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2006

The Stoic Method of Happiness

Ian Blecher Haverford College, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.haverford.edu/philosophy_facpubs

Repository Citation Blecher, I. “The Stoic Method of Happiness” Apeiron 39(2):157-176. 2006.

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Haverford Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Haverford Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TheStoic Method of Happiness Ian Blecher

Leta stoicarise who shall reveal the resources of man. . . - Emerson

1

TheStoics - mostof them, anyway1 - heldthat: (1) Virtueis thesole good.

(2) Outsidethe scope of virtue, some items are preferable to others. Not,however, without discomfort. From (1), and fromancient plati- tudesconnecting goodness with happiness, we mayinfer that virtue is notonly necessary, but also sufficientfor happiness; and thattherefore happinessis alwayswithin reach, even on therack (de Fin III 42; cf.EN 1000b22-1101a8).To be fair,the Stoics never claimed happiness must be alwayswithin easy reach; they were comfortable with the thought that onlySocrates and Cato theYounger - ifanyone at all - had thestuff forit.2 But this will hardly ease theimpression - widespread,unfortu- nately- thattheirs is a severeand joyless doctrine - thus,for example, Hegel,in thePhenomenology ofSpirit: 'Stoicism is thefreedom which

1 DiogenesLaertius reports that Panaetius and Posidonius reject (1) (DL VII 103,128). 2 Fora discussionof the problems posed by this possibility, see Inwood2005.

APEIRONa journalfor ancient philosophy and science 0003-6390/2006/3902157-176 $20.00 ©Academic Printing & Publishing

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 158 Ian Blecher alwayscomes directly out ofbondage [viz.,]freedom in thought... a truthlacking the fullness of life' (§§ 199-200).3 In replyit might be observedthat the Stoics also expoundeddoctrine (2); thatthey demonstrated sufficient concern for 'the fullness of life', for 'theresources of man', just by rankingexternal goods. But- ranking themaccording to what ? Itis notthat it is obviouslyincoherent to prefer healthand wealth and renown4 to say, having one's limbs torn from their sockets.5It is thatthe sense in whichsuch thingsare supposedto be preferredis difficultto makeout ifthey are notsimply better than the alternatives- if,that is, they are irrelevantto happiness.If it is intelli- gibleto prefersomething, one would think,this can onlybe because havingit is good (thoughperhaps in a sensedifferent from the sense in whichvirtue is good)(de Fin TV 20-2, 41, 57-60). This, presumably, is what movesAristotle to saythat virtue and its material conditions are needed fora happylife. ButAristotle's view is notwithout problems.6 The crassconclusion thatan increaseof wealth or other so-called external good should always cause greaterhappiness cannot be easilyavoided once some role in the happylife has beenprovided external goods. In particular,it cannotbe avoidedby attributingto Aristotlethe view thatonly that a minimum standardof external goods is required,increase beyond which does not makefor a betterlife.7 For thisis evidentlyto allow thatdecrease of externalgoods below that point makes for a worselife: and that Aristotle was unwillingto concede.'[T]he happy man can neverbecome miser- able,'says he (EN llOlaó). Whatis leftis somethingof a hodgepodge: 'Successor failure in life does not depend on [externalgoods], but human life,as we said, needs theseas well,while excellent activities or their oppositesare what determine happiness or the reverse' (EN 1100b9-ll).

3 Cf. also Diss 1 19.

4 For catalogs of externalgoods, see, e.g., de Fin TV20, 49. 5 This is not,however, a unanimous opinion. For Pyrrho,Herillus of Carthage and Aristoof Chios, among others,external goods simplydid not rate (de Fin II 35, 43; IV 42f.;V 23; DL VÜ 160, 165).

6 The positiondeveloped in thisparagraph closely followsthat of Julia Annas 1993, 364-84.

7 Cf. Annas 1993,382.

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This sounds somethinglike the Stoicview, actually:but ratherthan followit through to thelogical (though pruna facie unintuitive) conclu- sionthat external goods are not, after all, good, Aristotle maintains that humanlife needs externalgoods if it is to attainto theevocative but obscurestatus of 'blessed' (¿iccmpioç - EN 1100b25et passim). And this is unhelpful.For either it is better to be blessedthan to be happy,in which case we oughtproperly to have in view the one and notthe other as our ultimateend (and theoriginal problem with happiness now arisesfor blessedness),or itis notbetter to be blessedthan to be happy,in which caseit is unclearwhy one should want to be blessed.(Indeed it is unclear in preciselythe sense that it is unclearwhy one shouldwant external goodsif having them does notmake for a betterlife, which is ofcourse thequestion in responseto which the category of 'blessedness' was first introduced.) I agreewith Julia Annas that claims (1) and (2) oughtto be regarded as an attemptto clarify and stabilizeAristotle's position8 (though I think she is wrongabout how theStoics think it ought to be revised).Now it seemsto me that any such attempt can succeed only if it does notsimply cordonoff virtue on theone handand externalgoods on theother, and declarefor each a separatesense of 'good' and a correspondingsense of 'happy'.For from this the problem of the relation of the two sorts of good inevitablyarises. We would be leftwith a versionof, and not an improve- mentupon, Aristotle's solution to theproblem (indeed, the Stoics were oftenaccused - unfairly,I think - offailing sufficiently to distinguish themselvesfrom Aristotle in thisrespect [cf. e.g., de Fin TV11-13, 43; Commnot 1071B-C]). The right approach will instead derive both claims (1) and (2) froma singleaccount of actions - one whichshows them to have bothvirtue and externalgoods in view,but in such a way that successwith regard to theone is necessaryfor the success of a given action,while success with regard to theother is not. Theclaim of this paper is thatwhat I havecalled 'the right approach' is, indeed,the Stoic approach. I shall try,in whatfollows, to give an accountof it.

8 I do notclaim, nor does Annas, that the Stoics took themselves to be respondingto Aristotlein particular. They may simply have had inmind a positionsimilar to his; orthey may have been thinking of a positiondeveloped by Aristotle's followers.

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2

A popular sortof introduction to theStoic conceptionof virtue takes the formof an analogybetween virtue and some set ofeveryday doings. The - following drawn by several Stoics,beginning with Antipaterin the thirdcentury BC9 is perhaps thebest-known example:

Justas a manwhose task it is to shoot(conliniare) a spear or arrowat somethinghas, as his ultimateend, to do everythingin his powerto shootstraight, so itis withwhat we callthe ultimate end in life.In the case (ofthe archer), it is to shootstraight that he mustdo all he can; nonetheless,it is to do all he can to dischargethe task (of shooting straight)that is (really)his ultimate end. So itis withwhat we call the supremegood in life. But to hit something is, as we say,to be "selected" not"sought", (de Fin III 22; cf.Stob 5b3, 6a-c; Comm not 1071B-D.)

The manuscript has perhaps been corrupted somewhat,10and Cicero's Latin is uncharacteristicallydense here (perhaps in an attempt to ape thestyle of Stoic dialectic[cf. de Fin Hl 19]). The idea seems in any case to be this:first, the ultimate end fora given archeris not thata given targetbe hit;rather his ultimateend is thathe do the thingsrequired of him by the task in the appropriateway. And second, someone tryingto be virtuousis like our archerin thisrespect. The analogy has neverfared well outside theStoa. Posidonius is said to have thought it contained 'a manifestinconsistency and nothing honorable or productiveof happiness' (fr.187; LS 1, 405). Alexander of Aphrodisiascalled it 'absurd' (de An II 164.6;LS 1, 401). And, of course, thereis Plutarch'scanonical objection:

Ifsomeone were to say that archer does everything inhis power not for thesake of hitting the target but for the sake of doing everything in his power,one would suppose him to be speakingin riddling and fantastic way.So itis withthe idiots who insistthat the end ofaiming at things inaccordance with nature is notthe getting but the taking and selecting ofthem, and thatbeing healthy is noteach man's end in his desire and

9 Annas1993, 402. Striker 1996, 310 gives another suggestion about its origin. Cf. also Alpers-Gölz1976, 82. 10 Butcf. LS 2,398.

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pursuitof health, but on thecontrary being healthy has referenceto the desireand pursuit of being healthy. For what is thedifference between someone'ssaying that health has comeinto being for the sake of drugs, notdrugs for the sake ofhealth, and one who makesthe selection of drugsand theircomposition and use morechoiceworthy than health, orrather regards health as notchoiceworthy at all,but locates the end in activityconcerning the drugs, and declaresdesire to be theend of thegetting, not the getting the end ofthe desire? (Comm not 1071Fff.)

Letus setaside, for the moment, his indecorous lack of sympathy for it,and observehow Plutarchbrings the analogy into focus. The end of thearcher - 'thatthe task be completedin theappropriate way' - is glossed here in termsof the practiceof an art. And I thinkthis is appropriate.11For the standards by which even a failedattempt at hitting thetarget could count as a kindof success could onlyhave comefrom theirsatisfying the standards of a generalpractice of target-hitting (that, forexample, one assumedthe proper oblique stance, nocked the arrow at a rightangle, took accountof the wind,released smoothly... But imaginesomeone failing not only to hit the target, but also evento try to do anyof these things. Under what circumstances would we say sucha personnevertheless did hisbest to hitthe target?). So Plutarchhas theanalogy right; he onlythinks it absurdthat the ultimateend ofarchers is notthat targets be hit,but rather that archery be practicedappropriately - as itwould be absurdto supposethat the ultimateend ofdoctors is thatmedicine be practicedappropriately, and notthat their patients' health improve. Contemporaryscholarship has largelyfollowed Plutarch in this, thoughit has refinedhis complaints somewhat. It is nowadayssaid that Stoicdogma entails, disastrously, that archery is - and archers,there- fore,ought to be - indifferentto hitting targets;12 that the standards by whicharchers actually judge theirown performancesare notthose by

11 Cf.Alpers-Gölz: 'Here the meaning of "conliniare" is important: its significance does notreside merely in thestraightforward aim of hitting the target, but rather in the "aimingaccurately" - thesurehandedness, that is, which signifies the mastery of theart../ (1976, 81; my[somewhat liberal] translation). The relevanceof Alpers- Gölz'smarvellous book to this paper was brought to my attention by an anonymous referee.

12 See,for example Annas 1993, 402.

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 162 Ian Blecher whichthey ought to be judged;13that archery must have been invented forthe sake of shooting arrows.14 Itis sometimesadded, as ifin their defense, that the Stoics were aware of,and happyto accept,these consequences, and manymore besides; that,in theirview, the skeptic needs to revisehis intuitionsabout such matters- indeedwould revise them, if only he realizedthe significance ofvirtue.15 Suchconsiderations seem to me confused.The analogy with archery was supposedto helpus realizethe significance and scope ofvirtue in thefirst place - so it isn'tmuch good to requireus alreadyto have realizedthem in orderto graspthe analogy. Nor will a furtheranalogy help(sports and acting,among others, having been suggested16). For the criteriaaccording to whichit would be a successfulanalogy could only havebeen supplied by a correctconception of virtue; but that conception was supposedto have been supplied(in part,at least)by theanalogy witharchery.17 Ifthe analogy is worthbothering about - andthis paper is addressed to thosewho thinkit is - thiscan onlybe because it can supply non-Stoicswith a correctconception of virtue. This will be possibleunder two conditions:first, it mustnot presupposeany priorphilosophical commitmentstoStoic doctrines. Any interpretation ofthe analogy must thereforegrant the default view, that archery was designedin orderto hittargets. It is notas ifthis is someunexamined prejudice: the goal of target-hittingis pretty obviously the source of the systematic unity of the art(cf. SVF 173). How elseshould such diverse activities as checkingthe directionof the wind and tighteninga bow-string and carryingaround a quivercome to be essentialparts of the same set of doings?

13 See, forexample Cooper 1999,438. 14 See, forexample Striker1996, 243, 307, 309. 15 See Annas 1993,399, 410.

16 By Striker1996, 245, 310 (but cf.Annas 402n.,for a replyto this) and Cooper 1999, 348 respectively. 17 Of course the Stoics did draw an analogy between actingand virtue(see de Fin HI 24f.).But thatanalogy was not,it seems to me, intendedto explain how claims (1) and (2) may be held simultaneously.I considerwhat it was intendedto explain in §4 below.

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Andsecond, it must be madeclear why the analogy we areto consider is witharchery, and notjust any art - geometryor sculpture,say. We shouldtake ourselves to have missedsomething if we conclude,with Annas,among others (1993, 400-2; cf. White 1990, n.36), that the analogy is meantonly to alert us toa similaritybetween virtue and theother arts: so muchis alreadyclear from the Stoic definition of virtue as the'xé%vr| TiepiTov ßiov' that is, the art of living (AM XI 170,181, 184). Virtue must thereforecome to resemblearchery in a way whichsets both of them apartfrom other arts. In thefollowing section, I shall examine how an unprejudicedconcep- tionof archery might nevertheless conform to Stoic thought about action. In §4 1shall suggest what a conceptionof virtue analogous to this might looklike. With this in place, it should be easierto see how claims(1) and (2) mightbe heldsimultaneously. I shall conclude by considering, in §5, an objectionto the use I thinkthe Stoics wish to make of the analogy with archery.

3

Take theclaim that someone, given the task of hitting something with an arrow,would not try to hitthe target, but rather to practicea certain artappropriately. Gisela Strikerhas suggestedthat we may suppose thereare people so motivated,inasmuch as practicallyany motivation fordoing anythingwill have its hour with someone('I am voting Republicanbecause Christ desires it of me . . .') . But,she says, for this very reasonthe bare existence of someone so motivatedtells us nothingabout theproper attitude toward the good. What we wantto knowis whether it is rightto tryand practicearchery properly given the task of hitting somethingwith an arrow,not whether there exists someone who would so try.The point of the analogy, she concludes, must actually have been togeneralize about the end of archery as such.18The claim the Stoics want us to considerwould thenbe:

(A) Theend ofarchery is thatarchery be practicedappropriately.

18 Striker1996, 243, 306; a similarview can be foundin Annas1993, 400ff.

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And,Striker concludes, this is moreor less fatuous. For it was widely agreedamong ancient philosophers that arts must differ from the objects forwhich they are practiced(the claim seems to have originatedwith Carneades;see deFin V 16ff.;cf. Striker 1996, 311ff.). Even if this is not, strictlyspeaking true, archery does seemto be one ofthe class of arts so conceived(cf. Striker 1996, 245, 311ff.). Whereas, presumably, virtue is not:substituting Virtue' for 'archery' in (A) yieldsa claimwe can take seriously.But it is notas thoughtthe analogy with archery helped us to see this:it seemed rather to getin theway. Now it is perhapspeculiar that a readingwhich makes the analogy fatuousshould have recommendeditself to Strikerover one which makesit look merely trivial. But let us considerwhether these really are theonly alternatives. Now certainlythe issue cannotbe whethersome particularperson might try to practice archery, given a bow and arrows and somethingto hit.But why suppose we are speakinghere of a particularperson, the detailsof whose biographyhave simplybeen elidedfor convenience's sake? Isn't the idea ratherthat we wantto know whata humanbeing would do here?It is as ifwe had asked:what would a catdo givena saucerof milk? It would reflecta misunderstandingto reply:'My Tibbies detests anything ina saucer'.In thisexample, we want to knowabout the nature of cats - notabout Tibbies. In thecase ofthe archerwe want,analogously, to knowwhether (A') A given(good example of a) man,asked to hit something with a bow and arrows,would try to practice archery. accuratelycharacterizes human nature, and notjust whetherit accu- ratelycharacterizes the disposition of any actual persons. Now itsurely isn't fatuous to say a manwould practice archery in a givensituation; nor is it trivialto describehim as tryingto do so (as it maybe to describesomeone walking down the street as 'tryingto walk down thestreet'). For he maywell failto practicearchery in theright way evenif he is good at it:it is understoodthis is notan easything to do (perhapsonly Socrates and Cato theYounger were up to it ...). We seemto have a claimwhich we can takeseriously, even if it turns out to be false. The claimcan also be put thisway: to practicearchery is an end for our man because of whathe is, and because of whatarchery is, and becauseof what his taskis, and notbecause he justwants to (he is not selectinga brandof detergent). It is thereforea claim about the explana- tionof human actions of the relevant sort. If we wantto know why a man actsas he doesupon receiving some task, we cannotalways, and because

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheStoic Method of Happiness 165 notalways, cannot ultimately advert to a supposeddesire that the task be accomplished.We mustcite a practice. Whyshould this be? Letus imaginesomeone whose actions vís-à-vís a giventarget all reflectthe end that it be hitand nothingmore. For such a person,practicing archery here is butthe means to thatend. Perhaps thissounds like a truismabout arts: cobbling, we maysay, is themeans ofproducing shoes, gunsmithing the means of producing guns, geome- trythe means of bissecting angles. . . Buthere we mustnote a peculiarity ofarchery (and theso-called 'stochastic' arts19). So longas all he wants is thata pairof shoes be made,a cobblerhas no reasonto try and achieve his end by anymethod other than cobbling. If he cobblescorrectly, he willsucceed. Success with archery is, however, a matterof probability. In certaincases, archers will stand a betterchance of landing their arrow witha methodother than archery. It maybe preferable,for example, to throwthe arrow at thetarget rather than to shootit, or to walk up tothe targetand shoveit into the bull's eye. Or, we mayimagine the target is beingguarded in sucha way thatthere is onlythe slimmest chance of hittingit by means of archery; but that there is an extremelygood chance ofhitting it ifone bribesthe guard to shovean arrowinto it. Here, we shouldsay, the end thatthe target be hitdemands that the guard be bribed. Now practicingarchery is notthe answer to every problem involving arrows('I wantyou to fashiona duckdecoy from this'). But I thinkwe shallsay our archer has misunderstoodhis task if he decideson bribery - thathe has behavedunsportingly, perhaps; or that he has,by permit- tinghimself this short-cut, merely rid himself of the task without actually accomplishingit.But why do we feelthis way? Our archerwill, after all, havebrought it aboutthat, by meansof a bow and arrow,the target is hit.Why shouldn't this count as success? Theproblem comes into focus, I think,if we arrangefor our archer's financialstraits to be suchthat the money required for the bribe could onlybe raisedby thesale ofhis bow. Now, as long as theend of our archer(as such)is simplythat this target be hit,there will be no reason forhim not to go ahead withthe bribe. For the rationality of taking the meansto an end is unaffectedby considerationsabout one's abilityto

19 Arts,that is, whose successful performance is compatible with the failure to produce theend. Medicine and navigationare the standard examples.

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 166 Ian Blecher realizelike ends in the sequel unless those ends are already in view. And, byhypothesis, they are not - ourarcher has as hisend nothingbut the hittingof this target. 'You'll need your bow ifyou want to hit targets ever again'is, to him,inert. Fromthis we should concludethat we do not thinkour archer's ultimateend hittinga particulartarget. But what is his end ifnot this? The Stoicssay - plausibly,in myview - itis thatthe target be hit'in theright way [certogenere quodam, possibly rendering the Stoic term of art,KccOriKÓVTCoç] - nothowever one likes [quolibet]' {de Fin III 23-4).Here we aretold 'in theright way' means'consistently' (translating the Latin convenienta,itself translating the Greek 'o^ioXoyia [de Fin III 22]).This is, obviously,a peculiargloss. But I thinkthe claim is an intuitiveone. To be concernednot just for the target's being hit but also forthe way this is doneis tobe concernedfor the 'consistent' - thatis to saygeneral - methodof target-hitting being deployed in particularcases. Of course, giventhe vicissitudes archers face (wind,fleet-footed quarry, hostile guards...),no methodfor hitting targets could guaranteesuccess in everyinstance. This is whatit meansthat archery is a stochasticart. Nevertheless,we can devise a methodto maximizethe numberof successesoverall - viz.,by organizing the body of practical knowledge abouttarget-hitting with this in view (cf. SVF II 93-97;de Fin III 50;Allen 1993,89). Once themethod of archery is in place,then even where bribing the guardis thesurest way to hit a giventarget, and where trying to do things properlywould make success terrifically unlikely, there is stillreason to makea go ofarchery - then,indeed, for one in the position of our archer, bribingsomeone to shovean arrowinto the target could notcount as successat all. For now a particularattempt at target-hittingis to be judged by how the methodemployed would fareat hittingtargets generally.And thisis justto say thatit is tobe judgedby thestandards ofarchery.20 Thisdoes notmean that our archer is nottrying to hitthe particular target,or thathe shouldnot be glad ofhitting it, if he does (so longas

20 I am notclaiming archery (along withthe other stochastic arts) is to be distinguished fromnon-stochastic arts in thisrespect; only thatthe generalaim of artsas such is broughtout most clearlyin the case of the stochasticarts, since fornon-stochastic artiststhere is never a conflictbetween the end in a particularcase and the end in general.

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'glad' does not standfor any emotionalresponse. But a meaningful discussionof theStoic theory of emotionshere would be out ofplace here).Obviously he is tryingto hit his target - tryingto hit it by means ofarchery; and to thisextent he maybe glad ofa particularsuccess. But what our archerdoes in orderto hit a particulartarget cannot be explainedin terms of the end of success in that particular case. If we want to understandwhat he is doing,we willhave to understandhis actions interms of the general practice of target-hitting - in terms, that is, of the artof archery.

4

I have notcharacterized the Stoic account of the archer in a way which distinguishesitfrom other ancient conceptions of art (cf. Allen 1993, 89; he cites,in thisconnection, Phœdr 269d-e, 272a-b; Rhet 1355blO-ll; Top 101b5-10).And thiswas preciselythe aim: to approachthe analogy withoutprior commitment to a theoryof virtue,so thatit mightbe understoodas an appeal to theuninitiated. Now we have to see what theappeal is. It can be putstraightforwardly: virtue, as theStoics understand it, is an artstructurally similar to archery. Let us thereforesay: givena particulartask (of a sortI am aboutto specify),a (good example of a) manhas reasonto try to be virtuous,and notto tryto accomplishthe task. Assuming the analogy holds, it may wellturn out in a lotof cases that trying to be virtuouswill result in the task'sbeing accomplished; but, in certaincases, a choicewill have tobe made in favorof practicingvirtue and againsta methodmuch more likelyto accomplishthe task. Now thesort of task the Stoics must have in mindhere is thatwhich is givento a manin virtueof his being human: the task of attaining the so-calledprimary things according to nature(prima naturae - deFin III 16ff.;7ipoT|Y|iéva mía cpúaiv- Stob II 6a; DL VII 105 et passim)- of attaining,in otherwords, those goods whichsatisfy his animalneeds and desires.Though it is perhapssurprising given claim (1) above,the Stoicsnever claimed that it is pointlessor wicked to pursue such things, as thoughthey were a distractionfrom the real work of cultivating virtue; on thecontrary, they regarded pursuit of themas a necessarypart of whatit is to liveas a humanbeing (cf. de Tin III 39). 'Everyanimal, as soonas itis born,'Cicero's Cato says,

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is concernedwith itself, and takescare to preserveitself. It favorsits constitutionand whateverpreserves its constitution, whereas it recoils fromits destruction and whateverappears to promote its destruction. In supportof this thesis, the Stoics point out that infants seek what is goodfor them and avoidthe opposite before they ever feel pleasure or pain.This would not happen unless they valued their own constitution and feareddestruction. But neither could it happenthat they would seekanything at all unlessthey had self-awarenessand therebyself- love.So one mustrealize that it is self-lovethat provides the primary motivation,(de Fin III 16;cf. Ep 121,DL VII 85)

Now the claim of the analogy can be put thisway: with a particular opportunityof promoting the maintenance of one's constitutionin view - - thatis to say, given the opportunityto act one always has reason to practicevirtue, and not to seize the opportunityby whatevermeans happen to be most convenient.And indeed, this is what childrenwho are broughtup properlylearn, the Stoics say. Hence Cicero's Cato:

The initial"appropriate action" (by which I translate"kcc&tìkov") is to preserveoneself in one'snatural constitution. The next is to takewhat is in accordancewith nature and rejectits opposite. Once this method ofselection (and likewise rejection) has been discovered, selection then goes hand in hand withappropriate action. Then such selectionbe- comescontinuous, and, finally, stable and in agreementwith nature. Atthis point that which can trulybe said tobe good firstappears and is recognizedfor what it is. (deFin III 20)

The importof this passage will come clearwhen we see why we ought not to ask, 'if man's firstconcern for rationality is a formof concernfor himself,why should he come to completelyneglect his animal nature?' (Striker1996, 288, see also 289; Engberg-Pedersen1986, 145ff.).It is not simply that the prospects for a satisfyinganswer to this question are bleak - thoughthey are (see Striker1996, 292). The question is simply confused. The suggestionis not at all thatan adult's interestin virtuesupplants childhood concernswith externalgoods (as we may say an interestin TheNew Yorkerand Penthousesupplants a childhoodinterest in Boy'sLife and Mad). The suggestion is ratherthat over time a method for the selection and rejectionof external goods takes shape. Prior to this, - selectionand rejectionstill happened only not methodically.That is

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheStoic Method of Happiness 169 to say,it happenedwithout a view to whatis good fora humanbeing throughouta life.But it is onlythe haphazardnesswhich has to be abandoned- notthe 'animal nature'. Partof the upbringing of a childwill therefore involve explanations ofthe sort, 'Because if you gobble up all theraisins now youwon't have anywhen you want them later/ and 'BecauseI wouldn'ttrust someone who lies,'and 'Becauseit is impoliteand unsanitaryto pickone's nose, that'swhy.' And thisis because,though children do not,according to theStoic way of thinking,need to learnto desireparticular external goods,they do need to learnhow theirparticular actions bear on their prospectsfor securing those goods in thelong term. This is surelynot to learnthat securing those goods is notimportant at all. On thecontrary: it is to learnthat the greatestpossible number of such goods can be securedthroughout a lifetime only by means of a generalmethod. And, ofcourse, it is tolearn that the piecemeal means children (and Cyrenaics) use willmake this harder - willlead, in themost extreme case, to their beingunable to secureany goods at all. Considerthe response of Xeno- phon'sSocrates to Aristippus'view thatone oughtalways and onlyto do whatbrings immediate pleasure. Such a person,Socrates says, would not long be able to gratifyhimself in thisway. He would soon find himselfa slave to thosewho becamestrong by delayinggratification (MemII 1 10-15;cf. Annas 1993, 227). Andthis general method is called'virtue'. Now theStoic claim is that, afterlearning the method of virtue, one willconcern oneself more with its employmentthan with getting the particular items to be selected. Perhapsthis sounds implausible - themethod is, afterall, a meansof securingprecisely those items (or so we maysuppose, anyway). But it is by now,I hope,sounding a littlemore familiar. We have to hear the appropriateconcern as a generalone, to be contrastedwith a concernfor gettingsome particularexternal good. Thatis whatthe analogy with archerywas supposedto teachus. Thisdoes notmean, of course, that if I stopmyself stealing this pear fromthe market, I shall someday have many more pears. Perhaps, after notstealing the pear, I shallbe stabbedto deathon thebus home.(Does a greatlode ofpears count always as a good?We mustn't,in anycase, equate successat securingexternal goods withmere accumulation of wealth- perhapstoo manypears would impedemy securing health, orgood friends, or. . .) Thepoint is, however, a pointabout how to justify whatI am doing:in lightof my ultimate end - viz.,that I lead a happy life- myactions would be at bestarbitrary ifthey were not directed at securingthe greatest share of external goods throughouta life as such

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(thoughperhaps, it may turn out, not my life in particular,if I am after all stabbed).The securingof no (evenvery high) number of particular goods couldattain to thesort of generality which this end has in view. Thisincommensurability ofthe particular with respect to thegeneral is, I think,what justifies the Stoic claim that 'the particular value ofvirtue is distinct:a matterof kind, not degree' (de Fin HI 34; see also in 39): the pointis notthat the number of goods obtainedbe absolutelyhigh, but thatit be as highas possible,whether or notwhat is possibleis actually verymuch. And, conversely,if we are to understandthe actionsof someone virtuous- hisabstaining from food and drinknow and then,his giving awayhis money to the poor, his wearing the occasional beard of bees - we mustunderstand them as directedat theultimate aim of securing externalgoods throughout a life (as such)and notof securing, say, this pear,for him, now. Herelet us revisitclaims (1) and (2). To saythat virtue is thesole good is, as I said,to say thatvirtue and nothingelse makesfor a happylife. Butwhy think this a severeand joyless doctrine? It cannot be a contingent factabout virtue that it is a meansof deciding which external goods to pursue,as ifits 'intrinsicvalue' were some separatematter, to be ex- plainedby its possession of wondrous abstracta. On thecontrary: virtue wouldhave nothing to recommend it - wouldbe no morethan Hegel's contentless'freedom in thought'- ifit were second-best as a practical method;if there were some other less prettybut more efficient alterna- tivemethod in theapplication of which children might be tutored.The practical(by which I meanboth extrinsic and intrinsic)benefits of the virtuouslife (as conceivedby the Stoics, anyway), are inseparable from it.If they were not, it would be hardto see howvirtue alone could make a personhappy. I thinkwe can say,therefore, that claim (1) is designedto encompass all thoseparts of life which Aristotle counted valuable - bothvirtues and theirearthly rewards - butin sucha way thatno questionabout theirrelation need ever arise. The cases of conflict which have sometimes been emphasizedhere (shall I save theorphanage or buy a quitenice pen?)21must come to be regardedas conflictsnot between distinct ends or impulses,but between methods of satisfying the selfsame end. This

21 See forexample Inwood 1985,210ff. He cites,in thisconnection, Ep 76.18.

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheStoic Method of Happiness 171 evidentlyrequires us not- as Aristotledoes - tobegin by explaining whatthe virtues are, and thenconsidering what other sorts of goods theremight be; or- as Aristotlealso does - todistinguish a number of goods,and thentry to uncovertheir relative import to thehappy life. Virtuemust rather be conceived,from the beginning of the account, as inseparablefrom all questionsabout the good, which includes questions about the value of externalgoods. And thisis a consequenceof the conceptionwhich I thinkthe Stoic Bildungstheorie invites us tohave. For accordingto it,virtue just is theart of selection among external goods. Butif claim (1) alreadygives a fullaccounting of the relation between virtueand external goods, what is thepurpose of claim (2), the claim that securingsome mere things is preferable?Here, I think,we shouldrecall theanalogy with archery. Our archer'scommitment is to practicinghis art,not to hittinghis target;but that does notmean, as I said,that he is notin somesense trying to hit the target - orthat he wouldnot be at all gladof succeeding in a particularinstance. Similarly, a particular human actionis, in somesense, an attemptto securea particularexternal good; and it is hardto see whythe virtuous agent should not be glad ofthis justbecause he has prudentlydeployed a methodof acting designed for general,and notfor particular, success. Giventhe way things go, the method will of course sometimes require us to choosecourses of action less likelyto secureany external good at all than,say, simply stealing the pear; but failure in this regard is merely trivialif the overall share of goods is increasedmore by the employment ofa methodwhich in this case fails to secure the relevant good. The point ofclaim (2) is thereforenot to giveus a way to thinkabout the relation ofvirtue to external goods, but rather to give us a wayto think about the relationof particular actions (and theirparticular ends) to our general methodof living (and itsultimate end). And theclaim is: thesuccess of theformer must be judgedby thelights of thelatter - by whetherit manifestsa consistent method, and notwhether it secures some particu- lar externalgood. For in the case of virtue,as with stochasticarts generally,these criteria will sometimes come apart.

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5

Theclaim of analogy between virtue and archerywas, I think,meant to be controversial.In Aristotle'sview someone who approachedpractical mattesthe way an artistapproaches his artwould miss what is distinc- tiveabout virtuous actions: that there is no itemwhich they aim to secure (EN 1140al-23;1140b20-30). Their end is simplythat they be done. This is, in otherwords, to take seriouslythe dzsanalogybetween archeryand virtueI adumbratedin §2 above:we resist

(A) Theend ofarchery is thatarchery be practicedappropriately, in a waywe do notresist

(V) Theend ofvirtue is thatvirtue be practicedappropriately.

Now if (V) is the last word on the subject- a possibilityI shall considerin a moment- itis clearthat our original problem, the problem aboutthe relation of virtueto externalgoods, inevitably arises. For if virtuousactions do notaim at anythingbeyond their own performance, a fullaccount of themcan be givenwithout mentioning wealth and healthand renown.The value of items of the latter sort - ifindeed they are valuable- will thenhave to be made out separately.And hereis wherethings get sticky: are external goods valuable in themselves? If so, theyare a kindof good distinctfrom virtue; but how is therelation betweenthis sort of good and virtueto be made out?Or: are external goodsvaluable as thematerial condition for virtuous actions? Suppose, however,we shouldfail to securethem. Would virtuous action - and thereforehappiness - thenbe impossible?Certainly no one amongthe ancientswas willingto say this.Or: are externalgoods notvaluable at all?But surely some such things are preferable to others! One mightsuppose the analogy with archery is meantto resistthis line of thought,and to embraceinstead one whichmakes concise the relationof virtue to external goods as therelation of a methodof securing somethingto theitems secured. The troubleis, though, the Stoics did notresist (V). On thecontrary, theyshared to some extentAristotle's intuition that virtuous action is valuableintrinsically: 'Nor do we thinkwisdom is likenavigation or medicine,but rather more like acting or dancing. . . [For]the desired end

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheStoic Method of Happiness 173 is locatedwithin the [virtuous] act/ Cicero's Cato says,just two para- graphsafter presenting the analogy with archery (de Fin III 24,S222).23 Whatmight we makeof this? It seemsto me thereare twoquestions here.There is a questionabout what to make of Cato's assertionthat wisdomis notlike navigation or medicine - orpresumably any stochas- ticart - giventhe text which precedes it. And thereis a questionabout whatto makeof the assertion that wisdom is likedancing. Let us take themin turn. As regardsthe first question: John Cooper has said thepassage was Verylikely' intended to report both sides of an intestinedebate (cf. 1999, 438n).Now, it is possiblesuch a debatetook place. But, first, there is no evidenceto suggestCicero was aware of one. And second,even ifhe was,it would hardly explain the straightforward inconsistency in what purportsto be a singleaccount of the nature of virtue - especiallygiven Cicero'scare to distinguishexplicitly the views of different sects within theschools whose views he considers(cf. de Fin III 33).Perhaps it would be betterto say somethinglike this: Cato is claimingsimply that virtue is in some respectdifferent from the stochastic arts, though of course thereare the similarities mentioned at III 22.This not what Cato actually says,unfortunately; then again, what he actuallysays is intolerable,and I am notsure how else to getaround it.24 Suppose, then, that it is what he meant. Ifit is, we cansay, as regardsthe second question, that the comparison withdance is intendedto complement, not to undermine, the account of virtueI reproducedin §3 above.What was missingfrom that account was evidentlyan explanationof the intrinsic worth of virtuous actions: forit seemsthe value ofthe art of archery is derivedfrom the value of

22 III 32 is bracketedby theOxford Classical Text edition as irrelevantto itscontext. Annashelpfully suggests it would fit well with III 24,and with this in mind, I have runthe two passages together. 23 Strictlyspeaking, of course, Cato does notback down from the claim that virtue is an arthere (or elsewhere).But he mayas well have:it is no longerclear why it mattersthat we areregarding virtue as an art,and notas a suigeneris property of actionswhich nevertheless shares something with dancing. 24 Itis alwaysopen to us tospeculate about the corruption ofthe manuscript, ofcourse; butsuch speculation, based on nothingbut philosophical bewilderment, seems to meunnecessarily desperate here.

This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 174 Ian Blecher hittingthe greatest possible number of targets; but we shouldnot like to saythat the value of the art of living is derivedfrom the value of securing externalgoods - eventhe value ofsecuring the greatest possible num- ber of them- or,really, that it is derivedfrom anything to whichit wouldthen be a means.In thisrespect, I take Cato to be claiming,virtue is like dancing(and unlikearchery): the value of the actionwhich manifeststhe propermethod of selectionis whollycontained in its performance. Perhapsthis sounds like a repudiationof the analogy with archery. ButI do notthink it is. Thepoint of that analogy was to alertus to some structuralpeculiarities which virtue, understood as themethod of selec- tionof external goods, shares with stochastic arts (e.g., its demand that securingan externalgood in a particularcase be sacrificedin favorof successoverall). But this was a pointabout the relation of virtue to the choiceof particular actions, not a pointabout the relation of a particular virtuousaction to thevirtuous life as a whole.25This latter relation is quite differentfrom the former.For no choice ever need be made betweenbeing virtuous hie et nunc and beingvirtuous throughout life. The one is just a partof theother. But precisely because a particular virtuousaction is a partof the virtuous life, we do notsay theone is a meansto theother (as we do notnormally say thatthe pas de deux at theend ofAct I is a meansto theperformance of Le Corsaire). Theintrinsic value ofthe virtuous life apparently consists in itsbeing - nota meansto, but identical with - thehappy life, where happiness is understoodas absolutelyvaluable (cf. EN 1097a35-b7).So, we cansay, theintrinsic value ofa particularvirtuous action consists in itsbeing - nota meansto, but identical with - a partof the happy life. Butthis is perfectlycompatible with the account of §3 above;there is no reasonparticular virtuous actions could not bear the relation to the virtuouslife as a wholewhich the analogy with dance suggests and still be thebest method of selectionamong external goods. All thiswould mean is thatto practicethat method is to lead a happylife (and the converse).There is no reasonwhy thevalue of virtueshould not be compatiblewith the relation it bears to theaccretion of external goods

25 Hence Inwood rightlyspeaks of the 'limited aims of the author of this analogy', 1985,213.

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- so long,that is, as we do notinfer from this that the value is derived fromthat relation. But this - I haveargued - is preciselywhat we shall haveunderstood when we haveunderstood how (1) is compatiblewith (2).26

1001Cathedral of Learning Universityof Pittsburgh Pittsburgh,PA 15260 U.S.A. [email protected]

PrimarySources and Abbreviations

Alexanderof Aphrodisias, de Anima {-de An). Aristotle,Ethika Nicomachea (=EN). I have used J.O.Urmson's revision of W.D. Ross' translation(Princeton University Press 1984). , TechneRhetorike (=Rhet). , Topika(=Top). Anus Didymus,excerpted in Stobaeus'Eklogai apophthegmata hupothekai (=Stob). I have modifiedA. Pomeroy'stranslation (Society of Biblical Literature 1999). Cicero,de FinibusBonorum et Malorum (=de Fin). I have modifiedR. Woolfs translation (CambridgeUniversity Press 2001). DiogenesLaertius (=DL). Epictetus,Dissertationes (=Diss). Plato, Phœdrus(=Phœdr). Plutarch,De communibusnotitiis adversus Stoicos (=Comm not). I have used the translation whichappears in Longand Sedley1987. Posidonius,fragments (=fr.). I haveused the translation which appears in Long and Sedley 1987. Seneca, Ad Luciliutnepistulae morales (=Ep). SextusEmpiricus, Adversus Mathematicos (=AM). Stoicorumvetera fragmenta (=SVF). I haveused thetranslation which appears in Longand Sedley1987. Xenophon,Memorabilia (=Mem).

26 Forcomments on, and discussionsrelated to, this paper, I thankMatt Boyle, Chris Campbell,Ben Laurence, Sara Nichols, an anonymousreferee, and especially James Allen.

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SecondarySources

J.Allen, 1993. 'The AncientConception of an Art'.In T. Horowitzand A.I. Janis,eds. ScientificFailure. Lanham, MD: Rowmanand Littlefield. R. Alpers-Gölz,1976. Der BegriffIkotioç in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte(Spudasmata Vili).New York:Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim. J.Annas, 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. J.Cooper, 1999. Reason and Emotion. Princeton University Press. T. Engberg-Pedersen,1986. 'Discovering the good'. In M. Schofieldand G. Striker,eds., The Normsof Nature: Studies in HellenisticEthics. Cambridge UniversityPress. G.W.F.Hegel, 1977. Phenomenology ofSpirit, A.V. Miller, trans. Oxford University Press. B. Inwood,2005. 'Getting to Goodness'.Chapter 10 ofReading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome.Oxford: Oxford University Press. , 1985.Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A.A. Longand D.N. Sedley,1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1: translationsof the principalsources. Vol. 2: Greekand Latinsources. Cambridge University Press. AbbreviatedLS. G. Striker,1996. Essayson HellenisticEpistemology and Ethics.Cambridge UniversityPress. N. White,1990. 'Stoic Values', The Monist, 73 42-58.

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