IAEA-TECDOC-76S

Problems concerning the accumulationof separated plutonium

Report of an Advisory Group meeting held in Vienna, 26-29 April 1993

(s)

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY The IAEA doe t normallsno y maintain stock f reportso thin si s series. However, microfiche copie f thesso e reportobtainee b n sca d from

IN IS Clearinghouse International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse5 0 10 x P.OBo . A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Orders shoul accompaniee db prepaymeny db f Austriao t n Schillings 100, for e for e chequ th a f m th IAEf m o n i o n i r Aeo microfiche service coupons orderee b whic y hdma separately fro INIe mth S Clearinghouse. originatine Th g Sectio f thino s documen IAEe th An i t was: Nuclear Materials and Fuel Cycle Technology Section International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse5 P.O. Box 100 A-1400 Vienna, Austria

PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ACCUMULATION OF SEPARATED PLUTONIUM IAEA, VIENNA, 1994 IAEA-TECDOC-765 ISSN 1011-4289 Printed by the IAEA in Austria September 1994 FOREWORD

delaye th Du o et s worldwid developmene th n ei startind f fasan o t p t gu breede r reactors (which require large amount f plutoniuo s e t ongoinmstartupa th d an g) reprocessin f spengo t fuel (which produces separated plutonium), significant quantitief so separated plutonium are being created. An Advisory Group meeting was held in April 1993 o considet r this situation o primarmeetine tw Th . d ygha objectives o determint : e eth magnitude of the plutonium accumulations and to identify potential problems related to this accumulatio f separateno d plutonium.

IAEA estimates of present and projected inventories of separated plutonium were presented and discussed. Then representatives of Member States presented data and projections of national programmes for both production and utilization of separated plutonium addition I . datae th n,o t uncertaintie productioe th n si consumptiod nan n rates and the resulting uncertainties in the inventories were discussed.

The IAEA 199 d estimaten 2 e inventorieth f eo f separateso d plutoniu confirmes mwa d but the IAEA estimate for the projected inventories was judged to be the upper limit of the possible valueworldwide th f so e inventory.

The success of this meeting was in part due to the able leadership provided by Mr. H. Bay of Switzerland. EDITORIAL NOTE

preparingIn this document press,for IAEAthe staffof have pages madethe up from the original manuscripts as submitted by the authors. Ttie views expressed do not necessarily reflect those governmentsofthe nominatingthe of Member States nominating ofthe or organizations. Throughout the text names of Member States are retained as they were when the text was compiled. The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions delimitationthe of or of their boundaries. The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does implyintentionnot any infringeto proprietary rights, should construednor be it an as endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA. The authors responsibleare havingfor obtained necessarythe permission IAEAthe to for reproduce, translate materialuse or from sources already protected copyrights.by CONTENTS

Summary of the Advisory Group meeting ...... 7

China's nuclear power programm projectee th d ean d productiod nan consumption of plutonium ...... 13 Qiusheng Liu Industrial reprocessin recyclind gan Francen gi effectivn A : e plutonium management method ...... 15 Gerster,D. Longevialle,de H. LucasP. Problems concernin accumulatioe gth f isolateno d plutoniu Situatiom— n in Germany ...... 7 2 . U. Schmidt The rol f plutoniueo nucleae th mn i r power programm f Indieo a ...... 9 2 . D.D. Sood The necessit significancd an r yfo f nucleaeo r fuel recyclin Japan gi n ...... 5 3 . NakadaM. Russian prospect r plutoniusfo m accumulatio utilizatiod nan n ...... 5 4 . E.G. Kudriavtsev Utilizatio BN-800fasn i t reactor f isolateso d plutonium being accumulatee th n di Russian Federation ...... 3 5 . V.S. Kagramanyan Problems concernin accumulatioe gth f isolateno d plutonium— The Swiss situation ...... 59 H. Bay Plutonium arisings and utilization in the United Kingdom ...... 63 R. Dodds

List of Participants ...... 67 SUMMARY OF THE ADVISORY GROUP MEETING

1. OVERVIEW

An Advisory Group Meeting on Problems Concerning the Accumulation of Separated Plutoniu hels mViennn di wa Apri9 2 a froo l t 19936 m 2 delegate n observer6 Te . 1 d san s from 12 countries and one international organization attended. The aim of the Advisory Group meetin asseso t s magnitude gwa sth accumulatioe th f eo f separateno d plutonium and to identify problems related to this accumulation.

A presentation provided the IAEA's estimate of the present worldwide separated civil plutonium inventor projectiond yan s through 2005 assumption e {Tabl Figurd Th . an ) eI e 1 s underlying these projection givee countre ar sTabln i nTh . II ey representatives then presented their national reports. These reports gave a synopsis of each country's nuclear status including the inventories of separated civil plutonium at the end of 1992 and projection f futurso e reprocessing separation rate utilizatiod san n rate fueX sl botMO r hfo in thermal reactors and plutonium fuel in fast reactors. The year end total inventory is shown in Table III.

A working session organized the country data into a common format, and the data were then used to generate projections of future reprocessing and utilization rates as well as quantities of separated plutonium (see Figure 1). The assumptions underlying these projection presentee sar uncertaintiee th d Tabln di an V e I describe e sar Tabln di . eV

These projections were critically reviewed, leading to further refinement of the input data t thiA . s poin Advisore th t y Group splio refint te into eparton otw datd — s aan projections and the other to draft observations, conclusions and recommendations. The whole Advisory Group subsequently reconvene o reviet d d analyswan e reviseth e d projection f quantitieso f separateso d plutonium. This discussio vigorous nwa direcd san t — particularly raising the issue of the 'appropriateness' of a single projected value for future separated plutonium. Further discussions led to a consensus that the projections should be accompanied by a descriptive narrative on forecast uncertainties but that no upper or lower bound to generation rate, utilization rate, and inventories should be generated. Some quantitative figures were included in the narrative.

TABLE I. SEPARATED 'TOTAL' PLUTONIUM INVENTORIES (end 1992)

Owner Location

United Kingdom United Kingdom

Japan Japan, France

Belgium Belgium, France

USA USA

Russian Federation Russian Federation France France

Germany Germany, Belgium, France

India India Switzerland France

Netherlands France

Total inventories tonne7 8 : s CD c 150

a> 120

I 90

1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year AGM Projections Agency Projections

FIG. 1. Total plutonium balance.

TABLE H. ASSUMPTIONS FOR IAEA PLUTONIUM PROJECTIONS

- Reprocessin facilitieX MO sd experiencgan e less than full capacities during initial startup (learning effects).

THORP plant begins operatio 1993n i .

- Existing Hana fabricatioX uMO n plant doe t resumsno e operations Hanaw X ne ; uMO fabrication plant starts in early 1994.

- Reprocessing throughput through 1999 determine in-placy b d e contract data. Reprocessing throughput after 1999 estimate y assumindb g countr y countrb y y reprocessing rates remain constant.

Fast reactor consumptio negligiblns i e ove time th r e period examined.

A sensitivity analysis was made to determine the effect on separated plutonium inventories if the new Hanau MOX fabrication plant does not operate. In this case it was assumed that Germany would stop havin s spenit g t fuel reprocessed. Under these conditionse th , reduction in Pu separation rate nearly balances the reduction in Pu use rate. The maximum Pu inventories occur one year later and are about 8 metric tonnes larger.

The methodology use generatdo t projectiono tw e eth s show same e Figurnn i th s i .e1 The initial (end 1992) inventory for both projections was developed from data provided by the experts at this AGM. In each subsequent year, the plutonium separated in that year was added to the prior year's inventory and the plutonium utilized in that year was subtracte o derivdt e that year's ending plutonium inventory differencee Th . e th n i s projections arise from differences in input data. For example, the IAEA projection assumes no fast reactor plutonium consumption, while the estimates from Member States utilize 2.5 to 8.6 tonnes of plutonium annually in fast reactors. Also, the IAEA projection included no utilization of the plutonium separated in India. As these projections are refined and updated, it is expected that they will converge.

finae Th l sessio Advisore th f no y Group meeting focuse e draftine th th n do f go Observations, Conclusion Recommendationsd an s e finath f l o meetin, e whicon s ghi products. This discussio alss nowa lively with many views expressed groue Th . p finally reached a consensus which is given in Section 2 below.

8 TABLE ill. YEA INVENTORD REN TOTAF YO L SEPARATED PLUTONIUM (tonnes)

Year AGM projection IAEA projection 1992; 87 87 1993 92 100 1994 102 115 1995 111 131 1996 116 145 1997 117 154 1998 110 157 1999 95 160 2000 78 160 2001 57 157 2002 37 154 2003 15 149 2004 141 2005 132

2. RESULTS

The Advisory Group wishe notso t e that only plutonium from civil nuclear programmes is considered in the following.

2.1. Observations

Production of plutonium is a result of nuclear power generation. The plutonium produced as a result of nuclear power generation is a constituent of spent fuel. There are at present, two broad plutonium management strategies worldwide. One strategy regards plutonium as waste that is best retained in spent fuel in long term storage or in future final disposal in deep geologic formations. The second strategy sees the recovered plutonium and uranium in spent fuel as a valuable resource that will be vital future th n ei with advantage r wastsfo e management.

For those countries that have committed to reprocessing, the quantity of fuel to be reprocesse dbees ove nexha e n yearn th o rdefine s te t r so existiny db g contractual obligations.

Worldwide ove nexe th r t several year envisages i t i s d thaseparatioe th t n ratef so plutonium through reprocessing will exceed plutoniu ratese sloweme us Th . r than anticipated deploymen f plutoniuo t m utilization facilities underlie e builduth s f po separated plutonium. Some storage of plutonium, including existing inventories, is needed.

However, each of the principal countries engaged in the separation or receipt of commercial plutonium arising from reprocessin adoptes gha r o strategda e us o yt promote the use of the plutonium rather than store the plutonium. As a result of these strategies, projections show that a decrease in the quantities of separated plutonium will commence later this decade.

Ove neae th rmiddlo t r e term, quantitie f separateso d plutonium wilprincipalle b l y controlled by increased MOX use in thermal reactors. In addition, some countries seek to pursue a principle that would limit the quantities of separated plutonium to the level required to implement recycling programmes. Future technologies such as fast reactor managinn i als y d oai sma g quantitie f separateso d plutonium. TABLE IV. MEMBER STATES' FORECAST ASSUMPTIONS

Major assumptions

Major assumptions underlying these projections, are

- Full capacitie f reprocessino s fabricatioX MO g n facilitie throughpue ar s t when operating; - THORP plant begins operating mid-1993, - Hanau plant begins operating mid-1993 with existing plant and end 1994 with new plant; - Fast reactor plutonium consumption is

t/yea2 7- 1996Francn n 1 i i r 0 2 e( ) 06-16 t/year in Japan (1 6 in 1999) 01-50 t/year in Russia (5 0 in 1998)

Detailed assumptions

The assumptions in this analysis are primarily in the form of

- Plutonium separation rates (reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) times the plutonium recover reprocessed)F y ratSN r uni f epe o t ,

- MOX fabrication rates (including throughput at MOX fabrication facilities times plutonium conten fuel)n i td an ,

- Utilization rates of plutonium in fast reactor fuel (usually expressed as tonnes plutonium/year).

The data was provided by country representcitives and has not been critically reviewed Th t eappea datno o includao d t r e effect f technicaso r politicao l l uncertaintie date Th as were provide yeaa yeay n b rdo r basi separate— s d plutoniumf o inventoried en e th t sa 1992, and production — utilization rates yearly from 1 993 to 2005 — for each country Those data are summarized below

Country data

Belgium Separation rate none Utilizatio 30-8X n ratMO 0e t/year , 4-6%

China Separation t/yea 0 rat11 e r afte 9981 r kg/6 ,6 t Utilization rate none

France Separation rate 1075-1 650t/year, 5 0-6 8 Kg/t t/yea5 Utilizatio9 1 r 9- 37-55 X n ratMO e% FR 1 7-2 0 t/year

Germany Separation rate none Utilization rate MOX 1-120 t/year, 2 9-5 1 % FR none

India Separation rate reprocessin f TAPgo S fuel being negotiate RAPd dan SwitA fuehUS l being done under IAEA safeguards2- kg/67 t Utilization ratconsumo t e l plutoniueal m separated

Japan Separatio t/year0 kg/6 83 n5- ,- t rat0 8 e Utilizatio 01-X n ratt/yea6 4MO e r FR 06-1 3 t/year

Russian Federation Separation rate 150-1150t/year kg/0 6 , t Utilization rate MOX 0-1 50 t/year, 4% FR 1-20 t/year, 25%

United Kingdom Separation rate 782-1 640t/year, 2 1-6 7 kg/t % 5 t/year 0 Utilizatio5 2 7- 1 3 ,5- X n ratMO e

10 TABL . UNCERTAINTIEEV PROJECTIONSN SI SEPARATEF O D TOTAL PLUTONIUM INVENTORIES

The uncertaintie separatesn i d total plutonium inventories fall into several general classes. They are:

Technical uncertainties:

start dates of facilities, actual throughput in any one year (capacity factor).

These uncertainties small e tenb o dt .

Economic uncertainties:

• energy demand, • costs (natura , SWUU l , reprocessing fabricationX MO , , etc.), • international economic climate.

In some countries these uncertainties are the most important.

Political uncertainties:

• There are significant uncertainties — primarily of the political sort — associated with the projections of separated plutonium.

• Thirty years ago it was projected that the USA would have 1000 operating reactor yeae th rn si 200 primaril0— y plutonium burning FBRs.

• National polic reprocessinn yo Plutoniud gan changer m(o nationan si l policien si such matters) with regar non-proliferationo dt .

• Action nationay sb l licensing authoritie inactionr s(o licensiny sb g authorities).

• National policy respons changeo et r perceiveso d change publin si c opinion.

The political uncertainties appea provido rt largese eth t effecneae th r n i tert m while th en i longer term economie ,th c uncertainties ten havedo t mosn ,i t countries largese ,th t effect. The als e mose yar oth t difficul anticipato t t dead ean l with. Becaus f theieo r magnitude, themose th y e tten b important o dt .

France

The national policy is recycling plutonium. The reprocessed fuel until 2000 has been defined by existing contractual obligations. At the end of the century, the French reprocessin wil 3 160e b l UP 0d g t/year an capacit 2 .UP f yo

The yearly fabricatio fueX t leasl wila MO e f n tlb o century e 150th f o e 1 d befor.Th en e eth effective throughput/year5 19 o }t wilp (u tl depen demane th n do d fro utilitiee mth s from abroad.

Germany

If the German MOX fabrication plant at Hanau does not operate (the German reprocessing contracts are fixed) through 2002:

• Fabricatio fue5 X tonne83 l MO wilf nf losto e so b l .

plutoniue Th • m conten f thio t s 'lost' fuel woulmetri6 3 e db c tons fissile plutonium (52 t total Pu}.

• The worldwide inventory of separated Pu would be increased by these amounts (assuming that other circumstances are the same).

Russian Federation

The main uncertainties in the future Russian plutonium management policy are:

. 1 Timely constructio commissionind nan BN-800reactore th f go Soute th sn i h Urald san the Beloyarskaya NPPs to the years 1 998-2000. Schedule for construction of Complex-300 FBR fuel fabrication facility for BN-800 cores.

. 2 Completio f o construction d commissioninan n e yeath ry b g200 f o RT-5 2 reprocessing plant for WWER-1000 spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and associated MOX fuel fabrication facility for WWER-1000 reactor cores.

11 TABLE V. (cont.)

3. Availability of large investments for completing those facilities (economic issue].

4. Availability of WWER-1000 reactors (licensing) for MOX fuel utilization (political issue).

Japan

Japan's plutonium utilization will be promoted in accordance with the programmes which were e Atomimadth y b ec Energy Commission Advisory Committe n Nucleao e r Fuel Recyclin Augusn i g t 1991 uncertainte .Th e realizatioth s i y f thino s programme (e.g. constructio e Demonstratioth f o n n Fast Breeder Reactor (DFBR d Demonstratioan ) n Advanced Thermal Reactor (DATR), whic hoperation i wil e lb n after 2000, commencement of utilizatio f plutoniuno LWRmid-1990s)y me b th n si . However nationaa s i t i , l principle that Japan wilt posseslno s plutonium beyon amoune dth t require implemendo t nucleas tit r fuel recycling programmes, so even if the construction is delayed, the separated plutonium inventories will not be increased.

Although the following three subjects were not specifically addressed at the meeting, the Advisory Group wishes to note that:

• Safeguards system n existenci e e nucleath ar s r efo r fuel cycle which appear satisfactor r addressinyfo anticipatee gth d near term growt quantitiee th n hi f so separated plutonium,

risk e hazardd Th san • s associated with plutonium storage, transpor handlind an t g are well understood and the technology is available to conduct these activities for the next twenty years. Some industrial facilities are now in operation and have been operating for many years.

principae Th • l technologie r safelsfo y using plutoniu mreactorn i available sar d ean currentl usen yi .

• Plutonium use in thermal reactors does raise long term issues that must be addressed, particularl implicatione yth f multiplso recyclX build-ue eth MO e— f po minor actinides, the change in plutonium isotope distribution, etc.

2.2. Conclusions

Although quantities of separated plutonium will grow over the next several years, national strategies, when implemented, will result in a subsequent reduction in the quantit f separateyo d plutonium worldwide.

e principaTh l technologie available ar s o reduct e e quantitieth e f separateo s d plutonium.

Implementatio e nationath f no l strategies which would lea o reductiondt e th n i s quantitie f separateso d plutoniu mlinkes i publio dt c perception perceivee .Th d public concern regarding growing quantities of separated plutonium is divergent from the technical view that there are existing technologies capable of safely and securely using and handling plutonium. National strategies are in place in many countries to control the quantities of the separated plutonium.

12 CHINA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME AND THE PROJECTED PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTIO PLUTONIUF NO M

Qiusheng LIU Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering, Beijing, China

Abstract

China's nuclear power programm describedes i f China'o l Al . s spent fuel wil reprocessede b l . plutoniue th Primar f o e myus recovere dfasn i wil e t b lbreede r reactors.

1. INTRODUCTION OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME

China's nuclear power programme was launched in the early nineties. Qin Shan nuclear power plant with a prototype 300 MW(e) PWR in Zhejiang Province has been in operation since 1991 desige secone .th Th f no d phasprojece th f eo t which includeo stw 600 MW(e) PWRs is completed and is now being examined by the authorities concerned for approval.

The construction of Daya Bay nuclear power plant with two 900 MW(e) PWRs comes near completion PWRe th f t into s pu oe wil e operatiob lOn . Septemben i othee th d r an r in March 1994.

The projec f Liaonino t g nuclear power plant consistin 100o tw f 0go MW(e) reactors has been planned and the feasibility study is being undertaken. In addition, some other provinces have also shown interests in nuclear power and the early stage work is undergoing.

According to China's nuclear power programme, the total installed capacity of nuclear power will reach 6 GW(e) by the end of this century. It is predicted that the pace of increas nuclean ei r power wil evee b l n greate beginnine th nexe n i r th f t go century y M . estimat installee th f eo d capacit yeae th r y 201yb 5 would comGW(e)0 3 o et .

2. ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM AND SPENT FUEL

The spent fuel and produced plutonium will continue to increase while China's nuclear programm advancings ei .

TABL E. PROSPECI ANNUAF TO L ARISING ACCUMULATIOD SAN SPENF NO T FUED LAN ITS PLUTONIUM CONTENT IN CHINA UNTIL 2015

Year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Nuclear installed capacity (GW(e)) 2.1 6.0 12.0 20.0 30.0

Spent fuel Annual arisings (t HM) 60 140 300 450 750

Accumulation (t HM) 100 500 1 7OO 3600 6800

Pu content Annua) (t l 0.5 1.2 2.7 4.0 6.7

Accumulation (t) 0.9 4.5 15.3 32.4 61.2

13 The figures given in Table I contain some uncertainties since they are based on the nuclear power programme realizatioe th , f whicno h depend mann so y factors, sucs ha China's economi sociad can l condition developins it d san g strategy. Therefore figuree ,th s could be higher or lower.

. REPROCESSIN3 GNUCLEAF OPTIOO BAC E D TH KEN S RNA FUEL CYCLE STRATEGY Based on China's concrete conditions and in order to make the best use of nuclear resource disposo t d an se nuclear waste wit vieha protectinwo t environmente gth , China has opted for a reprocessing strategy for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. All spent fuels from nuclear power plant r froso m various research reactors wil reprocessede b l .

For this purpose, it is necessary to construct a central wet spent fuel storage facility (CSFS) away from reactor provido st e buffer storag f speneo reprocessine t th fue r fo l g plants CSFSe firse th Th . tt stagea , , will hav storagea d een capacit e th y f b 500 yo M 1H of this century. Meanwhile, a nearby pilot reprocessing plant with a throughput of 300 kg HM/d wil constructee b l t intaboun pu o ru same d th t dan e period.

A larger scale reprocessing plant with a throughput of 4001 HM/a will be built around 2010 whil CSFe eth S will expan storags dit e capacit . Therefore 100o t HM p t 0yu l al , civilian plutoniu reprocesseme b wilt no l wild ldan remai spenn i t fuel store individuan di l reactor pools until the end of this century.

. POLIC4 PRODUCN YO T FORMS, STORAGE, UTILIZATIO TRANSPORTATIOD NAN F NO PLUTONIUM The recovered plutonium will be mainly used in fast reactors in China. There are two

technological ways to fabricate MOX fuel. One is from plutonium nitrate Pu(NO3)4 and uranyl nitrate UO2(NO3)2 solutions othee th , r fro mixture mth f prefabricateeo d plutonium dioxide and uranium dioxide powder. MOX fuel fabricated by the latter technology, after irradiation, possesses indissoluble trend in concentrated nitric acid. This would cause some difficulty for the spent MOX fuel reprocessing process and purification process from americium-241 for aged plutonium products.

The plutonium nitrate solution has some chemical instability and corrosiveness. This would cause problem transportationn si fabricatio X MO e th n, planSo . t wile buile th b l n i t vicinity of the reprocessing plant. Therefore, the transportation could be simply done with pipe connecting between the two plants.

FASE TH T . 5 REACTOR PROGRAMME

China' developmenR FB s t plas beeha nn include e nationath n i d l development programm r higefo h scienc technologyd ean developmenR FB . divides i t d into three steps:

First step: The experimental FBR with a thermal capacity of 65 MW( 25 MW(e)) will be constructed by the end of century, its fuel load will be about 450 kg of heavy metal, consistin f 27%(w/w)ogo f civilian plutonium(76% Pu-239d )an 73%(w/w enriche% 30 f o ) d uranium. Second step: Construction of a module FBR will be completed beyond 2010. Third step: A large scale FBR with a capacity of 1000-1 500 MW(e) will be put into commissioning around 2025.

It may utilize plutonium alloy fuel for the module and largescale FBRs with a capacity of 1000 MW(e). Their initia lreactoe loa th f plutoniu o n d i 5 r 7. core d man s woul5 2. e db and the annual additional amount of plutonium would be 1.24 t and 1.76 t respectively.

14 INDUSTRIAL REPROCESSING AND RECYCLIN FRANCEGN I EFFECTIVN A : E PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT METHOD

D. GERSTER DCC, Centre d'études nucléaires, Gif-sur-Yvette LONGEVIALLEE D . H . LUCAP , S COGEMA, Vélizy France

Abstract

The paper describes the commercial facilities required for plutonium recycling. It presents the status of the French plutonium fuel cycle facilities in operation or under construction, including the quantities of materials treated to date and the current and anticipated capacity for the coming years. The French polic n plutoniuo y m management, including loading uranium oxidd an e uranium-plutonium oxide fuels in light water reactors over the coming years, is also described. Finally, French research and development relating to plutonium management, particularly with respec advanceo t t d reactors presenteds i , .

INTRODUCTION Long term use of nuclear energy implies recycling. A 'once-through' fuel cycle would put worldwide natural uranium reserves on a par with oil resources. Not only would this deplete limited natural resources t i goe, s agains trene th t d toward recycling spurrey db concerns about environmental protection in which nothing is disposed of as waste until its reusable materials have been recovere recycledd dan .

As uranium oxide fue burnes i l lighn di t water reactor t generatesi s plutoniume Th . only effective metho f preventindo e build-ugth f plutoniuo p m inventorie o takt s ei s advantag fissile th f eo qualit f plutoniuyo mnuclearn i reactors. Dependin desiree th n go d outcome, plutonium inventories can be increased, stabilized or decreased, each of which involves a different fuel management method, both in the reactors and in fuel cycle facilities.

Since the world's most prevalent reactor type is the light water reactor, the most readily available metho f reducindo g plutonium inventorie recyclo t s i e plutonium into fuel for these reactors. Another method will consist of improving the way that advanced reactors, including the fast reactors, generate or consume plutonium.

France has the full range of plutonium recycling facilities in operation or under construction: plutonium generation in pressurized water reactors, domestic capability to use plutonium fuels withi pressurizee nth d water reactors, fuel fabrication facilitied san plutonium separation at reprocessing plants.

The fuel cycle facilities offer plutonium fuel related service Electricito st Francee éd , the French national electric utility, and to foreign utilities. All these services are done under Eurato Internationad man l Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

15 . INDUSTRIA1 L FACILITIE PLUTONIUR SFO M RECYCLING Plutonium is generated in nuclear reactors. For its recycling in the power reactors, facilities to fabricate plutonium-containing fuels and to separate plutonium from spent fuel are necessary.

1.1. Plutonium generation

Plutonium is a fissile material produced by neutronic capture of the fertile 238U isotope nuclean i r reactors. Plutoniu generatee b n mca nuclean di r reactor scooles sucga s hda reactors (GCRs), light water reactors (LWRs) both boiling water reactors (BWRr )o pressurized water reactors (PWR) and fast reactors (FBRs).

For instance, a PWR which generates 1 TW-h of electricity using uranium oxide fuel also generate f fissilo g k e 0 plutoniums3 .

The plutonium content and isotopic composition in spent fuel depends on fuel type, burn-up and cooling time. In a conventional fuel, approximately 1 % of the heavy metal consists of plutonium with the following average isotopic composition:

238pu 239pu 240pu 24 u 1p 242pu 1.8% 57.8% 22.6% 12.2% 5.6%

1.2. Plutonium fuel use

Plutonium containing fuel was initially developed for both water reactors and fast reactors. For the time being, the industrial facilities which can use plutonium fuel are worldwide light water reactors.

The UOX fuel (uranium oxide fuel) used in PWRs and BWRs is made of uranium whose content of the fissile U isotope has been enriched to 3 to 5%, depending on the 235 anticipated bum-u fuele th f .po

In the MOX fuel (mixed oxide fuel), the fissile 235U isotope is replaced by the fissile 239Pu and 241Pu isotopes. Their content in the fuel are again dependent on the anticipated burn-u isotopi the als pbut o on c compositio plutoniumthe nof .

Existing BWR PWRd sfullan e sar y capabl f recyclineo g plutoniuX fore MO th mf mo n i fuel, as has been demonstrated in several countries. So the existing industrial facilities are impedimene th t no plutoniuo t m recycling technicae Th . l limitation onl e amoune sar yth t f plutoniuo m accommodatee whicb n hca e availabilit th e cord th an en di f certai o y n equipments such as monitoring equipment. There are also restrictions relating to reactor licensinfuelX sMO loadingr gfo .

1.3. Plutonium fuel fabrication

The principal type of plutonium containing fuel under fabrication today is the MOX fuel made for the light water reactors.

MOX fuel is a mixture of plutonium and depleted or natural uranium. The amount of plutonium depend anticipatee th n so fissile th d n ebum-uo contenfued e e th an lf th po f o t plutonium r instanceFo . plutoniue th , mfueX contenl MO assembl a f o t y designea r dfo 33 GW-d/t HM burn-up and made with plutonium generated by a 33 GW-d/t HM UOX fuel is approximately 5% of the heavy metal. In the next future the plutonium content will be 5 to 8%.

16 The following steps are involved in plutonium fuel fabrication:

proportional blending of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide, - micronization and blending of the powder, - palletizing, sinterin grindin d pelletse gan th f go , rod fabrication (fillin pressurization)d gan , fuel assembly.

1.4. Plutonium separation from spent fuel

Plutoniu 'minede b n mca ' from spent fuel muc valuabls ha e metal minee sar d from oreseparatios It . purificatiod nan importann a s ni nucleae t parth f o t r fuel reprocessing industry which currently use the PUREX process.

This process is now well mastered at an industrial scale. Plutonium recovery involves followine th g operations:

- spent fuel shearing, - dissolution and clarification of the dissolved fuel, separation from fission products using liquid-liquid extraction, separation from uranium using liquid-liquid extraction, purification using liquid-liquid extraction, - oxalic plutonium precipitation, - conversion into plutonium oxide, - conditionin plutoniumf go , returownerse th o nt .

1.5. Other facilities

For the industrial recycling of plutonium, other industrial units can be useful, especially to uncouple the different steps of the fuel cycle as much as necessary. Those operationfollowinge th e b n :sca

- interim storag f plutoniueo m oxide after reprocessin beford gan e fuel fabrication, interim storag f plutoniueo m fuel after fuel fabricatio beford nan e reactor loading, plutonium recovery from fuel cycle waste in order to strongly reduce plutonium losses, - americium removal from plutoniu meliminato t e 241Am generate radioactivy db e decay of 241Pu.

. FRENC2 H EXPERIENC CAPABILITIED EAN PLUTONIUSN I M RECYCLING

Franclarga s eha e experienc l industriaal n i e l step f plutoniuo s m recyclind an g provides an efficient industrial capability in this area.

2.1. Plutonium generation

installen Franca s ha ed generating capacit 7 GW(e)5 f o y . Nuclear power plants generated 320 TW- h in 1 992, that is approximately 75% of the country's electricity.

Three types of reactors exist in France:

natural uranium gas cooled reactors, pressurized water reactors, - fast reactors.

17 cooles ga e d th reactor s A s French programm shue b to t dow s ei n (onl reactoe yon r is now in operation and it will be shut down soon), their contribution to the plutonium production will not be taken into account in this paper.

faso Tw t reactor available sar Francen ei : PHENIX (250 MW(e) SUPERPHENId an ) X (1200 MW(e)). These reactors are prototypes designed to demonstrate the feasibility of this reactor typthereford t egeneratan no o ed e significant amount f electricitso e th r yfo national grid. The plutonium generated by this reactor type will also not be considered in this paper.

The French pressurized water reactors under operation are:

34 PWRs of the 900 MW(e) series, 18 PWRs of the 1300 MW(e) series.

Five other reactors are under construction and four in the design stage.

As of the end of 1992, The French pressurized reactors generated approximately 80 tonne f plutoniumso .

By the turn of the century, the French PWRs will have generated approximately 180 tonnes annuan a t a ,tonnes l0 1 rat f eo .

2.2. Plutonium fuel use in French nuclear power plants

France passed through a decisive step in 1985 when EOF decided to recycle plutoniu Frence th PWRss w hit m no polic n i o tako t S . s yei advantag f plutoniueo m through recycling in the industrial reactors.

Among the French nuclear power plants, the French regulatory authorities have now MW(e0 90 licenseF X ) correactore EO th MO e6 f r fuels o dwit1 X fa loao s% o t h MO S . d 30 fuels have been loade fivn di e plants , GRAVELINE t LAUREN, S B2 : d B4 an d 1 an T B 3 SB DAMPIERR fueX l . MO WhefabricatioE 1 w nne n capacity come linn so e after 1994e ,th loading of MOX fuel in PWRs will increase significantly.

MOX fuel is currently licensed in France for a maximum bum-up of 39 GW-d/t in the one third core management scenario. Developments in progress will lead to the use of e performancth t a R PW e n i leve X l currentlMO ye mos th use r t dfo efficien t enriched uranium fuel, i.e t averaga . e bum-u GW-d/t5 4 interie f th po n I m.hybri a d scenario (one fourth refueling fuelthirwitX e on d,hUO refueling fuelwitX )h MO wil implementede b l .

fue X additionan A l witMO technicae o hPWR2 n us 1 ln sca l modifications future .Th e N4 1450 MW(e) PWR series is designed to accommodate a 30% MOX core, in anticipation e widespreath f o f advancedo d reactors suc fass ha t reactor r moro s e advanced water reactors.

As of now, EOF has encountered no major difficulty in operating the current generation of PWRs with MOX fuel.

At of the end of 1 992, 140 tonnes of MOX fuels have been loaded in the French EOF PWRs, corresponding to approximately 7.5 tonnes of plutonium.

In the future, assuming average plutonium content of 5.5% of plutonium in the MOX fuel, the 16 PWRs licensed for MOX will use approximately 7 tonnes of plutonium yearly.

18 2.3. Plutonium fuel fabrication

COGEM d BELGONUCLEA1Ran A partnere Ear n plutoniui s m fuel fabricatiod an n marketing throug COMMOe hth X joint venture.

Francen I firse ,th t plutonium fuels were fabricate PHENIe th SUPERPHENIr d dfo Xan X power e CFCplantth y ab s plan t Cadarachea t . This COGEM Aprimarilw planno s i t y dedicated to the fabrication of MOX fuel. The plant produced 9 t HM in 1 992, which will yeae year th ry pe 2000b r M H .t 5 199n i 3 d M 3H an t 5 1 ris o et

Following the decision to recycle plutonium in PWRs, COGEMA launched construction MELOe oth f X plan t Marcoula t e wit annuan ha , correspondinl throughpuHM t 0 10 f o tg to 5 to 8 tonnes of plutonium per year.

The MELOX plant will begin operating in 1995 at a anticipated production of 501 HM for the first year, rising to its full capacity of 100 t HM per year in 1996, and increasing gradually to approximately 1 601 HM around the year 2000.

The BELGONUCLEAIRE plant year t Dessepe sa r M 'POH lt 'includ 5 facilit3 e eth n yi operation since 1973, and the 401 HM per year 'P1 ' facility scheduled to enter service in 1998.

Table I shows the anticipated throughput of these industrial facilities (CFCa facility, MELOX and BELGONUCLEAIRE plants) for the coming years. These facilities will give COGEMA access to approximately 280 t HM per year of MOX fuel fabrication capability centurye th f o tern I d . f beformplutoniumen o e eth , assumin averagn ga e plutonium content of 5.5% in MOX fuel, this production capacity represents a consumption of approximately 1 5 tonnes of plutonium per year. These figures have to be compared to the French plutonium separation capacity at the UP2 and UP3 plants which is 16 tonnes for the reprocessing of conventional 33 GW- d/t UOX fuels.

TABLE I. CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED MOX FABRICATION CAPACITY (in tonnes of heavy metal per year)

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 CFCA 15 15 20 25 30 35 35 35 MELOX O O 50 100 120 130 15O 160 PO 35 35 35 40 40 40 40 40 P1 O 0 0 0 0 10 30 40

havCOGEMF agreemenn ea EO d Aan t whereb formee yth r will separate plutonium and produce a specific quantity of MOX fuel, and the latter will consume them in its power generating reactors, thereby ensuring thaplutoniue th t m stockpil onls ei largs s i ya s ea necessar r commerciayfo l operations exampler Fo . , loadinwite % h 30 PWRMW 6 g1 0 s90 burnufuea X GW-d/tH3 t 3 a lo MO f po M requires yearly approximatel 20tHy1 X MO Mf o fuel.

By the end of 1992, 1 90 t HM of MOX fuels have been fabricated at the PO plant.

f 1992o d en , Be f 120plutonium-yo th M 1H c ntaining fuels have been fabricatedn i the CFCA plant including:

fueltonne3 R 10 ,FB f so 11 tonnes of MOX fuel for French requirements.

19 0 tU80

700

i 361.4 448

600

500

430.3' 400

300 332.6 R |———FB | FUEL '———' 200 MOX

UP3 100 104.9101.3

UP2 14.6 17.9 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

FIG. 1. Annually reprocessed UP2/UP3 oxide fuel (total quantity 31 Dec. 1992: 4762.1 t). 2.4. Plutonium separation from spent fuel

Frence Th h reprocessing industrial capabilit r spenyfo t fuels from PWR BWRd san s is provided by:

Hague a plan2 L t a tUP , e whicnominaa th s hha - l capacitt HM/yea 0 40 f yo r through 1 994, and will thereafter reach 8001 HM/year through the UP2-800 upgrade project, and the UP3 plant at La Hague, which started up in the 1989-1 990 time frame, and which has a nominal capacity of 800 t HM/year.

Whe UP2-80e nth 0 plant begins operation Hagua L e eth , reprocessing complex will have a total reprocessing capacity of 1600 t HM per year, giving COGEMA the largest commercial capability for plutonium separation in the world.

This capacity represents, for conventional 33 GW-d/t UOX fuel, the separation of approximately 1 6 t of plutonium per year. With a higher burn-up or for MOX fuels, the same reprocessing global capability will correspon greatea o dt r plutonium recovery.

thesn I e plants PUREe th , X process leadvera o yst high performanc plutoniun ei m recovery:

Mor plutoniue eth tha f o n % m99. 5containe spene th n di t fue recovereds i l .

Impuritie plutoniun si m produc lese ar st tha microCi/n1 g desig a (fo rregulatio d nan n specificatio f 8^/Ci/g)no .

The annually reprocessed quantit f oxido y e fue t UP2-UPa l 3 plant shows i s n ni Figur. e1

Tabl I showI e e projecteth s d throughput e e plantth th f f o so d througen e hth century.

TABLE II. CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED REPROCESSING THROUGHPUT AT THE LA HAGUE PLANTS (in tonnes of heavy metal per year)

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 UP2 300 65O 850 850 850 85O 850 850 UP3 600 700 800 900 900 900 800 800

f 1992o d en , e 476th f 2o tonnet A f fueso l have beed n an reprocesse 2 UP e th n di UP3 plants including:

tonne9 158 f Frencso h uranium oxide fuel, fuel X tonne5 4. .MO f so

commitment Th2 f 199o e2UP d en includ e th t sea 8156tonne f Frencso h spent fuel, correspondin separatioe th o gt f approximatelno tonne0 y8 f plutoniumso .

2.5. Other facilities As shown in the reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication sectors, COGEMA adapts its commercial service to its clients' needs. This will be further demonstrated by the americium removal unit which is currently under project and will allow reprocessing and fuel fabricatio decouplee b o nt termn di f timingso .

21 COGEMA also intend reduco st inventoryvolume e eth th d ean f unusablo e wastes and especiall recoveo yt valuable th r e materials suc plutoniums ha specifio S . c unito st recover plutonium from transuranic wastes thereby reducing the presence of alpha emitters waste th n i e prio disposalo t r presentle ,ar y under constructio achievo nt e both goals.

3. MANAGEMENT OF THE FRENCH PLUTONIUM INVENTORY

discusses A d above, EDF's polic f recyclinyo g plutonium int conventionals oit PWRs is supported by substantial operating experience and industrial capability in plutonium technologie fueX l MO fabrication d an s . Inheren e plutoniuth n i t m recycling polics i y minimizatio plutoniue 992th 1 f f Frencne o o ,th d men h inventory inventore th f o s f A y.o isolated plutoniu abous mwa tonnes7 t .

In the following sections, plutonium management through light water reactors fuerecyclinX lfore MO wil th presentedf e m o b ln g i futurd an , e trend r evesfo n more efficient plutonium management will be discussed

3.1. Near-term plutonium inventory management fuewitX lhMO

Tabl showI eII estimatee sth d additional amount plutoniuf so m entering inventory each year for various existing PWR 1000 MW(e) scenarios.

TABL EPLUTONIUR IIIPW . M BALANCE SCENARIOS

Plutonium balance

Enriched uranium fuel ±260 kg/year (UOX, 33 GW-d/t HM)

Enriched uranium fuel ±230 kg/year (UOX GW-d/5 4 , ) HM t

X MO UOX % % 70 30 , ± 70 kg/year (33 GW-d/t HM) seene b n : ca s A

for the same amount of power, uranium oxide fuel generates less plutonium at a higher bum-up, by its negative contribution to the plutonium generation, the use of MOX fuel significantly reduces the production of plutonium.

Figur showe2 s another perspectiv plutoniun eo fissiod man n products productionn i a closed fuel cycle vs an open one for the same level of power generation. A first plutonium recyclin closee th n gi d cycle produce canistero stw f higso h level vitrified waste for disposal and one fuel assembly containing approximately 20 kg of plutonium, whereas opee th n cycle produces eight fuel assemblie disposar sfo l containing approximatelg k 0 y4 of plutonium. The closed cycle therefore cuts plutonium generation by approximately half and make significansa t contributio plutoniuo nt m inventory controf o l througe us e hth MOX fuel.

Furthermore, plutonium is disposed of as part of the spent fuel in the open cycle scenario, wherea plutoniue sth m recyclee b containe y fueX ma dl MO e again di th n ni closed fuel cycle thir sFo . purpose successfua , l campaig spenX MO t f fueno l reprocessing has bee Haguea L n t conductea .2 99 1 n di

22 FIRST RECYCLING SPENT FUEL OF PLUTONIUM AS MOX FUEL NOT REPROCESSED (closed cycle) (open cycle) LWR fuel with enriched uraniuU kg 0 m50 per assembly

Reprocessing 4eoj k gu SkgPu *7 ISkgFP.J... • • 2 gl«s« canisters • • Fabrication of a MOX fuel assembly

Irradiatioa f no fuel assembly MOX enrichedU

Fuel assembly after irradiation spenX tMO spent LWR fuel

Total

spen1 X tMO 8 spent fuel assemblies (20kgPu) (40 kgPu) 4- 2 glass canisters II

FIG. 2. Reprocessing/open cycle comparison.

combinatio a conclusionn I f o e us e f uraniuno th , m oxid fuelX a en s i MO fuel d san closed fuel cycl first a decisiv s ebu i t e step towards controllin buildue gth f isolatepo d plutonium.

3.2. Future trends in plutonium inventory management

Plutonium recycling in PWRs has been proven on an industrial level. This is without douby an tremendoua t s advantage.

The entire fue fuee l on cycll r assemblyfo e , including fuel fabrication, power generation, reprocessing and recycling into new fuel, lasts approximately ten years.

23 Therefore, although MOX fuel multiple recycling will be limited because of the isotopic composition of plutonium, recycling will still be possible in unmodified PWRs for at least years0 4 o t . 0 3

In the meantime, ways of optimizing plutonium recycling and inventory management future th unde e n i ear r study activitieD R& . focusee sar d primaril modifyinn yo g existing methods, particularly with respect to retarding plutonium generation, and on finding new method r recyclingsfo , especially plutonium burning methods.

Method f retardinso g plutonium generatio PWRn i s include:

- increasin burn-ue gth f uraniupo m oxide fuels, increasing the proportion of MOX fuels in PWRs, from 30 % to 40 % for example, increasing the plutonium content in MOX fuels, - running spectral shifr increaseo t d moderation PWRs loaded solely with plutonium-containing fuel.

With respecrecyclinw ne o t g solutions, further researc Franchn i focusins ei e th n go use of fast reactors to:

- giv negativea e plutonium balance, - produce high quality plutoniu futurr mfo e recycling, regardless their configuration (breede r burner)o r , - 'rectify isotopie th ' c compositio f previouslno y recycled MOX.

The estimated performance of the SUPERPHENIX reactor when operating in accordance with reactor design criteria provides an example of this research. The core of SUPERPHENIX can accommodate approximately 5 or 6 t of plutonium. Table VI gives the estimated plutonium balance for various SUPERPHENIX operating scenarios.

TABLE IV. ESTIMATED PLUTONIUM BALANCE FOR SUPERPHENIX SCENARIOS

Plutonium balance

Breeder operation + 200 kg/year

Without blankets kg/yea0 0 1 - r

Without blankets with additional optimizatioe th f no - 300 kg/year core

Additional researc CAPRe parperformes e th a b f o tA o hAt projecCE y db t (increased plutonium consumptio fase th t nn reactorsi ) aim t plutoniusa m consumption level f morso e than 80 kg of plutonium per TW-h; the theoretical limit for plutonium consumption is 110k TW-hr pe g . Those promising initial results have prompted additional studies and testing in areas such as physics, fuel design, core management and nuclear safety. The numerous potential solutions offe interestinn a r g challeng programmesD R& r efo .

24 PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS

The above considerations show that the effective management of plutonium inventory does not rely mainly upon the numerical inventory at a certain date but relies upon the following elements:

- the industrial capacity first to produce and then to recover and consume plutonium when necessar whed yan n producuser e requested th en f so e tth withiy db n industrial plants and nuclear reactors, researce th h capacit proposo yt improvd ean e effective system recovero st , valorize and consume plutonium.

So, from a French point of view, four main directions for thoughts and actions at the International Atomic Energy Agency can be proposed:

- to go on registering data about plutonium in the world in the spent fuels, in the fuel cycle plants nucleae th n i , r reactors storage th n i , e facilities; to evaluate the existing technologies of plutonium management and to formulate recommendation these orden si us eo t rpossibilitie contributo st e th o et frow mno optimal managemen f plutoniumo t ; supporo t contributinD R& t managemene th o gt f plutoniumo t , especialle th r fo y reductio worle th f dno stock, thank developmene th o st fuels w reactorsw ne f ne , o t , new processes in order to produce as much or more nuclear power while limiting the amount of unused plutonium; - to undertake a communication action towards the public to explain what is done, especiall t IAEAfiele ya th f management do n i , , contro safetd an l f plutoniumyo .

ABBREVIATIONS

BWR boiling water reactor FBR fast reactor (breede r burnero r ) cooles ga d reactoGCR r LWR light water reactor PWR pressurized water reactor UOX uranium oxide X MO mixed oxide (uraniu plutoniumd man ) t HM tonne of heavy metal

Next page(s) lef5 2 t blank PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ACCUMULATION OF ISOLATED PLUTONIUM - SITUATION IN GERMANY

U. SCHMIDT Siemens AG, Power Generation Group KWU, Hanau, Germany

Abstract

German committes yi spendo t t fuel reprocessing, plutonium recover recyclingd yan totae .Th l present (en f 1992do ) separated plutonium inventor tonnes8 7. s yi .

1. PLUTONIUM PRODUCED BY REPROCESSING FOR GERMAN UTILITIES

German utilities have been and continue to be committed to reprocessing their spent fuel assemblie recycld an s e recovereeth d plutonium. accordancn Thii s i s e wite hth existing German Atomic Law which demands the utilization of fissile material contained in spent fuel assemblies, unless it is technically or economically impossible. Thus, the German utilities hold reprocessing contracts with BNF Cogémd managemene Lan th r afo f theio t r spent fuel assemblies.

This leads to:

Net present inventory f abou t Puo 3 fis5. st (7. 8t Pu tot) (additional 1 500 t HM spent fuel are already at reprocessing plant).

Estimated annual production ,,u ss /yeaP f abou t o 8 r 2. (4.2t totu ):1P thi equivalens i t

to cumulative plutonium generation of 29.41 Puflss (43 t Putot) in 2002 and additional 1 9.6 t Puflss (27.2 t Putot) in 2008.

At present, discussions are being held between the political parties, representatives nucleae oth f r industrutilitiee th d orden syi an reaco f t r o consensue ha us e th n so nuclear energy in Germany. One objective is that long term intermediate storage wit optioe hth f finano l disposal wil acceptee b l legallda y equivalen reprocessino t g and utilization of plutonium.

2. MOX FABRICATION IN GERMANY

- dato t 5 Since Siemen96 BWRr e1 fo manufactures X ssha MO f o M H d t abou8 5 1 t and PWRs and 5.9 t HM for fast reactors.

Thi equivalens i plutoniumo t t consumed f about Puo 8 fis5. st tot (8.u ).P 5t

- The existing Siemens MOX fuel fabrication plant in Hanau (25 t HM/year) is temporarily shut down by injunction since 1991, although it did operate for a very short period in 1992. Siemensw ne Foe th r 1201 HM/year fuelX MO fabrication plant Hanan i issues uwa d a license for plant erection and operation in March 1 991. The plant is almost ready for startup, but completion has been delayed by the Hessian Local Government. The

27 Federal Government, Siemens, and German utilities all continue to support both projects. t presentA Germa0 1 , n nuclear power plants hold licenseoperatioe th r fo s n with MOX fuel assemblies and 7 of these are currently operating with MOX fuel assemblie reactoe th n si r cores. License insertioe fueX th r l MO assembliesfo f no s into further German nuclear power plants have been applied for but are still pending for political reasons.

. TOTA3 L AMOUN ISOLATEF TO D PLUTONIUM PRODUCE CONSUMER DO D

REPROCESSING CONTRACT GERMAF SO N UTILITIES

Quantity

spenM H tt fuel kg Pufiss kg Pu total* Contracts until 2002

COGEMA 4731 6 96 7 2 41 189 WAK 98 637 882 BNFL 884 5 747 7 956 Miscellaneous 971 1 390

Total 5713 35321 7 5141 Produced Pu until end 1 992 11 246 5 23 6 1

Consumed Pu for MOX fuel until 1992 5 923 8465 Present Pu Inventory 5 323 7770

reprocessee b Po ut d until 2002 24075 35 182

Pu available until 2002 8 2939 42952

Additional contracts until 2008

COGEMA 1 674 10 884 15 066 BNFL 1 344 8 736 12 096

Total 3 018 19 620 27 162

* Calculated with 9 g Putot/kg U without Pu decay.

28 ROLE PLUTONIUF TH EO E TH MN I NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME OF INDIA

D.D. SOOD Radiochemistry and Isotope Group, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Bombay, Trombay, India

Abstract

India's nuclear power programm entireles i y self-reliant, including plutonium recycle. Although firse th t power plants were BWRs primare th , y reacto e PHWth w rR typno utilizin s ei g natural uranium lone gTh . range programme anticipatef FBRso e us . Mose sth f India'o t s plutoniut no ms i separated and remains in spent fuel. Plutonium is utilized shortly after separation; no long term plutonium storage is planned.

. INTRODUCTIO1 N

The rol f nucleaeo r energgeneratioe th r yfo f electricitno Indi n yvisualisei s awa y db Dr. H.J. Bhabha when the exploitation of this source of energy was in early stages even in the developed countries. India's strategy for nuclear power development has been to base our technology on indigenous effort and today India is one of the few countries to attain self-reliance in all aspects of nuclear power generation starting from prospecting and minin f uraniugo mo fuet l reprocessin wastd gan e managemen wels a plutonius t a l m recycle choice reactoe th Th . f eo r syste alss mowa made keepin vien g i objectivee wth s of this indigenisation. With limited known reserve f uraniuso tonnes)0 00 Indim n i 0 a(7 t i , s decidewa d thae reactoth t r system shoul e naturabasee th db n o dl uranium, since enriched uranium reactors required more uraniu r equivalenmfo t power base firse Th .t power statio Indin installei s awa t Tarapuda r wit hele hf th Generap o l Electric, USAn ,i 196 thid 9s an type reactor o statiochoicR e tw .Th d BW f thi ef no ha s o s reactor syster mfo the first station was based on the requirement of initiating the nuclear power programme in India with a reliable and developed system. All subsequent reactors which are in operation or under construction are pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) which used natural uraniu fuels ma .

India is a vast country and the two most prominent established sources of energy tappee whicb n o meedt hca e energth t y requirement s populatioit f o s coae d nar an l nuclear. The existing uranium resources can sustain a nuclear power programme, based o n0 MW(e) PHWRs00 0 1 . f Thio , s potential can, however increasee b , factoa y df b o r 40-50 if the major isotopes of uranium, i.e. 238U, could also be channelised to produce power possibls i thit o I usin.y d sb o et g fast breeder reactors whic t onlhno y produce powe t alsrbu o efficiently convert 238 Uplutoniumo t bees ha n t estimate.I d tha currene tth t resource f uraniuso m could sustai installen na d capacit MW(e0 f abou00 f yfaso o 0 ) t30 t breeder reactor mansfor y decades. India alslargohas e reserve 000 thoriu sof 600 m(3 tonnes) which coul convertee db fissilo dt e 233U. Thorium reserve f Indiso a could ensure stable supply of nuclear energy for many centuries.

Currently operatin 9 Indi s aha g reactors reactor2 :MW(e0 6 1 f so ) each (TAPSt a ) Tarapur, 2 reactors of 220 MW(e) each (RAPS) at Kota, 2 reactors of 220 MW(e) each (MAPS) at Kalpakkam, 2 reactors of 220 MW(e) each (NAPS) at Narora and 1 reactor of 220 MW(e) (KAPS) at Kakrapar. A second unit of 220 MW(e) is expected to be commissioned shortly at Kakrapar. A station having 2 reactors of 220 MW(e) each (KAPS) is under constructio t Kaigana morx Si . e unit f 220/50so 0 MW{e) eac plannee har t da

29 TABLE I. NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN INDIA

Reactor Current capacity (MW(e)) Year of criticality/status

TAPS-1 160 1969

TAPS-11 160 1969

RAPS-1 220 1972

RAPS-11 220 1980

MAPS-1 220 1984

MAPS-11 220 1986

NAPS-1 220 1989

NAPS-11 220 1991

KAPS-I 220 1993

KAPS-II 220 1993

RAPS-111 220 1995

RAPS-IV 220 1996

RAPS- V- RAPS-VI M eac0 50 h Planned

KAIGA-I 220 1995

KAIGA-II 220 1996

KAIGA-II - KAIGA-VI I 220 each Planned

TAPS-11 TAPS-I1& V 500 each Planned

Rajasthan site and 2 reactors of 500 MW{e) each are planned at Tarapur site. It is expected that the nuclear power capacity would approach 6000 MW(e) by the turn of the century. Present financial constraints have, however, mad programme eth e slightly uncertaid nan exact date r completiosfo f variouno s unitundew sno r construction would heavily depend upon the inflow of capital. An outline of the programme is given in Table I.

India has also launched on the use of plutonium in fast as well as thermal reactors. experimentan A l fast breeder test reactor (FBTR MW(th0 4 f o ) ) capacitp beeu s t yha n se t Kalpakkama . Experienc alses i o being gaine thoriur dfo m recycle solutio.A n reactor based on 233U fuel, namely PURNIMA-III, was set up at BARC using 233U isolated from irradiated thorium rods. A second reactor KAMINI based on 233U-AI alloy fuel is being set up at

Kalpakkam for neutron radiographie of FBTR fuel pins. PHWR fuel bundles containing ThO2 pellets are being used for neutron flux flatterring in reactors at Kaiga. These activities would provide good experience in plutonium as well as thorium fuel cycles.

2. PLUTONIUM UTILISATION PROGRAMME

The main emphasis of India's long range atomic energy programme is based on the us f faseo t breeder reactors. With this objective facilitiep u t , se reprocessinIndir s fo aha g of spent fuel to isolate plutonium, facilities for the fabrication of plutonium fuels and a separate centr r desigefo constructiod nan f fasno t reactor systems. Whil e majoeth r

30 development effor reprocessinr tfo fued glan fabricatio Bhabhe carrieth ns i t a t a dAtomiou c Research Centre, Bombay developmene ,th f faso t t reactor syste responsibilitye th ms i f o Indire th a Gandhi Centr r Atomiefo c Researc t Kalpakkamha . Somfacilitiee th f eo s which hav r thifo s e p purposbeeu t n se briefl e ear y described below:

2.1. Fuel reprocessing

A fuel reprocessing plan proceso t t s researc Bhabhe th t ha reactoap u t se r fues wa l Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, in 1964 and this was subsequently refurbished to expand capacits it abouo yt tonne0 5 t f spenso t fuer annumpe l seconA . d reprocessing plan reproceso t s fue l(TAPS froR PHWmd BW )an Rt Tarapu a (RAPSp u d t ran se ) fues wa l operatioe th f thino s plan bees ha tn established. This nominaa plan s ha t l capacit0 10 f yo tonnes of spent fuel per year. There has been no opportunity to reprocess BWR fuel as this fuel is under safeguards and prior consent of US, which is stipulated under the agreement, t habeesno n forthcoming fuee f RAPo Th .l alss Si o under safeguard onld san y limited quantities have been reprocessed in view of the lack of current requirement for plutonium. A third reprocessing plant of 100 tonnes per year capacity is nearing completion at Kalpakkam. This plant is expected to reprocess fuel from MAPS reactors.

2.2. Plutonium fuel fabrication

smalA l plutonium fuel fabricatio Bhabhe th t a ap u Atomin t facilitse s c yResearcwa h

Centre, Bombay, to fabricate Pu02 fuel for experimental research reactor PURNIMA. The facilit subsequentls ywa y expande requiremene cateo dt th o rt f fue fasr to fo l t breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam. This plant has a notional capacity of 200 kg of fuel per year. This

plan bees ha tn use fabricato dt e (U03, Pu07)C fuel require firse th tr chargdfo f faseo t breeder test reactor (FBTR) and would shortly fabricate fuel for the second charge of that reactor.

Supply of enriched uranium by the USA, for the manufacture of TAPS fuel, started encountering impediment 197 n si stopped 6an d after Septembe rtherefor s 1979wa t I . e mixea p u decided t oxidse o edt fuel fabrication plan o providt t fue X r TAPfo l eMO S reactor orden si ensuro t r e continued suppl f electricityo than yi t regioninterin a s mA . measure, a plant of 10 t MOX/year capacity was set up at BARC, Trombay and it was teste r fabricatiodfo f TAPno S fuel bundles. Short length fuel bundles mad thin ei s plant were successfully tested by irradiation to 15 000 MW- d/t burn-up. This plant was not used subsequentl supple th s f yenrichea y o d uraniu arranges mwa d through Francr pe s ea agreement signed in November 1982.

Simultaneously a full fledge plutonium fuel fabrication plant, which could cater to the full requirement of MOX fuel for TAPS has been set up at Tarapur. This plant has a capacity of fabricating 20 tonnes of MOX fuel per year. The plant would be available for fabricating MOX fuel for any reactor as and when required.

The burn-u f fuepo PHWRn i l bees sha n founonle b yo dt 670 0 MW- d/t. Thers eha been increasing interest to increase the burn-up of this fuel by suitable enrichment. Reactor physics calculation have shown tha fuef some i t th PHWle f epino th n si R fuel bundle ear

enriched by incorporating 0.4% PuO2, it would be possible to increase the average burn-up of the fuel to 10 000 MW-d/t. Detailed physics calculation have been carried out to work out the fuel management scheme and fabrication of MOX PHWR bundles is also being established. Success of this programme would greatly enhance the uranium utilisation in currene th t reactors.

desig prototypa The nof MW(ee500 ) fast breeder reactor (PFBR alshas o) been finalised and Government has already given approval for setting up this reactor in the near

31 TABL . EESTIMATEII D AMOUN POWEF TO R REACTOR PLUTONIUM PRODUCED (Calculations are based on the total electricity generated since commercial operation)

Reactor Total electricity generated since Estimated amount of Pu* commercial (MU Januar)to y 1993 (kg)

TAPS-1 21 100 989

TAPS-11 21 500 1 008

RAPS-1 8 100 443

RAPS-11 13300 726

MAPS-1 9 100 497

MAPS-11 6450 353

NAPS-1 1 600 88

NAPS-11 650 35

Total already existing 4 139

* The ratio (plutonium produced/fissile material consumed) is taken as 0.3 for TAPS and 0.35 for other reactors.

future. In the first phase this reactor would use (U,Pu)O2 fuel but subsequently advanced fuels like (U,Pu)N or U-Pu-Zr alloy may also be tried. Detailed design of each type of fuel is in hand and R&D effort in this regard is also in progress at various laboratories of the country.

. QUANTITIE3 PLUTONIUF SO M

Th eplutoniue bulth f ko m produce Indin di tie s ai witp du spene hth t fuel lyint ga various reactors , sitesthereforeis t I . t possiblno , o givt e e precise numbere th n o s quantities of plutonium. However, at each station the amount of electricity generated is known and it can be used to calculate the quantities of plutonium tied up with the spent fuel from these reactors. The data for various stations upto January 1993 is given in Tabl . ProjectioneII f futurso e plutonium productio uncertaie nar vien i f uncertaintiewo s in the installed capacity and capacity factors of the installed power stations.

4. STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM

Plutoniu mIndin i storeas i speciadn i practice l vaultth s i s esa internationally. These vaults are located adjacent to the fuel reprocessing or fuel fabrication plants and are provided with full ventilation and other facilities required for handling of plutonium. In general, India has a policy to separate plutonium from spent fuel only if it is required for some application and therefore no long term storage is envisaged. All plutonium in India is stored as plutonium oxide. The containers for plutonium are specially designed and each

container contains 2 kg of PuO2. Each container is doubly sealed in PVC bags. This sealed container is in turn put in a secondary container mounted in a bird cage, in order to ensure minimum separation betwee containerso ntw stored an , lockern di s locate vaulte th n di . store Th provides ei d with plutonium-in-air monitor criticalitd san y monitors store .Th e also ha fira s e alarm systesystea d r mdetectinan mfo y watean g r ingrese storeth n i s. Non-destructive assay techniques are employed to verify plutonium content in the stored containers. Access to plutonium store is strictly controlled.

32 5. HANDLING AND TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM

Transpor f plutoniuo t m anothee fro sitth e meo t on don s i r surfacy eb e transporte Th . guidelines stipulate IAEdocumeny s db it An i t Safet Atomie usee th yar y dSerieb 6 c . sNo Energy Regulatory Boar f Indio d r clearinfo a y shipmentan g e primarTh . y plutonium containers are encapsulated in specially designed thick walled stainless steel pressure vessels of about 1 50 mm internal diameter. Metal gaskets are used to ensure containment even if there is a temperature rise due to a fire accident. These pressure vessels are in turn mounte refractora n di y lined steel containers outee Th . r steel containe mountes i r a n di bird cage. The bird cage in turn is put in a wooden box made from special quality wood. The transport system has been extensively tested and approved by the regulatory bodies. Most of the handling of plutonium containers is carried out by using mechanical devises to minimise exposure of personnel to radiation. Elaborate security precautions are taken during any shipment.

Plutonium is highly radioactive and also fissile. It is therefore essential that adequate precautio takee nar n durin storages git , handlin transportd gan radiatioe Th . n emittey db plutonium depend on its isotopic composition which in turn depends on the burn-up of the fuel. Some typical isotopic composition f plutoniuso m from TAP RAPd San S reactore sar give Tabln i e essentias IIIi t .I l that adequate gamm neutrod aan n shieldin provides gi s da perequiremente th r regulatore th f so y guidelines.

TABLE III. ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF PLUTONIUM FROM DIFFERENT REACTORS

23a 239p 240p 241 242 Reactor Burn-up Pu u u Pu Pu (MW-d/t) wt% Wt% wt% wt% wt%

BWR 6 100 0.125 82.7 13.94 2.89 0.339 (TAPS) 9 500 0.203 73.54 20.31 4.81 1.080 13750 0.393 65.77 25.17 6.45 2.21 29000 0.500 53.40 29.60 10.48 6.01

PHWR 2960 0.02 82.52 15.01 2.2 0.22 (RAPS) 5 700 0.05 67.7 26.0 4.8 1.2 6 200 0.06 66.07 26.87 5.52 1.48

6. CONCLUSION

In the first phase of the atomic energy programme of India, significant quantities of plutonium have been generated and would be very useful for increasing the burn-up of the PHWR fuels and for the fabrication of fuel for the prototype fast breeder reactor. As a policy e reprocessinth , f speno g t fuel woul synchronisee db d wit e utilisatiohth f no plutonium and, storag f plutoniueo m woul limite e extende b th do t t necessar meeo yt e th t requirement f fueso l fabrication. This woul t dowd cu proble e nth f mhandlino g plutonium containing significant quantities of 241Am and the associated radiological consequences. large vien th I f ew o lea d time require r developindfo g plutonium technology, significant R&D effortprogresn i e sar l aspectcateo st al o t r f thiso s technology.

Next page(s) left blank 33 NECESSITE SIGNIFICANCD TH AN R YFO F EO NUCLEAR FUEL RECYCLING IN JAPAN

M.NAKADA Nuclear Fuel Division, Atomic Energy Bureau, Scienc Technologd ean y Agency, Tokyo, Japan

Abstract

Japan's nuclear program f necessityo , , includes fuel reprocessin recyclind gan f uraniugo m and plutonium for several reasons: Japan lacks natural resources and recycling utilizes resources more efficiently, the environmental impact is reduced and waste disposal problems are reduced. Japa stronglns i y committe nucleado t r non-proliferatio wilt possesd nno lan s plutoniu militarilma ( y sensitive material) in amounts greater than required for its fuel cycle program. Japan has submitted to full scope safeguards and supports efforts to improve safeguards effectiveness. Japan's plutonium recycle program will focus first on FBRs then on LWRs and ATR. To gain a greater degree of acceptance both domestically and abroad Japan will endeavour to provide greater openness and transparency throughou nucleas it t r program. Japan's plutonium recycling prgramme will consume tonne0 9 o t f fissil so 0 8 e plutonium 2010y b .

INTRODUCTION

Research and development, and commercialization of peaceful applications of nuclear energy have been carried out in Japan since the mid-1 950s. Today, nuclear energy plays an important role as a key energy source in the nation's energy supply. Recently, worldwide opinio s calle ha nr restrainin fo d g dependenc fossin o e l fuel s muca s s ha possible o increaset e . Thidu s i sd concer r protectinnfo e globagth l environmentd an , becaus tensf eo e international relation aftermate th than sr Guli e th tfWa f hhavo e seriously undermined confidence worldwid stabln ei l supplyeoi . Clearly importance th , f nucleaeo r energ futura s ya e sourc f energeo increasings yi promotinn I . nucleas git r energy policy, Japan mus t onlno t y take domestic conditions suc demans ha secura r dfo e energy supply into account t alsbu ,o maintai n internationaa n l perspective that encompassen a s understandin f globago l condition energyn so . Japan need placo st e more emphasi thin so s international perspective in its nuclear fuel recycling programs in the future.

o construct w unde y no Plan wa re ar ts nuclear fuel cycle facilities includina g commercial reprocessing plant at Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture. In May 1991 construction of the FBR prototype reactor Monju was completed and the preoperational reactor's functional test was started. Furthermore, plutonium will be transported to Japan neae th rn i future from Britis Frencd han h facilities where, base commercian do l contracts, beehas n it recovere reprocessindby g Japan's spent fuels. This report present studsa yon the future of nuclear fuel recycling in Japan taking into account recent domestic and international developments, and defines the long range policy to implement nuclear fuel recycling programs through aroun yeae dth r 2010.

NECESSITE TH . 1 SIGNIFICANCD YAN NUCLEAF EO R FUEL RECYCLIN JAPAGN I N

Japan's nuclear energy developmen utilizatiod an t n program, sinc initias eit l stage, has consistently calle r recyclindfo f nucleago r fuel. This involves reprocessing spent fuels and recycling the recovered plutonium and uranium as nuclear fuels. This policy is based reasonine onth g that Japan, being scarc naturan ei l resources, must effectively utilize

35 uranium resources to enhance the stability of nuclear energy as a domestic energy source. Such reasoning on necessity of nuclear fuel recycling remains unchanged even today. In recene vieth f wo t domesti internationad can l developments necessite ,th significancd yan e of nuclear fuel recycling are summarized in the following three points:

First, nuclear fuel recyclin re-uso t s gi e useful materials energn a s a , y resourcef o l al , which would otherwise become waste. This contribute e preservatioth o t s f o n uranium resource reduced san s environmental impact f energso y use.

Second, nuclear fuel recycling makes nuclear energy a more economical and stable energy source from a long-range point of view so that the national energy security e furtheb y rma increased. Japan, being scarc n naturai e l resources s giveha , n particular importance to this point.

- Third, through nuclear fuel recycling, it is possible to separate radioactive wastes from useful resources, which are recovered as energy resources. The high-level radioactive waste produced by reprocessing is small in volume and easily solidified int stabloa e form. Therefore, nuclear fuel recyclin improvn gca managemene eth f o t radioactive waste in Japan, and contribute to the preservation of the environment in Japan. These three point discussee sar d furthe detain i r l below.

1.1. Preserving natural resources and environment, and contributions to the formation of a recycling society

n recenI t years, warning e increasinar s g ovee destructioth r e globath f o nl environment and the deterioration of our living environment through extravagant consumptio f naturano l resources response Th . bees eha n give accelerato nt e efforto st recycle and conserve natural resources and to save energy. This is because effective utilizatio f naturano l resource f vitao s si l importanc preservinn ei globae gth l environment. necessite Th significancd yan f nucleaeo r energy, especially, nuclear fuel recycling, must be define thin di s context.

Nuclear energ severas yha l highly attractive features t produceI . massivsa e returf no energy fro ma relativel y small amoun f uraniumo t resources e amounTh . f wasto t e generate alss di o small t doeI . t generatsno e carbon dioxid fossis ea l resource , whicsdo h causee isth f regarde o f globa so e on ls dwarminga bees ha n t I .confirme t internationada l meetings, including the G7 Summit, that the utilization of nuclear energy under strict safety measure contributn sca e protectioth globae o et th f no l environment while playinn ga important role in energy supply.

Nuclear fuel recycling is intended to make better use of features of nuclear energy referred to above, and to contribute to the formation of a so-called recycling society, where people think muc f recyclinho g used things. Nuclear fuel recyclin o re-ust s gi e useful materials energn a s a , y resource f whico l al , h would otherwise become waste additionn I . , reducing the consumption of natural uranium resources by recycling could eventually also reduce impacts of nuclear energy itself on the environment. Therefore, nuclear fuel recycling is very significant in both resource conservation and environmental protection. Fo natioa r n like Japan that consume largsa e amoun f resourceso t importann a s i t i , t policy matter to play a leading role in efforts to save and recycle resources.

1.2. Making nuclear powe mora r e economica stabld an l e energy sourc long-tera n ei m perspective

econome Th f nucleayo r fuel recycling depend markee th n so t resourcesprics it f eo , recycline th an si f othego r resources price f Th uranium.e o bees ha n stabl relativela t ea y

36 low level in recent years. Consequently, interest in the necessity and significance of nuclear fuel recycling in securing an economical and stable long-term supply of uranium has tende fadeo dt . However, future uncertainty l markesimilaoi alsy e thao th ma t tr n i t plague the uranium market. Accordingly, nuclear fuel recycling is necessary for Japan with scarce resources fro mviewpoina efficiene f uraniuth o f e o t energd us t man y securityn I . addition, nuclear fuel recycling could stabilize demand and supply in the uranium market, which could resul stabln i t e uranium pricefuturee th n si .

Another importan t economie pointh n i t c valu f nucleaeo r fuel recyclin thats gi y b , recycling e econom th , e entirth f eo y nuclear fuel cycle will become more immuno et external factors such as fluctuating uranium prices. This is because as the proportion of natural uranium cost is reduced as a part of the whole by recycling, the extent of dependence of the nuclear fuel cycle's economy on the uranium cost is reduced.

Nuclear energ calles yi technology-intensivda e sourc f energeo y because thera es i very high retur f energno y produce y meanb d f technologo s y fro msmala l amounf o t natural resources. The economy of nuclear energy is determined largely by the effectiveness of technology, rather than natural resource costs. This means then that as technology matures cost-performance th , f nucleaeo r energy improve t becomei d san sa more reliable energy source expectes i t I . d tha econome th t f nucleayo r fuel recycling will continue to improve as further progress is made in research and development, more experience is gained, and the scale of the recycling is expanded step-by-step. It is considered significant that Japa committens i leadindo t thign i s technological development, fro mviewpoina f makino t g nuclear energ morya e economica stabld an l e energy source usee b thadn worldwidca t lona r gefo tim comeo et .

1.3. Makin radioactive gth e waste managemen Japan i t n more appropriate

Although a much smaller amount of waste is generated by nuclear power generation than thermal generation firing fossil fuels waste th , radioactivs ei musd manageee an b t d wit utmose hth t care. Especially, spent fuel includes high level radioactive materiald san so must be very carefully managed, although its radioactivity decreases rapidly according to the half-lives of its radioactive materials.

Currently, some nations plan to dispose of spent fuel as waste without recycling. However f spen,i t fue reprocesseds i l , large amount f usefuso l resource recoverede b n sca , and high-level radioactive separate e wastb n eca managed dan d more effectively.

In fact, the volume of high level radioactive waste after reprocessing is much smaller than that of spent fuel disposed of unprocessed and it is easily solidified into a stable form, additionn i perioe th , f radioactivitdo high-levee th f o y l radioactive waste solidified after reprocessing becomes relatively shorter. Such a radioactive waste management method is appropriate in Japan from a viewpoint of environmental protection. However, a secondary radioactive waste strea malss i o produce recyclingy db importans i t I . reduco tt e generatioe th f thino s secondary wast mucs ea possibles ha .

Effective management of radioactive waste generated through the nuclear fuel cycle process depend e methoth n f o srecyclingd o f I recycle. d resource utilizee ar s d highly efficiently amoune th , f radioactivo t e reducede wastb n eca .

This further improves radioactive waste management and is more desirable for environmental protection. In this respect, it is important to efficiently recycle transuranic elements, whic intimatele har y lonrelatew gho wasto dt e remains radioactive. Further advance researcn si developmend han recyclinn o t g method transuranie us o st c elements as resources could make radioactive waste management more appropriatee b d an , expected to increase the value and significance of nuclear fuel recycling.

37 2. COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Japan has demonstrated a firm commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Domestically, it is set forth as its national commitment in Japan's Atomic Energy Basic Law that the development and utilization of nuclear energy shall be limited solely to peaceful purposes. Internationally e natioth , n adhere Treate e Non-Proliferatioth th n o t syo f no Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and accepts the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency l (IAEAnucleaal r fo ) r material s nucleait f so relatey r programsan o dt . Japan also adheres to the Convention on Physical Protection. Japan has sincerely fulfilled obligation d responsibilitiean s s provide thesn i d e international agreements. Although Japan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has been consistently reaffirmed by the national policy referre abovedo t promotinn i , g nuclear fuel recyclin thin gi s country, Japan must fully take into account the fact that recycling is based on the utilization of plutonium recovered from spent fuel thad an ,t plutoniu mconsideres i militarilda y sensitive material. Accordingly, it is most important for Japan to maintain stringent measures with regards to nuclear non-proliferation and to give as much transparency as possible to its nuclear fuel recycling programs so that concerns on nuclear proliferation in relation to Japan's programs raisee b wilt dno l internationall casey an .n yi

Therefore, it is a national principle that, in addition to continuing stringent controls of plutonium, Japan will not possess plutonium beyond the amount required to implement its nuclear fuel recycling programs. To that end, Japan will make steady use of plutonium in accordance with appropriate recycling programs, in consideration that it makes sense from a nuclear non-proliferation point of view to actively utilize and consume plutonium as a nuclear fuel by means of recycling.

At the 1990 NPT Review Conference, it was confirmed that the NPT is the fundamental framework for nuclear non-proliferation and that the IAEA safeguards system plays the central role in ensuring non-proliferation. It was also confirmed at the Conference thae effectivenesth t e IAEth Af o s safeguards shoul maintainee b d d particularlr fo y reprocessing and plutonium utilization, responding to the expanded peaceful use of plutonium. Japan has been of the view that it is important to facilitate effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear facilities, and has actively contributed maintainino t strengthenind gan IAEe gth A safeguards system. Important examplee th e sar Japan Support Program for Agency's Safeguards (JASPAS) which began in fiscal 1 981 and internationae th l joint projec studr tfo safeguardinn yo g large reprocessing plants (LASCAR) which began in fiscal 1987 with special funding to the IAEA by Japan. IAEA safeguards have already been applie Plutoniue th o dt m Fuel Production Facilit Powee th f yo r Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC), utilizing achievements of Japan-US joint researc elemenn ho t technologie r safeguardinsfo g mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facilities. With launchin f Japan'go s full-scale commercial nuclear fuel recycling programs scheduled for the near future, it is essential, first of all, to maintain the earnest attitude that has been kept so far. It is also most important not only to apply effective and efficient safeguards to plutonium utilization based on technologies and experience accumulated in Japan, but also to make every effort to further improve safeguards technologies in order to ensure further international understanding of Japanese programs from the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation. Through these efforts and activities, Japan will continue to join international efforts towards the sound development of the IAEA safeguards system and strengthening of the world nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is a responsibility to be take Japay n b intend o nwh advanco st peacefue ef th plutonium o e us l .

In regard to the international, long-distance transportation of plutonium, Japan will sincerely fulfill the obligations and responsibilities provided in bilateral nuclear energy agreements, the Convention on Physical Protection and so on, and work closely with countries concerned to get more understanding and co-operation for it, fully recognizing

38 that it is Japan's international responsibility to fully apply stringent physical protection measures to the transportation.

3. FUTURE NUCLEAR FUEL RECYCLING PROGRAMS IN JAPAN

3.1. Basic view

The key points in advancing future nuclear fuel recycling programs in Japan are to develo systepa m with which nuclear energ mors yi e widely accepte Japanese th y db e publi fundamentaa s ca l energy source endeavoo t d an , havo rt programe eth s understood internationally. From this point of view, future nuclear fuel recycling programs must be promoted systematicall steadild yan y with full consideratio f majono r social concerns such as further improving radioactive waste management. The programs must also be implemented in such a way that the scale and method of recycling can be flexibly adapted to future variable circumstances.

First, the demand side of nuclear fuel recycling is discussed. Fast breeder reactors (FBRs) utilize uranium resources highly efficiently alss i t oI . expected tha f transuranii t c elements could be recycled by FBRs, radioactive waste management could be further improved Japann I . bees , thereforeha n R developeFB e maie th , th ns d a reacto r nuclearfo r power generatio s considerei e future principa th d th n i e an nb o lt d e reactous o t r plutonium. Efforts will be continued for commercializing the FBR in the future.

Light water reactors (LWRs) will be a major source for some time to come in Japan's nuclear power generation program. Therefore, LWRs will be used for recycling plutonium as fuel so that the recycling in LWRs can play a role as an energy source in Japan's nuclear power generation system and the technologies and infrastructures required for commercial-scale recyclin developee b n f commerciao gca m d ai wit e hth l operatiof no FBRs. Noting that nuclear fuel recycling in LWRs is already substantially proven in Europe, particularl n Germani y d Francean y , Japan will promote recyclin n LWRi g s wite hth objectiv f steadileo y developin recyclins git g programs.

In addition, to enhance the flexibility of recycling programs, advanced thermal reactors (ATRs), reactors with high flexibility in fuel use, will be used for recycling plutonium. consides u t le supple th w r No y sid f nucleaeo r fuel recycling plutoniue Th . m needed o implement t future nuclear fuel recycling programs wile supplieb l d e mainlth y b y Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The plant is indispensable for carrying out the FBR programs, e principath l elemen f Japan'o t s nuclear fuel recycling programs, fro ma long-rang e viewpoint wild lan , also continuously provide plutonium necessar r recyclinyfo LWRn gi s an researcr dfo developmend han ATRsf o t . This plan schedules i t into g o do fult l operation shortly after the year 2000. The plutonium recovered there will be used for the research and development of FBRs and ATRs for some time to come and for commercial operations of FBRs later as well as for the commercial-scale recycling in LWRs.

Reprocessing contracted to overseas nations is a transitional measure. It is appropriate that plutonium fro overseae mth s reprocessing service usee sb r researc dfo h and development of FBRs and ATRs, as well as for recycling in LWRs.

Plutonium recovered fro Tokae mth i Reprocessing Plan bees t wil ha usedn e t i b l s a , in the past, basically for research and development of FBRs and ATRs. It is advisable that onc Rokkashe eth o Reprocessing Plant begins operation Tokae ,th i Reprocessing Plant shift its major role to research and development of future reprocessing technologies.

39 For the above recycling programs to be realized, it is necessary that progress be made constructioe th n i Rokkashe th f no o Reprocessing Plant whicr ,fo h more understandind gan cooperatio locae th f ln o peopl requireds ei . Also, smooth transpor Japao t t f plutoniuno m from the overseas reprocessing services is necessary. The Japanese government must therefore provide assistance for these operations. A domestic supply system for MOX fuel must als establishee ob connection di n with these programs.

3.2. Japan's nuclear fuel recycling programs through aroun yeae dth r 2010

The basic view above forme followin th e basi th r s fo s g nuclear fuel recycling programs through around the year 2010. Since recycling programs are based on the use of plutonium, it is important that they be transparent in order to secure a wide understanding both domesticall internationallyd yan thar Fo .t reason programe th , s which are deemed appropriate under current circumstance presentee sar d below. These programs will naturall affectee y b change e th y db f circumstanceso s surroundin programe gth e th n si future. Even if that is the case, it is essential to make every effort towards steady implementatio e programth f o n s while firmly maintainin e attitudeth g s describen i d . Commitmen"2 nuclearo tt non-proliferation conformind an " "3.1go t . Basic view" above.

3.2.1. Plutonium utilization

(a) Utilization by FBRs and ATRs

In view of the important roles played by the two reactors below in the development of FBRs appropriats i t i , continuo et e researc developmend han t usin experimentae gth l reacto rutiliz o t Joy d eoan recycled plutoniu prototype th mn i e reactor Monju amoune .Th t of plutonium required by the two reactors is around 0.6 tonnes of fissile plutonium (Ruf) per year, and the cumulative requirement up to around 2010 is about 1 2 to 13 tonnes of Puf.

Planning for a FBR demonstration reactor (DFBR) is under way, with an aim to start construction in the late 1 990s, and to commission the reactor shortly after 2000. This DFBR program must be positively promoted, and further development following the DFBR must als promotee b o d systematicall steadild an y y wit e objectivhth f commerciao e l operation of FBRs. The amount of plutonium needed for the DFBR and the succeeding reactor must be accurately evaluated as the development plans become more specific in the future. Currently, however, it is estimated that a total of around 10 to 20 tonnes of Puf will be required for both the DFBR and the succeeding reactor through around 2010. The dominant factors affecting this plutonium requiremen timin e introductioe th th e f go tar d nan the scale of the reactor succeeding the DFBR. Thus, as not only the plan for the DFBR but that for the succeeding reactor considerably affect the amount of plutonium required through around 2010, it is advisable that these plans be continuously examined from a long-term perspective.

The prototype ATR Fugen has been kept in operation with objectives including the further improvement of its reliability. The construction of an ATR demonstration reactor (DATR) at Ohma Town in Aomori Prefecture is now at the planning stage with an aim of commissioning the reactor in around 2000. These ATR projects require continuous, steady promotio orden ni o increast r flexibilite eth f nucleayo r fuel recycling amoune Th . f o t plutonium require r Fuged fo the-DAT d r yearnan pe tonne6 f , 0. arounR s Pu i o t f so S dO. ancumulative dth e requiremen ATRe th r s fo tthroug h around 201littla s ei 0 less tha0 n1 tonne f Pufso .

40 (b) Utilization by LWRs

appropriats i t I e tha firse tth t commercial recycling progra mLWRn i implementee sb d mid-1990se th n i , resultbasee th n f demonstratiodo so n programs being conducted with a small number of fuel assemblies, to use MOX fuel in the quarter reactor cores of one plantR sPW wite outpuMW(eon BW0 n h a d 80 R morr f an o to ) e each alss i t oI . appropriate that electric utility companies undertak e preparationth e s necessar e smootth r fo yh implementatio firse th tf ncommerciao l program above.

objective Th f nucleaeo r fuel recyclin LWRn gi plao energt n a s roly i a s ea y source n Japan'i s nuclear power generation system, while developin e technologieth g d an s infrastructures required for commercial-scale nuclear fuel recycling, with a view to achieving commercial operation of FBRs. It is thus essential to continue recycling in LWRs scala n o e compatible wit capacitiee hth f commercial-scalso e reprocessing facilitied san commercial fuescalX l efabricatioMO n facilities appropriats i t I . Japaen i n that preparations necessary to gradually and systematically expand the recycling programs be undertaken reactoreplaco 3 t 1/ s o a e erth core f fouso r 1000 MW(e) class LWRs fuewitX t a lh MO 990s1 thef d o ,an nd thosen e f twelveo th e 1000 MW(e) class LWRs shortly after 2000.

The estimated cumulative amoun f plutoniuo t m require o implement d e recyclinth t g programs by LWRs will be around 50 tonnes of Puf through around 2010. The recycling program LWRn si s mus expandee b t d steadil flexiblyd yan , respondin surroundine th o gt g circumstances includin future gth e developmen f utilizatioo t FBRy nATRsb d san .

These programs requir cooperatioe eth f bot no publie hprivatth d can e sectorsd an , appropriats i t i e tha relatee th t d ministrie agencied san s provid necessare eth y supporr fo t the programs.

3.2.2. Plutonium supply The combined utilization plans for recycling in FBRs-ATRs and LWRs will require an estimated around 80 to 90 tonnes of Puf through around the year 2010. The amount of plutonium supplied in the future from the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and the overseas reprocessing services provided by Britain and France respectively depends on the type and amount of spent fuel actually reprocessed. Therefore, s difficuli t i o accuratelt t y calculat amoune th e f plutoniuo t m supplied. Howevere th , appropriate estimates currently possible are presented below.

First, the annual reprocessing volume of the Tokai Reprocessing Plant for the time being will be around 70 to 90 tonnes of spent fuel in tU, which will recover around 0.4 tonnes of Puf per year. When the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant goes into operation, the major role of the Tokai Reprocessing Plant will be shifted to research and development on future reprocessing technologies including MOX fuel reprocessing, which will reduce the plant's plutonium recovery to around 0.1 to 0.2 tonnes of Puf per year.

The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is scheduled to go into operation at the end of 1990s. Its reprocessing volume will be gradually increased after the start in operation, reachin e fulgth l capacit tonne0 80 f f speno so y tshortl U t fue n i l y after 2000e Th . capacity of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is the same as that of the UP3 Plant in France, a commercial plant already in operation, and is considered to be appropriate for a commercial reprocessing plant expectes i t I . d tha ttonnef 5 wil aroune o Pu b t l f 5 so d4. recovere yeada r afte Rokkashe th r o Reprocessing Plant begins full-scale operation.

cumulative Th e amoun f plutoniuo t m fro e overseamth s reprocessing services i s estimated at around 30 tonnes of Puf, based on the amount of reprocessing service contracts between Japanese electric utility companies and reprocessing entities in Britain

41 and France expectes i t I . d thatransportatioe th tplutoniue th f o l al m f no fro m Europo et Japan will have been complete 2010y db .

To calculat totae eth l supply through around 2010, above baseth n edo estimates: supply from the Tokai Reprocessing Plant will be around 5 tonnes of Puf, around 50 tonnes f fro oe RokkashPu mf th o Reprocessing Plant around an , f tonne0 frod3 e Pu m th f so overseas reprocessing services, makin totaa p f aroungu o l tonne5 d8 f Pufso . Considering tha adequatn a t e amoun f runnino t g stoc requires ki actuae th dn i l supply-demand balance of plutonium, the estimated total supply of about 85 tonnes of Puf is considered-to be necessary to carry out nuclear fuel recycling programs in Japan in the future, which would require around 80 to 90 tonnes of Puf.

4. MOX FUEL FABRICATION SYSTEM IN JAPAN

4.1. MOX fuel fabrication system for FBRs and ATRs experimentaR fueX FB e l MO useth r dfo l reacto prototypR r JoyoFB e th e, reactor Monju, and the ATR prototype reactor Fugen will continue to be manufactured by the PNC as it has been in the past. In line with the current policy, the PNC will also build a fuel fabrication facility in its plutonium fuel production facility, for MOX fuel used in the DATR. Concerning MOX fuel for the DFBR, in the Long-Term Program for Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy of 1987 drawn up by the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, it is stated that "Although it is possible to supply the MOX fuel for the DFBR by expandin facilitiee gth PNCe th concep e f fuee so th , th lr fabricatiofo t n system shale b l specified in the early 1990s taking into consideration experience accumulated in Japan of MOX fuel fabrication, progress of the DFBR's construction plan, progress of future MOX fuel supply system developmen private th n i te sector, lead time require construco dt e th t fabricatioX MO n facility othed ,an r factors" DFBe plath e r alreadRs th i n fo s A . y under way, detailed investigation f methodso f utilizinso g PNC' fueX l sfabricatioMO n technologr yfo FBRs must begin early.

fueX 4.2l fabricatioMO . n syste LWRr mfo s Correspondin operatioe th Rokkashe o gt th f no o Reprocessing Plant, domestiX cMO fuel fabrication for LWRs must also be developed into a commercial operation. In the Long-Term Progra r Developmenmfo Utilizatiod an t f Nucleano r Energy states i t i , d that "MOX fuel fabricatio full-scale th r nfo e utilizatio f plutoniuno mLWRn i s principlshalln i e b e performed by the private sector, and the actual fuel fabrication system shall be established earle th yn i 1990s latest"e th t nuclea, a e vien I th . f wo r fuel recycling program LWRy sb s mentionee asar dcommissionine earlieth d ran Rokkashe th f go o Reprocessing e Planth t a t end of the 1 990s, a domestic fabrication plant with a capacity of around 100 tonnes of MOX fuel per year must be in commercial operation around 2000. Detailed study should be contene mad fabricatioth e th n eo f o t n business, mainlrelatee th y yb d private sector entities. However, it is important that commercialization of this domestic MOX fuel fabrication shoul flexible db y develope matco t s expansioa e hth recyclingo dR s LW f no . The policy for commercial MOX fuel fabrication must be established as soon as possible, considerin leae gth d time require r determinindfo operatorn ga , selectin planga t sited an , design, safety examination, constructio tesd ntan operatio plante th f no .

promoto T commercializatioe eth fueX l MO fabricatio f no Japan i mentione s i s na d above, the safety and reliability of domestic LWR MOX fuel fabrication technology must be demonstrate PNC' e fabricatioX th d sMO d an n technology mus smoothle tb y transferred to the private sector. This requires that both the PNC and the related private sector entities urgently undertake joint study on the best way of utilizing the PNC's plutonium fuel production facility.

42 5. OVERSEAS MOX FUEL FABRICATION It is appropriate to fabricate some amount of plutonium from the overseas reprocessing services into MOX fuel at overseas at least for a transitional period. For this reason, electric utility companies must urgently stud timine yth f startingo overseae gth s fabrication of MOX fuel and the scale of the contracted fabrication. MOX fuel fabricated abroad will be transported to Japan by sea. Electric utility companies must study detailed measure transportatioe th f so complo t s a o yns fully wit t onlhno y domestic lawd san regulations, but also requirements of the relevant provisions of the Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the Convention on Physical Protection, and other international regulations such as IAEA regulations for safe transport of radioactive material. Transportation of MOX fuel should be performed so as smoothlo t y launc plutoniue hth m recycling program LWRy sb s startin mid-e th gn 1i 99Os. The Japanese governmen requires i t provido dt e relevant measure assistancd san e th r efo transportation under the close cooperation of the ministries and agencies concerned.

If MOX fuel fabrication is to be undertaken in a nation with which Japan has not concluded a bilateral nuclear energy agreement, a new arrangement will be required to ensure the peaceful utilization of the plutonium transferred to the nation.

. METHO6 UTILIZINF DO G RECOVERED URANIUM

importans i t I t that uranium recovered from reprocessin activele gb y utilize furthedo t r accelerate the nuclear fuel recycling programs. Re-enrichment is considered to be the best metho f recyclindo g uraniu mtermn i f economs o amoune th d f recovereyan o t d uranium usable Japann I . e relateth , d private sectoshoulC PN r d e entitiecooperatth d an s o et develop ,e resultth base f n o previouo sd s efforts, commercial-scale conversion, re-enrichment, fuel fabricatio utilizatiod nan reactorn i preparo st full-scalr efo e commercial utilizatio f recovereno d uraniu futuree th mn i .

appropriats i t I e that uranium recovere overseae th y db s reprocessing servicee sb converte re-enriched dan d abroa securo dt e higher efficienc economd yan transportinn yi g the uranium to Japan. It is advisable that, to that end, electric utility companies take the preparatory measures as required. If the conversion or re-enrichment is to be undertaken in a nation with which Japan has not concluded a bilateral nuclear energy agreement, a new arrangement will be required to ensure the peaceful utilization of the uranium transferred to the nation.

7. REPROCESSING OF SPENT MOX FUEL

It is important to recover plutonium and uranium by reprocessing spent MOX fuel so as to promote nuclear fuel recycling. It is therefore appropriate that the PNC develop technologie e reprocessinth r spenfueR X sfo AT l MO tincludin d f fuelgo an R , witgFB h targets including the improvement in recovery efficiency.

Next page(s3 4 ) left blank RUSSIAN PROSPECT PLUTONIUR SFO M ACCUMULATIO UTILIZATIOD NAN N

E.G. KUDRIAVTSEV Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russian Federation

Abstract

Russia now has 20 GW of installed nuclear capacity (vs 36.4 GW in the former USSR). Stagnation in the Russian nuclear industry has delayed many programmes. Russia believes a closed fue mose lth cycle t b economica o et t continuebu — l uraniuw dlo m price buildud san f separatepo d plutonium raise questions. Projected separated plutonium inventories vary greatly, depending on assumed reprocessing rated BN-80an s 0 plutonium utilization rates e start-uTh . f RT-o p 2n i 2002-2005 will increase plutonium annual separatio tonnesn2 3. rat y e b nuclea e . Nearlth f o l r yal scientists and engineers of the former USSR now reside in Russia. Utilization of plutonium in thermal reactors could be speeded up by international technical co-operation.

1. NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING AND INDUSTRY OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

Afte USSe NPPe falleth rs th Rf sha o ninstalle apartW G 0 2 ,d capacit remaines yha d on the territory of Russia (from 36.4 GW of the former USSR's capacity). Table I shows the structure of these NPPs as well as those of the former USSR's republics. The near-term outlooe Russiath f o k n nuclear power engineering developmen connectes i t d wite hth commissioning in the nearest future of the two WWER-1000 units and, probably, one RBMK unit, having currently been constructed by -80%.

For the previous years the uranium mining industry, uranium enrichment and the NPP fuel production in the former USSR were developed exceedingly. Currently, the uranium production capacities available are enough to provide for 100 GW of the NPP installed capacity. The main facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle remain on the territory of Russia.

Economic evaluations conducte 1980e th n di s confirme experience dth closea f eo d fuel cycle for WWER reactors, with additional enrichment and recycling of the uranium reprocessed. Recovered energetic plutonium was supposed to be used in the BN-800 and BN- fas0 160 t reactor cores.

e stagnatioTh e nucleath f no r power engineerin f Russiao g , radical politicad an l economic reforms, nuclear disarmamen correspondine th d tan g reductio defensnn i e orders have considerably worsened the economic situation at NPPs and nuclear enterprises. The state fundin f largo g e project s problematii s c unde e conditionth r f inflationo s , great uncertainty in engineering and economical evaluations and absence of nuclear legislation.

The main change fiele th f nuclea do n si r power engineerin followinge th e gar :

refusa continuo t l programme eth f constructioeo NPPw ne sf nwito h RBMK reactors; refusal of some local authorities to construct new NPPs on their territories (NPPs with WWER-100 AST-50d 0an 0 reactors); delay of the programme of BN-800 reactors construction, refusal to implement the BN-1 600 project, delay of the construction of MOX fuel production on facility at the "Majak" complex; slowdow e constructioth f o ne RT- th e f WWER-1002o th n plan r fo t F SN 0 reprocessin reschedulind gan commissionins it f go r 2005gfo ; developmen f projectNPPo w t f ne improve so r sfo d safety (NP-50 VPBR-600)d 0an .

45 TABLE I. STRUCTUR TERRITORE NPPF TH E O FORME E N sO TH F YO R USSR

Independent State of the former Type of Installed SNF buildup Annual unload USSR reactor capacity (GW) en f 199do 2 M H t F oSN f

Russian Federation WWER-440 2.6 75.0 WWER-1000 6.0) 2 1+ 750»(RT-2) 144.0(4-48.0) RBMK-1000 11.0( + 1) 5500 550.0(4-50.0) BN-600 0.6 6.0 BN-800 ( + 1.6) 12.0

Ukraine WWER-440 0.88 no data 25.0 WWER-1000 10.0( + 2) available 244.0(4-48) RBMK-1000 3.0(-3.0) 1500 100.0 2 units under from 2 units operation

Kazakhstan BN-350 0.35 -

Lithuania RBMK-1500 3.0 no data available

Including SNF shipped from Ukrainian NPPs before 1991.

All those factors have caused the delay in implementing the plans of plutonium commercial utilizatio Russiae th n i n Federation.

Both energeti militarcand y plutonium from dismantled warhead valuablsare e energy resource future th r esfo nuclear power engineering. Plutonium utilizatio fasn i t reactors e mosith s t efficien t e knowwayw s A ,. water reactor n alsca so operate th n o e uranium-plutonium fuel. Nevertheless, no serious investigations on military plutonium utilization in reactors of the WWER-type have been conducted in Russia. There are as well no plants for plutonium utilization as the RBMK fuel.

In this situation the storing of plutonium in special stores providing for nuclear, explosion fird ean , safety forcea s i , d measure.

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF A CLOSED FUEL CYCLE - PROs AND CONs

maie Th n argument followinge th favoun se i closear a f C o r: dNF

- radiochemical reprocessin enable wit F e maximue hus th SN o f st go m efficience yth resource f uraniuso m being mine usefullo welt s da s a l y utilize plutonium; economically vien i , f long-terwo m prospec radiochemicae th t l reprocessin mors gi e beneficial compared with long-term monitore storagF expensivSN d an e e final disposal; - from the ecological point of view, the reprocessing makes it possible to recover from SNF and HLW the most long-lived and hazardous nuclides, first of all, plutonium and TPE; there exist greasa t scientifi reliabld can e technological solutions that mak et possibli e implemeno t reprocessinF SN e tth g taking into account stringent requiremente th r sfo environment protection.

But the arguments given above are seriously criticized in case of great excess capacitie uraniue th n so m minin enrichmentd gan connection i d an , n wit environmene hth t radioactive contaminatio probleme nth risd k an f plutoniu so m buildup.

46 The situation in Russia, connected with the spent fuel permanent buildup, is not satisfactory. Spent fuel storag supposes ei mainle b o dt y on-site storagcreatioe th d ef an n o a joint regional storage facility for SNF seems to be hardly implemented because of local authorities opposition speciao N . l funds have been forme desigo dt construcd nan facilita t y unprocesseNPP forthe d fuel final disposal. Predictio builduSNF pnof without taking into accoun constructioe th t NPPw Russine n s i f no giveas i . CommissioninTableII n i d an sI e gth RT-2 plant wit productioe hth 1000t/yeao t np ratu firse f eo th tr stagfo r e would providr efo the equilibrium between the fuel discharged and reprocessed for a middle-term prospect.

The problem of the RBMK-1000 SNF buildup requires further study and additional economical calculations and prospectn ,i possibla , e co-operatio f Russiano Ukraine th , d ean Lithuani creato at commoea n storage facilit r thayfo t SNF.

BUILDUTABLu P D . CALCULATIOEII AN PF (withouSN E TH t F takinNO g into accoun RT-e th t 2 plant)

Spent nuclear fuel yearr pe Buildu)M H t p(m

1995 2000 2005 2010

WWER- 0 (Russia100 ) 1 050 1 800 2 700 3600

WWER-1000 (Russia & Ukraine) 1 500 2400 4500 5600

RBMK-1000 (Russia) 7 150 10450 13750 17000

Minatom's plan for the NPPs construction in Russia and NFS operation up until 2010 was announced.

3. BUILDUP AND OUTLOOK ON ENERGETIC PLUTONIUM UTILIZATION

The main par f plutoniuo t m (both energeti militaryd can recoveres i ) d from nuclear fuel, store reprocessed dan radiochemica3 t da l plant f Russiso Chelyabinsk-65n i a— , Tomsk-d 7an Krasnoyarsk-26. About 25 Mt of energetic Pu is stored now at the "Majak" complex radiochemical RT-1 plant. Some amount f plutoniuso hundredo t p m(u f welgramss so a ln ca ) be obtaine n laboratoro d y installation n radiochemicai s l research centrese . th The e ar y following:

V.Ge th . Khopli - n Radium Institut Petersburg. St n ei , Scientifie th Researcd can h Institut f Atomieo c Reactor Dimitrovgradn si , e A.Ath . Bochvar Ail-Russian Scientifi Researcd an c h Institut f Inorganieo c Materials (ARSRIIM) in Moscow.

Considerable amounts of plutonium are used for physical test-bench experiments. For example, more than 900 kg of weapon grade plutonium are available in the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in the form of special rods.

Application of the improved Purex-process at the RT-1 plant makes it possible to recover up to 99.5% of plutonium. Scientists of the A.A. Bochvar and V.G. Khoplin Institutes consider it possible to achieve the 99.9-99.95% Pu recovery as well as the 95% Np-237 recovery. Currentl possibls i t yi f recoveNp-23o et o 99.5% d 780 r. an U % f o

maximua t A m production rat f 400t/yeaeo plane th r t provide r reprocessinsfo f o F gSN all the WWER-440 reactors in Russia and abroad as well as fuel of BN-600 and BN-350. Currently, the rates of SNF reprocessing are reduced to 100 t/year that is caused by the problem transportatioF SN f so n into Russia. Therefore ratee th , f plutoniuso m buildup being

47 predicted vary fro mmaximua m 6 t/yeart/yea5 valu 0. 2. constructioe f o t ro eTh . d nan commissionin firse th tf go BN-80 same Sout0e th th unif eo t ha te (1977UralP on d NP , an ) type at the Beloyarskaya NPP (2000) are planned. Calculation variants for the Pu buildup rates are given in Table III.

TABLE III. ENERGETICAL PLUTONIUM BUILDU RT-E TH 1 PLANT PA T

Variant 1995 2000 2005

I 33.8 46.8 59.8 II 33.8 34.2 18.6 III 27.8 30.8 33.8 IV 27.8 22.1 17.1 V 27.8 19.8 6.8 VI 27.8 19.8 -0.3

Variant I: Reprocessing of 325 t SNF/year, beginning with 1993 (2.6 t Pu/year) refusal to construct BN-800. Varian : II tReprocessin t SNF/yea 5 32 f go r commissioning BN-80 19970n i , 1999, 200 2002d 1an . Variant III t :SNF/yea Reprocessin0 8 o t r p beginninu f o g g from 1993 (0.6 tPu/year) refuso t e construct BN-800. Variant IV: Reprocessing of up to 80 t SNF/year beginning from 1993 (0.6 tPu/year) commissioning BN-800 in 1997. Varian : AdditionallV t Variano yt commissioninV I t BN-80d 2n e 0gth uni 2000n i t . Varian : AdditionallVI t Variano yt commissioninV t unid f BN-803r o t e gth 20020n i .

An annual BN-800 consumption assumed in calculations for plutonium is equal to 1.6 t and the initial reactor charge is 2.3 t Pu without taking into account the MOX-fuel radiochemical reprocessing. In fact, Pu buildup in two reactors could make up 2.8 t by 2005.

The data given in Table Ml show that commissioning of one more BN-800 unit after 2001 would require additional Pu at low rates of the WWER-440 SNF reprocessing (80 t/year).

Plutonium utilization in the form of MOX fuel was studied in detail for BN-350 and BN-600 maximue .Th consumptiou mP thosy nb e reactor estimates si t/year1 s da . However, core f thosso e reactor designee t seemi s ar fue d U r an ls dfo problemati licenso ct e their full conversion to the MOX fuel.

WWER-1000 spent fuel, being built up on the territories of Russia and the Ukraine, is another potential sourc f energetio e c plutonium n prospectI . , that fuel reprocessins i g schedule RT-e th r 2d fo plan t (approximatel 2002-2005).Thn yi e constructio fueX l MO e th f no production facilitWWER-100e th r yfo 0 reactor assumes si RT-e th r 2d fo plant.

initiae reprocessinF th t SN l A g rat f 100eo 0beinu t/yeaP ge th recoverer d woule db enoug fabricato ht fuelX t/yea0 ,6 MO . containin e1 f o rPu f o % g5

WWER-100e th f I 0 cor chargees i one-thirdr dfo , more tha WWER-1000 n2 0 units should be converte fueX r paro lf plutoniuMO o t n do mprogrammeN shoulB e usee th d b r d dfo an , that seems more beneficial.

casn I f suceo h WWER-100 patterC 0NF n implementatio builduu ratee P nth f so p after 2005 woul minimu e dtotae b th d l amounman f plutoniuo t cycle th men i would makp eu approximately 60 tonnes.

The analysis show s carrieha t nd ou tha utilizatioe tth f militar ntonneo 0 5 , f whicysPu o h would become available alread firse th tt a ystag warhead'a f eo s dismantling, woula e db

48 rather difficult problem. Original engineering and technological solutions, optimum in view of economics and meeting stringent requirements on nuclear safety and the environment protection, shoul lookine db g for.

4. MAIN TRENDS OF SCIENTIFIC R&D IN RUSSIA

More than 90% of scientific potential of the former USSR being involved in nuclear scienc technologyd an e practicalld an , y 100 f scientisto % s being occupie fiele th f do n di nuclear fuel cycle, have remained in the Russian Federation. The main R&D on Pu utilization are being carried out at the following institutes:

the A.A. Bochvar Institute of Inorganic Materials, Moscow: technology for pelletized MOX fuel fabrication, development of new fuel compositions, radiochemistry and waste management;

Institute th f Physiceo Powed san r Engineering, Obninsk: nuclear physical investigations, basic design of the BN-800 reactor core concept for MOX fuel, transmutation of minor actinides and thorium nuclear cycle;

the Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors, Dimitrovgrad: development of technology for the RBN vibropacked MOX fuel and spent fuel electrochemical reprocessing;

e V.Gth . Khoplin Radium Institute: radiochemical studie d co-ordinatioan s f o n investigation energetin so utilizatiou cP WWER-100e th n i 0 NFC;

"Majak" complex numbe:a f piloro t installation fabricato st fued X lan l eelementsMO , reprocessin u l productiotypeP al f f o o sg n waste. Minatom' e sNPP th pla r sfo n constructio operatioS Russin ni NF d tilp anan u l 201 gives i recentl0a n ni y published "Concept of Nuclear Power Engineering Development in the Russian Federation".

The main installation operato st e fuegivewitX e ar lh TablMO n i . eIV

Currently, the possibility to use Pu both of weapon grade and energetic one in BN-350 and BN-60 confirmes 0i d reliably enoughdiffereno tw e Th .t fuetechnologieX l MO e th r sfo fabrication have been develope tested semi-industriada an n do l scale following.e Theth e yar : technologa - r pelletizeyfo d fuel fabrication, using various method r producinsfo g initial mixed U-Pu oxides (mechanically mixed, co-precipitated in sol-gel, in the form of carbonate ammonid san a hydroxides; plasma chemical denitration);

a technology for vibropacked granulated MOX fuel, obtained by electrochemical method.

secone Th d techniqu bees eha n develope t SRIAda R (Dimitrovgrad distinguishes i d an ) d by a relative simplicity, a possibility of remote maintenance and a relatively small amount of wastes. That technology attract attentioe s, th Japanes US f nChineso d ean e expertt i s sa could provid researca r efo h fast reactor fuel cycle with minimum expenses.

At the same time, the possibility to use that technology for manufacturing full-scale assemblies of the BN-800 and WWER-1000 type commercial reactors requires an additional confirmation becaus lowea f eo r specific densit f vibropackeyo fuesomd X an l dMO e other problem solvede b o st .

49 TABL . PILO EIV SEMI-COMMERCIA D TAN L INSTALLATION FUEu P L- U R SFO

Type Location Life-period Tasks being solved Pu production rate

Lab. exper. ASRf o I 1960-1970 Fabrication of Military Pu up to inst. inorganic pellets and e th r pe u P 1t materials, experimental fuel whole period Moscow elements frou mP oxides and alloys

Scientific & SRI for Atomic 1985 until Fabricatio f fueno l Military & exper. complex Reactors, now elements and fuel energetica; Pu l Dimitrovgrad assemblies from 40-50 ass/year vibropacked fuel for to 0.5 t Pu/year research & commerciaN RB l

Pilot semi- "Majak" complex 1988 until FabricatioX MO f no Military Pu; comm. inst Chelyabinsk-65 now fuel for RBM by U- 80 kg Pu/year in "Granat" Pu co-precipitation the form of mixed oxides

Pilot" semi- "Majak" complex 1988 until Fabrication of Military Pu; comm. Chelyabinsk-65 now pellet fued san l Pu/yeag k 0 8 n i r inst. "Paket" elementN RB r sfo fore th f mo finished fuel elements

Produc f U-Po . u "Majak" complex Since 1 985 Fabrication of MOX Energetical Pu: fuel "complex- Chelyabinsk-65 under fue r RBN-80fo l f 0o 5-6 t Pu/year 300" construction South UraP NP l 50% availability

Produc f U-Po . u Krasnoyarsk-26 From 2005 Fabrication of MOX Energetical Pu to fue t RT-a l 2 (Planned) fue r WWERfo l - 8 t Pu/year plant 1000 reactors

Ministre Th r Atomiyfo c Energ Russiae th f yo conducter nfa Federatioo s t y no d an s nha special investigation inclusiou P n so n intremovee ob vitrifieo t dW frod HL biosphere e mth . Moreove contenu P l type al e f th wastrn i s to beins ei g rigidly monitore limitedd dan .

The main trend f investigationso s being following e designeth e ar unded y dan : wa r

- investigatio possibilit e studd th nf an yo utilizo yt (botu eP h energeti militard can y one) in reactors of the WWER-1000 type and in future LWR-type reactors; - investigatio optimizatiod nan utilizatiou P f no BN-80n i advanced 0an d reactors; - developmen optimun a f o t m reactor concep utilizationu P r fo t ; - developmen mose th f t o tmoney-savin ecologicalld gan y safe metho r militardfo u yP conversion into the NPP nuclear fuel; - minimizin radwastee gth s from nuclear warheads dismantlement including those from military Pu reprocessing; feasibility study of the most economical Pu-fuel cycle, including open NFC.

t knono wo Thus d toda e w alternativ,n ya long-tera o et storageu mP , meetine th l gal necessary requirements on nuclear and radiation safety, provision of reliable nuclear material physical protection from non-authorized access and protection from Pu-release into the environment.

50 largA e scal utilizatiou eP nucleann i r power-engineering would require great investments and the most advanced technologies. It is possible to speed up the solution of that problem co-operatioy b statee th l al s f developinno nucleae gth r power engineerin beind gan g interested nuclean i r warheads dismantling non-proliferationd an .

5. CONCLUSIONS

1. Proceeding from the present situation in Russian nuclear power engineering and nuclear fuel cycle, Pu in the nearest future will be building up both in the form of NPP spent fuel and processed energetic and military Pu.

. 2 Reductio stock-pila n ni wilu causee P b l f eo d onl y commissioninb y g fast (burner) BN-800 commercial reactors.

3. No reasons exist for Pu inclusion into solidified HLW for deep geological disposal.

4. Construction of safe and reliable storage facilities for both energetic and military Pu is necessary in the nearest future.

5. A wide scientific and technological international co-operation is necessary to find out the mos tutilizatiou beneficiaP r fo y nuclean i wa l r power engineering.

Next page(s) left blank UTILIZATION IN BN-800 FAST REACTORS OF ISOLATED PLUTONIUM BEING ACCUMULATED RUSSIAE TH N I N FEDERATION

V.S. KAGRAMANYAN Institut f Physiceo Powed san r Engineering, Obninsk, Russian Federation

Abstract

The Russian Federation has presently an inventory of about 26 tonnes of civil separated plutonium, with an annual production rate of 2.5 tonnes. When RT-2 reprocessing plant starts in 2005 annuae th , l production will increase addition I . n 50-100 tonne f plutoniuso expectee mar d to be released from nuclear weapons. The first BN-800 reactor is supposed to be finished by 2000. Three more BN-800 unit expectee sar introducee b o dt 2005y db . These four units will consume all plutonium inventories. Use in fast reactors is preferred since Thermal reactor utilization does not efficiently utiliz energe eth y conten particularl— t weapoe th f yo n material.

e maiTh n sourc f isolateo e d plutoniu e Russiath mn i n Federatio chemicaa s i n l reprocessing plant RT ("Mayak" complex, Chelyabinsk). Information on civil plutonium accumulation rate was published in the paper [1]. The total quantity of such plutonium, stored by now at the "Mayak" complex amounts to about 26 t. At maximum production , civiHM l plutoniua t/ plan t T Pu/a 0 ratR 5 40 f t 2. mt eo presen . A o t outpu p u ts i tspen t fuel reprocessing rate has been decreased to 100 t/a, respectively, plutonium yield fell t Pu/a dow6 0. .o nt

Besides civil plutonium produced by RT plant, arising of weapon plutonium is expected as a result of nuclear weapon conversion strategy, 501 in the nearest future and anothe t later 0 5 r .

Another perspective powerful source of civil plutonium might be RT-2 spent fuel reprocessing plant intende r WWEdfo R spent fuel f commissionei , d afte yeae th r r 2005, accordin planso gt .

Civil plutonium being isolated by the spent fuel reprocessing was always considered a valuablsa e power resourc r nucleaefo r power system. Weapon plutoniu usee b dn mca same inth e way commos i t I . n knowledg eterme thath f effectivn so i t f nucleao e eus r resources only plutonium fueled fast reactor giv n bese esca th t results same th t eA . time they are, to a certain extent, more complicated and expensive than thermal reactors are and this accounts for a delay in their construction.

That is why possibility of plutonium use in thermal reactors was of interest in many countries. This issue has been investigated there for many years, and such programs exist anbeine dar g developed nowadays.

foregoine th t A g Advisory Group Meetin papega isolaten o r d plutonium utilization i light water reactor discusseds swa .

r countrou n prograe I yth f mplutoniuo m utilizatio therman i l reactor r behinfa s si d similar foreign programs. It seems unlikely that it will have any influence on the solution of isolated plutonium program yeae tilth l r 2010.

Meanwhile, the program on plutonium utilization in fast reactors despite some delays is going on in this country. By the end of the century shop-300 ("Mayak" complex) for

53 MOX fuel fabricatio fasr nfo t reactor firse th t d unisan t BN-800 reacto Chelyabinsn ro k site are suppose e finishedb o t d n accordancI . e wit e lashth t plan f nuclearo s power development In the Russian Federation three more units BN-800 reactors are to be introduced into service till the year 2005.

First fast power reactors are of semi-industrial nature, their specific costs: capital investmen energd an t y cos 1.5-e ar t 2 times higher than thos r up-to-datefo e light water reactors.

Analysis of these differences performed in this country [2] and abroad [3] has shown that they only to a small extent (within to 25%) account for sodium coolant technology, influence of other factors is much stronger: achievement of high safety level; - kinfirsa f do t fabrication technology; - fuee statth l f cyclo e e technology, capacit load dan y fuee factoth l f cyclo r e plants, etc.

BN-600 reactor operation experience was taken into account in the BN-800 reactor design. Specific metal deman r BN-80dfo 0 reactor construction amount f thao r fo t% s75 BN-600 reactor.

The fuel cycle economics improvement for BN-800 can be achieved by enhancement of the fuel burnup to 15-20% h.a. and by creation of a large scale automated mixed U-Pu fuel fabrication.

Strengthenin f safetgo y requirements after Chernobyl furthere betweep ga e dth n economic characteristic f thermafasd so an t l reactors. Inheren faso t t t reactors features (low coolant pressure, relatively easy reactor control, stability of heat release fields, etc.) as wel s introductioa l technicaw ne f no l solutions helpe o meedt n BN-80i t 0 design requirements to NPP of new generation.

In particular in this reactor positive sodium void reactivity coefficient under sodium boiling conditio excludeds nwa .

To enhance safety of our light water reactors WWER type new designs proved to be necessary: WWER-500 and WWER-600. Their specific capital costs according to calculations are about the same as for BN-800 being planned for construction.

In Figs 1 and 2 there are calculated estimates of isolated plutonium quantities stored at the RT-1 plant versus of the plant production rate and depending on BN-800 reactors introduction.

thesn I e calculations BN-800 reacto annuas ha r l plutonium deman a f aboudt/ o 6 1. t Pu-239 equivalent and initial loading 2.3 t Pu-239 equivalent. Plutonium breeding ratio in all the cases considered is equal about 1. Once through version of fuel cycle has been analyzed. This fuel cycle allowt througpu o st h fast reactor maximua t sa m rate isolated plutonium being accumulate RT-dn i 1 storag reducd ean e irreversible losse f Pu-24so s 1a well as transform the isolated plutonium into spent fuel, where it is mixed with fission products. Storag f suceo h plutoniu mmors i e preferabl terme th f non-proliferation esi o f no nuclear weapons.

As far as isolated plutonium storage in the RT-1 plant is concerned one can see from tha2 d t e an Figthi th 1 s storage during minimuma s a , e nexth , t 12-15 years i s inevitable, if at least 3 BN-800 units will be introduced. In the case when less than 3 BN-800 units will be introduced the isolated plutonium from the RT-1 storage can be thoroughly used only under condition f nowadayso s fuel reprocessing rate conservation.

54 Pu quantity stored at the RT-1 plant e functiointh n BN-800 reactors introductio cycleT (O n ) (RT-1 capacity 0.6 t Pu/a)

Figure1

Additiona demanu lP d til e yealth r 2030

2 BN-800 - 32 t Pu

3 BN-800 - 89 t Pu

u P 4t BN-806 14 0-

Pu quantity stored at the RT-1 plant e functioith n n BN-800 reactors introductio cycleT (O n ) (RT-1 capacity 2.6 t Pu/a)

Figure 2

Additional Pu demand till the year 2030

3 BN - 66 t Pu

4 BN - 120 t Pu

55 That is why all those problems in regard to safe and economical long-term storage of probleme th plutoniu solvedf necessite e o b th e o s st i On e . mchango ar yt nuclide eth e compositio e storeth f no d civil plutonium (becaus f Pu-24eo 1 decay into Am-24d 1an arisin n thii g s connection necessit f repeateo y d plutonium reprocessin o removt g e americium).

After isolated plutoniu mRT-n i 1 storage wil exhaustee b l d BN-800 reactors can:

1. To begin reprocessing and use of their own plutonium. plutoniume us o T ,. obtaine2 resula s df a conversio o t n strategy. isolatee us o T d plutoniu . 3 m from RT-2 reprocessing plant, intende r WWER-100dfo 0 spent fuel.

choice determinee optioe b Th th n f eo nca economiy db r ecologicaco l reasond san possibly political considerations, connected, for instance, with a necessity of weapon plutonium utilization.

Result f calculationso s show tha BN-804 t 0 units workin oncgn i e through fuel cycle can completely solve the problem of isolated plutonium accumulation at the RT-1 plant, even at the maximum production rate, and, if necessary, they can put through them and get bounded with spent fuel all weapon plutonium.

When alternative ways of weapon plutonium utilization are being considered, it is necessary to take into account that its use in a light water reactor is connected with 50-60% loss of plutonium energy potential as far as future nuclear power is meant. And wha s veri t y importan o mentiot t n that there will occur additional accumulatiof o n radiotoxic minor actinide Pu-24d san 1 which decay procese th n si f sourceso d storage into highly toxic radionuclide Am-241.

Putting through the BN-800 reactors with BR = 1, weapon plutonium we conserve its energy potential and practically do not change total radiotoxicity of actinides.

Besides, effective utilization of weapon plutonium in thermal reactors would require loading plutonium in all light water reactors operated in the country, because MOX loading e cor f th totao s restricte i e n i 3 l 1/ cor y b ed fuel loading. This will complicate th e nonproliferation proble increasy mb f installationeo s numbe inspectede b o t r .

In the case of BN-800 reactors all plutonium fuel cycle is restricted within the "Mayak" comple Beloyarskayd xan siteP .a NP Ther RT-e ear 1 reprocessing plant, shop-300 fuel fabrication facilit foud yran BN-800 reactor units worthwhils i t I . mentioeo t n that this joina e tb Russian-Europeay ma n projec f speciao t l plutonium utilizer.

CONCLUSIONS

. 1 Reliabl safd ean e plutonium storage both civimilitaryd r fuean lfo fora t l n mi ,ap fabrication inevitabln a s i , necessard ean y solutiostage th n ei f isolateno d plutonium problem.

2. Fast reactors in Russia are prepared to plutonium utilization, including weapon one, muca o t h greater extent than thermal reactors areproblee Th . f misolateo d civil plutonium accumulation as a result of RT-1 plant operation and utilization of weapon plutonium being released can be solved under conditions that plans exist for 4 BN-800 units introductio theid nan r operatio oncn i e through fue l firse cyclth tt ea stage.

56 3. When alternative options of plutonium utilization are being compared it is essential to take into account besides economical, ecological issues as well, for instance accumulation of highly toxic long-lived actinides.

REFERENCES

[1] DZEKUN, E.G., Fissionable materials handling experience at the RT-1 radiochemical plant, Int. Seminar on spent fuel reprocessing, storage and plutonium arrangement. Moscow, December 14-16, 1992. ] [2 RINEISKIJ, A.A., Compariso f up-to-dato n e thermal reactor d fasan st reactors technica economicad an l l characteristics. Atomic Energy, 1982, V.53 . 360,p . [3] NANDET, G., SATRE, C., MARTIN, J., DUCHATELLE, L, The Trends, the Competitivenes Europen i R FB .f so Proc . Int. Conf Fasn o . t Reactor Related san d Fuel Cycles, Oct.28- Nov.1, 1991, Kyoto, Japan, V.2, p.184.

Next page(s) left blank 57 PROBLEMS CONCERNIN ACCUMULATIOE GTH F NO ISOLATED PLUTONIUM - THE SWISS SITUATION

H. BAY Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerk, eAG Baden, Switzerland

Abstract

At present Switzerland has only kilogram quantities of separated plutonium domestically. Contracts for reprocessing spent fuel with COGEMA and BNFL will result in 6.2 tonnes of fissile plutonium prior to 2004. All this plutonium will be consumed by Swiss utilities as MOX. The inventory of separated Swiss plutonium will never exceed 0.6 tonnes. The greatest uncertainty in the Swiss plutonium utilization programme results from delays in approval from the US DOE for proceeding with spent nuclear fuel subject to prior consent rights.

. RESEARC1 H FACILITIES

Paul Scherrer Institut onle (PSIth ys i )facilit Switzerlann yi d that handles isolated plutonium for research purposes. The main objectives of its research in the nuclear fuels area are:

- improved MOX fabrication techniques; advanced fuels such as plutonium nitrite fuels ; actinide burning.

PSI has currently kg quantities of isolated plutonium for its research and these quantitie likele s ar decreaso yt importance th s ea f nucleaeo r research decreases over time.

2. PLUTONIUM CONSUMPTION

With no other plutonium facility existing in Switzerland presently we are left with the plutonium consumption of Swiss nuclear power plants.

NPP5 Foe sth r operatin Switzerlann gi d reprocessing contract placn i e ear s with COGEM BNFd Aan coveo L t estimate e th rf abouo 3 / d1 t lifetime spent fuel arisings (980t HM). 6.2 t of fissile plutonium are estimated to become available from the reprocessing of this t havfuel 5 e0, , already been separate madd dan e availabl ownere e th th d o et san remaining quantity of 5.7 t are scheduled to become available between now and 2003.

Total consumption has been about 1.2 t of fissile plutonium as MOX fuels in NOK's recycling progra theimn i r Beznau power plant. Plans have been develope currentle ar r do y develope recycline th remainine r f fissilth dfo o f gt o e0 gplutonium5. .

If successful, these plans will result in the use of all of the plutonium to be separated for Swiss customers under existing reprocessing contracts by the year 2004 and the amount of isolated plutonium for Swiss customers will not exceed at any point in time 0.6 t of fissile plutonium. This situation is depicted in Figure 1.

59 Kg PU fies ) IÏVV J I i ...... j ...... 1000 i 000 l

600 1 ; 5 1 400 I n. \ \ \ 1 ''''' ! 200 O) ; / \ | s 1 t _ f) Ljj n M R| KM u a J !« 0 j Ü1 1 ' it : > : 1 1 1 11 1 il T -200 $ • J 1 i ' -400 A. •' •' -800 1 : • o -800 ... j ! ! 1000 i ...... J...:...... l i ! 1 OAA I I I 1 1 1 1 i i l 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 7 0 6 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 9 -9 8 9 7 6 6 9 6 9 4 9 3 9 2 9 1 9 0 9 0 8 8 8 7 8 6 8 5 88 4 •i PU Arlslngs / Year ES3 Swap / Year IH MOX F.A. / Year • ^ Cum. PU In Store

FIG. 1. Plutonium arisings and plant utilization for Swiss utilities — April 1993 (assuming US prior consent rights are renewed after 1995).

3. WHAT ARE THE MAIN UNCERTAINTIES OF THIS ASSESSMENT?

A. Plutonium availability e lac f plutoniuTh o k m availabilit s obviousli y problea e context th no y n mi f o t excessive stock f isolateso d plutonium commerciawela n e ca b l t I . l proble thosr mfo e utilities that certaia commi fabricatioX e us n MO o t n capacit cannod yan thie sus t capacity at the desired time. An uncertainty of lesser importance is that the rules for plutonium allocation are not established in all cases (THORP).

B. Timely licensing of plutonium/MOX transfers An important uncertainty in past has been the poor reliability of timely licenses for transfere spenth f i t f plutoniufueX o s e sourcle MO th whic th d s f mo ean h wa plutonium was subject to prior consent rights by the US. Up to 4 years were necessar t approvage o yt r whafo l calles i t subsequenda t arrangemen termn i t f so DOES U e . th

Switzerland is particularly vulnerable to these licensing delays as it is not a member to the Euratom where nuclear material can circulate up to now and does not qualify for programmatic approval under President Reagan Plutoniu policye mus .

The US-Euratom bilateral agreement will laps Swiss-Ue 199n ei th d 5an S bilateral agreement wil 996 1 l conditionfale e lapsf o th l.Th n ei r transfersfo f plutoniuso m subjec US-prioo t t r consent right after difficul1995/e ar 6 forecasto 1t t99 . Figure1 shows the situation assuming the plutonium that is subject to prior US consent rights can be transferred from the reprocessing plants to the MOX fabrication plants and on reactors e Switzerlano t th n i e . us Figur r dfo depicte2 e resulte th sth t f thisi no s si case.

60 KG PU i.' U U U l i i , 2-100 - n ? , i i i 1 1 i i 2000 •" ; • j i l ! 1600 - L » ; .! . 1200 - • •j

800 •

400 - , l R / 1 f^ li i1 Mscfl i *** I? il U J 0 4 u LJ l a ü ir u ^; ¥ [T | FYV t 1 U . T l -400 1' ' "* . -800 , | , i 1 1 1 i i i 1 1 i i i 1 1 1 OrtA l l i 1 1 1 1 7 0 6 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 9 9 8 9 7 9 6 9 6 9 4 9 3 9 2 9 1 9 0 9 0 8 8 8 7 8 6 8 6 68 4 SwaS §§ / pYea r AflgingU P i / gYea B r / YoaPA rX MO ! EU n StorI U eP m WàCu

FIG 2 Plutonium ansings and plant utilization for Swiss utilities — April 1993 {assuming US prior consen t renewe rightno e sar d after 1995}

capacitX MO C. y Another important uncertainty is the availability of MOX fabrication capacity. Currently there is competition for MOX capacity for the next several years and the aging of isolated plutonium in the stores of the reprocessors is a major concern to utilities

Next page(s) left blank 61 PLUTONIUM ARISING UTILIZATIOD SAN N IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

R. DODDS THORP Division, British Nuclear Fuels pic, Risley, United Kingdom

Abstract

The UK has presently 11.1 GW installed nuclear generating capacity with an additional 1.2 GW under construction. Plutonium is separated domestically at Sellafield and will be separated for both domestic and foreign customers in the THORP facility which is now complete but not yet operationn i . Current stock f separateso d plutoniu t mSellafiela tonnes5 3 e dar . Total plutonium arisings from AGR fuel will be 58 t; 15 t additional plutonium will come from LWR fuel reprocessed at THORP. Plutonium wil utilizee b l LWRn di s since fast reactor deploymen bees ha tn delayed till after 2030, and there is no incentive to use plutonium in AGRs which require only low enrichment fuels.

1. NUCLEAR GENERATION PROGRAMME

The UK's nuclear generating capacity comprises some 3200 MW Magnox and operateR AG Nuclea510y W db M 0 r Electri operateR c (NE245AG d Scottisy an W )d 0b M h Nuclear (SNL) together with 400 MW Magnox operated by British Nuclear Fuels pic (BNFL). The only additional nuclear capacity currently under construction is the 1175 MW Sizewell B PWR owned by NE and which is expected to be in operation in 1994.

Further expansio e UK'th sf o nnuclea r generating capacity will depene th n o d outcom Governmena f eo t review later this yea 993)1 ( r . Although planning permissior nfo proposee th d Hinkle statioyR Poinapproves PW nwa C t Septemben di constructio0 99 1 r n approval was deferred. NE is currently expressing a preference for a twin PWR station, Sizewell C, as the next stage of its development programme.

. SPEN2 T FUEL MANAGEMENT

Magnox

Magnox fuel (uranium metal/magnesium alloy cladding) must be reprocessed early for technical reasons. All such fuel will continue to be despatched to BNFL's reprocessing facility at Sellafield which on current station lifetime assumptions will be required until at least 2005/2006.

AGR

Nuclear Electri s contracteha c o reprocest d n BNFL'i s s THORP facility , some 1 3000arisinge th , stationU tR sabou o t froAG yea e p s msu th it t r 2005 retainE N . e sth optio f earlno y reprocessin f storino r go g subsequent arising f fueso l from these stations. SN contractes Lha d with BNF THORr Lfo P reprocessin f somgo arisinge e th IOO , U O st from

Construction of THORP at Sellafield is complete but active commissioning and operation have 1 been delayed pending approval by the Regulatory Authorities of new Discharge Authorizations for Sellafiele th d Site.

63 their AGR abouo t p su t 1995/1 996 subsequenr .Fo t arising f fueso l from station theiR rAG s SNL are planning on-site long term dry storage; a Public Inquiry on the planning application for such a store at Torness was completed in January. However, SNL retain the option for early reprocessing of this fuel.

PWR

Although indicative cost r spenfo s t fuel management were provide o botdt e hth Sizewel Hinkled an B lpubli yC c inquirie termn si f reprocessingso reprocessine th , d gan direct disposal options remain open. The current UK design of PWR provides for 18 years of at-reacto t storagwe rthi d sean would increase wit adoptioe hth f higheno r burn-up and/o consolidationd ro r . Decision reprocessinn so r direcgo t disposa t e havb no o et o d l taken for some considerable time.

3. SAFEGUARDED UK PLUTONIUM STOCKS

Currently f safeguardethero some t ear 5 e3 MagnoK dU x plutoniu mstocn i t a k Sellafiel e Magno thid th sf dan o figur xd expectes en ei e th y riso db t abouo et t 8 5 t programme. Contracted reprocessing of AGR fuel in THORP would add a further 15 t approximatel togethed yan r with those arisings from oversea fueR whico lt sLW h BNFs Lha title and the arisings from the UKAEA's WAGR and SGHWR fuel, the grand total would be about 74 t. Each additional t U of fuel reprocessed would provide an additional 5 kg for AGR fuel and 10 kg for PWR fuel.

4. PLUTONIUM UTILIZATION

Fast reactor

Historically, UK policy on plutonium utilization has been based on an assumption of early commercial exploitatio f fasno t reactors. Recentl GovernmenK U e yth t gave notice f withdrawao f financiao l l suppor r operatiofo t Prototype th f no e Fast Reacto t Dounreara y after 1994 (and of associated reprocessing operations after 1997) and terminated its suppore Europeath r fo t n Fast Reactor Projec n Marci t h 1993. This effectivelha s y postponed deploymeny an f faso t t reactors commerciall untiK t U leas a l e tth 2030n yi .

AGR

feasibilite Th f recyclinyo g plutoniu fueX AGRn i l beenMO s s msha a demonstrated by trial loadings in the prototype AGR (WAGR). However, given the relatively low burn-up and low-enrichment feature f AGRso s there currently economiappearo n e b o st c incentive recyclo t e plutoniu mAGRsn i optioe Th . n remains open however.

PWR

The feasibility of recycling plutonium as MOX fuel in PWRs is established. MOX fuel coul loadee db Sizeweln di and/oB l othen i r r PWRe sTh tha . t UK migh e buile th b t n i t stoc f plutoniuko m available from contracted reprocessin fue R f Magnogo l woulAG d xan d be enoug provido ht overlife erequirementth X thireMO e on d a cor t s(a e loadingo t 4 f o ) 5 PWRs.

5. MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITIES

The MDF (MOX Demonstration Facility) situated on the UKAEA's Windscale site at Sellafiel schedules di operation r i fo e b a p wito d 3 t Jun n i M 99 h capacita H e1 t 8 f yo

64 fuelLWX R.MO Thi joina s i t BNFL/AEA Technology planprojece th d t wil an toperate e b l d by the AEA.

BNFL's propose (SellafielP dSM plant X , subjecdMO is ) approvalo t t , plannee b o dt fuelX . MO Thioperation R i s LW plan r fo 199n ti a wilp 7e lb M wit H capacith1 a 20 1 f yo situated adjacen e THORth o t tP reprocessing facilits beini d gan y designe o utilizdt e plutonium from THORP that may have been stored for several years; it will also be capable of receivin usind gan g plutonium from other sources.

Next page(s) left blank 65 LIS PARTICIPANTF TO S

Bay, H. Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerke AG (NOK), Postfach 365, CH-5401 Baden, Switzerland

Bragin. V , Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrass , P.O e1005 x .Bo , A-1400 Vienna, Austria de Canck. H , Belgonucléaire SA, Département Sécurité, Europalaa, n20 B-2480 Dessel, Belgium de Longevialle, H. Cogéma, 2, rue Paul Dautier, F-78141 Vélizy Cedex, France

Dodds. R , British Nuclear Fuels pic, Risley, Warrington, Cheshire WAS 6AS, United Kingdom

Finucane, U.S. Divisio f Nucleano r Fuel Cycl Wastd ean e Management, (Scientific Secretary) International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Furness, B. J. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, . PeterSt s House, Stanley Precinct, Bootle, Merseyside 3LZ0 L2 , , United Kingdom

Gerster, D. DCC, Centre d'études nucléaires, F-91191 Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France

Hori. K , Safeguards Office, Nuclear Material Control Division, Power Reacto Nuclead an r r Fuel Development Corporation, 1-9-13 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107, Japan

Joseph. J . C , Ultra Centrifuge Nederland N.V., Almelo, Netherlands

Kagramanyan, V. S. Institut f Physiceo Powed san r Engineering, Obninsk, Kaluzhskaja Region, Russian Federation

Koutchinov. P . V , The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Erzherzog Karl-Strasse 182, A-Vienna0 122 , Austria

67 Kudriavtsev, E.G. International Relations Department, Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Staromonetnyj per. 26, RUS-109180 Moscow, Russian Federation

Lawrence, M. J. Permanent Mission of the US to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Obersteinergasse 11, A-11 90 Vienna, Austria

Liu, Qiusheng Beijing institute of Nuclear Engineering, P.O. Box 840, 100840 Beijing, China

Lucas, P. Cogéma, 2, rue Paul Dautier - B.P. 4, F-78141 Vélizy Cedex, France

Nakada. M , Nuclear Fuel Divsion, Atomic Energy Bureau, Scienc Technologd ean y Agency, 2-1 2-chome, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japan

Nelson, R. US Arms Contro Disarmamend an l t Agency, Washington, DC 20520, United States of America

Oi, N. Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Ouvry, B. Représentation permanent Belgique ed Vienneeà , Wohllebengasse 6, A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Rinejskij, A. Division of Nuclear Power, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrass , P.Oe 5 100 x .Bo , A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Ruiping, L. The Permanent Mission of China to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Steinfeldgasse 1, A-11 90 Vienna, Austria

Schick, E. A. Permanent Missio f Australino e th o at International Atomic Energy Agency, Mattiellistrasse 2-4/III, A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Schmidt. U , Siemens AG - KWU BV9, Rodenbacher Chaussee 6, Postfach 11 00 60 D-6450 Hanau 11, Germany

Shea. T , Departmen f Safeguardso t , International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrass , P.Oe 5 100 x .Bo , A-1400 Vienna, Austria

68 Sood, D.D. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Bombay 400085, India

Takamatsu. M , Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Tilemann, J. Director General's Office, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Linger, K. The Permanent Missio f nGermano Office e th th f o yet o United Nations and to the other International Organization Viennan si , Wagramerstrass, e14 A-Vienna0 122 , Austria

Williams. J , NE-45 DepartmenS U , f Energyo t , Washington, DC 20585, United States of America

Yu, H. The Permanent Mission of China to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Steinfeldgasse 1, A-11 90 Vienna, Austria

Zarimpas. N , Nuclear Development Division, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Le Seine Saint-Germain, Boulevar2 1 liess dde , F-92 Issy-les-Moulineaux0 13 , France

. ZhuL . J , Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

69