A Properly Closed Book

The ICTR and the secrecy around the

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in History: Holocaust and Studies University of Amsterdam

Name: Marjolein Verhaag Student number: 5677106 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate Second reader: Thijs Bouwknegt Abstract

The of 1994 was allegedly planned and prepared by a group known as the Akazu, an informal power structure centered around ’s President Juvénal Habyarimana and his wife Agathe Kanziga. According to the historiography on the Rwandan genocide, from the 1970s until 1994 this group of influential Rwandan infiltrated and consolidated the economic and political sphere in Rwanda in order to strengthen the president’s and their own power base. This study explores the structure and mode of operation of the Akazu on the basis of three cases that came before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, respectively the Media Trial, the Military 1 Trial and the case against . It will lead the reader to the conclusion that the Akazu consisted of the inner and wider Akazu, and that the power its members wielded differed significantly. Moreover it will argue that it was not so much the Akazu, but all the more a parallel clandestine organization called the Zero Network that masterminded the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Key words Rwandan genocide, Akazu, Zero Network, clandestine organizations, Power, ICTR

Table of Contents

Glossary I

Acknowledgements V

Introduction 1 Historiography 2 The rise of the Akazu 3 The power of Juvénal Habyarimana 6 From civil war to genocide 10 Focus 15

1. Ideology and propaganda: the ICTR Media Case 19 1.1 and the 21 The invention of hate media 21 Awake the Majority People 23 1.2 CDR 26 The rise of multipartyism 26 The ‘underlying’ message 29 1.3 Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 31 An administrative puzzle 31 Clear intentions 34 1.4 36 The extremists unite 36 From defense to action 38

2. Preparing, arming and training: the Military 1 Trial 41 2.1 The Definition and Identification of the Enemy 43 The ENI Document 43 The enemy lists 46 2.2 The actual perpetrators 47 Organizing the youth wings 47 State units 49 The civil defense system 50 Financial support 52 2.3 Secret societies 53 The Zero Network 53 AMASASU 56 Death squads 58 3. A Family Affair: the case against Protais Zigiranyirazo 63 3.1 The facts 64 Family ties 65 Regional ties 65 Ideological Hutu Power ties 66 3.2 Insider witnesses 66 Central and wider Akazu 67 The parallel network 69 3.3 Expert witnesses 70 The actual rulers 71 Threats to the power 73 The power of the Zero Network 74

Conclusion 77 Central versus wider Akazu 78 The Akazu versus the Zero Network 81

Bibliography 85 Primary sources 85 Secondary sources 89

Appendices 93 1. The Hutu Ten Commandments 93 2. Structure of RTLM Limited 94 3. The ENI Document 95

Glossary

ADECOGIKA Association through which international aid and development money was channeled to the home region of the Akazu Akazu Kinyarwanda for ‘Little house’; group of influential individuals close to President Juvénal Habyarimana and his wife Agathe Kanziga AMASASU Clandestine group that made an urgent call for the legitimate use of self-defense against the RPF threat. Its members ranged from FAR officers to the smallest soldiers Peace agreement – signed on the 4th of August 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania – between the Rwandan government and the RPF to bring an end to the civil war BBTG Broad Based Transitional Government CDR Coalition pour la Défense de la République; the Hutu extremist party, formed in 1992 by the extremist wing of the MRND Clan de Madame See Akazu Death squads Hutu extremist forces that massacred and assassinated the enemy and disturbed the events of opposition parties. Their aim was to destabilize the democratization process, intimidate the and other opponents and bring a halt to the peace process DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo Enemy Commission Military Commission, established on the 4th of December 1991, that studied the enemy in order to find an answer to the question of how to defeat that enemy militarily, in the media and politically ENI document Document, written by the Enemy Commission, that defined and identified the enemy of the Rwandan Hutu population FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises; the Rwandan Armed Forces FPR French acronym for the RPF, the Rwandese Patriotic Front

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Gacaca-courts Rwandan court system, based on a traditional dispute resolution mechanism, at which lay judges held trials for the smaller acts of genocide GP French acronym for the Presidential Guard, the highly trained and well equipped unit of Hutu extremists, which were intensely loyal to President Habyarimana HRW Human Rights Watch; international NGO that conducts research on and supports human rights Hutu Power Movement, established in October 1993, which further disseminated the extremist Hutu ideology Ibyitso Kinyarwanda for ‘Accomplice’ ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Kinyarwanda for ‘Those who have a single aim’; the youth wing of the CDR Inkotanyi Kinyarwanda for ‘war fighter’ Kinyarwanda for ‘Those who stand together’; the youth wing of the MRND Inyenzi Kinyarwanda for ‘cockroach’ Kanguka Kinyarwanda for ‘wake up’; independent Rwandan newspaper Kangura Kinyarwanda for ‘wake others up’; Rwandan anti- periodical Kinyarwanda One of the official languages of Rwanda MDR Mouvement Démocratique Républicain; the main opposition party to the MRND MRND Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement; President Habyarimana’s political party NGO Non-governmental organization NUR National University of Rwanda ORINFOR Office Rwandais d’Information; government agency that managed Rwanda’s public media

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Prefecture At the time of the genocide, Rwanda was divided in ten prefectures, comparable to provinces, which were led by a prefect, a kind of governor who served as the personal representative of the president RPA Rwandese Patriotic Army; the army of the RPF RPF Rwandese Patriotic Front; Tutsi-led opposition party RTLM Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines; the hate radio in Rwanda SC Security Council UN United Nations UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAR Royalist Tutsi party that the members of the AMASASU linked to the RPF Zero Network Clandestine organization that operated parallel to and partly in cooperation with the Akazu

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IV

Acknowledgements

“Rwandan history has the dark-magic ability to cause anyone who studies it to lose all reason.”1 Thierry Cruvellier

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone who supported me throughout the course of this research project. Writing this thesis took quite some time and energy, and without the help of a couple of people I would have never succeeded.

First of all, I want to extend my deepest gratitude to Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate. Without his suggestions, constructing criticism and encouragement this thesis would have never been written in the first place. I also want to thank Thijs Bouwknegt for his insightful thoughts, for challenging my thinking and helping me out when I got stuck, and for his interest in acting as my second reader. Thank you both for your patience.

I am very thankful to Adam Hayward for initially sparking my interest in the Akazu and for proofreading the draft text. I am also grateful to my friends for keeping me motivated and offering me a listening ear. Last but not least I want to thank my family, and especially my parents, for their love and support during this long journey.

1 Thierry Cruvellier, Court of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, trans. Chari Voss (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 140.

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Introduction

“The difficulty with any type of “secret societies” is that insider knowledge is rarely available, usually only after a longer period of time; however, the tribunal needs to know it in order to bring the Akazu members to justice.”2 Christian P. Scherrer

“It was as if we were taken over by Satan. […] When Satan is using you, you lose your mind. We were not ourselves. […] We had been attacked by the devil.”3 Gitera Rwamuhizhi, Hutu farmer

The twentieth century has known quite some . From the to , Cambodia, Rwanda and eventually Bosnia, it happened, and despite saying ‘never again’, it does happen again. Every time after such an atrocity, people have asked the question of how this could possibly happen. There is, unfortunately, not one single answer to this question. Before, during and after a genocide, several parties and events fulfill several roles and release several forces on several levels. We often see a certain set of ‘genocidal preconditions’ that occur in the decades preceding a genocide. These preconditions enclose, but are not restricted to, the rise of a utopian ideology, ideas of social engineering, a political, economic and/or social crisis, a deteriorating social position of minorities and the process of ‘othering’. 4 These preconditions on their own are not so threatening, yet the combination of these conditions can lead to a serious and dangerous escalation of events. Then, as soon as the genocide is eventually sparked, the perpetrators get into action and do their job. The question of why these ‘ordinary men’ obey the orders and do their jobs has been widely investigated and discussed by Christopher Browning

2 Christian P. Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 106. 3 Gitera Rwamuhizhi, “Taken over by Satan,” BBC News (2 April 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ programmes/panorama/3582011.stm [21-02-2014]. 4 Ervin Staub, “Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation,” Political Psychology 21, no.2 (2000): 369-370.

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and Hannah Arendt amongst others.5 It is however harder to understand why the chief culprits, the ideologues or the ‘genocidal masterminds’ initially picked up the idea of exterminating a certain group, and subsequently designed a plan to carry out that extermination. When trying to answer this question, one needs to look at several factors: Who were these planners? What did they fear? What was the cause of that fear? And how did they transmit that fear to the ‘ordinary men’ in order to let them do their ‘job’? In other words, who is this Satan that Gitera Rwamuhizhi mentioned in Ghosts of Rwanda, and how does he annihilate his enemy?

Historiography

Two decades have passed since a group of Hutu extremists started up their plan to eliminate the Rwandan Tutsi population. The means through which they tried to achieve that goal were as gruesome as they were effective. While the world was watching, or actually looking away, approximately one million Hutus mutilated, raped and killed over 800.000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, in only one hundred days. In the following twenty years, the Rwandan genocide has been extensively investigated and documented. Scholars, lawyers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) wondered what exactly happened and how this could have happened. By now, the question of what happened both during and in the decades preceding the genocide has been answered quite clearly by Alison Des Forges, Gérard Prunier and Roméo Dallaire amongst others.6 Furthermore, Scott Straus, Jean Hatzfeld and Lee Ann Fujii have discussed the topic of why and how this genocide occurred on the micro – in other words perpetrator – level.7 Yet the Rwandan genocide, like any other genocide, did not appear out of the blue. It needed planners and instigators in order

5 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992); and Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Classics, 2006). 6 Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 1999); Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Company, 1995); and Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow Books, 2004). 7 Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak, trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005); and Lee Ann Fujii, Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

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for the ordinary men to pick up their machetes. And precisely those instigators, which appear to be gathered in a group called the Akazu, remain a poorly documented topic of the Rwandan genocide. Yet poorly documented does not mean undocumented. Therefore the following paragraph will explore the historiography of the Akazu, which will serve two purposes. On the one hand it will offer the historical context in which we can place, and through which we can better understand, the events that will be discussed in the rest of this thesis. On the other, maybe even more important hand, it will explore what has been written about the Akazu so far. This is important to know, as it will help to understand the relevance of this research. Hereafter, the aim of this study will be defined and the mode of operation of the following chapters will be clarified.

The rise of the Akazu One of the first works that was published on the 1994 genocide was The Rwanda Crisis by Gérard Prunier, a French historian specialized in the Great Lakes Region. As he was defining Rwanda’s political history of ethnic division, Prunier inevitably brought up the topic of where and when the tensions, which would in the end result in the genocide, had started. This is where the Akazu entered the historiography of Rwanda. According to Rwandan customs, its ruler was supposed to have a group of followers or ‘clan’ centered around him. While this clan held no official power, it functioned as the eyes and ears of the sovereign and gave him its unconditional support. When Juvénal Habyarimana came to power in 1973, he lacked such a backing, at least from his own relatives. He was a self-made man without an influential family to rely on, and thus had to find another clan that would support him. The answer was very close. Habyarimana’s wife Agathe Kanziga came from a well- known lineage that had ruled an independent principality in the north of Rwanda until the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. Despite the fact that the principality had recently fallen on hard times, Agathe and her relatives were still eager to exercise authority. The president’s search for a loyal backing consequently offered this Clan de Madame or Akazu as they are more often called, the perfect opportunity to regain

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power and status. By the early 1990s, the Akazu turned out to be a paramount factor in Habyarimana’s decision-making.8 The tide in Rwanda had changed during the second part of the 20th century. When Habyarimana came to power in 1973, he brought peace and stability to the agrarian country. During the previous reign of President Grégoire Kayibanda the Rwandan Tutsi had been systematically suppressed and persecuted. Though they were still not given any political power under Habyarimana, they were at least tolerated. Everyday life in Rwanda became carefully controlled, almost free of crime and seemed politically stable on the surface. Meanwhile, as there was little surplus value to be extracted from the peasants, the different clans enriched themselves with earnings from Rwanda’s export and the creaming off of foreign aid. The members of the Akazu even set up a special association, the ADECOGIKA, through which they channeled international aid and development money into their own pockets. Whoever dared to protest against these corrupt practices, especially those of the Akazu, was immediately silenced. However, as the regime was well disposed against its foreign donors, the western world seemed to be satisfied with Habyarimana’s achievements.9 By 1986 this prosperity started to decline. The prices of Rwanda’s main export products – coffee, tea and tin – dropped dramatically and as a result the country’s economy collapsed. The different clans still had to be provided with an income, but as the resources of the export were allocated to running the government, all clans came to depend on foreign aid. Since this could only be appropriated through control of the highest governmental positions, the internal power struggles intensified and the political stability began to falter. Obviously, Habyarimana’s Akazu came off best. However as internal opposition was still suppressed, the international community started to demand political democratization in return for economic aid. Habyarimana was consequently forced to declare his support for a multiparty system, encouraging the Rwandan opposition to get into action. Hence, by 1990, not only Rwanda’s economy, but also its political scene was in deep crisis.10 This course of events in the decades preceding 1990 as told by Gérard Prunier, is widely supported by the historians and academics that have discussed this topic in

8 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 85-87. 9 Ibid., 74-76, 81-84; and Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (Chippenham: CPI Antony Rowe, 2009), 47. 10 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 84-85, 88-90.

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the past twenty years. Yet, disagreement arises when it comes to the question of when the Akazu was ‘established’. Just like any ‘regional mafia’, as Prunier labeled the Akazu, this mafia did not document all its activities. Documentation was risky; it could later on serve as evidence of complicity, and that is something any clandestine organization fears. As a result, no written records or agreements have been found, yet Prunier concluded that the Akazu was already formed before 1973. Its members subsequently benefited from the fact that Habyarimana had come to power as they saw their own influence in the Rwandan politics grow. Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama – respectively historian/human rights activist and researcher on Rwanda – have shared this view. In their article “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda”, they traced the origins of the Akazu back to the 1960s. Initially, Kakwenzire and Kamukama stated, this group began to structure itself not out of an ethnical but all the more out of a regional threat. The then President Kayibanda mainly surrounded himself with supporters from his home base Gitarama and the southern city of Butare. Though Kayibanda and his clan were all Hutu, the northern Hutus, especially those from the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefecture, felt alienated from the power system. Hence, they drew up a plan and devised the 1973 bloodless coup. As Head of the National Guard, their in-law family member Juvénal Habyarimana would become president and the power base of the Akazu would be recaptured.11 Thus, without mentioning an exact year, Kakwenzire and Kamukama determined that the Akazu was founded decades before the genocide actually took place. Yet not all authors share this view. According to central and east Africa specialist Andrew Wallis and the Dutch researcher Helen Hintjens, the Akazu was not founded until the end of the 1980s or even 1990. Wallis, who shed light on the role of France in the Rwandan genocide in his book Silent Accomplice, stated that Agathe Kanziga began to form the Akazu by the late 1980s. With the economic and political crisis and the additional erosion of power in mind, she decided to make her own plan in order to stay in control. Wallis claimed that the common and only objective of the relatives she gathered around her was to use the presidency for their own personal

11 Ibid., 85; and Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama, “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994,” in The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 64- 65, 90.

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wealth and power.12 If one assumes that the only aim of the Akazu was a violent retention of power, then the Akazu could indeed not have been established earlier, as it was not until the end of the 1980s that their influence threatened to diminish. In “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda” Hintjens supported this view. She stated that the Akazu was formed as a response to growing opposition; its members feared a loss of power. According to Hintjens however, the foundation took place even later, by the beginning of 1990.13

The power of Juvénal Habyarimana Despite differences of opinion in the historiography of the founding of the Akazu, it is certain that by the time the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed branch of the Tutsi led (RPF), crossed the Ugandan border into Rwanda on the 1st of October 1990, the Akazu was well in control. The tensions between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority in Rwanda were by then already deeply embedded, and would only grow worse over the next few years. The roots of these tensions can be traced back to the colonial era. In 1897, when the European powers were expanding their territory, Rwanda fell into the hands of Germany. With their fascination for racial matters around that time – witness the fact that in those years anti-Semitism in Germany was up and coming – the Germans began to explore Rwanda and its people from a European point of view. In order to explain the domination of certain African groups over others and to justify their own colonial presence, German scientists applied the Hamitic theory. According to this theory, the Hamites were a race of people, mostly Egyptians, which had spread through parts of Africa and carried with them “greater sophistication than the Negroid races of equatorial Africa.”14 The scientists concluded that in the Rwandan case, these Hamites were the tall, light-skinned, cattle owning Tutsis who seemed to dominate the shorter, darker and poorer Hutus.15

12 Andrew Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 51. 13 Helen Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 2 (1999): 259. 14 Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 17. 15 Ibid., 17-18.

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By appointing the Tutsi as the superior Rwandan race, the German rulers disregarded both the fact that the social relations in Rwanda were far more complex, and that during preceding centuries the ruling status had not been a result of ethnicity but all the more of clans. When the Belgians took over Rwandan control in 1919, this ethnic separation became even worse. First, the Belgians labeled the Tutsi as the intellectual and administrative ‘ruling class’, on which the Belgians relied to fulfill the administration of the League of Nations’ mandate to officially legitimize their colonial authority. Furthermore, they introduced the system of identity cards that specified a person’s ethnicity. Though this period of Tutsi domination did not last long, the memory of this domination, the additional Hutu-Tutsi competition and the legacy of the identity cards would be felt throughout the rest of the century.16 Subsequently, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Western cry for democratization and equality that had entailed the end of World War II also reached Rwanda. With decolonization looming ahead, the competition between the Hutus and Tutsis once again intensified. Realizing their flaws from the past, the Belgians adapted their colonial policy and opened up educational and economical opportunities for the Rwandan Hutus. Due to this, it did not take long before those Hutus started to demand political reform as well. Soon the 1959 Hutu Revolution, a series of clashes between Hutus and Tutsis over who would control the independent Rwandan state, began.17 The Hutu majority ultimately were the victors of this revolution. From the moment the Belgian colonists left Rwanda in 1959, ethnic violence, first under the Kayibanda and later under the Habyarimana regime, forced Rwandan Tutsis into exile. Whether they fled to , Uganda, Tanzania or Zaïre – present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – over the next decades many of these refugees began to share the same dream: to be able to return to and live in Rwanda one day. In the course of the 1980s, those who had fled to Uganda began to organize themselves as a response to growing threats in their ‘new’ home country. Even though a lot of these second generation Rwandans had been born in exile and had never stepped foot in Rwanda, they were determined to go back. Hence the RPF, an

16 Ibid., 18-19. 17 Ibid., 19-20; and Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 27-28.

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“offensive political organization dedicated to the return of exiles to Rwanda”18 was created. Due to the growing threats in Uganda and their desire to turn back to Rwanda, the RPF invaded its country of origin on the 1st of October 1990.19 This RPF attack meant the start of a civil war that would rage through Rwanda for almost four years. The ruling regime, in which the Akazu had obtained a considerable role by that time, deliberately came to direct that civil war. Only five days after the RPF attack, a second assault took place, this time in Rwanda’s capital . Though it appeared to be another RPF attack, it was actually staged by the regime in order to exaggerate the gravity of the RPF threat. As a response to these attacks, the government began to arrest educated Tutsis and opposition-minded Hutus, who were said to be RPF accomplices.20 Yet this was only the beginning. During the next three years, staged attacks and round-ups appeared on a regular base. By April 1994, these staged attacks turned out to be part of a bigger plan. Obviously, the Akazu played an important part in the unfolding of events that led to the genocide. But what exactly was President Juvénal Habyarimana’s role in these events, and thus in the Akazu? The opinions on this matter differ. According to Prunier and Philip Gourevitch, Habyarimana’s power decreased gradually in the course of his reign. While the extremist group had depended on Habyarimana during the 1970s and first part of the 1980s, this tide changed as soon as the crisis hit. The growing opposition from the Tutsi and moderate Hutu side exposed and challenged Habyarimana’s vulnerability as a political leader. The Akazu consequently agreed that in order to stay in control, the grip on the president had to be tightened. Not only was the Akazu reluctant to share power with any other political group, they probably realized that the crimes they had committed over the past couple of years would not remain unpunished lest there be a new government. Hence, they came to interfere with the politics of the president on every level.21 This interference did not go unnoticed. Though Rwanda’s state radio and newspapers presupposed that the president was still in control, it was widely known that no political steps could be taken without the consent of Habyarimana’s wife and her entourage. They were the ones who made the decisions, they only needed and

18 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 73. 19 Ibid., 61-62, 66-74. 20 Ibid., 101-102, 108-109. 21 Ibid., 86-87.

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used Habyarimana to execute their power and officially decree their regulations. As Prunier stated, Habyarimana “gradually became their prisoner and eventually their victim,”22 and he was aware of that fact. When for example Habyarimana proposed Colonel Mayuya, one of his few own men, as his successor, the Akazu, who felt threatened with a loss of power, simply arranged Mayuya’s assassination.23 Moreover, the March 1994 edition of Kangura, the Rwandan journal that was financed and published by people close to the Akazu, ran the headline “Habyarimana will die in March”.24 It will be clear that these were not Habyarimana’s own actions and words. In her book Conspiracy to Murder, Linda Melvern was also of the opinion that Habyarimana gradually lost his power. She blamed this, however, on the fact that he was actually reluctant to share that power. Due to that reluctance, his command had steadily shifted into the hands of his brother-in-law Protais Zigiranyirazo, better known as Mister Z.25 Mahmood Mamdani, a researcher from Uganda and author of When Victims Become Killers, has on the other hand argued that Habyarimana’s diminishing power was not caused by unwillingness, but all the more by the fact that Habyarimana and the Akazu aspired different objectives. While Habyarimana pursued tightened ties with the Tutsis, the Akazu was using the Hutu Power web of political, economic and military muscle and patronage, of which the Akazu itself was the core, to try to “undo the Presidents attempt to rehabilitate the Tutsi as an ethnic minority in Rwandan society.”26 Thus, for whatever reason, all these authors share the view that President Habyarimana gradually lost his power to the Akazu. Yet some other important authors on the genocide, including Andrew Wallis and Roméo Dallaire, have contradicted this statement. Wallis concluded that though it seemed like Habyarimana split ways with the Akazu by the end of his reign, he only did this as an answer to national and international pressure. As the international community started to demand political reform and the signing of the Arusha Accords – the peace agreement that should bring

22 Ibid. 23 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1996), 77, 81; and Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 86-87. 24 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 108. 25 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (New York: Verso, 2006), 12-13, 124. 26 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 190.

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an end to the civil war in Rwanda – in return for financial support, both Habyarimana and the Akazu realized that they had to pander to the community’s request. Consequently, on the surface it appeared that the president took a more moderate stance and was willing to share power, while in the meantime the Akazu could continue to operate and plan the genocide on the background.27 It was right after the signing of the Arusha Accords in August ’93, that Roméo Dallaire arrived in Rwanda. As Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), his job was to monitor the implementation of the Accords that were designed to bring a halt to the civil war in Rwanda. One of the most important elements of these Accords was the installation of a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG), in which five political parties would be seated. Yet by the end of December 1993, Dallaire was told by Faustin Twagiramungu, the prime minister designate, that “President Habyarimana was trying to manoeuver around the installation of the BBTG and that this interference was one of the major factors behind the political impasse.”28 Since Twagiramungu had been chosen in Arusha to lead the BBTG, he was quite concerned by this interference. A little more than three months later Twagiramungu and Dallaire would find out the real reason behind Habyarimana’s hindrance.29

From civil war to genocide On the evening of the 6th of April 1994 the installation of the BBTG and President Habyarimana’s interference were suddenly stopped. Earlier that day, the president had attended a meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, where he ended up discussing the similar Accords with his fellow presidents from Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. Somewhat startled, as his colleagues had admonished him for not making much progress in implementing the Accords, Habyarimana returned home in his presidential jet. Around 8.30 p.m., right before the airplane would touchdown in Kigali, two missiles were launched from just outside the airport. The plane, that carried not only Habyarimana but also the Burundian President and some other

27 Wallis, Silent Accomplice, 66-67. 28 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 133. 29 Ibid., 60, 133.

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officials, was hit, crashed into the presidential garden and burst into flames. None of the passengers survived.30 Twenty years later it is still not clear who ordered and arranged the attack. Different authors have presented different theories with different suspects, but up till today the real culprit has not been found. It is known however, that within one hour after the attack Kigali was turned upside down, with two sides fighting each other. On the one hand, the Presidential Guard (GP) and militiamen were erecting roadblocks and searching houses all over town to find ‘enemies’: Tutsis and moderate Hutus who could be held responsible for the assault. On the other hand, Habyarimana’s army, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) tried to halt them. This disorder was caused by the fact that the FAR commander-in-chief Marcel Gatsinzi was not aware of the plot, while the head of the GP, Colonel Protais Mpiranya, was. Gatsinzi had just succeeded the former commander-in-chief, Déogratias Nsabimana, who had also died in the plane crash, and thus tried to do what he thought was best: keep the army out of the ‘final solution’.31 Gatsinzi’s efforts were to no avail. During that first night, the Presidential Guard, together with the paramilitary Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, deliberately attacked their opposition. Previously drawn up killing lists were finished and Tutsis were killed simply because they were Tutsi, and therefore considered to be RPF ‘accomplices’. By the afternoon of the 7th of April, the slaughter had spread throughout almost the whole country and in the night that followed the provisional government, which consisted exclusively of politicians who rallied to the ‘final solution’, was established.32 Prunier frequently uses the term ‘final solution’. He stated that the Hutu extremists had already, on the night of the 6th of April, started to work on that solution. He subsequently defined that the most important difference between large- scale killings and genocides is the purpose of a ‘final solution’. While in a ‘regular’ large-scale killing the slaughter stops when the killers get tired or feel like their enemy has learned its lesson, a genocide only stops when the targeted group is completely destroyed and thus the final solution has been achieved. As this was the aim the Akazu envisioned from the start, the Rwandan genocide, at least according to

30 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 211-212. 31 Ibid., 229. 32 Ibid., 229-233, 236.

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Prunier, was set in motion on the night of the 6th of April, immediately after President Habyarimana’s airplane was shot down.33 Furthermore Prunier stated that the plan for the genocide was first put together in outline by the end of 1992. It was around that time that a couple of extremist officers, who were gathered in a secret society called the AMASASU, began to arm the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias.34 In order to succeed they worked hand-in-hand with the Zero Network, a civilian-military organization that constituted a death squad. According to Prunier “the list of the death squad’s leaders […] read like an Akazu ‘who’s who.’”35 Still, though the members of the Zero Network were closely linked to the Akazu, they gradually began to lean more on the extremist CDR political party as they started to lose their faith in the die-hard resolution of the president. Linda Melvern supported this view on the Zero Network, especially regarding its members. In Conspiracy to Murder she explained how, over the course of 1992, the Hutu extremists had began to draw the first preparations for the genocide. These preparations involved the training of death squads that were part of the Zero Network, and close to the clan of the president.36 At the same time, Melvern stated, this Zero Network was a “secret communications link, a radio network whose existence was known only to the extremists and which enabled them to keep in touch with each other.”37 Indeed, the accounts on the Zero Network that were given by Prunier and Melvern appear rather vague, yet it seems like it was hard to find detailed information on the group. Christian P. Scherrer only claimed that the Zero Network, which coordinated the death squads, was headed by Habyarimana’s sons-in-law and controlled by the Akazu. In Leave None to Tell the Story, the famous report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) two years after the genocide, Alison Des Forges supported this assumption. She moreover stated that this Network was responsible for the apparently random attacks that occurred all over Rwanda in 1992 and 1993. In addition, Andrew Wallis argued that the Zero Network was a hard core of men around the president who expanded into the economy, the army, the civil service and the

33 Ibid., 237-238. 34 AMASASU means ‘bullets’ or ‘ammunition’ in Kinyarwanda. This clandestine organization made an urgent call for the legitimate use of self-defense against the RPF threat. For more details on this group see §2.3. 35 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 168. 36 Ibid., 168-169, 182; and Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 31, 41. 37 Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 31-32.

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churches with the means to take over the state and put it at their own service. Thus, though the Network certainly played an important part in the escalation of events, it remains hard to determine its exact structure, activities or responsibilities.38 With regards to the ‘final solution’, Linda Melvern also agreed with Prunier on this matter. On the basis of several witness testimonies she concluded that the attack on the Tutsis started right after Habyarimana’s assassination. As the Akazu had determined that the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi – ‘cockroach-war fighter’, the term used to indicate Tutsis – were responsible for Habyarimana’s death, the battalions were told that “All soldiers should get out and start killing people who were against the government, including Tutsis.” 39 Another witness recalled that the troops “were ordered to kill anyone who had an identity card bearing the Tutsi ethnic group reference and anyone who was opposed to the government.”40 Subsequently, the troops went out on the streets and “started forcing people out of their houses, asking them for identity documents. If your ID card had the word Tutsi, then you would be killed.”41 This was no longer warfare, but genocide in a very pure form. Another witness to the events, Roméo Dallaire, drew the same conclusion. During the first critical hours after the plane crash, the ruling Hutu extremists, who were now faced with a power vacuum, were acting as if they were trying hard to keep the Presidential Guard and the army in control. It did however not take long for Dallaire to notice that he was actually excluded from the important meetings and decision-making. Though Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, chef de cabinet of the Ministry of Defense, promised Dallaire that he did not want to jeopardize the Arusha Accords and risk another war with the RPF, Dallaire, in his own words, “didn’t trust him for a minute.”42 As the killings continued and neither Bagosora nor any of the other prominent extremist Hutus made an attempt to intervene, Dallaire concluded, “in just a few hours the Presidential Guard had conducted an obviously well- organized and well-executed plan”.43 However, it was not only the Hutu extremists who contributed to the escalating situation. On the 7th of April, Paul Kagame, the Military Commander of the

38 Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 130; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 46, 67; and Wallis, Silent Accomplice, 52-53. 39 ICTR prosecution testimony. Military One. Witness DBQ in Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 144. 40 ICTR prosecution witness statement. GS in Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 145. 41 ICTR prosecution testimony. Military One. Witness DBQ in Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 145. 42 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 223. 43 Ibid., 232.

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RPA and present-day president of Rwanda, offered Bagosora and Dallaire a clear ultimatum. By nightfall, either the killings throughout Kigali had to be over or the RPA would be ordered to intervene. Bagosora, on his turn, once again made no attempt to change the situation, stop the killings or cooperate with the RPF. Gatsinzi made some efforts, but they were to no avail, and the mandate given to UNAMIR did not allow the Blue Berets to use proactive force, only in case of self-defense. Hence, by the end of that day the hostilities had resumed and Dallaire realized that his mission had failed.44 He would later recount, “It was the end of the first day of a hundred-day civil war and a genocide that would engulf all of us in unimaginable carnage.”45 Andrew Wallis and Christian P. Scherrer supported this view as well. According to Wallis, the Akazu was already carrying out its ‘carefully nurtured’ genocidal plan while Habyarimana’s plane was still burning, ironically in his own garden. Scherrer even stated that the starting signal for the massacres was given at 6 p.m., two and a half hours before the plane crashed. From that moment, and for the next 100 days, Rwanda’s residents were summoned to go out ‘to work’ and ‘do their job’, which in genocidal terms meant nothing less than to kill any Tutsi and moderate Hutu that they would run in to. Philip Gourevitch however indicated that the extermination of the Tutsi only got underway by the 7th of April, after the most important Hutu opposition leaders had been killed. In Leave None to Tell the Story Des Forges claimed that the widespread killings, which had been prepared for months, started immediately after the attack on Habyarimana. Though Des Forges labeled these killings as ‘genocide’, she remarked that the aim of the slaughter was to draw the RPF back into combat and hence give the Hutu extremists a new chance for negotiations or maybe even victory.46 Despite all these assumptions about an immediate outbreak of the genocide, Scott Straus held a somewhat different point of view. In The Order of Genocide, he stated that on what would be later seen as the ‘eve of the genocide’, there were four major parties that were operating on the Rwandan national level. The first two, the Hutu moderates and the international actors on site were determined to implement the

44 Ibid., 247-248, 254, 261. 45 Ibid., 262. 46 Wallis, Silent Accomplice, 79; Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 108; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 113-114; and Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 185.

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Arusha Accords. The other two, the Hutu hardliners and the Tutsi rebels had however no interest in these Accords at all. While pretending to strive for peace and a multiparty government, they were actually training their militias, importing weapons and preparing for a war that was eventually sparked on the night of the 6th of April. Especially the Hutu hardliners felt threatened by a loss of power as a result of the Accords, and therefore decided to seek alternative ways to regain that power. The anti-Tutsi propaganda, the killings lists and the training of paramilitary troops were initially all meant to win the coming war, not to eliminate the Rwandan Tutsi population. As it is still unclear when or even if an order for a systematic and coordinated attempt to physically eliminate the entire Tutsi population of Rwanda was given, it remains hard to tell when the Akazu decided to turn the war into genocide. Turid Laegreid of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs went even further by stating that the attack on the Rwandan president had only resumed the civil war, and did not even mention the word ‘genocide’ in her article “U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda”.47

Focus

So far this chapter has given a short overview of the Rwandan history as it led to the outbreak of the genocide. It has also explored the most crucial opinions and some discussions that have occurred on the Akazu and other informal powers, such as the Zero Network, in the existing literature. There is however one quite important organization that has not yet been mentioned in the historiographical discourse, and this organization is the United Nations (UN). Though the UN has not given a literary contribution to this discourse, the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did gather and examine a lot of information on some of the most crucial perpetrators of the genocide. This information, and especially the knowledge it gathered on the Akazu, will be the focus of this study. Four months after the end of the genocide, on the 8th of November 1994, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 955 and thereby created the ICTR. The

47 Straus, The Order of Genocide, 42-44, 49; and Turid Laegreid, “U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” in The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 235.

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purpose of this international court was to prevent impunity and promote national reconciliation in Rwanda. Just like at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the aim of the ICTR was to focus on indicting and trying the ‘big fish’: the leaders, chief culprits and organizational masterminds of the genocide. The ordinary perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide would, on the other hand, be prosecuted by the national and later on gacaca courts.48 Over the past twenty years the ICTR has indicted almost one hundred men – and one woman – who were accused of playing a considerable role in the planning and execution of the genocide. The information that was brought forward during their trials not only lead to their eventual judgment, it also contributed to the historiography of Rwanda. Hence these trials served not only a legal, but also an extralegal purpose. This extralegal purpose of producing a historical record in which the events that led to the genocide can be better understood, grew with the responsibilities of the accused; the more they were involved in the planning of the genocide, the more their case could tell about this planning. And though this extralegal information often needs to be left out of account by the judges and other legal investigators, for the historian they offer an important source for the investigation of certain topics and hence the writing of history.49 From that point of view this study will examine the Akazu. As the ICTR aimed at prosecuting the highest officials and the Akazu operated among these highest officials, the cases that came before the Rwanda Tribunal inevitably revealed information on this clandestine organization. The aim of this study will be to gather and unravel this information. However since it is too much for this study to investigate all the ICTR cases, the focus will be on one aspect of the genocide in which the Akazu was said to be specifically involved: the planning. Though in almost every case this topic has been mentioned at some point, there were two trials in which the planning received particular attention. These cases were the Media Case and the Military 1 Trial, which respectively discussed the ideological incitement and physical preparations that eventually led towards the genocide.

48 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 955, “Establishment of the ICTR,” 8 November 1994; and Timothy Longman, “An Assessment of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,” Peace Review 21, no. 3 (2009): 305-306. 49 Nena Tromp, “Understanding the Milošević Case: Legacy of an Unfinished Trial,” in The Genocide Convention: The Legacy of 60 Years, ed. H.G. van der Wilt et al. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 27- 28; and Richard Ashby Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 72-73.

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Each chapter will explore its own case. On the basis of the concerning judgment the chapters will discuss the topics that were brought forward during that trial. In that manner we will for example see that during the Media Case the judges not only investigated the role of the hate media, but also of the CDR political party and the Hutu Power movement. Hence we will get a better understanding of how the Rwandan people were gradually directed to and prepared for the genocide. Where necessary this information will be completed by secondary literature. Subsequently the chapters will examine who pulled the strings in all these activities. Obviously, the defendants in the concerning cases played an important part, but there were also people who operated more on the background. By looking at testimonies and analyzing evidence we will try to get a better picture of who these people were. Who, for example, defined the enemy and who drew up the plan to give military training to civilians and youth militia? Once this is clear we can see whether and how these people were connected to each other, after which we can turn to the real subject of this study: the Akazu. The third and last chapter will then broach a different kind of case, that against Protais Zigiranyirazo, also known as Mr. Z. In the introduction it has already been discussed that Zigiranyirazo and Habyarimana were family members, as Mr. Z. was the older brother of Agathe Kanziga. This family, and especially the direct family of Agathe, played an important role in the Akazu. The last chapter will therefore investigate the testimonies of insider as well as expert witnesses, to see what they revealed about the Akazu and parallel organizations, such as the Zero Network. It will not only discuss their structure and hierarchy, but also their mode of operation and activities. The conclusion will link the knowledge that was gained about the Akazu and other clandestine organizations during the Zigiranyirazo trial, to what has been revealed in the first two cases, in order to conclude what these trials have learned about the Akazu. Subsequently it will discuss the findings of this research and compare these findings to what has been recorded in the historiography. Did it add anything to the existing literature, or has it given us completely new insights? And did it find answers to the questions about the rise of the Akazu, the power of Juvénal Habyarimana or the outbreak of the genocide? Since the historiography on the Akazu and other informal power structures in Rwanda still appears to be rather incomplete and open for discussion, by the end of this research we will be able to conclude if and

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how these leading researchers on the Rwandan genocide have used these three ICTR trials to find an answer to the ongoing secrecy around the Akazu.

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1. Ideology and propaganda: the ICTR Media Case

“Even if you were young at the time, it does not take a moral saint to realize that killing your neighbors is wrong. […] You killed not because you were mentally retarded or morally derailed, but because you were led to believe that killing Tutsis, all of them, was a matter of self-defense or of protecting your loved-ones.”50 Bert van Roermund

“The ideology – or what Rwandans call “the logic” – of genocide was promoted as a way not to create suffering but to alleviate it. The specter of an absolute menace that requires absolute eradication binds leader and people in a hermetic utopian embrace, and the individual – always an annoyance to totality – ceases to exist.”51 Philip Gourevitch

In times of crisis, seemingly normal things can make people perform absolutely terrible actions. Think of an utopia. You imagine a happy place, a mountain landscape with a babbling brook, or maybe an azure sea with white sand beaches. Drinks and food are abundant and the people are good for each other. Though this utopia may be somewhat theatrical, the original notion of the utopia that was introduced in the sixteenth century described an ideal world. Political philosophers of all kinds came to use the concept to promise the people a brighter future. Whether they were capitalists or socialists, they planned to achieve this utopia through economic prosperity or the implementation or improvement of social welfare programs. By the twentieth century, a new means of creating a utopian society was favored. The rise of extreme and revolutionary regimes started to offer states in crisis the promise of a better, homogeneous society trough the annihilation of a certain group that was pointed out as the cause of that crisis.52 The twentieth century has seen plenty of these extreme regimes, which usually prospered when a country was faced with a crisis. Whether economic or political, the country had a desperate need for reform, and that is exactly what these regimes

50 Bert van Roermund, “Reconciliation from a Philosophical Perspective” (lecture, Tilburg University, Tilburg, October 4, 2013). 51 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 95. 52 Eric Weitz, “Utopian Ideologies as Motives for Genocide,” in Encyclopedia of Genocide and 3, ed. Dinah Shelton (Detroit: Thompson Gale, 2005), 1124-25.

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offered. Their carefully designed ideology came to serve as an answer to the problems, a patch of light at the end of the tunnel. However, in order to reach the end of that tunnel, the initial cause of the crisis had to be eliminated. This cause, as will become clear, was always a group – political, national, ethnical, religious or racial. And this group, which the regime had picked as the target of their campaign, then became gradually classified, dehumanized, separated and eventually exterminated. It was scapegoated, labeled as the ‘enemy’ and depicted as vermin or simply the ‘other’, different from and absolutely not like ‘us’. It had distinctive customs, features and origins. And as the only goal of this enemy was to conquer ‘us’, it should not be there, it did not even deserve to be there. Therefore, in order to defend ‘us’, the country had to be purified; the ‘other’ had to be exiled or, even better, exterminated. Once that goal had been achieved, the crisis would be solved and the utopia had been reached.53 This utopian ideology however, never arises and disseminates itself out of the blue. It has been designed by so-called ‘ideologues’, who may have been waiting for the crisis to occur – or have even helped it occur a little bit – in order for the regime to grab this opportunity and present their solution to the crisis. During the Weimar Republic it was Hitler who designed the Nazi ideology, which he wrote down in Mein Kampf. Subsequently, his Minister of Propaganda Dr. Joseph Goebbels arranged the circulation of this ideology among the German Volk. For Democratic Kampuchea, Khieu Samphan started writing his thesis called Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development in 1959. This thesis became the ideological foundation of the Khmer Rouge regime some sixteen years later. And in Rwanda, it was Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and who came to be known as these ideological and propaganda masterminds. Though they did not draft the extremist Hutu Power ideology, they nevertheless were the ones who arranged its dissemination through the use of the media.54 Soon after the genocide, Rwanda’s ideological masterminds were indicted by the ICTR. On the 23th of October 2000, Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze appeared before Trial Chamber 1 at the Rwanda Tribunal in Arusha, and the ICTR Media Case

53 Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide, trans. Cynthia Schoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 37-41. 54 Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 105; and Khieu Samphan, Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development, trans. Laura Summers (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1979), 3 [In Asia the family name always comes before the individual’s name, therefore the name of Khieu Samphan appears in the same order in both the footnote and the bibliography].

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finally took off. The men were accused of inter alia conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity. Their trials had been joined as the Chamber concluded that the alleged acts of the accused had formed part of a common scheme. The emphasis of the trial was on the role of the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) radio station and the Kangura periodical in the spread of the Hutu Power ideology and the planning and execution of the genocide. The case not only brought three key perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide to justice, it also looked deeper into the foundation of these media companies, which were financially supported by officials and businessmen who were often linked to the regime. This chapter will further investigate the Media Case and determine the role of these companies and their supporters in the dissemination of the genocidal ideology.55

1.1 Kangura and the Hutu Ten Commandments

The invention of hate media The first public signs of the anti-Tutsi Hutu Power ideology appeared with the birth of Kangura in May 1990. The main purpose of Kangura, Kinyarwanda for ‘wake others up’ was to defend the extremist Hutu ideology. Its editor-in-chief was Hassan Ngeze, a Hutu from the northwestern prefecture of Gisenyi. In 1978, at the age of 21, Ngeze had started working as a journalist for Kanguka – ‘wake up’ – an independent Rwandan newspaper. After a clash with the owner of Kanguka, Ngeze decided to leave the paper and start a new periodical. Together with a couple of influential Rwandans he conceived a plan to set up Kangura, which soon became the best known and most widely read magazine in Rwanda. In his capacity as a journalist, Ngeze became in charge of the content of the journal, while his co-founders provided the financial resources.56 But who were these co-founders? During the ICTR Media Trial, the topic of Kangura was widely investigated. Numerous witnesses were heard, evidence was examined and deliberations were

55 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze: Judgement and Sentence, 3 December 2003, 9-10, 25; Gregory S. Gordon, ““A War of Media, Words, Newspapers and Radio Stations”: The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech,” Virginia Journal of International Law 45 (2004-2005): 141; and Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 66-67. 56 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 2, 39-42; and Gordon, “A War of Media,” 157.

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made. The first issue that was discussed was the ownership and control of Kangura. Though some useful information was revealed, the Chamber in the end only concluded that it had found that Ngeze had established and controlled the journal. Yet, a closer look at the witness testimonies can tell us some more about its co- founders and sponsors. Several prosecution witnesses mentioned the fact that Kangura gained its income not only through sales and advertising, but also through the obtainment of sponsorships. One important sponsor, several witnesses said, was the governmental intelligence agency lead by Anatole Nsengiyumva. Some – like Ngeze’s housemate and Hutu colleague at Kangura – had learned this from Ngeze himself, others – a Tutsi journalist and another Tutsi from Ngeze’s home region of Gisenyi – heard this from his friends. The Chamber did not consider this evidence specific and sufficient enough to sustain this finding. However, the fact that several witnesses mentioned this involvement does imply that there probably was a link between Kangura and the intelligence agency, or at least Nsengiyumva.57 Yet Nsengiyumva was not the only government official who was said to be involved in the financing of Kangura. According to the former Prosecutor of Kigali Francois Xavier Nsanzuwera, the MRND Executive Secretary and Minister for Public Works and Trade Joseph Nzirorera was also financially involved. In 1990, as Nsanzuwera was investigating Ngeze and Kangura, he had discovered that a couple of MRND politicians, among them Nzirorera, were behind the periodical. In a confidential report, Nsanzuwera informed President Habyarimana about Nzirorera’s involvement in the funding of the paper, probably as he considered its dubious content. Nzirorera, on his turn, reacted furious and summoned Nsanzuwera. Subsequently, Nsanzuwera’s next investigation of Ngeze was halted by a higher-level official, who stated, “all matters had been sorted out and judicial action should not proceed.”58 Though the Chamber did not find enough evidence to consider this as proof of Nzirorera’s complicity, this testimony does raise the impression that Nzirorera was somehow financially involved in Kangura.59

57 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 40-44. 58 Ibid., 42. 59 Ibid., 42, 44.

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Awake the Majority People Soon after its launch Kangura began to call for the building of a new community that would be authentic and pure. In February 1991 it started running the subtitle ‘The Voice that Awakens and Defends the Majority People’. The RPF attack of October 1990, Kangura claimed, had not ushered a civil war but actually a counter-revolution against the 1959 Hutu Revolution. Kangura had therefore imposed itself with the task to awaken the Rwandan Hutus, who were until now unaware of that fact, in order for them to stop this Tutsi counter-revolution. Hence, the ‘voice of the Hutu’, as Kangura was called, began to publish articles that illustrated this new, pure community that the Hutus were now striving for. Though Tutsis would be tolerated, they would also be closely monitored to prevent them from regaining power and to diminish their imminent dangerous presence. Thus, Kangura started to provide its readers with a utopian ideology that could not yet be achieved through the extermination, but at least with the monitoring and segregation of a certain group.60 Already in December 1990, Kangura published what would come to be known as its most infamous article. Under the title “Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu”, Vincent Ntezimana announced the Hutu Ten Commandments. 61 Tutsi infiltrators and accomplices within Rwanda, Ntezimana stated, supported the counter- revolution that was conducted by the Tutsi extremists. The aim of this revolution was to “conquer the country and establish a regime based on their [the Tutsi] feudal monarchy.”62 Though the RPF attack had been repelled successfully, Ntezimana warned his readers that

… The enemy is still here, among us, and is biding his time to try again, at a more propitious moment, to decimate us. Therefore, Hutu, wherever you may be, wake up! Be firm and vigilant. Take all necessary measures to deter the enemy from launching a fresh attack.63

Subsequently, the article described how this enemy was planning to dominate not only Rwanda, but the whole of Central Africa. Through its money and women, the Tutsi had infiltrated the higher circles to spy on influential Hutus. The Hutus were

60 Ibid., 45; and Marcel Kabanda, “Kangura: the Triumph of Propaganda Refined,” in The Media and the Rwandan Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 62-63. 61 Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 130. 62 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 45. 63 Ibid.

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therefore prompted to wake up, stay away from Tutsi women, recapture important economic and political positions, cease feeling pity for the Tutsi and accept the new Hutu ideology that had its roots in and defended the 1959 Hutu ‘social’ Revolution. These orders were defined in the concluding Hutu Ten Commandments.64 Yet, this was only the beginning. Over the next couple of years the relevance of these Ten Commandments was regularly emphasized and an increasing amount of accusations about the still growing Tutsi threat was published. Repeatedly Kangura underlined the fact that not only the RPF, but actually all the Tutsis in Rwanda were conducting a counter-revolution in an effort to regain power. Generalizing and dehumanizing became the order of the day. An article in the November 1990 issue read that

… the Tutsis live like cats. When you have milk, they will come to you. The only thing that makes them better than cats – or, rather, their difference with cats is that once they’ve already drunk the milk, they’ll try to find ways and means of taking the milk away from you or even to harm you or they will also try to rule you.65

Clearly, this article generalized the Tutsi, as they were all said to live like cats and they were all eager to harm or rule ‘you’ – and ‘you’ in this case were the Hutu readers of Kangura. The means by which they tried to achieve this dominance was through the use of women and money, as was already pointed out in the Commandments. The July 1993 edition reminded the Hutus:

When a Tutsi is in need of something from a Hutu, he is ready to sacrifice by using all the means including money, his sister or his wife. … Immediately a Tutsi gets what he wants from he a Hutu, he turns his back and hurts him as if they have never had anything in common.66

Over and over again, the Tutsi were portrayed as those who are everywhere, take everything, control the business sector, govern despite appearances and constitute the majority in the school system.67 In addition to making the Hutus aware of the Tutsi slyness, Kangura also informed its readers on how the Tutsi should be dealt with, and how this new, pure

64 Ibid., 45-46. See Appendix 1 for the Ten Commandments. 65 Ibid., 58. 66 Ibid., 61. 67 Ibid; and Kabanda, “Kangura”, 63.

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community could be achieved. This was, according to its editors, quite easy. In an article published in February 1993 it was explained that the weakness of the non- human Tutsi was causing their own destruction:

Experts on human genetics inform us that the demographic weakness of Tutsis is due to the fact that they marry among themselves. People from the same family marry and procreate among themselves. If they are not careful, this search for purity may lead to their disappearance from the earth. If that occurs (and it will happen), they will be solely responsible for their demise and no one else. Will people say that Hutus decimated them? That is the message they spread everywhere, that they are few because the Hutus had decimated them with machetes… We have stated that a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly.68

Next to dehumanizing the Tutsi, portraying them as cockroaches that did not deserve to live, this article also predicted their extermination, which would, according to its editors, eventually take place. In this case, the Tutsi would be responsible for their own destruction, but another issue incited the Hutus to take control. On the cover of the November 1991 edition of Kangura, its readers were asked, “How about relaunching the 1959 Bahutu revolution so that we can conquer the Inyenzi-Ntusi.”69 Next came the question: “WHAT WEAPONS SHALL WE USE TO CONQUER THE INYENZI ONCE AND FOR ALL??”70 – indeed, in capital letters. To the left of this question was a drawing of a machete.71 In hindsight, it can be stated that Kangura was clearly preparing and inciting the Rwandan Hutus for what was about to come. The magazine generalized, dehumanized and depicted the Tutsi as the enemy. It furthermore offered the Hutus an image of the utopian society that would be achieved once it would be pure and freed from the enemy. Kangura was however not the only medium that spread hatred among the Rwandan Hutus, it soon found support from other media, as will be discussed later on in this chapter.

68 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 59; italics added. 69 Ibid., 53. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid.

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1.2 CDR

The rise of multipartyism As we have seen in the previous chapter, by the beginning of the 1990s the monopoly of the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), the political party of President Habyarimana, started to falter. The economic crisis and complaints about the corrupt practices in Habyarimana’s inner circle forced the president to consider the introduction of a multiparty system. Hence, he agreed to set up a national commission that would conduct a two-year study to examine possible solutions. Yet before any decisions were made, the RPF attacked Rwanda, the civil war started and the whole discussion was speeded up.72 The outbreak of the civil war and the additional staged attacks offered the regime an excuse to imprison Tutsis who were said to be ibyitso – accomplices – of the RPF invaders. But instead of broadening the ethnical gap, this measure actually pushed the opposition minded Hutus towards the Tutsi. More and more Rwandans started to see the Habyarimana government as a repressive regime that wanted to keep the power in the hands of its own circle. As a result of this growing opposition, it took the national commission only eleven months – instead of two years – to publish the report in which it submitted its outcome. With that report it obliged Habyarimana to accept a constitutional amendment that made multiple political parties legal. Only a few months later sixteen new parties had been formed, of which the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) became the biggest threat to the MRND.73 While these ‘moderate’ parties were forcing Habyarimana to share power and accept a coalition government, the extremist part of the MRND still complained that there was no party or institution that defended the interests of the majority, the Hutu, publicly and consistently. Therefore, in February 1992, this group decided to split ways with Habyarimana’s MRND and set up a new political party, the Coalition pour la Défense de la République, CDR. According to its Statute, the CDR fought for the preservation of the gains of the 1959 Social Revolution and the reinforcement of the unity of the popular masses. From the outside, it seemed like the CDR frequently criticized Habyarimana and his MRND, stating that their moderate stance conceded too much to the opposition parties and the RPF. Yet in reality, the CDR and MRND

72 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 47, 52. 73 Ibid., 49-52.

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often cooperated, which led the Chamber to conclude that these parties were actually in a symbiotic relationship and shared the goal of eliminating the Tutsi population. Both parties took its benefits from this cooperation. As the CDR was the party that explicitly defended the interests of the majority people, it could proclaim statements that were considered to be too radical for the MRND, even though the latter actually supported them. The MRND, on the other hand, had the authority of the ruling party and could therefore exercise power and take decisions that the CDR could have never taken itself.74 The CDR soon appeared as the extremist party that supported and disseminated the Hutu Power ideology. And given its important role in the support and dissemination of that ideology, it later on received a lot of attention at the ICTR. Just as it had done with Kangura, the Tribunal began with closely investigating the founding members and leaders of the extremist party. The CDR founding Statute and the minutes of the Constituent Assembly on 22 February 1992 served as a first piece of evidence. According to the minutes, during this Assembly the ten-headed Executive Committee was elected. The daily board consisted of Martin Bucyana as President, Théoneste Nahimana as First- and Antoine Misago Rutegesha as Second Vice President and Jean Baptiste Mugimba as Secretary-General. Among its other members were Béatrice Uwamariya, Célestin Higiro, Célestin Nzaramba, Emmanuel Akimanizanye, Athanase Hitimana and Stanislas Simbizi. However, this election turned out to be only a formality, the real power soon shifted into the hands of Jean- Bosco Barayagwiza.75 Though Barayagwiza had only signed the founding Statute and had therefore been appointed as ‘adviser’ of the CDR, the Chamber determined that his real power went much further than that. Both the minutes of the Constituent Assembly and the testimonies given by several witnesses indicated that Barayagwiza played a considerable role. At the Assembly on the 22nd of February 1992, he was reported stating that the CDR had been founded as a response to the MRND policy. According to Barayagwiza, it was impossible for Hutu and Tutsi to live in unity, like the MRND had asserted, but rather they should live in accord and agree on the mechanisms of

74 Ibid., 52-53; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 83-84, 116. 75 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze: Procès-verbal de la réunion de l’Assemblée Constitutive de la CDR, le 22.02.92,” http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/29584/ [10-03-2014]; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 84-85.

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government. As President of the CDR fraction in Gisenyi, Barayagwiza eventually managed to obtain a lot of power, even on the national level. He not only took the floor on several national assemblies, he even represented the CDR on foreign missions. Moreover, several witnesses, of whom some were quite close to Barayagwiza, declared that when Bucyana was murdered in February 1994, Barayagwiza replaced him.76 Though Barayagwiza himself declared that he had never been appointed as President of the CDR, the Chamber found these exhibits and testimonies credible enough to conclude that

Barayagwiza was one of the principal founders of the CDR and played a leading role in its formation and development. Although initially not a CDR office-holder, Barayagwiza was seen as, and was, a decision-maker for the party, working to some extent behind the scenes, in the shadow of CDR President Martin Bucyana, technically as an adviser or counselor. […] In February 1994, following the assassination of Martin Bucyana, Barayagwiza succeeded Bucyana.77

When asked why not Barayagwiza but Martin Bucyana was initially elected as President of the CDR, one of the prosecution witnesses stated that this was done to show that even though the majority of its members were from the north, the CDR still placed powerful people from the south at high positions. This could have been a reference to the power of the Akazu, as they are often referred to as the powerful clique from the northwestern part of Rwanda. However, the Chamber paid no further attention to this remark, which was probably due to the fact that it was not investigating the Akazu, but primarily focused on the role of the accused.78 What the Chamber did find was a link between Hassan Ngeze and the CDR. Just like Barayagwiza, Ngeze attended its Constituent Assembly and signed its Statute, and was therefore appointed as ‘adviser’. Though the editor of Kangura did not want to obtain an official position in the party, he was seen as an active supporter and promoter of the CDR. Yet as soon as he would become a party member, Ngeze would be obliged to publish CDR advertisements without receiving a financial remuneration. This would entail a considerable loss of profit for the periodical, which probably made Ngeze decide to refrain from the party membership. Meanwhile, the

76 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze: Redacted Transcript of 28 March 2003,” 20; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 84-88. 77 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 91-92. 78 Ibid., 85.

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fact that the CDR held a significant share in Kangura implied that the party probably influenced the content of the paper as well. Thus Kangura and the CDR seemed to be inseparably attached to each other.79

The ‘underlying’ message But what were the aims of the CDR, and how did the party profile itself and those aims? Given the fact that the CDR had originated from the extremist part of the MRND, one would expect its policy and statements to be overtly anti-Tutsi and inflammatory. Yet this was not the case, at least not on the first sight. Since parties that openly advocated violence were forbidden and could not register in Rwanda, the CDR used a moderate approach. Its manifesto stated that though the Tutsi were determined to recover power, the Hutus should take non-violent measures in order to prevent the Tutsi from succeeding their counter-revolution.80 The three ethnic groups that lived in Rwanda – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – could live peacefully next to each other, but, one of the following communiqués stated, when one group attacked another, the attacked group had “the right to defend through democratic means their legitimate interests.”81 Though the party officially condemned violence as a means to attain its objectives, the underlying threat of resort to force was sometimes hard to ignore. In a letter addressed to the editor of a Belgian journal, Barayagwiza mentioned the ongoing negotiations between the MRND and the RPF, which eventually led to the signing of the Arusha Accords. Barayagwiza stated that neither he nor the CDR had any influence over these negotiations as “my party, the CDR, is not taking part in the Government and was not involved in the preparation of these negotiations.”82 Yet though his party could not intervene in the negotiations, Barayagwiza wrote “despite the peaceful methods of its political action, the CDR party will defend by any means, the interests of the Hutu popular majority against the hegemonic and violent aims of the Tutsi minority.”83 For the Chamber, this statement offered enough evidence to conclude that “this sentence represents a statement of CDR policy, and a justification

79 Ibid., 87, 91-92; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Nahimana et al.: Redacted Transcript of 28 March 2003,” 20. 80 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 93-94. 81 Ibid., 94. 82 Ibid., 92. 83 Ibid., 92-93; italics added.

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by Barayagwiza for the use of force to defend the Hutu popular majority from the Tutsi minority.”84 Moreover, over the course of time, the CDR increasingly equated the RPF with the whole Rwandan Tutsi population. The RPF was referred to as the advocate of the Tutsi ideology, an ideology that comprehended a determination to recover power. In a Special Communiqué of 22 September 1992, the CDR blamed several Tutsis of betraying the country “by sending their children, members of their families, or those whom they pay, to the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi, so that they can continue to commit their misdeeds and shed the blood of the majority population.”85 Attached was a list with names of those responsible for the recruitment, as well as those who worked for the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi. As the government was not making an effort to end this problem, the CDR urged the population to be careful, not only towards the Tutsi, but also towards anyone helping the Tutsi.86 The communiqué concluded by stating “the enemy is the enemy. Whoever supports him is himself an enemy of Rwanda.”87 The Chamber therefore found that “the CDR equated political interest with ethnic identity and thereby equated the RPF with the Tutsi, effectively defining the enemy as the Tutsi ethnic group. The CDR also identified as the enemy prominent political opposition leaders.”88 Maybe even more important than its manifesto and communiqués were the CDR practices, its membership, rallies and other public displays, as this is where its ideology was disseminated and more supporters were obtained. Though membership to the party and presence at its rallies was officially said to be open to everyone, in actual practice it turned out that only Hutus or ‘people who could stick two fingers into one nostril’ were admitted.89 The Chamber learned from several witnesses that Barayagwiza and Ngeze had communicated this policy of Hutu exclusivity personally to them. Subsequently, the message that was disseminated during those CDR meetings, once again by Barayagwiza amongst others, was that the Tutsi should be exterminated. The fact that these meetings were frequently followed by attacks on

84 Ibid., 100. 85 Ibid., 95. 86 Ibid., 93-95. 87 Ibid., 95. 88 Ibid., 100. 89 Before and during the genocide, one of the ways to determine someone’s ethnicity was to look at one’s nose. Rwandans with a long, pointed nose were considered to be Tutsi, those with a broad, short nose were seen as Hutu.

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Tutsis only further corroborated this finding. Especially the CDR youth wing, the Impuzamugambi, became a prominent factor in the execution of these killings.90 Obviously, the ideology that was preached by the CDR, the policy it handled and the messages it disseminated were inciting and resentful. The CDR was not only determined not to share power with the RPF, it was clearly out to annihilate the Tutsi. In order to disseminate this message, the CDR worked together with Kangura, of which the editor was also an ‘adviser’ of the CDR. This cooperation will also be discussed later on, but for now it is important to realize that the collaboration of the different media and parties that all worked towards the same goal clearly developed during the beginning of the 1990s.

1.3 Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines

An administrative puzzle The publication of a periodical and the establishment of its own political party was however not enough for the Hutu hardliners; they subsequently began to desire their own radio station. Already before the war, Rwandans of all kinds, whether ordinary people or the elite, liked to listen to the radio. Since not all households had a radio, people frequently came together in bars to enjoy the music and discussions that were broadcasted. Up to the beginning of the war Rwandans could only listen to one station, Radio Rwanda, which broadcasted what the president and his government wished for. However, as soon as the war broke out, another radio station, Radio Muhabura, began to broadcast as well. Though Muhabura officially glorified the RPF, the message it disseminated emphasized a minimization of differences between Hutu and Tutsi. Consequently, its audience grew steadily as not only Tutsis but also Hutus started to like listening to its broadcasts.91 This new development concerned the Hutu hardliners. They realized that in order to promote their own ideology, it should also be disseminated through the airwaves. Hence, by the second half of 1992, Joseph Serugendo and Vénuste Nshimiyimana found a plan to set up Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, RTLM. The aim of this station would be to counter Radio Muhabura and give the

90 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 101, 114-116. 91 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 67-68.

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Hutu majority a voice. However, as both men lacked considerable financial and organizational backing, they soon turned to Ferdinand Nahimana. Nahimana was a member of the MRND and used to be the Director of ORINFOR – the government agency that managed Rwanda’s public media – and therefore Serugendo and Nshimiyimana hoped that he would and could help them raise funds and find more supporters. Nahimana liked this idea and decided not only to help, but to actually take the lead in the establishment of the new radio station.92 Within a few weeks, in October 1992, the RTLM Steering Committee was established. The purpose of this Committee was to set up a company that could finance the material creation of the RTLM radio station, provide judicial support and prepare its broadcasts. Among its members were the wealthy Rwandan businessman Félicien Kabuga who served as chairman, and Ignace Temahagari as his secretary. Ferdinand Nahimana and Joseph Serugendo were charged with the technical and programming aspects and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, the unofficial leader of the CDR, handled the legal affairs. After six months of hard work, the Committee had assembled enough financiers to set up RTLM Limited, the company that would run the radio station. Fifty shareholders gathered on the 8th of April 1993 at the RTLM Limited Constituent Assembly. Of these shareholders at least thirty-nine were MRND members and only two of them, Barayagwiza and Stanislas Simbizi, adhered to the CDR.93 Though the Chamber considered this evidence as presented by Ferdinand Nahimana himself undisputed, it did raise its doubts about the extent of authority and responsibility that the members of the Steering Committee had on the management of RTLM. During his hearings, Nahimana stated that he had only dealt with the organization of RTLM Limited, not with the radio station itself. Actually, the day-to- day management and the editorial policy were in the hands of Phocas Habimana, the Director or RTLM. Thus, though he himself was actively involved in directing RTLM Limited, he said that he could not be held responsible for the content of the radio broadcasts. The Chamber had its doubts about this. Several witnesses testified that the Steering Committee, and especially Nahimana and Barayagwiza, did have a say over

92 Ibid., 68; ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 166-167; and Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, “Rwandan Private Print Media on the Eve of the Genocide,” in The Media and the Rwandan Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 73. 93 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 166-167.

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the broadcasts of the radio station. In fact, Nahimana was often referred to as the ‘top man’, ‘director’ or ‘ideologist-in-chief’, while Barayagwiza was said to be his ‘number two’. These testimonies came among others from international journalists who visited Rwanda by the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, as well as Rwandan officials of that time, such as Francois Xavier Nsanzuwera, the former Prosecutor.94 Nsanzuwera furthermore recounted a conversation he had with Alphonse Nkubito, the General Prosecutor. In March 1994 Nsanzuwera had summoned Kantano Habimana, an editor at RTLM. During one of its broadcasts, Habimana had named Nkubito as being part of a plot to kill the president. When Nsanzuwera discussed this issue with Habimana, the latter replied that the RTLM journalists were only ‘small fish’, who just announced what Nahimana wrote for them. Nsanzuwera reported this to Nkubito, who concluded that if Nahimana was behind it that meant the Akazu must have been behind RTLM. Nkubito advised Nsanzuwera to drop the matter, “otherwise they would get themselves killed.”95 Unfortunately, this remark was not further investigated, but the Chamber did subsequently determine that Nahimana and Barayagwiza effectively controlled the management of RTLM, both internally and externally.96 Thus, following Nkubito’s line of thought, Nahimana’s involvement implied involvement of the Akazu as well, which meant that (some of) its members were supposed to have a (considerable) share in RTLM Limited. With regard to its sponsors, the Chamber consulted a list of shareholders that was obtained from a Belgian investigation. This list pointed out RTLM’s 1177 shareholders, the number of interests they had and the bank at which they were registered; Banque de Kigali, BACAR – present day National Bank of Rwanda – or Banque Commerciale du Rwanda. Most of those shareholders had only one interest of 5000 Rwandan Francs, but some really stood out. With 200 shares President Habyarimana was the largest shareholder, followed by Pierre Basabose, owner of a big Rwandan exchange bureau; Joseph Nzirorera; Félicien Kabuga; Habyarimana’s brothers-in-law Séraphin Rwabukumba and Elie Sagatwa; Pasteur Musabe, Director of BACAR and Théoneste Bagosora’s brother, and Bagosora himself. Nahimana however purchased only ten

94 Ibid., 168-169, 189, 171, 174-175. 95 Ibid., 176. 96 Ibid., 175-176, 193.

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shares; Barayagwiza and Joseph Serugendo shared fifteen interests. Besides their functions in Rwandan enterprises, the Chamber concluded that a significant number of these shareholders also held positions in the Rwandan Armed Forces.97 We will later see what this meant for the involvement of the Akazu in the Rwandan hate radio.

Clear intentions Yet, as complex as its directive, corporate and financial structure was,98 as clear were RTLM’s objectives. Kangura welcomed RTLM as the birth of its partner in the fight for Hutu unification, and RTLM surely met these expectations. The development of its broadcasts was well thought out, so that over time more and more Rwandans would be attracted to the Hutu Power ideology. At first ‘only’ the ethnical division between the Hutu and Tutsi was emphasized. For example, RTLM stated, “The Tutsi had to be brought up knowing that he was the chief, that the Hutu child was under his authority… No Hutu would share his meal with a Tutsi; that was forbidden.”99 The Tutsi, who found themselves superior to the Hutu, wanted to regain power through the preservation of these ethnical groups. Subsequently, the Tutsi urge for division and dominance was brought forward by RTLM as the root cause of the conflict that endured Rwanda.100 Soon RTLM began to equate the Tutsi population with the terms Inyenzi and Inkotanyi, dehumanize them and pointing out Tutsis who were said to have collaborated with the RPF and the Inkotanyi. In a broadcast on the 14th of March 1994 RTLM journalist Gaspard Gahigi summoned his listeners:

… I urge you, people of Biryogo, who are listening to us, to remain vigilant. Be advised that a weevil has crept into your midst. Be advised that you have been infiltrated, that you must be extra vigilant in order to defend and protect yourself. […] I would like to tell you, inhabitants of Biryogo, that one of your neighbors, named

97 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze: List of RTLM Shareholders from BACAR, Banque de Kigali and BCR, Notarized in Brussels on 20 November 1995,” http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/ 26572/ [18-03-2014]; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze: Statement by Omar Serushago,” 5, http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/38050/ [18-03-2014]; International Justice Tribune, “The Secret of the Akazu,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide (21 November 2005), http://www.rnw.nl/international- justice/article/secret-akazu [18-03-2014]; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 172-173, 193. 98 For an exact overview of the structure of RTLM Limited, see Appendix 2. 99 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 118. 100 Ibid., 118-119, 160.

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Manzi Sudi Fadi, alias Bucumi, is no longer among you. He now works as a technician for Radio Muhabura. […] It’s a brigade composed of Inkotanyi over there in Biryogo.101

Such announcements eventually became customary and continued until the end of the genocide. When accused of promoting ethnic hatred the RTLM editor Kantano Habimana replied: “I am a Hutu but I have nothing against Tutsis. But in this political situation I have to explain: “Beware, Tutsis want to take things from Hutus by force or tricks.””102 The Chamber consequently decided that through such broadcasts, RTLM disseminated hostility towards and resentment of Tutsis.103 This gradual radicalization of RTLM was best described by one of the prosecution witnesses. As a civil servant, this witness had been tasked by the Ministry of Information to monitor RTLM before the 6th of April. During his testimony he described its early programming as follows:

RTLM started by endearing itself to the people by attracting them with music, music which is referred to as “hot” and it was mainly Congolese music… And little by little […] the broadcasts changed […] based on events that took place in Burundi in October RTLM started presenting to the people an issue – i.e., that the Tutsis constituted danger to the Hutu majority. But the manner of presentation was diluted […] so that it is not seen as a mistake by the authorities, and to get them to sanction the RTLM. And when the Arusha peace accords were adopted, RTLM was much clearer in its statements by addressing itself to what it referred to as the “masses”, that henceforth power has been taken from their hands and that they were going to […] be put into a situation of servitude. […] And, indeed, the people followed the message like dogs that had been taught to bite, and everywhere there were demonstrations of Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. […] These groups were chanting, “Let us exterminate them, let us exterminate them”. There was a climate of fear among the people, and it was apparent that the entire population had listened to the teachings of RTLM.104

Obviously, the people behind RTLM knew what they were doing and how to gradually disseminate their escalating ideology among the Rwandan Hutu population. RTLM would eventually turn out to be crucial in the planning and execution of the genocide as it both incited hatred and pointed out Tutsi targets and their whereabouts.

101 Ibid., 128. 102 Ibid., 126. 103 Ibid., 123, 125-126, 128. 104 Ibid., 147.

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Indeed, RTLM, Kangura and the CDR completed each other in the dissemination of the Hutu Power ideology.

1.4 Hutu Power

The extremists unite Though the Hutu Power ideology had already existed for some years, by October 1993 its supporters realized that it was time to take control, assemble and give the ideology its own movement. This thought was set into action by the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye in neighboring Burundi. In June 1993 the Burundian people had fairly elected Ndadaye, a Hutu engineer, as their new president. In spite of the fact that Burundi was predominantly Tutsi, during the first couple of months of Ndadaye’s reign the situation in the country remained quite stable. His Tutsi opponent accepted his loss and Ndadaye took a moderate course and tried to minimize the tensions between the ethnic groups. By the 21st of October however, this relative calmness came to an end as Ndadaye was kidnapped and murdered by Tutsi extremists. The Burundian response was massive, causing and killings on both the Hutu and Tutsi side. It did not take long before the flame spread to Rwanda.105 In Rwanda, it was as if the Hutu Power extremists had been waiting for this moment to occur. The signing of the Arusha Accords two months earlier had already made them realize that the Hutu Power ideology, that they adhered to, had to be further propagated. As discussed, one of the provisions of the Accords required the installation of a Broad Based Transitional Government on the 8th of April 1994. The Hutu extremists understood that there would most likely be no room for them in this coalition – in fact even the Tutsis would be given more power. Thus, if they wanted to remain in control, they had to obtain more supporters, establish a movement and take control themselves.106 Under the lead of Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita and Laurent Serubuga the ‘coalition that would make the genocide possible’ began to be formed. Both men used to be high-ranking Rwandan officials, but had been dismissed as they had openly opposed the Arusha Accords. They soon found support from the side of Agathe

105 Ibid., 109; and Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 199. 106 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 137; and Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 187.

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Kanziga, the spouse of the president, who also opposed the Accords as they would bring an end to the power of her Hutu entourage. Justin Mugenzi, the then Minister of Trade allegedly led the movement; yet the Tribunal, neither in the Media Case nor in Mugenzi’s own trial, later on explicitly assumed this speculation. Nonetheless, these extremists realized that the crisis in Burundi could easily be used to rally simple and hesitant Hutus for the Hutu Power cause, and thus the fear of a small minority group of extremists was turned into a general feeling that appealed to the majority of the Hutu population.107 At its first assembly, which took place in Kigali only two days after Ndadaye’s assassination, Froduald Karamira, the Second Vice-President of the MDR, took the floor. Karamira declared that it was the RPF and specifically its leader Paul Kagame who were responsible for Ndadaye’s death. Therefore, the Hutu Power supporters did not only refuse to share power with the RPF, they also called for all Hutu in Rwanda to rise and take ‘appropriate action’. This ‘appropriate action’ was not just uttering words to ‘heat heads’ but rather “unifying into one effective Hutu mass.”108 Any Hutu who was opposed to the Arusha provision of power sharing, who thought that the Habyarimana regime was worn out and who wanted the principles of the 1959 Hutu Revolution to be pursued, even through radical measures, was welcome to the movement. On the contrary, any Hutu who worked against Hutu solidarity was considered to be on the side of the enemy.109 Hutu Power eventually had less than six months to rally as many Hutus as possible behind its cause. Sure, Kangura and RTLM had been generating fear already for a while, but it was with the birth of the Hutu Power movement that the cry for action was introduced. The ways in which the movement spread its ideology among the Hutus however remains quite vague, at least to the Tribunal. The Chamber reported on only one, yet very important rally, which was probably the same meeting as the one mentioned before. At this rally, the Chamber stated, Barayagwiza, Nahimana and Ngeze were introduced within the framework of the rising Hutu Power movement. This government-planned meeting was attended by approximately 15.000

107 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 187-188, 200; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 137; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor against Casimir Bizimungu, Justin Mugenzi, Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka and Prosper Mugiraneza: Judgement and Sentence, 30 September 2011. 108 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 138. 109 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 147, 188; and Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 137-138.

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people, among which Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi members, as well as Félicien Kabuga and MRND President Mathieu Ngirumpatse. Kabuga, Nahimana and Ngirumpatse addressed the attendants and encouraged them to listen to and support RTLM, as that was the radio that belonged to and disseminated Hutu Power. Barayagwiza furthermore proclaimed that the CDR, MRND and RTLM had collaborated in order to fight the Inyenzi. These inciting speeches were subsequently broadcasted on RTLM, which generated tension and hostility among Rwandans.110

From defense to action Thus, the Chamber concluded, the CDR directed Hutu Power movement, “created a political framework for the killing of Tutsi and Hutu political opponents.” 111 Subsequently, the CDR began to openly call for action. Its communiqué of 23 November 1993, which responded to an attack carried out by the RPF in the demilitarized zone in the north of Rwanda, encouraged its members to “avoid any surprise and to react immediately and energetically to all provocation” as “the popular majority has no choice but to find other ways and means to arrive at a just and lasting peace.”112 Also Kangura now openly called for action. In the issue of January 1994, Ngeze wrote about the Tutsi ‘Final Plan’, in which they intended to kill 1600 Hutu opponents during the transition period. Ngeze then warned:

Let’s hope the Inyenzi will have the courage to understand what is going to happen and realize that if they make a small mistake, they will be exterminated; if they make the mistake of attacking again, there will be none of them left in Rwanda, not even a single accomplice. All the Hutus are united…113

And eventually, even RTLM began to urge its listeners to come into action by stating

We know the wisdom of our armed forces. […] What we can do is to help them whole-heartedly. A short while ago, some listeners called to confirm it to me saying: ‘We shall be behind our army and, if need be, we shall take up any weapon, spears, bows. … Traditionally, every man has one at home, however, we shall also rise up. Our thinking is that the Inkotanyi must know that whatever they do […] they will not be able to seize power in Rwanda. […] They should know, however, that they are

110 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 200; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 301-302, 305, 346. 111 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 318. 112 Ibid., 97. 113 Ibid., 70.

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doing harm to their children and grand-children because they might one day have to account for those actions.114

Obviously, the birth of the Hutu Power movement not only rallied the Hutu extremists into one movement; it also turned the fairly passive resistance against the Tutsi into active opposition. The ‘separate’ parties and media now really began to work together in order to accomplish their common goal of annihilating the Rwandan Tutsi. Furthermore, the movement also had its impact on the military field. This cooperation and mutual radicalization could hardly be a coincidence, especially given the fact that a select group of Hutus, who were gathered in the Hutu Power movement, seemed to collectively control these separate news media and parties. And this, to cite Christian P. Scherrer, was due to the Akazu. Though the political expression of the movement went far beyond this ruling clique, the Akazu nevertheless skillfully used Hutu Power to pursue its own interests.115

In this chapter the concept of the utopian ideology has been introduced. We have learned how in Rwanda, the utopian Hutu Power ideology gradually evolved, radicalized and spread throughout the country. We have seen that over time, more and different media were employed, a political party was introduced and even a movement was established to further disseminate this ideology and broaden its support. We have also seen that the control of these different media, parties and the movement lay in the hands of a small group of Hutu officials, who increasingly feared a loss of power. Yet what began as self-victimization eventually ended in an open cry for action, a cry of which the outcome was worse than anyone could have ever imagined. All these matters have been investigated from the point of view of the ICTR Media Trial. Logically, the aim of the Chamber was to make people accountable for these crimes, which it did. Indeed, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze were mainly responsible. The three of them were not only considered as actively involved with the Hutu Power movement, they all held executive functions in one or more of the above-mentioned media and parties. This resulted in collaborations between Kangura and RTLM, the CDR and Kangura and

114 Ibid., 126. 115 Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 111.

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the dissemination of the Hutu Power ideology through the extremist journal, the radio and the CDR. We have, however, also seen some other names, names of people that were not judged, at least not in this case. The name of Félicien Kabuga has been mentioned a couple of times, both in relation to RTLM and Hutu Power. Kabuga has been indicted by the ICTR, yet he still remains at large and thus, up till today, the real state of affairs regarding his involvement is not clear. Stanislas Simbizi was said to be a board member of the CDR and an RTLM shareholder, as was Joseph Nzirorera. The latter was also linked to Kangura, which he allegedly supported financially, yet the Chamber did not corroborate this fact. The Chamber did likewise not acknowledge the financial support of Anatole Nsengiyumva in this respect, thus the involvement of these two men remains disputed.116 What is undisputed is the involvement of the names that appeared on the list of RTLM shareholders, as this list was drafted on the basis of the bank accounts of several Rwandan banks. Among the big shareholders were President Habyarimana, Pierre Basabose, Séraphin Rwabukumba, Elie Sagatwa, Pasteur Musabe and Théoneste Bagosora, as were Nzirorera and Kabuga. For now it is sufficient to know that these people were in one way or another involved in the dissemination of the Hutu Power ideology. In the judgment the Akazu was only mentioned incidentally, thus in that regard no real findings have been made. Yet there are still some topics left to discuss, so whether these people had any more links with the Akazu or if they were maybe even members of the Akazu themselves, will be discussed later on. However, it stands out that it was a small group of Hutu extremists who had collectively arranged the spread of fear and hatred in Kangura, via RTLM and through the CDR and the Hutu Power movement. In the coming chapter another important aspect of the planning of the Rwandan genocide will be discussed. On the basis of the ICTR Military 1 trial the physical and material preparations that were taken in the years prior to the genocide will be investigated. We will not only look at why certain measures were taken and how they were implemented, but moreover at who ordered them and thus who was responsible for these preparations. Hence a clearer picture will be drawn of the men that were, according to the Military 1 Trial, involved in the planning of the genocide.

116 TRIAL, “Félicien Kabuga,” http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trialwatch/profiles/ profile/96/action/show/controller/Profile.html [13-02-2014].

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2. Preparing, arming and training: the Military 1 Trial

“It stands out that the way massacres multiply is clearly not a random process generated of some unknown tribal hatred or ancestral ethnicity, but a deliberate mobilization launched to implement a policy of destruction.”117 Jacques Semelin

“For us, genocide was the gas chamber – what happened in Germany. We were not able to realize that with the machete you can create a genocide.”118 Boutros Boutros Ghali, Former UN Secretary-General

The previous chapter has demonstrated that genocides do not occur out of the blue; they need to be psychologically organized. However, as important as it is to manipulate, indoctrinate and mentally prepare a people to commit violence, it is equally important to prepare that genocide on the physical and material level. Without the bodily extermination of the enemy, the genocide has not ‘succeeded’ and the utopia will not be achieved. Therefore, a genocide also requires armaments, organized killers and a clear command structure, which is shaped by genocidal masterminds. Though generally these genocidal masterminds are not the ones who in the end carry out the killings, they are most often the ones who can be held responsible for these physical preparations. They mobilize the main perpetrators and designate specific troops, such as militias and other specialized commandos, to propel and perpetrate the massacres. Hence, from training military units to drawing up killings lists and importing weapons, the design and startup of the genocidal killing machine is always well considered.119 In any war or genocide, these physical preparations need a strong leader. Nazi- Germany had Heinrich Himmler, the Yugoslav Wars Ratko Mladić and in Rwanda it was Théoneste Bagosora, sometimes even referred to as Rwanda’s Himmler, who took this task upon himself. This chapter will lead the reader to the conclusion that

117 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, 165-166. 118 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Ghosts of Rwanda: Interview Boutros Boutros-Ghali,” PBS Frontline (21 January 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html [21-02- 2014]. 119 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, 165-166.

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from late 1990 until the end of the genocide in July 1994, Bagosora and several other influential Rwandan military officers effectively prepared and planned the physical annihilation of the Rwandan Tutsis and opposition minded Hutus. They defined and identified the enemy and designed and mobilized a military apparatus that would literally be able to kill 1000 Tutsis in only twenty minutes. Consequently, it was due to Bagosora and his associates that the Rwandan genocide eventually became a fact.120 Soon after its opening, the ICTR indicted Rwanda’s genocidal mastermind, and on the 9th of March 1996 Bagosora was arrested in Cameroon. His case was joined with those of Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva, as they were also accused of playing a considerable role in the material preparations. As a result of the joinder, the case got delayed and eventually commenced more than six years after Bagosora’s arrest, on the 2nd of April 2002. Since the lawsuit emphasized the military planning and preparations of the genocide, it soon came to be known as the Military 1 Trial. On the 18th of December 2008 the judges closed the case, sentencing Bagosora, the ‘mastermind of the genocide’ and his co-accused Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva to life imprisonment, and acquitting Kabiligi of all counts.121 This chapter explores the material planning and preparations for the genocide and the people who played a part in these preparations. It will demonstrate that without these measures the genocide would in the end not have taken place. It will furthermore look into some clandestine organizations, such as the Zero Network, which have been linked to the Akazu. Investigating this case hence serves two goals. On the one hand it will become clearer who, besides the accused, also contributed to these military preparations, while on the other hand it will show the importance of timing and the extremely dangerous impact that the combination of the right ideological and material measures can have.

120 Chris McGreal, “Rwanda’s Himmler: the Man Behind the Genocide,” The Guardian (18 December 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/18/rwanda-genocide-theoneste-bagosora [24-02- 2014]. 121 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Judgement and Sentence, 18 December 2008, 568, 576, 582; and TRIAL, “Théoneste Bagosora,” http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial- watch/trialwatch/profiles/profile/153/action/show/controller/Profile.html [24-02-2014].

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2.1 The Definition and Identification of the Enemy

The ENI Document We have yet explored the importance of the ideological indoctrination and preparation of a genocide and how, in the case of Rwanda, this ideology was disseminated by a group of Rwandan Hutu extremists. However, these Hutu Power leaders soon realized that an ideology alone could not exterminate a people and thus these words had to be translated into deeds. That is why, on the 4th of December 1991, the Enemy Commission was founded. The aim of this military commission was to further study the enemy and to find an answer to the question of what must be done in order to defeat that enemy militarily, in the media and politically. The answer was written down in a report, the ENI document, which was published by the end of December 1991.122 Initially, the report was only limitedly distributed, but nine months later, on the 21st of September 1992, the chief of staff of the Rwandan army Déogratias Nsabimana ordered the dissemination of its excerpt throughout the country. This sudden dissemination was triggered by the commencement of the negotiations for the Arusha Accords a couple of weeks earlier, and was meant to “lead our men to be more vigilant and to not count on political negotiations alone.”123 The excerpt carried the title ‘Definition and Identification of the Enemy’ and emphasized – besides the definition and identification of the enemy – the grounds on which the enemy recruited its supporters. The primary enemy was indicated as

… the extremist Tutsi within the country and abroad who are nostalgic for power and who have NEVER acknowledged and STILL DO NOT acknowledge the realities of the Social Revolution of 1959, and who wish to regain power in RWANDA by all possible means, including the use of weapons.124

The secondary enemy was subsequently defined as “all who lend support to the primary enemy.”125 The document stated that those who strove for democratic change were not considered to be the enemy, yet it also specified that the enemy was united behind “a single political will and a single political ideology, which is Tutsi

122 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 46. 123 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 62. 124 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 47. 125 Ibid.

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hegemony.” 126 As the word ‘enemy’ in the document often appeared to be interchangeable with the word ‘Tutsi’, this actually implied that no Tutsi desired democracy; they all strove for Tutsi hegemony.127 Both the Enemy Commission and its ENI document were discussed during the Military 1 Trial, if only because some of the accused had supposedly played a role in the commission. However not only the commission and the document were investigated, the Chamber also looked into the intentions behind the document. Though it did not agree that the existence of the document indicated a conspiracy among the Enemy Commission to exterminate the Tutsi – as it is customary for military authorities to define its enemy – it did raise its doubts about the content of the document. The judges noted that the Tutsis were frequently defined as ‘extremists’ or ‘refugees’, who were determined to regain power by any means.128 It furthermore stated that all Tutsi were equated with the RPF, and that the document proclaimed that the goal of the RPF was to “seize power in Rwanda and install the political system of its choice”.129 It therefore concluded that the document was “an early illustration of the tendency to polarize Rwandan society along ethnic lines” 130 and that “the identification between Tutsi civilians and the enemy was an important precondition of the genocide.”131 Still, the Chamber did not conclude that the real intention among the members of the Enemy Commission was to target the Tutsis, as the composition of the commission did not support that view. Though little was revealed about its establishment and internal working, the Tribunal did get inside information on its structure. This information came from Théoneste Bagosora himself. Since he was seen as the military mastermind behind the planning of the genocide, Bagosora was intensively interrogated about anything relating to that planning, and thus about the Enemy Commission as well. He was asked to illustrate the arrangement of the commission and to explain what happened to its members afterwards. Bagosora answered that the commission had consisted of ten members, among them Déogratias Nsabimana; Marcel Gatsinzi; Pontien Hakizimana and Félicien Muberuka, the

126 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 63. 127 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 46, 48; and Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 62-63. For the first two provisions of the ‘Definition of the Enemy’, see Appendix 3. 128 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 47-48. 129 Ibid., 48. 130 Ibid., 50. 131 Ibid.

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commander of the operational sector in Kigali. Furthermore there were the head of the governmental intelligence agency – and co-accused – Anatole Nsengiyumva; Juvénal Bahufite; Augustin Cyiza, who worked for the Ministry of Defense; Pierre Claver Karangwa; Aloys Ntabakuze and Bagosora himself. Bagosora stated that at the time of examination, only Nsengiyumva, Ntabakuze and he himself had been indicted and arrested. Nsabimana, Hakizimana and Bahufite were deceased, the first two by the beginning of the genocide, the last one while in exile. Muberuka, Cyiza and Karangwa were – and still are – either in exile or reported missing, and Gatsinzi had become Minister of Defense in the RPF Government. 132 This commission, the Chamber subsequently found, contained persons who were generally considered as moderate and thus no evidence was found that “a group of extremists within the Commission imposed their view on the other members or exercised a particular influence on the Commission’s conclusions.”133 Whether its authors were moderates or not, and whether the outcome was intended or not, the fact remains that on the 21st of September 1992 Nsabimana ordered the dissemination of the ENI Document. One day later, the CDR issued its Special Communiqué in which it stated that several Tutsis had betrayed the country as they had sent their children, family members or others whom they paid to the Inyenzi- Inkotanyi. Attached was the list with names of those who worked for the Inyenzi and those responsible for their recruitment, in other words, those who could be identified as the enemy.134 Though for the historian it would be clear that this Communiqué resembled the ENI Document, on legal grounds the Chamber found that “while it makes reference to similar categories found in the ENI Document […] this general category does not sufficiently reflect that there was any collaboration with the CDR party and members of the Commission.”135 Yet it seems clear that the simultaneous dissemination of the Document and the Communiqué was prepared well in advance.

132 Ibid., 47-49; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Redacted Transcript of 26 October 2005,” 52-54. 133 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 49. 134 See §1.2. 135 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 50.

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The enemy lists All this however, turned out to be only the beginning. Some ten days after the publication of the ENI Document and the CDR communiqué, Nsabimana ordered his military units to prepare lists of people who were suspected to be RPF accomplices. Though such lists had been drawn up before, they had so far ‘only’ been used to arrest those Rwandans who were accused of supporting the RPF attack on Rwanda in October 1990. These new lists however, did not appoint suspects of a particular crime, but ‘suspected RPF accomplices’. And a suspected RPF accomplice, as discussed in the ENI Document, was anyone who possessed the Tutsi ethnicity or who, as a Hutu, was known to be supporting the Tutsis. Still the Chamber did not find it legally established that the purpose of these lists was to identify and eliminate Tutsi population. Yet the dissemination of these documents and orders in such a short time considerably contributed to the increasing tensions and threats.136 By February 1993, Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye got wind of the efforts to compile the enemy lists and decided to write a letter to the Minister of Defense. In this letter, Nsengiyaremye not only condemned the practices, he also demanded that all the enemy lists would be submitted to the Minister of Justice, as it was up to him to administer justice. He ended his letter by stating that “the witch- hunting of individuals is an obsolete practice to be proscribed.”137 This reprimand was however to no avail; the drawing up of the enemy lists continued. Eventually, even the local authorities and Interahamwe members began to make “an organized effort to create lists of suspected opponents of the regime”138 as the Chamber concluded. This ‘organized effort’ not only increased the chances of success, it also justified the killings as they were entrusted from above.139 Subsequently, instead of handing these lists over to the Ministry of Justice, as Nsengiyaremye had demanded, they appeared in Kangura and even on RTLM. In the February 1993 issue of Kangura, a list of 123 names was published. The accompanying article stated that on this list were the names of the children who had

136 Ibid., 96. 137 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: English Translation of the Letter Dated 2/2/1993 – Prosecution Exhibit P22,” http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/72329/ [21-04-2014]. 138 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 105. 139 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Bagosora et al.: Prosecution Exhibit P22.”; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 105.

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joined the Inkotanyi, and who were “going to use the gun to exterminate you.”140 Even their parents’ names were given. The readers were hence advised to organize their self-defense, since the governmental security services had ‘lost their nerve’. Shortly hereafter, the names, family compositions and whereabouts of the Inkotanyi accomplices were also broadcasted on RTLM. And precisely these broadcasts, which continued throughout the genocide, turned out to be very helpful for the Interahamwe and other forces to locate their targets, or, as they called it, the enemy.141 In hindsight it has been established that the military and ideological preparations for the genocide, which commenced apart from each other, gradually evolved towards each other and eventually totally completed each other. This preconceived plan was obviously well thought out by a group of people who were not only determined to stay in power but also knew how, and had the means to achieve that goal.

2.2 The actual perpetrators

Organizing the youth wings History has learned that gradually all these ideological and material preparations came together, until already one hour after President Habyarimana’s plane had crashed, the military and Interahamwe went out on the streets to deliberately chase and attack people who were on the lists. During those first hours, it was mostly the political opposition that was targeted, but in the following days also intellectuals, businessmen and ordinary people were chased. Sometimes they were killed directly, on other occasions neighborhoods were sealed off, houses were searched systematically and all those on the lists were sent to churches, schools or other fenced areas. There, the militaries checked the identity cards of the deported against their lists and subsequently killed them. The Chamber hence found that the use of the lists that were discussed above facilitated the killings of specific individuals.142 But who carried out these killings, why did they do so and, even more important in this matter, who had trained and armed these men?143 By the end of

140 ICTR, Prosecutor against Nahimana et al., 65. 141 Ibid., 65, 130. 142 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 108. 143 It were rarely women who participated in these killings.

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1991, after the implementation of the multiparty system was completed, the different political parties in Rwanda began to establish youth wings. The purpose of these wings was twofold: on the one hand young people would be mobilized, on the other hand they were sensitized to politics. Following the example of the RPF and MDR, the MRND and CDR respectively erected the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. For the recruitment of its members the political parties focused on unemployed youths, mainly war refugees. As most of these adolescents held few perspectives for the future they were easy to attract; the promise of beer and even a little bit of money was enough to persuade these deprived young men to join the militia.144 Next to being involved in politics, these youth wings soon began to receive military training, weapons and support from the FAR. Though a lot of these youngsters had initially not been explicitly anti or pro-RPF, by February 1993 they were forced to choose a side as the wings began to be narrowed down into two camps. From that moment on, the anti-RPF camps of the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi gradually grew together until eventually “all militias and anyone who manned the roadblocks were called Interahamwe.” 145 Their training was organized on the national level by the FAR, but occurred on the communal level in training camps, which were scattered all over Rwanda. The same went for its recruitment, which happened on the local level but was in the end supervised by the Interahamwe National Committee and its College of Advisers. Among this Committee and College were a couple of familiar names. It has been discussed that Joseph Serugendo, head of the Interahamwe Research and Development Commission, was both actively involved in the foundation of RTLM and became a shareholder in RTLM Limited. Moreover, Bernard Maniragaba, head of Social and Legal Matters, Ephrem Nkezabera of Economic and Financial affairs and Georges Rutaganda, who was on the National Committee, also joined RTLM Limited. Though by the end of 1991 – when the Interahamwe was established – nobody had yet heard of or spoken about RTLM, it seems clear that these men played a role in the dissemination of hatred and the spread of violence against the Tutsis.146

144 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 110; and African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London, 1995), 56-57. 145 Cruvellier, Court of Remorse, 50. 146 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 110-111; Cruvellier, Court of Remorse, 50, 54-55; and African Rights, Death, Despair and Defiance, 55-56.

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State units The Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi were however not the only organizations who were being directed towards the genocide. Gradually a strategy of mass killing evolved as these youth militia, the Rwandan state units and later even civilians were organized and mobilized to take part in the genocidal killing machine. But how exactly were these state units organized? Previously it was stated that the youth militias were trained by the FAR, the Rwandan Armed Forces, which were under the direction of President Habyarimana. This FAR consisted of the army and the Gendarmerie – the Rwandan police – and was supervised by the Minister of Defense, who handled its daily matters and reported directly to the president. The minister was assisted in this task by a chef de cabinet and an Adviser on Technical Affairs. Especially the chef de cabinet held a lot of responsibilities: he formulated department policy, managed and monitored activities of advisers, press and other support services, replaced the minister whenever he was absent and performed any other duties the minister assigned him. This quite important position was occupied by no one other than Théoneste Bagosora.147 The army, which was thus practically under the control of Bagosora, grew steadily under his ‘lead’, until by 1994 it consisted of roughly 30.000 troops. At that time the overall commander and operational head of these troops, the chief of staff, was Déogratias Nsabimana, who has been mentioned before. This army chief of staff was assisted by a general staff, which was composed of four bureaus, namely Personnel and Administration (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Military Operations (G-3) and Logistics (G-4). We have already seen that the Intelligence unit was under the command of Anatole Nsengiyumva; his co-accused Gratien Kabiligi was appointed as the head of Military Operations. The army consisted of approximately 28 battalions and specialized units. However, during the Military 1 Trial only two of these units were investigated, as these were the only battalions in which some of the accused played a role.148 These two battalions were the Para Commando Battalion and the Presidential Guard, two of the strongest battalions of the country. The Para Commando Battalion, which was closely linked to the Hutu Power group, was tasked with the mission to

147 Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 106; ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 32, 110; and Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 68. 148 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 33, 35, 38.

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defend the national territory. This unit was commanded by Aloys Ntabakuze who, on his turn, received his orders directly from Théoneste Bagosora. The latter battalion, the Presidential Guard, belonged to the Rwandan elite units and was responsible for the security of President Habyarimana, his family members and his offices and residences. The majority of the members of this Presidential Guard came from the northern prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. The reason for this, according to one of the witnesses who used to be a member of this Presidential Guard himself, was that the recruiters also came from these regions. Elie Sagatwa, Habyarimana’s private secretary and brother-in-law, was responsible for the presidential security and gave out his orders to Leonard Nkunidye and later on Protais Mpiranya, who commanded these guards. Moreover, the maintenance of the public order and the enforcement of the Rwandan laws was the responsibility of Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who controlled the Gendarmerie. Besides, this Gendarmerie could also be ordered to support the army during military operations, which is exactly what it did when it began to train the youth militias.149

The civil defense system Next to the youth militias and the official militaries there was a third, and last, group that was equipped to be mobilized “in the event of resumed hostilities”.150 This group, which consisted of “able-bodied, fit and morally stable people”151, was trained and organized in the so-called civil defense system. And for this training and organization a detailed plan was documented. Though this document lacked an exact date, the Chamber concluded that it was written somewhere between October 1993 and the 7th of April 1994. This document not only gave a very detailed explanation of the relevance of the organization of civil defense and the objectives of that defense, but also how this defense should be organized, which resources were required and how it should be implemented. Moreover, the text incited hatred against the Inkotanyi and

149 Ibid., 34-35; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 183, 194; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Redacted Transcript of 5 February 2004,” 105-108; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Redacted Transcript of 22 September 2003,” 7. 150 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Organization of Civil Defence – Prosecution Exhibit P254B,” 3, http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/48366/ [14-05-2014]. 151 Ibid., 6.

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used ways of ideological indoctrination to enforce its impact. Subsequently, on the 29th of March 1994, Nsabimana met with Tharcisse Renzaho, the prefect of Kigali, and the commander of the operational sector of Kigali, Colonel Félicien Muberuka. At this meeting, the civil-defense plan was fine-tuned and the men discussed which measures had to be taken subsequently.152 Though it seemed like this plan was drawn up on very short notice, as the genocide broke out a little more than a week later, Muberuka had ordered the training of civilians already far in advance of this meeting, around the end of 1993, beginning of ’94. The 29th of March meeting however, turned the plan from a Kigali based one into a nationwide plan. Though it was officially implemented through a directive that was issued on the 25th of May 1994, the Chamber nevertheless found “a number of references in the evidence concerning its implementation prior to that date.”153 In other words, the plan that was drawn up by Nsabimana, Renzaho and Muberuka, and which they passed on to – and was approved by – the Ministry of Defense to use nationwide, became the guideline for how the genocide would be executed through the civil defense system. The Chamber therefore concluded that “the discussion held at army headquarters on 29 March 1994 reveal the extensive involvement of the Rwandan army at the highest levels in the planning, implementation and oversight of the civil defense system.”154 Unfortunately, once again, it did not elaborate on who these persons among the highest level were. If it had done so, the name of Elie Sagatwa would inevitably have been mentioned and the link with the Akazu would have been made immediately, as we will see later on in this study.155 Though this involvement on the highest level remained vague, besides the fact that the names of Nsabimana, Renzaho and Muberuka were given, the Directive of the 25th of May demonstrated that there was a close cooperation between the civil defense system and the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. This did not, according to the Chamber, mean that all Interahamwe members were part of the civil defense structure or vice versa; but it did indicate that, especially in the chaotic context of a genocide, they worked closely together, gradually even partly incorporated and therefore

152 Ibid; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 114. 153 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 115. 154 Ibid., 119. 155 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Redacted Transcript of 13 April 2004,” 19-20; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 115-116, 119.

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followed up orders that might not have been specifically meant for the youth militia or the civil defense. For this study it shows that though the forces might have been (officially) separated, there was a small group of influential men who directed the army, the paramilitary and the civilian troops.156

Financial support Besides knowing who gave out the orders, who organized the training of the youth militias and who fought together with these militias – at least according to the Tribunal – it is also important to know who was financially responsible for this organization. This was however harder for the Chamber to determine as less people were informed on this information; actually only one witness could give an extensive testimony on this subject. This protected witness, who at the time was a high-ranking Hutu national official within the Interahamwe, claimed that by the end of 1991 the President of the Interahamwe Robert Kajuga lacked the financial resources for the equipment. Hence he turned to President Habyarimana, who gave him 500.000 Rwandan Francs that were used to buy uniforms and organize the Interahamwe rallies. Yet Habyarimana only financed the Interahamwe department in Kigali, the sections of other prefectures were funded by their own, local prefectural leaders. With regard to these local sponsors and Interahamwe leaders the witness stated

… in 1993, things which happened at the level of influential people, that is, with regard to very influential politicians in the MRND from the north, is that each influential member, very influential member, could establish his own Interahamwe group, and he would lead such group, finance the group, and he asked them to do whatever he wanted them to do. So every MRND influential person who had money to pay those people established Interahamwes, Interahamwe movements.157

According to this witness, the influence these prefectural leaders had on their militia became so extensive that eventually “the national committee no longer had any

156 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Directive of the Prime Minister on the Civil Defence, Dated 25 May 1994 – Prosecution Exhibit 47B,” 2, http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/ rec/34631/ [14-05-2014]. 157 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Redacted Transcript of 1 June 2004,” 42-43.

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control over Interahamwe at the prefecture level”.158 Once again a possible reference was made to the influence of the Akazu, as the witness clearly pointed to the influential MRND officials from the north, but unfortunately, once again no further attention was paid to this remark. Yet it seems clear that when it came to the Interahamwe, a bunch of influential politicians from the north were pulling the strings.159 With regard to the financial aid of the military or civilian defense groups the Chamber did not find any other evidence besides the institutions that were responsible. It therefore remains unclear who exactly financed the import of the weapons and the training of these militia.

2.3 Secret societies

Though on the surface it seemed like these (para-) military and civilian troops were controlled by state organs and more or less official commissions, pre-genocide Rwanda also knew some clandestine organizations that secretly exercised a lot of power. While most of them were initially established to consolidate power on the economic and political front, they also gradually began to engage in targeted violence that erupted in the early 1990s. Given their unofficial status, these groups could covertly design and carry out plans without the rest of the country – and the world – watching and judging their activities. Moreover, their links with the political and economic Rwandan elite secured its impunity and increased the possibilities of success. Indeed, the Akazu was one of these groups, but during the trial against Bagosora and his co-accused the focus laid on some other clandestine societies.

The Zero Network The Zero Network has without a doubt become the best-known clandestine organization that operated in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The group was introduced into the Rwandan society on the 15th of August 1992, when Christophe Mfizi publicly announced what a lot of Rwandans must have suspected for a long time: the real

158 Ibid., 36. 159 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 106; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Bagosora et al.: Redacted Transcript of 1 June 2004,” 35-36, 38, 42-43.

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power in Rwanda lay in the hands of a small group of relatives who were centered around the president. Though Mfizi himself used to be close to Habyarimana – he was the former head of the national information service – he had decided to leave the MRND as he disapproved of the way in which these individuals were using the power for their own benefit. In order to show the Rwandan people the misdeeds that were taking place at the highest levels, Mfizi stepped out through an open letter of resignation.160 In this letter Mfizi complained that while all other political parties in Rwanda had adapted to the times through democratization, the MRND was still led by the old ‘gurus’ who had been in charge of the party for decades. Lately, Mfizi stated, these gurus had set up the Zero Network, “a hardcore of people who have methodically pervaded the entire national life at the political, military, financial, agricultural, scientific, scholarly, family and even religious levels.”161 These people considered Rwanda “as a company which they can legitimately derive maximum benefit from.” 162 In order to keep the company working and Habyarimana and more important the MRND – and thus themselves – in power, the Network was even willing to bring the president down to the level of clan head. According to Mfizi there had been very few people who, in recent years, had been “promoted to and/or maintained in an important position without having a servant-master relationship with an important member of the “Zero Network”.”163 As the members of the Network would never agree to share power, they had even managed to downgrade the president into a servant of those who were really in control. In the international community Mfizi’s letter of resignation did not remain unnoticed. Two months after its appearance by October 1992, Filip Reyntjens, a Belgian expert on the African Great Lakes region, published a report called “Information on the “Escadrons de la Mort” [Death Squad]” in which he investigated Mfizi’s allegations. Thanks to several testimonies Reyntjens could obtain the composition and activities of the Zero Network. He found that for at least a year this

160 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 44-45; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: “The Zero Network”, Open Letter from Christophe Mfizi to the President of the MRND, Dated 15 August 1992 – Nsengiyumva Defence Exhibit 104,” 3, http://trim.unictr.org/ webdrawer/rec/69913/ [14-05-2014]. 161 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Bagosora et al.: Nsengiyumva Defence Exhibit 104,” 4. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid.

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group had tried to sabotage and destabilize the democratization process, intimidate the Tutsi population and obstruct the Arusha peace process. As the Network openly disapproved of any power sharing agreement it had decided to disrupt activities of opposition parties by causing unrest and even bloody clashes.164 The testimonies also offered Reyntjens insight in the composition of the group, on which he wrote:

At the national level, the nucleus of this group was made up particularly of the following people: NZIRORERA Joseph (former Minister, member of Parliament for Ruhengeri), ZIGIRANYIRAZO Protais (former prefet of Ruhengeri, Brother-in-law of the President), RWABUKUMBA Seraphim (Chairman, Managing Director (PDG) of the “Centrale”, Brother-in-law of the President), Col. SERUBUGA Laurent (Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army), Col. SAGATWA Elie (Private Secretary of the President, Brother-in-law of the President), Ms. Dr. RUSHINGABIGWI Chantal, NTIRIVAMUNDA Alphonse (Managing Director of the Highways Department, Son-in-law of the President), Capt. SIMBIKANGWA Pascal (Government official at the Presidency, Brother-in-law of Col. Sagatwa), Col. BAGOSORA (Principal Private Secretary at the Ministry of Defense), RUCAGU Boniface (member of Parliament Ruhengeri), Major NKUNDIYE Leonard (Commander of the Presidential Guard) and Col. NSENGIYUMVA Anatole (Head of the Military Intelligence – G2).165

What immediately stands out in this list of names is that – besides the fact that some of them have already been mentioned before – this group had specific characteristics that have been assigned to the Akazu as well. These men were all somehow linked to the president and, maybe even more important, his wife Agathe, either through family ties of professional ties or by coming from the northwestern region of Ruhengeri, the home region from both the president and his wife. After the publication of Reyntjens’ “Escadrons de la Mort” report, Human Rights Watch also decided to conduct an investigation. At the insistence of a coalition of Rwandan human rights associations – who saw the situation in Rwanda deteriorate despite the signing of the Arusha Accords – HRW began an inquiry into the human rights violations that had occurred in Rwanda since the beginning of the civil war. The findings of this investigation were subsequently published in a report that appeared in March 1993. It stated, amongst other things, that the Rwandan

164 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Information on the “Escadrons de la Mort” [Death Squad] – Prosecution Exhibit P303,” 3-4, http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/56482/ [23-05-2014]. 165 Ibid., 3, 4, 7.

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government had killed its own civilians; that the majority of these victims were Tutsis and gradually also opposition minded Hutus; and that it was authorities at the highest level, including the president himself, who carried out these abuses. It, furthermore, found that these authorities were gathered in a group known as the Zero Network. This Zero Network directed the so-called death squads: informal, even secret organizations that for the greater part carried out these killings. In spite or maybe because of their shadowy character and mode of operation, these death squads were neatly structured and terribly effective. Next to directing these death squads, the Zero Network also coordinated civilian, military and judicial authorities and militias as the Network “determined the ideological bent, the choice of means, and the selection of targets for the abuses.”166 Among its members, the report stated, were Elie Sagatwa, Protais Zigiranyirazo, Captain and Come Bizimungu.167 On the basis of these reports the Chamber drew several conclusions regarding the Zero Network. First it stated that even though the members of the Zero Network may not have used that name themselves, it was undisputed that a group or network of people close to President Habyarimana was at that time effectively exercising influence within Rwanda. Though their exact activities remained quite vague – the Chamber could for example not establish whether the network had had its own, secret radio station – it did find enough indirect evidence that indicated that the group had instigated violence. Regarding the Zero Network membership the Chamber had to conclude that it had found very little evidence, at least with reference to the accused. Indeed, some names had been revealed, especially in Reyntjens’ report, but they were of no interest for the Military 1 Trial. For this study on the Akazu however, they might be important to remember.168

AMASASU Less well known was the clandestine group called AMASASU, the French acronym for the ‘Alliance of soldiers irritated by the ancient underhanded acts of the members

166 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Report of the International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990 (1993), 44. 167 Ibid., 1-2, 43-44. 168 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 132-133.

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of the UNAR party’.169 On the 20th of January 1993 AMASASU, which also means ‘bullets’ or ‘ammunition’ in Kinyarwanda, introduced itself in a letter written to President Habyarimana. The goal of the AMASASU, this letter proclaimed, was to “thwart the malicious plans of the members of the UNAR party who have been aggressing us from the 1959 to the present.”170 These plans were aimed at restoring the Tutsi monarchy and were implemented by the Inyenzi and Inkotanyi who were conducting ongoing preparations to take Rwanda by force; the AMASASU had even already identified Tutsi infiltrators. In order to prevent the UNAR and RPF from succeeding, the members of the AMASASU, which ranged from the FAR officers to the smallest soldiers, made an urgent call for the legitimate use of self-defense. As the Rwandan people had the right to take the law into their own hands the civilian youth should be trained to support the army where necessary. The message that was disseminated in this letter was however not so new; it has been discussed that the civilian youths had been trained for a while and that the enemy had already been identified.171 Subsequently Mike Tango, the pseudonym for the leader of the AMASASU of whom the real identity remained unknown, wrote a note to the MRND and the CDR. Through this note the AMASASU asked the parties for their support in the case of an ““operation to eliminate RPF accomplices who are working here on the inside”, to counter “certain bitter opposition leaders”, and to spread the AMASASU message.”172 Hence the Chamber found that these ‘AMASASU documents’ contained the expressions of frustrated military officers who, as a group, were very threatening. Its exact activities could however not be established beyond reasonable doubt, even though several witnesses did claim that the group was responsible for the planning of the genocide and the distribution of weapons.173 The Chamber could moreover not determine who had been a member of the AMASASU. Though several witnesses gave several names, the Chamber – once again – only focused on the accused and therefore did not take any further notice of

169 Alliance des Militaires Agacés par les Séculaires Actes Sournois des Unitaristes. The UNAR was a royalist Tutsi party that the AMASASU linked to the RPF. 170 Mike Tango, “Creation and Purpose of AMASASU,” (Kigali, 20 January 1993) 3, http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/mil1docs/archives/HASH01e4.dir/doc34524.pdf [28-05-2014]. 171 Ibid., 2-3. ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 135, 139-140. 172 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 136. 173 Ibid., 136-137, 141.

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these facts. It even ignored the statement of a former Interahamwe witness who claimed that the AMASASU was related to and hard to distinguish from secret groups such as the Akazu. Furthermore it regarded the information that was given on the accused as unreliable as it was acquired indirectly. Therefore in the end no names were linked to the AMASASU.174

Death squads Though the composition and the activities of these clandestine organizations still remain indistinct, it is clear that they were involved in the death squads. These death squads massacred and assassinated the enemy and disturbed the events of opposition parties; all with the means to destabilize the democratization process, intimidate the Tutsis and other opponents and bring a halt to the peace process. Once again the Chamber referred to the HRW report in which these death squads were extensively discussed. An important source in this report was Janvier Afrika, a former agent of the Rwandan secret service who claimed to be a former member of the death squads as well. According to Afrika he had participated in a couple of death squad meetings in which several killings – that indeed took place prior to the genocide – were organized. He recounted one of these meetings that was attended by the highest Rwandan officials. During this assembly, Afrika stated, Elie Sagatwa had proposed massacres, which were approved by President Habyarimana. Charles Nzabagerageza and Come Bizimungu were subsequently given the task to find trustworthy agents to carry out the operations. Furthermore, Afrika said, , Elie Sagatwa’s wife and Joseph Nzirorera were also present, yet their role in the meeting was not clarified.175 This was however not Janvier Afrika’s first warning. In August 1992 Afrika had published an article in a Rwandan journal. In this article he discussed the unrest and disturbances that had recently occurred throughout Rwanda. According to Afrika these troubles “were all incited by influential persons, members of the Akazu, who terrorize Rwandans.”176 Thereupon he named the people who had organized this

174 Ibid., 138, 143-145. 175 HRW, Report on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, 23; and ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 147. 176 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Article Written by Janvier Afrika,

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unrest and once more, this list contained a lot of names that have been discussed before. Not only did Afrika mention almost every member of the Zero Network – except for Nsengiyumva – he also indicated that President Habyarimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Tharcisse Renzaho, Pasteur Musabe, Casimir Bizumungu who was Minister of Health and Special Adviser to the President, Charles Nzabagerageza and Habyarimana’s godfather Noel Mbonabaryi were involved in organizing disturbances all over the country.177 Though the term ‘death squad’ was not mentioned in the article, the Chamber concluded that the people that were discussed and the attacks they organized revealed the composition and activities of the death squads.178 The last piece of evidence regarding the death squads was a report published by the United Nations in August 1993. In this report, the “extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of unarmed civilians by the Rwandese security forces in connection with the armed conflict between government security forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (FPR) since October 1990” were discussed. 179 After conducting an investigation in Rwanda in April 1993, UN Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye ascertained that the aim of the death squads was to create terror and discredit “democratic reforms through, for example, assassinations and provoking riots in collaborations with militias and members of the armed forces in civilian attire.”180 Though this report did not look into the composition of the death squads or any other clandestine organization, it did conclude that “a second power exists alongside that of the official authorities.”181 Thus, even the UN had detected and confirmed the existence of Rwandan clandestine groups surrounding Habyarimana already a year before the outbreak of the genocide.

This chapter has explored how, from late 1990 until the 6th of April 1994, a group of high-ranking Rwandan Hutus physically and materially led Rwanda towards the

Umurava No. 10, August 1992 – Nsengiyumva Defence Exhibit 57,” 4, http://trim.unictr.org/ webdrawer/rec/56891/ [30-05-2014]. 177 Ibid., 4-5; and Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 105. Afrika did give some more names yet it appears that these men did not play a relevant role, therefore they are not mentioned here. 178 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 154. 179 United Nations Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye, “Report on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,” 11 August 1993, 1, http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/ ndiaye1993.htm [30-05-2014]. 180 ICTR, Prosecutor against Bagosora et al., 155. 181 UN Special Rapporteur, “Report on Extrajudicial Executions,” 13.

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genocide. Though it might not have been the aim from the beginning, without the measures that have been discussed the genocide would have never been able to commence, let alone succeed to such an extent. Hence the outcome was not a mere coincidence. With regard to all these preparations the Military 1 Trial has revealed a significant number of names of men who were responsible for the military planning. Obviously, Théoneste Bagosora played an important part. He held a seat in the Enemy Commission, was an alleged member of the Zero Network and was said to be involved in the death squads. As chef de cabinet of the Ministry of Defense he practically controlled the army and gave out direct orders to the Para Commando Battalion, which made him responsible for the defense of the national territory. Directly under Bagosora stood Déogratias Nsabimana, who, as chief of staff, commanded the Rwandan army and besides designed the civil defense system. He moreover participated on the Enemy Commission, arranged the dissemination of the Enemy Document and subsequently ordered his military units to prepare the enemy lists. Nsabimana died in the plane crash on the night of the 6th of April and was thus never indicted nor tried, yet his involvement in these events seems not only undisputed but also of great importance. Another name that has been mentioned a couple of times is that of one of the other defendants, Anatole Nsengiyumva. In the previous chapter he was mentioned as an alleged sponsor of the Kangura magazine, in this chapter it was established that he was on the board of the Enemy Commission and hence took part in the creation of the Enemy Document. He was a member of the Zero Network and in his function of the head of the Intelligence Agency of the Rwandan army he assisted Bagosora and Nsabimana in directing the army. They used to work together with Anatole Ntabakuze, the third defendant in the Military 1 Trial, who also served on the Enemy Commission. He moreover held the post of the commander of the Para Commando Battalion, in which he cooperated with and received orders from Bagosora in order to defend the country. Furthermore we have seen that Félicien Muberuka, the commander of the operational sector of Kigali, was not only part of the Enemy Commission, he also held a considerable share in the design and implementation of the civil defense plan, which he proposed together with Déogratias Nsabimana and Tharcisse Renzaho. As prefect of Kigali the latter had no military authority, yet he was nevertheless also said

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to be involved in the control of the death squads. With regard to Joseph Serugendo, Georges Rutaganda, Ephrem Nkezabera and Bernard Maniragaba it has been established that they were not only involved in the Interahamwe National Committee and College of Advisers, but that they also held official positions and some even shares in RTLM Limited. We have seen that some of the men who were involved in the military preparations were appointed as members of the Zero Network. On the list of people that were involved in this Network was also the name of Joseph Nzirorera, who has already been mentioned in the previous chapter. Nzirorera allegedly supported Kangura and was a shareholder of RTLM Limited. During the Military 1 Trial he was also linked to the death squads. Another name that was linked to the death squads – but not to the Zero Network – was that of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, the unofficial leader of the CDR who was also involved in RTLM. Furthermore the name of Elie Sagatwa has been mentioned several times, and will be mentioned even more in the following chapter, just as a couple of other men who were linked to the Zero Network. The following chapter will explore these clandestine organizations and especially the Akazu on the basis of the case against Protais Zigiranyirazo, the brother-in-law of President Habyarimana. It will try to reveal the structure and mode of operation of these organizations, look at the interaction between the formal and the informal powers in Rwanda and establish which role the abovementioned men played in these secret societies.

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3. A Family Affair: the case against Protais Zigiranyirazo

“This case has been about Akazu. Over and over again, the Court has heard evidence of a parallel system of power that was held that was apart from the administrative kind of power.”182 Charity Kagwi-Ndungu, Prosecution Counsel in the case against Protais Zigiranyirazo

“The Akazu, there is no register or membership of the Akazu, as such. It is something – you have it because you have it. You have it either because you were born in a certain position or you have acquired a certain amount of inference and power to make you respectable enough to be admitted amongst those who were drinking the fine wine.”183 Lee Gacuiga Muthoga, Judge in the case against Protais Zigiranyirazo

The previous chapters have discussed the ideological and physical preparations that were taken towards the Rwandan genocide. On the basis of the Media Case and the Military 1 Trial it has been explored how the climate in Rwanda gradually radicalized and who were responsible for this radicalization. With regard to the responsibility for these psychological and material preparations a lot of names have been mentioned, some even in more than just one case. So far this study has tried to reveal the complicity in the concerning cases, even though this was often hard to do as the Tribunal mainly focused on those who stood trial. Yet as some names reappeared more often and some people seemed to be more decisive than others, we did get a picture of who were more and who were less involved in the organization of the Rwandan genocide. The following chapter will explore one last case, that against Protais Zigiranyirazo, the brother of Agathe Kanziga and thus brother-in-law of Juvénal Habyarimana. This case did not discuss one particular aspect of the planning of the genocide – like the other two cases did – but became all the more known for the accused himself. As Zigiranyirazo, who is more often referred to as Mister Z., was

182 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 27 February 2006,” 3. 183 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 2 March 2006,” 22.

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closely linked to Habyarimana and his wife, he managed to acquire a very powerful position in the Rwandan political and economic sphere. Hence, Zigiranyirazo has often been regarded as a key figure in the Akazu who played an important role in the planning and execution of the genocide, for example by Christian P. Scherrer, Alison Des Forges and Linda Melvern.184 Some eleven years after the genocide, by the end of 2005, the ICTR opened the case against Protais Zigiranyirazo. It took the judges subsequently three years to hear all the witnesses, investigate the evidence and pass a judgment. During those three years the Chamber investigated the involvement of Zigiranyirazo in several meetings and events in which the genocide was prepared and, later on, executed. Moreover, the aim of the Prosecutor was to prove that Mr. Z. had agreed with his fellow Akazu members to commit genocide. In order to do this, a couple of witnesses would testify how, over the years, political and financial power was consolidated by the Akazu and how this group had influenced and changed governmental decisions in their own favor. These testimonies came from insider as well as expert witnesses. The insider witnesses were people who were once members of the Akazu, but had later on abandoned the group and could thus give inside accounts on its way of operation. The experts, on the other hand, were called to place this information in historical context, in order to understand why and how this group could become so influential. Though the historical context has been given in the previous chapters, we can still learn a lot from these experts when it comes to the Akazu.185 This chapter will therefore first establish what we know about the Akazu so far, and subsequently look at the testimonies of these insider and expert witnesses to see what they revealed on the structure of the Akazu and its role in the planning of the genocide.

3.1 The facts

As the goal of this research is to reveal the composition and the role of the Akazu, it is important to first organize the facts that have until now been brought forward. Though

184 Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis, 105; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 46; and Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 29. 185 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Judgement, 18 December 2008, 5; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 3 October 2005,” 1-4; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 27 February 2006,” 3.

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we still do not know much about the group, so far three characteristics seem undisputed: first, the members of the group were mostly connected to each other by family – and maybe also commercial – ties; the members came, for the most part, from the northwestern prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi and last but not least, they all adhered to the Hutu Power ideology. Though these characteristics were obviously connected to each other, it seems like there were also members who did not meet all these requirements. We will therefore first define these characteristics and subsequently investigate Zigiranyirazo’s case in order to see whether these assumptions are correct.

Family ties We have already seen that a lot of influential Rwandans, for example those who were involved in the Zero Network, were relatives of each other. As the power in Rwanda of old was in the hands of a few influential clans this was not so surprising. Hence the same has been said of the Akazu. One of the things the Chamber established was that it was “proven beyond reasonable doubt that a power group consisting primarily of members of the extended family of the President existed before and during the genocide.”186 This assumption has been generally accepted in the existing literature, as the introduction has shown, and was moreover corroborated by several witnesses during Zigiranyirazo’s trial. By the end of this chapter it will be clear to what extent this describes the structure of the Akazu.187

Regional ties Thus, the Akazu mostly consisted of relatives of President Habyarimana and his wife, who all came from the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures in the northwestern region of Rwanda. Since Habyarimana and Agathe Kanziga both came from another commune this assumption sometimes seems confusing, yet a short explanation on the structure of Rwanda’s administrative division provides clarity.

186 ICTR, Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo, 27. 187 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 23 January 2006,” 6, 10; ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 2 March 2006,” 21-23; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 20 February 2006,” 13.

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Protais Zigiranyirazo was a native of Giciye commune in Gisenyi prefecture, where he grew up together with his younger sister Agathe Kanziga. President Habyarimana, on the other hand, came from the adjoining commune of Karago, which was only separated from Giciye commune by a small river. Hence Karago also belonged to the Gisenyi prefecture, which, together with Ruhengeri, formed the Bushiru region. This region was a former chiefdom, which was inhabited by a people known as Bashiru, who were led by the Abushiru, the family of Agathe Kanziga and Protais Zigiranyirazo. In 1974 Zigiranyirazo became the prefect of Ruhengeri, a position he occupied until 1989 and which made him quite powerful in that prefecture as well. Between 1973 and 1994 both prefectures produced a lot of high-ranking Hutu officials, such as Ferdinand Nahimana, Georges Rutaganda and Félicien Kabuga amongst others.188

Ideological Hutu Power ties While the two former characteristics may not always have been a requisite, one thing seemed to be absolutely sure: every member of the Akazu adhered to the extremist Hutu Power ideology. As all its members were powerful in some way, either by being a member of the presidential family or by virtue of their occupation, they were all determined not to lose that power and were therefore reluctant to commit to any power sharing agreement whatsoever. Eventually, as the threat of such an agreement gradually increased, these Hutu Power extremists could only think of one last solution: in order to stay in power the Tutsis and opposition minded Hutus had to be annihilated.

3.2 Insider witnesses

The best way for the prosecution to disclose the structure and mode of operation of the Akazu was by using insider witnesses. Such witnesses could offer a lot of firsthand information as they used to be members of the group themselves. They had experienced its hierarchy and participated in its activities and could hence reveal a lot

188 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 23 January 2006,” 4-5; ICTR, Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo, 4; and Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 81, 85.

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of valuable information. The two insider witnesses that were brought forward were Michel Bagaragaza, a Hutu from Giciye who was both before and during the genocide the managing director of the controlling body of the Rwandan tea industry, and Christophe Mfizi, who has been discussed in the previous chapter. Though at the Tribunal their testimonies could not always be legally accepted, for this historical record they are nevertheless of great significance.

Central and wider Akazu With regard to the power structure in Rwanda in the years preceding the genocide, the testimonies of Mfizi and Bagaragaza reconstructed the following record. From the moment Juvénal Habyarimana conducted his coup d’état in 1973, the power in Rwanda was concentrated in his hands. He not only became the president of the republic, but also chief of staff of the army, Minister of Defense, head of the Gendarmerie and later on president of the MRND, which was then the only active party in Rwanda. This power was however too much for him to handle by himself, and he therefore soon appealed to a group of people in whom he had confidence. This group was called the central Akazu, a circle of people around the president who had been eminent already before Habyarimana came to power.189 This central or inner Akazu immediately began to participate in carrying out the public affairs. Their most important task was to help the president with recruiting the right people for the right job. As the members of the central Akazu lacked the competencies and opportunities to rule the country politically and economically, they realized that they had to recruit subordinates who would carry out their duty in favor of the central Akazu. Hence, these subordinates became part of the wider Akazu, which was constantly monitored by the central Akazu. One of the most notable characteristics of this inner Akazu was that its five members were all related to President Habyarimana and his wife Agathe. These members were Protais Zigiranyirazo, brother of Agathe Kanziga and brother-in-law of the president; Elie Sagatwa, who was actually the cousin of Zigiranyirazo but who referred to each other

189 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 18 October 2005,” 30; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 13 June 2006,” 9; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 21 June 2006,” 25.

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as brothers; Sagatwa’s brother Séraphin Rwabukumba; Habyarimana’s younger brother Séraphin Bararengana who was married to the sister of Agathe and Mr. Z.; Noël Mbonabyari, the godfather of the president and of course Agathe Kanziga and Juvénal Habyarimana themselves.190 Thus, the purpose of this inner Akazu was to support the president in governing the country on the judicial, legislative and executive field. The division of labor among this group was plain and indistinct at the same time; some members had clear duties and responsibilities while others operated and supported the president on the background. However, in the end all decisions were taken around the family table. Those with the clearest sectors were Mr. Z., Elie Sagatwa and Séraphin Rwabukumba. Zigiranyirazo, who was prefect of the Ruhengeri prefecture, was responsible for the administration; Sagatwa, Habyarimana’s private secretary and personal advisor was responsible for the Rwandan security and Rwabukumba, who held a high position at the National Bank of Rwanda, was in charge of the economic sector.191 These men secretly advised – or actually directed – Habyarimana on which persons were qualified and thus should be hired to work in their respective sectors. They also recruited capable servants for governmental positions. From the highest ministers to the lowest burgomasters, they were all appointed to accomplish the mission of the Akazu, which was to keep all the power in their own hands. And as a result of the traditional Rwandan regionalism, the central Akazu relied to a significant extent on the people from their own home regions of Karago and Giciye. Due to this, eventually all civil servants of these regions became members of the wider Akazu. These members were not all necessarily ‘bad’; most of them were primarily hired because of their competencies, not out of ideological convictions. However, as soon as one of these wider Akazu members did not live up to the expectations of the central Akazu, that person was immediately dismissed and replaced by someone else. Hence,

190 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 13 June 2006,” 9-11; ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 21 June 2006,” 51-52; ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 18 October 2005,” 30-31; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 27 November 2006,” 13, 16; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 14 June 2006,” 14, 16. 191 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 13 June 2006,” 9-10; ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 27 November 2006,” 12-13, 15; ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 14 June 2006,” 16; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 21 June 2006,” 7-8, 52.

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it was a constant coming and going of wider Akazu members, and in the end only the inner Akazu knew who exactly belonged to the wider Akazu. There were, however, a couple of high officials among the wider Akazu who turned out to be really dedicated to the mission of the Akazu, and thus managed to stay in their position for quite some time.192 With the implementation of the multiparty system by the beginning of the 1990s the central Akazu saw its power base diminish. Since during the previous decades Habyarimana and his entourage had appointed all officials, by the beginning of the 1990s the government and the private sector were led by MRND members who were automatically Akazu members as well. The introduction of the new party system brought a change to this situation. Some established ministers decided to leave the MRND – and thus the Akazu – and join another party, while other ministerial positions were taken over by new ministers from new parties. As for the remaining government posts, the military and state controlled companies, the central Akazu realized that these had to be filled by very dedicated and trustworthy supporters. And so they did. When, for example, James Gasana became Minister of Defense, he initiated reforms. These reforms however, worked against the interests of the inner Akazu, and thus at a given moment, the Akazu began to threaten Gasana. Shortly thereafter, Gasana left the ministry and fled abroad. The central Akazu subsequently placed Augustin Bizimana, who had worked together with the Habyarimana regime for some time, in Gasana’s position. In that way, the central Akazu still managed to place a lot of influential wider Akazu members to major positions.193

The parallel network It was out of this circle of influential wider Akazu members that a parallel group, which would later be named the Zero Network, appeared. This was a group of people – family, clients, friends and businessmen – who wanted to consolidate as much power as possible into the hands of the families of President Habyarimana and Agathe Kanziga. This nebulous group, which was under control of Mr. Z., came into

192 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 13 June 2006,” 11-12; ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 21 June 2006,” 57; ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 14 June 2006,” 10, 14, 16, 21; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 27 November 2006,” 16-17. 193 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 13 June 2006,” 13-14; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 27 November 2006,” 20.

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existence by the second half of the 1970s and gradually infiltrated within the constitutional power over the following years. Through this network Zigiranyirazo surrounded himself with a group of professionals who infiltrated and influenced the Rwandan government and commercial enterprise. Among its members were Ferdinand Nahimana, Laurent Serubuga, Joseph Nzirorera, Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita and Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who took on positions in both the public and the private sector. Also Elie Sagatwa and Séraphin Rwabukumba, Zigiranyirazo’s co- central Akazu members, were among the higher officials of the group.194 This network began to run Rwanda as if it was a company from which the Zero Network could and should benefit. It encouraged ethnic and regional division in order to arrogate power and wealth, especially into the hands of Mr. Z. In order to do this, the Zero Network made use of several tactics. As we have seen, the network infiltrated the entire Rwandan public and private sector. It was not necessarily active on the administrative field, but all the more on the lower levels. Hence, it could influence practices and propositions from the inside. By these means, it also exerted pressure and even threatened people so that these propositions would not be turned down at this stage. In this way at least the military, the centrally intelligence agency and ORINFOR were infiltrated; other examples were not given as, according to Christophe Mfizi, “the list is very long indeed.”195 Furthermore the network made sure that before a proposition would be sent to the president for his final approval, it would first be approved by Zigiranyirazo himself. Eventually, by the advent of multipartyism, the Zero Network totally obviated the president from his decisions, as the president had to take into account the interests of the other parties as well and would thus never be able to support the goals of the network.196

3.3 Expert witnesses

Obviously the insider witnesses drew a clear picture of the ins and outs of the Akazu and the closely connected Zero Network, a picture that was furthermore corroborated

194 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 21 June 2006,” 26-28, 46, 49, 56; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 22 June 2006,” 4. 195 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 21 June 2006,” 38. 196 Ibid., 27-29, 36-38, 47-48, 53, 65; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 22 June 2006,” 5-6.

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by especially one expert testimony. Of the five expert witnesses that were called by the prosecution, only one was intensively questioned about the role of the Akazu and other clandestine organizations. This witness was Alison Des Forges, a Human Rights Watch investigator who was known for her comprehensive knowledge of the Rwandan genocide and its history, which she documented in her book Leave None to Tell the Story.

The actual rulers Just like Mfizi and Bagaragaza, Des Forges testified that besides the formal power structure there was also an informal network that operated in Rwanda before and during the genocide. She stated that this informal system, which was based upon personal relationships, was sometimes interwoven with and sometimes parallel to the formal power structure. Des Forges explained that in this parallel system, someone’s rank was not always equal to his power as

you could have someone whose weight in this system was disproportionate to his rank in the formal system. There were cases where subordinate military officers could give orders which were contradictory or could refuse to obey orders from their superiors. Why, because they had a personal network of power which allowed them to operate with certain autonomy. That network of relationships continued to be extremely important throughout the period of crisis and sometimes led to results in the official institutions that are difficult to understand by themselves.197

This system in which both these formal and informal powers operated had come into existence when Habyarimana came to power. Back then, a group of people from Bushiro had decided that it was time to obtain a share in the power at the national level. This group, which consisted mostly of the extended family of Agathe Kanziga, had chosen her husband Juvénal Habyarimana as their front man. They subsequently found support from the people of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi who were linked to this powerful family through a clientage landholding system. The more prosperous the landowners were the better the situation for these people would be. On the other hand, if these people would not support their landlords, the consequences would be

197 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 1 March 2006,” 84.

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incalculable. Hence soon the whole region supported Habyarimana and his clique, and the powerbase of the Akazu was established.198 By 1973 Habyarimana and the group of military officers that surrounded him carried out their bloodless coup, establishing Habyarimana as the new president of Rwanda. Immediately the Akazu came into action.199 Their activities as described by Des Forges corresponded with those that had been mentioned by the insider witnesses, as she stated that

They put their people in power so that the ministers, who were there, were ordinarily accountable to the Akazu, and this is what then leads those Rwandans who begin to dissent and to criticize to say, “You people are the ones who are running the country and you are not accountable; you are behind the scenes. You are pulling the strings and we can’t get at you because we cannot get a handle on who is doing what. We need a transparent system where we have multiparties, where people are clearly responsible in the structural and institutional sense for what’s happening.” And that is very much the – the drift of much of the criticism of the Akazu, is its secret nature; the fact that it is not transparent, that you cannot know who is doing what.200

Later on she added

There is always an implied reciprocity in that kind of a system, so that those who are powerful make demands on those who are less powerful and they, in return, expect to get certain services or favors for their service. It was a system which could be exercised privately, discretely, by telephone call, by a personal face-to-face contact. It did not require an order given in triplicate through an administrative network. It was something that could result from the expression of a single person who speaks to another person and says, “This is what I would like to see happen.”201

Though its mode of operation remained obscure, Des Forges nevertheless made it plain that the quid pro quo principle was often applied. Its membership however seemed to be somewhat clearer. Though no members were registered, Des Forges claimed, there was a nucleus, a core that never changed – or what the insider witnesses called the ‘central Akazu’ – which consisted of five people: the president, his wife, Elie Sagatwa, Protais Zigiranyirazo and Séraphin

198 Ibid., 84-86, 88, 93; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 2 March 2006,” 7-8. 199 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 1 March 2006,” 97-98. 200 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 2 March 2006,” 22. 201 Ibid., 57.

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Rwabukumba. She did not explicitly mention Séraphin Bararengana or Noël Mbonabyari, as Habyarimana’s family members “would have been included as a courtesy, for biological reasons. Yes, they were part of the family. But, in political operative terms, no member of the president’s family had the equivalent kind of power to those members of his wife’s family.”202 Des Forges also mentioned another category of members, those who the insider witnesses called the ‘wider Akazu’, who, like Bagosora and his brother Pasteur Musabe, were pulled in but could subsequently, if they did not live up to the expectations, be repelled again. Hence this ‘complex ball of yarn’ as Des Forges called it, was continuously changing its composition.203

Threats to the power Just like the insider witnesses, Alison Des Forges stated that this whole system began to shake on its foundations by the early 1990s. As a result of the increasing cry for democratization, the Akazu began to face a dual threat. On the one hand several people among the inner circle decided to leave the MRND and thus the wider Akazu as they were not satisfied with the way the organization worked; on the other hand the organization needed to change its mode of operation as the introduction of the multiparty system diminished its power base. Their response, in the eyes of Des Forges, was a little different from the way the insider witnesses had recollected it. While Habyarimana had no choice but to negotiate with the other parties, the hard core of people that once surrounded him now began to threaten the president as they did not accept the policy of negotiation.204 He was therefore “caught between a rock and a hard place.”205 Yet Habyarimana managed to “retain his personal network and it was in that connection that personal power came into play. The less that could be done openly through the administration, the more it had to be done through personal contacts of reciprocity and graft.”206 This ‘stable’ situation did not however last long. By the second half of 1992 President Habyarimana was forced to participate in the Arusha

202 Ibid., 18. 203 Ibid., 17-19, 21-23; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Protais Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 6 March 2006,” 22. 204 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 2 March 2006,” 72; and ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 6 March 2006,” 68. 205 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 6 March 2006,” 68. 206 Ibid., 69.

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peace negotiations. Yet the most influential part of his supporters, especially a group of military officers who were associated with the MRND and the Akazu, were determined to stay in control and therefore resisted these negotiations. Once again they began to threaten the president. They wrote him a letter, in which they stated that if Habyarimana would continue to engage in the peace negotiations, he was going to be overthrown. Furthermore, the letter said, the civilian population would rise up and kill the Tutsi, and military officers would take care of the annihilation of politicians who had been involved in the peace negotiations. On the 7th of April 1994 it became clear that this was not an empty threat.207

The power of the Zero Network With regard to the Zero Network Alison Des Forges for the bigger part based her findings on the letter of resignation that Christophe Mfizi wrote to the president of the MRND, President Habyarimana. Hence, her view on this network also agreed with the view of Mfizi. She stated that the name of the network, which had been coined by Mfizi, derived from its leader as the Z in Zero made a reference to Protais Zigiranyirazo. Under his lead the network gradually tightened its grip on the Rwandan political sphere as any decisions that were made by the party organs directly or indirectly passed the Zero Network. Eventually, Des Forges stated, the Zero Network did not necessarily have to operate through the MRND, it rather dictated to the MRND what the party should do. And as all the members of the Akazu, both from the inner and wider group, were member of the MRND, the power of the Zero Network actually surpassed that of the Akazu.208 The decisions that were dictated by the Zero Network were however not aimed at serving the national and popular interest, but at hanging on to and even enlarging its own power. In order to cover this hidden agenda the Zero Network stoked ethnic and regional divisions. While the whole political agenda was occupied by these conflicts, the Zero Network could silently infiltrate the Rwandan political, military, financial, agricultural, scientific, scholarly, family and religious sphere,

207 ICTR, “Prosecutor against Zigiranyirazo: Redacted Transcript of 2 March 2006,” 76-78. 208 Ibid., 17, 31, 49-50.

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which they began to operate like a company. This not only secured the network’s power base, it also offered its members a legitimate way to enrich itself.209

This chapter has tried to reveal the way in which informal powers operated in Rwanda during the reign of President Habyarimana, and especially in the years prior to the genocide. First we summarized what we knew so far. Subsequently we looked at the testimonies of several inside and expert witnesses that were brought forward by the prosecution in the trial against Protais Zigiranyirazo. These testimonies corroborated each other on a lot of points and have therefore offered plenty of useful information, not only on the structure of the Akazu and other informal organizations, but also on its mode of operation. And this information, as the conclusion will prove, surely produced some insights that have not been discussed in the existing literature so far.

209 Ibid., 47-48.

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Conclusion

Just like with a lot of clandestine organizations, when it comes to the Akazu it is obviously hard to find out the absolute truth. Not only is there a lack of documentation or primary sources regarding its activities and membership; there is also disagreement and ignorance among its putative members about the exact definition of the concept and the real composition of the group. This study has not given these answers either – as trying to do that would have required a much more comprehensive investigation – yet it did bring forth some useful information that was revealed and deduced from those three crucial trials at the ICTR. This information will now first be combined in order to conclude what these cases eventually tell us about the composition and activities of the Akazu. Subsequently these findings will be placed in the historiographical discussion with the means to determine if and what this thesis has contributed to that debate, and how the participants have used these trials in this debate. The foregoing chapters have elaborately discussed the events that led to the Rwandan genocide, and who were involved in and responsible for these events. First, we have looked at the importance of ideological indoctrination and radicalization in the preparation of a genocide. It was indicated how a group of Hutu hardliners introduced the hate media in Rwanda, and how that media gradually imposed the Hutu Power ideology upon and incited hatred in the minds of the Rwandan Hutus. We looked at who these hardliners were, and how they broadened their power base with the establishment of a new, extremist political party, the CDR. Subsequently it was explored how this group of Hutu officials set up the Hutu Power movement, and how they used that movement to openly call for action against the Tutsi and opposition minded Hutu enemy. The second chapter has shown how these Hutu hardliners physically and materially prepared Rwanda for the genocide. It discussed how the enemy was defined and identified, who was responsible for this identification and how the enemy was subsequently registered. We have also seen how the youth militia were directed and trained and how the civil defense system was set up, both with the aim of eventually attacking the identified enemy. This chapter also introduced the concept of

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the clandestine organizations, and on the basis of several letters and international reports we managed to get a better understanding of the AMASASU and especially the Zero Network. The third and last chapter finally got to the core as it examined the trial of one presumably very important member of the Akazu, Protais Zigiranyirazo. It did however not primarily look at what this trial revealed about Zigiranyirazo’s accountability, but all the more to what it exposed about the Akazu and the Zero Network. By looking at the testimonies of several insider and expert witnesses we have obtained a better understanding of the parallel power networks that were operating in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Therefore we can now finally turn to the question of what these three trials have told us about the structure and activities of the Akazu, and if this information adds anything to the existing literature.

Central versus wider Akazu

Now that all these topics and trials have been discussed, a couple of conclusions can be drawn. A first and very important conclusion is that we cannot speak about ‘the’ Akazu; there is a clear distinction between the central and the wider Akazu. The Zigiranyirazo trial has shown that while the central Akazu was a fixed group that consisted of Agathe Kanziga, Juvénal Habyarimana, Protais Zigiranyirazo, Elie Sagatwa, Séraphin Rwabukumba and most probably also Séraphin Bararengana and Noël Mbonabyari, the wider Akazu was a dynamic concept of which the composition constantly changed. This did not, however, imply that the group was not powerful. As we have seen this central Akazu effectively supported Habyarimana in governing the country, primarily by recruiting and placing the right people in the right positions. These recruited people consequently became members of the wider Akazu, which made them subordinate to the inner Akazu. The status among these members of the wider Akazu differed considerably. While the majority functioned among the lower echelons and could hence do nothing more than obey and delegate orders received from above, the minority of high-officials among the wider Akazu occupied key positions in the Rwandan political and economic sphere, and were therefore almost as influential as the members of the central Akazu themselves.

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Though the composition of the wider Akazu was dynamic, the trials that have been discussed – especially the Military 1 and Media Trial – nevertheless drew a clearer picture of who were among the more or less permanent influential members of that wider Akazu. As we have seen a couple of names were frequently mentioned during these trials, even names of people who have never been officially accused of being involved in the genocide. One thing these people had in common was that they all adhered to the extremist Hutu Power ideology, which was one of the reasons why they had been recruited by the inner Akazu to take up these key positions. As the members of the inner Akazu could simply not carry out all these duties themselves, they outsourced several important positions to other capable people who had the knowledge and competencies to fulfill these tasks. A clear example was Hassan Ngeze. With his journalistic background, Ngeze knew how to establish, edit and publish a periodical. As his Hutu roots lay in the Gisenyi prefecture, he was moreover acquainted with and loyal to the Habyarimana clan. This all led him to become the editor-in-chief of Kangura. The first chapter learned that the publication and content of Kangura were not only silently approved by, but also found secret financial support from government officials, among whom Anatole Nsengiyumva and Joseph Nzirorera. As a result of this governmental interference any complaints about its content or investigation regarding its financial backing were simply neglected. And thus Ngeze could publish whatever he and his principals and sponsors, who were evidently the inner and wider Akazu, wished for. Likewise, with his media experience as the former director of ORINFOR, Ferdinand Nahimana knew how to set up a radio station, both financially and materially. Hence he established the RTLM Steering Committee, in which he surrounded himself with other capable and influential Rwandans, including the unofficial CDR foreman Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. This Committee on its turn gathered a group of wealthy Rwandans who took care of the financial support of the radio station. These shareholders also became part of the wider Akazu, yet not necessarily for their competencies, but all the more for their financial resources. Among these shareholders were, as we have seen, government officials like Joseph Nzirorera and businessmen like Pierre Basabose, Félicien Kabuga and Pasteur Musabe, but also some members of the inner Akazu. Musabe’s brother Théoneste Bagosora held some shares as well, yet this was not the only reason why he became a member of the wider Akazu. This study has also shown how Bagosora, as chef de

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cabinet of the Ministry of Defense, arranged the physical preparations for the genocide. In collaboration with Déogratias Nsabimana, Anatole Nsengiyumva, Félicien Muberuka and Joseph Serugendo amongst others, he not only targeted the enemy but also organized the training and arming of both the military and paramilitary troops. These men all had the competencies and opportunities to carry out their tasks, which had been imposed upon them by the inner Akazu. Moreover, Elie Sagatwa, who as Habyarimana’s private secretary was responsible for the presidential security, personally represented the inner Akazu in these military preparations. Though much more examples can be given the point will be clear: the power in Rwanda was concentrated in the hands of the inner Akazu, who delegated tasks to the wider Akazu, which consisted of people who had the competencies to fulfill their specific responsibilities. Most of these orders were however not registered; they were given privately and discretely, without tangible evidence, so that it remains hard for us to determine the exact responsibilities of the inner Akazu. Nevertheless it seems undisputed that this small group of prominent figures directed the country, yet they put other people in charge so that they themselves could not be held accountable. Hence, the central Akazu relied as much on the wider Akazu as the wider Akazu relied on the central Akazu, and thus someone’s official rank did not always reflect his informal power. That said, though these members of the inner Akazu and the small group of high-ranking officials among the wider Akazu were certainly all Hutu Power supporters, this did not by definition apply to the lower majority of the wider Akazu. As the bigger share of these people was only part of the group as a result of their appointment by someone higher in the hierarchy, they were not necessarily all Hutu extremists, anti-Tutsi or ‘bad’ for that matter. A lot of them had just been recruited as they were supposedly easy to motivate and obeyed orders without questioning. Hence it cannot be stated that the Akazu as a whole was responsible for the planning of the genocide, as has been done quite regularly in the historiography. It can also not be said that its members were all Hutu extremists who had a deeply rooted aversion against the Tutsi, as some of them had become a member of the group merely by (bad) luck. It is however true that all the persons who were involved in the preparations were also members of the Akazu, but this probably had more to do with the role of the Zero Network.

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The Akazu versus the Zero Network

Thus, though not every Akazu member was automatically a Hutu extremist, this could not be said of the Zero Network. Though the name for this group only came into use by the end of 1992 when Christophe Mfizi wrote his letter of resignation, the group had probably originated already right after Habyarimana came to power. The axis of this group was Protais Zigiranyirazo, who, as the brother-in-law of the president, had decided to do anything to consolidate and keep as much power as possible in the hands of his family. In order to achieve that goal all types of policy would be justified. Hence he gathered a group of influential people – friends, family, clients and businessmen which were all either members of the inner Akazu or high-ranking wider Akazu officials – around him, and began running the country as if it was a company from which they could derive maximum benefit. As we have seen, the Zero Network infiltrated the entire Rwandan public sector by placing the right people in key positions in order to influence practices and decisions from inside. In this way they could not only influence the decision-making process, they could also encourage ethnic and regional division with the means to reinforce their own power and wealth. Therefore we can state that it was not the Akazu, but actually its nucleus of influential members, gathered in the Zero Network, who were determined to stay in power and consequently planned and prepared the genocide. As to Habyarimana’s position in the Zero Network, it is clear that his influence in the organization gradually diminished as he, whether or not voluntarily, adjusted to the multiparty system. The power of Mr. Z. consequently grew even more as his decisions, though unofficial, eventually totally surpassed Habyarimana’s official authority.

This thesis has tried to reveal the structure and role of the Akazu in the planning of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Its aim was to conclude whether those three discussed trials, which were important either because they explored the preparations of the genocide or because it prosecuted a prominent Akazu member, could give a better understanding of this group. By now it is safe to say that they did. As we constantly focused on the extralegal purpose of these trials we have deduced some crucial

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information that neither the ICTR, nor the existing literature has specifically discussed so far. When looking back at the historiographical discourse it can be stated that this study has contributed to some of the ongoing debates, but it also completely neglected others. The reason for this is that the ICTR trials simply did not pay attention to all these issues, as they were not interested in the extralegal narrative, and thus neither did we. We did however see that both the inner and wider Akazu and the Zero Network came into power in the course of the 1970s, after Juvénal Habyarimana had become president. The question of whether it was the Akazu who helped Habyarimana to power or if it was the other way around has however not been answered. Furthermore, with regard to Habyarimana’s power in both groups, it seems undisputed that he had considerable control in the Akazu, as he was one of the members of the central clan. Yet for the Zero Network this is harder to say. Though it seems likely that he used to support this group during the bigger part of his reign, it is more difficult to determine his stance by the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover the question of when the Zero Network exactly decided to begin the genocide has also not been answered. In hindsight we can state that this study has not so much involved itself in the historiographical debate, but all the more discovered totally new knowledge. Not only has it given a better understanding of the structure of the inner and wider Akazu and the way it really worked, it also made us realize that it was not so much the Akazu, but actually the Zero Network who, as a group, feared a loss of power and hence started up the genocidal machine. One question that then remains is why this information on the difference between the inner and wider Akazu, and on the power of the Akazu versus the Zero Network, has never been revealed before. As regards the literature that has been discussed in the historiography this question is easy to answer. Indeed, these authors all mentioned the members of the Akazu as the alleged planners of the genocide, and the Zero Network as a death squad that was linked to the Akazu and carried out attacks against the Tutsis, but none of them made a distinction between the inner and the wider Akazu, the extent to which its members had an aversion against the Tutsi, and the difference in power its members exercised. Neither did they comprehend that it was not the Akazu, but actually the Zero Network that united the Hutu hardline extremists who in the end masterminded the genocide. Yet this information that we have deduced from these

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three ICTR trials, and especially the Zigiranyirazo case, was not available to these authors as the judgments, or at least those of the Military 1 and Zigiranyirazo case, were only passed after their books had already been published. But why has the ICTR never used this information? As we have seen the Tribunal emphasized the importance of fighting impunity and acknowledged the existence of the Akazu and the parallel system of power. During the three trials that have been investigated in this study, the Tribunal apparently gathered a lot of information on these informal power structures. Nonetheless, this information has subsequently not been used to further investigate the members of the Akazu, the Zero Network or other informal powers in Rwanda. And this has surely been a missed opportunity for the ICTR, as further research probably would have revealed a lot more information on the structure and mode of operation of the Akazu and other informal powers in Rwanda, and their responsibility in the planning of the genocide.

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Secondary sources African Rights. Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance. London, 1995. Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguin Classics, 2006. Browning, Christopher R. Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. Cruvellier, Thierry. Court of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Translated by Chari Voss. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010. Dallaire, Roméo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. London: Arrow Books, 2004. Des Forges, Alison. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch, 1999. Fujii, Lee Ann. Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. Gordon, Gregory S. ““A War of Media, Words, Newspapers and Radio Stations”: The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech.” Virginia Journal of International Law 45 (2004-2005): 139-198. Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1996. Hatzfeld, Jean. Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak. Translated by Linda Coverdale. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005. Higiro, Jean-Marie Vianney. “Rwandan Private Print Media on the Eve of the Genocide.” In The Media and the Rwandan Genocide, edited by Allan Thompson, 73-89. London: Pluto Press, 2007. Hintjens, Helen. “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 2 (1999): 241-286. Jones, Bruce D. Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. Kabanda, Marcel. “Kangura: the Triumph of Propaganda Refined.” In The Media and the Rwandan Genocide, edited by Allan Thompson, 62-72. London: Pluto Press, 2007.

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Kakwenzire, Joan and Dixon Kamukama. “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994.” In The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, edited by Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, 61-91. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999. Khieu, Samphan. Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development. Translated by Laura Summers. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1979. Laegreid, Turid. “U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda.” In The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, edited by Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, 231-251. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999. Longman, Timothy. “An Assessment of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.” Peace Review 21, no. 3 (2009): 304-312. Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. Chippenham: CPI Antony Rowe, 2009. Melvern, Linda. Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. New York: Verso, 2006. Prunier, Gérard. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst & Company, 1995. Scherrer, Christian P. Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War. Westport: Praeger, 2002. Semelin, Jacques. Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. Translated by Cynthia Schoch. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Staub, Ervin. “Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation.” Political Psychology 21, no.2 (2000): 367-382. Straus, Scott. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. TRIAL. “Félicien Kabuga.” http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial- watch/profiles/profile/96/action/show/controller/Profile.html [13-02-2014]. TRIAL. “Théoneste Bagosora.” http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial- watch/profiles/profile/153/action/show/controller/Profile.html [24-02-2014].

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Tromp, Nena. “Understanding the Milošević Case: Legacy of an Unfinished Trial.” In The Genocide Convention: The Legacy of 60 Years, edited by H.G. van der Wilt, J. Vervliet, G.K. Sluiter, and J. Th. M. Houwink ten Cate, 27-39. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012. Wallis, Andrew. Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Weitz, Eric. A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Weitz, Eric. “Utopian Ideologies as Motives for Genocide.” In Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity 3, edited by Dinah Shelton, 1124-27. Detroit: Thompson Gale, 2005. Wilson, Richard Ashby. Writing History in International Criminal Trials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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Appendices

1. The Hutu Ten Commandments 1. Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever they may be, are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, shall be deemed a traitor: - Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman; - Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine; - Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée. 2. Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more dignified and conscientious in their role of woman, wife and mother. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest! 3. Hutu woman, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to their senses. 4. Every Hutu male must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in their business dealings. They are only seeking ethnic supremacy. “RIZABARA UWARIRAYE”210 Shall be consequently considered a traitor, any Hutu male: - who enters into a business partnership with Tutsis; - who invests his money or State money in a Tutsi company; - who lends to, or borrows from, a Tutsi; - who grants business favours to Tutsis [granting of import licenses, bank loans, building plots, public tenders…] 5. Strategic positions in the political, administrative, economic, military and security domain should, to a large extent, be entrusted to Hutus. 6. In the Education sector, (pupils, students, teachers) must be in the majority Hutu. 7. The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. That is the lesson we learned from the October 1990 war. No soldier must marry a Tutsi woman. 8. Hutus must cease having any pity for the Tutsi. 9. - The Hutu male, wherever he may be, should be united, in solidarity and be concerned about the fate of the Hutu brothers. - The Hutus at home and abroad must constantly seek friends and allies for the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu brothers. - They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda. - The Hutu must be firm and vigilant towards their common Tutsi enemy. 10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be taught to Hutus at all levels. Every Hutu must propagate the present ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother for having read, disseminated and taught this ideology shall be deemed a traitor.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze: Judgement and Sentence, 3 December 2003, 46-47.

210 Kinyarwanda for: ‘Only he who spent a sleepless night can talk about the night.’

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2. Structure of RTLM Limited

STRUCTURE OF RTLM sa [accordingto Exhibits1 D 11 andP 53]

of ailshareholders (ct. 6- l]~ î’lPresident General AssemblyFélicien Kabuga

Secret~ry I~nace Temaha~ari Y e e e oei e e e e m Board of Directors 2 Auditors(art.12; 2~-25) ! InitiativeCommittee (art.12- 22) i PresidentFélicien Kabuga Notin place in 1993-1994 : Secretary’ Ignace Temahagari ~ Not appointed in 1993-1994 i Members"Ferdinand Nahimana i JosephSerugendo _. EphremNkezabera " -" AugustinHatari I v" : CharlesNzabagerageza ! I i Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza ! SilasMucumankiko (26.11.93~ I ie e e e e e ee e el e e e e e e e e |~e e eoe J oe I e| l e eII oe eoeoel i’Co’ln’mf~~l~~l’S"};1~ Initiative Committee . i in placeafter the 26 th November1993i e e e e| em I e e || e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e eoe eoe e eoel I

Commissionin charge of Commission in charge of Sensitisationcommission Budget commission regulationand preparationof technicaland programs the General Assembly

President: J Bosco Barayagwiza President: Ferdinand Nahimana President: Ch. Nzabagerageza Presient: Silas Mucumankiko Members Members: Members: Members: StanislasHarelimana VénusteNshimiyimana J.BerchmansUtezurundi EphremNkezabera CharlesBunane FrançoisSerushyana CyprienNdagijimana PhocasHabimana Andr6Hakizimana GaspardMusabyimana P.CélestinRwagafilita GeorgesGakeri StmlislasSimbizi FrodualdNtawulikura AronNtizihabose InnocentShyirambere BernardManiragaba SpérancieKarwera Munyagishari GeorgesRutaganda IgnaceRudahunga JosephSerugendo RégineMukeshimana PasteurMusabe DonatHakizimana AugustinHatari PierreKayondo SéraphinRwabukumba I I CharlesGasarabwe I A MarieMukakayange_

Branchesof RTLM sa IIIIIIIImIIUIIlI~I llIIIIIIIiii iiiIiliiiii GeneralDirector (art. 12- 20) I PhocasHabimana [~

Administration Radio RTLM TelevisionRTLM Commerceof audio- andfinances visualproducts

- Counter - Editorin Chief Notyet in place in Notyet in place in - Secretary GaspardGahigi 1993- 1994 1993- 1994 - Otheremployed - Journalistsand people techniciansradio

Note: Structurein placein 1993-1994or to set up accordingto the Statutesor the decisionofthe General Assembly.

...... Notpermanent structure in placein 1993-1994; it hadto runtill the General Assembly of April1994.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze: Structure of RTLM SA,” 23 September 2002; http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/33550/ [14-02-2014].

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3. The ENI Document

A. DEFINITION OF THE ENEMY The enemy can be subdivided into two categories: - the primary enemy - enemy supporters

1. The primary enemy are the extremist Tutsi within the country and abroad who are nostalgic for power and who have NEVER acknowledged and STILL DO NOT acknowledge the realities of the Social Revolution of 1959, and who wish to regain power in RWANDA by all possible means, including the use of weapons.

2. Enemy supporters are all who lend support to the primary enemy. […]

Political opponents who desire power or peaceful and democratic change in the current political regime in RWANDA are NOT to be confused with the ENEMY or supporters of the ENEMY.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ENEMY The ENEMY, or their accomplices, be they Rwandan or foreign nationals within the country or abroad, can be identified in particular by any of the following acts: - Taking up arms and attacking RWANDA; - Purchasing arms for enemy soldiers; - Contributing money to support the ENEMY; - Providing any form of material support to the ENEMY; - Spreading propaganda favourable to the ENEMY; - Recruiting for the ENEMY; - Contaminating public opinion by spreading false rumours and information; - Spying for the ENEMY; - Divulging military secrets to the ENEMY; - Organising or performing acts of terrorism and sabotage in support of ENEMY activities; - Organising or inciting revolts, strikes or any form of disorder to support ENEMY activities; - Refusing to fight the ENEMY; - Refusing to comply with war requisitions.

Political opponents who desire power or peaceful and democratic change in the current political regime in RWANDA are NOT to be confused with the ENEMY or supporters of the ENEMY.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor against Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva: Judgement and Sentence, 18 December 2008, 47-48.

95