of

commercialization; but they become unemployed or employed in low-

productivity jobs as they cannot be absorbed by an industrial sector which is

undeveloped (Mouzelis 1995: 228). More often than not, state is the biggest

actor in industrialization and thus, the bourgeoisie and the working classes as

weIl as civil society organizations emerge under state tutelage. Under these

12 One has to be cautious since as we have seen, competition for rents involve one sort of effort, the effort to obtain the rents. Yet, these are not productive efforts. Thus, this definition must be modified to emphasize that benefits are provided independent of productive efforts.

35 conditions, it is difficult to institutionalize what Mouzelis calls the integrative

mode of inclusion and people are brought into the center via the incorportive-

clientelistic mode (Mouzelis 1995).13 Lower classes are integrated into

national politics through the establishment of particularistic, clientelistic ties.

This creates a double bind for late developing states since late development

requires effective state involvement but the state is also the source of anti-

development forces since it operates through particularistic ties (Mouzelis

1995).

What Mouzelis argues for the case of Greece has been argued for

Turkey as well. 14 Sunar explains the prevalence of particularism and

clientelism as the quasi-solution found for filling the gap that existed between

a central state at the top without ties in the society and a traditional society at the bottom. According to Sunar, establishing patron-client relations was the

only effective way of gaining social support in the context of a modernizing

state and a 'unreconstructed' traditional society (Sunar 1996: 145). Others have emphasized the distance between the state at the top and "people" at the

bottom, between the "center" and the "periphery" (Kolars 1973; Mardin

1973). This distance has been filled with patronage politics (Sunar 1996;

Sunar 1990; Sayari 1977; Kudat 1975). Kudat makes the same argument for

Eastern Turkey, pointing out that the inability of the state to reach the countryside as weIl as widespread poverty, fragmentation of political power, ethnic and religious cleavages have contributed to the persistent importance of patrons rather than formal political organizations and parties (Kudat 1975: 73).

13 The integrative mode of inclusion is the WestemlEuropean path where people are brought into the national political arena through autonomous, horizontal ties. The incorporative clientelistic mode brings people into the center through particularistic patron-client networks (Mouzelis 1995: 231). 14 For a similar argument for Argentina and Mexico, see Gibson (1997).

36 Finally, this type of gap between the state and people argument has

been made by Englebert in the context of Africa. Englebert argues that African

states are not endogenous creations of local history and as such, remain

outside domestic power relations. Thus, they lack legitimacy. As a result of

this lack of legitimacy, state elites resort to patronage, nepotism and corruption

to gain support for themselves (Englebert 2000: 5). Neo-patrimonialism is not

an outcome of Mrican culture but rather an outcome ofhistorical conditions.

Levels of state legitimacy bear directly on developmental performances and

Englebert shows that differential developmental performances of African

states are explained by levels of state legitimacy (Englebert 2000).

State-civil society interaction

The need to set up a theoretical framework of analysis in which rent

seeking relations are understood as embedded in a historical and institutional

context requires us to tum to sociological analyses of the state and its

interactions with civil society groups. When we look at the literature on the

state, we see that the importance of the state as an actor in development has

been emphasized ever since there was a call to "bring the state back in" (Evans

et al. 1985). Approaches that focused on the role of the state emphasized its

autonomy, perceiving states as organizations capable of implementing goals

defined independently of interests and thus, able to shape society. The state is seen as a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed by a

more-or-Iess well-coordinated executive authority (Skocpol 1979: 29).15

15 This approach is a critique of the liberal and Marxist approaches to the state which, according to Skocpol, reduce the state to an arena where conflicts over basic social and economic interests are fought out (Skocpol 1979: 25). Nevertheless, Skocpol goes on to add that basic state organizations are built and operate within the context of class-divided socio-

37 These 'state-only' approaches were criticized for neglecting the social context

in which states were embedded (Evans 1995). Evans argued that it is

"embedded autonomy" which is the necessary combination for successful

developmental outcomes, meaning that the state is involved with particular

social groups with whom it shares a joint transformation project while at the

same time it maintains its autonomy.

The c1assical definition of civil society is an individualistic concept

which portrays it as a collection of individuals pursuing their private interests

in competition with each other. It is associated with the rise of the market and

thus, seen as constituting a sphere that is in opposition to the state. Tolerance,

a counterbalance to despotism and respect for individual rights (and thus,

respect for rule of law, private property) are crucial elements in this

conception of civil society (for a review of the liberal tradition of civil society,

see Hann 1996; Hall 1995; Keane 1988; Dietz 1987). One modification to this

conception of civil society is suggested by Hall who argues that it is necessary

to go beyond the traditional definition of civil society as the self-organization

of strong and autonomous groups that balance the state by emphasizing state-

society interactions rather than seeing the two as diametrically opposed. The

state is needed by civil society to ensure protection and basic social conditions

(Hall 1995: 15_16).16 This, of course, supports the idea that the state and civil

society reinforce each other which 1 will discuss further below.

economic relations and within the context of national an international economic dynamics (Skocpol 1979: 29). 16 Many reformers in Eastern Europe had sought to abolish the state, in the belief that civil society would work best in its absence but the situation in Russia, lacking mIe oflaw, proves the weakness of this view that state is exclusively a threat (Hall 1995: 16).

38 The liberal tradition is further challenged by Oxhom who develops a collectivist perspective of civil society. According to Oxhom, liberal definitions of civil society ignore the importance of power relations in social relations. Oxhom argues that the liberal perspective of civil society is ethnocentric and exclusionary in three fundamental ways (Oxhom 2003). First, the liberal perspective focuses on the individual and ignores the collective. In many historical contexts and regions of the world, communities and larger social networks to which the individual belongs are emphasized rather than the individual. AIso, the liberal emphasis on individual rights overlooks the collective dimension of rights in established democracies. Rights are granted to groups of people (such as women) and such rights for disadvantaged groups are often the result of collective struggles (Oxhom 2003). Secondly, in the liberal perspective, civil society is understood to have normative foundations such as civicness, trust, and associability. This understanding is based on

Western history and is exclusionary of societies that do not share that history.

Thirdly, liberal discussions of civil society are characterized by a sharp separation of state and civil society. Oxhom rightly points out that such separation ignores how the nature of the state and political regime fundamentally shape civil society (Oxhom 2003). States play an important role in creating and/or strengthening civil society actors. As 1 show throughout this dissertation, state and civil society as sharply separated from each other does not have an empirical basis. Thus, analysis must be corrected accordingly.

State and civil society can only be studied in interaction with each other. As much as a capable state strengthens civil society actors as Oxhom argues, the lack of a capable state affects civil society actors adversely, as the two cases of

39 my research show. Oxhom also points out that the state-civil society

dichotomy ignores the fact that many civil society actors including social

movements, business groups and organized labor target the state directly in

order to ensure their demands are met (Oxhom 2003). Activists perceive civil

society as active citizenship. "It is not about minimizing the state but about

increasing the responsiveness of political institutions. It is about the

radicalization of democracy and the redistribution of political power"

(Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001: 11).

Oxhom defines civil society as "the social fabric formed by a

multip licit y of self-constituted territorially- and functionally-based units which

peacefully co-exist and collectively resist subordination to the state, at the

same time that they demand inclusion into national political structures"

(Oxhom 1995:251-2). This dual dynamic ofresistance and inclusion reflect a

relative dispersion of political power. In societies where political power is

more concentrated, civil society is weaker (Oxhom forthcoming: 7).

Furthermore, civil society is distinct from economic structure even though its

potential is conditioned by economic structure (Oxhom forthcoming: 8).17

Most importantly, in this approach, civil society can accommodate collective

actors that engage in social struggles as opposed to being an aggregation of individuals pursuing private interests. The nature of collective actors of civil

society and their specific demands or objectives distinguishes civil society from other social formations (Oxhom forthcoming: Il). Similarly, Mouffe advocates a collectivist approach to civil society as she argues that notions of

17 Economic structure creates shared interests that can serve as a basis for the emergence of important collective actors such as workers, professionals, peasants, business groups. AIso, it affects the availability of resources and may affect the ability of different groups to engage in collective action (Oxhom forthcoming a: 8).

40 citizenship and community are stripped of content by liberal individualism

(Mouffe 1992: 3). Civil society is perceived to consist of citizens who can act

collectively to resolve democraticaIly the issues that concem their life and who

exercise citizenship rights which are not only political but also social (Mouffe

1992). Lewis emphasizes that conflicts over power and politics take place in

civil society and cannot be separated from formaI political pro cesses in which

the state has a defining role (Lewis 2001).

The focus on the role of civil society has been utilized to exp Iain good

government. Such a focus drew attention to the importance of social capital in

affecting quality of democracy and performance of govemments. Social

capital is a concept that has become most popular recently. One such 'society

only' approach that places social capital at the center is Putnam's comparative

study of the differences between the northem and southem regions of Italy in

which he finds that better institutional performance and better govemment in

the North is explained by the degree of civicness (Putnam 1993). A civic

community is marked by active participation in public affairs, equal rights and

obligations for all, trust among the members and a network of horizontal

associations (Putnam 1993: 87-91). What defines the civic community is the

existence of social capital which is the "features of social organization, such as

trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by

facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993: 167). This seemingly basic

definition is in fact controversial. The problem is that it is not clear from this

definition what can be included as social capital and what must be excluded.

The example ofrent seeking, particularistic relations makes my point exactly.

These types of relations are marked by reciprocity and networks as weIl but

41 they do not produce horizontal association and good democracy. Quite the opposite. Thus, it is crucial to clarify what exactly constitutes social capital.

The tendency has rather become to calI anything and everything social capital, without giving detailed attention to how exactly the activity in

question rnight give rise to the goods social capital is supposed to facilitate.

This problem does not merely point to linguistic concems but rather to

conceptual issues as it is closely related to the problem of identifying the causal mechanism between social capital and public goods such as democratic participation and collective action. For instance, Putnam has extended the

range of activities to include such things as card playing but it is not clear through which mechanisms this would contribute to good govemment and democratic participation (Putnam 2000). Ladd, arguing against Putnam's

claim that there is a decline in associationallife in the U.S., suggests that the form of association has changed rather than declined (Ladd 1999). However, his study finds that the largest involvement is parents helping with homework

and "being there for the child" which are, again, activities whose contribution to producing social capital is unclear. Parents' working with their own

individual children is at a big distance from horizontal association and

building networks and ties.

AlI ofthis discussion raises, once again, the question ofwhat the nature of social capital is. Do we count any interaction, any associational membership or do we look at content? 1 would argue for the latter as paying attention to the content of the nature ofinvolvement leaves us with a very different picture, with different consequences in terms of accountability and inclusion. As

Skocpol points out, there has been a transformation from membership to

42 advocacy which means that ci vic entrepreneurs do not think of recruiting interactive citizen-members but rather, they open a national office and manage national projects and member-building from the center (SkocpoI1999). This transformation has serious consequences for democratic accountability and citizenship leverage on politics in that they cannot be exercised in this transformed structure of civic life. Thus, it is not generating the same public good. AIso, this transformation has distributional consequences since associations now have predominantly upper-middle-class membership

(SkocpoI1999). Wuthnow also acknowledges this distributional problem in his discussion of the League ofWomen Voters which became more consolidated but also more dorninated by upper-rniddle-class women

(Wuthnow 1998). This is especially a grave concem if democracy is understood as equal rights and inclusion for all since it is obvious that this new civic life will not deliver it. At most, it will deliver Dahl's polyarchy. Thus, the nature of social capital is absolutely crucial.

The unclear nature of social capital is best portrayed in

Lowndes' critique which rightly points out that studies of social capital has been mostly directed at male-dominated activities such as sports clubs or pub attendance. Social networks such as child-care activities that involve women, on the other hand, have been largely ignored (Lowndes 2000). Thinking about social capital in a gender-specific context helps to clarify the causal links between social capital activities and the democratic good and the public involvement. At the very least, it points to the lack thereof. According to

Lowndes, the answer to the question of why child-care networks have not been considered in analyses of social capital lies in the public/private divide which

43 delegates all activities traditionally associated with women such as child-care

to the private sphere. These activities are seen as outside politics and issues of

citizenship which belong in the public sphere. Thus, it is assumed that child

care activities take place in the family which falls outside of the networks of

trust and reciprocity and as a result, have no relevance for analyses of social

capital (Lowndes 2000). This perception, however, immediately raises the

question ofhow sorne of the activities seen as conducive to generating social

capital such as card-playing (Putnam 2000) can be placed in the public sphere.

How are they really relevant? This again goes back to the nature of social

capital (or what kind of association is useful for the democratic good) which is

in turn related to the causal links between social capital and the democratic

good. Lowndes identifies this as the biggest question facing social capital

analysis as well: "what are the causal links within the virtuous circle of social

capital- between social networks of trust and reciprocity, patterns ofpolitical

engagement, and democratic and economic health?" (Lowndes 2000: 536).

1 think that this lack of clarity is what also gives rise to discussions on

good social capital and bad social capital or the "dark side" of social capital.

That is, characteristics such as reciprocity and trust bound up in networks are

also typical of rent-seeking, corrupt systems or even the Mafia for that matter.

Warren argues that due to such vagueness in the notion of social capital,

"social bads" such as corruption that social capital can pro duce have gone

unnoticed (Warren 2002). His suggests that adopting Coleman's and

Bourdieu's initial definition so that social relations can be considered as social

capital when they provide a retum for the participants will remove this

vagueness and allow us to focus on negative externalities that social capital

44 can produce (Warren 2002). According to Coleman, social-structural resources act as social capital when they enable individuals to achieve certain ends that would not be possible in the absence of such social capital. Thus, social capital is productive in this sense (Coleman 1994). Still, recognizing negative externalities of social capital as Warren does, do es not ultimately resolve the issue ofhow social capital produces public goods, collective action and participatory democracy. As Coleman points out, a given form of social capital that facilitates certain actions may be useless or even harrnful for others

(Coleman 1994). What it does is identify the problematic relationship between the nature of social capital and democracy.

The same kind of distinction is made by others in terms ofinclusionary vs. exclusionary social capital, "social" vs. "unsocial" capital (Foley, Edwards and Diani 2001; Levi 1996). According to Foley et al., this distinction is not captured by what they call the political/civic culture approach which relies on aggregate measures of attitudes such as generalized trust and as such, ignores crucial issues of distribution of social capital between and within groups (such as ethnic groups or classes). The kind of association (rather than mere associational density), who has access, how inclusionary or exclusionary the connections are all crucial in understanding what social and political outcomes will be generated (Foley, Edwards, and Diani 2001). Thus, understanding the nature of social capital is the first step toward understanding the causal links generating either public goods or public bads. Foley et al. suggest that this can be done by analyzing how specific social contexts shape the use of social capital. The social context is crucial in deterrnining how social capital will be put into use because resources and access (both of which must exist as

45 components of social capital) are distributed unevenly and the distribution

varies from context to context which, in tum, affects the use of social capital

(Foley, Edwards, and Diani 2001).

It is this point that 1 would like to focus and expand on, that is the

importance of the social context in understanding what outcomes social capital

will generate. More specifically, 1 will argue that nature of the state is a crucial

factor in determining whether the characteristics attributed to social capital

such as reciprocity and networks generate democratic participation, inclusion

and collective action or exclusion and corruption. 1 have already touched on

the issues surrounding causal links while discussing the vagueness of the

concept of social capital. The vagueness in the definition of social capital is

directly related to the underexplored links between social capital and public

goods such as democracy and participation. If social capital can produce

opposite outcomes, what we absolutely must do is identify under which

conditions social capital produces democracy, participation and inclusion and

under what conditions it produces corruption and exclusion. That is why we

cannot simply assert that social capital in general pro duces good govemment,

leaving the me chanis ms unexplored. The suggested links are that people who join associations and participate in civic life develop norms of trust and

reciprocity. They also acquire civic skills such as making speeches, signing

petitions and the like. According to Putnam, a community that has inherited a

large stock of social capital in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks

of civic engagement can coordinate actions much more easily. Networks of

civic engagement make communication easier and improve the flow of information about the trustworthiness of individuals (Putnam 1993: 174). Even

46 though Putnam relates the existence of a strong civil society to the degree of

civicness in a community determined by the stock of social capital, he does

not sufficiently explain where civicness cornes from or how social capital is

accumulated, apart from a historically path dependent explanation that argues

that social capital is inherited through traditions of civic engagement. It is true

that Putnam relates the traditions of civic engagement to the lack of

authoritarian rule in the North whereas the South failed to develop civicness

because ofauthoritarian rule (Putnam 1993: 130_1)18. Yet, the mechanisms

through which a community becomes civic and accumulates social capital

needs to be further developed in order to answer the more crucial question of

how horizontal networks prove productive for the existence of strong civil

societies accompanied by publicly-oriented states. Levi makes the same

critique, arguing that what is unclear is that how citizens joining a bird

watching club become politically active and organize for political demands.

Furthermore, the demands made can be particularistic on behalf of one group,

to the exclusion of others (Levi 1996).

The vagueness due to under-analyzed causal mechanisms between

social capital and the political outcomes it will generate is aggravated by a

lack of attention to the nature of the state as a possible factor influencing the

nature/use of social capital. The role of the state has been to a large degree ignored in discussions of social capital as they tend to focus solely on civil society. 19 Many have pointed this out as a serious shortcoming and stressed the importance of the impact state institutions can have on the creation/use of

18 Even this is a questionable c1aim as Tarrow shows that Putnam's historical account of Italy's north and south regions leaves out important developments. A c10ser look shows that after a short period ofvoluntary associations, northern city-states produced c10sed urban oligarchies. Putnam ignores the later stages of city-state development (Tarrow 1996). 19 The central figure ofthis approach is of course Putnam (Putnam 1993,2000).

47 social capital (Levi 1996; Tarrow 1996; Hall 1999; Rothstein 2001; Booth and

Richard 2001; Rothstein and Stolle forthcoming) as well as on civil society

actors (Oxhom 2003). It is crucial because the role of the state in determining

the use of social capital may prove to be the missing link in the causal

mechanism between social capital and the political outcomes/public goods (or

its lack thereot) it is supposed to generate. ContraI)' to Putnam's daim that

intermediate associations create generalized trust, Levi argues that state

institutions can, under certain conditions, provide support for creating

generalized trust among citizens, to say the veI)' least. Levi also argues that

states may do more than provide the basis for generalized trust among citizens;

states affect civic behavior depending on whether they create trust or distrust

from the citizens towards themselves (Levi 1996: 50-51). For instance, Tarrow

gives the example of the last two regimes in southem Italy which, before the

regionjoined the North, worked actively to create mutual distrust and conflict,

destroying horizontal ties of solidarity and replacing them with vertical ties of

dependence and exploitation (Tarrow 1996: 394). A specific example ofhow

the state "creates social capital from ab ove" is the economic support given by the state in Sweden to study circles and educational associations which

constitute a major civic network in Sweden (Rothstein 2001). Thus, state

structures help shape any "civicness" or uses of social capital. According to

Tarrow, ignoringthis is one of the central flaws in Putnam's approach (Tarrow

1996). Rothstein and Stolle agree, arguing that contemporary political

institutions are important deterrninants of social capital. Furthermore, they establish a link between micro and macro levels of trust, with state institutions as the determinants of generalized trust. Specifically, they argue that building

48 and maintenance of high institutional trust levels depends on the degree of perceived faimess and impartiality of institutions responsible for the implementation of public policies, which then spills over to generalized trust

(Rothstein and Stolle forthcoming). Brehm and Rahn find empirical support for the effect of confidence in govemment (i.e. high institutional trust) on interpersonal trust and argue that good performance of state institutions can foster social capital while poor performance will contribute to its decline by undermining trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997).

Other studies that take into account both the state and civil society emphasize their interaction, rather thanjust taking a 'state-only' or 'society only' perspective (Hall and Ikenberry 1989; Migdal et al. 1994; Evans 1997;

Oxhom 2003). The hypothesis of mutual empowerment proposes that the increased vitality of civil society and the increased capacity of the state reinforce each other rather than encroach upon each other (Migdal 1994). This is based on a positive-sum understanding of power. The empowerment of social forces does not necessarily decrease the ability of the state to govem effectively. Under certain circumstances, interactions between the state and society may create more power for both although this is not always so and it is an empirical question when state and society will be mutually empowering

(Migdal1994: 4). This approach takes the formations and transformations of states and societies as reciprocal, instead of autonomous processes. It analyzes the intersections ofstate and society (Kohli and Shue 1994: 321). The basic rights necessary to the emergence and maintenance of civil society can only be guaranteed by the state (Oxhom 2003). As Oxhom points out, even in the

United States, the epitome of a liberal civil society, the state plays an

49 important role in facilitating the emergence of civil society actors through mechanisms such as tax exemptions for civil society organizations and financial contributions to them (ibid). Thus, a strong civil society is intricately linked to the existence of a capable state.

In discussions of state-NGO relationship as well, it has been argued that NGO impact is strongest where state presence is significant (Farrington and Bebbington 1993). Overstating capacities of grass roots organizations is counter-productive (ibid). Similarly, Lewis (2001) points out that there is increasing concern that NGOs may have been promoted beyond their level of competence. The reason for this is the neglect of the role of the state in shaping civil society which is a result of the predominant neoliberal agenda.

Most critiques of the neoliberal agenda inc1uding the collectivist approach to civil society emphasize that the neoliberal agenda overemphasizes the potential contribution of civil society organizations while arguing for a very limited role for the state (Oxhom 2003; Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001;

Chandhoke 2002). As 1 will show throughout the thesis, the dichotomous approach of the neoliberal approaches have no empirical basis since the state and civil society can be explained only in interaction with each other.

The possibility of mutual empowerment between the state and society can be understood by using Mann's typologies of state power (Hall and

Ikenberry 1989; Wang 1999). Mann differentiates between despotic power of the state and infrastructural power of the state. Despotic power refers to the range of actions that state elites can undertake without negotiating with civil society whereas infrastructural power refers to the institutional capacity of a central state to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions

50 (Mann 1993: 59). Hall and Ikenberry argue that a strong state is one which is able to penetrate and organize society rather than astate which is highly despotic (Hall and Ikenberry 1989: 13). Thus, state strength is measured by its ability to work with other power centers in society. Also, making these distinctions between different types of state power rules out the idea that state society relations are necessarily based on a zero-sum power relation (Wang

1999: 236). Although the despotic power of the state increases at the expense of society, infrastructural power is a "two-way street" since it also increases the ability of civil society to control the state (Mann 1993: 59).

The argument that state and society reinforce each other in a positive sum relationship has received sorne empirical support. Applying the "synergy hypothesis" in different development contexts has shown that sorne capable states and vibrant civil societies work together towards common goals (Evans

1997). Evans identifies two contrasting forms of state-society relations that lead to synergy. The first one is the conventional conceptualization of a healthy relationship between the public and private spheres where synergy depends on complementarity and possibilities for civic action are enhanced by the provision of public goods. In this instance of synergy, the state pro vides complementary public goods (an example is the provision of dams in an irrigation project) but is not further involved (Evans 1997: 7). The second view of synergy emphasizes embeddedness which sees trust and productive informal networks as a property of civil society that spans the public/private divide. A combination of complementarity and embeddedness emerges in the case studies and they are mutually supportive (ibid: 180).

51 These approaches that focus on the interaction between the state and society do not fully account for why this interaction would be positive-sum rather than a negative-sum relationship such as rent-seeking. The question of what conditions are conducive to the development of synergy is complex and brings us again to existing stock of social capital and how exactly it is accumulated. Evans poses the problem as a question of endowments versus constructability. The existence of social capital is an endowment. Other endowments are necessary properties of govemment institutions and the degree ofinequality (Evans 1997: 190). These factors, where they exist, are obviously conducive to productive state-society relations; however, how they might be built is a more elusive task. Yet, this is crucial. If not given government institutions with proper characteristics and productive state society networks, synergy might easily degenerate into rent-seeking or patron client relations which are far more pervasive in developing countries.

Evans acknowledges that missing endowments will make the construction of synergetic relations very difficult. Still, he is optimistic given sorne of the trends that point at constructability. For instance, the case studies show that levels of trust and solidarity which characterize social capital are not necessarily high in the successful development projects. The more important missing link is "competent, engaged set of public institutions" according to

Evans since synergy emerges out of communities that are ordinary in terrns of their stock of social capital but govemments vary significantly in terms of their ab i lit y to contribute to the creation of effective civic organizations (Evans

1997: 193). Thus, the weak link is the character of the state apparatus in creating synergistic relations. The East Asian cases confirm the importance of

52 a robust bureaucracy where the existence of public institutions with traditional

Weberian features prevents the close, informal networks from degenerating into rent-seeking relations (ibid: 194-5).

AlI ofthis again emphasizes the crucial role of the state in affecting the levels and use of social capital. Recent research shows that the nature of state institutions is the key in understanding whether the characteristics attributed to social capital such as reciprocity and networks generate democratic participation, inclusion and collective action or exclusion and corruption. The discussion on social capital reveals that there may be various possibilities in the use of social capital and the outcomes it will generate and that the state is crucial in shaping which ofthese possibilities will be in effect. 1 think that there are two such major possibilities with respect to how the state may interact with civil society. The first possibility or trajectory in state-civil society interaction is a positive-sum relationship which is also the most researched and empirically shown to hold in cases of mutual empowerment or synergy. In this mode of interaction, the robust state capable of delivering public goods reinforces the capacities of civil society organizations. The second mode of state-civil society interaction is a negative-sum relationship in which state failure, that is, a dissolved state incapable of delivering public goods, leads to the persistence ofrent-seeking, particularized relations. My research on the interaction between the Turkish state and two associations unravels the mechanisms of the latter mode of interaction. The first case study,

Kizilay, demonstrates how the state creates a multilevel chain system of particularistic networks by co-opting an association and using it as a source of particularized distribution. The second case study, AKUT, shows how state

53 failure adversely affects a civil society organization through over-missionizing it. Both cases underline the importance of the nature of the state in affecting civil society organizations and its implications for the use of social capital in a negative-sum relationship where the state is incapable of pro vi ding public goods and can only establish particularized networks.

54 Chapter 3: Setting the Scene

The state tradition in Turkey

Since 1 argue that historical structural factors are crucial in understanding the causal mechanisms of particularistic ties formed by the state, the inevitable question we need to ask first is what the historical structural formation of the state in Turkey is. The case of Turkey is particularly an intriguing case to analyze in order to answer the question of why rent seeking occurs in sorne states since these types of particularistic relations are pervasive in Turkey despite a considerable degree of modernization and industrialization. Historically, the legacy of the Ottoman

Empire has determined, to a certain extent, the type of state and the nature of civil society in Turkey. This legacy has meant that it is a centralized and patrimonial state with a weak civil society characterized by the lack of collective actors. Insel defines patrimonialism as a type of social organization

(Insel 1996). In this type of social organization, the land and people belong to the state. Ownership is represented by the sultan in the name of the state and the center takes on the role of the 'father' towards the periphery. This patrimonial state tradition of the Ottoman Empire has continued its legacy in the Turkish Republic as a result of which a tradition in which the state as the only guarantor of society is taken as a given (ibid).

The Ottoman Empire was an agrarian society with a central bureaucracy at the top. There was a distinct division between the producing population and the ruling class which was made up of the bureaucrats and the military. Throughout the empire, small peasant ownership was pervasive since the peasants were entitled to their land. Hypothetically, aIl land belonged to

55 the sultan and there was no private property, with exceptions allowed.

Peasants were de facto owners of the land they worked and in return for the protection of small peasant ownership granted by the sultan, they were liable to pay taxes to the central authority. The state administered production in the cities through gui Ids which it very tightly controlled. The quantity and the quality of products as well as the prices were strictly determined within the guild system. It was very difficult to establish a new guild as they tried to prevent competition. The state tried to control the merchants as well by setting price ceilings and taxed them. The two main concems of the state were fiscal revenues and provisioning of large urban centers, especially the capital. Thus, the whole system was administered by the state to achieve those ends. Insel argues that an ideology of state service became dominant in the bureaucracy in the 1i h century which became an ideology of protecting the state (Insel 1996).

The state constituted the most important resource of wealth and the only legitimate source of power (ibid: 85). The Ottoman state continuously worked to offset/inhibit the emergence of alternative sources of power in society.

Thus, the state was strongly centralist as it refused to enter into alliances in the periphery (Insel 1996). This centralist tradition was mainly based on state ownership and the right of confiscation (ibid).

The patrimonial and centralized nature of the Turkish state has been underlined as an important factor that accounts for the existence of patron client networks and particularistic relations in Turkey. It should be noted that the literature on particularistic relations in Turkey deal almost exclusively with patron-client networks. Even though both rent seeking and patron-client networks are particularistic relations and by no means unrelated, they must

56 nevertheless be differentiated since patron-client networks refer to broader

relations of exchange where one party is not necessarily the state. 20 Patronage

is defined as a form ofreciprocal exchange between parties ofunequal status

and wealth whereby individual patrons and/or political parties seek to mobilize

the support oftheir followers in retum for assistance and benefits (Sayari

1977: 103: Kudat 1975: 66).

The historical characteristics of the state play an important role in

explaining particularistic relations mainly because they gave rise to two social

pro cesses. First, during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish

Republic, a national bourgeoisie was created by the state since no center of

social power other than the state had previously developed in the Ottoman

Empire. The creation of the national bourgeoisie by the state has led to the

establishment oftight-knit, particularistic relations between the state and the

bourgeoisie. Secondly, a centralized state at the top with lack ofties in society

attempted to solve the problem of disconnectedness by establishing patron-

client relations.

The establishment of a bourgeois class in Turkey was the result of a

deliberate attempt on the part of state elites to create a national bourgeoisie as

part of the larger project of national economic development. The initiation of

this project goes back to the end of the Ottoman Empire when the Committee

of Union and Progress (CUP), the party of the Young Turks, took several steps

towards this end. The CUP started out by making trade laws and property

rights conducive to private ownership (Ahmad 1980). Especially after its

announcement of the unilateral abolition of the capitulations in 1914 with the

20 Please see the introduction chapter for a detailed discussion of these distinctions and definitions.

57 onset ofWorld War l, it embarked on supporting a Turkish entrepreneurial class more vigorously. Profiteering during the World War 1 became a major means through which the CUP supported the accumulation of capital in the hands of the national bourgeoisie that was being created (Ahmad 1980; Bugra

1994; Insel 1996). Another measure taken by the CUP to create a national bourgeoisie was the creation of commercial and to a much lesser extent industrial companies which were set up to raise scarce capital. The initiative for the establishment of almost any commercial or industrial company came from the bureaucracy or the CUP which was carried out in partnership with either local merchants, traders and artisans or local notables (Ahmad 1980:

343). Finally, not only did the CUP support entrepreneurship but they themselves became entrepreneurs and members of the national bourgeoisie.

Where constituents like the artisans and the traders were rnissing, the CUP made entrepreneurs ofbureaucrats and professionals (Ahmad 1980: 338;

Bugra 1994: 71-72). The founding members of the new companies and banks had either close relations with the party or they were members of the party.

The project of national economic development and the creation of a national bourgeoisie along with nation-state building were carried on with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Bugra argues that the development of the private sector in the Republican era resembles that of the relationship between the state and the private sector in the CUP era. In the Republican era as weIl, the development of an entrepreneurial class that is defined, above all, by its relationship to the political power centers can be observed (Bugra 1994:

81). The bourgeoisie had to be, above all, in compliance with the general aims of the state (lnsel 1996). Yet, this was a reciprocal interaction in the sense that

58 the state attempted to control the bourgeoisie while at the same time the latter asked for protection and benefits. Thus, there was a mutual dependency (Insel

1996: 231). As soon as the bourgeoisie defected from this understanding, its relationship to the state became conflictual (Insel 1996). This new bourgeoisie, created by the state, had to remain in its place which was deterrnined by the state. The state also took care to ensure that the bourgeoisie was dependent on material resources provided by the state (ibid). This was a continuation of the patrimonial state tradition in the Ottoman Empire which required the state to be the only source of wealth and power (Insel 1996).

Similar to the CUP period, the founding members of new companies and banks in the Republican era were mostly politicians, ministers and parliamentarians ((Insel 1996). For instance, M. Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, founded a private bank in 1924. More than a third of the founding partners were politicians close to M. Kemal. The Minister of

Economy at the time, CelaI Bayar, quit his post to become the director of the bank. The members of the board of directors were all parliamentarians, two of them being ministers (Insel 1996).

The 1950s is a turning point since with the transition to democracy, a political party explicitly advocating markets and the private sector came to power. Nevertheless, continuity rather than change has marked this period as weIl. As Insel (1996) points out, even though the year 1950 has been called the transition to liberalism, liberalism remained within the boundaries drawn by the state. Actors claimed to be unique to liberalism were none other than actors who had been made into entrepreneurs in a guided economy (Insel

1996: 191). This period has been marked by contradictions which Bugra calls

59 a love and hate relationship between the state and the businessmen. On the one

hand, the Oemocrat Party (OP) advocated a liberal stand while on the other,

arbitrary interventions by the OP subject to frequent changes were common

(InseI1996; Bugra 1994). Thus, a contradictory situation was created whereby

the ruling party which advocated liberal policies still resorted to interventionist

policies. For instance, the president of the OP party and the newly elected

prime rninister in 1950 claimed that privatization was no longer necessary

(though still a legitimate demand) because state support offered more

profitable opportunities to the private sector (Insel 1996: 193). Sorne

businessmen were allowed to accumulate wealth through unaccountable

means. Yet, the business sector in general suffered from the uncertainties

associated with such arbitrary interventions (Bugra 1994: 176). What we find

again is that particularism and clientelism have dominated state-business

relations in this period. Under such arbitrary interventions, rent-seeking

activities were encouraged.

The historical pro cess of a national bourgeoisie creation by the

state and the resulting particularistic relationship between the state and the

bourgeoisie has been reinforced, especially after 1950s. This brings us to the

second outcome that the patrimonial, centralized state gave rise to. Sunar explains the prevalence of particularism and c1ientelism as the quasi-solution found to filling the gap that existed between a central state at the top without ties in the society and a traditional society at the bottom. He argues that the mechanisms that the OP came up with to fill the gap between the bureaucratic state and the "people" were populism and patronage. The "people" were to be incorporated without re-traditionalizing the state and modernization had to be

60 maintained without isolating the people (Sunar 1990: 747). Other scholars have emphasized the distance between the state at the top and "people" at the bottom. Kolars poses the issue as the incorporation of the villager into the national entity, a project the state has embarked on in different periods, for instance through People's Houses (Halk Evleri) during the one-party rule and through the establishment of government agencies in the rural areas (Kolars

1973). Mardin (1973) argues that the main political c1eavage in the Ottoman

Empire and later in the Turkish Republic was between the center and the periphery. According to Mardin, the founding party of the Republic, the

Republican People's Party (RPP), was unsuccessful in establishing contact with the rural masses (Mardin 1973: 183). Despite the successful co-optation of a sizable portion of the provincial notable c1ass into the ranks of the RPP, the state failed in its attempts to establish new links between the govemment and the peasants (Mardin 1973: 182-183).

Thus, patronage politics has come to fill the gap between the isolated state at the top and the society at the bottom/periphery (Sunar 1996;

Sunar 1990; Sayari 1977; Kudat 1975). According to Kudat, the inability of the state to reach the countryside as well as widespread poverty, fragmentation of political power, ethnic and religious c1eavages are factors that have contributed to the persistent importance of patrons rather than formal political organizations and parties (Kudat 1975: 73). Finally, Sayari argues that where horizontal solidarities are relatively weak, there is a greater frequency of c1ientelist social interactions (Sayari 1977: 103).

In sum, the peculiar nature of the relationship of the state in Turkey to its bourgeoisie, having been the creator and the patron of it, has had long-term

61 consequences in that they established close, particularistic relations. AIso, state-society relations in Turkey have been characterized by a gap between the central state at the top and the society at the bottom. The solution found to the problem ofbridging this gap between the centralized state with a project of modernization and the traditional "people" has been establishing relations of patronage. Thus, populi sm and patronage dominated the politicallife of

Turkey. This historicallegacy in Turkey has contributed to the making of a particularistic state.

The historical fie ofKizilay ta the state:

Just like the bourgeoisie in Turkey have close, particularistic ties to the state because oftheir historical relationship, Kizilay, too, has thick ties to the state because oftheir historical involvement. Historically close ties are not confined to state-business relations but also span civil society organizations.

Kizilay is one of the few organizations which pre-dates the Turkish Republic, having been founded in the Ottoman Empire in 1868 and having survived it into the Republic. When the association was first established in the empire, it was met with suspicion, leading to a conflictual relationship with the state.

However, as a new political elite established its mIe, Kizilay became closely intertwined with the state since the new elite took an active interest in it.

The Turkish Red Crescent Society, known as Hilal-i Ahmer (Ottoman

Red Crescent Society) in the empire, was founded as part of the international

Red Cross organization. At the time when the Red Cross initiation was begun, the nationally-founded Red Cross societies came together in 1864 in Geneva where they signed the Geneva Convention of the Red Cross which lays down the basic mission and principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent

62 Movement. This convention was signed by about fifty states, including the

Ottoman Empire. When the official representative of the state sent to the first international Red Cross conference tried to initiate a local unit in the Empire, he was met with reluctance and indifference. Finally, the association was set up with the inspector-general of the army medical service as the president.

Still, the association was met with suspicion by the government which did not approve ofits regulations which was regarded as civilian involvement in military affairs and the association disintegrated after a while (Ozbek 1999;

Akgun and Ulugtekin 2000; Yeniaras 2000; Turkish Encylopedia). The association was started a second time when the lack ofhumanitarian aid for

Ottoman soldiers during wars made the need for a humanitarian association clear. The Red Cross organization was unable to give humanitarian aid to

Ottoman soldiers since there was no local association with whom the Red

Cross could establish contact. The grand vizier (sadrazam) ordered a meeting as a result of which the association was officially founded as Hilal-i Ahmer

Cemiyeti.

Kizilay was disbanded for a second time with the onset of the oppressive reign of Abdulhamid II, a period in which no association or organization outside the strict control of the sultan was allowed to exist. As

Abdulhamid II wished to reign as an absolute monarch, he feared any potential political expansion. As a voluntary association with international links, Kizilay threatened such an expansion. Thus, the sultan used it at his convenience

(Ozbek 1999). Whenever there was a war, the state invited the aid committee to partake in the war effort and used the committee to get assistance from the

Red Cross. As soon as the war ended, however, the committee would be

63 disbanded. For instance, just before the Ottoman-Greek war, the sultan appointed an executive committee to the society by an imperial decree but dissolved it after the war, postponing the foundation of a society to an indefinite date (Ozbek 1999: 24).

Attempts to establish a permanent society by sorne medical professionals continued even though they were frequently sabotaged by the sultan. One instance ofthis was when he tried to confiscate the assets of the former society in order to be used by a municipal hospital. Another was when the sultan, learning of an intended aid from the members of the former executive committee, tried to transfer the society' s money to a govemment account (Ozbek 1999: 24-5). In both cases, the society was protected by its international links. According to Ozbek, the sultan's des ire to temper with

Kizilay had very much to do with the political stmggle between the sultan and the new political elite, the Young Turks.2i Ozbek argues that the newly created poor relief organizations became a site of contention between the sultan and the Young Turks who challenged the legitimacy of the sultan' s mIe.

Abdulhamid II attempted to reinforce rus legitimacy through building two po or-relief institutions, the Poorhouse of Istanbul and the Imperial Hospital for

Children. Through these charity organizations, the sultan sought to emphasize himself as mler and as the protector of rus people (Ozbek 1999). Kizilay which came into existence around the same time was a different matter. As we have seen, the society was met with indifference at the very least and more

21 The newelite emerged out of a large group of intellectuals, professionals and a civil and military bureaucracy who were recruited, trained and employed to carry out the govemmental functions necessitated by the military, educational, legislative and administrative reforms carried out from 1808 onwards (Ozbek 1999).

64 often than not with suspicion and sabotage since it was seen as a possible

avenue for the expansion of the political sphere.

According to Ozbek, the sultan viewed the formation of a voluntary

relief organization with intemationallinks as remaining outside the sphere of

his strict control since the establishment of Kizilay aimed at expanding public

involvement in activities such as the war effort. 22 The sultan had exploited the

problem of poor relief in order to legitimize his position as the absolute

protector ofhis subjects and had, to this end, established the Poorhouse and

the Imperial Hospital for Children (Ozbek 1999). This renewed des ire for

reinforcing ms legitimacy was necessitated by the Young Turks' potential

threat to ms rule. Thus, Kizilay became a site of struggle between the sultan

and the new political elite. For instance, a considerable part ofthis elite came

from the medical profession. Controlling Kizilay would enable the sultan to

control the medical professionals who were active in Kizilay (Ozbek 1999:

26). The sultan also wanted to maintain his monopoly in the field of charity,

relief and aid.

What is striking in all ofthis is both the role of the state elites in the

formation of Kizilay and the state response to it in determining its future

prospects. The first Society was formed under the patronage of Omer Pasa,

commander in-chief of the Imperial Guard and the first president of the

Society became Marko Pasa, inspector-general of the army medical service

(Yeniaras 2000; Ozbek 1999). Kizilay was under the scrutiny of the state from the beginning as it became a site of contention between the Sultan and the

Young Turks. The state intervened many times, first disbanding the Society,

22 As mentioned above the first attempt to establish the society was refuted as it was regarded as "an tmacceptable civilian involvement in military affairs".

65 then appointing an executive committee to it by an imperial decree and after

sorne time, dispersing it yet again.

The ties ofKizilay with the state were strengthened after the Young

Turks gained victory over the sultan, resulting in the overthrow of Abdulhamit

II and the establishment of the parliamentary system. Ozbek argues that

Kizilay, which began to dominate the field of relief, emerged as an arena for

the new elite to establish an identity for itself. The main activities of Kizilay at

this time were organized around war relief since the Ottoman Empire was

continually fighting on various fronts. Kizilay set up hospitals and provided

care for the soldiers. It also worked in public health and disease prevention

and provided services for displaced populations. Through the activities of

Kizilay in wartime and peacetime, the new elite (formed by professionals,

doctors, women and the local elite in sorne provinces) found that they could

participate in the political and social sphere (Ozbek 1999: 23-29). Again it is

important to note that the state elite were present in the Society to a large

extent. In the first congress of Kizilay held in 1911, out of one hundred

delegates, 22 were ministers and prime ministers; 6 were members of the State

Council (Surayi Devlet) members; 12 were parliamentaries; 7 were members

of the military; and 5 were members of the civil administration (Yeniaras

2000: 32-33; Ozbek 1999:26)?3 Thus, Kizilay became closely intertwined

with the state as the new political elite took an active and significant role in it.

These close ties between Kizilay and the state were further reinforced

by the modemization mission attached to Kizilay which was part of the

broader agenda of the Young Turks, now formally organized as the Committee

23 There were also 5 merchants, 6 members of the press and 16 medical doctors.

66 of Union and Progress (CUP). A medical doctor writing in one of the newspapers at the time argued that the lack of an association similar to the Red

Cross associations in the West had been a sign ofbackwardness in the

Ottoman empire and expressed the wish that the formation of Kizilay would now be a measure ofprogress (Akgun and Ulug-tekin 2000: 146-9). This modernization mission is best observed in the foundation of the Women's

Center of Kizilay which worked in collaboration with the Society. The members of the Women's Center consisted of the wives and daughters of the state elite such as the wi ves of bureaucrats, ministers and Prime ministers

(Akgun and Ulug-tekin 2000: 148, 151). The formation of a women's organization was regarded as a step forward in the modernization effort since it had been possible to demonstrate that women as weIl as men can work for the progress of the country. As the women working at the Center provided a first example of women doing charity work in public, it was seen as an indication ofmodernization, very much in line with the political project of the

CUP. The charity work was supported by the wives of the state elite at the top level (Akgun and Ulug-tekin 2000: 150-1). That the Women's Center took on the modemization mission is obvious from these lines published in a calendar prepared by the Center: "Progress cannot be achieved without women"; "one cannot catch with one foot those who advance with two strong feet"; "in order to save a country from destruction, first and foremost significance should be given to girls" (for more examples ofthese lines, see Akgun and Ulug-tekin

2000: 164). Thus, the ties between Kizilay and the state were multiplied and strengthened through the integration of the association into the modernization project of the state.

67 Strong and close ties between the state and Kizilay need not necessarily

lead to particularistic and corrupt exchanges. As 1 have suggested, there are two major possibilities as to how the state may interact with society. A

positive-sum interaction ofmutual empowerment or synergy may also result

from close ties to the state. On the other hand, a negative-sum interaction

results from close ties with a particularistic state which co-opts civil society

organizations. Indeed, corruption of the scale that was exposed in the

aftermath of the '99 earthquake was not always the lot of Kizilay. According

to a participant who worked in Kizilay in 1968-70, corruption was not

prevalent in Kizilay even though she noted the existence of close ties to the

state (Author interview 6; June Il, 2001). This is why the state of affairs in

Kizilay came as a shock in the aftermath of the '99 earthquake. As a national

aid organization, Kizilay held a privileged position in public esteem. However,

by the time we get to 1999, we find that Kizilay is invol ved in the dramatic

failure of the state. The big '99 earthquake in Turkey presented a context with

which to start the study ofparticularistic ties the state establishes with civil

society organizations since the earthquake represents an instance of state

failure in which the state (and affiliated institutions) was unable to deliver

universalistic relief services. The aftermath of the earthquake was a context

which required urgent universalistic public provision and reliefwhich was

precisely what could not be provided by astate pervaded by particularistic ties.

This is why the earthquake is a most blatant instance of state failure where

state failure was spectacularly displayed. Thus, the two case studies ofthis

research emerged out of this context.

68 Selection of the cases:

Why Kizilay?

The earthquake proved to be a breaking point for both of the associations 1 studied. However, it placed these two associations in the public eye in completely dichotomous positions of state vs. civil society, failure vs. success, corrupt vs. clean. It was a breaking point for Kizilay because the earthquake exposed the extent of its ineffectiveness in terms of relief efforts as weIl as the corrupt ties it was involved in.

Kizilay, an association among the ten biggest national associations in

Turkey and one whose foundation pre-dates the foundation of the Turkish

Republic, has an interesting position in that it is by definition part of civil society as an association but at the same time it is intertwined with the state so much so that it is equated with the state. Kizilay is seen as a part of the state by those working in the organization, by those who have worked with it on the reconstruction project such as foreign Red Cross Societies, by those who have investigated the organization such as the Prime Ministry inspectors, by the press and by people in general. Not only is it seen as a public agency rather than a civic association but it is also involved in the corrupt networks that the state is involved in.

AlI of this came to public attention most painfully in the aftermath of the 1999 Marmara earthquake which devastated a wide area in the most industrialized part of the country. Faced with extensive and overwhelming damage, Kizilay was incapable ofproviding effective relief services. Kizilay was one of the main organizations, along with state institutions and officials, contributing to the chaos that ensued after the earthquake. The inability of

69 Kizilay to deliver relief services as expected joined with the corruption in the organization which was exposed at this time caused deep public mortification which was reflected in the media and public discussion for several weeks. As a result, an investigation was started both by the Parliament and the Prime

Ministry. The president of the association, who had been in office for twenty years, had to resign because of the public pressure. Finally, a re-construction project was launched in which many foreign Red Cross societies were involved, working together with Kizilay.

WhyAKUI'?

The earthquake was a breaking point for AKUT because as one organization working as it ought in a huge gap left by state failure, it became elevated to such a point as to represent everything Kizilay and the state was not. An unprecedented civil effort emerged to fill this gap and do what the state was supposed to do. AKUT was not the only association working for relief in the unprecedented collective civil effort that took place in the area after the earthquake. In fact, many organizations and even more people were part ofthis civic mobilization. However, AKUT had a unique position in the civil effort because they operated in a selfless, disciplined and organized fashion in the midst of chaos and confusion, saving many lives. Equally importantly and perhaps more so, AKUT was portrayed by the media as the exemplary civil association in contrast to Kizilay and the state. Thus, AKUT came to represent the opposite end of the 'state vs. civil society' dichotomy.

However, this led to the expectation that AKUT should take care of anything that needed to be taken care of. The popularity of AKUT was such that according to a large household survey, it became the second most trusted

70 organization in the country, after the armed forces (Adaman et al. 2000)

AKUT was chosen as the second case study for the research for its unique position as the other end of the dichotomy and forming a supposedly neat contrast to the state and institutions and values attached to it (i.e. efficient, non-corrupt, and non-Kizilay). Studying two associations that initially started out at completely different positions which merged as the relationship of

AKUT to the state evolved has allowed me to do a comparative analysis in which the nature of the state and the mechanism of particularistic ties it establishes can be clearly delineated.

ln sum, 1 have chosen Kizilay to study particularistic, rent-dispensing relations the state establishes because Kizilay has become an extension of the state, to the point that it was involved in corrupt exchanges despite its status as an association. The earthquake was a context where sharp dichotomies were formed around the state and civil society. In this context, Kizilay, the first case ofthis study, literally represented the state and all that it stood for and AKUT, the second case of the study, literally represented civil society and all that it stood for. Studying these two cases comparatively has made it possible to understand the historical structural factors, such as the nature of the state and its interaction with civil society organizations, which explain particularistic, rent seeking ties.

Data and Methods

This study is based on 40 interviews 1 conducted during my field work from April 2001 to the end of December 2001 and the follow-up fieldwork during the summer of2002. The interviews were conducted in Turkish and sorne in English (with representatives of the IFRC, American Red Cross and

71 German Red Cross). They lasted an average of 1 hour each and were tape-

recorded.

The field is quite wide-ranging in the sense that the participants included in the study came from various organizations and institutions?4 In

Kizilay, 1 have interviewed the president of the association, two ex-presidents

one of whom held the post for the last 20 years and several heads of internaI

departments. These interviews were conducted at the headquarters in Ankara

but 1 have also interviewed heads of branches in various locations in Istanbul,

Izmit, and Bursa. In addition to the bulk of the interviews within Kizilay, there

were many participants outside the association who worked together with

Kizilay in the reconstruction project such as representatives of the IFRC, the

American Red Cross, the German Red Cross, and the principal researcher

from the Middle Eastern Technical University (METU) who designed the

reconstruction project for Kizilay.25 Finally, 1 interviewed those who

investigated Kizilay: the prime ministry inspectors and a member of the

parliamentary commission set up to investigate claims of corruption in

Kizilay. In AKUT, interviews were conducted with the president of the

association, members of the board, heads ofinternal units and some of the

founding members.

24 1 have chosen to caU the interviewees participants mainly because research is a participatory process in the sense that those who are interviewed contribute their time and knowledge to the research. Also, the use of 'participant' seems better than other alternatives generally used such as 'informant' which brings to mind something to do with spying. 25 The Middle Eastern Technical University (METU) participated in the re-structuring project that Kizilay undertook after the earthquake in '99. Kizilay worked together with a research team from the university who analyzed CUITent problems in the association. The research team began its project in April, 2000. Their report is based on interviews and investigations at the headquarters, interviews at the branches, survey administrated to the branches, regional meetings, interviews with Red Cross societies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Their report was presented to Kizilay in 2001.

72 The participants varied in terms of time spent working for Kizilay.

Sorne were recruited recently as part of the reconstruction process and had

worked in Kizilay for 1-2 years at the time of the interview; others held their

posts for 20-30 years. 1 have also tried to coyer a wide range within the

association by interviewing participants from both the headquarters and

various branches. This was not necessary for AKUT since it is a much smaller

and compact association. There the variance was between current senior

members and the founding members sorne of whom had quit AKUT.

The number of interviews conducted proved to be quite sufficient,

verging on the representative though obviously a representative study in the

strictly statistical sense could not be undertaken. Snowball sampling was used;

however, expert interviews were conducted with most of the participants who

were most able to answer questions about relations with the state due to their

position in the relevant association. This is also why the choice of participants

is biased toward more senior members ofboth of the associations since they

were the ones who were familiar with the details oftheir organizations'

relations with the state. Junior members were not well-placed to answer

questions aimed at unraveling mechanisrns ofties with the state established at

the highest echelons. A qualitative approach in which in-depth interviews were

used to study the particularistic networks the state establishes was crucial in

gaining insight into mechanisms of state-civil society relations which are

usually studied from a macro/historical/comparative perspective. 26

26 In addition to the inteIVÏ.ews, 2 reports, the report prepared by the parliamentary commission set up to investigate Kizilay in November 1999 and the report prepared by the team from METU (please see above footnote), as well as data from newspaper research were used. The commission carried out its work for four months, investigating documents of all kinds provided by Kizilay and related organizations, and carrying out extensive inteIVÏ.ews in the headquarters as well as branches.

73 Chapter 4: An Extension of the State: the case of Kizilay

One of the biggest national associations in Turkey is Kizilay. Its work is similar to the work various Red Cross societies do around the world. As other Red Cross societies, it is a member of the International Federation of

Red Cross and Red Cres cent Societies. Not only is it among the biggest associations in terms of registered membership and the number of staff employed but it also is a very extensive institution with more than 600 branches all over the country. It is a large institution with considerable financial resources. Even though it is hard to find exact numbers due to data collection problems in the association, the ex-president of Kizilay who remained in office for 20 years said that he left a budget of 174 million USD in 1999 when he resigned, comparing it to the budget of7,8 million USD in

1979 when he first became the president (Author interview 12; September 18,

2001). These numbers must be exaggerated; however, as the president of

Kizilay in 2003, Ertan Gonen, announced that the budget of the association is approximately 54 million USD. Despite discrepancies, this should nevertheless give sorne rough idea about the budget which is in millions of dollars. The association employs approximately 3000 staff whose expenditure has reached 23% of total expenditure. This makes Kizilay one of the top ten associations employing the largest staff. Kizilay engages in a wide range of activities including blood services, dis aster relief, health services, tirst aid training, social welfare, and services for the youth. Table 4.1 shows the different resources the association has for the organization ofthese activities.

74 Table 4.1: Activities and Resources ofKizilay.

Areas ofactivity Resources

Disaster Relief 8 warehouses

Health Services 38 dispensaries

Blood Services 22 blood centers;

7 blood stations

Social Services 21 soup kitchens;

6 day nurseries;

4 nursing homes

Youth Services Youth camps; Scholarships; Dormitories

Commercial 1 mineral-water factory; 1 syringe factory;

real estate

One of the main activities ofKizilay is providing dis aster relief

services since Turkey is a disaster-prone country. When a disaster such as an

earthquake or flood strikes a region, Kizilay goes there and pro vides

temporary shelter in tents and serves hot meals. Kizilay also has health centers

that serve people with low incomes. These dispensaries are run by the bigger

branches and provide health services at low or no charge. They are usually

quite modem health centers, fully supplied with technologically advanced

medical equipment. The soup kitchens operated by Kizilay provide hot meals daily. Blood services is another area that Kizilay has been engaged in for a

75 long time and it collects approximately 45% of all blood nationwide.

Additional services include youth programs, elderly care and first aid training.

As 1 have already mentioned, this association suffered a major blow

during the 1999 earthquake in the Marmara region of Turkey which devastated

a wide area in the most industrialized part of the country. Kizilay was unable

to provide expected relief services adequately which placed the association

under much public criticism and scrutiny after the initial shock had worn off.

It was around this time that the extensive corrupt networks that the association

was involved in were revealed. In this chapter, 1 will first describe the

circumstances of state failure following the Marmara earthquake in which

Kizilay partook. 1 will then analyze the organizational dynamics of the

association as weIl as its ties to the state that have contributed specifically its

failure during the '99 earthquakes to deliver relief services which are also

important in understanding the corrupt networks the association is involved in.

ln terms of its ties to the state, 1 will analyze what type of relations Kizilay has

to the state, the extent oftheir involvement and the nature oftheir interaction.

ln terms of organizational dynamics, 1 will analyze Kizilay with respect to

approach to aid, membership and volunteer system, and internaI dynamics

such as the relationship of the administration to departments in the

headquarters internally and to branches externally.

The Earthquake: State Failure27

The Marmara earthquake in 1999 was devastating not only physically in terms of the damage it caused, but also socially in terms of the extent of the

27 As discussed in detail in the introduction chapter, state failure refers here to the failure to provide universal/public goods. This was most blatant in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and represented an instance of state failure. This is an the more curious (and needs to be explained) considering the level of statehood in general.

76 failure of state institutions it exposed and the extent of criticisms it unleashed.

The earthquake that hit the Marmara region on August 17, 1999 measured 7.4

on the Richter scale and affected a large area consisting of the cities and

regions of Sakarya, Kocaeli, Yalova and Golcuk. This area is the industrial

heartland ofTurkey, accounting for roughly 7% ofGDP. It is also a densely

populated area, where 23% of the country's total population lives (Jalali 2002;

World Bank 1999). In this earthquake, over 17,000 lives were lost and many

more were injured?8 Earthquakes in Mexico City, Mexico (1985) and Kobe,

Japan (1995), roughly similar to the one in Turkey in terms of magnitude,

were nevertheless sma11er in term of death to11, with 9500 lives lost in Mexico

and 6430 lost in Japan (World Bank 1999). The quake destroyed or severely

damaged an estimated 100,000 houses and left around 250,000 people

homeless (Jalali 2002). Fina11y, the World Bank report estimates the economic

cost of the quake at US$3-6 billion (World Bank 1999).

According to the World Bank Marmara Earthquake Assessment report,

"the earthquake created the most difficult emergency management cri sis faced

by any nation in recent history" (World Bank 1999; also quoted in Jalali

2002). The immediate chaos that ensued in the aftermath of the earthquake

was marked by the "absence of the state". This meant that relief and rescue

arrived very late, communication could not be re-established immediately, effective transportation could not be provided, the flow of relief materials to the quake victims could not be organized smoothly and the reliefthat did

arrive was of low quality, to say the least. In the first few days after the earthquake, the prime minister in office announced on television that even he

28 These numbers are not final. Many c1aim that twice this number were killed and that the official numbers grossly llilderestimated the death to11. The ambiguity in the numbers is a mark of the scale of the disaster as we11 as the scale of state failure.

77 could not establish communication with the earthquake area as the backbone

of the telephone connections into the earthquake region had gone down

(Birikim 1999: 55; World Bank 1999; Jalali 2002). Media teams provided the

only source of news and a channel for the Prime Minister to send instructions

from the earthquake area to his ministers in Ankara (Jalali 2002). There were

no police officers in sight and roads could not be opened for transportation of

aid, relief services and rescue groups (Radikal, 18 August, 1999). A destroyed

bridge blocked the road (arguably easily removable) and affected

transportation, resulting in the arrivaI of the rescue teams of the General

Directorate of Civil Defense (official search and rescue teams), almost 20 hours after the earthquake. As one colurnnist bitterly noted: "The Japanese

arrived from the Far East in 24 hours but Ankara [capital city in reference to

the govemment] could not reach Adapazari in 24 hours" (about 300 km. away)

(Coskun 1999).

The roads were blocked also because people, who had not heard from their relatives because telephone lines were not working, were going to the

area in their cars, causing much of the traffic. There was no organization of traffic to ensure the passage of aid, rescue and ambulances (RadikaI, 18

August, 1999). On one such blocked road, sorne men who had taken up sticks directed the traffic, with no intervention from the police or state officiaIs

(Hurriyet, 21 August, 1999; Cogito 1999; Kivanc 2002). Foreign assistance teams who arrived shortly after the quake were also delayed in reaching the area because of transportation and coordination problems (Hurriyet, 19

August, 1999; Altayli 1999). Local authorities failed to organize and direct the

78 foreign assistance teams to the areas in need, with sorne having to wait in the

airport in Istanbul for hours on end.

The official crisis centers that were set up by the state precisely to

ensure the smooth flow of aid and relief and rescue services to the people

affected by the earthquake were incapable of effective organization due to lack

of experienced staff and experts. In many cases, there was no coordination

between the crisis center of the Prime Ministry and municipal crisis centers

(Milliyet, 27 September, 1999; Radikal, 18 August, 1999; Kivanc 2002). As a

result there was a lot of waste and inefficiency. As one participant remarked,

with the aid wasted there, one could provide relief for 3 earthquakes ofthis

size (Author interview 8; December, 2001). Another participant pins down the

coordination problem very well:

"1 mean people there- there was an uncoordinated, undirected organization there ... There was no crisis management center. It is very important. You cannot channel resources correctly because of the absence of a crisis management center. Let me give you a very simple example. 1 asked for 30 bags of cement, 1800 bags arrived. A full truck. A bag of cement is 25 kilos. 1 mean there is no one to load it off. Or you ask for anything- 45 doctors arrived, a bus full of doctors arrived. What are you going to do with 45 doctors? There are not 45 doctors in the hospital. This is the [absence of] crisis management center- 1 mean in one area there is a lot of aid, in another, there is none ... It is an unbalanced distribution. This is completely the absence of a crisis management center and the absence of the state" (Author Interview 40; October 5, 2002).

A colurnnist quotes an earthquake victim: " ... The state was absent! There was

no organization ... Now help is coming but there is no one to take it. No one to

distribute it. Bread cornes and rots. [he] brought 5 tons ofmilk but no one

distributes it" (quoted in Cemal 1999).

On top of the incapacity to provide services, there were scandals of

obstruction. The Minister of Health at the time and a member of the

79 Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Osman Durmus, made a statement that

Turkey did not need foreign assistance and rejected Greece and Romania's offer of sending medical teams (Hürriyet, 22 August 1999). A scandal erupted as the media revealed that Durmus had rejected blood donated from Greece as well as obstructing other foreign medical assistance such as ships from the

USA. There was a public outrage at this, with many demanding Durmus' resignation. Sorne of the headhnes were: "Stop Durmus", (Hürriyet; 29

August, 1999); "Reactions to Durmus do not subside", (Curnhuriyet; 29

August 1999); ''Thank you Neighbor" [Greece], (Hürriyet; 21 August 1999).

As the Minister ofHealth was announcing that there was no need for blood donation (along with no need for ambulances and doctors), the news was broadcasting the urgent call from the hospitals for blood donations (Dündar

1999). The Ministry of Health made a group ofvoluntary health personnel wait in Ankara, claiming there was no need for health personnel in the area even though the claim was groundless (Radikal; 18 August, 1999). From the first day of the disaster, the Minister ofHealth claimed that his ministry was prepared for every kind of disaster and that there were no problems while local adrninistrators, earthquake victirns and volunteers in the dis aster area complained of lack of aid, medical services and coordination (Radikal; 21

August, 1999). In accordance with that claim, he went as far as blarning

AKUT (one of the most organized civil society organizations contributing to rescue and coordination) for making a spectacle of itself and for disseminating false information such as announcing the need for health personnel in the quake area (Radikal; 21 August, 1999). He was dubbed the Minister of III

Health by the media for such proclamations (Jalali 2002). He was also publicly

80 criticized by the Turkish Medical Association which issued a harsh press

statement on the poor response of the Ministry to the health crisis in the

earthquake area (ibid.) That this type of response is not just characteristic of

the Minister of Health is evident from a telling incident communicated by a

participant who worked in the area as part of the voluntary Civil Coordination

group. In the middle of the crisis and confusion, he saw a state official send a

fax. to one of the mayors of the earthquake area which read "as oftoday, there

is no urgent need in our tent cities". As the participant remarked, "There was

nothing but urgent need at that moment" (Author interview 30; December 8,

2001).

Finally, the state was blamed for corruption which was seen as the real

cause of the high number of casualties. The state had not established and

effectively reinforced controls for construction as a result of particularistic ties

and corruption. To complete the picture, the tents provided by Kizilay for the

earthquake victims were flooded with the first rain (Milliyet; 29 October,

1999). This confirmed the connection between failure to provide services and

corruption since Kizilay, which was seen as an organization of the state,

proved to be a part of the multi-Ievel chain system ofparticularistic ties.

Scandals of corruption in Kizilay appeared almost daily in the media,

deepening the state's crisis since Kizilay is seen as an extension of the state

even though it is an association. In a survey undertaken in the earthquake area

after 3 months in December 1999, only 3.4 per cent of the quake victims

mentioned Kizilay as having provided any help soon after the earthquake and state authorities were mentioned by only 10.4 per cent (Jalali 2002).34 per

81 cent said that the help they received immediately after the earthquake had

come from relatives, neighbors and through their own efforts (ibid.).

The failure of the state provoked an unprecedented stream ofharsh

criticism. The media constantly and aggressively portrayed the state as

ineffective, uncoordinated and corrupt. The national newspapers accused the

state of inaction and indifference (Gavrilis 2001)?9 Headlines and news items

as well as colurnnists focused on the immense failure of the state both in

providing aid, relief and rescue and solving infrastructural problems such as

transportation, communication and coordination. A columnist asked "Where

are you?", pointing out that the only question quake victims had was where:

"where is help? .. where is the state?" (Coskun 1999b). Sorne of the countless

sirnilar news items read "Crisis in the crisis center" (Radikal, 18 August,

1999), "Finally" (Hürriyet, 20 August, 1999), ''The state is not in the dis aster

area" (Curnhuriyet, 23 August, 1999). Despite the scale of the failure to

respond and the media and public outrage, top state officials such as the

President, the Prime Minister and heads of coalition parties gave the usual

response that 'the state will heal the wounds'. Along the same lines, Suleyman

Demirel, the President in office at the time, thanked the govemment for its

work at the earthquake site which, according to Demirel had done the best it

could (Coskun 1999c). Sorne ministers did admit that the state response was

inadequate (Radikal, 21 August, 1999; Jalali 2002). However, in general, state

officiaIs defended the institutional response. Buient Ecevit, the Prime Minister in office at the time, asked for 'understanding' for problems of

communications and transportation in the first few days of the dis aster and

29 This initial criticism of the state subsided and was not sustained according to Gavrilis (Gavrilis 2001).

82 criticized the media for 'demoralizing state officiaIs' (Radikal; 21 August,

1999).

Relationship to the State

Kizilay: An extension ofthe state

Kizilay has always been and continues to be seen as c10sely tied to the

state, so much so that it is perceived as an extension of the state. This was

evident in the aftermath of the earthquake when state's failure to deliver

services was tangled up in Kizilay' s failure to provide relief services and vice

versa. It was aU part of the same chaos: state failure. Thus, Kizilay and the

state are not evaluated differently. Evidence ofthis is abundant. Every

participant 1 interviewed has emphasized that Kizilay is part of the state, an

organization of the state or equivalent to the state. This is true for those

participants who work in Kizilay and those participants outside of Kizilay who

have worked with Kizilay (Author interviews 3,4,5, 7, 9, Il, 13, 14, 15, 16,

18,20,21,28,32). For instance, those who harm Kizilay's property is legaHy

considered to have harmed state property. Sorne of the administrators use

official li cense plates. Also, certain ministries such as the Ministry of Health,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Intemal Mfairs, Ministry of

Education, Ministry of Public Works and the Army General Staff aH send

representatives to Kizilay's central committee who participate in meetings

without the right to vote (Author interview 12, September 18, 2001; Author

interview 27, October 23,2001).

One head of division at the headquarters has remarked that one cannot

think of Kizilay and the state as separate, that they work for the state, and that

Kizilay behaves as an arm of the state (Author interview 3; May 30, 2001).

83 According to a senior administrator of Kizilay, Kizilay always works with the state and the state always helps Kizilay because what Kizilay does is state/public work. The state provides aid through the organization of Kizilay

(Author interview 32; December 27,2001). Also, administration in the association is similar to the state (Author interview 19; September 28,2001).

Interestingly, this is at odds with Kizilay's status as an association.

Realizing this inconsistency, the participants sometimes gave ambivalent answers to the question of whether Kizilay is a public institution or a civil society organization. After all, Kizilay is supposed to be a civil society organization. Consider the following:

(on being asked whether Kizilay is a public institution or a civil society organization) "Civil society organization. 1 mean public institution- public has a certain weight there. They have received moral support and protection from political authorities. You always feel this and they also tell you" (Author interview 9; Aug. 29,2001).

(doser to) "civil society organization. 1 mean Kizilay is a civil society organization. It is what it should be. That is what is right. But in Turkey this doseness (between the state and Kizilay) became a little too much because of the circumstances. As 1 have said a few minutes ago, all the Red Cross societies are in a close relationship to the state all around the world. But our Kizilay has become a little closer. But it is an NGO. We must emphasize that; it does not receive a lot of funding from the state" (Author interview 26; Oct. 23,2001).

Thus, it was not uncommon for one participant to start talking about how

Kizilay is perceived as astate organization by the public, but that it is not one actually, that it is a voluntary organization; and then to continue by saying that

Kizilay is an institution that stands by the state, works with the state and works under the command of the state (Author interview 28; November 22,2001).

Interestingly, a senior administrator in Kizilay, highlighting the difference between civil society organizations and Kizilay, has pointed out that while civil society organizations may criticize the state, it is not possible to see

84 Kizilay doing so since what Kizilay does is its duty. Thus, he infers, Kizilay is more like a public sector organization working with the state (Author interview 32; December 27,2001).

The most striking fact about Kizilay for the members of Red Cross societies who worked with Kizilay was this close relationship to the state.

Emphasizing that the Red Cross is a community organization, they found that

Kizilay departed from this idealized version since they perceived it as a governmental organization. They argued that this has to do with the centralized structure of the state in Turkey which is reflected in Kizilay.

According to a participant from one of the Red Cross delegations in Turkey, it is important to avoid being semi-governmental since the Red Cross and Red

Crescent societies are community organizations but that Kizilay has rather a governmental approach (Author interview 16; September 27,2001).

Although everyone agrees that Kizilay has thick ties with the state, so much so that it is perceived as part of the state, this relationship is not as smooth as it would seem at first glance. It is also a conflictual relationship at times. This is because Kizilay, as an association, is of course not a part of the state completely, no matter how close. More importantly, these tensions arise because the relationship between the state and Kizilay is not an egalitarian one of mutual empowerment. Rather, it is a particularistic relationship in which

Kizilay is co-opted by the state. Thus, Kizilay is the vulnerable party. On many occasions, Kizilay stays in the field much longer than they would like to because the state requires them to. Generally, Kizilay wants to stick to the rule of staying for 15 days in the field providing shelter and food after which they

85 would like to tum it over to state institutions. What actually happens is that they end up staying 6-8 months after a dis aster, as required by the state.

"[Kizilay] goes, starts distributing hot meals, [then it] wants to leave. After 15 days, it wants to leave. Kizilay always wants to do this. That is what they always say, they say that 'we go there, we should leave in 15 days because for instance, we can't set up a tent city' ... But what happens, from here [the state], they receive the order 'no, continue'. For example, there was a flood dis aster in Izmir, they [Kizilay] distributed meals for 6 months. It is incredible; they spend all their resources like this. They have the largest tent stocks in the world. There are not so many tents in any of the countries in the world. It [Kizilay] does not have to [have so many tents] ... The IFRC has a 2010 strategy, their mission definition is to improve the lives of vulnerable people. We also adopted this to a large extent. You [should] define who the vulnerable people are yourself, according to circumstances. Kizilay cannot decide these things for itself' (Author interview 7; June Il,2001).

Another participant, head of a Kizilay branch, after pointing out that all over the world, IFRC, the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent provide shelter and provisions temporarily for 15 days and then tum over to state institutions, continues:

''Now it is not possible to think of Kizilay apart from the state. What 1 mean by veto is this. They said Kizilay should not leave, Kizilay should stay there. When they say stay, Kizilay cannot say 'no 1 am an autonomous association, 1 cannot stay'" (Author interview 8; June 27,2001). Other participants have emphasized that even though the state do es not have sanctions, Kizilay does not refuse something when required. If it falls within the range ofKizilay's areas of activity, Kizilay undertakes aid accordingly.

For instance, an ex-president mentioned the opening of a camp in Azerbaijan which was seen as important by the state:

" ... The Ministry of Mfairs attached importance to it. The government, the state did, the President did. Isn't Kizilay a national organization? Will it not help people in other countries? It did" (Author interview 12; September 18, 2001).

Representatives of Kizilay have the understanding that state cornes first, especially in big disasters. They participate in disaster relief as directed by the crisis management center of a municipality. For example, tents are set up

86 whenever and wherever the municipality deems appropriate (Author interview

32, December 27,2001; Author interview 28, November 22, 2001; Author interview 22, October 12,2001). The mayor is the head of the crisis management center and all units of the state inc1uding Kizilay work under the coordination of the mayor. In dis aster relief, coordination and organization is no doubt crucial; however, the unequal relationship of cooption between the state and Kizilay in which Kizilay has become an extension of the state has meant that Kizilay is unable to take initiative outside state control with regard to its organizational decisions such as the duration of stay in the field after a disaster. The vulnerability of Kizilay vis-à-vis the state is also manifest in the above-mentioned comment by a participant that Kizilay cannot criticize the state. The representatives of the state aIso share the view that Kizilay does carry out the demands of the state (Author interview 10, August 29,2001;

Author interview 23, October 12, 2001). A deputy mayor comments that

Kizilay has to meet the demands of the state and that legally, the municipaIities have greatjurisdiction (Author interview 23, October 12, 2001).

These tensions aIso ran high in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Again, Kizilay stayed in the field for about 8 months. AIso, the state intervened in the distribution of aid which is actually a task Kizilay is supposed to carry out. The municipal authority insisted that the foreign aid sent to Kizilay to be distributed by Kizilay to the earthquake victims be handed over to the (state-run) crisis center and distributed from there (Author interviews 20, 24). The local branch resented this as the head of the branch explained that they need to distribute the aid so that the public can see Kizilay

87 helping them as it ought to (Author interview 24; Oct. 18,2001). The head of another branch shared the same feeling:

"". [the municipal authorities] started doing sorne work themselves as ifthere was no Kizilay, as ifthere was no such aid organization. It was unnecessary ... the organization did not work and in a short time, they saw that it could not work and stopped. After that, for months, for 5 -6 months Kizilay continued" (Author interview 20; Oct. 05,2001).

Two incidents which have occurred lately in an earthquake in Bingol in 2003 shows that state intervention in Kizilay' s affairs continues to cause tension. In the tirst incident, Kizilay sent 7,700 tents to the area instead of the 10,000 demanded by the mayor who reprimanded Kizilay. Kizilay ended up sending an extra 3,000 tents, 10,000 in total (Aksam, May 4, 2003; Milliyet, May 4,

2003). In the second incident, the Minister of Public Works demanded that the donations for the Bingol quake victims be transferred from Kizilay's account to the Ministry account which Kizilay refused (Hürriyet, May 9,2003).

Finally, representatives of Kizilay were very bitter about the harsh criticisms directed at their organization. First of all, they believe that given the size of the earthquake and the extent of the damage in terms of areas and number of people affected, a certain amount of confusion and disorganization was natural. More importantly, it was not only their organization that failed but all the other institutions as well, meaning state institutions. A participant, after emphasizing that all of Turkey was unsuccessful in the earthquake, highlights the former success of Kizilay in Albania where the tent city received an award from the UN (Author interview 22; October 12,2001).

Representatives of Kizilay believe that they were made the scapegoat, in a situation where no institution associated with the state was without fault. Thus, too much was expected of Kizilay and Kizilay was the scapegoat in the face of

88 public fury (Author interviews 4, 8, 9, 13, 15,22). A participant, after emphasizing that the Marmara earthquake was quite a big one, said that

Kizilay cannot be expected to replace the government (Author interview 4;

May 31,2001).

Not withstanding the se tensions, the relationship between the state and

Kizilay is a network of closely intertwined ties. AlI the representatives of the association, even those who talked about the tensions discussed above, spoke of the state in these terms, emphasizing the cooperation and support they receive from state institutions:

"If Kizilay has business at a state institution, we always have the opportunity to do it there easily- here we receive that support, warmth from alileveis of the state" (Author interview 20, Oct. 10,2001).

Nevertheless, as 1 have shown, this relationship is not one of mutual empowerment but rather one in which the state has co-opted Kizilay through particularistic ties, making the latter the vulnerable party.

Politicized Ties

Not only Kizilay has very close ties to the state, so much so that it is thought of as a govemmental organization, but at the same time, these ties are politicized. A parliamentary who investigated Kizilay has eXplained that politics has permeated since Kizilay is very much influenced by the state. The state has been interventionist with respect to the general structure of the association, personnel recruitment and aid distribution (Author interview 26;

October 23,2001). According to a prime ministry inspector who also investigated Kizilay, the administration in the headquarters and the delegates who come from various regions in Turkey to vote in the general congress feel affiliated to a certain political party and they have received support from that

89 party (Author interview 6; June 6, 2001; Author interview 9; August 29,

2001).

These politicized ties naturally affect the recruitment process. Initial

membership and its continuity is not contingent on activities undertaken by the

members or their skills. Furthermore, the recruitment of important positions

such as branch heads is through political channels as weIl. Actually, the heads

ofbranches are elected; however, the candidates are in general connected to

the administration. On being asked how member registration is kept political, a

former head ofbranch explains that he had been an industrialist in 1979 and a

member of the ***Industrial and Commerce Charnber. At that time, he was

contacted by a political party (the same party that the administration of Kizilay

is affiliated to) and asked whether he would like to become a head ofbranch in

Kizilay. The participant remarked that he did not have prior knowledge of

Kizilay; nevertheless, he 'was brought' as head ofbranch and he was asked to

Interview Il; September 4,2001). Another head ofbranch who has been in

Kizilay for 20 years has been initially recruited by an ex-president ofbranch.

Furthermore, he held the position of (politically elected) mayor for 10 years at

the same time that he was the head ofbranch in Kizilay (Author interview 28;

November 22,2001). Not only the branch heads but basically aIl important

positions in the administration in the headquarters have usually been filled

with those associated with a particular party and those associated with them. A joumalist who has talked to the administrators in Kizilay while investigating corruption there has pointed out that Kizilay has been used as a 'side organization' ofthis party. He continues:

90 "They all come from that party originally ... There are those who become par1iamentarians, those who have run in the e1ections but 10st, and their relatives. Re1atives/friends from the same po1itica1 affinity have a1ways made up the organizational structure of Kizilay" (Author interview 25; October 22, 2001).

Another participant in a senior position in the administration who has been in

Kizi1ay for 15 years has been invited to his position by Kemal Demir, the ex- president of the association who had been in office for 20 years. In fact, the career of Kemal Demir himselfillustrates the point perfectly. He had a politica1 career which carried him to the parliament in 1961. He became the

Minister ofHea1th in 1963. He resigned from his party, CHP (The Republican

Peop1e's Party) in 1972 but he was in the coalition govemment in the same year. The party affiliated with Kizilay was one of the parties in the coalition.

Demir held various positions as minister. He finally resigned from his position as Minister of Health in 1977 and quit active poli tics. It was at this point that he was offered the presidency of Kizilay. Being a member of Kizilay, he became a member of the central committee and from there, was elected president for the next 20 years (Author interview 12; September 18, 2001).

Thus, politicized ties between Kizilay and the govemment have existed beginning with the 1970s which influence how positions are filled in the administration ofKizilay. Moreover, if the govemment pointed to anyone to be 'elected' to the central committee, it has been always granted (Author interviews 6, 7, 26). People in the administration have had political support

(Author interview 6; June 6,2001). Thus, the historically close ties of Kizilay to the state have become politicized as the latter has co-opted the former through particularistic exchanges. This, in tum, has had a decisive impact on the organizational dynarnics of the association, contributing to its closed,

91 centralized and hierarchical structure. 1 deal with these organizational

dynarnics in the next section.

Orgaoizational Dynamics

Aid Approach

Kizilay's approach to aid-giving is based on an understanding of giving

as charity. Kizilay sees the aid receivers as passive consumers of aid and does

oot expect them to actively participate in the aid process (METU report 2001).

30 This is also strongly emphasized by the administrators and fellow workers

of various Red Cross societies who have established in-country offices in

Turkey after the earthquake in '99 and who work with Kizilay on various

projects to improve its capacity. In disaster relief, the only time Kizilay and

people who are in need of assistance cross paths is after the disaster has

occurred. The people receive aid such as tents, blankets, and meals on site.

Kizilay, rather than working on helping people build capacities to help

themselves, approaches aid as handing out help as it deems proper.

"So for Kizilay in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, is charity oriented approach. Instead of encouraging the public, educating the public, asking them to participate in the day-to-day situations, what they do is OK, you don't need to do anything. When you have a dis aster, you tell us and we'll come and give you. So it is charity" (Author interview, May 31, 2001).

A representative of the IFRC, talking about the transformation in the aid

approach, maintains that in the 1960's, the approach was 'whatever problem

you have, we solve it for you'. In the 1980s, a community approach was

adopted in which the solution is part of the planning which is more active

30 The Middle Eastern Technical University (METU) participated in the re-structuring project that Kizilay undertook after the earthquake in '99. Kizilay worked together with a research team from the university who analyzed CUITent problems in the association. The research team began its project in April, 2000. The report is based on interviews and investigations at the headquarters, interviews at the branches, survey administrated to the branches, regional meetings, interviews with Red Cross societies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Report was presented to Kizilay in 2001.

92 compared to the former approach patronized by the government (Author interview 4; May 31,2001). The latter type of approach, still retained by

Kizilay, creates dependency, rather than empowerment and active participation by citizens in making use of aid. Citizens are seen as passive receivers. It has also put a distance between the association and the people since they do not work together on a continuous basis participating in various campaigns, educational initiatives, and public awareness programs. Thus, one important area for the IFRC on which they are working is getting Kizilay closer to the people since Kizilay is not as close to the people as it should be due to its highly centralized structure. Providing direct services occurs only during disaster response but the rest of the time, there are no educational campaigns or promotion of health issues. According to the Red Cross representative, Kizilay sometimes organizes programs to give aid to the poor during religious holidays; however, these are one-shot deals that create dependency (Author interview 5; May 31,2001).

"What we need to get them to do to improve, to enhance is get closer to the people so that they empower people so that the civilian society becomes stronger because the mentality- we have gone through this in the U.S. Twenty years ago, people saw the United States government as their sole source of assistance and we had to change that. We had to tell people no, you are your own source of assistance. The government is there as a last resort or as one of the lines of defenses for you but it shouldn't be everything you depend on... Making big bureaucracy isn't the way to respond to a dis aster. Making people aware how they need to behave and react is what saves lives" (Author interview 5; May 31, 2001).

The alternative that is advocated by the Red Cross societies working with

Kizilay is a participatory approach that enables people to help themselves should the need arise. For instance, in an earthquake situation, it is the family members and neighbors who play an important role in rescue efforts in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake sin ce they are already there in the most

93 crucial few hours after the earthquake. AIso, knowing how to behave in a way that will minimize risks during an earthquake is crucial in saving lives.

Therefore, education programs and public awareness become central to a participatory aid approach. This is why international organizations such as the

IFRC working together with Kizilay want to ensure that Kizilay adopts participatory principles through these programs (Author interview 4; May 31,

2001). The role of Kizilay should be building on the capacities communities have and supporting them. However, Kizilay has fallen behind in this participatory approach according to the IFRC representative (Author interview

4, May 31,2001).

In sum, Kizilay has approached aid giving as charity which leads to dependency and passiveness on the part of the aid-receivers. Kizilay's approach to aid is to first raise/collect money and then to distribute aid once they have the resources. This is not as sustainable as first identifying needs, then building projects accordingly and finally creating funding for them actively from within the community (Author interview 7; June 11,2001). A major part ofthis alternative aid approach is a participatory setting in which members and staff of the association work together with the people in educational campaigns and public awareness programs to build capacities of citizens to help themselves (Author interviews 4, 5, 7, 16). The lack of such a setting has also contributed to the removal of the association from close contact with the people which in turn played a role in tuming the association into a closed structure.

94 Closed structure

Over the years, Kizilay has become a closed structure in which the

active participation ofmembers is hardly existent. The METU report31 points

out that member registration has been limited and the existing member base is

not involved in the activities or the govemance of the association (METU

report 2001). One of the reasons for lack of active participation is the lack of

responsibilities taken by the members. There is no connection between being

accepted as a member and activities undertaken for the association. Neither

does the maintenance of membership depend on the active participation by the

member. They are due-paying members only and sometimes not even that

(Author interviews 7, June Il,2001; 8, June 27, 2001; Il, September 4,2001;

24, October 10,2001; METU report 2001).32 In the words of one participant:

" ... They only become members here. Members are not effective and active. Unfortunately we do not have an active membership" (Author interview 24; October 10, 2001).

Another participant confirms this, further suggesting that becoming a member

has become politicized. On being asked to elaborate on Kizilay's being closed

to the outside, he says:

"Now for long years, delegate or member registration has been kept very limited or in another sense, it has been kept political (Author Interview Il; September 4,2001)".

A prime ministry inspector who has investigated Kizilay also underlines this

politicized nature of membership registration, arguing that the method of

recruitment, requiring the reference oftwo Kizilay members and approval of

31 Please see footnote 4. 32 At the time of the interview, the membership due was 60,000 Turkish liras which is a negligible amount so much so that the heads of branches are able pay from their own pockets the total for their members' membership to continue (Author Interview 7; June Il,2001).

95 the administration, is open to abuse and in fact, has been abused in the past by

the administration in order to limit access to Kizilay. He goes on to say:

"This blocks the access of the public ... participation of the public has been prevented. It has to be opened up; we made suggestions to that effect" (Author interview 10; August 29,2001).

Volunteers are scarce in the association as well. Kizilay has no policy

for recruiting volunteers. In general, it is c1aimed that volunteers are very

difficult to find; yet, there is no attempt at recruiting volunteers (METU report

2001). This is a problem according to a representative of the IFRC who points

out that Kizilay does not have the system of tools to register and motivate

people who want to help as Kizilay volunteers. Accordingly, these are the

kinds of methods they have to leam. He also adds that it is not only Kizilay but

Red Cross Red Crescent volunteers have decreased dramatically all over the

world (Author interview 2; May 5,2001). Thus, it is also the case that a larger

trend of decreasing volunteers exists.

Both the lack of active members and the lack of volunteers make

Kizilay an association that is c10sed to the outside and removed from citizens.

Lack of participation by members and volunteers in Kizilay also means that

accountability of the administration cannot be ensured since those who will

hold the administration accountable are precisely those who are absent from

Kizilay. Even though this kind of structure may be counter-intuitive for sorne

associations/NGOs which emphasize participation at the grass roots level,

other NGOs, especially large, highly professional ones work precisely without an active membership base. These NGOs, also called membership due-paying

organizations, are sometimes criticized for lack of accountability; yet they operate large services (Kaldor 2003). Thus, this type of structure is not unique

96 to Kizilay. However, what is unique in the case of Kizilay is the network of close ties to a particularistic state in addition to lack of accountability. It is not surprising, then, to find that this combination oflack of active membership and the network of particularistic ties facilitate establishing and maintaining corrupt networks, which is not necessarily true for an organization merely without channels of accountability. One participant draws the link as:

''Now ifyou keep a social structure closed to the outside all the time, you have difficulty in producing (outcomes). Just like when you keep a door closed all the time, a place begins to deteriorate; in the same way, ifyou do not open the door ofthese social organizations widely to the outside, they begin to decay and deteriorate inside" (Author interview Il; September 4,2001).

Centralized and Hierarchical Structure

Lack of accountability due to the lack of an active membership base goes hand in hand with a centralized and hierarchical structure in the association in which the administration in the headquarters weighs heavily.

This is the common observation of the representatives of Red Cross Societies interviewed who work together with Kizilay, heads ofbranches and junior staff in the association itself Rather than delegation of responsibility and empowerment of the local chapters, activities are controlled by the headquarters and by senior management within the headquarters. A conflictual relationship between the headquarters and sorne of the big branches exists because ofthis centralized structure.

Comparing Kizilay to other Red Cross Societies, the most striking difference the representatives of the IFRC and the Red Cross Societies working with Kizilay have emphasized is the centralization in the association as opposed to a complete delegation of authority in federal systems such as the

United States and Canada. One participant described it as a culture shock:

97 "Culture shocks, yeso The system- ours is a federal system or we delegate, as 1 said, to the lowest common denominator. Here they don't delegate, they are very centralized, very controlling. For instance, in health and safety- health and safety instructors in the United States are volunteers at the chapter, at the branch level. Here, the health and safety instructors are headquarters staff and that is a shock" (Author interview 5; May 31, 2001).

He goes on to say that dis aster response in the U.S. is provided by the local

branch so that when a hurricane strikes in Puerto Rico, for instance, it is the

Puerto Rico chapter that has to respond. In contrast, in Turkey it is the national

office that responds to disasters. This is risky since the headquarters should be

the back-up plan. If the resources of the national office are depleted, there is

nowhere else to go. In the U.S., however, the national office steps in only

when local resources are exhausted. That way, it is possible to have a back-up

plan which is absolutely necessary in disaster response (Author interview 5;

May 31,2001).

A representative of the German Red Cross Society also emphasizes this difference:

"Our society's strength is diffuse. Strength is on level of township, of district level and less at regionallevel and stilliess at nationallevel. Here you have a different approach. You have a top down approach. You have a strong headquarters and the headquarters establishes branches and also guides the branches ... ". He continues by saying that the opposite is true for Germany, that is, the

branches have established the headquarters. The branches have their own

budgets and they deliver services at this level. What is done at the national

level is establishing general guidelines for policy issues, gui ding the general

mission issues and organizing relations to national authorities (Author

interview 16; September 27,2001).

This lack of delegation is also true for junior staff in the headquarters.

According to a participant from the International Federation of Red Cross and

Red Crescent Societies (lFRC), slow response in Kizilay is a result of lack of

98 delegation since department managers may not be able to make decisions.

Thus, what is needed in KIzIlay is more transparency and more delegation of

authority (Author interview 2; May 5, 2001). Kizilay is found to be centralized

by sorne of the representatives working in the association as well. One head of

an internaI department in the headquarters of Kizilay makes a similar

observation with respect to centralization in the organization:

"A more liberal administration. Authority must be delegated to lower echelons, rather than centralizing. Authority delegation must move from the top to the bottom ... " (Author interview 19; September 28,2001).

On being asked whether the CUITent administration is centralist, she says that it

is and that she would like to see the lower management endowed with more

controVauthority, as opposed to what was done in the past (Author interview

19; September 28,2001). Another participant relates an illuminating 'joke'

they had at the time she worked in Kizilay: they would calI the administration

"our council of ministers". She then compares it to the administration (of

which she is a part) of the association she currently works in which they invite junior staffto the meetings to receive feedback (Author interview 6; June 6,

2001).

The centralized and hierarchical structure of the association is reflected

in the relationship between the headquarters and the branches. The branches

are dependent on the headquarters in many decisions since possible initiatives

cannot be taken without going through the headquarters first. This creates a

tension between the headquarters and the branches, especially the big branches

that run health centers with big budgets. Kizilay has 648 branches; however,

not aH ofthem are big and active. Sorne ofthese branches are "on-paper"

branches; others are quite large and operate sophisticated health centers with

99 highly technological medical equipment. The difference between these two types ofbranches and its impact will be discussed further below. The large branches have been quite vocal against the headquarters and have criticized it for its extreme centralizing tendencies.

One of the mechanisms of control by the headquarters is the organization ofbranch finances. According to the association's statute, the branches have to obtain the permission of the headquarters for the purchases they make, save the ones of negligible amounts. Thus, any major undertaking by the branches has to be approved by the headquarters. This leads to too much dependency of the branches on the headquarters and elicits complaints from the branches that they cannot work effectively as a result of such dependency (Author interviews Il, 20, 24; METU report). One former head of branch who has founded a technologically advanced medical center affiliated to his branch has pointed out that it would not be possible to build such a center, not in the short time that they did it in any case, had they gone through the bureaucracy of the headquarters.

"If it is 250 million (Turkish Liras), you have to obtain permission from Ankara- I am making up the numbers now. So every time you breathe, you will ask for permission ... There are many obstacles like this. Why? The reason is everything is located at the center. But the biggest structural characteristic of the Turkish Red Crescent is its closeness to de-centralization ... Ifthere will not be de-centralization, why open up 650 branches? ... "(Author Interview Il, September4, 2001)

In another similar example, a branch needed to buy expensive medical equipment while setting up their health center. According to the statute, this purchase had to go through the headquarters and this demand was made to the headquarters by this particular branch. They had to wait for 14 months for a response from the headquarters and in the end, they bought the equipment

100 themselves 30% cheaper than the priee obtained by the headquarters despite

14 months of inflation (Author interview 21; October 9, 2001).

Not all of the branches are able to voice such criticism. In fact, that is one of the problems since not all branches are big and active. In fact, only a few branches (mainly the ones that operate their own health centers) are independent which creates conflict between these branches and the headquarters. The rest of the branches are "branches-on-paper", inactive and not properly working as a branch. This of course aggravates the representation issue (METU report 2001). Besides, each branch has its own agenda which may aggravate conflict (Author interview 2; May 5, 2001). The big branches that are able to generate income approach smaller branches who reeeive funds from the headquarters critically, and take a lot of pride in the fact that they are able to run the branches with the income they generate, without outside

(meaning headquarters) help (Author interviews Il,20,21). Those who receive funds from the headquarters are accused of selling their vote. A common complaint is the undemocratic nature of elections at the headquarters.

Each year, there is a general assembly in which the members of the administration are elected. However, this is not a real election since the candidates are pre-determined by the administration and all that is expected of the delegates is to give a yes vote to the prepared lists. A participant describes it as:

"1 mean for years from here (Ankara), from Anatolia delegates have been elected according to the (wish) of the administration. 80 they came (to Ankara), in their own words, 'we were given a bag, a pen and we were hosted for that day'. In the congres s, those who accept, those who do not, aceepted. Done" (Author interview 26; October 23,2001).

101 Thus, an administration can remain in power for a long time, without the delegates exercising real choice. In fact, the same administration did

remain in power for twenty years until the '99 earthquake when the president

was forced to resign. The president in question pointed to this out himself,

saying that he is one of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Associations'

presidents in the world who have remained in office the longest (Author

interview 12; September 18, 2001). This longevity in the administration can be

true for branches as well, especially for the big ones that have created

independent sources of income. Once branch heads start to control income

coming from renting spaces in the buildings they have built on donated land,

"that branch head becomes a very important man because he is the one that

rents that space, he is the one that collects that rent" (Author interview 7; June

Il,2001). Of all the branch heads interviewed, 5 ofthem had been in that

position for at least 15 years, sorne for 20 years and one for 30 years. Only one

had been the head of the branch for 5 years.

There are no established channels for the branches to participate in the

activities of the headquarters. The communication between the branches and

the headquarters is slow and inadequate which results in a lack of coordination

between them. It also means that the branches are not represented in the

headquarters. Furthermore, the branches cannot communicate and organize

between themselves (METU report 2001). This contributes to the perpetuation

of established modes ofhierarchy. The branches feel that they are not properly

represented:

"Thus the branches have not been represented for 131 years in Ankara ... Let me put it this way. The branches are servants (kapikulu), Ankara is the palace. When the servant cornes to the palace, s/he is taken in if s/he begs; s/he is

102 heeded if s/he begs; s/he is helped if s/he begs" (Author interview Il; September 4,2001).

This issue of representation is aggravated by the huge discrepancy between large branches with health centers which can run their branch without relying on the headquarters and the so-called on-paper branches which generally are unable to organize any activities. These latter types ofbranches are manipulated by the headquarters which, in return for their loyalty and vote, makes monetary contributions (Author interviews 7, Il,20,21,26). As one participant points out:

''Now we go to Ankara to vote, they prepare lists, those branches which have taken 1 billion, 2 billion (Turkish liras), what are they going to do with their vote?" (Author interview 21; October 9, 2001).

It is not only the heads ofbig and active branches who complain that the vote of smaller branches is bought off by the headquarters. Those who have investigated Kizilay (prime ministry inspectors and the parliamentary commission) have also emphasized that delegates/votes are bought in retum for monetary compensation to these branches (Author interviews 18, 26).

Finally, ajoumalist who investigated corruption in Kizilay has received similar confirmation, that is, before elections, aid is sent as election investment to certain cities/areas (Author interview 25; October 22,2001). Thus, despite elections, the administration gives the impression ofbeing appointed rather then elected (Author interview 18; September 28,2001).

Certain changes have been made as part of the reconstruction process in order to address the concems about lack of democratic process within the association. 1 will discuss this reconstruction process in detail in the next section; however, suffice it to say here that the statute has been amended to address sorne of the concems of the branches who criticized the headquarters

103 for being undemocratic and controlling. It is possible now for the branches to

nominate 15 candidates to the central committee. AIso, the branches no longer

have to obtain the approval of the headquarters for each and every purchase they need to make provided that they put into their budget each year the

purchases they plan to make and obtain a general approval for the budget from

the headquarters. These changes have provided the branches more room

(Author interviews 20,21,24).

1 have shown that Kizilay has become a closed structure without an

active member or volunteer base as weIl as a centralized and hierarchical

organization. This has happened as a result of particularistic ties established by

the state. At the same time, both the lack of internaI democratic process and

the lack of channels of accountability contribute to the perpetuation of a chain

of particularistic networks, creating a vicious circle. The ties established by the

state create a chain of particularistic networks whose mechanisms 1 will spell

out below, after 1 consider the reform pro cess Kizilay entered after the

earthquake.

Outcome of Change: The Restructuring Process

As the need for reform became ever urgent for Kizilay after the 1999

earthquake, a restructuring project was begun with the aim of updating the

association in terms of mission, personnel, technology and statute. The first

radical change was the removal of24 of the 30 members of the administrative

committee, including the president. The new administration then embarked on

a reconstruction project. In pursuing this goal, Kizilay contacted the Middle

Eastern Technical University (METU) from which a team of researchers had

already embarked on a project of disaster mitigation. Their original idea, after

104 having worked in the earthquake area in the immediate aftermath, was to initiate a comprehensive dis aster planning scheme in Turkey. To that end they had visited several state agencies. Around November 1999, having heard that they were interested, Kizilay asked the METU team to prepare a reconstruction project for them. In order to do this, the METU team examined the association for 3 months to get a synopsis of the state of affairs in Kizilay.

During this period, they visited several branches, interviewed representatives, and organized meetings with the heads of branches. At the end of the 3 months, they presented Kizilay with a restructuring project that was to take effect over the next 2 years. In this meeting, all of the problems ofKizilay

(discussed above) and ways of overcoming them were presented within a comprehensive restructuring plan. Kizilay accepted this plan and they started working with METU in April 2000 (Author interview 7; June Il, 2001).33 The reconstruction project envisioned by METU aims for fundamental change, a transformation of the 'identity and mission' ofKizilay (Author interview 7;

June Il,2001). This includes changing Kizilay's approach to aid, establishing performance evaluation and planning for each unit so that at the end of each year, they can be evaluated in terms ofwhether they were able to meet their objectives. It also includes:

" ... Increasing the power of Kizilay's members was very, very important to us. We forrnulated this as the most important thing but it is so difficult to realize, very difficult. 1 mean very basically to democratize Kizilay, to give members representation and to give members responsibility" (Author interview 7, June 11,2001).

33 According to one of the project researchers, Kizilay more or less felt obliged to accept this plan because of the foreign presence in the meeting in which the plan was presented. There were several representatives ofvarious Red Cross societies (participating national societies) who welcomed the plan with enthusiasm (Author interview 7; June Il, 2001).

105 Along with this broader and fundamental change envisioned by the

ODTU, there are other changes that the headquarters is working on that are more technical and organizational such as computerization and changes related to personnel. Thus, for instance, Kizilay did not have an inventory oftheir stocks before automation but now they are able to control their stocks, such as tents, which were renewed. There were also many changes in personnel so that perceived problerns such as lack of relevant skills, including foreign languages and high level of education, could be amended (Author interviews 9, 10, 13,

14, 15, 22, 24, 25, 27). More than 150 new personnel with university-Ievel education was hired, out of whom 40-50 can speak a foreign language so that now in every unit, there is someone with language skills (Author interview 27;

Oct. 23,2001). This is seen as important in terms of establishing and maintaining relations with other Red Cross societies. There were also many personnel training programs to upgrade skills.

Changes were also made to the statute of the association. With these changes, it is now possible for the branches to send representatives to the central committee at the headquarters. AIso, financial dependence of the branches on the headquarters decreased to a certain extent since they no longer need to obtain the approval of the headquarters for every purchase they make.

Instead, they can prepare a budget in which expenses for the year are indicated and the headquarters approves this general budget (Author interviews 20, 21).

In evaluating how much change there has been, participants have pointed out that it is a pro cess that takes time and effort (Author interviews 3,

13, 16, 19,24). Still, there is change even though it is possible to identify two types of change with different levels of advancement. The changes that are

106 related to personnel training, skill upgrading, and automation have advanced further as they are also the easier changes to make. The evaluation of changes that are related to re-definition of mission and aid approach, increased weight ofmembers, accountability and democratization in the association (type of change envisioned by the METU project) is trickier to make. Thus, on the one hand:

"We have seen a lot of changes. When you look at (Hatay)/Antakya, the last floods that occurred, the local branches in both in Adana and Antakya were involved, the thinking was different. You look at the recent earthquake in Erzurum, the response was perfect, impeccable. They were pro-active, they did not wait for the government to calI on them to do response- that was perfect. They also did not tum over all oftheir assets to the government. They sent their teams and their teams made the assessments based on needs. They were able to provide their response, their assistance to the victims, to the public. Very different from what '99 was" (Author interview 5; May 31, 2001).

Another participant also pointed out that the govemment and public in general were happy about disaster response in the latest dis asters such as the earthquake in Ak~ehir and the floods in Hatay/Antakya (Author interview 17;

September 27,2001). The latter, though quite small in scale, did find its way to the media, this time without a critique of Kizilay attached. In another recent earthquake in Pülümür, Kizilay, after sorne claims in the media that its tents were still deficient, got the quality of the tents certified by the notary to the effect that they do not leak, and that they can be warmed up in 15 minutes by heaters (Radikal; February 22, 2003).

On the other hand, other participants were more cautious:

"1 think it is certainly true that there is interest to take this mission seriously and to carry it out. The way it is being done is very often subject to discussions" (Author interview 16; September 27,2001).

"1 mean there are those who want change and those who do not, like anywhere in the world. There are people who are 60-70-80 years old. These people maintain the status quo. They do not want change. Ifthey want it, they know

107 they will be out of their position. That is why it is difficult" (Author interview 8; June 27, 2001).

Failure in the State: Corrupt Exchanges

Having shown that Kizilay is seen as an extension of the state and

indeed, works as an institution of the state, the former connected to the latter

through politicized ties, 1 will now argue that these ties between the state and

Kizilay form a chain of particularistic networks in which the particularized

benefits pass from the state to Kizilay and from Kizilay to other persons and

organizations who have established ties with Kizilay. It is important to point

out that even though Kizilay is a semi-state organization which is perceived by

practically everyone as an extension of the state, it need not follow that it is

involved in corrupt/particularistic networks. However, the failure of the

Turkish state, its incapacity to provide public goods on a universalistic basis,

has resulted in the substitution of particularistic ties instead since these are the

only type ofties the state is able to establish. Thus, Kizilay is co-opted by the

state and takes its place in the chain of particularistic networks.

There are three main areas that the parliamentary commission set up to

investigate Kizilay after the earthquake identified in which Kizilay carried on

corrupt exchanges. 34 These refer to contracts, personnel and renting fiats and

apartment buildings that belong to the association. Firstly, Kizilay makes

contracts with firms to buy various relief and health-related items such as food

supply and medical equipment; however, over the years, Kizilay has worked

34 After various stories of corruption appeared in the media foIlowing the failure of Kizilay to provide satisfactory relief services in the earthquake, a parliamentary commission was set up in November 1999 in order to investigate Kizilay and the alleged accusations of corruption. The commission carried this work out for four months, investigating documents of aIl kinds provided by Kizilay and related organizations, and carrying out extensive interviews in the headquarters as weIl as branches. The commission produced a detailed report of their investigation, hereby referred to as commission report.

108 with the same few firms, buying at above-market priees and thereby, providing

extra profits to those firms (commission report 50-51). The possible methods

of bidding for contracts determined by statutes of the association are invitation

of closed offers, auction, invitation, bargaining, and competition. Which

method will be chosen is determined by the value of the contractlpurchase.

Purchases under 2.5 billion Turkish liras do not require a general

announeement of competition.35 The smallest purchases can be made through

bargaining while all other purchases excepting those bigger than 2.5 billion TL

are contracted through invitation of offers which provides flexibility in the

sense that the invitation can be made to a firm of Kizilay' s choice

(commission report 236-238). The commission report has established that

Kizilay has worked with 2 firms in purchasing medical equipment in the time

period 1995-1999. These two firrns have won 23 contracts out of24 in 1995,

19 out of19 in 1996,18 out of21 in 1997, 26 out of28 in 1998 and 19 out of

25 in 1999 (commission report 239). Further inquiry has shown that members

of the same family are partners in both firrns and that they have used the same

business address. Finally, the commission found that the wife of one of the

partners of the second firm works in the department of purchases in Kizilay

headquarters (commission report 240). It was also the case that in purchases,

Kizilay administrators took care not to exceed the limit which would

necessitate the announeement of a competition. In this way, they were able to

work with a few selected firms (in any case tumed out to be owned by the

members of the same family in the purchase of medical supplies detailed

above) and buy ab ove-market prices, disseminating rent in the form of extra

35 In December 2001, the exchange rate was 1,455,795 Turkish Liras for 1 US$. Thus the limit is approximate1y 10,600 US$. This amoWlt is from 1999; the limits of purchases may have changed as they are adjusted to inflation in Turkey.

109 profits. A final example of corrupt exchanges is the purchase contract oftent material which was bought at hijacked priees. The corrupt dealings in the tent contract found its way to the media as weU. In this incident, Kizilay administrators took advantage of a statute which allowed for "emergency purchase" under extreme conditions such as war which pre-empts regular procedures and allows for purchases to be made by invitation from a few firms, without any announcement of competition. An investigator-joumalist who prepares documentary-type news programs and who investigated Kizilay has also found that contract bidding is fixed. Posing as an interested party, one member of the crew was told that they would buy from him in exchange for a retum (Author interview 25; October 22,2001). The members of the crew also talked to a firm owner as well as sorne representatives of Kizilay who had been involved in fixed bidding who were later on arrested. They were told about the details of the corrupt exchanges, such as how checks were written by

Kizilay administrators and for whom they were deposited in the bank (Author interview 25; October 22,2001). In one incident in the program, a representative from the purchases department in Kizilay caUs the interested firm and asks for a blank document (to be fiUed in by the representative) and

Kizilay ends up buying tent material400,000 TL/m. square more expensive

(Arena 1999 on Kizilay).

We find that the same state of affairs prevails in awarding contracts to construction firms. Kizilay acquires through donations property such as land, apartment buildings and flats. It then awards contracts to construction firms which build property on land donated to Kizilay. The commission has found that construction contracts of Kizilay are monopolized by a few firms and that

110 contracts are awarded without general announcement of competition

(commission report 249).

The second area that Kizilay carried on particularistic exchanges concems the personnel. It has been found that the majority of personnel are recruited through personal ties, as family members and friends of the members of the administration are hired for various posts. Whenever a position becomes available, that position is officially cancelled to prevent potential applicants from applying until a "suitable" applicant is found at which point the position is established again. Inquiring about the people who applied to the general headquarters for jobs in the past years and were refused, the commission was told that the reason for rejection was lack of open positions. However, they found that other people were hired for the positions that were not supposed to be open around the time the other applications were rejected. The commission concluded thatjustification given by the headquarters for the rejection of job applications was false (commission report 129). The family members ofmany the members of the administration (both past and cUITent) work in the headquarters. In fact, the whole system of recruitment is based on personal ties and the recommendation of people holding position in Kizilay. In sum, Kizilay has no formal policy/criteria on personnel recruitment but operates on a basis ofwho-you-know. This has been confirmed by sorne of the heads of branches ofKizilay interviewed by the investigators (commission report 92,96). This has also been confirmed in my interview with one of the parliamentarians who had carried out the Kizilay investigation as well as in my interview with one of the main researchers from METU who analyzed the problems in Kizilay with

III a view to design new pOlicy36 and prime ministry inspectors (Author interview

26, October 23,2001; Author interview 7, June Il,2001; Author interview 10,

August 29,2001).37 Finally, particularistic ties have been the basis for allocating apartments/flats that belong to Kizilay, acquired through donations.

Property has been rented out to relatives of the members of the administration at below-market values. These below-market values have been preserved throughout the years by increasing rents only slightly and very much below the percentage ofincrease settled in the contract (commission report 52-53).

This has also been corroborated by prime ministry inspectors and the joumalist who investigated corruption in Kizilay (Author interviews 9, 10,25).

Participants from within Kizilay in general claimed that they have been abused by the media when asked about corruption in their organization.

According to them, they were made the scapegoat in a situation where all organizations and above all state institutions failed. However, a number of representatives, including those who are in the most senior positions have accepted that corruption has occurred but that it was not to the extent that the media claimed, that it was exaggerated, that it happens from time to time everywhere and that those who are culpable have beenlare being tried anyway

(Author interviews Il,20,21,27).

36 Please see footnote 4. 37 Other breaches identified in the commission report include making personal trips at the expense of Kizilay, using the same travel agency (ofwhich a member ofthe administration is a partner) for all traveling arrangements and purchasing tickets, and sending to international youth camps the relatives of Kizilay administrators and personnel (commission report 45). However, these critiques have been addressed by the president of Kizilay who has argues that the above breaches have not in fact taken place. He bas argued in bis reply to the commission that all the trips were taken on account of Kizilay business and their compensation was in accordance with statutes, that the practice ofbuying tickets from a single agency was adopted for reasons of convenience and practicality and not only by Kizilay, but by many organizations and firms and that sending Kizilay personnel's and administrators' children who knew Red Cross and Red Crescent principles well to youth camps did not constitute a breach (commission report 47-49).

112 Concluding Remarks

ln a particularistic state, civil society organizations become co-opted through particularistic ties. In the case of Kizilay, it has become a part of a multilevel chain system of corrupt exchanges, sorne of which include buying equipment at higher priees, giving contract-holders extra profit; renting apartments acquired through charity at lower priees to relatives and connections; selling new equipment as old at low prices; and hiring personnel mostly from relatives and connections. At first glance, neoclassical analyses of rent-seeking arguing that too much state involvement will bring about corruption may seem to hold. However, deeper analysis shows that it is in fact too little state involvement that causes state failure, which in tum leads to the persistence ofparticularistic ties and affects civil society organizations adversely. This 1 take up in the next chapter by analyzing the case of AKUT which confirms that lack of state capability affects civil society organizations adversely through over-missionization.

113 Chart 4.1: Organizational Structure of Kizilay

114 Chapter 5: The epitome of Civil Society? the case of AKUT

In the aftermath of the Marmara earthquake in 1999, as Kizilay became the focal point of all the criticisms directed at the state (as weIl as at itself) by a people devastated by the extent of neglect, helplessness and corruption which was seen as the cause of the dis aster that occurred, it was also constantly compared to the successful work undertaken by the civil initiative post-quake. The most prominent ofthese civil actors, AKUT, is a reliefrescue team which at the time was quite a small and informal group. AKUT is a relatively small association that specializes on rescue work whereas Kizilay does logistic work and it is one of the biggest associations in Turkey. Thus, in terms oftheir size and the work they do, they do not seem to warrant comparison. In fact, this was a point stressed passionately by participants from both of the associations. Nevertheless, 1 have chosen AKUT as a comparative case because Kizilay and AKUT came to represent all the dichotomies formed after the earthquake. AlI public discussion was shaped by sharp dichotomies such as the state which cannot do anything vs. civil society which can do everything; the state which cannot be trusted at aH vs. civil society which can be fully trusted; and Kizilay, agent of the state vs. AKUT, a civic actor. In analyzing state-civil society relations, the comparison oftwo associations one ofwhich is perceived as an extension of the state and the other which is perceived as the epitome of civil society and all the implications ofthese perceptions offered most interesting insights. Both associations are, in the end, affected by state failure, albeit in different ways.

AlI ofthese dichotomies are formed around the earthquake. As such, the earthquake is a turning point. It is definitely a tuming point for AKUT

115 since it underwent a major transformation due to the changes caused by the work it has carried out in the aftermath of the earthquake. It became a much larger and institutionalized organization. It also became the most well-known and the most trusted association in Turkey.38 That is why the discussion of the case of AKUT calls for a comparative analysis of pre-quake AKUT and post- quake AKUT. Through this comparative analysis ofpre-quake and post-quake

AKUT, 1 will show that the enormous transformation AKUT went through led to both internal change within the association and external change in terms of its relationship to the state. The change proved to be divisive for AKUT since most founding members quit the association as a result of dis agreements on how to institutionalize and how to organize relationships with the state.

AKUT's relationship to the state increased both in terms of joint activities and in terms ofbenefits received from the state. However, as 1 argue below, this relationship does not constitute an egalitarian one since AKUT is the vulnerable party. 1 argue that this is so because the state establishes particularistic ties with civil society organizations, granting AKUT benefits that are specifically arranged for them. 1 also argue that the particular way

AKUT's transformation has occurred is due to the over-missionization ofthis association, with expectations and demands from AKUT far exceeding their self-defined goals and capabilities. Finally, 1 argue that the over- rnissionization of AKUT is directly the result of state failure.

38 In fact, the second most trusted institution in the country after the armed forces, according to a large household survey of 3021 respondents on corruption (Adaman, Çarkoglu, and ~enatalar 2000).

116 The Earthquake: An Emergent Civil Society?

The chaos that followed in the aftermath of the Marmara earthquake was not only characterized by state failure but also, an unprecedented civic mobilization. The very failure of the state provoked this unprecedented civil reaction and mobilization. Not only civil society organizations poured into the area, anxious to reach earthquake victims who were obviously not being helped by the state but also many citizens, not attached to any organizations, arrived in the area offering food, medicine, clothing and their services. People filling up their cars with aid material and going to the area or people with no rescue trainingjoining the search and rescue were typical stories. There was a large collective civil effort in the face of state failure. In order to fill the gap created by the state, many people, thinking about "what can we possibly do?" were mobilized and thus, created a spontaneous civil initiative that was unprecedented in size and extent of solidarity. In this civil mobilization,

AKUT emerged as the modal of civil society, representing trust, reliability, voluntariness, selflessness, and success. AKUT became the most prominent association since it was the most well-known and the most trusted civil society organization. The media played a crucial role in portraying AKUT as such.

The demand to join AKUT to do rescue work was so overwhelming that in a short time, it became impossible to accept more volunteers and many others started new initiatives such as the Civil Coordination Center (CCC).

Actually, the start up of the CCC demonstrates weIl the spontaneity of the civic mobilization. A participant from the CCC describes it:

" ... 1 am one ofthose people- a lot of people mobilized, not knowing what they could do by themselves, thinking 'what should 1 do, should 1 go here, should 1 go there?' We first went to AKUT, the crowd was huge and there were not

117 enough members even to talk to them" (Author interview 30; December 8, 2001).

He continued by saying that he came together with a couple of people, with whom they had worked together in a previous civic initiative, in an office which became the center for CCC as calls started coming from people and organizations, who heard by word of mouth, that aid could be sent to the earthquake area reliably through such a center. The CCC thus became a coordination center which would take the aid from people/organizations that wanted to send it and direct it to areas where there was need for that particular item of aid (Author interview 30; December 8, 2001).

The media praised the civil mobilization to help the earthquake victims as much as it criticized the state for its incapacity to do so (Gavrilis 2001).

Typical headlines such as 'The people took over' and 'Civic Mobilization'

(Hurriyet, 20 August, 1999) could be found in every paper. The civil mobilization and the failure of the state were portrayed in the media in sharp dichotomies. Thus, the media played a pivotal role in creating and reinforcing the emerging dichotomous public discussion of the incapable state vs. heroic civil society; the state which cannot be trusted at all vs. civil society which can be fully trusted; corrupt state vs. clean civil society. This constituted a problem since many people assumed the position of either-or, completely ruling out the state in relief services and relying only on the civil initiatives. In practice, it was reflected in people insisting that they personally hand over the aid that they had collected or in donor organizations making aid conditional on its transfer to earthquake victims only through civil organizations. On the part of aid-receivers, it meant that they only trusted civil society organizations and

118 civil organizations that worked in a collective effort with state institutions aroused suspicion.39 ln the specific context of AKUT, which was seen as representing best all the attributes attached to civil society, it led to the association becoming over-missionized with a burden they were neither prepared nor willing to carry. 1 will discuss how AKUT became over- missionized and the adverse effects of it in detail below but first 1 need to lay out how AKUT started out in order to appreciate the scale of the transformation it went under.

Institutionalization: an organization in transfOimation

AKUT was officially founded in 1996 as a small association whose aim was to go to rescue in mountain accidents and incidents. The seven founding members were all mountain c1imbers. The idea first started in 1994 and was finalized when 2 young mountain c1imbers lost their lives because of lack of coordination (Interview data). As they started accumulating training and experience with first aid and rescue, they started pro vi ding rescue in other accidents and dis asters such as small plane accidents and floods. One of the founding members of AKUT was a renowned figure in the media because of his successful career as a professional mountain c1imber. A few lines would appear in the media here and there due to rus membership and the association was promoted to a certain extent through rus name (Lordoglu 1999). Apart from that, however, AKUT largely remained an undistinguished, small rescue

39 When the Civil Coordination, a civil initiative started after the earthquake to organize aid to the victims, announced that they were working with the crisis management center, the response they received was that "then no good can be expected ofyou". One member points out that it was extremely difficult (and often impossible) to explain to the earthquake victims that civil society organizations and state institutions had to corroborate because of the scale of the disaster (Klvanc 2002: 605).

119 association. Their resources, both tinancial and equipment-wise, were very limited, leaning towards non-existent.

AKUT made its first remarkable appearance in the media with the

Adana-Ceyhan earthquake in 1998 in which a group of 20 AKUT members contributed to rescue efforts for four days and saved 3 lives (Lordoglu 1999).

This earthquake was nowhere near the 1999 Marmara earthquake in terms of damage and extent. Nevertheless, it was big enough to warrant national attention and to carry AKUT to headlines for the first time, despite its size and limited resources. An example of their limited resources and scope is the fact that they went to this tirst relatively large-scale natural disaster with plane tickets bought with the credit card of one of the members (Author interview

29; December 5,2001). After the Adana-Ceyhan earthquake, AKUT became more generally known and loved for the voluntary, selfless work it carried out.

This meant that there was an increase in donations such as donations of equipment. Their work was recognized by the state as well with many awards and reception by the President ofTurkey at the time, Suleyman Demirel.

AKUT was granted the status of an "association working for the public good. "

There was also an increase in membership as approximately 60% of its members joined the association after the Adana-Ceyhan earthquake (Author interview 29; December 5,2001). Gradually, AKUT started focusing more on natural dis asters and less on mountain rescue.

The recognition AKUT got after the Adana-Ceyhan earthquake, however, can be considered negligible compared to the tremendous publicity and popularity its work inspired in the Marmara earthquake. AKUT's major transformation occurred after the 1999 Marmara earthquake which proved to

120 be a turning point for the association. AKUT, a small association with limited

means, was working effectively at rescuing earthquake victirns while the state

institutions and Kizilay, with extensive resources precisely to be used in such

situations, had failed to deliver services which were most urgently needed.

This had an enormous effect on the earthquake victims and citizens who were

mobilizing to help them. The state was held responsible for not only being

incapable of organizing effectively to help the victims but also, for allowing

sub-standard construction which caused the casualties to be so high in the first

place. This constituted a picture that was in sharp contrast with the picture that

AKUT helped create as a prominent element of the civil initiative. No wonder

that the members of AKUT became national heroes. The media played an

important role as well in carrying AKUT to the position of the most

appreciated and trusted association. It came to such a point that all successful

rescue work was credited to AKUT. Increasingly, whoever wanted to send aid

to the earthquake area demanded that it be sent through AKUT even though

managing aid was not among the missions of the association at aIl. 40

A senior member in the association has pointed out that one impact of

the earthquake has been that people had a chance to learn about what civil

society organizations are about and the kind of work they do. Thus, AKUT

played a pioneering role in showing society in general what a civil society

organization does. Before the earthquake, there was only a single search and

rescue association in Turkey, which was AKUT. Currently there are about

3000 such associations. Thus, AKUT played a pioneering role in that sense as

40 In fact, managing aid and delivering services such as shelter, food, and health services are the responsibilities ofKizilay. Ironically, one newspaper headline even suggested that 'Kizilay he handed over to AKUT' (Lordoglu 1999).

121 weIl. AKUT presented society with a positive image of civil society (Author interview 37; September 9, 2002).

The most important and comprehensive change AKUT experienced as a result of the earthquake is institutionalization. AKUT went from being quite an anonymous, small, informaI association with limited resources to being the most popular association with a lot of prestige as well as expectations attached to it. One senior member put it this way:

" ... In 15 days, AKUT suddenly became known to greater masses. It became a prestigious, well-respected, well-loved institution which was regarded sympathetically and in which more people showed an interest and wanted to join. Of course, financial resources changed accordingly. Before that our resources were very limited. We always- everybody went with their own car to the 1i h of August earthquake" (Author interview 39; September 23,2002).

Donations to the association exploded after the earthquake. So did applications for membership.

The pre-quake institutional structure was quite informal. One founding member describes it in this way:

''We had different duties. One looked after money matters. Another friend looked after training, another one was a doctor, one friend was a lawyer. So like this, completely spontaneous relations within itself, there is no distribution of duties" (Author interview 29; Author interview 29; December 5,2001).

AlI the participants described a similar structure. This structure, however, changed radically after the earthquake. The popularity and the public visibility that soared, the increased responsibilities, greater demand for membership and increased resources brought about the institutionalization process.

"On 17th of August, we were a group of friends, approximately 30-40 people among themselves without institutional formation. In the three years since 1999 we have completed our institutional structure" (Author interview 37; September 9,2002).

122 The current institutional structure of the association is based on a model

suggested by two consultancy firms which advise companies on professional

business administration. These two companies offered their services to AKUT

voluntarily and after conducting interviews for two months with the

approximately 100 members active at that time, they constructed an

organizational model for AKUT and defined its mission, vision and values

(Author interview 39; September 23,2002). Currently, there is a board of

directors constituted of 7 members, including the president and the vice

president. There are 6 major divisions as weIl as sorne sub-divisions. (Please

see Chart 5.1). There is also a board ofauditors, an ethics board, and a

disciplinary board. 41

The decision-making pro cess has also changed accordingly within the

new institutional structure. In the pre-quake informal structure, decisions were

made in what was called a 'decision group' of about 20 members who would

come together to discuss the issue at hand and arrive at a decision by taking a

vote. They still had a board of directors of five members who would take the

responsibility for the decisions but the decisions themselves were made in the

larger group. In the current structure, the relevant issues and potential projects

are first discussed in the divisions. The division heads then bring those issues,

points, projects that were agreed upon to a meeting with the other division

heads and any feedback is incorporated at this stage. Then it is taken to the

next level which is the meeting with the board of directors and heads of

divisions where they are discussed further. The final decision rests with the

board which is taken by a vote (Author interviews 37, 39). As senior members

41 One senior member told me that they regularly publish information on their expenditures and balance sheets on their website but when l went in, l could not find such information. However, it could be that they publish this information only at certain times in the year.

123 of the association emphasized, the projects travel from bottom to top, rather than the reverse.

Until today AKUT has carried out about 90 operations including mountain accidents, avalanches, accidents in technical climbing, accidents in para-gliding, search operations, earthquakes and floods. 42 In the process, they have saved approximately 600 people's lives. They are active in 5 regions in

Turkey: Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Marmaris and Bingol, with Bingol the latest founded station in the east (Author interview 39; September 23,2002).

Apart from search and rescue operations, AKUT carries out educational and training prograrns. In fact, the mission to develop educational projects pertaining to dis aster preparedness and re-modeling of dis aster planning in

Turkey is a much more important and primary issue for AKUT now that the mission to create a positive image of civil society organizations and to introduce the kinds of tasks they undertake is largely accompli shed (Author interviews 37, 40). Accordingly, they carry out several educational and training prograrns. They have ajoint project with one of the major universities in Istanbul in which they contribute to the educational programs by showing applications such as techniques of rope tying (Author interview 37; September

9,2002). AKUT is also Turkey's representative at the Federal Emergency

Management Agency in the U.S. They have various kinds of training programs such as an adaptation of the U.S.-based Community Emergency Response

Team program to Turkey (TAG) and another program that is a more advanced version of the former (T AMT). 43 Both programs cover issues such as basic disaster preparedness, intervention in small fires, first aid, basic search and

42 A complete list oftheir operations can be found on their website at www.akut.org.tr. 43 TAG stands for Toplum Afet Gonüllüleri and TAMT for Toplum Afet Müdahale Talaml in Turkish.

124 rescue and dis aster psychology and team organization. Until today, AKUT has given 475 T AMT, 43 TAG, 60 first communications, 40 avalanche training,

32 advanced rope techniques, and 41 first aid programs, with a total of700 people trained.

As important as the education mission is what a senior member ca1led the social mission of AKUT. He explained that AKUT should create projects that have social dimensions such as teaching children that being members of civil society organizations is a citizenship duty. In that regard, they have developed a project called young AKUT which aims to develop in children social responsibility and voluntary spirit (Author interview 37; September 9,

2002).

Activities and Relationship with the State

A major part of the institutionalization process has been increasing relations with the state, in the form of common projects carried out together with state institutions, especially with the army and benefits provided to the association by the state. Immediately after the earthquake, AKUT was received and congratulated by the prime minister and the president of Turkey on their contribution to the rescue effort. The prime minister asked AKUT for suggestions on how to build Turkey's capacity for dis aster management and what they had drawn from their experiences in the field which was presented as a report (Author interviews 31, 39). The Prime Minister backed AKUT extensively and went to the official opening of the association's headquarters even though he had not attended any opening ceremonies for a long time

(Author interviews 36, 40). Even before the earthquake, AKUT had ongoing relations with the state (Author interviews 33, 34, 37, 40). They had achieved

125 the status of "association working for the public good" in J anuary, 1999 before the Marmara earthquake. They had participated in the search and rescue in the

Ceyhan-Adana earthquake in 1998 in response to the Prime Minister's caU

(Author interview 39; September 23,2002).

Still, their relations with the state increased considerably both in terms of projects and activities carried out together and benefits provided by the state to AKUT. One of the main activities carried out with the state is organizing training programs because as one of the members of AKUT put it, they are good at it (Author interview 40; October 5, 2002). They organize seminars with the military. In military schools, there is an hour-long seminar each week

(Author interviews 37, 40). Transportation is another major area where AKUT and the military collaborate. Since the military has the most advanced and the most reliable means of transportation even in the worst of situations like dis asters , it is an important asset for AKUT to be able to use it to reach disaster areas in the shortest time possible. For instance, they went to search and rescue in Greece and India with military planes with the approval of the

Prime Ministry. In mountain rescue, they have again used military aircrafts provided by the army (Author interviews 31, 37, 39). All ofthis amounts to increased relations and involvement with the state compared to the pre-quake

AKUT (Author interviews 36, 37, 39, 40). Now AKUT constitutes one leg of a whole institutional arrangement together with state institutions such as the

Civil Defense (the official search and rescue organization of the state), the army and Kizilay. To this has been added the Turkish Emergency

Management General Directorate (TAY) which was established after the earthquake under the Prime Ministry and which coordinates aH disaster

126 management both in Turkey and abroad. When a project is being planned,

AK.UT is also called upon to contribute suggestions, human resources and equipment (Author interviews 37, 39). When AKUT receives a calI to go to search and rescue, they first notify the municipal authorities and go to the operation only ifthey are asked to go by the authorities (Author interview 37;

September 9,2002). Operations abroad are organized by TAY which is the official organization that coordinates disaster management in Turkey. AKUT goes to operations abroad if TAY asks them to. It is TAY which decides how many people from AKUT will participate in the operations, how manY from the Civil Defense and so on. AK.UT cannot act outside this hierarchical state structure of dis aster management (Author interviews 37, 40). A senior member describes their position as:

"We stand in the institutional- state institutional structure as part of the running mechanism of the system. We are subject to commando After we ob tain permission from the institutions which are supposed to be in contact with us and which are above us, we add our voluntariness to the project and we work. We cannot work with the logic that there has been an incident, let us run to the rescue" (Author interview 37; September 9,2002).

AKUT has become more involved with the state not only in terms of increased joint activities and projects, but also in terms of the benefits provided to AK.UT by the state. First, AKUT received financial aid from the state for two consecutive years in 2000 and 2001. Before the earthquake, the state did not give AKUT any financial aid (Author interviews 29, 33, 34,36,

39). Second, the building that AKUT uses for the association's activities was rented from the state in favorable terrns for AKUT (Author interviews 34, 36,

37,39,40). When AKUT established a First Aïd Training Center, the municipality was involved in securing the location for the center. Similarly,

127 they are in the process of buying another location with the involvement of another municipality (Author interviews 39, 40).

Other benefits that the state has provided AKUT with have been arranged specifically for AKUT's use who is the sole beneficiary. This has meant that the state has allowed AKUT to enjoy certain advantages which are not legally granted. For instance, in Turkey, there is a regulation that the maps with scale under 11100,000 can only be used by the military. However, AKUT also needs these detailed maps in order carry out search and rescue. A participant has told me that they had great difficulty in search and rescue without the maps and they informed the Prime Ministry ofthis difficulty. It was arranged by the

Prime Ministry that these maps be sent to AKUT from the Military Map

Headquarters (Author interview 40; October 5, 2002).44 ln another instance, they have asked for help in order to be able to use wireless equipment because the use of wireless equipment in Turkey is regulated by certain legal procedures (Author interview 34; August 2, 2002). AIso, AKUT is legally required to ob tain permission from the Municipality to go to any search and rescue operations which is a process that takes a week. However, as the operations they undertake are dis asters or accidents, they require immediate mobilization and intervention. Thus, AKUT has never gone through the legal procedure of obtaining permission in any oftheir operations and they have not met any repercussions (Author interview 34; August 2,2002). As these examples show, the nature ofthese benefits provided by the state constitutes a particularistic relationship that is established by the state since these are arranged specifically for AKUT and AKUT only. Even the foundation ofthe

44 Though at the time of the interview, the maps had not yet arrived.

128 association was based on a certain flexibility provided by the state since legally, search and rescue activities in Turkey cannot be carried out by a civil society organization but only by the official state organization of search and rescue, the Civil Defense (Author interviews 33, 34). Currently, AKUT works as a part of the state institutional arrangement of dis aster management. They work under the Municipality and the Turkish Emergency Management

General Directorate (TAY) (Author interviews 39,40).

The joint activities and the increased ties between the state and AKUT do not constitute an egalitarian relationship of mutual empowerment or synergy. AKUT is the vulnerable party in this relationship. This is because the

Turkish state is a particularistic state and deals with civil society organizations only through such ties. Even though it is not a classical case of cooptation in which AKUT is made financially dependent on the state (even though this is partly true as AKUT received financial aid from the state only after it became extremely popular in the public eye after the earthquake), the ties between the state and AKUT are still particularistic since the state establishes such ties by allowing AKUT certain benefits that are not granted universally and legally.

The state allows AKUT to "skip" certain regulations. These are specific to

AKUT, put into effect just for them (thus AKUT is singled out on a particularistic basis) and conditional on behaving according to certain codes established by the state. As one participant explained, they do not in general experience the problems political groups experience precisely because they are not a political group but the state has leverage which it could use if AKUT behaved outside their understanding. Were AKUT to breach it, the state could and does stop overlooking and puts into effect the existing, written laws. For

129 example, once AKUT sent sorne ofits members abroad to receive training

without obtaining permission from the Municipality.45 This training was to

reinforce their program on emergency management since AKUT is the only

organization which is qualified to issue the American-based Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) certificate in Turkey. The reaction

of the Municipality was to take AKUT to court (Author interviews 34,40). A

senior member thought that they were right in doing this and remarked:

"If the Prime Ministry or the military somehow withdrew their support from AKUT, the Civil Defense could put the lock here [AKUT] the next day. As you know, there was a court case. It was a display of power. They did the right thing actually" (Author interview 34; August 2,2002).46

In another instance, there had been a collective initiative in 2000, exactly one

year after the earthquake, among sorne civil society organizations who came

together and published a statement that was critical of the state. In one of the

participant's words, it was "completely against the state and rebellious."

AKUT was also invited to this collective action but it refused, arguing that

they can only do work in their area of expertise. However, AKUT's name was

still mentioned in connection to this initiative. AKUT immediately started

having problems with the Municipality which began refusing permission for

their regular meetings (Author interview 34; August 2, 2002). Only after

AKUT explained that there had been a mistake was the situation smoothed

over. AlI ofthese incidences underline the vulnerable position of AKUT vis-à-

vis the state. Thus, co-optation does not only work through rent distribution

45 A participant remarked that they had notified the Municipality 3 weeks prior to departure but they were supposed to do it 4 weeks prior to departure (Author interview 40; October 5, 2002). 46 The court ruled that the members of the board of directors were well-intentioned; however, ifthey are taken to court again and are punished, they will receive a cumulative sentence together with this one.

130 but as in the case of AKUT, also through allowances/breaches/exceptions the state provides.

Outcome of Change

AU of these changes, growth, institutionalization and increasing relations with the state, ultimately caused problems for the association, resulting in most founding members to quit. The earthquake was a turning point for AKUT because it set AKUT on the path towards change and institutionalization. The change triggered by the earthquake proved divisive, however, because the founding members of the association disagreed on fundamental questions of the direction of the change. The first fundamental question arose with respect to how to institutionalize and how to run the organization. The second fundamental question was how to organize relations with the state. Both questions contained issues of disagreement for the founding members.

The question ofhow to institutionalize

In terms of institutionalization, while sorne members felt that the change from the informaI running of the association to an institutional arrangement where formaI procedures were clearly laid down and followed was not only necessary but inevitable in order to deal with pressures of growth; other members felt that this made AKUT less democratic internally. A senior member of AKUT expressed approval of the CUITent institutional arrangement by saying:

''Nowafter 1 i h of August we all of a sudden grew 100 times bigger overnight. In every respect. In order to adapt to this, of course we needed to change ourselves, develop ourselves (Author interview 39; September 23, 2002).

131 Others, however, saw this change towards a more formal, institutionalized

structure as a means for limiting democratic debate. The changes with respect

to the decision-making process were particularly evaluated in this light. As

discussed ab ove, before the earthquake, AKUT's decision-making process

involved a group of20 people all coming together, debating the issue at hand

and deciding by taking a vote. The board of directors would then apply the

decision. In the current arrangement, the decision-making power rests with the

7 members of the board of directors who evaluate issues that are brought

before them by lower divisions. According to sorne founding members, this

has completely destroyed the democratic structure of the association (Author

interviews 31, 33). In fact, the feeling that decision-making power was too

strictly in the hands of a smaU clique within the association has been one of

the major reasons why sorne founding members of AKUT left it. This was

certainly the internaI conflict that was most paraded in the media and shown as

the reason behind the break-up in AKUT. There are also members who find

both pre-quake and post-quake decision-making mechanisms democratic

(Author interview 40; October 5, 2002).

Another problem that is related to internal democracy within the

association is the handling ofpotential new members. In the aftermath of the

earthquake, there was an enormous demand for AKUT membership, so much

so that applications were frozen for a while. Now AKUT accepts new

applicants; however, they are not accepted as full-fledged members, but as volunteers. Volunteers work and participate in aU activities in the association

as regular members except that they do not have the vote. The volunteers are granted the vote after they work for AKUT for a year at which point they are

132 evaluated and if found suitable, become members of AKUT. There are about

200 full-fledged members and about 600 volunteers. This rais es a concern

since AKUT has people 3 times more the number of regular members who do the same work but who cannot vote. Furthermore, their becoming a full

member is conditional on being approved by the existing members which has

obvious implications for the limits of internaI democracy within the

association. The founding members who left AKUT felt strongly about that:

''There is no such thing as democracy. There is no participation. Everybody does not enjoy right of speech equally. Rent and games, scams, tricks, silencing people with alternative views. Go and try to become a member, say that you came from Canada, McGill so and so forth, there is no way you can [become a member]. First [they] will look at you, will she vote for us in the future or will she oppose us? Will she speak her free mind, will she bring in different perspectives from similar organizations in Canada, all over the world? Or will she vote for us? There is that concern. That they willlose control over [AKUT]" (Author interview 31; December Il,2001).

Thus, the members who left AKUT believe that the present arrangement of

volunteer-member is in place because of the centralizing tendencies of the

administration. It is a mechanism to ensure the exclusion of alternative views.

In fact, a group of founding members who left AKUT blamed the president of

the association for establishing a one-man mIe and behaving like a dictator

which found quite an echo in the media (Author interview 31; September 23,

2002; Hürriyet, July 31, 2002; Sabah, September 26, 2002). These accusations

were denied by the president of AKUT (Hürriyet, August 24, 2002). In fact,

the current members of AKUT felt that the volunteer system worked weIl.

That period until volunteers became full members was perceived as a time

when they got to know the volunteers and also had a chance to observe

whether and how weIl they carried out responsibilities entmsted to them

(Author interviews 34, 39). They also emphasized that there was no difference

133 between full members and volunteers except for the right to vote (Author interviews 36, 39). A senior member sums it up:

'Yes there are volunteers. There are members. We don't really differentiate them. Volunteers are just people who have been with us for a while, whom we are trying to get to know as well as to whom we introduce ourselves. If, after a point, they are found to fit in with AKUT's mission, vision and values, they become members but there is no difference between member and volunteer in terms of participation in activities. 1 mean they can do everything" (Author interview 39; September 23,2002).

Still, the fact remains that the number ofvolunteers in AKUT without the right of vote is three times more than the number of full members and that these volunteers need the approvaI of full members to become full members themselves. Thus, the c1aim that there are no differences between volunteers and full members is not as neutraI as it sounds.

The importance ofmembers' right of vote and the differences in the implications of all members' having the vote as opposed to only sorne was fully recognized as one senior member discussed it in relation to another issue of disagreement, that ofwaqf. The final disagreement with respect to the direction of AKUT's growth and institutionaIization was the issue ofwaqf.

This disagreement sprang up when AKUT wanted to obtain the legal status of waqf. The reasons of the senior members for embarking on the project of obtaining waqf status were two-fold. First, waqfs are seen as more permanent institutions than associations. Second, waqfs can undertake financial ventures and make money but associations cannot. In discussing the justification for waqf status, one senior member also related it to internai control in the association which is directly relevant to the discussion ofmembers' votes.

This participant explained that in an association, elections have to be held every 2 years in a general assembly. If the number of the members of an

134 association suddenly soars (as AKUT's has done), then the changes within the

association become unpredictable since every member has a vote. This

explanation by a senior participant is worth quoting at length:

"Every two years you have to be elected again. So the people you will accept here [in AKUT] because ofnumerical value-we are alllike brothers here and we know each other's homes, we know [their] brothers and sisters, we know each other inside out. So we don't have strangers among us. But ifyou take AKUT - suddenly increase the number which is a 100 to 2000 people and if you remain as an association, think that every person you accept as a member will have a right to vote, in the next general assembly in 2 years, there is no guarantee as to who will own this association. Will it be an ideological fraction or a group of people with a different worldview who wins numerical majority and takes control of the structure? Do you know what 1 mean? But if you [AKUT] become a waqf, then you cannot possibly destroy this main structure. And you can increase yOuf numbers. How? You have volunteers but they don't affect yOuf structure legally" (Author interview 37; September 9, 2002).

This connection that is drawn by the participant between volunteers, voting

and internal control is why 1 have argued above that the daim that there are no

differences between the volunteers and full members might not be as neutral

as it sounds. In fact, the issue of waqf proved to be a big controversy leading

to more members leaving AKUT because they were highly critical of the

cUITent administration, alleging that the real purpose in obtaining the waqf

status was to strengthen the administration's centralizing tendencies and

position and making it permanent (Author interview 33; July 19,2002;

Hurriyet, July 31, 2002; Sabah, September 26, 2002).47

Obtaining the waqf status also enables an organization to run business

enterprises and make money. An association cannot run any commercial

activity and can only accept donations. Donations, however, have decreased

and became almost nonexistent since the earthquake. In 1999 after the

47 The charge that the administration is trying to make its position permanent was denied by the members of the administration, both to me in the interviews and in the media.

135 earthquake and in 2000 following it, donations and financial aid flowed in to

AKUT but the passage oftime, AKUT's losing its headline status and the severe economic crises have meant that donations have dwindled (Author interviews 36, 37). Thus, becoming a waqfis seen as a solution to the financial problems of AKUT which have become increasingly serious since they have difficulties in attracting donations and huge expenditures to finance. 48 As a waqf AKUT would be allowed to run commercial activities. Sorne activities that were considered by the administration were to give first aid training course which they could charge for (Author interview 37; September 9,2002).

Even though AKUT gives many seminars in schools and companies, they are free of charge unless the company makes them a donation. Another idea was to sell AKUT products to generate income. The senior participants pointed out that the bigger projects like establishing a training center and an academy are not possible on voluntary labor alone. Staff expenditures could be met by generating in come through commercial activities as a waqf (Author interviews

39,40). One senior member underlined the need to become firm-like (Author interview 39; September 23,2002).49 The change towards firm-like organization is also observed by junior members (Author interview 38;

September 17, 2002). Despite AKUT's urgent need to create financial resources, plans to ob tain waqf status have been put on hold due to a change in waqf1aw whose outcome is uncertain at the moment.

48 Operations are costly as well as the training courses they organize. For instance, the cost of a TAMT training per student is $100 (Author interview 40; October 5, 2002). Cost of an operation is estimated to be $1000 on average, sometimes going up to $2000-$3000. AKUT bas run about a 100 operations up unti1 today, adding up roughly to $150,000 of expenditure (Author interview 37; September 9, 2002). This cost is exacerbated by the fact that associations are not legally entitled to the right to hold theirmoney in foreign currency because in the Turkish economy it means that whatever financial assets AKUT has will be devaluated steadily. 49 That the administration is trying to tum AKUT from an association into a firm is another critique targeted at the administration (Sabah, September 26, 2002).

136 The question ofrelationship to the state

Equally controversial was the issue of relationship to the state. Sorne members felt that the new increasing ties with the state should be treated with extreme caution and the distance between AKUT and the state should be kept to a certain extent while other members did not have these scmples. The latter group's approach was summarized weIl by a participant as "what is the harm?

The state is our state" (Author interview 29; December 5,2001). One participant believed that if AKUT established closer ties with the state, the state inevitably would make certain demands on AKUT. Thus, this participant believed that financial aid offered by the state ought to have been refused

(Author interview 29; December 5,2001). Thus, what to do with the financial aid was one issue of disagreement. According to one of the founding members, a relationship with too close ties to the state turns into a relationship of dependence which means that the civil society organization cannot act as a civil society organization any longer.

"If you ask me, by definition, a civil society organization must keep its ties with the state to a minimum. A civil society organization must be independent but if the relationship to the state becomes too close, [it] becomes a dependent relationship ... When a dependent relationship starts, we cannot carry out your functions the way we would like to or our members would like to ... Of course there can be cooperation, the state's Civil Defense and civil society organizations can do something together but 1 think it must be in equal terms." (Author interview 29; December 5,2001).

He added that it is necessary to remain independent because the state would not want competition from civil society organizations. This observation that the state is threatened by civil society organizations that can potentially become more successful in delivering certain services which was certainly tme in the case of AKUT was made by other participants as weIl.

137 "It came to such a point that in public opinion polls, the military, the state and AKUT were compared. Of course this is dangerous. The state does not want this. 1 mean [the state] never wants it self compared to and evaluated with civil society organizations" (Author interview 33; July 19, 2002).

"A civil society is established to compensate for something that is lacking. What is lacking is indirectly related to the state. The state knows this as weIl ... That is why [it] does not want civil society organizations" (Author interview 40; October 5, 2002).

Related to this was the critique that the for-state group in AKUT always acted and spoke in a manner that would please the state. First of all,

AKUT emphasized from the beginning that it was not a political group and that it did not belong to any political group (Author interview 29, December

12,2001; Author interview 38, September 17, 2002). The participant who criticized this said that AKUT did not necessarily need to be in politics but nevertheless, it needs to have a position and a point of view which it does anyway. Still, AKUT emphasized that it was "above politics" as a result of which it found support from the state (Author interview 29; December 12,

2001). This was confirmed by a participant who currently works in AKUT and who did not consider it as a point to be criticized:

"As a civil society organization, we do not have any political views. Everyone may have different views. This has made the people and the state love us" (Author interview 38; September 17, 2002).

Especially the military was keen in extending its support to AKUT. They were told that they were doing a very good job and that they were demonstrating to

Turkey how a civil society organization ought to work (Author interview 33;

July 19,2002).

Other members sorne of whom make up the current administration did not find the relationship to the state problematic. They think that AKUT became a very good example in Turkey because it showed that a civil society

138 organization can be the best in its area of expertise without fighting with the state. Especially in the aftermath of the earthquake where the state faced public outrage and harsh criticisms, AKUT formed a tie between the state and society according to a senior participant (Author interview 34; August 2,

2002). That they refrained from such criticism is evidenced by the fact that they refused to join a collective initiative of a bunch of civil society organizations, which made a public statement critical of the state on the first anniversary of the earthquake. When their name was mistakenly included, they immediately dissociated themselves from the initiative which they felt was

"completely against the state and rebellious" (Author interview 34; July 19,

2002). AKUT sees itself as an integral part of the institutional arrangement that has been set up to deal with dis aster management in Turkey involving the state Civil Defense, Kizilay, and TAY. A senior participant explained to me what he said is the administration's position:

''The civil society organizations contribute voluntarily and within the limits of their resources to any activity within the borders of the Republic of Turkey. This is all that is done. 1 mean if AKUT, using its resources, can contribute to the improvement of services provided by the Civil Defense and if it can ease sorne oftheir burden or in a social project, it [AKUT] can contribute to the activities of the state, this is our biggest success. This is our job anyway" (Author interview 37; September 9,2002).

This cooperation between the state and AKUT becomes problematic though when it is considered that the state's relationship to AKUT is a particularistic one and do es not constitute a relationship between equal parties, as 1 have argued ab ove. The state has a certain level of leverage which has been obtained through co-optation by granting allowances/breaches/exceptions to

AKUT.

139 Failure in the State: Too Much to Handle?

The problerns AKUT faced was not only because of growth but because, as 1 will argue below, it became over-missionized, expected to compensate for state failure which is the crucial factor undedying its growth and institutionalization process. The circumstances of the earthquake marked by state failure was a tuming point for AKUT because it led to the over missionization of the association and the change it underwent happened in a particular way because of expectations it faced to compensate for state failure.

The changes AKUT went through-escalated public visibility and popularity, increased resources, increased demands for membership- which occurred abruptlyand which were massive in scale caused this small association to become over-missionized. Suddenly, AKUT was the one organization that was trusted enough to be able to take care of anything and everything, from rescue which was their self-defined mission to aid collection, aid distribution and other miscellaneous tasks needed to be undertaken in the dis aster area. This, of course, is a direct result of state failure. The state in Turkey proved itself ultimately incapable of delivering any public services the situation required such as aid organization and fair distribution of aid. Even the basic requirements such as ensuring smooth flow of transportation and communications, which are the very basic elements of infrastructure, could not be fulfilled. Moreover, there was a crucial trust deficit as the state and Kizilay, which is perceived as part of the state, could not be trusted since the connections between sub-standard construction and sub-standard aid services and corruption were all too clearly drawn. Thus, all that was expected of state

140 institutions was then channeled into AKUT, which could be trusted but which, as a smaIl search and rescue association, could not be a substitute for the state.

In the face of state failure, there was a generaI demand that aIl the donations that were pouring into the area be organized and distributed by

AKUT and not the state. However, as participants have emphasized, AKUT had not taken upon itself such a mission. They found the responsibility and the expectations to be quite a burden which they were not prepared to carry. One founding member describes this overload:

"It is as if AKUT is not a rescue organization but one that distributes, that goes 50 to aid whatever- there was a caricature in Cumhuriyet . Let's turn everything over to AKUT ... So people- nobody asked AKUT's opinion but they burdened AKUT with too great a mission. In the end, AKUT was an association in which sorne people came together and worked voluntarily. People here too had weaknesses, strengths. But something suddenly is made into a superhuman creature, something too big. This especiaIly by the media" (Author interview 29; December 12, 2001).

This is echoed by other members:

"First, they made us run. We started running before we started crawling and it made it very difficult" (Author interview 40; October 5, 2002).

''Trust for AKUT is greater than trust for state institutions. 1 don't know why. Maybe they find (us) doser, maybe there are sorne things the media does. It is not true actuaIly, we don't accept them. We do not accept the exaggeration media does because we are reaIly burdened with a lot of responsibility. When the organization was not created, completed, when institutionaIization had not started, we were burdened with incredible responsibility and we struggled a lot. There were a lot of problerns" (Author interview 34; July 19, 2002).

The fact that AKUT was asked to transfer the aid that was collected to the disaster area and distribute it there caused a problem since it was not organized to undertake this. Even answering caUs constituted a problem since there were so many with only a few to answer those (Interview data., Lordoglu

1999). There was aIso international aid pouring in. AKUT had to refuse 90%

50 Cwnhuriyet is one of the nationwide newspapers in Turkey.

141 of the aid whose donors insisted that the aid should go through AKUT. AKUT would try to channel these into more appropriate authorities such as the municipal crisis centers, arguing that they are not an aid organization but rather a search and rescue association (Author interview 33; July 19, 2002).

Aid provision and distribution normally falls within Kizilay' s range of duties.

However, at the time, there were even suggestions that Kizilay be taken over by AKUT. This must have made quite an impression on the members of

AKUT since a few participants mentioned it to underline the extremity of the situation (Interview data; Lordoglu 1999). Despite its resistance, AKUT still had to organize sorne aid distribution because in sorne cases they had not much choice when people would bring something and give it to AKUT because they saw AKUT as the 'right institution' (Author interview 40;

October 5, 2002). Sorne participants saw this as the result of the lack of an effective cri sis center:

"lndirectly this has to do with the absence of a crisis management center. There is always a crisis management center in these types of organizations" (Author interview 40; October 5, 2002).

After the earthquake as well, demands for AKUT to take over the organization of crisis management continued. The president of AKUT mentioned in a roundtable discussion which was published in a journal that the demands for AKUT to organize training prograrns were too great. This he found scary because he thought that the probability of making a mistake

(which could lead to the loss oflives of either the rescue workers or the victims) was infinitely higher now that they faced demands of dealing with thousands of people (CogitoI999: 258, 263).

142 Such over-missionization of AKUT, caused directly by the failure of the state, put AKUT on a certain path of institutionalization which proved divis ive and raised concerns with respect to fundamental questions ofhow to run the organization and how to organize relations with the state, as 1 have discussed ab ove. This is because over-rnissionization was accompanied by another dynamic, the dynamic of prestige. Over-missionization also made

AKUT a source of great prestige from which sorne people drew privilege rent which exacerbates the dynamics of the change put in place by over missionization. The enormous trust and goodwill that AKUT rightly earned for itself after the earthquake turned into too great a source of prestige because of the failure of the state. Sorne of the participants talked about how the name of

AKUT opened all doors and became a trademark and how AKUT became an arena where people thought they could gain power (Author interviews 29, 31,

33). One participant shared an observation of a small but telling incident.

Interest in training activities to which the media was invited was great, but members found excuses not to participate in radio programs (Author interview

29; December 12, 2001).

That the work done in organizations ofhumanitarian aid, dis aster relief and rescue work brings substantial prestige is not a new idea. In fact, one of the recent trends in international NGOs working in the areas ofhumanitarian aid, disaster relief and peace-building is the increasing prestige associated with this type ofwork. However, in AKUT's case this has been so pronounced that it became a source of rent and as such, a threat to voluntariness and democratic participation associated with such organizations. This dynamic, again, is directly related to over-missionization to fill the gap created by state failure.

143 Conclusion:

The case of AKUT shows that civil society organizations are adversely affected by the absence of a capable state even though state failure to deliver services may create what seems to be an opportunity from a neoclassical perspective emphasizing minimal state involvement to substitute for the state.

Furthermore, civil society organizations cannot escape particularistic networks that the state establishes no matter how much they may be removed from the state initially. This is because state-society relations form a setting in which particularistic relations have a historical, structural basis. At this point, it is important to emphasize that AKUT is not involved in corrupt exchanges even though the state has established particularistic ties with it and it is the vulnerable party in a hierarchical relationship. Corrupt networks are always particularistic but particularistic ties are not always corrupt. It is possible to think of a continuum of cooption:

Close ties --+ particularistic ties --+ corrupt exchanges.

(A) (B) (C)

Thus, AKUT has particularistic ties from which they benefit by obtaining favors that allow them to skip regulations that apply universally but it is not involved in corrupt exchanges whereas Kizilay is. It is also the case that there are different types of cooption. The obvious one is financial but as we have seen in the case ofboth AKUT and Kizilay, the state can co-opt by establishing particularistic ties without creating financial dependence. Kizilay does not receive financial support from the state and AKUT received only a small one which was not continuous. Still, they have been co-opted by the state, at different points on the continuum of cooption. Financial dependence,

144 however, is the only type of cooption considered in the literature which l take up in the next chapter.

145 Chart 5.1: Organizational Structure of AKUT

146 Chapter 6: Comparative Perspectives: International NGOs, Global civil society and humanitarian work

The arguments advanced so far have been based on the two cases of this research, situated in Turkey. Up to this point, 1 have shown that state failure in Turkey, understood as the incapacity to provide univers al goods and services, means that the state can only establish particularistic ties. Thus, the state has created multi-Ievel chain systems of particularized ties through which selective benefits travel. Since the state can only establish particularistic ties, the interaction between the state and civil society organizations varies on a continuum of co option from close ties to particularistic ties to corrupt exchanges. Kizilay has been so intertwined with the state that it has become an extension ofit and is involved in corrupt exchanges. AKUT, which has started out at a completely different point than Kizilay, has also been co-opted by the state as the latter established particularistic ties with the former even though

AKUT is not involved in corrupt exchanges. State failure, an instance of which was the '99 earthquake, has aIso led to over-missionization in the case of AKUT. Thus, 1 have argued that the nature of the state, whether it is universalistic or particularistic, is the historical structural factor that explains the type of interaction between the state and civil society organizations.

However, it could be argued that the characteristics of certain organizations inevitably lead to the type of interaction with the state that we find in the Turkish context which has nothing to do with the nature of the state. For instance, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies in general are organizations that are close to the state, aImost state-like. Alternatively, it

147 could be the case that there is something peculiar about disasters that lead to contexts similar to the one that emerged after the '99 earthquake in Turkey. In order to make a strong case that can be generalized about the nature of the state and the resulting state-civil society relationship, we need to differentiate organizational factors and dis aster context factors from effect of ties to the state so that we isolate the latter. In other words, in order to strengthen the causal argument, we need to compare first, similar organizations (NGOs in general and NGOs doing humanitarian work as weIl as Red Cross and Red

Crescent societies more specifically) and second, dis aster contexts. Thus, we need a comparative perspective in order to see what similar factors exist in similar organizations and in disaster situations. Only then we can establish that what is different is the result of the nature of the state. Sorne characteristics are common to all dis aster contexts while others such as state failure is not found in all disaster contexts which is specifically the result of particularistic ties in the state. Likewise, questions of accountability surround the issue of relationship ofNGOs to states; however, lack of accountability of civil society organizations with close ties to universalistic states gives rise to very different problems than civil society organizations with close ties to particularistic states.

Organizational Factors

There has been a large growth in the number and scope of 'third sector organizations/NGOs/civil society organizations in the 1990s as well as growing interest in them as they have become 'high-profile' (Anheier and

Themudo 2002; Lewis 2001; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Edwards and Hulme

1996; Brett 1993). The ideological prevalence of markets and elections, what

148 has been called the "new policy agenda", has contributed to this increase as

NGOs are seen as an important mechanism for implementing this agenda for a number of reasons (Kaldor 2003; Hulme and Edwards 1997). They can pro vide a social safety net without extending the role of the state; provide training in democracy and citizenship; check abuses of the state; and push corporations toward social responsibility (Kaldor 2003: 88). The increasing importance ofNGOs is related to the prevalent dichotomous thinking which underlies the neoclassical agenda of rninimizing the role of the state.

Chandhoke argues that the growing power ofNGOs, whether they are national or global, has been facilitated by the Washington consensus (Chandhoke 2002:

43). In fact, it is now possible to talk about a post-Washington consensus which maintains that globalization needs to be 'governed' with accountability, transparency, capacity building and that in the process, the state ought to be replaced, not by the market but rather by civil society organizations which can potentially strengthen democracy (Chandhoke 2002). This is of course contentious for several reasons, not the least of which is to do with problems ofaccountability and representativeness ofNGOs which 1 discuss below but first we need to note the increase ofNGOs both in numbers and importance.

Indeed, the number ofNGOs registered as international organizations has increased by 1/3 from 10,292 to 13,206 and their memberships has increased from 155,000 to 263,000 during the 1990s (Kaldor 2003). These organizations are engaged in development work, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, relief, service provision, and campaigning around the world. Increasingly, aid to developing countries is channeled through international NGOs and the share

149 ofprivate donations to NGOs has more than doubled by the end of 1990s

(Kaldor et al. 2003).

The growing interest in NGOs is accompanied by a more comprehensive debate on the efficiency, accountability and effectiveness of

NGOs, replacing the earlier tendency to see them as "magic bullets" (Lewis

2001: 5). This broadening of the debate was made possible by studies which investigated claims and achievements attributed to NGOs' development work and which showed that they could not be simply presumed (Lewis 2001;

Hulme and Edwards 1997). These studies found that whether NGO work is characterized by the values and strengths attributed them such as greater focus on gender and poverty, greater performance and efficiency, the ability to innovate and adapt, an emphasis on participation and human rights, and a sensitivity to need and appropriateness of interventions, is an empirical question (Lewis 2001). The problem is that evidence for NGO performance is scarce. Thus, this growing debate is aIso more critical of the neoliberal agenda which often promotes NGOs as an unconditional good.

Closer investigation has given rise to the awareness that first, the category ofNGO covers a wide range of types (Kaldor 2003; Anheier and

Themudo 2002; Brett 1993). Sorne NGOs are large, bureaucratie and formaI.

For instance, in the development and humanitarian field, there are about 8 major organizations sorne of which are Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontiers, Save the Children, and CARE. Each has a budget of approximately $500 million a year (Kaldor 2003). Other NGOs are small and informaI. Kaldor has differentiated NGOs according to geography, task, aim and organizational form. Thus, northem NGOs are closer to the policy making community and

150 sources of fund whereas southem NGOs have roots in the local environment.

Sorne NGOs are involved in service provision (relief in emergencies, health care, education, housing and legal services, provision of micro-credit); others in advocacy and campaigning. Sorne organizations are established to show solidarity with others while others are mutual benefit organizations, established to provide benefits to members. Finally, in terms of organizational forms, they can be formal or informal, hierarchical or participatory, centralized or de-centralized (Kaldor 2003).

Similar differences are observed by others (Anheier and Themudo

2002; Farrington and Bebbington 1993; Lewis 2001). Farrington and

Bebbington (1993) c1assify them according to whether they are northern or southem-based; whether they are grassroots organizations (communities, cooperatives, neighborhood communities, etc.), organizations that give support to the grassroots or organizations that lobby or network; and whether they are membership or non-membership organizations (Farrington and Bebbington

1993: 3).51 Lewis also points out that NGOs vary significantly in their structure and in the nature oftheir operations since they inc1ude large, bureaucratie organizations with multi-million dollar budgets as well as small, informallocal initiatives. They could be engaged in long-term community development or short-term disaster relief (Lewis 2001 :3) It is hard to talk about a category ofNGOs according to Lewis since they can be "large or small, formal or informal, extemally funded or driven by volunteers, charitable and patemalistic or radical and empowerment-based" (Lewis 2001 :3). This

51 Membership organizations are staffed and elected by the people they are meant to serve and represent. Non-membership organizations are staffed by people who are socially, professionallyand sometimes ethnically different from their clients (Farrington and Bebbington 1993: 3).

151 recognition of diversity among NGOs is coupled with a criticism, what Kaldor calls the NGOization of public space. This refers to the fact that certain types ofNGOs, those that are northem, solidaristic, formaI, hierarchical and that emphasize service provision have dominated the field (Kaldor 2003:92).

The growth ofthis type ofNGO raises concems because of issues of accountability which is crucial since it is directly related to the relationship

NGOs form with governments and donors. Problerns of accountability and representativeness are seen as one of the limitations ofNGOs. This is particularly relevant to our discussion of forms of cooption. The issue of such relations and their impact on accountability is invariably taken up in the literature in terms of whether financial support from official donors or use of public funds from the state hinders the ability ofNGOs to carry out their promises to their beneficiaries (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Hulme and

Edwards 1997; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Farrington and Bebbington 1993).

It is estimated that in the early 1970s about 1.5 per cent of total income of development NGOs came from donors; by the mid 1990s, this had risen to around 30 per cent (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Figures vary form country to country: in the US, 66 per cent ofNGO funding cornes from the govemment, in Canada 70 percent, in Sweden 85 per cent and in the UK, the five largest development NGOs are increasingly dependent on govemment funding, with figures varying between 20 and 55 per cent (Hulme and Edwards 1997: 7).

The issue of financial dependence raises several concems as to what is done and how it is done. First, there might be an emphasis on certain activities at the expense of others, financial dependence distorting mission. The providers offunds may come to defme achievement and techniques more and

152 more (Kaldor 2003; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Edwards and Hulme 1996).

For instance, donors emphasize cost-efficiency over innovation (Anheier and

Themudo 2002). As a result, the diversity ofNGOs is being reduced. More

NGOs are adapting 'best practices' and leaving their role as innovators because donors promote the adoption of best practices (Hulme and Edwards

1997; Anheier and Themudo 2002). This leads to the repetition of the same type ofprojects; tuming innovation into reinvention of old practices (Smillie

1996). Second, upward accountability (to donors and states) may gain precedence over downward accountability (to members or beneficiaries). This may create tensions between donor daims and NGOs' daims to being organizations that promote qualitative change, and that conceptualize participation as a means to empower the poor and the disadvantaged (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Edwards and Hulme 1996). Since NGOs are not subject to formal mechanisms of democratic accountability, they may reduce citizens' empowerment, rather than strengthen it (Kaldor 2003; Chandhoke 2002;

Lewis 2001). Those in whose name the NGOs receive funds have no mechanism through which to hold NGOs accountable. In this respect, we need to differentiate between membership organizations and non-membership organizations. In the former, members have the right to vote, and thus a say in organizational decisions. In non-membership organizations however, donors are members and accountability to the beneficiaries remains weak even though

NGOs ofthis type are involved in work that gives voice to exduded groups or draw attention to critical problerns (Anheier and Themudo 2002).

In non-membership organizations, in addition to accountability, there is a problem with representativeness as weIl since many NGOs do not have

153 representatives of the people they mean to empower in their structural organization and decision-making remains removed from their control

(Farrington and Bebbington 1993; Anheier and Themudo 2002; Chandhoke

2002). This also means that they do not have a say in how resources are used since they are not directly represented in many NGOs which are non membership organizations. Even though NGOs raise issues/concems in global civil society, the c1aim that they represent the public or general interest may be questioned (Chandhoke 2002). When we look at trends, much of the growth in membership numbers seems to be in supporter-based (i.e. non-membership) organizations rather than in membership organizations (Anheier and Themudo

2002: 211). Sorne have suggested government monitoring to ensure NGO accountability but govemments may have ulterior motives like gaining access to NGO funds or keeping an eye on them since they fear NGOs as political competitors (Farrington and Bebbington 1993) Govemments are likely to see

NGOs as a threat or competitor. Even if an NGO is not overtly critical of the state, there is implied criticism. Its actions in social development (or relief or search and rescue) point to the shortcomings of the state (Farrington and

Bebbington 1993). This is not to rule out co-operative state-civil society interaction which has been empirically shown to exist but to point out issues surrounding regulation and related to that, accountability.

The goals that NGOs strive for may be contradictory since their achievement requires different types of organizations. For instance, large-scale service provision requires structures that can handle large amounts of extemal funding and organizational forms that allow for speedy and hierarchical decision-making. Effectiveness as an agent of democratization, on the other

154 hand, is based on close ties to the po or and the disadvantaged, representative structures and the ability to spend time on dialogue and learning (Edwards and

Hulme 1996). The bulk of the funding offered to NGOs by donor institutions and governments is for project implementation which crowds out participatory and more experimental, innovative work and thus, reduces the contributions

NGOs might make based on their strengths (Bebbington and Farrington 1993).

One of the biggest concerns is that NGOs will pursue activities and organizational forms that are most likely to ensure funding such as service delivery. For instance, in Bangladesh, NGOs increasingly focus on provision of group-based credit for micro-enterprises as their main activity. This type of activity is supported by donors who identify with this model ofpoverty alleviation through individual enterprise and self-employment rather than public provision of basic needs (Hulme and Edwards 1997). While not denying the importance ofthis activity, Hulme and Edwards argue that too much focus on one type of activity as a result of donor preference results in the exclusion of others. AIso, NGOs that rely on official funding may be incapable of pursuing local institutional development, strengthening capabilities and capacities, supporting long-term horizons and qualitative change. Finally,

NGOs may be unwilling to advocate issues that are unpopular with governments ifthey are dependent on state funding (Kaldor 2003; Edwards and Hulme 1996).

Two points emerge from this discussion. First, forms of cooption differ. While the literature on relations ofNGOs/civil society organizations emphasize financial dependence, 1 have shown that cooption is also possible through establishment of particularistic ties without financial aid as in the case

155 of Kizilay and AKUT. 52 Second and more crucially, the outcomes of cooption

differ. In none of the concerns related to outcomes of relations with donors

and states discussed ab ove is there any concern ofparticularistic and lor

corrupt exchanges. Concerns are lack of accountability, lack of

representativeness, loss of diversity, too much emphasis on cost-efficiency,

and loss of capacity to promote democratization and long-term development,

not particularistic exchanges. Sorne NGOs have been transformed into

parastatal organizations or government sub-contractors because of their

dependence on government funding (Kaldor 2003); and there is no doubt that

Kizilay likewise has become a parastatal organization; however, no concern of

particularistic ties is raised with respect to similar organizations. The issues

raised are no doubt crucial; yet they are qualitatively different. These

differences are the result of the nature of the state. To go back to the

continuum of co option, in a universalistic state, civil society organizations

may be close to the state on the continuum of co option (point A below) but

only in a particularistic state do they become part of the state machine (point

C).

Close ties ~ particularistic ties ~ corrupt exchanges.

(A) (B) (C)

Thus, the ambiguous status of parastatal NGOs which is the most important

characteristic of organizational similarity between these organizations and

52 Actually, sorne tinancial aid has been given by the state. In the case of AKUT, it was a one time grant after the earthquake. In the case of Kizilay, there are no direct payments but rather, sorne tinancial advantage has been provided through measures such as exemption from tax. However, the creation ofparticularistic ties has been more prominent in the cooption ofthese organizations.

156 Kizilay does not necessarily inc1ude particularistic or corrupt exchanges. 53

One cannot make the argument that corrupt exchanges between the state and

Kizilay are to be expected since Kizilay is not even an NGO but a parastatal organization because similar organizations are not involved in corrupt exchanges even if financial dependence raises other problems. The existence of such ties depends on whether we have a universalistic or a particularistic state at hand. Neither can one argue that Kizilay is involved in corrupt exchanges because organizationally, it lacks accountability. As we have seen, lack of accountability is true for many NGOs; however, it is not the case that they are involved in particularistic ex changes like Kizilay because their interaction is with a universalistic state.

Table 6.1 summarizes this:

53 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain organizationai similarity in terms of institutionai isomorpism. Isomorphism is a process of homogenization that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmentai conditions. Thus, sorne of the organizationai similarity such as ambiguity of status and Iack of accountability may be explained by isomorphism. The existence ofparticularistic ties which characterizes only the relationship between Kizilay and the state, however, is a result of the nature of the state. Even though DiMaggio and Powell emphasize the role of the state in shaping organizationai structure, they assume a universalistic state, for example one that sets environmentai regulations or performance criteria for NGOs and as such, exerts pressures on organizations.

157 Table 6.1: State structure and type of interaction

State

Universalistic Particularistic

Civil Society

Organizations Formal Large-scale Semi- NGOs in governmental serVIce organizations deli very and relief Informal Grass-roots Civic organizations initiatives

Thus, a formaI organization co-opted by a particularistic state is involved in corrupt exchanges, such as Kizilay. There is usually not a significant relationship between informal organizations and the particularistic state but as they become bigger and more important, the state forms particularistic ties as it has done in the case of AKUT even though AKUT is not involved in corrupt networks. In a universalistic state, even if the formal organizations may be close to the state and dependent on financial aid, it is still possible to maintain a positive-sum relationship in which constructive criticism and exchange provides partialleeway to tackle problerns of combining contradictory goals. The case ofWorld Vision International (WVI), one of the biggest development and reliefNGOs in the field, pro vides a good example. WVI is an international partnership of national offices working on development and relief work. It has 17 national offices that raise money for prograrns outside their own country and above 50 national offices that implement development and relief prograrns (Commins 1997). It is an NGO

158 that has received and used government funds extensively for programs and projects in developing countries. Commins (1997), analyzing the relationship ofWVI to its official donors, asks the question ofwhether relationship to government agencies and the World Bank has restrained WVI's ability to work for reforms in aid policies. In other words, Commins asks whether the priorities of donors have shaped/limited the work ofWVI and argues that it is possible for NGOs to be accountable both to governments in terms of the use offunds and to the low-income communities where they carry out prograrns

(Commins 1997: 143). Through a review of the relationship between WVI and its donor agencies, Commins shows that receipt of government and other official funding does not immediately mIe out the possibility and capacity to influence and criticize donor policies. WV Australia, Canada and UK have been able to use government funding while keeping a critical distance with the state. Furthermore, WVI has developed relations with the World Bank (WB) since late 1980s. The use of WB funds has been a contentious issue from the beginning; however, WVI has maintained transparency in its relations with the bank while cooperating on various projects. WVI has regularly met with critics of the Bank and shared its experiences with other NGOs (Commins

1997: 151). Thus, WVI has been willing to criticize WB policies and procedures and input fundamental operational changes before implementing any Bank-funded projects. WVI staff have gained Bank-related knowledge and 'are recognized by both Bank and NGO colleagues as playing an informed and critically engaged role in Bank-NGO policy discussions' (Commins 1997:

151). There is certainly evidence of productive forms of interaction between the state and NGOs which have had positive outcomes for all involved

159 (Farrington and Bebbington 1993); however, it is only possible given a universalistic state. Among possible types of interaction between the state and

NGOs, possibilities other than productive synergies such as reluctant partnerships and hostile confrontations are considered but not co-option through particularistic ties. This is because the former interaction trajectories, i.e. productive synergies, reluctant partnerships and hostile confrontations, take place within the context of a universalistic state.

Humanitarian work as part of Global Civil Society

The growth of international NGOs has been pointed to as an indication of the emergence of global civil society. Kaldor (2003) defines global civil society as 'the global process through which individuals debate, influence and negotiate an ongoing social contract or set of contracts with the centers of political and econornic authority' (Kaldor 2003: 79). Global civil society includes all those organizations which individuals can join and articulate demands and influence decision-makers (Kaldor 2003). International NGOs,

NGOs registered as international organizations, have increased in number but this does not cover all NGOs that have sorne kind of global connection

(Kaldor 2003: 79-82). NGOs are one type of global civil society actor. Other actors in global civil society are grass-roots groups, loose coalitions, networks, think tanks and individuals (Anheier et al: 2001). NGOs involved in humanitarian aid constitute an important part of global civil society and provide a framework in which organizations involved in the same type of work Kizilay is involved in can be compared. First, however, 1 will introduce the bigger picture of global civil society of which NGOs and NGOs doing humanitarian work are a part.

160 Kaldor (2003) has categorized global civil society actors into 6 types:

'old' social movements (pre-I970); 'new' social movements (1970 and

1980s); NGOs, think-tanks, commissions (late 1980s and 1990s); transnational civic networks (late 1980s and 1990s); 'new' nationalist and fundamentalist movements (1990s); and 'new' anti-capitalist movements (late 1990s and

2000s). Old social movements are made up of workers and intellectuals; organized hierarchically; and funded through membership. They aim to capture state power using demonstrations, strikes, petitions, lobbying and focus on issues of redistribution, employment, welfare, anti-colonialism. New social movements are made up of students, the new information class, caring professions; are organized loosely; and are funded by individual supporters and events. They aim to change state/society relations using media and direct action and focus on issues of human rights, peace, women, environment, third world solidarity. NGOs, think-tanks, commissions are made up of professionals and experts; are organized in both bureaucratie and corporate as well as small-scale and informal structures; and are funded by governments, international institutions and private foundations. They aim to influence civil society, the state and international institutions using media, expert knowledge, advocacy and service provision and focus on issues ofhuman rights, development and poverty reduction, humanitarianism, conflict resolution.

Transnational civic networks are made up ofprofessionals, experts and activists; are organized through networks ofNGOs, social movements and grass roots groups; and are funded by individual supporters, private foundations, international NGOs. They aim to put pressure on states and international institutions using parallel summits, the media, local and expert

161 knowledge and advocacy, and focus on issues ofwomen, dams, land mines, international criminal court, global climate change. Nationalist and fundamentalist movements are made up of workers, small entrepreneurs, farmers and the informal sector; are organized vertically and horizontally with charismatic leadership; and are funded by criminal activities and diaspora.

They aim to capture state power using the media, mass rallies and violence, and focus on issues of identity politics. Finally, anti-capitalist movements are made up of students, workers and peasants; are organized through networks of

NGOs, social movements and grass roots groups; and are funded by individual supporters, churches and private foundations. They confront states, international institutions and transnational corporations using parallel summits, direct action, the media and mobilization through the internet and focus on solidarity with victims of globalization, abolition or reform of global institutions (Kaldor 2003).

NGOs as actors in global civil society are institutional and generally professional. They include voluntary associations, charities, foundations or professional societies. They are usually formally registered. NGOs as organizations are characterized by the fact that altruism or values play a more important role than coercion or monetary incentives (Kaldor 2003: 86). NGOs are one type of global civil society actor but they "play a larger-than-life role in global civil society" (Chandhoke 2002: 38). For instance, NGOs are considered as the main actors of what Kaldor et al. (2003) has called manifestations of global civil society. These manifestations are new public management, corporatization, social capital or self-organization and activism.

In three ofthese manifestations, NGOs are seen as the main actors. In new

162 public management, NGOs are sub-contactors in policy-making and provide services and development assistance that used to be provided by the welfare state. Corporatization is a manifestation of global civil society in which NGOs form partnerships with transnational corporations. This works in both directions as corporations adopt social responsibility programs and as NGOs professionalize, anxious to attract funding and form partnerships. Finally,

NGOs play an important role in the social capital or self-organization manifestation of global civil society as they are supposed to build networks of trust (Kaldor, Anheier, Glasius 2003). As Kaldor et al. (2003) recognize, these manifestations are contradictory. NGOs are seen as actors involved in large scale service provision (new public management and corporatization) which require, as discussed above, hierarchical and more bureaucratic structures. At the same time, they are seen as the main actors of civil society which create dense networks offace-to-face relationships that cut across social cleavages such as race, ethnicity, gender and class which ultimately contributes to the creation of social capital. As 1 have shown above, NGOs can be differentiated along several axes. The fact that the predominance of certain types ofNGOs

(those that are northern, solidaristic, formal, hierarchical and that emphasize service provision) raises concerns because of issues of accountability and representativeness emphasizes the point that NGOs cannot be considered as an undifferentiated category. Placing NGOs as undifferentiated actors at the center of different manifestations is problematic since these manifestations calI for organizational forms and end-goals that usually do not exist simultaneously. Nevertheless, it does highlight the space NGOs take up and the weight they carry in global civil society. Kaldor et al. argue that global

163 civil society includes an institutional and organizational infrastructure (along with values and ideas and individuals willing to participate) and international

NGOs form a major part of the formal aspect ofthis infrastructure (Kaldor et al. 2003: 10).

For comparative purposes, it is important to note that the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Cres cent Societies is considered as one of the first international NGOs to exist in the supranational non-governmental sphere

(Chatfield 1997; Anheier et al: 2001; Kaldor 2003: 87). Humanitarian aid is an important part of global civil society. NGOs involved in humanitarian work as a component of 'thicker' global civil society and increasing analysis/debate on them provide a framework in which organizations similar to Kizilay can be compared. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is generally perceived to be the first institutionalization ofhumanitarian action. In a historical account of humanitarian action, humanitarian organizations are grouped into four types: structures competing with the state, structures paralleling the state, structures pre-existing states' interventions, and state action (Aeberhard 1996).

Structures competing with the state are religious structures and workers' structures which have historically formed an opposition to the state. Structures parallel to the state are various NGOs which are completely subsidized by the state. The category of structures pre-existing states' intervention mainly consists of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement which was created as an independent structure of relief and is the ancestor of contemporary NGOs.

Finally, the category of state action is composed of actions among states to assist each other (Aeberhard 1996). Even though 1 find these categories much too simplified and somewhat inaccurate, 1 would like to point out that the Red

164 Cross and Red Crescent as an international body is classified as structures

preceding state intervention rather than as structures parallel to the state. Thus,

on the one hand, the NGO status of the Red Cross and Red Cres cent societies

is reinforced.

On the other hand, however, it is also argued that it is an international

organization rather than an NGO since the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC), other than the UNHCR, is the only humanitarian relief

organization that has a mandate assigned to it under internationallaw under

the Geneva Conventions (Natsios 1995). More importantly, the Red Cross and

the Red Crescent and the ICRC are criticized for having become auxiliaries to

the government (Destexhe 1996). This is perhaps related to the critique of the

most well-known principal of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, the

principal ofneutrality which means that the movement is not opposed to war

per se but rather to war without mIes. By enforcing a legal framework on war

and ensuring that it is followed, it indirectly sanctions war (Aeberhard 1996).

In fact, organizations like the Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) the foundation

ofwhich signaled anew era in the field ofhumanitarian action have been

founded on this critique of the principal ofneutrality. Formed in opposition to

the Red Cross and Red Cres cent and the ICRC, the MSF developed the

doctrine of 'duty to interfere' (Aeberhard 1996; Destexhe 1996; Vincent 1996;

Kaldor 2001; Kaldor 2003).54 The embodiment ofthis critique in new NGOs

54 This new era ofhumanitarian intervention began in the Biafra war which is considered as one of the worst genocides in the twentieth century. Sorne physicians united arOlUld Bernard Kouchner, founder of the MSF, vio1ated the p1edge of silence and spoke out on the atrocities being cornrnitted and eventually an airlift was organized together with the ICRC without the consent of the Nigerian govemrnent (Aeberhard 1996; Ka1dor 2003). Following the opposition of the MSF and other NGOs which criticized the ICRC for being outdated, ineffective and oppressive, the Red cross and Red Crescent rnovernent and the ICRC underwent a reforrn

165 which chose to intervene on behalf of the victims rather than remain silent to

protect states may have deepened the fault line between NGOs and NGOs too

close to the government such as the Red Cross and Red Cres cent movement.

Thus, the status of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies is not

unambiguous, much like Kizilay. They are NGOs engaged in humanitarian

service delivery, tied to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies which is considered to be one ofthe first international

NGOs as a movement; yet, at the same time, they are perceived to be

operating more like an auxiliary to the government than a global civil society

organization.

Even though Kizilay and other Red Cross and Red Cres cent societies

are similar in terms of the ambiguity oftheir status as an NGO, the

organizational similarity does not extend further. In other words, the problem

ofplacing these organizations within the category ofNGO or governmental

organization exists both for Kizilay and other Red Cross and Red Crescent

societies. Nevertheless, the nature of interaction between the state and the Red

Cross and Red Crescent societies depends on the nature of the state(whether it

is universalistic or particularistic). In the case of Kizilay, 1 have shown that it

is an extension of the state so much so that it has been co-opted by the state

and is involved in corrupt exchanges. Not all national societies are involved in

corrupt exchanges. Kizilay is co-opted through particularistic ties because the

state in Turkey can only establish such ties with civil society organizations. In

a uni versalistic state, on the other hand, close ties to the state does not translate

into particularistic ties/corrupt exchanges. The Danish Red Cross is a case in

process as a result of which they have an efficient medica1 structure. They have a1so been more willing to speak out, under certain circumstances (Aeberhard 1996; Vincent 1996).

166 point. This case is useful in demonstrating the varying state structures since the Danish state is an example of a universalistic state. Thus, 1 will go into a detailed account of the interaction between the state and the Danish Red Cross which is not co-opted by the state into particularistic ties.

Interaction with a Universalistic State: the case ofthe Danish Red Cross

The Danish Red Cross was founded in 1876, 12 years after Denmark signed the Geneva Convention of the Red Cross to establish a local society, originally named (like Kizilay), "The Society for the Improvement of the

Conditions for the Sick and Wounded during War" (Christensen and Molin

1995). Just as the tirst president of Kizilay was the inspector-general of the army medical service, a general who had served as a minister of war became the president of the Danish Red Cross (DRC). The same presence of state elites that we found in Kizilay we also tind in the DRC since the members of the executive committee were recruited from the nobility and the military, much like Kizilay. Again much like Kizilay, the foundation of the DRC was met with suspicion by the Danish state as it regarded it as a criticism of its not being able to care for wounded soldiers sufficiently. Finally, the military regarded the Society's foundation as an unwelcome civilian involvement in military affairs, as was the case with Kizilay. This suspicion and reluctance led to a period of twelve years which Denmark resisted founding a local society despite having signed the Geneva Convention and tinally did so because of international pressure (Christensen and Molin 1995).

ln the beginning, the DRC mainly assisted the Danish army. Until the

First World War (WW1), it did not really engage in major reliefwork abroad and the few efforts that it was involved in were a result of pressure from the

167 royal family due to ties between the royal families of Denmark and the countries to which relief was sent. The pursuit of activities in this initial period reflects the preferences of the state elite in the association even though the association was founded as a voluntary organization with open membership and election ofleadership (Christensen and Molin 1995). Thus, the foundation of the Danish Red Cross and the initial state response to it as weIl as the importance of the elite presence in the association is quite similar to the foundation of Kizilay. However, the development ofboth the Danish state and the Danish Red Cross took a completely different tum to end up in a position completely the opposite of Kizilay.

The DRC expanded in two directions. First, the executive committee decided to introduce 'Ladies' Circ1es' in order to increase the capacity of the society to organize field hospitals. The Crown Princess became the patroness of the Ladies' Circ1es and recruited women from the upper c1ass who collected donations and organized field hospitals (Christensen and Molin 1995). Second, the DRC needed to train nurses and first aid volunteers to work in war zones.

This need emerged with the need for training in first aid for workplace safety which was a growing concem in major industrial plants at the time. As a result, many young workers were recruited as first aid volunteers but they did not join the organization as members. However, they organized themselves informally and increasingly wanted to partake in decision-making in the society (Christensen and Molin 1995). As a result of the pressure from the first aid volunteers, the DRC underwent a re-organization, leaving its role as appendix of the army and becoming a voluntary relief organization involved in civilian tasks. Organizationally, it became a federated structure. It had always

168 had a general assembly but this was a defunct body as it never exercisedits purpose. The executive committee had held all the control. With re organization, the central committee passed a new constitution through which a federated structure with local branches was adopted. The central committee would be elected by delegates from the local branches which would then appoint an executive committee (ibid). In reality, the organization was still controlled by the elites at the executive level; however, this transformation to a federated structure with local branches constituted the basis for further change.

With the establishment of local branches, they became crucial in the organization. In the period 1920-40, the ORC was involved in tasks that supported and supplemented the welfare state such as care and assistance to young mothers, infants and the elderly, first aid training and blood services

(Christensen and Molin 1995). Ouring WW2 and its immediate aftermath, the

ORC was involved in tasks related to the war such as providing relief assistance to families adversely affected by war and Oanish prisoners in concentration camps. The ORC also established and ran refugee camps, with donations from the government. It continued its work in international relief and disaster operations until mid 70s; however, both the activity and membership levels fell considerably.

In order to address this problem and revitalize the organization, the central committee decided to professionalize and internationalize the organization (Christensen and Molin 1995). As a result ofthis decision, the

ORC shifted from a mainly volunteer-run organization to a professionally-run

NGO while local branches maintained local activities. More and more, the

ORC came to be identified with international development work. At the same

169 time, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), part of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, started looking for NGOs through which to

channel their increasing commitment to dis aster relief and development work

in the Third World (ibid). The DRC became one of the main NGOs which

were involved in development and reliefwork in the Third World, funded by

the government. The rate of funding provided by the government is as high as

90% (ibid). The government agencies set standards for NGOs they funded

such as accurate accounting and budgeting procedures. In addition,

government consultants conducted studies of organizational structures of the

NGOs to ensure their accountability. The DRC and the government also

cooperated on the refugee issue. The government subcontracted the DRC to

establish and run camps for political refugees seeking asylum in Denmark

(ibid). The DRC became composed oftwo parts: the voluntary part at the

branches as self-contained units involved in tirst aid training, visitors' service

for the elderly, disabled, and prisoners and the professional part at the

headquarters involved in international dis aster and development work in the

Third World, funded by the government.

The reason 1 have gone in length into the history and transformation of

the Danish Red Cross is because it illustrates very weIl how two similar

organizations that started at the same point, in terms ofboth the initial

suspicious attitude towards the organizations by the state and the military and

the pre-dominantly elite composition of the organization, went down

completely different paths to end up in two positions that are in stark contrast.

Christensen and Molin (1995), analyzing this case in a completely different framework, that of organizational theory, conclude that the source of the origin

170 and transformation of the DRC is the macro-sociological pro cesses in the wider society and that the DRC reflects, in important ways, the development of the Danish nation-state. This is true for both Kizilay and the DRC. What is different is that the Danish state aspired to be "a civilized nation", to be accepted among the other civilized nations in Europe. As a result, Denmark responded to international pressure for the foundation of the DRC because it was seen as necessary to be part of the Red Cross movement to "look good among other civilized nations" (Christensen and Molin 1995: 78). The state in

Turkey also aspired to a modernization project; however, a centralized state at the top gave rise to a different state tradition that ultimately resulted in a particularistic state. The establishment of both the DRC and Kizilay was met with suspicion because of the implied criticism of the state as weIl as the unwelcome civilian involvement in military efforts. Both organizations started out as elite societies despite being voluntary organizations. Yet Kizilay became a co-opted link in the chain of particularistic ties the state establishes while the DRC became a partner in cooperative relationship with the state.

What we find throughout the history of the relationship between the DRC and the state are examples of cooperative interaction. First, they have cooperated on welfare work, as the DRC has supported and complemented the tasks of the welfare state. Second, they have cooperated in development and refugee work as the DRC has transformed into an NGO. The fact that the state provides a substantial amount offinancial aid to fund the operations of the DRC does not lead to co-option into particularistic exchanges. On the contrary, the state establishes rules to hold NGOs accountable. The reason that we have a

171 productive state-civil society relationship rather than a particularistic one is because the Danish state, as a welfare state, is a universalistic state.

Disaster Context:

Disaster researchers argue that disasters both reveal fundamental pro cesses of the social order and are explained by the political, social and economic dynamics of everyday life (Bolin and Stanford 1998; Kreps 1984).

The aftermath of the '99 dis aster in Turkey has indeed provided a context in which to study state-ci vil society relations, both in the immediate aftermath and in the continuing processes that emerged related to the earthquake. The failure of state institutions along with Kizilay as well as civic mobilization that ensued created a sharp dichotomy between the corrupt, failed, unreliable state and the clean, successful, reliable civil society. 1 have shown that the processes that the two case studies ofthis research were involved in were the result of a state nature that can only establish particularistic ties. In other words, 1 have argued that Kizilay is a part of multilevel chain of corrupt networks because it has been co-opted by a particularistic state and is at the end point of what 1 have called above the continuum of cooption. AKUT, which at the time of the earthquake was a completely independent ci vic initiative, became more involved with the state as it became prominent in the earthquake relief. This has allowed me to analyze the type of interaction that exists between state and civil society organizations through the particularistic ties the state established with AKUT. Finally, state failure in the earthquake which is directly related to the incapacity of a particularistic state unable to provide universal services and public goods has led to the over-missionization of AKUT. Thus, disaster and the response to it (or its lack thereot) is explained by the specifie nature of the

172 state but more importantly for this study, disaster has given rise to processes that reveal the dynamics ofthe social order, in this case the nature of interaction between the state and civil society organizations. What 1 aim to do now is to compare dis aster contexts so that the conditions which give rise to different disaster contexts (that is, a dis aster context in a particularistic state as opposed to a dis aster context in a universalistic state) can be differentiated to c1arify those conditions that are specifically related to the nature of a particularistic state.

For instance, it has been hypothesized that the higher the ratio of cadre to voluntary personnel in an established relief organization, the more routine the organized dis aster response is and that coordination and control is easier

(K.reps 1978: 80-2). Thus, we would expect Kizilay, an established dis aster organization where the ratio of cadre to voluntary personnel is high, to respond in the 1999 earthquake in a routine, coordinated and controlled manner.

However, as we have seen, the result could not have been more widely different. This is because Kizilay is involved in the general state failure of a particularistic state whereas the above hypothesis pertains to disaster contexts ofuniversalistic states, not characterized by state failure. In another study that examines organizational prestige in disaster situations, the author finds that ratings of prestige of an organization involved in disaster-related tasks are determined not by actual contact with organization or background characteristics but by task saliency. The prestige ratings change over time according to which tasks gain or lose importance. In comparing the police,

National Guard, the churches, the Salvation Army, and the Red Cross in the

US, the author finds that organizations associated with early tasks such as

173 security decline in prestige while organizations associated with later tasks such as social services rise in prestige (Wright 1978). Thus, in the case ofTurkey, we would expect AKUT's prestige to de cline since search and rescue efforts are immediate tasks in the emergency period. Likewise, we would expect

Kizilay's prestige to rise as the emergency period ends and longer-term tasks such as shelter and food provision become more important. 55 However, the prestige of both associations, with AKUT held in the highest esteem and

Kizilay in the lowest esteem, proved durable. This is because again, the disaster context in Turkey was characterized by state failure and both organizations represented two opposite ends of the dichotomy state vs. civil society.

The emergence of collective volunteer groups in disaster contexts is well-noted by dis aster researchers as a common phenomenon (Wenger and

James 1994; Kreps 1984; Kreps 1978). There are many emergent social networks which result in search and rescue actions (Kreps 1984). Studies show that social bonds are produced/enhanced during dis asters (Kreps 1984: 318).

Also, the greater the size, density, and proximity of community populations to the impact area is, the greater the development of emergent groups which perform disaster-related activities. Finally, the greater the intensity and scope of impact is, the greater the development of emergent groups which perform disaster-related activities (Kreps 1978: 81). The '99 earthquake did strike densely populated urban centers and with a magnitude of7.4 on the Richter scale which created massive destruction. Thus, on the one hand, it is not

55 It is interesting to note that Wright finds that among the five organizations, the Red Cross stays consistently at the bottom. However, in Turkey, there are no separate organizations that lUldertake tasks equivalent to the ones lUldertaken by churches which rise in prestige as social services become more important. So aU social services tasks after earthquakes are lUldertaken by Kizilay in Turkey.

174 surprising that we find an immense civic mobilization. (Kreps 1978: 80-2).

However, the extent ofit (unprecedented in Turkey) and the resultant dis aster context shaped by sharp dichotomies around state vs. civil society is caused by failure of a particularistic state. We do not find this type of sharply dichotomous contexts after disasters in universalistic states even though there are emergent civil groups. What we do find is a co-operative state-civil society relationship. For instance, in the 1994 Northridge earthquake, federal government, local govemment and non-governmental organizations were able to work together successfully for recovery and reconstruction while allowing local participation and citizen input. The positive-sum relationship between civil society organizations and the state meant that NGOs were able to combine mutually beneficial working relationships with city, county, and federal agencies with local knowledge and expertise to produce programs that provided resources for the unmet needs of poorer households after the earthquake (Bolin and Stanford 1998). This positive-sum relationship can be established in a universalistic state but not in a particularistic state whose relationship to civil society organizations is far from mutually beneficial because of particularistic ties.

By contrast, in Mexico, a particularistic state like Turkey, we find that the disaster context is marked by state failure. The twin earthquakes that occurred in Mexico City in 1985 have had important social and political consequences as weIl. The earthquake in Mexico, like the earthquake in

Turkey, was quite damaging, in fact the most damaging earthquake in

Mexican history. As in Turkey, it struck an urban heartland and the city sustained extensive life loss and physical damage (Robinson et al. 1986). As in

175 Turkey, state failure in the face of a major disaster provoked civic mobilization. The state failed to provide relief and basic services such as shelters and water. The army moved into industrial zones to protect machinery at the request of manufacturers while citizens were under the rubble waiting to be rescued (La Botz 1995). On top of the incapacity to provide, the state attempted to obstruct people mobilized to help the quake victims by cordoning off damaged buildings (Robinson et al. 1986). The president and other state officiaIs told the people to stay at home and await instructions (La Botz 1995).

The state was also blamed for shoddy construction. FinaIly, the state refused foreign aid and tried to 'project an illusion ofnormality' (Robinson et al. 1986). Thus, the spontaneous mobilization of the people became an act of civil disobedience as the volunteer rescue groups joined with neighborhood organizations to compensate for state failure.

This case is alike to the aftermath of the '99 earthquake in Turkey in terms of the depth of the crisis state went into and the extent of civic mobilization this triggered. The similarity between Turkey and Mexico does not stop at the striking similarities in the aftermath ofboth the earthquakes.

Turkey and Mexico are similar also in terms of their state structures and the prevalence of particularistic, patronage networks. In Mexico as weIl, the tragic consequences of the earthquake were blamed on the ineffectiveness and corruption of the government and institutions (Robinson et al. 1986). The

Mexican state, too, has co-opted the grass-roots groups mobilized to solve the housing issue that arose after the earthquake (Eckstein 1990; Robinson et al.

1986). Even though both the sIum dwellers and the state benefited from the resulting housing reform, the reform was carried out on the terms set by the

176 state. The groups that had effectively mobilized and demanded restructuring had to accept the terms ofhousing imposed by the government. At the same time, the government allocated housing such that it undermined the social base of the newly mobilized civic groups because they had organized outside formal political channels (Eckstein 1990: 294).

Concluding Remarks

This comparative examination completes my analysis of particularistic state-civil society interaction. Comparison to organizations similar to Kizilay such as NGOs generally and NGOs in humanitarian work specifically has shown that despite certain organizational similarities, NGOs in interaction with universalistic states are not co-opted into particularistic or corrupt exchanges even though they have close ties to the state on the continuum of cooption. Similarly, disaster contexts in universalistic states differ from dis aster contexts in particularistic states in that they are not characterized by state failure. As such, instances ofpositive-sum state-civil society interaction are more likely to characterize disaster contexts in universalistic states.

Through a comparison of similar organizations (NGOs, NGOs in humanitarian work, Red Cross) and similar situations (disasters), we can isolate the role of the state. Such comparative analysis re-confirms the central argument advanced in this dissertation, that the nature of the state, whether it is particularistic or universalistic, shapes substantially the type of state-civil society interaction. The final question which remains to be answered is whether aIl civil society organizations are bound to be co-opted a particularistic state. In other words, is all state-society interaction in a particularistic state negative-sum and cooptive? And how can positive-sum

177 interaction be created? ln the next and final chapter, 1 discuss directions for further research.

178 Chapter 7: Conclusions

As the writing of this thesis draws to a close, the board of directors of

Kizilay was removed from the administration of the association by the governrnent. This me ans that not only the administration which has been implementing the re-construction pro cess in Kizilay has been removed from the administration of the association but also that the new administration is appointed by the government rather than elected. This has implications with respect to questions of change and reform. First, the restructuring pro cess has not been completed. The fact that changes such as personnel training, skill upgrading, and automation have been more easily made while more fundamental changes of re-definition of mission and aid approach, increased weight ofmembers, accountability and democratization in the association (the type of change envisioned by the METU project) have been much more difficult to bring about as well as the fact that the administration that was implementing the reconstruction project is now removed leaves us with limited reform. Furthermore, the removal of the administration by the government which has reinforced the idea that Kizilay is an extension of the state with politicized ties, points to continuity rather than change. This removal has been criticized in the media as an attempt of the government to control Kizilay and to strengthen AKP's (the party in government) presence in the association. That the appointed president for Kizilay is from this party does not help.

The capacity for reform is one of the factors to take into consideration when differentiating particularistic and universalistic states. The other grounds on which to differentiate particularistic and universalistic states are prevalence

179 and costs. Astate is particularistic when corruption is systematic and when particularistic ties are more pervasive than horizontal ties including ties with civil society organizations and not just public bodies or private businesses.

Finally, in particularistic states, in addition to material costs and wasting of resources, social costs of corruption such as increasing inequality, exclusion, eroding trust in state institutions and moral costs such as increasing leniency are suffered. Needless to say, particularistic states and universalistic states are ideal types. States can be placed on a continuum which would have, at one end, a completely particularistic state and at the opposite end, a completely universalistic state. This is not to suggest that particularistic exchanges do not exist in universalistic states or that universalistic interactions are impossible to find in particularistic states. Neither astate which is mainly particularistic nor astate which is mainly universalistic is a pure monolithic entity. Nevertheless, a difference between states conceptualized as universalistic and states conceptualized as particularistic with regard to how much each case approximates either the one or the other end of the continuum exists so as to warrant separate analysis.

Thus, we still need to ask: given a particularistic state, are all civil society organizations bound to be co-opted? In other words, is all state-society interaction in a particularistic state negative-sum and cooptive? Before we can answer this question, we have to understand the precise nature of particularistic state-society interaction and the mechanisms involved in particularistic exchanges. Working on this question, the preceding chapters emphasized the role of the state. The research results of the two cases as well as the comparative analysis has shown that the nature of the state, whether it is

180 particularistic or universalistic is the historical structural factor that explains the type of interaction between the state and civil society organizations. Thus, l have argued that we need to understand the nature of the state, specifically a particularistic state, before we can consider prospects for change.

Explaining particularistic ties in a historical structural context

One of the main questions l started out with undertaking this research was why rent-seeking relations persist. l have argued that the neoclassical answer to this question is inadequate as it fails to explain all particularistic ties. Neoclassical approaches fail to explain all particularistic ties because they are restrictive explanations in the sense that the context in which these interactions are immersed is missing. In other words, neoclassical explanations solely focus on the restriction of competition by the state which leads to rent seeking relations. However, this state is an abstract state, with no attention paid to its historical structural context. It could be any state as long as it is a large state with a considerable role to play in the public sector. Thus, neoclassical explanations offer the general prescription that the role of the state must be minimized, regardless of the type of state.

l have shown throughout this thesis that it is not only restriction of competition that leads to particularistic ties. This limited approach cannot explain particularistic ties that exist between the state and civil society organizations which are not based on restriction of competition. Using a comparative institutional approach, l have shown that particularistic ties can be explained as a historical structural pattern of relations between state and society which also extends to civil society organizations. Thus, largue that we need an institutional approach which looks beyond explanations based on

181 utilitarian calculations of individuals to the pattern of relationships in order to explain particularistic ties. Such an institutional approach also treats the state as a social actor, and not an aggregation of the interests ofindividual office holders (contrary to neoclassical approaches) (Evans 1995).

The historical structural factors at the core of the thesis are the nature of the state, nature of civil society and their interaction. 1 have shown that the state in Turkey has become unable to deliver public goods on a universal basis and can only establish particularistic ties and deliver selectively on this particularistic basis. When the nature of the state is taken into account, particularistic ties between the state and civil society organizations can be explained. The particularistic state in Turkey fails to provide universal and public goods and services, establishing instead multilevel chain of particularistic ties through which benefits pass from the state to co-opted organizations and through the latter, to third parties. Kizilay, the first case of the study, is part of such a multilevel chain and as an extension of the state, it is involved in corrupt exchanges. AKUT, the second case of the study, is not involved in corrupt exchanges; nevertheless, the state has established particularistic ties with it through which it provides particularized benefits specifie to AKUT. It is possible to establish the role of the state through the analysis oftwo such different associations. On the one hand, Kizilay, a large organization with historical ties to the state, is co-opted by the state and has politicized ties to it. It is treated and acts as an organization of the state. It is not surprising to find that it is involved in corrupt exchanges as part of a multilevel chain ofparticularistic ties the state has established. AKUT, on the other hand, is a small, completely civic initiative until it enters its growth and

182 institutionalization process during which it becomes involved in similar type ofties to the state (i.e. particularistic, cooptive). Thus, the nature of the state has a direct bearing on the type of state-civil society interaction.

State failure, defined as the incapacity to provide public goods and services, affects civil society organizations adversely. The state, unable to provide univers al services, substitutes instead particularistic ties through which it co-opts civil society organizations. The Marmara earthquake was a most blatant instance of state failure where state failure was spectacularly displayed because it was precisely a situation where the provision of univers al public services was urgently needed-a matter of life and death. State failure affects civil society organizations adversely also through over-missionization.

State failure has led to the over-missionization of AKUT, defined as expectations and demands from the association exceeding their self-defined goals and capabilities. AKUT was expected to compensate for state failure.

Overnight, this small, civic initiative became the most trusted organization in the country to which people turned demanding a solution to all kinds of problems. In addition to rescue which is the self-defined mission of the association, AKUT was expected to take care of aid collection, aid distribution and other miscellaneous tasks needed to be taken care of in the quake area.

Such over-missionization is the direct result of state failure which characterized AKUT's consequent process of growth and institutionalization.

AKUT found these out-of-scale expectations and demands, escalated public visibility and popularity a burden they were not prepared to carry. As a result of over-missionization and a dynamic of prestige that was blown out of sca1e which accompanied over-missionization, AKUT's growth process was

183 affected adversely by state failure which resulted in divisions and splits within the association.

Thus, state capacity (or its lack thereot) is crucial in shaping civil society. AlI of this points to the existence of a complex web of interactions.

This complex interaction is why we cannot think in terms of dichotomies, state vs. civil society. However, this is still the prevalent tendency.

Dispensing With Dichotomies

A dichotomous approach underlies aIl analyses which situate state and society separately and not in interaction. 56 We observe this not only in neoclassical analyses that argue that getting rid of the state is a cure-all solution but also, in the euphoria created around civil society organizations which attributes a major role to civil society organizations be it in development or humanitarian aid. The interest in civil society organizations

(CSOs) has especially grown in the 1990s as the new policy agenda (of markets and elections) became dominant after the shi ft towards a market- oriented development paradigm in the beginning of the 1980s. Accompanied by disillusion with the state, the prescription of a minimal role to the state has led to the perception of CSOs/NGOs as magic bullets. The result of neoclassical thinking has led to the dichotomous approach of state vs. civil society. The neoliberal agenda perceives CSOs/NGOs as an alternate channel through which the role of the state can be minimized. "Support for civil society is seen as a kind ofpoliticallaissez-faire, the political equivalent of neo-liberalism. Civil society is seen as a way ofminimizing the role of the state in society, both a mechanism for restraining state power and as a

56 As this implies, sorne, though few, analyses exist which do not study state and civil society separately and as such, avoid the error of dichotorny. Please see chapter 2 for a detailed discussion.

184 substitute for many of the functions of the state" (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor

2001: 11).

The neo-liberal agenda, based on the neoclassical wisdom that the role of the state must be minimized regardless of the type of state, offered its policy recommendations offinancial and trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and tax reforms in the Washington consensus. The Washington consensus required that the state should withdraw to free the forces of the market and that civil society organizations should provide social services rather than the state (Chandhoke 2002). Typical ofthis dichotomous approach, civil society is situated as an alternative to both the state and the market. In discussing global civil society, Chandhoke argues that contemporary thinking

(what 1 have called the dichotomous approach) portrays global civil society as uncontaminated by either the power relations of states or markets (Chandhoke

2002). She argues that it should not be assumed that global civil society is autonomous of other institutions of international politics, that it can pro vide us with an alternative to these institutions, and that it can even give a structural critique of the world order. The same can be said of national civil societies.

Civil society is permeated by the same logic that underlies the state and the market sphere (Chandhoke 2002). As 1 have shown with respect to the two of these spheres, state and civil society can only be analyzed in interaction with each other. What 1 have demonstrated is that where the state fails, so does civil society. Civil society organizations are affected by state failure both through cooption through particularistic ties and through over-rnissionization above their capabilities. This is why presenting one as an alternative to the other, as dichotomous approaches do, has no empirical basis.

185 We find the same tendency to dichotomize in most discussions of social capital. Social capital has become a key concept in discussions of civil society. Social capital, defined as networks ofreciprocity, trust and civicness, is central to a strong civil society while a strong civil society, for instance in the form of associations, strengthens/contributes to social capital. Debate on social capital generally suffers from a problem of causality. The links between social capital and public goods such as democracy and participation remain under-explored. The basic problem is summarized by Levi (1996) as 'what is unclear is that how citizens joining a bird watching club become politically active and organize for political demands'. That there is vagueness about causality has very much to do with the dichotomous approach in the analyses of social capital which tend to focus solely on the civil society side of the equation. This must be modified by recognizing the crucial role of the state in shaping civil society organizations, as 1 have argued throughout the thesis.

Discarding dichotomous thinking will allow us to identify causal mechanisms in the creation/maintenance of social capital. This research confirms that the role of the state is one of the most important, ifnot the most important, factors in the creation and use of social capital.

Types ofstate power

Mann (1993) has classified state power into two main types: despotic power and infrastructural power. Despotic power refers to 'the range of actions that state elites can undertake without routine negotiation with ci vil society groups' which derives from the fact that orny the state is inherently territorially centralized (Mann 1993: 59). Infrastructural power refers to the institutional capacity of a central state to penetrate its territories and

186 logistically implement decisions (ibid). The state coordinates sociallife through state infrastructures. Increasing infrastructural power also enables civil society to control the state (ibid). As 1 have shown throughout the thesis, states establish particularistic ties because they fail to provide universal services, that is, in cases of state failure. Thinking in terms of state power, particularistic states rank low in infrastructural power. State failure is closely related to low infrastructural power. The spectacular failure of the state in

Turkey in the aftermath of the earthquake showed how little infrastructural power particularistic states have. This is why, for the most part, the state could not respond to a situation which required univers al public provision and high infrastructural power. The attempt to respond was particularistic. An incident typical of such a response, communicated by a participant who worked in the disaster area as part of a civil initiative (Civil Coordination Center), is that the state distributed very small amounts ofmoney to earthquake victims individually. To the suggestion by the participant that the money could be better spent collectively to build toilet facilities for quake victims, the state officiaIs answered: "if the state does not distribute this money, it does not exist" (Author interview 30; 8 December, 2001). The state opted for the momentary solution of giving money to sorne earthquake victims rather than building toilet facilities, a univers al service which required infrastructural powers that a particularistic state do es not have and from which more earthquake victims could ultimately benefit but which did not pro vide the state with the advantage of establishing one-to-one relations.

State failure results not only in low infrastructural power but also high despotic power. The attempt of the state to respond was not onlY particularistic

187 but also aimed at control. This became apparent especially after the shock of the disaster had wom off and disaster response had become more effective and organized. Jalali argues that there was a shift in state attitude towards civil society from spontaneous acts of collaboration to systematic acts of control and threats in the months following the earthquake as the state authorities assumed control (Jalali 2002: 126). That control and threats was part of the response of the state from the moment disaster struck is evident from the fact that state officiaIs tried to assume normality by refusing aid and declaring 'the state will heal wounds'. The Minister of Health became the caricature for this type of response as he refused aid from Greece, stopped health workers going to the area claiming there was no urgent need, and attacked AKUT claiming they were making a spectacle ofthernselves. However, he was severely criticized and civil society organizations worked alongside state organizations, providing the bulk of the response effort much needed in the chaos of the immediate aftermath. They also published a manifesto calling on the state to extend gratitude to civil society organizations instead ofbelittling and threatening them (Kubicek 2002). Ibrahim Betil, the head of the Turkish

Education Volunteers Foundation which is a well-connected, mainstream civil society organization, staged a one-man sit-in at the customs house to protest the confiscation by Kizilay of tents that had arrived from overseas in his name which found extensive coverage in the media (ibid).

As the state pulled itselftogether, its ability to provide aid to the earthquake victims improved substantially. As the organization and distribution of relief services became more effective, the state started centralizing delivery of services. According to Jalali, this latter phase of

188 disaster management, however, was marked by domination and control (Jalali

2002). The state centralized the distribution of relief services by setting up a center (Logistics Support Coordination Center) in Izmit which received all the donations from citizens as weIl as foreign govemment and nongovernmental organizations (Jalali 2002). NGOs were no longer allowed to distribute donations thernselves. By the beginning of October, govemors started asking

NGOs who had built tent cities to leave the earthquake area (Jalali 2002;

Kubicek 2001). When the NGOs were reluctant to leave, the state authorities closed down all the NGO depots for donated goods and threatened to tum of water and electricity supplies to the tents (Jalali 2002). The state also froze the bank accounts of several organizations, especially those whose ideological orientations were unwelcome by the state, such as Islamic organizations and leftist organizations like Mazlumder (the Association of Human Rights and

Solidarity for Oppressed People) (Jalali 2002; Kubicek 2002; Kubicek 2001).

These were not the only organizations treated with suspicion; apolitical associations like AKUT also had their bank accounts frozen. The reason for such harassment is that the state felt its legitimacy threatened when civil societyorganizations effectively and successfully provided the services expected of, and not received from, the state.

According to Jalali, this legitimacy was partially regained as the services provided by the state improved. 72% of earthquake victims surveyed in the area reported that they were satisfied with the tent city they were living in and 77% reported they were satisfied with the pre-fabricated houses.

Finally, the financial aid to earthquake victims, a scheme put into effect by the state, worked reasonably weIl (Jalali 2002). Kubicek also argues that in the

189 end, the forces of the state proved to be too much for civil society organizations to push for change (Kubicek 2002). The state was able to resist effective change. Kubicek identifies a number of reasons: the decline of public rage and media interest, the lack of resources in civil society organizations, partially regained legitimacy of the state and lack of sustained cooperation among civil society organizations (Kubicek 2002). 1 have argued that the state in Turkey has maintained the status quo because it has not solely relied on despotic power which was its initial response but it has resorted to particularistic ties.

In fact, the stages of AKUT's relationship to the state illustrate very well the responses of a particularistic state and the types of power it resorts to.

In the first stage, the state attempted to control the association which was perceived as everything good that the state could not be, (that is successful, reliable, trustworthy, non-corrupt, and civil) through measures of despotic power such as freezing bank accounts and threatening to file charges (as the

Health Minister did). In the next stage, the state established particularistic ties to AKUT through which it coopted this civil society organization which is ultimately a more clever mechanism of control as AKUT has become part of an institutional arrangement of disaster management established by the state.

These two types of interaction (control and cooption) are two different aspects of state failure. As a state incapable of pro vi ding uni vers al goods and services, the state in Turkey can only establish particularistic ties.

In the end we get a vicious circle. As various analyses have shown

(Sunar 1996; Mouzelis 1995; Sunar 1990; Sayari 1977; Kudat 1975; Kolars

1973; Mardin 1973), a centralized state at the top with a historicallegacy of

190 patrimonial state tradition and with no ties to a traditional society, as the state in Turkey was at the stage of state building and modemization, has resorted to particularistic ties to carry on its modemization project and at the same time, establish links to society and incorporate periphery into the center. This, however, has eventually led to state failure as the infrastructural power of the state eroded so that the state became incapable of providing univers al goods and services. This, in tum, has led to the persistence of particularistic ties as the state became incapable ofproviding universal services, creating a vicious circ1e. The important question then becomes, is it possible to break this vicious circ1e? How can a virtuous circ1e be created? This is the type of question

Kubicek and Jalali are dealing with when they ask if civil society is sustainable. Kubicek airns to understand whether civil society in Turkey has broken its barriers so that it can sustain its momentum, overcomes obstacles in that direction and consolidate it self as a force that can democratize the state

(Kubicek 2002). Both argue that it was not possible for civil society organizations to sustain their mobilization and extend it beyond dis aster relief because the established state structure maintained itself. Before considering whether and how much change is possible, 1 have to emphasize that focusing on what civil society alone Can do reproduces the dichotomous approach 1 have shown to be invalid. As the two cases ofthis dissertation confirm, state and civil society can only be understood in interaction with each other as the nature of the state has a significant role to play in shaping civil society organizations. Thus, what we need to ask is how a positive-sum, cooperative interaction can be created/maintained rather than a negative-sum, cooptive interaction.

191 Directions for change

It is true that change has been limited in view of the extent of the failure of the state and the tremendous civic mobilization that followed the

Marmara earthquake which was not sustained. The state has prevailed in maintaining particularistic ties. This is particularly striking in the case of

AKUT because it demonstrates how the state establishes a particularistic interaction even with civil society organizations with no initial ties to the state.

At the same time, however, instances of productive state-society interaction also existed in the aftermath of the earthquake. Despite the disorganization and inefficiency of state organizations, civil society organizations were able to cooperate with at least sorne state officiaIs. For instance, a participant who worked as part of the Civil Coordination Center (CCC) talked at length about a state official from the team of a govemor who is known for skipping procedures and bureaucracy to respond to emergency efficiently. This state official had a similar approach in that he would skip procedures in order to speed up the response pro cess which required immediate action in the aftermath of the earthquake. On first meeting the representatives of the CCC, he (being a state official himselt) sarcastically remarked 'this [emergency response] cannot be done with state officials' (Author interview 30; 8

December, 2001). The participant differentiated this type of approach with which they could easily work and get things done from the traditional bureaucratic approach of state officiaIs which required this particular official to sign papers for twenty minutes in the midst of emergency and chaos. AIso, civil society representatives cooperated withjunior military staffwith whom

192 they had "a very good relationship" (Author interview 30; 8 December, 2001).

However, these instances were fewer and ultimately, did not continue once the crisis was over. 1 have shown that the particularistic nature of the state leads to cooptive and unequal state-civil society interaction and it was this type of interaction that the state was able to uphold. This analysis of particularistic state-society interaction raises the next question immediately. How can particularistic ties be transcended? In other words, given a particularistic state, are all civil society organizations inevitably coopted by the state as AKUT was?

Answering the question ofhow particularistic ties are transcended will also enable us to understand how positive-sum, cooperative state-society interaction is created/maintained. Analyses which focus on the interaction between the state and society and which demonstrate mutual empowerment of state and civil society (Migdal et al. 1994) or synergy (Evans 1997) do not fully account for why this interaction would be positive-sum rather than a negative-sum relationship such as rent-seeking. They assume certain endowments such as necessary properties of government institutions and the degree of inequality (Evans 997) but the question ofhow conditions that are conducive to the development of synergy might be built is crucial. Analyzing how particularistic ties are transcended will also reveal under what conditions universalistic interactions and hence, positive-sum cooperation, are established. This is the pressing research agenda that must be undertaken next.

1 believe that a strong potential answer lies in the non-unitary structure of the state. State structures are far from being unitary, homogenous, and coherent entities. On the contrary, states are fragmented structures with

193 multiple departments, bodies and organizations which do not make up a harmonious whole. This is evident in the case of Turkey in the aftermath of the earthquake where various state organizations as well as state and military elites made up the chaos that was disaster response. Participants have emphasized a difference between administrative staff and political elites of the state who were completely useless (but then sorne were not as the above example shows) and the army which, amidst all confusion and disorganization, offered more efficient and effective (at least in comparison to other state organizations) rescue and relief. Moreover, there is conflict among state elites between the civil bureaucracy and the army as to who gets credit (Author interview 30; December 8, 2001). Thus, the state presents a fragmented structure of divisions working in an uncoordinated and contradictory fashion.

For instance, the Human Resource Development Foundation had problems with the mayor of Golcuk as well as the local police. It resolved these problems due to its good relations with the Navy (whose headquarters is in

Golcuk), the Ministry of InternaI Affairs, and the state rninister responsible for social services (Kubicek 2002: 767). Thus, it is the non-unitary structure of the state that at times allowed civil society organizations to work productively with state organizations, and at other times, compelled them to battle hostile and exclusionary attitudes. On the one hand, civil society organizations had to deal with state officiaIs who tried to keep them at bay and create obstacles for them in delivering aid. On the other hand, instances of productive state-civil society interaction could be found where state officiaIs and civil society organizations learned to work together.

194 1 believe that this fragmented state structure is key to analyzing how particularistic ties are transcended. What we still need is to understand how positive-sum state-society interaction is advanced given the type of state structure 1 have been discussing (particularistic, cooptive with less infrastructural power than despotic power). Future research must focus on those areas/organizations where it has been possible to create productive, cooperative state-civil society interaction. This aim can be achieved by studying successful developmental projects in which state institutions and civil society organizations cooperate and which deliver universalistic services to those who are socially excluded as a result of particularistic ties or which uphold the common good (such as environmental protection) without sacrificing the public interest to particularistic ties. Such projects successful in upholding the common good and maintaining positive-sum state-civil society interaction ought to reveal how particularistic ties are transcended. In other words, it will answer the question ofhow come there are such success stories.

Furthermore, the role of supra-national organizations such as the EU in mediating this type of state-civil society interaction can be analyzed by choosing projects that include a supra-national organization as an additional partner. This type ofresearch will provide insight into the positive-sum state civil society interaction in successful cases of partnership in a context where state-civil society interaction is usually characterized by particularistic relations.

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