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6 X 10.Long New.P65 Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-69754-5 - The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism Edited by Richard Bett Index More information index Academic scepticism 3, 4, 5, 13, 16, 34, and happiness 67–70, 72 273, 294 impossibility of 83 and the apraxia objection 74, 167–71, justification for right 67–70 197–207 practical criterion for 72–74, 106, 166, Arcesilaus’ 62–66, 198–200 167, 172, 199 and beliefs 145 Pyrrhonic view of 40, 50, 53–55 Carneades’ expansion of dialectical requires assent 67, 75, 170 method 67, 200–02 responsibility for 171, 279 Cicero on 38, 267, 306 Stoic theory of 150, 165, 167, 169, 197 compared with Pyrrhonist 8, 90, 106, and the undecidability argument 29, 30 195–207, 274, 294 without assent (Arcesilaus) 167–68, debates with Stoics 53, 62–66, 91, 150 169, 198–200 and dogmatism 209 without holding opinions 53–55, 133, and ethics 181, 193 139, 202, 288 Latin transmission 267, 272, 275 see also apraxia (inactivity) objection and Middle Platonism 90–96 adaptation (oikeiôsis), Stoic doctrine as mitigated 36, 76, 102, 195 of 92 use of Stoic claims to refute 208 adiaphoria see indifference see also Sceptical Academy adoxastôs (without holding opinions) academicus, use of the term 268 53–55, 133, 139, 202, 288 Academy Aenesidemus of Cnossos 5, 36, 89–90, 97, Antiochus’ 5 122, 202, 213 of Arcesilaus 58 Against Wisdom 106 “fourth” of Philo and Charmadas 85 argument strategies 213 Polemo’s 62 and Heraclitus (kat’ Herakleiton) see also New Academy; Old Academy; 115–17 Plato, Academy; Sceptical Academy his scepticism 106–13, 122, 126, 128, action(s) 167 137, 196, 206 or activity 171–72 influence on Tertullian 269 and appearances 54, 107, 172–74, On Inquiry 106 191, 198 on pleasure 41 appropriate or correct 68, 169, 202 on Pyrrho 106, 206 based on habit or socialisation Pyrrhonian Discourses 105, 106, 107, 174–75, 191 110, 113, 114, 122, 274 belief and 165–80, 197, 209 on Pyrrhonism 36, 38, 52, 54, 89, 98, by chance (tychon) 174 122, 127, 185 by law and custom 53, 54 and the rebirth of Pyrrhonism elements of impression, impulse and 105–19, 122 assent 67 in Sextus 113–15, 124, 129, 196 346 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-69754-5 - The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism Edited by Richard Bett Index More information Index 347 and suspension of assent 127 compared with scepticism since types of sceptically-acceptable locution Descartes 6, 8, 288–313 107, 108 and current scholarship 9 see also Eight Modes Against Causal defined against dogmatism 125, 167, Explanation; Ten Modes of 196, 279 Aenesidemus during the Renaissance 6, 8, 101, Aeschines 84 277–82 Aetiologists 114 ethical or practical aspect 2, 8, 181–94 affect (pathos) 129–33, 212 history 4–5, 13–35, 36–57, 122 appearance as a kind of 159–61, and humanism 278, 283 173, 202 in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages and assent 159–61 267–77 and non-assertion in Sextus 129–33, rediscovery and posthumous influence 159–61, 202 of 8, 267–87 affections (pathe) 108 “rustic” and “urbane” 132–35 announcements of immediate 109 sources and references 270–71, 272 necessitation of the 133, 173, 174–75, as a unified tradition 97 202, 203, 239, 242, 245, 246 use of term 1 passive and involuntary 173, 203 Animal charge 166, 168, 171 Pyrrho’s conquest of the 40, 54 animals Agathias 273 differences between humans and 21, agnosticism 71, 279 68, 214, 218, 261 agriculture 232, 258 non-rational 67, 166, 198, 200, 204, 206, Agrippa 208, 299 212, 244, 245 De Incertitudine et Vanitate Annas, Julia 187, 209 Scientarum 281 anti-intellectualism, ancient scepticism “trilemma” 290, 297, 299 and Christian 268, 269, 270, see also Five Modes of Agrippa 275, 279 Agrippa von Nettesheim, Henricus Antigonus of Carystus 37, 38 Cornelius 280 antilogies 52 akatalêpsia (inapprehensibility) 39, 58, Antiochus of Ascalon 5, 6, 86, 88, 61, 70, 111, 127, 145–50, 233 91–92 alêtheia (truth/reality) 45 and Middle Platonism 91 Alexander, expeditions 4, 39 versus Philo 87, 88, 91, 105 Alexandrian philosophical school 273 antitheses, sceptical 296 Allen, James 8, 232–48 Antony 84 Alypius 100 apatheia (impassivity) 36, 40, 54 Ammonius 95 aphasia see non-assertion In Aristotelis categorias Apologists 270 commentarium 273 Aporetic Pyrrhonism 212, 252, Anaxarchus of Abdera 25, 26, 35 254, 280 and Pyrrho 39, 40, 57, 132 aporia (uncertainty) 61, 111, 123, 138, ancient scepticism 213, 226 antecedents in early Greek philosophy aporiai see refutation 13–35 “apparent” characterized as an attitude of openness as far as the argument goes 154 2, 279, 283 and non-apparent 227 and Christian anti-intellectualism 268, and phenomenon 239 269, 270, 275, 279 as a practical criterion for action 53, Christianization of 279–81 54, 57 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-69754-5 - The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism Edited by Richard Bett Index More information 348 Index “apparent” (cont.) and suspension of judgement 3, 62, role in decision-making 37, 53 166, 172 things as things perceived 113, 116, and the undecidability argument 29–31 173, 261 versions of the 165, 166, 172 appearances Arabic culture 273, 275 and actions 53, 54, 57, 172–74, 191, 198 influence of Pyrrhonism on writers 274 belief in accordance with 161 Arcesilaus of Pitane 4, 57, 58–62, 75, 81, conflicting 19–22, 27, 47, 52, 116, 117, 89, 97, 196 172, 211, 218, 221, 297, 304, 306 on action without assent 167–68, 169, describing without holding opinions 198–200 125, 132 Augustine on 100 explanation of 227 on belief 145–50 and impressions 173, 202 Carneades’ modification of 65, 200–02 as a kind of pathos 159–61, 173, 202 dialectical method 58, 59, 61, 63, 84 and ordinary life 173, 258 ethics 181, 193 passive acceptance of 90, 173 objections to Stoic epistemology 62–66, and principle of synonymy 222 88, 195, 200 relativity of 27, 214, 215, 225, 227, oral tradition 82 304, 305 Plutarch on 96 role in Pyrrho’s philosophy 53, 106 practical criterion 67–70 sceptical language as language of and suspension of assent 58, 62, 64, 87, 112, 173 127, 198–200, 204 Sextus on 172–74, 204, 258 argumentation truth of 20, 117, 276 Carneades’ method 64 and the undecidability argument 21 Democritus’ strategy 19 variability of 19–22, 47, 216, 218–19 dialectical method 58, 167, 249 variation between humans and animals refutation as a form of 213 21, 31, 214 sceptical linked with actual variations between humans 21, 31, 214 disagreements 298, 302 variations between senses 21, 214 self-refuting 130–31 variations owing to circumstances Sextus’ two different types of 123 21, 215 Socratic 4, 60 variations owing to positions, distances standardized forms of sceptical 177 and locations 21, 215 see also Modes versus reality 14–19, 22–26, 59, 154, argument(s) 157–61, 221, 222, 239 accumulation of different force and apprehension (katalêpsis) 63, 108, 112 type 135, 189 distinguished from the notion against scepticism in the classical (ennoia) 136 period 27–33 approval, versus assent 149, 170–71, 200, based on lack of utility 137, 139 201, 204, 205 demonstration as 135 apraxia (inactivity) objection 3, 28, 29–31, dilemmatic forms of destructive 115 40, 67–70, 95, 131–34, 150, 165–78, early Greek sceptical 13–27 202, 239 from “opposites” 52, 60, 182, 222 Academic scepticism and the 167–71, importance of sceptical 296, 299 197–207 infinite series of 224 Arcesilaus and 67–70, 198–200 negative conclusions 185 Carneades’ response 71, 74, 170 negative in Pyrrhonism 111 sceptic’s responses to 165–70 pre-emptive or reactive use of sceptical Sextus’ response 171–78, 202–07 298, 302 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-69754-5 - The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism Edited by Richard Bett Index More information Index 349 proto-sceptical in the classical Greek assent period 26–27 action requires 67, 75, 167, 170, schemata 208–27 197, 200 that rely on affects 134 action without (Arcesilaus) 67, 167–68, see also equipollence 198, 204 Arian doctrine 271 or approval 149, 170–71, 200, 201, Aristarchus of Soli 250 204, 239 Aristo of Chios 91 and belief 149–50, 157–61 on Arcesilaus 62 by choice 204 Aristocles of Messene 25, 37, 48, 208 and dogmatism 77, 125, 167 on Aenesidemus 109, 111, 113 forced 174 On philosophy 37 and impulse (hormê) 165, 198 passage on Pyrrho in Eusebius 37, or passive acquiescence 191, 205 41–47, 52, 129 and pathos 159–61 Aristophanes of Byzantium 250 preconceptions acquired without 176 Aristotelianism, scepticism opposed and the principle of universal to 275 suspension of judgement 146–50, 174 Aristotle 5, 13, 28, 98, 130, 200, 208 of the sage and probability 83, 199 Bede on 272 sage withholding 65, 75, 77, 83, 86, 108 critical approach to texts of 275 sceptically acceptible or dogmatic 73, on experience 234 74, 77, 167 on flux and contradictionism 23, 25, 28 Stoic view 174 on infinite regress of justification 33 strong versus weak 148–50, 168, 200, Metaphysics 20, 22, 23, 28, 31, 197 204, 209 objections to sceptical arguments suspension of see suspension of assent 14–27, 28–33, 34, 41 withholding is withholding faith 99 Physics 46 assertibility 23, 25 on possibility of knowledge 26 see also inassertibility objection Posterior Analytics 15, 16, 33 assertions principle of non-contradiction 28 apparent in dialectical method 109, Protrepticus 206 110, 182 theory of perception 30 see also non-assertion (aphasia) on the undecidability argument 21, 28, assumptions 29, 30, 31 about rationality
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