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The South African National Defence Force integration

Thandi Modisei

The history of is littered with conflicts – cultural, ethnic and racial. Different wars were fought during different eras, in different geographical spaces using different arms and systems.

South Africa’s negotiated settlement took place over a period of time. Some people believe that the negotiations began with discussions between the African National Congress (ANS) leadership in prison and the South African government of the time as early as the late 1980s. The negotiated settlement has been under discussion and in the public domain since the early 1990s. We know that the armed forces of the two political actors, the South African government and the ANC, became involved in direct and structured negotiations only in November 1993. Clearly, there was a ‘gap’ between the political and the military talks. The pace of the negotiations also tended to be slower and to ‘follow’ the political talks.

There were two reasons for this ‘time gap’:

º Both parties saw the retention of their armed forces as a ‘security fallback’, an asset necessary to appease their respective constituencies. º Retaining their armed capabilities was seen, in very pragmatic terms, as a physical guarantee that could be utilised should the negotiation process falter or fail.

Considerable debate had preceded the formal military negotiations between the primary actors - the South African Defence Force (SADF) and (MK) - and the other armed forces present in South Africa at the time: the Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army (APLA); the Defence Force (TDF); the (CDF); the (VDF) and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF). (The Inkatha Freedom Party’s self-protection units were to join the integration very late.) Because of the numerical, organisational, budgetary and skills superiority of the SADF, many observers maintained that the negotiations were 2 a waste of time. In their opinion, the envisaged integration process was rather going to be a process of absorption in which MK and other non-SADF armed forces would simply disappear into the SADF.

These debates added to the environment of mistrust that existed between the statutory and the non-statutory forces and the dangers of absorption were even spelled out:

º Absorption would reduce the capacity of an incoming ANC government to effectively control the armed forces of the new democratic dispensation. º It would impact minimally on the reprofessionalisation and democratisation of the armed forces - a process deemed crucial given the praetorian profile of the SADF within the P W Botha administration.

º It would leave the officer corps largely white and male for the foreseeable future and reduce the capacity of the other integrating armed forces to impact meaningfully on the restructuring of the new defence force.

Most of these observations were valid at the time and some were accurate for at least the first phase of the integration process. A number of factors in the period after 1996 introduced - and indeed influenced – a real shift in the balance of power within the armed forces. This shift moved the process from absorption to integration. The shift had much to do with the enforced resignation of the Chief of the National Defence Force, George Meiring, over a report which he had presented to President Nelson Mandela implicating senior MK officers in an alleged coup plot.

It is necessary to look at the different phases of the integration process to understand the nature of the shift in power and to assess the relative success of the process.

The Joint Military Co-ordinating Council phase (November 1993 – April 1994)

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The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was established in the last months of 1993. Of its seven sub-councils, three had broad security mandates (in defence, intelligence, and law and order). That integration would take place was a given - the question was HOW such integration would take place. Essentially the role of the sub- council on defence was political-strategic by nature. It was primarily responsible for monitoring the armed forces during the pre-election period. It was also charged with initiating the planning required to create a new, integrated national defence force.

The sub-council on defence established the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC), which reported directly to the sub-council. This JMCC was tasked with the management of all pre-integration planning processes, including staff. The JMCC was not a formal command structure, but it was to become responsible for the management of the strategic planning process whereby detailed plans for the creation of the new defence force were drawn up.

The chairpersonship of the JMCC rotated between the leaders of the two major negotiating forces - General George Meiring (Chief of the SADF) and Siphiwe Nyanda (Chief of Staff of MK).

The JMCC established a number of working groups according to identified needs. Members of these working groups were drawn from both the statutory forces (the SADF and the TBVC armies) and from the non-statutory forces (MK and later APLA, when it came on board in 1994). The SADF and MK co-chaired the working groups and committees and dominated the proceedings and the agenda.

The SADF’s main objective in the JMCC period seems to have been to keep the structures, doctrines, training culture and organisational culture as intact as possible throughout the integration process. This was achieved for a number of reasons:

º The SADF had the organisational, planning and budgetary capabilities that enabled them to plan and prepare, in considerable detail, their various position papers well before their discussion with the formal structures of the JMCC. Invariably the SADF positions were seen as the most thought-out and coherent and more often than not they were included in the proceedings of the JMCC. 4

º The SADF possessed formal strategic staff and management skills. It was familiar with practical, conceptual, strategic and doctrinal issues underpinning both the planning and force design process. The SADF was also familiar with bureaucratic politics.

On the other hand, MK could influence the process by banking on the significant political leverage of the ANC in the national political arena. By the end of 1993 it was already a foregone conclusion that the ANC would be the ruling party after the national elections. MK used this political leverage to exact key political compromises on the ranking and placement of non-statutory force officers, the management and oversight of the integration process during the post-election period, and the participation of the British armed forces as neutral arbitrators overseeing the entire process.

MK was not able, at the time, to impact more decisively on the process, because of the nature of its structure. It was largely a guerrilla force and its members were scattered throughout the country. Some were still in exile. Some MK members were allocated to non-military roles (as was particularly pronounced after the first democratic elections). MK negotiations relied largely on their political leadership’s broad interest in a legitimate, representative national defence force. MK officers frequently had to use their own political and military acumen to divert, stall or derail SADF positions that, in their opinion, would have disadvantaged their broad mandate and compromised the non-statutory and non-SADF personnel in the integration process.

Practical problems such as lack of transport, computers and other material to help in the research and preparation of position papers limited the ability of MK to compete on an equal footing with the SADF.

The influence of MK on the integration process was thus uneven and depended strongly on the area of focus. Although MK had produced a number of pilots, it had very little impact on the Air Force and Navy working groups. MK was primarily a landward guerrilla army, and this became evident in the more pronounced influence it had in the Army working group. It is also important to note that the character of the SADF co-chairperson was such that the working group was able to conduct its 5 discussions in a more relaxed atmosphere and that the trust levels were higher. In the Medical Services working group MK officers and doctors proved adept at preparing detailed position papers for the integration process of medical personnel.

The armies of the former homelands (TBVC forces) did not have any significant impact on the integration process beyond the influence of a few individuals. These armies’ lack of strategic exposure, lack of political legitimacy and an institutional power base beyond their regions, and lack of confidence among many of their officers, contributed to their marginalisation in the process.

In view of the above, it is not surprising that the force design of the new SANDF was largely based on that of the old SADF and that the strategies, doctrines and the procedures remained unchanged. The integration process was therefore to be based on SADF structures, rules and regulations. This greatly undermined the capacity of the non-SADF forces to influence the integration process during this phase.

The most important achievement of the JMCC process and period was that it brought together sworn enemy armies for the first time and created space for the fusion of different military cultures and experiences, creating a basis for a common institutional culture and camaraderie within the organisation. It also provided a manageable and goal-oriented planning framework for the new SANDF. It planted the seeds of national identity and enjoyed greater public comment than any other state department at the time.

The Integration Phase (1994–1998)

The fact that 80 per cent of the structures and practices agreed on by the JMCC were those of the SADF only fuelled national debate that the non-statutory forces and the TBVC armies were simply being absorbed into the SADF.

The SADF brought in some 90,000 personnel, MK contributed 22,000, the TBVC armies together contributed 11,000 and ALPA brought in some 6,000. With the last- minute entry of the Inkatha Freedom Party Self-Protection Unit personnel, the new SANDF stood at approximately 130,000 members.

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Interesting problems began to emerge. None of the non-SADF forces had an institutional power base within the SADF. There was therefore no free and fair integration into the structure of the new SANDF. Many of the SADF members regarded the activities of the new SANDF merely as ’business as usual’ and treated integrating non-SADF members as though they were new members joining an old and established organisation. This added to the psychological intimidation and marginalisation of non-SADF personnel. The continued use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and command and control added another psychological obstacle and further contributed to the disempowerment of the non-statutory forces.

Regular displays of racism and arrogance by some white officers restricted the participation of non-SADF officers, thus limiting their understanding of the restructuring processes within which they were to contribute. These obstacles cumulatively resulted in the delay in the integration of non-statutory officers and in some of them leaving out of frustration.

The capacity of the non-SADF forces to exert influence on the restructuring process was further limited by the ranks they occupied, the authority vested in these positions, and by the training they were required to undergo before they could be confirmed in their ranks. Most strategic and influential senior command and staff positions within the new SANDF continued to be filled by former SADF officers. These positions included the chiefs of the arms of service, the chiefs of the staff divisions (intelligence, logistics, personnel, finance, operations), the officers commanding of the territorial commands, the officers commanding the conventional forces and virtually all key directors at Defence Headquarters.

All nine non-SADF generals (three generals and six major generals) were appointed to a number of general staff positions in the SANDf. In 1994 all these positions carried only de jure and not de facto authority. Many of the generals were elderly MK veterans. Their capacity to influence the restructuring was limited by age and their lack of familiarity with the formal staff, operational and strategic concepts utilised by the SANDF. They also enjoyed relatively little of the effective staff support which could have enabled them to understand and adapt quicker to the post-election restructuring process. Some of these generals were ‘deputised’ by former SADF officers who assumed responsibility for their staff and command duties. Effectively 7 these generals found themselves excluded from de facto decision-making within the divisions or arms of services they were placed in.

The generals who were appointed to influential command posts (for instance chief of defence staff and the officers commanding two of the territorial commands) had to complete courses before they could occupy their ranks. The training (so-called bridging courses) was extensive and of course could be justified. These long absences provided a convenient rationale for the exclusion of the non-SADF members from key staff and command appointments in the SANDF. They were also excluded from various other restructuring and transformation processes.

During the pre-election negotiations phase agreement had been reached on the establishment of a fully-fledged Ministry of Defence and a civilian defence secretariat. The first Minister of Defence was a former commander of MK. He was able to strongly resist the attempt by the Chief of the SANDF to establish the political and strategic agenda that would determine not only the direction but also the pace of restructuring of the defence function. (Heated exchanges ensued between the office of the minister and the office of the Chief of the SNDF.)

In order to ensure that the proposed policies were implemented, the Ministry had to employ personnel it could trust to oversee and execute its mandate. The newly established defence secretariat was composed of a small group of former MK officers and some liberal former SADF officers, especially in the finance and policy and planning divisions.

Two factors that emerged in this period reversed the de facto absorption of the non- SADF forces.

First, The Ministry of Defence, through the Defence Secretariat, managed the Defence White Paper process very ably. The comprehensive Defence Review process was conducted and managed equally successfully. These two processes enabled the Ministry to develop the ambitious ‘blueprint’ for transformation upon which defence restructuring would henceforth be based.

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Second, the role of Parliament (the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, JSCD) in co-designing the defence ‘blueprint’ is important. In 1994 two committees were established to oversee and monitor the defence function. The JSCD had a constitutional mandate to oversee the integration process of the SANDF. At the time the JSCD was composed of very determined activists-turned-politicians who were resolute that if South Africa were to continue to have a defence force it would be one of the people’s choosing - fashioned and approved and owned by them much in the fashion they ‘owned’ MK. This shifted the political and policy debate more into Parliament and therefore more into the public domain. The JSDC was very clear that no defence policies or programmes of procurement would be approved unless they were endorsed by the committee. This effectively shifted the locus of decision- making away from the military elite within the SANDF towards the Ministry and Parliament.

Parliament argued strongly for a policy change in the language of instruction and command and control. It further insisted that the minister show proof that the SANDF was undergoing integration rather than absorption. It also rejected the premise that former SADF officers needed no training and could automatically be ‘translated’ into posts.

The process of absorption was being reversed. By this time the non-SADF officers, particularly those of MK, were completing their compulsory courses and were now ready to take up their real deployment within the SANDF.

Just as things looked like they were shaping up, the Meiring Report surfaced. The report was written deliberately in bad English and with little respect for strategic and logical continuity. It alleged that prominent business people, politicians and international personalities (Michael Jackson was mentioned) were being led by the SANDF heir apparent, Siphiwe Nyanda, in a plot to overthrow the government.

The report was handed over President Nelson Mandela and was subjected to analysis by various bodies, including the JSCD and the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee. All agreed that the report was mischievous.

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For some time, concern had been raised about the manner in which intelligence was being passes on to the President. Oversight and regulatory channels had been by- passed on a number of occasions. But what irked Parliament most was that the military was misusing its access to the President to lobby for greater defence spending, without regard for other national imperatives.

General George Meiring and the officers involved in the compilation of the report were given no option but to go. This happened a few months after the appearance of the report.

The departure of General Meiring and Company opened up some positions. Lieutenant General Nyanda became the Chief of the SANDF, General Gilbert Romano replaced General Reg Otto as the Chief of the Army, and Lieutenant General Mojo Motau became the new Chief of Defence Intelligence.

This shift of power signalled the demise of the ‘old guard’ in the SANDF. The departure of the old guard (conservatives whose loyalties could be traced back to the P W Botha era, the South West Africa campaigns and South Africa’s rightwing elements) allowed for the emergence of new groups within the SANDF. The first was a group consisting of former SANDF officers who were supportive of the democratic transition and who accepted the importance of transforming the Department of Defence at all levels. These levels included organisational efficiency, equal opportunities and affirmative action, as well as the alignment of defence policies with the evolving strategic environment.

Interestingly, this group came largely from the conventional army forces that had not been involved in any counter-insurgency programmes. Some came from the Navy, the Air Force and the Medical Services and a few were former SADF officers who had civilianised into the Defence Secretariat. The second group consisted mainly of former MK officers within the SANDF (some had civilianised into the Defence Secretariat and the Ministry of Defence) and other officers from APLA and the TDF (the ). After the departure of General Meiring and Company a spate of resignations followed, opening up more space for the now qualified and ready former non-SADF officers to be promoted to senior staff command positions.

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The South African integration process was a reflection of a changing national political reality and the beginning of a real change of power in the department itself. South African civil-military relations have changed. The integration of the armed forces is now over. The process has not been without tension. It has been a complex process. What is admirable is the emergence of black and white former enemies who identified the need to put their country first and push through the transformation agenda. What is also worth remembering is the contribution of the JSCD members, who often bore the brunt of their convictions in the party caucus for pushing through with their oversight function and who often spoke out when they thought certain compromises would jeopardise the legitimacy and integrity of the SANDF.

Despite growing pains, the SANDF has managed to maintain its cohesion and has continued to execute its constitutional mandate. But this process must continue to be monitored and managed so that our new democracy with all its tensions and precarious race relations do not undo the good work of some of our country’s heroes.

Lessons to be learned from the South African experience

A number of lessons can be learned from South Africa’s integration process.

♦ The political settlement under negotiation must provide for viable and lasting solutions that can provide space for all the belligerents to ‘buy in’. ♦ Political will is important amongst the leadership involved in the negotiations and in the post-conflict scenario. The leadership must carry enough credibility and legitimacy to give guidance and directives to the rank and file. ♦ Key values, objectives and principles must reflect the national interest and be carried through to national legislation, the constitution, etc. ♦ All former belligerents must be accorded the space to contribute meaningfully to the integration and restructuring processes. ♦ Processes proposed and carried out must reflect the domestic situation and reality. ♦ There must be an honest assessment of the institutional capacity of all armed forces to deal with complex processes of transformation. Objectives of transformation must be clearly and understood by all parties. ♦ Priorities must be identified and adhered to. 11

♦ A sustainable and realistic demobilisation strategy must be formulated during the early stages of integration and a realistic assessment of resources be conducted. ♦ Civil society and Parliament need to be involved, in order to provide policy direction and ensure democratic oversight of security matters.

i The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the presenter acknowledge the work of the late Dr Rocky Williams on this subject, as published in the ISS African Security Review 11.2, 2002, p 17.