DOCSLIB.ORG

Self—Management and Requirements for Social Property: Lessons from Yugoslavia

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Self—Management and Requirements for Social Property: Lessons from Yugoslavia SELF—MANAGEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA DIANE FLAHERTY 1 INDEX I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................. 2 II. THEORETICAL VIEWS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF SELF—MANAGEMENT ............................................... 3 III. YUGOSLAV SELF—MANAGEMENT........................................................................................................... 7 IV. MARKET REFORM AND SELF—MANAGEMENT ...................................................................................... 7 V. TOWARD NON—MARKET SELF—MANAGEMENT.................................................................................... 9 VI. CONTRADICTIONS OF SELF—MANAGEMENT...................................................................................... 10 VII. CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL PROPERTY ................................................................. 13 VIII. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL PROPERTY ............................................................................. 16 IX. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................ 19 X. BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................................................... 20 1 Diane Flaherty: Professor Economics Department University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 email. [email protected] SELF—MANAGEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL PROPERTY. LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA 1 I. INTRODUCTION taxation of established firms or attempts to harden budget constraints so that firms do not 1. Problems with transitions in Eastern Europe squander social capital. have focused attention on alternatives to both 4. Each solution, government intervention or central—planning and unregulated markets. private ownership, does violence to some Naive enthusiasm for the market has already definitions of self—management. For example, begun to wane in the face of growing economic with government intervention to maintain chaos and inequality, precipitating a search for employment, conflict arises between the rights more humane and stable forms of organization. of workers in any one firm to control hiring Theoretically and in practice, worker self— decisions and the right of all workers to have a management is being advocated as a system job. Which right dominates depends upon one's able to produce efficiently and at the same time definition of self—management. If self— distribute goods and power equitably. The management is narrowly construed as purpose of this paper is to evaluate the role of autonomy of workers within any given firm, the self—management in achieving equity and cost of self—management may well be efficiency from both theoretical models of the unemployment. Similarly, if worker ownership, self—managed economy and the experience of not merely worker management, is considered Yugoslavia, the one economy at least nominally to be a defining characteristic of self— self—managed on a system—wide scale. management, the rights of workers who can 2. Theoretical models derive from many afford to own their firms dominate the rights of different frameworks, distinguished from each those who cannot. other by assumptions about property rights, the 5. Other models pose the issue in terms of a level of competitiveness or openness of the different set of defining characteristics of self— economy and even the objectives of the management, including enhanced enthusiasm, worker—managers within their firms. At issue commitment and therefore productivity of fundamentally are the degrees of inefficiency workers who manage their own firms. From and inequality inherent in self—management. this theoretical perspective, the self—managed The major sources of theoretical inefficiency firm is necessarily more efficient than its are an inability of self—management to secure capitalist counterpart because of the greater full employment in the long run, vulnerability effort exerted by a self—determining to inflation and a tendency toward less than workforce. optimal rates of investment due to ambiguous 6. Whether the individualist or the committed property rights. Inequality arises from the character of the self—managed firm prevails in tendency of self—managed organizations to reality derives to a large extent from the nature maximize their internal gains, rather than of the property and social relations in which the satisfy social goals. firm is embedded. For example, considerable 3. Solutions to the unemployment and inflation recent work on the conditions necessary for problems usually call for either further market cooperation focuses on destructive effects of reform to establish private property rights or private ownership on the trust and cooperation government intervention to promote entry of needed to make both heirarchical and self— new firms. Property rights concerns typically managed firms efficient. have been addressed by reformers with calls for 7. The major thesis of the paper, based on an private ownership, based largely on reference to evaluation of Yugoslav experience, is that the tragedy of the commons. On the other hand, efficiency and equity cannot be based on self— concerns for preserving social ownership have management at the level of the firm. However led to government intervention in the form of appealing the ideal of control by direct SELF—MANAGEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL PROPERTY. LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA 2 producers, intrafirm organization is not the II. THEORETICAL VIEWS OF THE primary determinant of economic and social EFFICIENCY OF SELF—MANAGEMENT trajectories. Unemployment, inequality among sectors and regions and inefficient investment 10. Beginning with the original Ward (Ward, are hardly features of a desirable transition. 1967) and Domar (Domar, 1966) models of the Moreover, autonomous firms in a competitive producer cooperative, the focus of self— environment seem to reproduce many of the management theory has been the goal of the least appealing features of the capitalist worker—managed firm. Although these models organization of work, among them intra—firm assume social ownership of means of hierarchy. Any new economic system must be production, what is seen to distinguish the construed as a society—wide system of self—managed firm is maximization of income production and distribution, including but not per worker rather than profit as the goal. Thus reduced to structure of the firm. the socialist context of the firm is relegated to 8. Further, the optimal form of organization for the background. The self—managed firm is enhancement of self—management rests upon a different from the capitalist firm not because form of social property that moves beyond a private property in capital is abolished but simple dichotomy between private and state simply because the two firms pursue different ownership. Rather, social ownership and social goals. property are relationships that may incorporate 11. Theoretically, the consequence of reducing aspects of both private and state ownership the difference between capitalist and socialist where necessary, but both must emphasize the firms to management structure is to define social nature of production and distribution. efficiency relative to the performance of the Concretely, social property can be privately or ideal competitive capitalist firm. Several state owned, but the constraints within which conclusions about the inefficiency of self— production and distribution decisions be management follow from using a capitalist defined to reflect norms of equality and social “twin” firm as the standard of reference. responsibility. 12. In the simplest one variable input case, the 9. The first section of the paper briefly reviews behavior of the self—managed firm compared the major theoretical literature on efficiency to its capitalist twin is “perverse”. The supply and equity in self—management. In the second curve is backward—bending and prices are section, the performance of Yugoslav self— highly volatile in response to cost or demand management is evaluated briefly for two changes. Most perverse is the result that if periods of reform, the 1960's in which markets prices rise, the firm produces less, not more as were emphasized and the 1970's, when non— the capitalist firm would do. Therefore, rising market methods of economic coordination were prices are associated with contraction of sought. The third section links failures of self— employment and output in self—management. management to an insufficient development of 13. Many extensions of the basic model have the theory and practice of social ownership and shown that the perversities dwindle with more social property. A final section addresses the reasonable approximations to reality, like role of social property in generating solutions to multiple variable input and substitutability the failures of self—management revealed by among inputs (Milenkovitch, 1984). Yugoslav experience. Nonetheless, maximization of income—per— worker does have the undesirable effect of rendering marginal productivities of labor unequal across firms. Because hiring decisions are made on the basis of payment to the worker SELF—MANAGEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL PROPERTY. LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA 3 of a share of the firm's net revenue, firms will 17. The first approach to salvaging the only hire workers if
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A New Politics of the Commons
    Published in Renewal magazine, December 17, 2007. Renewal is a Labour-oriented political journal dedicated to social democracy” published in London. A New Politics of the Commons By David Bollier One of the most stubborn problems in confronting the pathologies of the neoliberal political order is the limitations of our language. We do not have an adequate public vocabulary to describe the plunder of globalized markets. We have trouble highlighting the social inequities that are built into conventional economics and political discourse. We do not have a grand narrative with compelling sub-plots to set forth an alternative vision, one that can both stir the blood and show intellectual sophistication. That’s the bad news. The good news is that there is a brave, decentralized movement on the march that is addressing these problems with ingenuity and patience. The focus of this movement is the commons. The commons is still an embryonic vision. It will require time to evolve. But it is a vision with great potential, perhaps because it is not being advanced by an intellectual elite or a political party, but by a hardy band of resourceful irregulars on the periphery of conventional politics. (That’s always where the most interesting new things originate.) These commoners are now starting to find each other, a convergence that augurs great things. To be a bit more concrete: This proto-commons movement consists of environmentalists trying to protect wilderness areas and win fair compensation for the corporate use of public lands. It includes local communities trying to prevent multinational water companies from privatizing public water works and converting groundwater into over- priced, branded bottles of water.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Indian Property Rights
    Property rights, selective enforcement, and the destruction of wealth on Indian lands Ilia Murtazashvili* University of Pittsburgh Abstract This paper reconceptualizes the nature of property institutions in the United States. Conventional economic analysis suggests that the U.S. established private property rights protection as a public good by the end of the nineteenth century. The experience of Indians suggests otherwise. During the mid-nineteenth century, the economic fortunes of settlers on public lands owned by the United States government and Indians diverged. Settlers secured legal property rights and self-governance, while members of Indian nations were forced into an inequitable property system in which the federal government established an institutionalized system to discriminate against reservation Indians. The property system is most appropriately described as a selective enforcement regime in which some groups enjoy credible and effective property rights at the expense of others who confront a predatory state and institutionalized property insecurity. The persistence of the selective enforcement regime explains the persistence of poverty among reservation Indians. * Email: [email protected]. Paper prepared for the Searle Workshop on “Indigenous Capital, Growth, and Property Rights: The Legacy of Colonialism,” Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Many thanks to Terry Anderson and Nick Parker for organizing the workshop. 1 2 Introduction The United States is often used as an example to illustrate the beneficial consequences of private property rights for economic growth and development. Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) use differences in land policy to explain the reversal of economic fortunes of the U.S. and Spanish America, which started with a similar per capita GDP around 1800 but diverged substantially by the twentieth century.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 4 Freedom and Progress
    Chapter 4 Freedom and Progress The best road to progress is freedom’s road. John F. Kennedy The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impeded their efforts to obtain it. John Stuart Mill To cull the inestimable benefits assured by freedom of the press, it is necessary to put up with the inevitable evils springing therefrom. Alexis de Tocqueville Freedom is necessary to generate progress; people also value freedom as an important component of progress. This chapter will contend that both propositions are correct. Without liberty, there will be little or no progress; most people will consider an expansion in freedom as progress. Neither proposition would win universal acceptance. Some would argue that a totalitarian state can marshal the resources to generate economic growth. Many will contend that too much liberty induces libertine behavior and is destructive of society, peace, and the family. For better or worse, the record shows that freedom has increased throughout the world over the last few centuries and especially over the last few decades. There are of course many examples of non-free, totalitarian, ruthless government on the globe, but their number has decreased and now represents a smaller proportion of the world’s population. Perhaps this growth of freedom is partially responsible for the breakdown of the family and the rise in crime, described in the previous chapter. Dictators do tolerate less crime and are often very repressive of deviant sexual behavior, but, as the previous chapter reported, divorce and illegitimacy are more connected with improved income of women than with a permissive society.
    [Show full text]
  • Participatory Economics & the Next System
    Created by Matt Caisley from the Noun Project Participatory Economics & the Next System By Robin Hahnel Introduction It is increasingly apparent that neoliberal capitalism is not working well for most of us. Grow- ing inequality of wealth and income is putting the famous American middle class in danger of becoming a distant memory as American children, for the first time in our history, now face economic prospects worse than what their parents enjoyed. We suffer from more frequent financial “shocks” and linger in recession far longer than in the past. Education and health care systems are being decimated. And if all this were not enough, environmental destruction continues to escalate as we stand on the verge of triggering irreversible, and perhaps cataclys- mic, climate change. yst w s em p e s n s o l s a s i s b o i l p iCreated by Matt Caisley o fromt the Noun Project r ie s & p However, in the midst of escalating economic dysfunction, new economic initia- tives are sprouting up everywhere. What these diverse “new” or “future” economy initiatives have in common is that they reject the economics of competition and greed and aspire instead to develop an economics of equitable cooperation that is environmentally sustainable. What they also have in common is that they must survive in a hostile economic environment.1 Helping these exciting and hopeful future economic initiatives grow and stay true to their principles will require us to think more clearly about what kind of “next system” these initiatives point toward. It is in this spirit
    [Show full text]
  • Mill's "Very Simple Principle": Liberty, Utilitarianism And
    MILL'S "VERY SIMPLE PRINCIPLE": LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND SOCIALISM MICHAEL GRENFELL submitted for degree of Ph.D. London School of Economics and Political Science UMI Number: U048607 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U048607 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I H^S £ S F 6SI6 ABSTRACT OF THESIS MILL'S "VERY SIMPLE PRINCIPLE'*: LIBERTY. UTILITARIANISM AND SOCIALISM 1 The thesis aims to examine the political consequences of applying J.S. Mill's "very simple principle" of liberty in practice: whether the result would be free-market liberalism or socialism, and to what extent a society governed in accordance with the principle would be free. 2 Contrary to Mill's claims for the principle, it fails to provide a clear or coherent answer to this "practical question". This is largely because of three essential ambiguities in Mill's formulation of the principle, examined in turn in the three chapters of the thesis. 3 First, Mill is ambivalent about whether liberty is to be promoted for its intrinsic value, or because it is instrumental to the achievement of other objectives, principally the utilitarian objective of "general welfare".
    [Show full text]
  • “Critical Notice of GA Cohen's Self-Ownership, Freedom, And
    “Critical Notice of G.A. Cohen’s Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1998): 609-626. Peter Vallentyne SELF-OWNERSHIP FOR EGALITARIANS G.A. Cohen’s book brings together and elaborates on articles that he has written on self- ownership, on Marx’s theory of exploitation, and on the future of socialism. Although seven of the eleven chapters have been previously published (1977-1992), this is not merely a collection of articles. There is a superb introduction that gives an overview of how the chapters fit together and of their historical relation to each other. Most chapters have a new introduction and often a postscript or addendum that connect them with other chapters. And the four new chapters (on justice and market transactions, exploitation in Marx, the concept of self-ownership, and the plausibility of the thesis of self-ownership) are important contributions that round out and bring closure to many of the central issues. As always with Cohen, the writing is crystal clear, and full of compelling examples, deep insights, and powerful arguments. Cohen has long been recognized as one of the most important exponents of analytic Marxism. His innovative, rigorous, and exciting interpretations of Marx’s theories of history and of exploitation have had a major impact on Marxist scholarship. Starting in the mid-1970s he has increasingly turned his attention to normative political philosophy. As Cohen describes it, he was awakened from his “dogmatic socialist slumbers” by Nozick’s famous Wilt Chamberlain example in which people starting from a position of equality (or other favored patterned distribution) freely choose to pay to watch Wilt Chamberlain play, and the net result is inequality (or other unfavored pattern).
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts*
    The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 10, Number 1, 2002, pp. 20±53 Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts* CAROLE PATEMAN Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles Democracy is at war with the renting of human beings, not with private property. David Ellerman URING the 1990s a number of political philosophers turned their attention Dto the concept of self-ownership. Much of the discussion is critical of libertarianism,1 a political theory that goes hand-in-hand with neo-liberal economic doctrines and global policies of structural adjustment and privatization. Attracta Ingram's A Political Theory of Rights and G. A. Cohen's Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality are devoted to such criticism Uand I shall focus much of my argument on their books2). The consensus among most participants in the debate is that self-ownership is merely a way of talking about autonomy, but Ingram and Cohen go against the tide by arguing that the idea is inimical to autonomy and that an alternative is needed. In The Sexual Contract I am also critical of libertarianism, and my conclusion is similar to Ingram's and Cohen's. I argue that the idea of property in the person must be relinquished if a more free and democratic social and political order is to be created. However, despite some common concerns, there are very few points at which my work and that of Cohen and Ingram, or of most contributors to the current debates about self-ownership, come together. In large part this is because property in the person, not self-ownership, is central to my analysis.
    [Show full text]
  • Rebels with a Cause: Revolutionary Syndicalism, Anarchism, and Socialism in Fin-De-Siècle France
    Rebels with a Cause: Revolutionary Syndicalism, Anarchism, and Socialism in Fin-De-Siècle France Andrew P. Miller History In his influential book, Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor, Peter Stearns presents the fin-de-siècle syndicalist movement in France as “a cause without rebels.” Stearns asserts that syndicalist leaders and intellectuals “produced distinctive and abundant rhetoric…yet they did not characterize French labor in their heyday and they did not set an enduring trend.”1 For Stearns, the revolutionary syndicalists failed to meet the workers’ material needs and paralyzed the unionist movement because they did not have a centralized leadership dedicated to pragmatic business and organizational practices. Bernard Moss comes to a similar conclusion, stating that the workers’ shift from “a cooperative strategy in alliance with the reformist middle class” to “a revolutionary strategy of class struggle” through loose federations and autonomous trade associations hampered the centralized discipline and political power of unions at the turn of the century.2 Stearns and Moss engage the French labor movement from very different perspectives, but in the end, both either discount or fail to recognize the specific ideals and moral tradition behind revolutionary syndicalism. Stearns’s concern with the importance of higher wages and job security conceals the fact that narrow, short-term gains were not the main objectives of the skilled labor force in the syndicalist movement. Moss, on the other hand, recognizes the ideological character of the movement, but fails to acknowledge that political socialism, as a path into twentieth-century industrial politics, eventually embedded the French syndicalists in the capitalist system they sought to overturn.
    [Show full text]
  • Performance Differential Between Private and State-Owned Enterprises: an Analysis of Profitability and Leverage
    ADBI Working Paper Series PERFORMANCE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN PRIVATE AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: AN ANALYSIS OF PROFITABILITY AND LEVERAGE Nguyet Thi Minh Phi, Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary, Chuc Anh Tu, Naoyuki Yoshino, and Chul Ju Kim No. 950 May 2019 Asian Development Bank Institute Nguyet Thi Minh Phi is a Lecturer at the Academy of Finance, Ha Noi, Viet Nam and an associate researcher at Centre for Applied Economics and Business Research, Ha Noi, Viet Nam. Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary is an Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo. Chuc Anh Tu is an Associate Professor, Academy of Finance, Ha Noi. Naoyuki Yoshino is Dean and CEO, ADBI, Tokyo. Chul Ju Kim is Deputy Dean, ADBI, Tokyo. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms. Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published. The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI’s working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. Suggested citation: Phi, N. T. M., F. Taghizadeh-Hesary, C.
    [Show full text]
  • Critical Notice of GA Cohen's Self-Ownership, Freedom
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Missouri: MOspace “Critical Notice of G.A. Cohen’s Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality ”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1998): 609-626. Peter Vallentyne SELF-OWNERSHIP FOR EGALITARIANS G.A. Cohen’s book brings together and elaborates on articles that he has written on self- ownership, on Marx’s theory of exploitation, and on the future of socialism. Although seven of the eleven chapters have been previously published (1977-1992), this is not merely a collection of articles. There is a superb introduction that gives an overview of how the chapters fit together and of their historical relation to each other. Most chapters have a new introduction and often a postscript or addendum that connect them with other chapters. And the four new chapters (on justice and market transactions, exploitation in Marx, the concept of self-ownership, and the plausibility of the thesis of self-ownership) are important contributions that round out and bring closure to many of the central issues. As always with Cohen, the writing is crystal clear, and full of compelling examples, deep insights, and powerful arguments. Cohen has long been recognized as one of the most important exponents of analytic Marxism. His innovative, rigorous, and exciting interpretations of Marx’s theories of history and of exploitation have had a major impact on Marxist scholarship. Starting in the mid-1970s he has increasingly turned his attention to normative political philosophy. As Cohen describes it, he was awakened from his “dogmatic socialist slumbers” by Nozick’s famous Wilt Chamberlain example in which people starting from a position of equality (or other favored patterned distribution) freely choose to pay to watch Wilt Chamberlain play, and the net result is inequality (or other unfavored pattern).
    [Show full text]
  • URBAN SQUATTING: II an Adaptive Response to the Housing II Crisis I • I Rimma Ashkinadze I Submitted for Honors in Sociology Oberlin College
    I II I URBAN SQUATTING: II An Adaptive Response to the Housing II Crisis I • I Rimma Ashkinadze I submitted for honors in Sociology Oberlin College .. 26 April 1996 • •.. II.. .. II II I [I I would like to thank Daphne John, my esteemed professor, advisor, and friend I - without her support, I would never have the courage and patience to finish this; """ Professor Norris, my second reader and knowledgeable resource person; the honors cohort - Rachel Laibson, Molly Moloney, Avril Smith, and Stacy Tolchin; I0,?'~ my wonderful, supportive friends - especially Gillian Schmidt and Becky I Wolfinger. I '",,' I,<A I I I I I I II II I "I'" 2 ,'" ,;; INTRODUCTION 5 What is squatting? 5 Why am I interested in squatting? 6 Methodology 9 I What is my goal in doing this research? 11 I THEORIES 12 Housing as a Need 12 The Meaning of Home 12 .11 Homelessness 16 Connection Between Homelessness and Squatting 26 II Autonomy and Control in Housing 27 Structural Capitalist Economic and Social Changes 36 [I Economic Changes 38 co' ~ Conflicts within Capitalism 40 Changes in cities 42 Inner cities and the Urban Frontier 48 II Disinvestment and Reinvestment 53 Possible solutions 56 <~ Merton's Strain Theory and the Theory of Adaptation 58 II«" Definition 58 Adaptations of Strain Theory for Housing 61 How Squatting Fits into the Theory of Adaptation 63 Oversights of Strain Theory 65 Social Movement Theory 67 Theoretical Approaches to Social Movements 69 Networks vs. Organizations 76 , Recruitment 78 II Participation 81 Activism 82 II What kind of social movement
    [Show full text]
  • This Thesis Has Been Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Postgraduate Degree (E.G
    This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: • This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. • A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. • This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. • The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. • When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. A LeftLeft----LibertarianLibertarian Theory of Rights Arabella Millett Fisher PhD University of Edinburgh 2011 Contents Abstract....................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................v Declaration.................................................................................................................. vi Introduction..................................................................................................................1 Part I: A Libertarian Theory of Justice...................................................................11
    [Show full text]