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New Market Socialism: a Case for Rejuvenation Or Inspired Alchemy?

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New Market Socialism: a Case for Rejuvenation Or Inspired Alchemy? NEW MARKET SOCIALISM: A CASE FOR REJUVENATION OR INSPIRED ALCHEMY? DIMITRIS MILONAKIS * ÍNDICE I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................. 2 I. EARLY MARKET SOCIALISM: THE LANGE MODEL ................................................................................... 4 II. MARKET SOCIALISM AND THE QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE: THE AUSTRIAN CHALLENGE ............. 6 III. THE QUESTION OF INCENTIVES: MARKET SOCIALISM AND ‘NEW INFORMATION ECONOMICS’.... 7 IV. MODERN VERSIONS OF MARKET SOCIALISM ..................................................................................... 10 V. NEW MARKET SOCIALISM: A CRITIQUE FROM WITHIN........................................................................ 14 VI. TOWARDS A MORE RADICAL CRITIQUE ............................................................................................... 17 VII. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 21 VIII. REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 22 *Department of Economics, University of Crete. I would like to thank Ben Fine for his painstaking critique of an earlier draft of this paper. My thanks also go to Costas Lapavitsas, George Argitis, the participants of the Fourth Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, Graz, Austria, February 2000 especially my discussant Stephan Boehm, and the anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions. Last, my thanks to Stavros Ioannides for his help with the literature on Austrian economics. Any remaining errors are mine alone. NEW MARKET SOCIALISM: A CASE FOR REJUVENATION OR INSPIRED ALCHEMY? 1 I. INTRODUCTION 3. It was not until the ‘calculation debate’ of the 1920’s and 30’s that the concept of market 1. Socialism as a concept has its roots in the socialism itself was used and the idea of the eighteenth century Enlightenment’s ideals of marriage of socialism with markets re— equality and co—operation, whereas the term emerged. Although the ‘calculation debate’ itself was coined during the 1820’s. Throughout started as a reaction by the Austrians (see most of its history and certainly throughout the Mises, 1920) to central planning, the debate nineteenth and early twentieth century, from itself was actually conducted between socialists Karl Marx and Frederic Engels to the Fabians, of neoclassical persuasion (Lange, Dickinson, the concept has been held to be synonymous Taylor, Lerner) and representatives of the with corporate planning in the context of Austrian school (Mises, Hayek, Robbins) with common ownership of the means of production. Marxian interventions by Dobb. The result was As such, the essence of the concept has the crystallisation of the idea of a marriage traditionally been based on a critique of between markets and socialism in the form of a capitalism as an exploitative class system and formal model proposed by Lange which has has correspondingly been hostile to both since become the standard point of reference. It markets and private ownership (Hodgson, was widely thought at the time that the midway 1999b, ch.2). house (midway between central planning and 2. Market socialism as a concept has a shorter capitalist free markets) presented by Lange’s history: its origins can be traced back to the ‘competitive model’ had won the argument (see 2 calculation debate of the 1920’s and 1930’s. for example Bergson, 1948). However, the basic idea associated with it⎯to 4. This was a reflection of the ideological marry socialism with markets—is climate of the period which was characterised contemporaneous with the invention of the term by ‘the intellectual dominance of socialism’ ‘socialism’. Thus from Pierre Proudhon’s free (Mises, 1981, p. 465). The widely held view at association of small independent producers the time was that the socialist system was a ⎯what Marx called ‘petty bourgeois socialism’ more advanced economic system than capitalism, reflecting the fact that, at that time, ⎯to John Stuart Mill’s sympathy with decentralised co—operative socialism, the idea the Soviet economy was witnessing has been to combine the efficiency of markets exceptionally high rates of growth at a time when the West was plunged into the vagaries of with the egalitarian goals of socialism. Having said this, it is also true that the idea of the Great Depression of the 30’s. Even then, combining socialism with the market would be however, the ideological climate on the left was such that the idea remained in a subordinate considered a contradiction in terms by most 1 nineteenth century socialists (ibid). 2 It has to be said at this point that the real answer to Mises came not from Lange but from Lenin, when he introduced his 1 For a potted history of the concept of socialism together with a New Economic Policy (NEP) in Russia. Mises’ was above all a critical review of recent debates see Hodgson 1999b, ch. 2; for critique of what subsequently came to be known as War a potted history of the concept of market socialism see Communism. When he introduced NEP at the beginning of Blackburn, 1991; for more general histories of socialism see 1921, Lenin answered Mises in practice through the partial Landauer, 1959; Mackenzie, 1966; Thompson, 1988; Itoh, introduction of the market mechanism. It is in the real 1995. The literature on market socialism is by now enormous. experience of NEP in Russia as well as of the ‘central planning No attempt will be made in this article to offer a comprehensive with a regulated market’ reforms in Eastern Europe and of review of this literature. Rather only selective references will be China at the present time, that we can see the achievements – made to this literature where necessary. Vaughn, 1980, Murrell, and limitations – of (real) market socialism. Indeed, as we shall 1983 and Lavoie, 1985 offer comprehensive reviews of the see in more detail below, one of the main drawbacks of the ‘calculation debate’ from the Austrian perspective; for more proposals discussed in this article is the fact that they do not general critical reviews of the whole debate on market discuss real market socialism as such, preferring instead to deal socialism see Adaman and Devine, 1996, 1997. with the properties of abstract models of market socialism. NEW MARKET SOCIALISM: A CASE FOR REJUVENATION OR INSPIRED ALCHEMY? 2 position among socialists. The fact that nothing is more than evident in recent discussions of approximating Lange’s model had ever been alternative models of socialism where Marx is tried in practice pays testimony to this. At that hardly mentioned.3 In such a climate many time the term ‘socialism’ was still being used in socialists have resorted to reliance on the the traditional sense to imply central planning market once again, favouring either proposals and state ownership of the means of production. involving some sort of mixed economy as in the 5. ‘Socialism’, in this traditional sense, case of Nove and Brus & Laski, or a although much debated, has been on the retreat reformulation of the concept of market since 1945. The relative success of welfare state socialism, as in the models proposed by mixed economies of the West during the so— Bardhan and Roemer and others. At the same called golden age of capitalism in the 50’s and time radical political economy is being 60’s coupled with the problems increasingly abandoned by these writers in favour of neo— facing the centrally planned economies, classicism. Naturally, the way the issue of contributed to a discrete change in the socialism is being treated has also been ideological climate. This change was reflected changing radically, away from the traditional in the reform movement in the centrally issues of exploitation, class, power, conflict and planned economies. The main thrust of these social transformation to concepts such as reform proposals ⎯what came to be known as (juridical) property relations and equitable ‘central planning with a regulated market’ distribution of income. In reformulating the ⎯was the introduction of the (limited) use of concept of market socialism, recent markets in the context of state ownership and developments within mainstream economics in central planning. It was in the 1980’s and the form of the ‘new information economics’ 1990’s, however, with the rise to dominance of and the incentive compatibility and the the free market ideology of the New Right, principal/agent literature, have played an together with the demise of the centrally important part, both in the recent critiques of planned economies that the ideological climate the early models, as well as, in the changed decisively. conceptualisation of the new models. 6. Following the revival of the Austrian school 8. Based on these developments, Lange’s model in the 1980’s, it has increasingly been argued is seen as limited from the modern perspective, that the ‘calculation debate’ had been wrongly its main deficiency being identified with its interpreted as having been conducted between neglect of the twin 10. issues of incentives and socialists and non—socialists arguing within monitoring. But these late models will also be the same paradigm. Rather, the revisionists critically shown to be equally limited by their suggest, what was involved was a clash own context. The aim of this
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