1 The South African National Defence Force integration Thandi Modisei The history of South Africa is littered with conflicts – cultural, ethnic and racial. Different wars were fought during different eras, in different geographical spaces using different arms and systems. South Africa’s negotiated settlement took place over a period of time. Some people believe that the negotiations began with discussions between the African National Congress (ANS) leadership in prison and the South African government of the time as early as the late 1980s. The negotiated settlement has been under discussion and in the public domain since the early 1990s. We know that the armed forces of the two major political actors, the South African government and the ANC, became involved in direct and structured negotiations only in November 1993. Clearly, there was a ‘gap’ between the political and the military talks. The pace of the negotiations also tended to be slower and to ‘follow’ the political talks. There were two reasons for this ‘time gap’: º Both parties saw the retention of their armed forces as a ‘security fallback’, an asset necessary to appease their respective constituencies. º Retaining their armed capabilities was seen, in very pragmatic terms, as a physical guarantee that could be utilised should the negotiation process falter or fail. Considerable debate had preceded the formal military negotiations between the primary actors - the South African Defence Force (SADF) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) - and the other armed forces present in South Africa at the time: the Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army (APLA); the Transkei Defence Force (TDF); the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF); the Venda Defence Force (VDF) and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF). (The Inkatha Freedom Party’s self-protection units were to join the integration very late.) Because of the numerical, organisational, budgetary and skills superiority of the SADF, many observers maintained that the negotiations were 2 a waste of time. In their opinion, the envisaged integration process was rather going to be a process of absorption in which MK and other non-SADF armed forces would simply disappear into the SADF. These debates added to the environment of mistrust that existed between the statutory and the non-statutory forces and the dangers of absorption were even spelled out: º Absorption would reduce the capacity of an incoming ANC government to effectively control the armed forces of the new democratic dispensation. º It would impact minimally on the reprofessionalisation and democratisation of the armed forces - a process deemed crucial given the praetorian profile of the SADF within the P W Botha administration. º It would leave the officer corps largely white and male for the foreseeable future and reduce the capacity of the other integrating armed forces to impact meaningfully on the restructuring of the new defence force. Most of these observations were valid at the time and some were accurate for at least the first phase of the integration process. A number of factors in the period after 1996 introduced - and indeed influenced – a real shift in the balance of power within the armed forces. This shift moved the process from absorption to integration. The shift had much to do with the enforced resignation of the Chief of the National Defence Force, General George Meiring, over a report which he had presented to President Nelson Mandela implicating senior MK officers in an alleged coup plot. It is necessary to look at the different phases of the integration process to understand the nature of the shift in power and to assess the relative success of the process. The Joint Military Co-ordinating Council phase (November 1993 – April 1994) 3 The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was established in the last months of 1993. Of its seven sub-councils, three had broad security mandates (in defence, intelligence, and law and order). That integration would take place was a given - the question was HOW such integration would take place. Essentially the role of the sub- council on defence was political-strategic by nature. It was primarily responsible for monitoring the armed forces during the pre-election period. It was also charged with initiating the planning required to create a new, integrated national defence force. The sub-council on defence established the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC), which reported directly to the sub-council. This JMCC was tasked with the management of all pre-integration planning processes, including staff. The JMCC was not a formal command structure, but it was to become responsible for the management of the strategic planning process whereby detailed plans for the creation of the new defence force were drawn up. The chairpersonship of the JMCC rotated between the leaders of the two major negotiating forces - General George Meiring (Chief of the SADF) and Siphiwe Nyanda (Chief of Staff of MK). The JMCC established a number of working groups according to identified needs. Members of these working groups were drawn from both the statutory forces (the SADF and the TBVC armies) and from the non-statutory forces (MK and later APLA, when it came on board in 1994). The SADF and MK co-chaired the working groups and committees and dominated the proceedings and the agenda. The SADF’s main objective in the JMCC period seems to have been to keep the structures, doctrines, training culture and organisational culture as intact as possible throughout the integration process. This was achieved for a number of reasons: º The SADF had the organisational, planning and budgetary capabilities that enabled them to plan and prepare, in considerable detail, their various position papers well before their discussion with the formal structures of the JMCC. Invariably the SADF positions were seen as the most thought-out and coherent and more often than not they were included in the proceedings of the JMCC. 4 º The SADF possessed formal strategic staff and management skills. It was familiar with practical, conceptual, strategic and doctrinal issues underpinning both the planning and force design process. The SADF was also familiar with bureaucratic politics. On the other hand, MK could influence the process by banking on the significant political leverage of the ANC in the national political arena. By the end of 1993 it was already a foregone conclusion that the ANC would be the ruling party after the national elections. MK used this political leverage to exact key political compromises on the ranking and placement of non-statutory force officers, the management and oversight of the integration process during the post-election period, and the participation of the British armed forces as neutral arbitrators overseeing the entire process. MK was not able, at the time, to impact more decisively on the process, because of the nature of its structure. It was largely a guerrilla force and its members were scattered throughout the country. Some were still in exile. Some MK members were allocated to non-military roles (as was particularly pronounced after the first democratic elections). MK negotiations relied largely on their political leadership’s broad interest in a legitimate, representative national defence force. MK officers frequently had to use their own political and military acumen to divert, stall or derail SADF positions that, in their opinion, would have disadvantaged their broad mandate and compromised the non-statutory and non-SADF personnel in the integration process. Practical problems such as lack of transport, computers and other material to help in the research and preparation of position papers limited the ability of MK to compete on an equal footing with the SADF. The influence of MK on the integration process was thus uneven and depended strongly on the area of focus. Although MK had produced a number of pilots, it had very little impact on the Air Force and Navy working groups. MK was primarily a landward guerrilla army, and this became evident in the more pronounced influence it had in the Army working group. It is also important to note that the character of the SADF co-chairperson was such that the working group was able to conduct its 5 discussions in a more relaxed atmosphere and that the trust levels were higher. In the Medical Services working group MK officers and doctors proved adept at preparing detailed position papers for the integration process of medical personnel. The armies of the former homelands (TBVC forces) did not have any significant impact on the integration process beyond the influence of a few individuals. These armies’ lack of strategic exposure, lack of political legitimacy and an institutional power base beyond their regions, and lack of confidence among many of their officers, contributed to their marginalisation in the process. In view of the above, it is not surprising that the force design of the new SANDF was largely based on that of the old SADF and that the strategies, doctrines and the procedures remained unchanged. The integration process was therefore to be based on SADF structures, rules and regulations. This greatly undermined the capacity of the non-SADF forces to influence the integration process during this phase. The most important achievement of the JMCC process and period was that it brought together sworn enemy armies for the first time and created space for the fusion of different military cultures and experiences, creating a basis for a common institutional culture and camaraderie within the organisation. It also provided a manageable and goal-oriented planning framework for the new SANDF. It planted the seeds of national identity and enjoyed greater public comment than any other state department at the time. The Integration Phase (1994–1998) The fact that 80 per cent of the structures and practices agreed on by the JMCC were those of the SADF only fuelled national debate that the non-statutory forces and the TBVC armies were simply being absorbed into the SADF.