Prospects in China for Nuclear Development up to 2050 Yanxin Chen, Guillaume Martin, Christine Chabert, Romain Eschbach, Hui He, Guo-An Ye
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Prospects in China for nuclear development up to 2050 Yanxin Chen, Guillaume Martin, Christine Chabert, Romain Eschbach, Hui He, Guo-An Ye To cite this version: Yanxin Chen, Guillaume Martin, Christine Chabert, Romain Eschbach, Hui He, et al.. Prospects in China for nuclear development up to 2050. Progress in Nuclear Energy, Elsevier, 2018, 103, pp.81 - 90. 10.1016/j.pnucene.2017.11.011. cea-01908268 HAL Id: cea-01908268 https://hal-cea.archives-ouvertes.fr/cea-01908268 Submitted on 30 Oct 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Progress in Nuclear Energy 103 (2018) 81–90 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Progress in Nuclear Energy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/pnucene Prospects in China for nuclear development up to 2050 T ∗ Yanxin Chena,b, Guillaume Martinb, , Christine Chabertb, Romain Eschbachb, Hui Hea, Guo-an Yea a Department of Radiochemistry, China Institute of Atomic Energy, PO. 275- 26, Beijing, 102413, China b CEA, DEN, DER, F-13108 Saint-Paul-lez-Durance, France ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: An ambitious plan for nuclear development exists for long in China. The study of scenarios with prospect of 150 Scenario GWe to 400 GWe in 2050 is carried out using the COSI6 simulation software, and aims at analyzing the evolution China of nuclear energy currently planned in China. Results rely on natural uranium supplies, fuel fabrication, spent Nuclear fuel cycle fuel reprocessing, quantities of proliferating materials and the opportunity of a rapid deployment of fast reactors 2050 (FBR). It seems impossible for China to start two fast reactors before 2020 without any external source of FBR plutonium. Anyway, FBR may represent at the most around 30% of the total nuclear capacity in the country by Reprocessing 2050. Indeed the deployment of FBR only can start from 2035 to 2040. Finally, the pace of FBR development should be controlled carefully by the proportion of FBR and PWR with respect to the reprocessing capacity. Natural uranium savings appear rather low by 2050, because the transition toward a fast reactor fleet in- dependent from uranium ore lasts decades. However, this independence may be reached by the end of the century, before uranium resources are dwindling, if the first corners to close the fuel cycle are turned in the next decade. 1. Introduction would rise to about 40 GWe by 2020 (NDRC). Three years later, the status of Chinese nuclear energy development shifted from “active” to With the rapid development of the Chinese economy, the energy “aggressive” (Guobao, 2009). In 2011, the Chinese Academy of En- demand has been increasing year by year from the beginning of the 21st gineering (CAE) predicted that nuclear power capacity would be 200 century. The average electricity consumption in China is about GWe in 2030 and 400 GWe in 2050 (CAE-Chinese Academy of 4000 kWh per person per year at present, but may reach 7000 kWh by Engineering, ). But, because of the Fukushima accident, the State the end of the year 2050, assuming an increase ratio of 1.6% annually Council of China suspended new civilian nuclear projects and ordered (CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute, 2015). Fossil safety inspections of all nuclear power plants in operation and under fuels (especially coal) have been used as the main energy resource to construction. meet the energy demand in China up to now. This has detrimental ef- Over one year later, China restarted nuclear plants and approved a fects on environment and people life conditions, such as global new Medium and Long term Nuclear Power Development Plan warming and air pollution. In order to decrease CO2 emissions in the (2011–2020) which outlined its goal of increasing the nuclear capacity future and alleviate the pressure on the environment caused by fossil to about 58 GWe by 2020, with 30 GWe of reactors under construction fuel consumption, new energies have to be economically feasible, en- to this term (National Development and Reform Commission). There is vironmental friendly, publicly acceptable, and implementable at a large currently no official target for nuclear energy after 2020, but a few scale. In this respect, nuclear energy constitutes a top-ranking option growth prospects have been proposed in the literature (Yi-chong, 2008; for China (Zhou, 2010; Yi-chong, 2008; Zhou and Zhang, 2010; Zhou Mi, 2008; Energy Research Institute, 2010; Zhou, 2011; Chen et al., et al., 2011), along with renewable sources of energy. Indeed, to solve 2012; Fiori and Zhou, 2015a, 2015b), in which the installed nuclear air pollution issues, nuclear power can efficiently balance the inter- capacities are between 150 GWe and 500 GWe in 2050. By 2030 and by mittency of renewables without increasing GHG emissions. 2050, nuclear power is expected to contribute respectively to 15% and In 1996, the China National Nuclear Company (CNNC) forecasted 22% of the Chinese electricity production (CNPC Economics and that China would reach 150 GWe by 2050 (Suttmeier and Evan, 1996; Technology Research Institute, 2015). Rothwell, 2001). The Medium and Long-term Nuclear Power Develop- The issue for China is not whether the country will expand its nu- ment Plan (2005–2020) planned in 2006 that China's nuclear capacity clear energy programme; rather it is about the speed at which this ∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (G. Martin). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnucene.2017.11.011 Received 19 July 2017; Received in revised form 2 October 2017; Accepted 21 November 2017 0149-1970/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Y. Chen et al. Progress in Nuclear Energy 103 (2018) 81–90 Fig. 1. Closed fuel cycle policy in China. UMine Interim Spent Fuel Storage(Wet) SF Interim Spent Fuel Storage (dry) SF or Irradiated SF or target Irradiated SF target U Mill Closed Interim HLW Chemical Reprocessing HLW Reactor Fuel Storage (Tank) U Purification Cycle HLW & Conversion Fresh Fuel U and/or Pu Or HLW Processing Target 235U Enrichment Reactor Fuel HLW (target) Fabrication U HLW Pu U Immobilization U Nuclear Blend Depleted U U Weapons Down Geologic Disposal Pu expansion should occur. If China would have decided to operate its export drive, 2017). A prototype of high temperature gas-cooled reactor nuclear fleet according to a “one-through” cycle in the future, how (HTGR) of 210 MWe designed in-house by INET (Tsinghua University) much natural uranium and interim storage capacity of unloaded spent should reach criticality before 2020. fuel (SF) would be needed? If the nuclear fuel cycle is being closed, how For the front-end of nuclear fuel cycle, according to IAEA (IAEA, make a reasonable use of Pu and limit the proliferation risks? What may 2014), uranium resources in China totalize 265,500 tHM. Besides that, be the short-term alternative strategies if FBR are further delayed? In China National Nuclear Overseas Uranium Resources Development order to solve the above challenges so as to ensure a sustainable de- company (NNOURD) was set up to seek out and invest in overseas re- velopment of nuclear energy in China, it is necessary to have a complete sources in 2006. It has secured over 200,000 tHM reserves in total in overview of the nuclear energy development in this country. To this Africa, Australia, Canada, and Central Asia (Zhou, 2011). China General aim, this study has been carried out with the COSI6 simulation software Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) also invested in a uranium mining (Coquelet-pascal et al., 2015), to compare several scenarios built with project in Kazakhstan in 2009. In addition, AREVA and CAMECO signed great care as regards the level of details. nuclear fuel agreements with CGNPC to supply low-enriched uranium fuel for the next decades (IAEA, 2014; WNN, 2010). Identified natural uranium resources recoverable at costs lower than 130 USD/kgU (50 2. Nuclear industry in China USD/lb of U3O8) are 5,902,900 tU in 2013 according to IAEA (IAEA, 2014). 2.1. Current situation Three uranium conversion plants each with annual capacity of 500–800 tU have been in operation from 2002 (Energy Research China has aimed at closing its nuclear fuel cycle (see Fig. 1) as soon Institute, 2010; WNN, 2010). Another conversion plant with annual as it has decided to develop its nuclear power, in the early 1980s (Zhou, capacity of 3000 tU is in operation from 2008 (CAEA, 2008). According 2011). Pressurized water reactors (PWR) have been first deployed, and to (Zhou, 2011), there are two enrichment plants with more than 1.5 China is facing a considerable spent fuel accumulation. Qingshan Phase million separative work units (SWU) per year in China. Two nuclear I and Dayabay sites have recently accumulated SF in excess to their fuel manufacturers (in Yibin and Baotou) currently provide nuclear fuel storage capacity. Dense-pack racks are now used, but at least 104 ir- assemblies (over 1,200tHM/year). A pilot-scale MOX fabrication plant radiated assemblies were sent from Dayabay to an interim storage pool with an annual capacity of 0.5 ton has just been completed. at the pilot-scale reprocessing plant (Zhou, 2011), which capacity is For the back-end of nuclear fuel cycle, the State Council approved in limited to 550 tHM (Guoqing, 2010).