HillsdaleTimi College Hillsdale, Michigan 49242 Vol . 1s I , No . 4 April, 198 2

HAS THE THIRD WORLD WAR ALREADY STARTED ? By Midge Decte r Midge Decter is executive director of the Committe e for the Free World, a New York-based group throug h which leading figures in many countries have united behind the simple cause the committee's name implies . Mrs. Decter is the author of three books : The Liberated Woman and Other Americans, The Ne w Chastity, and Liberal Parents, Radical Children. Her essays and reviews, mostly in the field of social criti- cism, have over the past two decades appeared in a number of periodicals, including Harper's, The At- lantic, Exquire, and Saturday Review. She has been acting managing editor of Commentary, executive editor of Harper's, literary editor of Saturday Review , and senior editor at Basic Books. Midge Decter is a founder and past chairman of th e Coalition for a Democratic Majority ; co-chairman of the Advisory Committee on European Democracy an d Security; and a member of the board of the Committee on the Present Danger . She delivered this address at the third Center fo r Constructive Alternatives seminar of the 1981-82 said over and over, because an excess of armament s academic year, held February 1-4 on the topic, "Pre - will by itself one day inevitably set off nuclear arma- venting World War III." Other speakers at the seminar geddon. We must not take this action or that actio n included defense scholar Robert Pfaltzgraff debating lest it lead—accidentally, beyond our control—t o David Cortright of SANE ; William Colby on the CIA ; a confrontation between the United States and the Generals Daniel Graham and George Keegan o n Soviet Union and thus inescapably to worldwid e strategic weapons and deterrence ; conflict resolution extinction . Meanwhile, of course, literally hundreds o f specialist George Lopez on " waging peace" ; and wars have been engaged in all over the globe sinc e Czech emigre Libor Brom, a former political prisone r World War II—all of them made possible by the fac t of both the Nazis and the Soviets . (sometimes it was an illusion) that they fell short of World War III, the ostensible subject of thes e being a world war, that is, a conflict between the two observations, is not so much a war as a specter that ha s great superpowers . haunted all our public deliberations for at least thirty Recently, Richard Nixon also invoked the ghost o f years . The ghost of that great and final War Future World War III, but he meant something different by it . has been invoked on every occasion—from the smalles t For him the ghost was the ghost of War Past . By this I to the most magnified—when people wished to coun- mean that the members of Richard Nixon's generation , sel American inaction . We must not arm, it has been and the members of my own, are haunted by a worl d

Imprimis is the journal of Hillsdales two outreac h programs seeking to foster clear thinking on th e im•pri•mis (im-pri-mis) adv. In the first place . Middl e problems of our time : the Center for Constructive English, from Latin in primis, among the first (things) .. .. Alternatives in Michigan, and the Shavano Institute fo r National Leadership in Colorado . A subscription is fre e on request . war we can remember and particularly by the years tha t I have often, for instance, pondered the practice o f led up to it . In the history books World War II com- the television networks in connection with important menced in September 1939 . Looking back now, how - presidential speeches . The President announces a ne w ever, we can see that it actually commenced five year s initiative, say, or defends a policy, or speaks at length earlier, when Hitler marched into the Rhineland un- on the state of the nation, and no sooner has he finishe d opposed, and the governments who were to be know n than there are experts or panels of experts standing b y as the Allied powers by their inaction and self-decep- to tell a presumably incompetent populace what he ha s tion and wishful dreaming (for it cannot be dignified just said, along with what he has just not said and what with the word "thinking") made a world war inevit- people are likely to think and feel about it . We know, able by failing to stop it before it could get started . of course, to whom these experts are speaking : to one Winston Churchill called World War II the unneces- another. They are preparing the next day's betting line sary war." What he meant by this was that the proper on presidential-popular relations . And they create con- show of will and force at the right time, when Hitle r fusions that, circularly, only they will be able to clear was yet weak, would have stopped him in his tracks . up next time around by creating yet new confusions. This is what Richard Nixon, and others, mean thes e I do not mean to go on about this, but only to make a days when they speak of World War III . The member s simple point. I wish to begin with the proposition tha t of his generation, and the members of mine, are asking we know what most of the American people want th e now, Is this 1935, or 1938, or even 1939? Has the war role of the United States in world affairs to be . We we cannot yet see already commenced as a result of our know it because they have said so, and the evidenc e undeniable failure to hold the line against Soviet that they have said so is the election of Ronald Reagan aggression? (The irony of Richard Nixon's concern to the presidency . about this now, after he himself did so much to furthe r The year 1980 is important: it was simply inconceiv- the self-deception about Soviet desires and intentions in able five or ten years ago that Ronald Reagan coul d our own time, is a subject for another time . ) have become president . Just as it was inconceivable i n My own answer to the question is, I do not think so. 1980 that anyone but Ronald Reagan would become Though it is very late, though the Soviet Union has , president . As what has become known as a neo-con- like Hitler in the middle '30s, moved unopposed—into servative—I have surrendered to the title thoug h Africa, Afghanistan, and to some extent into the Mid- neither I nor anyone else knows exactly what it dle East, not to mention, of course, the crushing o f means—I was far more certain of this outcome than Poland (for the how-manyeth time in our century? ) many of my friends who had been wandering with going on before our eyes—despite all this, we are no t Reagan faithfully for years in the minority wilderness . altogether in the condition of the Western democracies I was more certain not because of any superior wisdom in the '30s . True, we are inadequately armed . True, the but because I had the great advantage of taking this counsellors of "peace at any price" and "peace in our country's shift to Reagan on my own pulse . And one's time" are vocal, and still highly influential, among us . own pulse, one's own true pulse, is the place to read Yet the answer to the question of our behavior in th e the country's temper . coming years is still not settled . The election of 1980 bespeaks a different condition from that which had so "Make us great again" fatally overtaken Western Europe in the 1930s . What, then, were people saying—what was 1 Thus, before we go on to a careful—and I must con- saying—when we graced him with a landslide victory fess to you, not completely cheerful—description of and helped him to carry so many of his party into th e where we are now on the scale of war and peace, w e Senate? To be sure, people were saying a certai n must stop and think for a few moments about the mean- number of different things: that the liberal Great Soci- ing of 1980 . ety had gone much, much too far ; that the governmen t I think it is true—though far from safe—to say that had become a monster ; that the country's values had in this vast agglomeration of groups and regions and gone well more than halfway to hell down the slippery races and classes we call the United States of Americ a slope of radical nihilism and liberal relativism; that we nothing is nevertheless easier to read than the publi c had, to put it most succinctly, to pull ourselves temper. The pundits would not thank me for sayin g together again . But most of all they were, in the reflec- this, I know . We have in our midst a large number o f tion of Ronald Reagan, granting themselves permission powerful people—some are journalists, some are socia l to see their country once more as a great and decent scientists, some are members of that arcane new pro- power . Both. Great . . .and . . .decent—indeed, a model fession, "consultants"—who make a living, often a of political and social decency, the kind of country, the very good living, trying to convince us all that popular kind of society, that others in the world would be fortu- nate to have the opportunity to emulate . opinion is a mysterious and volatile substance, a sub - stance whose properties and behavior are subject t o I think I do not have to rehearse once more what had laws that only trained experts can understand . interfered with Americans' capacity to think of thei r 2 country this way . Each of us has his own list of the This belief may have led to a certain amount o f events and influences that served to crack America' s naive, even foolish talk . It may have led to certai n sense of purpose and self-esteem (which are, for this wasteful and even futile policies, especially toward odd and singular nation, the same thing) . Besides, as I many of those countries now fashionably designated a s look back over the past two decades, I am not sure tha t the Third World . But the American people were right ; we actually do know yet all that happened to us . their country was a force for social good in the world , Which, for instance, came first, the endless, victory - social good that very much includes peace . Nowhere less slogging in Vietnam or the idea that the country can one point to a single group of people—except fo r was no longer entitled to declare itself the defender o f tinpot tyrants and their murdering myrmidons—wh o the free world? Let us just say what we can all agre e are better off as a result of the country's (as I believe , upon—that the country was hit by a plague, a blight, a temporary) abandonment of this belief. And in many seizure of self-hatred that in the end left it gasping an d places millions upon millions of people are distinctl y helpless before the insults and depredations, an d worse off. worse, of even the smallest, weakest enemies . Thus Reagan's mandate in January 1981 was no t The point is that the election of 1980 was the comin g simply to slow the metastatic growth of government , to fruition of a feeling that had been growing in the though it was that, to be sure—and not simply to country bit by bit over the 1970s and that could no undertake a massive increase in our now dangerousl y

longer be held off by the rhetorical tricks of those i n depleted military strength, though it was certainly tha t power. I have defined this feeling in the simplest of —but to return the country to its rightful, necessary , terms because it is a simple feeling : Make us grea t and benign role as leader of the free world . again. In other words, the simple feeling that led to the Now, the word "great" for Americans does not onl y .election of Ronald Reagan is not only a wish to be mean powerful and rich, though certainly that ; it also strong but a yearning to see more of the world — means, and has always meant, in Reagan's own words , perhaps one day all .of the world—peaceably enjoyin g make us the City on the Hill . that which we enjoy, and treasure . Yet, alas, this is not the end of the story . There are those—clever Europeans, wise old me n like George Kennan, even, I think, Richard Nixon — For the clever and the wise and the sophisticated— who find our definition of greatness childish, hardly i n and they are rife in the Reagan administration as i n keeping with the proper interests and purposes of grea t every other—these would-be architects of a "sensible" world powers . But these clever and wise people are and hard-nosed world order are still much in power . wrong . So-called hard-headed statecraft, based on a They say in objection to what I have called th e worldly and limited definition of national interests, ha s country's simple feeling : the world is an ever more twice in this century turned Europe into a bloody complicated place ; what people like you are talkin g wasteland, a scene of carnage to boggle the minds o f about is naive and gives no guidance to policy . My all generations who lived before . Whereas it has been answer to them is, what I am talking about is a policy . the American notion that the West is a civilization an d a political culture which it is our duty to protect fro m Only two choices the barbarities of Soviet Communism, that has led to The fact of the matter is that in a world more and policies which kept the peace in Europe for the past 3 7 more of whose real estate is coming to stand in th e years . Whatever the so-called wise men tell us, the Cold shadow of the Soviet empire, in such a world, the War—and why should we not commence to use that world we inhabit today, the United States has only two term proudly, without inverted commas—the Cold War choices of policy . The rest is, as in the '30s, self- was first made possible and then sustained at consider - deception and dreaming . Indeed, the adviser most to b e able cost by the belief of the American people that thei r trusted by the President of the United States would be country was acting as a force for social good in th e the man who, when asked to lay out all the options world : before us at this moment, would present the President 3 with a single sheet of paper on which were written onl y our would-be surrogates, must deep down be feeling two sentences: (a) we have the option to do everything the opposite of what they are saying—namely, that w e in our power to undermine the economic, political, and must be in an unreasonable condition indeed . They military strength of our enemy—and, as it happens, in cheer us because they wish us to surrender . Not a time of golden opportunity to do so ; or (b) we have because they fear that we will make war—they kno w the option of accommodating ourselves to the ever - perfectly well whose war-making machine threaten s increasing spread of the enemy's power, a powe r them—but because they do not wish to be interrupte d which at this moment threatens to castrate our friend s in their own downhill rush to accommodation . and allies and, after them, us . Take the recent "zero option" proposed by Reagan . So far, then, we must face the fact that whethe r The proposal is not only brilliant but self-evident : if the Reagan knows it or not, option b has continued to be Soviets remove their intermediate-range missiles, th e the policy of his administration. Not the language of United States will not deploy its . Neither the European s his administration, and language is important . Not the nor certain members of the Reagan administration now desire of his administration, and desire is vitall y appear to understand that such a proposal is what th e important . But nevertheless, alas, the policy of his students used to call "non-negotiable ." Either the administration. That is why my question about World Soviets will remove their missiles or they will not . Yet War III cannot yet be answered with assurance . we negotiate. We sat at the Helsinki conference in Now, accommodation to spreading Soviet power can Madrid for more than a year reviewing with the Rus- take, and has taken, many forms, each of them, o f sians an agreement every one of whose terms they hav e course, called by another name . There is the dis- violated—a treaty which gave them something of vital credited Nixon Doctrine—discredited, one would have importance, our acknowledgement of their hegemony thought, for all time in Iran, yet now being applied in Eastern Europe, and gave us what?—the privilege o f with the same degree of what the psychologists woul d sharing with their scholars the secrets of our newes t call "denial" to Saudi Arabia . This doctrine is based and most brilliant technology . And now we are i n on the seductive idea that we can, with a sufficient sup - Geneva—to do what? To reward the Soviets for a ply of extremely sophisticated weaponry, rely on surro- decade's worth of blackmail with the privilege o f gates to protect our interests . Even if such surrogates attempting further extortions of us? It is hard not to were stable and reliable, which they are not, how could believe that were Ronald Reagan not in the White they be counted on to fulfill their role as the protectors House, he would be leading the opposition to th e of our interests when they see us behaving weakly i n Helsinki Agreements, which should be abrogated as a relation to them? In the foreseeable future, the economic failure of American policy, and to the Geneva negotia- survival of our friends, and therefore in the long run , tions, which are, to say the least, several years pre - our own, depends upon unimpeded access to Middl e mature. Eastern oil. The only way, and the proper way, for us Another form of accommodation is our policy of to insure such access—and to keep the Soviet Unio n seeking consensus at the United Nations . Since that ultimately from determining it—is the stationing o f body has become little more than a weapon aimed at American troops in the Middle East. If we do not know the heart of the U .S . policy, a forum for anti-American this, the Arab nations certainly do . What have w e hypocrisy and mendacity, why do we continue to play done? Politely ask, and meekly accept the refusal of the game there? (What can be the meaning of the fact our would-be protector. Is this how a serious, let alone that in a universally turbulent world, with wars and a great, power behaves? I cannot believe that the civil wars raging from one end to the other, with Saudis think so, whatever one reads on the op-ed page s terrorism unbridled, 85 percent of the UN's time in of our great metropolitan newspapers. recent years has been devoted to Israel and Sout h Africa—85 percent!) Perhaps we should just pull out — A second form of accommodation is our continue d I myself would so advocate, though I agree that th e - willingness to cling to that talisman of the self question is arguable . But if we remain in, to continu e r deceived called "negotiation ." To be, even if only fo on, as we are, behaving as active participants in its appearance's sake, negotiating with our enemy whe n deliberations, allowing ourselves to be caught in th e there is nothing on our side to negotiate about or with , toils of such rank, destructive madness as "globa l when we have openly acknowledged our military disad- negotiations," (there is that talisman "negotiations " vantage, and have at the same time eschewed pressin g again)—all this remains no more than simply a n the enemy's economic disadvantage, even to preten d accommodation to the enemy . to negotiate is to entrap ourselves in an accommoda- tion . We negotiate to show the world that we are not Indeed, to lose clarity, as so many among unreasonable people . But it is in the logic of negotia- us have, and to imagine that the world offers us any bu t tions that they culminate in an agreement. And any two stark alternatives, is itself both the result of accom- agreement now can but disadvantage us . Thus while modations already made and—my greatest fear— a applauding us for our reasonableness, our allies, like harbinger of more to come . 4 Let me explain what I mean by mentioning the most faltering control over their populations . The object, w e urgent, and most exemplary, case before us, a case that were told, was to entangle them in a web of economi c collects to it most of the major issues facing Reagan' s relations with us and by so doing, help to bring the m foreign policy . I mean, of course, Poland . Here, too , into the community of civilized nations . But it is w e the choice has been simple, and since time is fast run- who were entrapped : our banks, our businesses, ou r ning out (in fact, it has probably already run out) o n governments—most of all, the minds of our policy - the Polish question as far as we are concerned, it may makers . have to be recorded that the United States was granted It is precisely to rescue us from this trap of confuse d the opportunity of a grave and entirely self-generate d and obfuscated intentions that Ronald Reagan was crisis of Soviet totalitarianism and actively helped the Soviets to manage it . In this, we are like Britain and elected . It could be no quick or easy job, such a France facing Hitler's conquest of the Rhineland . At rescue. It would not be fair, or even sane, to expec t the behest of some of our allies, who want the Polish that a dozen years' worth of failed policy could be crisis to go away, who want Jaruselski to succeed an d overcome in a year. But our weakness in the Middle quickly, so that they may return to their life of trading East, our presence at Geneva, our continuing relatio n and dreaming and most of all evading the truth abou t to the UN, and the moral and political shame of ou r n their situation, we have responded "with restraint . " response to Poland make the winter of '82 seem eve We have lit candles and rescinded some minor eco- colder and darker and grimmer than nature has made it . nomic agreements and shut down two weekly LO T There seems to me little use in asking who or what i s flights . We have said we will do worse, if . . . if things responsible for our current anxiety . This is not a get worse . But things are already worse—as they were moment for recrimination . And we have had so muc h already worse in 1935 . We have said that we will no t recrimination in our national life of the last decade—a return to our former relations with Poland until martial lifetime's worth . It is rather a moment for urgent law is lifted . But what does this actually mean? That appeal . What is missing from the Reagan foreig n when Jaruselski restores order, the order of the grave , policy, it seems to me, is that first, primary, stark clar- so that he can take the troops out of the streets, he wil l ity of intention . Do we wish, if we can, to preside ove r n be rewarded for his success in having betrayed his ow the beginning of the breakup of the Soviet empire? Or . If this people by a resumption of relations with us do we wish to accommodate ourselves to the idea tha t turns out to be the case, what will future generations , we may one day find ourselves all alone in a sea o f struggling with their own issues of freedom, have to sa y grim and envious and unfree people? I think the voters of us? Will we blush with shame from the very grave? have already answered this question for themselves . Reagan has heard them but he has yet to take hear t ? Reagan our Churchill from them . Washington is a difficult place to stay i n When I said that one of the two options before u s touch with America . It is also a difficult place for a was to do everything in our power to undermine ou r President to stay in touch with himself. Reagan must enemy, German, Dutch and British youth to the con- remember what he once knew so clearly . It is our job trary notwithstanding, I did not of course mean that we to make him remember and help him remember: we should set off a nuclear or even a conventional war . have come to that kind of watershed in history where i f Nor did I mean that we should incite others to be free- we are not truly, fully, and staunchly against them, w e dom fighters in a situation where there is no chanc e will inevitably be for them. that we will give them military support . But we do have leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, very rea l I am aware as I stand before you how extreme thi s leverage, and we should use it . The Soviets are after al l sounds . Those who think as I do must learn to bear th e in serious difficulty ; they know it and the world know s charge of extremism . It was the charge leveled at man y it . They need us . Therefore by withholding from them who spoke as I now speak in the mid-'30s . But unlike that which they and their system, and any and every the British in those years, we have not turned our backs totalitarian system, cannot produce for themselves, w e on the man who must now be our Winston Churchill ; undermine them . What they cannot produce is food , we have elected him . We must make him listen to us wealth, incentive to technological creativity, and well - and not to the others who have prettier things to say , being among their citizens . In the name of keeping th e perhaps, but whose counsels are the counsels of despai r peace by making them more at ease in the world (th e and folly . They speak of peace, but it is they who wil l basic idea underlying detente)—and, I am afraid, in th e bring us to World War III . The American people have name of short-term, self-destructive greed as well—w e willed otherwise . They deserve to enjoy the fruits o f have helped them to keep a grip on their otherwise their collective wisdom .

The opinions expressed in Imprimis may be, but are not necessarily, the views of the Center for Constructive Alternatives, the Shavano Insti- tute, or Hillsdale College . Copyright 1982 by Hillsdale College . Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided custom- ary credit is given . ISSN 0277-8432 . Editor, John K . Andrews, Jr. 5

Management Training Seminar s at Hillsdale College

Dear Friends: It is my pleasure to invite you to attend management training seminars at our well-known Dow Conference Center, one of the best equipped training facilities in the country. This year we began ou r 29th year of service to business and industrial organizations in training managers and supervisors t o lead more effectively . George C . Roche II I President

Seminar 1 - Self-Analysis for Managers: Seminar 1 To know one's self better is the gateway to better management . Man- Remaining Dates for 1982 agement of others begins with management of self . The major purpose April 25-30 of Self-Analysis for Managers is to help the individual learn more abou t June 20-25 the person he is, to help him discover the areas in which he does wel l August 22-27 and those in which further self-improvement is needed. September 12-1 7 September 26-October 1 Seminar 2 - Manager Development I : October 3-8 Working With the Individual November 7-1 2 This program emphasizes relationships between the manager and indi- November 28-December 3 viduals in the work environment . The manager will gain a better under - standing of himself and others and consequently a better understandin g Seminar 2 of the managerial process . Remaining Dates for 1982 Participants will have the opportunity of learning how to : understan d May 23-28 why people see things as they do, get better results from employee s through improved coaching and training, understand what motivate s people, pinpoint problems, develop alternatives and make final deci- sions, appraise performance, and manage time .

Seminar 3 - Manager Development II : Seminar 3 Working with the Individual Remaining Dates for 1982 This program focuses on the manager's role in working with groups . November 14-1 9 Emphasis is given to group dynamics and their application to the wor k environment. The participant will have the opportunity of learning how to : develop effective work teams, better understand his position as a leader, com- municate more effectively with groups, facilitate employee involvemen t and participation, employ effective training programs and use caree r planning as a tool .

Fees for seminars above are : Registration (includes tuition and training materials) : $585 per person . Room & meals (American plan, includes evening socia l hours and coffee breaks) : $71 per person, per day .

For information regarding seminars For information regarding reservations contact: contact: Michael E. Kolivosky, Ph .D. Mrs. Marjory Breeden Dean of Continuing Education Reservation Coordinator

Dow Conference Center Hillsdale College Hillsdale, MI 49242 (517) 437-3311