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The Stoic Method of Happiness Haverford College Haverford Scholarship Faculty Publications Philosophy 2006 The Stoic Method of Happiness Ian Blecher Haverford College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.haverford.edu/philosophy_facpubs Repository Citation Blecher, I. “The Stoic Method of Happiness” Apeiron 39(2):157-176. 2006. This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Haverford Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Haverford Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TheStoic Method of Happiness Ian Blecher Leta stoicarise who shall reveal the resources of man. - Emerson 1 TheStoics - mostof them, anyway1 - heldthat: (1) Virtueis thesole good. (2) Outsidethe scope of virtue, some items are preferable to others. Not,however, without discomfort. From (1), and fromancient plati- tudesconnecting goodness with happiness, we mayinfer that virtue is notonly necessary, but also sufficientfor happiness; and thattherefore happinessis alwayswithin reach, even on therack (de Fin III 42; cf.EN 1000b22-1101a8).To be fair,the Stoics never claimed happiness must be alwayswithin easy reach; they were comfortable with the thought that onlySocrates and Cato theYounger - ifanyone at all - had thestuff forit.2 But this will hardly ease theimpression - widespread,unfortu- nately- thattheirs is a severeand joyless doctrine - thus,for example, Hegel,in thePhenomenology ofSpirit: 'Stoicism is the freedomwhich 1 DiogenesLaertius reports that Panaetius and Posidonius reject (1) (DL VII 103,128). 2 Fora discussionof the problems posed by this possibility, see Inwood2005. APEIRONa journalfor ancient philosophy and science 0003-6390/2006/3902157-176 $20.00 ©Academic Printing & Publishing This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 158 Ian Blecher alwayscomes directly out ofbondage [viz.,]freedom in thought... a truthlacking the fullness of life' (§§ 199-200).3 In replyit might be observedthat the Stoics also expoundeddoctrine (2); thatthey demonstrated sufficient concern for 'the fullness of life', for 'theresources of man', just by rankingexternal goods. But- ranking themaccording to what ? Itis notthat it is obviouslyincoherent to prefer healthand wealth and renown4 to say, having one's limbs torn from their sockets.5It is thatthe sense in whichsuch thingsare supposedto be preferredis difficultto makeout ifthey are notsimply better than the alternatives- if,that is, they are irrelevantto happiness.If it is intelli- gibleto prefersomething, one would think,this can onlybe because havingit is good (thoughperhaps in a sensedifferent from the sense in whichvirtue is good)(de Fin TV 20-2, 41, 57-60). This, presumably, is what movesAristotle to saythat virtue and its material conditions are needed fora happylife. ButAristotle's view is notwithout problems.6 The crassconclusion thatan increaseof wealth or other so-called external good should always cause greaterhappiness cannot be easilyavoided once some role in the happylife has beenprovided external goods. In particular,it cannotbe avoidedby attributingto Aristotlethe view thatonly that a minimum standardof external goods is required,increase beyond which does not makefor a betterlife.7 For thisis evidentlyto allow thatdecrease of externalgoods below that point makes for a worselife: and that Aristotle was unwillingto concede.'[T]he happy man can neverbecome miser- able,'says he (EN llOlaó). Whatis leftis somethingof a hodgepodge: 'Successor failure in life does not depend on [externalgoods], but human life,as we said, needs theseas well,while excellent activities or their oppositesare what determine happiness or the reverse' (EN 1100b9-ll). 3 Cf. also Diss 1 19. 4 For catalogs of externalgoods, see, e.g., de Fin TV20, 49. 5 This is not,however, a unanimous opinion. For Pyrrho,Herillus of Carthage and Aristoof Chios, among others,external goods simplydid not rate (de Fin II 35, 43; IV 42f.;V 23; DL VÜ 160, 165). 6 The positiondeveloped in thisparagraph closely followsthat of Julia Annas 1993, 364-84. 7 Cf. Annas 1993,382. This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheStoic Method of Happiness 159 This sounds somethinglike the Stoicview, actually:but ratherthan followit through to thelogical (though pruna facie unintuitive) conclu- sionthat external goods arenot, after all, good, Aristotle maintains that humanlife needs externalgoods if it is to attainto theevocative but obscurestatus of 'blessed' (¿iccmpioç - EN 1100b25et passim). And this is unhelpful.For either it is better to be blessedthan to be happy,in which case we oughtproperly to have in view the one and notthe other as our ultimateend (and theoriginal problem with happiness now arisesfor blessedness),or itis notbetter to be blessedthan to be happy,in which caseit is unclearwhy one should want to be blessed.(Indeed it is unclear in preciselythe sense that it is unclearwhy one shouldwant external goodsif having them does notmake for a betterlife, which is ofcourse thequestion in responseto which the category of 'blessedness' was first introduced.) I agreewith Julia Annas that claims (1) and (2) oughtto be regarded as an attemptto clarify and stabilizeAristotle's position8 (though I think she is wrongabout how theStoics think it ought to be revised).Now it seemsto me that any such attempt can succeed only if it does notsimply cordonoff virtue on theone handand externalgoods on theother, and declarefor each a separatesense of 'good' and a correspondingsense of 'happy'.For from this the problem of the relation of the two sorts of good inevitablyarises. We would be leftwith a versionof, and not an improve- mentupon, Aristotle's solution to theproblem (indeed, the Stoics were oftenaccused - unfairly,I think - offailing sufficiently to distinguish themselvesfrom Aristotle in thisrespect [cf. e.g., de Fin TV11-13, 43; Commnot 1071B-C]). The right approach will instead derive both claims (1) and (2) froma singleaccount of actions - one whichshows them to have bothvirtue and externalgoods in view,but in such a way that successwith regard to theone is necessaryfor the success of a given action,while success with regard to theother is not. Theclaim of this paper is thatwhat I havecalled 'the right approach' is, indeed,the Stoic approach. I shall try,in whatfollows, to give an accountof it. 8 I do notclaim, nor does Annas, that the Stoics took themselves to be respondingto Aristotlein particular. They may simply have had inmind a positionsimilar to his; orthey may have been thinking of a positiondeveloped by Aristotle's followers. This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 160 Ian Blecher 2 A popular sortof introduction to theStoic conceptionof virtue takes the formof an analogybetween virtue and some set ofeveryday doings. The - following drawn by several Stoics,beginning with Antipaterin the thirdcentury BC9 is perhaps thebest-known example: Justas a manwhose task it is to shoot(conliniare) a spear or arrowat somethinghas, as his ultimateend, to do everythingin his powerto shootstraight, so itis withwhat we callthe ultimate end in life.In the case (ofthe archer), it is to shootstraight that he mustdo all he can; nonetheless,it is to do all he can to dischargethe task (of shooting straight)that is (really)his ultimate end. So itis withwhat we call the supremegood in life. But to hit something is, as we say,to be "selected" not"sought", (de Fin III 22; cf.Stob 5b3, 6a-c; Comm not 1071B-D.) The manuscript has perhaps been corrupted somewhat,10and Cicero's Latin is uncharacteristicallydense here (perhaps in an attempt to ape thestyle of Stoic dialectic[cf. de Fin Hl 19]). The idea seems in any case to be this:first, the ultimate end fora given archeris not thata given targetbe hit;rather his ultimateend is thathe do the thingsrequired of him by the task in the appropriateway. And second, someone tryingto be virtuousis like our archerin thisrespect. The analogy has neverfared well outside theStoa. Posidonius is said to have thought it contained 'a manifestinconsistency and nothing honorable or productiveof happiness' (fr.187; LS 1, 405). Alexander of Aphrodisiascalled it 'absurd' (de An II 164.6;LS 1, 401). And, of course, thereis Plutarch'scanonical objection: Ifsomeone were to say that archer does everything inhis power not for thesake of hitting the target but for the sake of doing everything in his power,one would suppose him to be speakingin riddling and fantastic way.So itis withthe idiots who insistthat the end ofaiming at things inaccordance with nature is notthe getting but the taking and selecting ofthem, and thatbeing healthy is noteach man's end in his desire and 9 Annas1993, 402. Striker 1996, 310 gives another suggestion about its origin. Cf. also Alpers-Gölz1976, 82. 10 Butcf. LS 2,398. This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheStoic Method of Happiness 161 pursuitof health, but on thecontrary being healthy has referenceto the desireand pursuit of being healthy. For what is thedifference between someone'ssaying that health has comeinto being for the sake of drugs, notdrugs for the sake ofhealth, and one who makesthe selection of drugsand theircomposition and use morechoiceworthy than
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