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Legacies of Division ON THE BASIS OF AND ETHNICITY IN CENTRAL

Equal Rights Trust EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST

Legacies of Division DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN

London, July 2017 The Equal Rights Trust is an independent international organisation whose purpose is to combat discrimination and promote equality as a fundamental human right and a basic principle of social justice.

© July 2017 Equal Rights Trust

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Acknowledgements Foreword

1 ...... 9 Galym Zhussipbek HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN – 1700 TO 1991 2. IN , , TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN ...... 41 Victoria Catliff

3 DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF ETHNICITY AND LANGUAGE IN KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN ...... 68 Victoria Catliff Acknowledgements

This publication has been produced by the Equal Rights Trust, following four years work to document and expose ethnic and religious discrimination in the of the Central Asia.

The development and production of this publication was managed by Jim Fitzgerald, Co-Director of the Equal Rights Trust, who oversaw the develop- ment of the three research papers and provided editorial guidance. The Trust is immensely grateful to the authors of the papers published here: Galym Zhussip- bek (author of the paper on the history of the Central Asia region) and Victoria Catliff (author of the papers on religious discrimination and ethnic discrimina- tion). Both worked diligently and with great commitment. of research conducted by the Trust, its partners, consultants and researchers in ThisKazakhstan, publication Kyrgyzstan, seeks to Tajikistan draw together, and Uzbekistan, contextualise with and the analyse aim of the identifying findings common causes and consequences. We are grateful to all those who participated in the research and development of the reports In the Name of Unity: Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kazakhstan, Looking for Harmony: Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kyrgyzstan, and After the Padishah: Address- ing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan, and our forthcoming report on discrimination and inequality in Tajikistan.

The Trust is grateful to a number of interns who undertook desk-based research and provided considerable editorial assistance in the development of the report. Thanks are due in particular to Elektra Clark, Pouya Fard and Kevin Murphy. proofreading and design. Very special thanks go to Istvan Fenyvesi and David CharlotteJones who Broydworked oversaw on the design the final of the stages cover of and the who editorial laid out process, the report. including

This report is an outcome of a project designed to empower civil society to com- bat discrimination and inequality in Central Asia, funded by the European Union. support provided. However, the contents of this publication are the sole respon- Thesibility Equal of theRights Equal Trust Rights is very Trust grateful and can to thein no European way be takenUnion tofor represent the financial the views of the European Union. The European Union has not interfered in any way whatsoever with the research or contents of this report.

In the process of producing our reports on discrimination and inequality in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Trust sought informa- tion or consulted experts and organisations in each of these countries, many of whom are cited in the report. The Equal Rights Trust wishes thank all individu- als and organisations who responded to queries, gave feedback, provided infor- mation and advice, or met with us, our partners or researchers. Finally, we wish to thank all persons who shared their stories with us. This report is dedicated to them and all other persons in the region who have suffered – and those who continue to suffer – discrimination and exclusion. Foreword

Each of the countries which constitute the region referred to today as “Central Asia” is unique. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbek- istan each have their own history and geography, their distinct culture and demography,economic and theirpolitical specific norms. polity and economy. As independent states, these countries have followed different paths, reflecting their different social, cultural, Yet these states also share a common history – dating back more than two centu- ries – of conquest, colonisation and, to some extent, assimilation. First under the Tsarist and then as part of the , the states of modern Central Asia were for centuries ruled by powers based in St Petersburg and Mos- - formed both the ethnic and religious make-up of the region and understandings cow.of national, Tsarist ethnic and Soviet and religiouspolicies left identity. a significant legacy. In particular, they trans

Starting in the 18th Century, the Tsarist Russian empire began to expand to its south, into the region known today as Central Asia. Beginning with isolated forti- - trol, eventually assumed authority over the entire region. Following the ficationsBolshevik and Revolution settlements in 1917, and endingattempts in conquest,at self-determination subjugation and and imperial con came to an end quickly, and by the 1920s, Soviet Russia had asserted author- ity throughout the region. Five Soviet Republics were established which, while nominally autonomous, had severely limited independence in practice.

This history of rule by an outside power fundamentally shaped the ethnic and the immigration associated with that control, means that each of the coun- make-uptries has anof ethnicthe five Russian Central minority Asian republics. – in some Two cases centuries a very large of Russian minority control, – and that Russian is a commonly used language of communication. Each is also home to one or more “reciprocal minorities” – ethnic in Kyrgyzstan, eth- nic in Uzbekistan, for example – as a result of Soviet policies of national delimitation which paid little heed to the realities of ethnic settlement and co-existence prior to the arrival of Russia. The states are each also home to eth- nic minorities from other parts of the Soviet Union, the result of both economic migration and deportation.

-

Tsaristduring andthe Soviet influenceera led to can a situation also be seen in which clearly Russian in the sphere Orthodox of religion. Rus sianbecame imperial an established influence andreligion the immigration in all states, ofin large a region numbers where of ethnic otherwise dominates. More broadly, Soviet state has informed modern political attitudes towards – and regulation of – the practice of religion, including the which has historically been practiced throughout the region.

Research conducted by the Equal Rights Trust – together with our courageous partners and independent researchers over the last four years – has found that the shared history of the Central Asian states has resulted in shared experiences of ethnic and religious discrimination. In this publication, we set out to iden- tify and explore transnational and regional patterns of ethnic and religious dis- crimination and disadvantage, looking at common causes and manifestations. Drawing on – and expanding upon – the Trust’s own research in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,1 the publication is designed to catalyse debate about the common causes and consequences of ethnic and religious dis- crimination in the region, and to foster discussion of potential solutions.

In order to properly understand the roots of ethnic and religious discrimina- tion in the region, the publication begins with a discussion of the history of the region over the last three centuries. Galym Zhussipbek, a historian specialising in the history of the Central Asia region, traces the history of Russian interven- tion in Central Asia under the Tsars, and then examines the establishment of the Soviet Union in the region. In both cases, the author focuses on policies and processes which impacted upon the ethnic and religious make-up of the states, or on understandings of ethnicity and religion. His paper elucidates the way in which, under the Soviet Union, national delimitation and mass immigration transformed the ethnic make-up of the states, while Soviet nationality policy established particular understandings of ethnicity and nationality. It also exam- ines the way in which the Tsarist and Soviet regimes – one rooted in Orthodox Christianity, the other in state atheism – dealt with religion in a region in which Islam played a central role in the lives of the populace.

In the second and third papers, Victoria Catliff, an international humanitarian and professional with more than a decade’s experience of legal and social research in the Central Asia region, examines patterns of religious and ethnic discrimination. Her papers draw upon the research conducted by the Equal Rights Trust in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,2 com- bringing new analysis of the links, connections and commonalities in experi- plementingences of ethnic and and contextualising religious discrimination these findings in thewith region. additional information, and

In respect of religious discrimination, the commonalities and echoes between the four states under review are remarkable. The majority population in all countries have sought to co-opt Islam as a tool for political power. Neverthe- Centralless, the Asian Soviet states legacy identifies of state as atheism Muslim is – clearand political to see, manifestedleaders in a in number the tight of regulation of religion, impacting in particular on small, heterodox or non-tradi- tional faith groups. All four states – despite providing constitutional guarantees of religious freedom – maintain notably similar legal frameworks which tightly regulate the practice of religion. Those wishing to practice religion are forced

1 The Equal Rights Trust was unable to undertake such research in Turkmenistan, due to the restrictive environment for civil society work in that . 2 Equal Rights Trust, Looking for Harmony - Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kyrgyzstan, December 2016; Equal Rights Trust, In the name of unity - Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kazakhstan, December 2016; Equal Rights Trust, After the Padishah Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan, December 2016, all available at: http://www.equalrightstrust.org/news/ new-equal-rights-trust-reports-expose-widespread-ethnic-and-religious-discrimination-kazakh- stan-kyrgyzstan-and-uzbekistan Rights Trust report on discrimination and inequality in Tajikistan. . In addition, the paper makes use of the findings of a forthcoming Equal to register a religious association, or face administrative (or in some cases criminal) penalties. Registration requirements are onerous, indirectly discrim- inating against minority groups which lack the membership to meet threshold requirements, or the resources to comply with administrative requirements. In each case, registration involves a process of theological review, creating ample space for direct discrimination in application. Registration is a require- ment for a great many aspects of religious practice and as such, non-registra- tion leads to the discriminatory denial of . In addition, reli- gious practice in the absence of registration leads to penalties, or harassment by law enforcement agencies. Moreover, this legislative framework serves to legitimise discrimination by private actors in both and employment. patterns. As noted, Soviet policies of national delimitation and mass migration In(both respect voluntary of ethnic and discrimination,forced) mean that Catliff all of finds the Centralsignificant Asian evidence states are of regionalhome to both an ethnic Russian minority, and at least one “reciprocal” minority – an eth- nic group which is the majority group in one of the neighbouring states, though the sizes of these groups vary by state. All states are also home to smaller minor- ities – notably the Lyuli – who are particularly vulnerable to discrimination due to their small numbers and social marginalisation. Commonalities in respect of

- theterns ethnic of discrimination, make-up of the with states problems are also in access reflected to public in patterns services, of discrimination education and acrossemployment the region. all arising Language from iseach arguably state’s the promotion single most of the significant language factor of the inethnic pat majority. Alongside the reduction in support to minority languages, particularly in education, the diminishing use of Russian – the language of “inter-ethnic com-

Takenmunication” together, – in these official papers communication together identify has had distinctly a particularly regional, deleterious transnational effect. patterns of discrimination and disadvantage arising on the basis of both religion and ethnicity. Despite their different pasts and the divergent approaches taken by the of the Central Asian countries today, experiences of ethnic and religious discrimination bear remarkable similarities. This commonality is, in very large part, attributable to the shared history of the states in question, particularly under the Soviet Union. Patterns of ethnic and religious discrimina- tion today bear witness to the legacies of division which each state has inherited.

This publication was conceived to identify and map regional and transnational patterns of discrimination and disadvantage on the basis of ethnicity and reli- gion. It is intended to encourage debate and discussion on the common causes and manifestations of such discrimination. As such, no recommendations are made, either to the states in question, or to international actors. Nevertheless, we hope that in elucidating the common roots and common experiences of dis- crimination in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this publica- tion will encourage collaboration between the states, in the search for solutions.

Jim Fitzgerald, July 2017 1 HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION – 1700 TO 1991

Galym Zhussipbek

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Each of these republicsCentral Asia is the as direct commonly successor understood to a Soviet today Socialist is constituted Republic, ofand five each republics: became independent on the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991.1 Barring a brief period of greater autonomy in some parts of the region in the wake of the twin 1917 revolutions in Russia,2 the peoples of this vast and diverse region had been free of direct control from Russia for over 150 years. 1991 marked the first time

It has been noted that “both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union would have been very different without their Central Asian ”.3 During both the Tsarist and the Soviet Union periods, the region stood out as one with an indigenous, non-European, Muslim majority, which according to some scholars constituted a Russian “Orient”.4 Northrop emphasises that Central Asia helped to make Tsarist Russia European and that after 1917, too, Central Asia continued to play this role - nial world.5 These differences informed, in turn, the particular approach taken forby theSoviet Tsarist Russia, and even Soviet as authorities it also helped to governancedefine communist in the region. for the colo

Yet the impact of Russian control over Central Asia was – inevitably – far greater on the region itself than on the imperial power. First under the Tsars, and later under the USSR, the states of modern Central Asia were subject to direct con- trol from Russia for more than a century and a half. Both the Tsarist and Soviet periods represent a shared, but deeply controversial, history for the millions of people in the five Central Asian states. In simple terms, all aspects of life for the

1 Tolipov, F. (ed.), Five States and/ or One Region? National-Regional Dualism in Central Asia, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016, p.6. 2 Bergne P., “The Autonomy, 1917–18: Political Background, Aims and Reasons for Failure”, in Ever- ett-Heath, T., Marshall, A. and Bergne P. (eds), Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, NY: Routledge, 2003, pp. 30-32. 3 Morrison, A., “Introduction: Killing the Canard and getting rid of : rewriting the Russian conquest of Central Asia, 1814–1895”, Central Asian Survey, 33(2), 2014, p. 133. 4 See for example, Buranelli, F., “Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expan- sion of International Society”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2014, 42(3). 5 Northrop, D., Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia, Cornell Press, 2004, p. 9 8. 10 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST onanumberofissues,including alliance. dispatched envoy to Khul-Mukhammed concludeagreements with theRussian 9 8 7 6 and itsexpansion into . as the1570s and 1580s, after the Russian conquest of Kazan andAstrakhan contacts betweenlomatic Moscowpeople areand theKazakh recorded as early were region Asia territories,made intheKazakh in theregion bordering theRussian state. Dip- Central the in intervention Russian towards steps first The First steps: theColonisation ofKazakh (1730s–1840s) 1 tage inthefive independentrepublics which constitute Central Asiatoday. understanding the patterns of ethnic andreligious discrimination anddisadvan- state policies on ethnicityandreligion. Inso doing, itaimsto provide a basis for shaped and informed the ethnic and religious constitution of the five states, and and Soviet periods, focuswith aparticular onhowthese two regimes have This paper examines thehistory oftheCentralAsia region duringtheTsarist Tsarist and Soviet authorities. and thetreatmentof minorities havebeen informed all by thepolicies ofthe ings ofcollectiveidentity, andnational therelative positionofethnicgroups enced by thepolicies of these outside powers.understand and political Public profoundlyMoreover,haveinflu- religionbeen and ethnicity of understandings ying degrees, determined by theactionsof the Tsarist and Soviet authorities. particular,In religiousthe ethnicand make-upof thesestates to hasbeen, var- and . shaped byactions ofexternalpolicies and the powers, PetersburgSt based in CentralAsian peopleswere are –andstill –directly andprofoundly marked and which thehallmark ofSoviet policycanbeclearly seen. tory framework governing theexercise of religious freedom – isanotherarea in of relations between thestate andreligionthe tight –andinparticular regula seen as a reflection of, and a reaction to, Soviet policy in particular.in policy Soviet to, reaction a and of, reflection a as seen – acentral issue andKyrgyzstan, inbothKazakhstan for example –canalsobe 10

Khodarkovsky, M., Looking Back, Moving Forward, TheGeorge Washington University, May 2017,p.92 Context: After 25 Years of Independence” inLaruelle,M.andKourmanova, A.,(eds), Radicalization inCentral Asia, See for example,Heathershaw J.andMontgomery, D., ChathamHouse, TheMyth ofPost Soviet Muslim & Co,2001. See for example, Landau,J.& Kellner-Heinkele B.,Politics ofLanguage inthe Ex-Soviet Muslim States , Hurst andDirections, RowmanDynamics, &Littlefield,2015. See, for example, Omelicheva M.(ed), at: http://e-history.kz/en/contents/view/1221. XVI -beginningof the XVII centuries”,Digital History National 5 Septemberof Kazakhstan, 2013, available National DigitalHistory of “HistoryKazakhstan, of the foreign policy of Kazakh and Russia in the Indiana University Press, 2002,p.147. Colonisation (1730s-1880s) Tsarist into Expansion Central Conquest Asia: and Russia’s Frontier:a Colonialof The Making Empire,1800 1500- November 2014 6 9 State andminority languages policy onnational Contactsresumed in 1594, when Tauekkel Nationalism and Identity ConstructionNationalism inCentraland Identity Asia: Dimensions, ; and Zhussipbek, G., “PoliticalIslam intheCentral Asian 8 10 However, the Central Asia at25: 7 The nature , Bloomington: - - Russian rulers – buoyed by their victories in Siberia and the other for- Legacies of Division merly under the control of the – aimed to claim over the .11

Diplomatic relations between Russia and the Kazakh rulers did not resume until 1716.12 By this point, in the18th century, the Central Asian steppe was largely controlled by the . By 1718, after the death of Tauke Khan, who had been recognized by much of the elite the three Kazakh Hordes (Zhuzes), the Kazakh Khanate splintered into three: the Elder, Middle and Younger Hordes h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 (Zhuzes).13 In the period 1723-1725, these were considerably weak- ened by the Dzungars, a group formed by tribes originating in the west of mod- ern-day which invaded and before expanding into Central Asia. The Dzungar undertook devastating raids into parts of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz while around the Syr-darya region – including – were occupied. Whileand Syr-darya the Dzungar regions. state The was Khanates destroyed lost by thesignificant army of territorythe Manchu and Chinese population, Qing Empire, the Khanates were not able to unite their military forces and coordinate their domestic and foreign policies.14

Zhuzes began to turn to the Russian Empire to seek protection. Contrary to the professionsThus, starting of the in theTsarists 1730s, however, the rulers15 the ofKazakh the significantly people did not weakened voluntarily Kazakh sub- mit to becoming the vassals – let alone the subjects – of the Russian empire. When, for example, Mirza Kutlu Tevkelev, a Russian envoy, arrived to administer the oath of to Abulkhair Khan, leader of the Younger Horde, angry Kazakhs, led by their “elders”, forced him to seek immediate refuge. Abulkhair then confessed that he had not consulted with the elders and had instead writ- ten to the Russian Empress alone, in an apparent attempt to enhance his own authority among the Kazakhs. Moreover, the Khans and the Russians clearly interpreted the nature of the oath of protectorate and the resulting new relation- ship differently: essentially, what Abdulkhair Khan sought was assistance, not incorporation.16 Indeed, text of the oath and other relevant documents indicates a relationship between two subjects of international law, with no clauses about the incorporation of Kazakh lands into Russia.17

Yet Russia saw an opportunity to extend its authority and sphere of control into the steppe region.18 Moreover, before reaching any agreements with Kazakh leaders, the Russians had already embarked on the gradual expansion into the

11 Pochekayev, R., Governors and Khans. Personal Factors in Russian Law- Making in Central Asia: 18th to Early , National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 2017, p. 23. 12 Ibid. 13 Kuzembaiuly, A. and Abil, E., Istoriya Kazakhstana, Kostanai: Institut Istoricheskih Issledovaniy, 2006, p. 135. 14 Laumulin, M., and Central Asia in Foreign Oriental Studies, Astana: KISI, 2016, p. 88. 15 See above for example, note 11, p. 26. 16 Sabol, S., Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness, NY: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2003, pp. 28-29. 17 See above, note 11, p. 31. 11 18 See above, note 16, p. 29. 12 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST burg, , and lines military forts and96 redoubts hadbeenconstructed, comprising the Yaik,Oren - constructed, advancing into thesteppe lands.By theendof 1700s, a line of 46 wave, afort wasOrenburg establishedat in1743 and alineof forts was then 21 20 peasants; thesameapproach was usedintheareas populated by theKazakhs. ties began systematically populating this area, first with and later with its positionintheupperbasinsofUral rivers,Kama and theTsarist authori- settlement of Russianbut migrants was acommon feature. After strengthening through variousmeans, ranging from engagement peaceful to direct conquest, Tsarist Russia’s gradualexpansion into Kazakh-dominatedcame about lands Ust-Kamenogorsk (1720) and Koriakovski (later ) (1720). cities was established with fortifications in (1716), Semipalatinsk (1718), fortified of chain of expansioncampaign turies long deep into CentralA Asia. constructed, markingthe linefrom which the Russian state began atwo cen- was settlements fortified of arc great 1645. From thesetwopoints, a starting at the Russo-Kazakh border appeared intheearlyfort 17thcentury:a was built along settlements Cossack first The forts. Cossack of construction with region, 23 22 19 sia decidedto assertitscontrol directly over theKazakhtribalconfederations. of powerlack Observing the region,in the by theearly 19thcentury,Tsarist Rus- asthe1800s began,the assertion ofpowerment, becamemore overtly political. resettle- and fortification on wasbased Russiancolonisation of stage first the If “non-possessed lands”, The Russian authorities repeatedly statedtheir aim wasthat to cultivate military fortresses instrategic areas. of Slavicment accompanied bylands, peoplesonthebest of theestablishment sians and from theforceful expulsion of the nativeand the settle- population Control of both fromcame about negotiated settlement by ethnic Rus- attachments to territory. pastoralistsnotable inthese still so-called “non-possessed had loosebut lands” disease, forced them towas settle, false. erantlifestyle, their herds maintaining some calamity,until suchasdrought or a particulartribe.The Russian imageof who stolidly persisted in anitin- Central Asianregion. forbase directagainstaction military ultimatelyand – states conquestof– inthe 25 24

Yaitski Gorodok (Uralsk) in1613 and one wasat Guriyev built () in Edition, Duke University Press, 1994,p.8. Allworth, Edward., Vostok (ed),Russia Saint-Petersburg andOrient, State University, 2011, p.24. Alekseyev, A.,“Russia and Central Asia: economic relationsand political inXVII-XIX centuries”, inRossia i See for example Schatz,E., See above, note 19. Abazov, R., Seeabove, note 23. Seeabove, note 16,p.21. sity ofWashington Press, 2004,p.29. Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas ofCentral Asia,Palgrave Macmillan, 2008,map30. Encounter, Central YearsAsia: 130 ofRussian Dominance, AHistorical Overview 21 23 Modern Politics: The Power of“Blood” in Kazakhstan andBeyond, Univer but this was but amyth:parts of thesteppeall belongedto 25 20 . These fortified Cossack settlements providedfortifiedThese settlements . Cossack the

24 AsSchatznoted,nomadic theKazakh 19 In a second In , 3d 22 -

Throughout , the Russian Empire gradually transformed theprotec- Legacies of Division torate status of the Kazakh Hordes into that of a through a series of polit- ical and administrative reforms and military interventions.26 After the death of Abylai Khan, the Middle Horde became greatly weakened and was ultimately annexed in toto by Russia in 1822. The incorporation of the lands of the Younger Horde (), which had begun as far back as the 1730s, ended two years later, in 1824. After formal annexation of the territories of Younger and Middle Hordes, lands were subdivided according to established Russian patterns of local gov- 27 ernance which supplanted traditional Kazakh confederated structures. A small h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 group of the were permitted to retain their semi-independent and self-governing status under the name of Bukei Horde, but ultimately it too was abolished in 1845.28

The Conquest of Middle and Southern Central Asia (1860s- 1880s)

While ’s attempts to conquer Transoxiana (an ancient name which roughly corresponds with the modern-day Uzbekistan, eastern parts of Turkmenistan, southern Kazakhstan and western parts of Tajikistan) in the early eighteenth century had ended in disaster29, by the 1860s, the situation in the central parts of Central Asia looked dramatically different. States in the region – politically divided and described by British travelers as “an impoverished land”30 diminishing power of the Manchu Chinese Qing Empire, an expansionist Tsarist Russia– were sawweakened opportunities. by conflict and internal disharmony. In this context, and with

By the 1860s, the three independent states in the central part of the region – the and the Khanates of and Kokand – were warring with each other, with and with the Kazakhs to the north. All took captives, who of Khiva in particular enjoyed a reputation for lawlessness and was a notori- ended up in the slave markets, and conflict ruined local economies. The Khanate centers the Bukharan Emirate had stagnated and become embroiled into fanat- icism.ous center31 Facing of the weak slave and trade. divided Also, opponents, once-famous and for with its educationboth technological and scientific and numerical superiority, the Russian military assessed that it could conquer the independent states in the region relatively quickly.

By and large, Tsarist conquest of the three independent khanates in the cen- tral part of Central Asia, Russia combined military force with diplomacy. Before launching a series of decisive military interventions, Russia initiated a propa-

26 Abuseitova M.H. et al., A History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, , 2001, pp. 353-359. 27 See above, note 16, p. 32. 28 See above, note 19. 29 Golden, P., Central Asia in World History, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 124; Ledonne, J., “Russia’s East- ern Theater, 1650-1850 Springboard or Strategic Backyard?”, Cahiers Du Monde Russe, 2008, Vol.49, pp. 22-2`. 30 Golden, P., Central Asia in World History, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 122. 13 31 Ibid., p. 122-3. 14 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST status in1873. Russian protectorate in1868, while theKhanate of Khiva accepted protectorate of independence, as thestates accepted protectorateBukhara status. becamea stronghold ofKokand. Russian militaryvictories were rapidly followed by loss Khanates –are manifold. Asian Central the and Kazakhs the Russia, between existed which conflicts and realitiessimplifying political andrelationships –thecomplexweb of alliances as warfare along straightforwardly ethnic and religious lines.The risks of over literature from modern CentralAsian states mistakenly present theconquest history of the conquestcanregress into jingoism, so too can post-independence 19 oases of themiddlepartsCentralAsia anditsurban centers, was oneofthe Imperial Russia’s expansion southwards, across the Kazakhsteppe, into the Drivers oftheTsarist Russian ExpansioninCentral Asia was completed only in1885. traditions.their tribal maintain theconquestofTurkmen Asaresult, territory expansion ofRussian Empire inCentralAsia after 1865 vigorously, seekingto In contrast to thepolitically divided khanates, the Turkmen tribes opposed the of Russian origin. gandacampaign, emphasising theneedto save between 8,000 and 60,000 slaves 38 37 36 35 34 33 33 (‘prisoedinenie’). ‘uniting’ in effort an as presented officially was erapre-Soviet the in empireTsarist the Soviet historiography from 1940s, the incorporation ofCentralAsian states into considerationsidentity toof imperial demographic pressures inside Russia. In the CentralAsian region rangefrom theeconomic toand from the geopolitical Tsaristthe forexplanations clear discern intoexpansionto equally difficult is It in southern Kazakhstan. 1864, Russian troops captured Auliye-Ata(), Chimkentand other places needs of theRussian textile industry, anditsneed for bothasecure domestic the- on specifically focusingmotives, economic to primacy give to tend erature in Englishalso inRussian. but sion in CentralAsia remain neglected and misunderstood, not only theliterature the Farhave East beenundertaken, theprincipalphasesofRussian expan while explorations oftheRussian conquestofthe Caucasusoritsexpansionin

th Ibid., Ibid., p.132. See above, note 3,p.131. of Central Asia,Vol. V., UNESCO Publishing,2003,p.344. Centraland “ I., Habib, Asia”, in Adle, Baipakovand I. C., Habib, Civilizationsof (eds.), History K. Ibid., p.153. ledge Curzon, 2003,pp.197-199. Geiss, P., Pre-Tsarist andTsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment andPolitical Order inChange, Rout- Ibid. century’s most rapid century’s dramaticand examples Yet, conquest. of imperial p. 135. 34 Thefinaldefeat ofKhanate ofKokand camein1875-6. 32 Military activity Military beganin earnestafter the Crimean war. In 38 33 39 In1865, GeneralChernyaev took Tashkent, avital More broadly,historians who rely onSoviet-eralit 36 37 As whilea result, modern Russian writing on the 35 - - - supply of raw materials and a captive market for Russian goods.40 Legacies of Division

Other scholars have focused on Russia’s geopolitical interests. It has been noted that establishing direct control over states in Central Asia strengthened Tsarist Russia’s position in response to an expanding British presence in the region.41 Yet other scholars argue that the Tsarist military may have sought to conquer Central Asia to re-establish prestige after the devastation of the Crimean War, providing 42 on national pride by the Crimean debacle”. h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 “a compensatory psychological need as balm for the wounds inflicted Nor can the domestic politics and internal dynamics of Russian society be ignored. In the wake of the conquest in Central Asia, the Russian Empire embarked on widespread reforms of its social structures, reshaping the judiciary, economy, polity and the agricultural system to more closely resemble a ‘European’ state. years earlier, in 1815, approximately 21 million of the 45 million people in Rus- siaRussia were was serfs, the ownedlast European as personal power property. to abolish43 The serfdom, abolition in 1861; of serfdom less than created fifty arable land to accommodate Slavic migrants.44 significant demographic pressures in fueled a search for vacant Another factor in imperial expansion was the undeniable tendency of Russian - ing and modernising mission in Central Asia.45 As a “great power” of the era, theimperial Russian officials Empire and was intellectuals driven to advance,to perceive expand themselves and annex as agents adjacent of a territo civilis- ries. This was even more the case when the people who populated these (par- ticularly in Asia) lands were seen as backward and in need of “imperial pro- tection and enlightenment”.46 In this conception, Tsarist Russia was a modern “European” imperial state with a great mission to be accomplished in an area dominated by “backward peoples” in need of elevation to the ranks of modern civilisation.47 Nothrop argues that, from the late 19th century onwards, imperial Russia’s claim to a “European” identity and a place among the world’s “civilised” nations came to be linked increasingly to the practice of empire-building and its self-proclaimed mission to modernize its imperial periphery, perhaps most vis- ibly in Central Asia. In effect, “the colonial space of served as a kindof civilizational laboratory, a place for thousands of Russian people to work out- who they were”.48

40 Ibid., p. 135. 41 Hopkirk, P., The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Kodansha America, 1994. 42 See above, note 4, p. 825. 43 Ibid. 44 See above, note 23, p. 33. 45 Morrison, A., “Peasant Settlers and the ‘Civilising Mission’ in , 1865–1917”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43(3), 2015, pp. 387- 417; Sahadeo, J., Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923, Indiana University Press, 2007, pp. 2-3, 10. 46 Bassin, M., Imperial Visions. Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian , 1840–1865, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 177. 47 See Morrison above, note 45, pp. 387- 417; see Sahadeo above, note 45, pp. 2-3 and 10. 15 48 See above, note 5, p. 6. 16 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST ers. warningit would that beunwise to transform rich herdsmen into poor farm- scholars considered the nomadiclifestyle tomost suited bethat to thesteppe, of theregion to settle,inthe 1930s. in localreligions andcultural matters intervene not did generallyTsarist officials and leaders, traditional their under ). of administered thereststeppe oftheKazakh (’skand Tajikistanand north-eastern partsof Turkmenistan). The GeneralGovernorate ate states (multi-ethnic comprising the territories of modern-day Uzbekistan, togethertwo with Russian , theBukharaEmirate andKhivaKhan - stan), , Samarkand, andTranscaspia (modern-day Turkmenistan) – regions ofmodernKyrgyzstan,and theTashkent area ofmodern-day Uzbeki- (southern and south-easternnorthern and central partsofmodern Kazakhstan, and Turkestan,Kazakhstan) comprising the provinces of , Semirech’e (correspondingand Semipalatinsk to modern-day northern, centraland eastern two GeneralGovernorates the Steppe, – consisting oftheprovinces ofAkmolinsk Following administrative reforms in 1898, Tsarist territories were divided into ance andthechancesfor frictionwithlocalsensibilities. administration operated,Russian asfardistance, hopingtoa aspossible,at minimisethecostofgovern The discern. to difficult is it territories, Asian Central If theRussian state hadamasterplanfor the administration ofitsnewly acquired 2 peti-tionof the19 differentmany factors.was It only not side-effect a oftheGreatPower com- reality,In theRussian conquestofCentralAsia was result a of theinterplay of 52 51 50 49 The newly conquered and annexed peoples inCentralAsia were designated the policywas implemented insome places, itwas onalimited scale. in theregion: thestate was wary ofpromotingalthoughsedentarisation, and Tsarist administrators did not tryto changethelifestyle of the nomadicpeoples dental in the flow of history. come of the development of Russian nor industrial capitalism; was ittheacci- the Tsarist empire cannotbeoverstated. the region, the significance of the conquest of states and lands in Central Asia by 54 53

53 parative ImperialStudies”inUyama,T. (ed.), Uyama,T. Relations “Mutual andPerceptions of Russians and CentralAsians: Preliminary Notes for Com See above, note 5,p.6. See above, note 19,map33;seeabove, note 29,p.127. See Morrisonabove, note 45, p.138. Ibid., p.23. Ibid., p.23. onization Studies, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2012, p.22. Indeed, it would bemore thanacenturytheSoviet Unionforced nomads 1916) Central UnderTsarist AsianSocieties Rule (1880s– 50 WithintheseGeneralGovernorates, remainedpopulation thelocal th century,as isgenerally argued; norwasthe inevitable it out- 49 Whatever thefactors driving Russian expansionin 54 Empire andAfter: EssaysinComparative Imperial andDecol 51 52 Russian ino- - - - rodtsy (aliens) – subjects, but not full citizens, of Russia.55 In one respect, this- Legacies of Division newly acquired Muslim population, as it was of non-Orthodox Christian or Jew- ishreflected subjects the in fact other that parts the ofTsarist its empire. regime Yet, was while uncertain the decision as to tothe label loyalty people of itsas inorodtsy – marking them out from Russian Orthodox Christian subjects – might appear condescending or derogatory, in reality, the term had multiple, alterna- tive and overlapping meanings. The term was used by Russian state in several ways: as a legal estate category designating various non-Russian (non-Ortho- dox Christian) minorities; as a means of assuring non-Russian peoples that they h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 - tain privileges, such as exemption from military service; and as an indicator of thecould “tribal” preserve origins their of local a people way of who life andwere traditional “different” status due toand their benefit under-devel from cer- oped status and so could not be assimilated into the category Russian.56

3 Tsarist Rule in Central Asia and Islam

The Tsarist “hands off” approach to governance in its Central Asian territories noted as stating during his reign as the -General of Turkestan (1867- 1882)extended that into Islam the should area of be religion. ignored Indeed, and that, one lacking official, state General support, von it Kaufman, would lose is ground.57

Before Russian expansion into Central Asia, Islam had experienced dark periods in the Russian territories, but starting in the late 18th century, the state’s atti- tude began to shift. Catherine the Great, seeking to bring all religious institutions under greater state control, gave the status of a tolerated minority and allowed the reopening of Muslim schools, and in 1788, the Russian state cre- ated the Muslim Spiritual Assembly.58 Yet the state response to Islam was not uniform: the Russian authorities distinguished between “steppe Islam”, seen as uncontrollable, the Islam of the , seen as more or less “preferable”, and the Islam of the Central Asian urban places, which was considered a “hotbed of fanaticism”.59

As a result of its conquest in Central Asia, by the end of the 19th century, Russia had some 20 million Muslim subjects, a larger Muslim population than that of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government treated this vast Muslim minor- ity within a non-Muslim imperial state with caution. Nonetheless, the Tsarist administration did not interfere in the religious life of the people over whom it claimed control.60 The Khiva Khanate and Bukhara Emirate, with their Muslim rulers, were not abolished but granted protectorate status. In the General Gov-

55 See above, note 29, p. 128. 56 Bhavna, D., Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power, Routledge, 2007, p. 39, citing Slocum, J., “Who, and when, were the inorodtsy? The evolution of the category of ‘aliens’ in Imperial Russia”, The Russian Review, 57(2), 1998, pp. 173–90. 57 See above, note 34, p. 210; See above, note 29, p. 126. 58 See above, note 29, p. 124. 59 Ibid. 17 60 See above, note 34, pp. 207-213. 18 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST were related, to agreater or lesser extent. colonisation were basicfeatures ofRussian history, to whichother features all CentralregardedAsia it Jadidism antidoteas an tofanaticism”. “Muslim (“” literally(“Jadid” was “New”) meaning born. In this environment of interaction, theMuslimreformist movement Jadidism enced thethinkingofregion’s Muslimintellectuals andreligious scholars. liberal ideas in Russian society – and thus into the Central Asian - influ- The establishment of Russian imperialinstitutionsandspread of modernist and controlrial in Central Asia ledto theintroductionideologies. ideas and ofnew “remote” approach to governance adopted by theTsarist regime –Russian impe- This interactionof two legalsystems was only oneway inwhich –despite the ment policy. govern with conflict not did they that extent the to (adat), law customary and tions: theRussianTsarist ImperialandIslamic. policyretained IslamicShari’a been granted “legalconfessional autonomy” andlived under to legaljurisdic By the turn of 20th century, Muslims throughout the Tsarist empire had officially Muslim institutions. manage to attempted and financed state however,the Steppe, the of ernorate ities adopted a policyof benign neglect inreligious affairs. In theGeneral Gov er-norate of Turkestan, withitslonghistory of urbanthe RussianIslam, author- 67 66 65 64 63 62 61 tion andimplementationofIslamiclaw. in practice,the Tsarist law imperial imposed some constraints on theinterpreta - ference” andallowed disputes to beresolvedcommunities, withinMuslim As the Russian historian Klyuchevskii noted in the19 Migration ical development oftheCentral Asiaregion. below,seen be rise ofJadidismwasthe to have polit the on impact significant a ditions. aimed to defend their indigenous Muslim culture byit to adapting modern con- Throughof Islam. education,increased literacy anduseofthemedia, had toMuslims acquire modern knowledge andthusreform theirunderstanding their ownconception –to reconcilemodernity.with Islam They believedthe that significantly in the last quarter of the 19th century, peaking in the 1910s, as large Cossack – inthe17th military settlements century. However, migration increased Asia region beganSteppeson theKazakh withsettlement –initially limited to

See above, note 16,p.25. See above, note 29,p.130. The PoliticsA., Khalid, Cultural ofMuslim Reform: Jadidism in CentralAsia, Oxford University Press, 2010. University, 2004,p.214-219. See for example, Devlet, N., Studies inthe Politics, andCulture History ofTurkic PeoplesYeditepe, Istanbul: See above, note 34,p.210-213. See above, note 29,p.128. See above, note 52,p.27;Seeabove, note 34,p.207-213. 65 WhiletheTsarist government was wary of Jadidism among Tatars, in ofRussian Settlers 62 However, while the state maintained an official position of “indif- However,of position official an maintained state the while 61 63 67 64 Russian migration into the Central Jadid intellectuals attempted in – th Century, migration and 66 Aswill - - - - groups of Russian peasants moved to the region.68 Legacies of Division

Mass migration of Russian peasants into the newly annexed Central Asian lands accelerated in the second half of the 19th century as state policy evolved from one of acquiescence to one of direct incentivisation of settlement. Following the abolition of in the 1860s, large numbers of peasants migrated - tion, but in 1889, a Resettlement Bill was enacted and the state began to actively encourageto the region. peasant At first, migration. the state In neither a bid toencouraged resolve the nor problems prevented of thesuch landless migra h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 former serfs in Russia, peasant families were offered plots of purportedly “unoc- cupied” land. 69 This offer triggered mass migration of Russian peasants into Central Asia, particularly to western and northern Kazakhstan, and later to cen- tral and southeastern parts of the country.70 In 1906, the state adopted Stolypin agrarian reforms and peasant resettlement became an imperial priority. 71

While the growth of native Kazakh population in the period 1897-1916 was rel- atively low, migration drove a massive increase in the size of the Russian pop- ulation. First Cossack, and then peasant, settlement transformed the demogra- phy, society and economy of the country.72 In Turgay region, for example, the Russian population increased ninefold (from 35 000 to over 300 000), while in Akmolinsk region the proportion of the population which was Russian increased from one third in 1897 to almost 60% in 1916.73 By 1914, Russians constituted between 30% and 40 % of the population of Kazakhstan.

Substantial groups of peasants came to other territories also, particularly to the valleys of Northern Kyrgyzstan. While Kazakhstan undoubtedly bore the brunt parts of the region, particularly the valleys of northern Kyrgyzstan. The Turke- stanof mass General immigration and receivedresettlement, some significant336,000 settlers groups from also European settled in Russia other in 1916 alone.74 In general, settlers received the best land: for example, at the

Kazakh and made available for the use of settlers. Later, as a result of end of the 19th century, 15.3 million hectares of fertile land was confiscated in- gether around 44 million hectares of fertile land (approximately 20% of the Stolypin’s agrarian reforms, the confiscation process75 This was led accelerated to the emergence and alto of landless class of Central Asians, fueling the ethnic tensions which would erupt inagricultural 1916. land) was confiscated in the region.

68 Aldashev G., and Guirkinger C., “Colonization and changing social structure: Evidence from Kazakhstan”, Journal of Development Economics, 2017, 127(1), p. 4. 69 Aldashev, G. and Guirkinger, C., “Deadly anchor: Gender under Russian colonization of Kazakhstan”, Explorations in Economic History, 49(4), 2012, p. 403. 70 Ibid. 71 See above, note 68. 72 Martin, V., Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs oaf the Middle Horde and Russian, Routledge, 2001, p. 2. 73 See above, note 68. 74 See above, note 29, p. 128. 75 Abdurakhimova, N. “Tsarist Russian and Central Asia”, in Adle, C. et al (eds.), History of Civilizations of 19 Central Asia, Vol: VI, UNESCO Publishing, 2005, pp. 134-135. 20 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST Russian Empire’s lands. tries which make upmodern-day CentralAsia) was of the themost“colonial” sponding tothe otherfourand Kazakhstan South-East and modernSouth coun- As Morrison has emphasized, from theTurkestan theoutset, region (corre- Colonisation UndertheTsars grantsfrom EuropeanRussia, moved tosupposedly settle lands. “unoccupied” century,the region colony hadbecomea ofSlavicpeasant-mi- as the settlement, Ukrainian andRussian-German settlers in thelate 19 Russian, then Cossacks, the first of migration The region. the in settled lations popu- Christian significant as Asia, Central in religion of practice the on impact large numbers of people from other parts of the Tsarist empire had a significant toaddition In of theregion,the ethnicconstitution changing themigrationof 1912, itproduced 64%ofallRussian cotton. cotton for plantation Russia”and increasingly turnedinto one-crop economy; by example,Turkestan, historyits long with of cotton cultivationhuge became “a nomic possibilitiesintheregion. Astheworldwide demandfor cotton grew, for of workers emerged inCentralAsian urban areas, inresponse to increasing eco migrationtook the earlyIn place. 20thcentury,predominantly a Russian class Alongside the active resettlement of peasants, more regular forms of economic 80 79 78 77 76 a civilizing mission. As oneauthornotes, “[t]The distancecreated between Rus- edly the case that Tsarist Russia sought to define itself as an outside power, with The Tsaristperiod colonial had bothpositive andnegative effects.is undoubt It ers) approved ofby theTsarist regime –suchastheRussian ‘Staroveriy’ (old-believ communities, while thedeportationofadherents offorms of Christianity dis statesthe Baltic led toof theestablishment other Christian – notably Catholic deportation into theregion ofgroups ofPoles, andpeoplefrom brought hundreds of thousands of Orthodox Christians to theregion. The forced tion intheState Duma. under effectively remained region civilian courts,zemstva (provincial elected assemblies) nor, the later,representa full - large, and By military1917. Unlike ruleuntil otherregions, itwas notgranted Georgians. independent and mans, sively,non-native, mainly ethnicRussians, togetherUkrainians, with Ger Baltic erals.These Governors and theirstaffwere predominantly, thoughexclu not series of special statutes gavethat considerableautonomy to itsGovernor-Gen of ImperialandCommonwealth, 43(3),2015,pp. 387- 417. History “PeasantMorrison, A., and the‘CivilisingSettlers Mission’in Russian Turkestan,1865–1917”, Russian and Eurasian, V.13, History Spring2012,pp.327-64. Morrison, A., “Metropole, Colony,Citizenship andImperial in theRussian Empire”, Kritika: Explorations in Empires andEncounters, andLondon:Bloomsbury, 2015,p.129. in Cvetkovski, Law” hammadan V. R.,andBarth (eds.),CooperationImperial and Transfer, 1870–1930: Morrison, “CreatingA., Shari‘a forColonial a Russian Turkestan: CountPahlen,the Hidaya and Anglo-Mu history/etno/staro/. For more information, see: http://mu-pankratov.livejournal.com/271291.html and http://kungrad.com/ See above, note 29,p.128. 77 –alsoledto theestablishmentofminorityChristiansects. 79 78 Afurther keyfeature colonial by the late is that, 19th It was It governed byadministrators military undera 76 th andearly 20 th centuries The Journal The 80 ------sia and Central Asia was therefore functional to the depiction of itself as higher, Legacies of Division better, more civilised, progressive and, most of all, European state”.81 It is clear that a number of positive impacts can be traced to this civilising mission: greater 82; the development of more effective agricul- tural techniques;83 the introduction of railroads; greater urbanization;84 and the securityexpansion and of aformal reduction education. in conflict85

Nevertheless, by every meaningful criterion, Central Asia under the Tsars was a 86 colony, politically and culturally subordinated to the Russian metropole. Tsa- h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 composition of the modern Central Asian states. First, and most obviously, in Kazakhstanrist colonial inpolicy particular, had significant but also long-termelsewhere impacts in the region, on the itethnic resulted and in religious a huge of the Tsarist empire. This in turn transformed both the ethnic and religious make-upinflux of ofethnic the region. Russian Moreover, settlers, theand Tsarist settlers colonial and deportees approach from entailed other the parts seg- regation of society, with Orthodox ethnic Russians cast as superior to indigenous - izens of the empire, resulting in the allocation of the most productive lands to migrantsMuslims, whofrom were other classified parts of as the ‘inorodsty’ empire. This (aliens), in turn “subjects” sowed butthe notseeds equal of citthe struggle for autonomy which unfolded from 1916 onwards.

4 The 1916 Rebellion and its Suppression

In the summer of 1916, a widespread rebellion against the Russian colonial regime erupted in the region. While the proximate cause of the uprising was a decree conscripting men to serve in the Tsarist army during World War One, it also had roots in colonial policies, in particular the seizure and resettlement of fertile lands.87 Beginning in and regions (in modern-day Tajik- istan and Uzbekistan respectively), the rebellion spread to the Semirechie region which today spans southeast Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan88 and, in due course, also to the Turghai region in the northern , the Ferghana region and some Turkmen areas.89

The rebellion was brutally suppressed, with more an estimated 150,000 people - ple call the Urkun, or exodus. According to Morrison: dying and 300,000 fleeing from Kyrgyzstan alone, in what the Kyrgyzstani peo

81 See above, note 4, p. 829. 82 See above, note 29, p. 129. 83 See above, note 68. 84 See above, note 29, p. 129. 85 See above, note 16, p. 24. 86 See above, note 78, pp. 128-129. 87 Morrison, A., ‘Central Asia: Interpreting and Remembering the 1916 Revolt’, Eurasianet, October 2016, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80931. 88 Ibid. 89 National Digital History of Kazakhstan, “1916 Uprising”, National Digital History of Kazakhstan, Septem- 21 ber 2014, available at: http://e-history.kz/ru/contents/view/287. 22 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST seen askey. questions andthewithdrawalof land settlement of Russian troops were also economic matters, aswellas inlegal, cultural, religiousand educational affairs; ize their own parliament and executive, and independence in local financial and ical autonomy”, something which was understood to meanfreedom to organ- and Khiva sought to preserve theirindependentstatus. were both established,while the already semi-independent khanates Bukhara ‘Alash ’ government andtheautonomous,Kokand multi-ethnic government religious,political, culturalrights. During thisperiod, the autonomous Kazakh ous groups inCentralAsia sought to achieve autonomyrecognition and oftheir For four years,immediatelystarting after theFebruary 1917 Revolution,vari - to thosewishingto press for independenceintheregion. control, revolutions thetwin of 1917 presented an unprecedented opportunity ry”. Russo-centrism, oftheempire,and thecollapse inthecourse of onlycentu- a half tive system anditsreforms, attemptsmodernization, at native revolts, a rise of toCentral colonization, creation Asia “experienced of theadministra conquest, - unlikehas beennotedIt that, other states and regions which have beensubjected 5 in thefollowing years, astheTsarist empire collapsed. helped to lay thefoundations for efforts to secure autonomy andindependence ars. Irrespective of its causes however, therebellion andthestate’s response The 1916 rebellionand itssuppression sourceis a ofcontroversyschol- amongst 94 93 92 91 90 7, 1917, theProvisionalApril On Government replaced theTsarist Governor federated Russia”. the Russianwithin state, orseeking““geographicalautonomy” looselya within approaches toachieving greater independence: seeking “culturalautonomy” was held inMoscowin May delegates 1917, with discussing two alternative Congress Muslim pan-Russian first FebruaryRevolution,the the to response In

91 Ibid., p.38. Ibid. See above, note 2,pp.30-32. See above, note 52,p.28. See above, note 87. Indeed, within fifty years of most parts of the region coming under Tsaristunder regioncoming the of parts yearsmost fifty of within Indeed, The Struggle Autonomy for (1917-1920) impose what would have beenasystem ofapartheid. Kuropatkinto mountainouseffect, In areas nearNaryn. wanted to theland in region around -Kul, with Kyrgyz forciblyrelocated an ethnically-cleansedating zone for Russian settlement onthe best for settlement “wherever Russian blood was shed.” Heproposed cre- sey Kuropatkin, issuedanotorious decree that land was to beseized theIn aftermath ofthe Turkestan’s revolt, governorgeneral, Alek 94 93 The majority of the participants voted The majority oftheparticipants infavor of “geograph- 92 90 - Legacies of Division Muslims.95 At the same time, however, Russian communists established the withso-called a Provisional Tashkent Executive Soviet. Two Committee, rival – but made both upRussian-led of five Russians – governments and four werelocal operating in parallel. In reaction to this situation, the First Congress of Central - cow Conference: “geographical autonomy”.96 Asian Muslims, was convened, confirming the primary aim agreed at the Mos Following the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, the Tashkent Soviet for- cibly removed the Provisional Government and declared Soviet power through- h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 out Central Asia. Furthermore, the Russian-led Soviet rejected a proposal from the Third Congress of Central Asian Muslims to form a regional council.97 Even in the environment of an egalitarian revolution, Russian workers denied equality to Central Asians. The Military continued as the ultimate arbiter of relations.98

Central Asian Muslims was convened in the of Kokand and the Government ofIn responseAutonomous to the Turkestan seizure of (Turkeston power by the Mukhtoriyati) Soviet in Tashkent, – centred the in first Kokand Congress – was of was announced and implemented in Central Asia.99 The founders of the Auton- established.omy called for For wide-ranting the first time, powers, the idea but of not a democratic full independence. parliamentary The Autonomy republic and education, while reserving issues of defence, monetary policy, customs, and foreigndeclared relations its independence remained toin theall internalcentral Russian affairs, authorities.including finance, Despite law, its rootsjustice, in the Congress of Muslims, the Autonomy was multi-ethnic and broadly secular: one third of the seats in the legislature were allocated to non-Muslims, while the executive committee had representatives from various ethnic groups;100 and - gion.101 while Sharia law was recognised, Islam was not recognized as the official reli The Autonomy was short-lived, however: lacking allies and resources, it was vul- nerable militarily. By February 1918, the Tashkent Soviet and the had defeated the regime, resulting in an estimated 14,000 deaths, and devastation of Kokand itself.102

Elsewhere in the region, ethnic Kazakhs also made moves for greater autonomy, convening a series congresses in the wake of the . In Decem- ber, the Third Kazakh Congress in Orenburg proclaimed an autonomous gov- ernment under the leadership of the Alash Party. Over the next six months, the “Alash Orda” government existed largely on paper, as most territory was under Bolshevik rule, but in June 1918, the group successfully expelled the

95 Roudik, P., The History of the Central Asian Republics, Greenwood Press, 2007, p. 93. 96 See above, note 2, pp. 33-34. 97 Ibid., p. 30. 98 See Sahadeo above, note 45, p. 2. 99 See above, note 95, p. 99. 100 See above, note 2, p. 38. 101 See above, note 95, p. 99. 23 102 Ibid., p. 100. 24 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST abandoning politicsaltogether. ceased to resist theBolsheviks,some membersjoiningSoviets with others and Bolshevik for call cooperation. By 1920 the AlashOrda government had ing greater autonomy. By 1919 many Jadids were responding positively to the land resettlement were factors inlocalsupportfor thecentral Soviet regime. and theTashkent Soviet over the handlingof the 1916 rebellion andissues of of that theunpopularity both thepreviousalso notable Provisional Government native ruralof war,died because population starvation”.epidemics, and tion, citingestimates“between that 1917 and 1920, one-fourthalmost of the popula the on conflict the of impact the highlights Roudik region. the in elites offactorsnumber A drove thismove from resistance to cooperationthe among al. Jadids and Jadidism-inspired intellectuals,were attracted by theBolshevik ide tially consideredphenomenon, some an “alien” groups intheregion, particularly toto appeal the“oppressed” peoplesoftheregion. Although Bolshevism was ini- keyA means. military strategy for Bolshevik the PetersburgleadershipSt in was Unlike the Kokand Autonomy, theAlashOrda was notdefeated primarily through and courtsannouncedthatitwould collecttaxes. fromThe regime Semipalatinsk. declaredgovernment,military a councils local 103 Tsars,butalso from theProvisional Government andtheTashkent Soviet. strateit had“liberated” that theregion, thusdifferentiatingitself from the should alsobenotedIt the central that Soviet government wanted to demon 104 105 106 107 108 109 Indeed, according to Slezkine: freedom of Muslims to practice Islam” Declarationpromising right “the ofpeople(nations)Russia to secede and the 104

International Contexts, Routledge, 2012,p.278. and theRussianment Legacy”,Imperial inUyama,T. Russia: (ed.),Asiatic ImperialPowerin Regional and Uyama,T. Orda’s“The Alash RelationsSiberia, theUrals with and Turkestan: MoveNational The Kazakh - Re-thinking the 1916UprisinginCentral 2017,p.151. Asia,Neo-Print, Morrison, Alexander, ‘Refugees, Rehabilitationand theRevolutionary Violence after 1916 Uprisings’, in age&q=ко%20всем%20трудящимся%20мусульманам%20россии%20и%20востока&f=f at: available R87023MW0&hl=kk&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjUnaaS48rUAhWhFZoKHeyPBFs4ChDoAQhGMAU#v=onep 113, - p. 1957, Moscow, имся+мусульманам+россии+и+востока&source=bl&ots=-2rJXk4ou_&sig=Xmbb_lvP2tboF9DewX V:1, 1918), 1917-March https://books.google.kz/books?id=rZrQDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=ко+всем+трудящ (October Documents Official Soviet Seeabove, note 103,pp.282-283. See above, note 95,p.95. and Stalin, Oxford University Press, 2001,pp.71-80. See above, note 104. rialism”, in Suny,T. GandMartin, (eds.), See for example, Martin, T. “An Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Impe - Aseries of pronouncements – includinginparticulartheNovember 1917 and [the] of compensatorywas ‘nation-building’ policy a spec ism formed thecon-ceptual foundationtheof Soviet Union evergood of took, (‘oppressed-nations’) histheory national- wasrights’ theof one uncompromisingmost positions he acceptanceLenin’s the of nations and‘national of reality 106 A StateA Nations. Empire of in the andNation-Making Age Lenin of 105 –appealeddirectly to those favour- 103 alse. - 107 It is It 108 109 - - - -

tacularly successful attempt at a state-sponsored conflation Legacies of Division of language, ‘culture,’ territory and quota-fed bureaucracy.110

Thus, both Jadids and Kazakh Alash-Orda activists “joined” with the Bolsheviks as a way to alleviate the hardships of the population. Though not sharing the regime’safter Lenin ultimate announced aims, an the “Affirmative Jadids in particular Action Nationality cooperated Policy” to pursue which thethey com saw- mon aim to reform the Central Asian societies.111 h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 Nevertheless, despite the growth of domestic support for the central Soviet regime, the Red Army did not cease military activities. In September 1920, the Red Army captured Bukhara, ending the sovereignty of Bukharan Emirate, and it was only at the end of 1923 that the Soviet regime could exert control over the whole region. Even then, sporadic resistance to Soviet rule continued until 1928.112

6 Soviet Rule in Central Asia (1920-1991)

The Soviet period in Central Asian history can be seen as a period of grand “social engineering” projects undertaken by a Soviet regime aiming to create a new type of “modern people” and “modern society” in the region. This was true in par- ticular during the period from the mid-1920s until the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, an era which saw massive state and campaigns with the ambition of building a new kind of civilisation in Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet Union.113 Indeed, as Khalid points out, under Soviet rule, the region underwent one of the most radical transitions to modernity anywhere in the world.114 The modernising project which drove this transition can be seen as having four key pillars: 1) Soviet nationality policy and the of the region; 2) Soviet cultural policy, including state atheism; 3) sed- entarization and collectivization; 4) industrialization and urbanization. coupled with mass migration from other parts of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Nationality Policy

Unlike other European empires, the Tsarist empire did not collapse, but rather evolved – after 1923 – under a different ideology. One central means by which the Soviet regime was able to preserve the territory of the former Russian Empire was through introducing the concepts of “nationality” (by way of the census) and later “national republics” (through the cartographic division of the region).

110 Slezkine, Y. “The USSR as communal apartment, or how a promoted ethnic particularism”, Slavic Review 53, 2, Summer 1994, p. 414. 111 Khaled, A., The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia, The Regents of the California University, 1999, pp. 289-295. 112 See above, note 19, map 36. 113 See above, note 5, p. 8 114 Khalid, A., “Being Muslim in , or an Alternative History of Muslim Modernity”, Journal of 25 the Canadian Historical Association / Revue de la Société historique du Canada, 18(2), 2007, pp. 123-143. 26 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST res”. education, inter- ethnicrelations, ofpartyandstate andtheappointment cad- questions ofdevelopinging controllingand culturesnational languages, and (ethnic) identity throughnational “central policies relatingto ethnicity, includ- tursunov modernKazakhgrammar. modern Tajikgrammar, Abdurrauf Fitratmodern Uzbekgrammar,Bay Akhmet literature,languages, artsand culture. For example,Sadreddin Ayni formed the spired intellectualsplayed rolecrucial a in developing modern Central Asian 115 Soviet authoritiesembarked ontheunprecedentedpoliti- policyofestablishing power,the consolidating After period. strategy action” “affirmative the during the boundaries between them –was akey elementof Sovietpolicy nationality – theprocessdelimitation National entities and political of establishingnational National Delimitation non-Russian native intelligentsia)toand gainground innon-Russian territories. in theeyes ofnon-Russian subjectsofformer Russian Empire (particularly the “affirmative an legitimacy a find to policy adopted nationality their of stage Bolsheviks first the in strategyaction” the words, other In opposition. tralizedneu- peacefully 1920s of half of first the during and Asia Central over control can bearguedIt through that policy theBolsheviks itsnationality gained full identity.national as such,itattracted many CentralAsian intellectuals interested indeveloping and affirmative,essentially was period first its during Policy Nationality Soviet distinctive feature oftheSoviet system. origin, which wasSovietconceptualized in tocame a be terms“nationality” as wasthat established ontheruinsofRussian Empire. therolefact, In ofethnic differentreligiousethnic and groupskeya became – issuefor theSovietregime Thus, relationsbetween Russians andnon-Russians -andingeneralthe rights of According to Hirsch,inthe1920s: 116 117 119 118

Hirsch, F., Empire ofNations.Ethnographic Knowledge andtheMakingofSoviet Union,2005,p.146. 1. Republicsof National The Establishment A., Haugen, Sovietin Central PalgraveAsia, 2003, p. Macmillan, Empire russe,Unionsoviétique, États indépendants,40(1)-(2), p.125. Blitstein, P.A., “Researching Stalin’spolicy inthearchives”, nationality Cahiers du monde russe: Russie, Central AsianSurvey, 18(1),1999. 20th centuryinsearchprospectsand identity ofnational oftheculturalsurvival people”,of theKazakh 2007, p. 81;Kendirbaeva,G., “We are childrenintelligentsiaThe Kazakh ofAlash. of the the beginning at See for example,Bergne, P., TheBirth ofTajikistan: andthe Originsofthe National RepublicIdentity , Tauris, Seeabove, note 114, 117 and society. nationally categorizedassimilation of groups into theSoviet state diverse categories peoples into nationality and,simultaneously, the cess that mightbecalled “double assimilation”: the assimilation of [The Soviet regime used]the census andthe map to facilitate apro- 118 115 pp.129-131. Thus,throughout the1920s, many Jadids or Jadidism-in 119 116 Thestate pursuedthedevelopmentof - - cal-administrative entities based on ethnicity, leading scholars to argue that the Legacies of Division Soviet Union was thus a maker of “nations”.120 Slezkine emphasises that “the Bol- - ism, classify all citizens according to their biological nationalities and formally sheviks appeared to be the first state to institutionalise ethnoterritorial federal121

Theprescribed national preferential delimitation treatment policy established of certain ethnically the Soviet defined federal populations”. state as “a qua- si- of national Soviet republics named after their respective predom- 122 inant population groups”. Crucially, in Central Asia, this approach ignored h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 the reality that, for centuries, diverse ethnic groups had lived as interdepend- ent (nomadic and sedentary) and intermingled (Turkic and Persian-speaking or speaking different but related dialects of either Turkic or Persian languages) communities. Until national delimitation, in much of Central Asia – with the notable exceptions of the steppe and desert areas populated by nomadic Kazakh and Turkmen ethnic groups respectively – the population was mixed in terms of language, culture and ethnic-tribal origin123 Throughout the Transoxania (an area which roughly corresponds with modern-day Uzbekistan, the eastern parts of Turkmenistan, southern Kazakhstan and the western parts of Tajikistan), par- language groups within mixed communities.124 Indeed, before national delimita- ticularly in its urban and suburban areas, it was difficult to separate ethnic and- lim” – or local – tribal.125 tion, the major markers of self-identification were either supra-ethnic – “Mus National delimitation did not begin immediately. Following the consolidation

(renamed Khorezm in 1920) and Bukhara continued to exist as autonomous entitiesof power – inPeople’s the region, Republics the Bolsheviks– until 1924. made The few former significant Tsarist changes. region Turke- Khiva stan was organized into the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The Kirgiz (Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was created in August 1920, though it was later renamed the Kazakh126 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.127 In December 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lics (USSR)was established, with the Turkestan and Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSRs included as parts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

Between 1924 and 1936, the region was reorganised, along ethnic lines, in what

120 Including, for example Terry Martin, Ronald G. Suny, Yuri Slezkine and Adrienne Edgar. 121 See above, note 110, pp. 414-415. 122 See above, note 116, p. 1. 123 Edgar, A. “Identities, Communities, and Nations in Central Asia: A Historical Perspective”, Presentation at a panel discussion held at the University of California, Berkeley, October 29, 2001, p. 2. 124 Ibid, p. 2-3. 125 See for example, Shahrani, N. “From Tribe to Umma’: Comments on the Dynamics of Identity in Muslim Soviet Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, 3, 1984, p. 29. 126 Qazaq was a self-appellation which was not recognized by the Tsarist or early Soviet administrations. Thus, before theIt was 1920s not alluntil Kazakhs 1925 thatwere Kazakhs referred were to as differentiated “Kirgiz”, while officially the people from known the Kyrgyz. today Kazakhas Kyrgyz or were called “Kara-Kirgiz” or Dikokomenniy Kirgiz (wild-mountain Kirgiz), see for example, Chokan V., Master’s Thesis, Ankara, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, 2004, p. 4. 27 127 See above, note 19, map 37. 28 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST local intelligentsia.local developedof the of asizeablepart least theguidanceandassentofat with implemented. out theSoviet Union, andindeed CentralAsia was region thelast where itwas ethnic lineswasalong delimitation National strategy a implemented through- groups these group, defined largely byethnic language. titular a with identified was SSRs five the of Each Asia which we know today largely cameinto beingbetween 1924 and 1936. or delineated. understood defined, consistently not were groups these and others, many and ethnic groups,, Uzbeks, including ,Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Turcomans more and of host of regionwascomposed the in population Beforethe diversefluid. delimitation, more – different was self-identification ethnic and ritories Soviet delimitation,noethnic or nameswere national national attached to ter SSR. the Turkmen SSR,theUzbekTajikSSR, theKyrgyz SSR andtheKazakh werecreated:(SSRs)Republicsfive Socialist SovietThen, were ASSR abolished. heterogeneous KhorezmianBukharaand People’s RepublicsTurkestanthe and was termed(natsional’noe razmezhevaniedelimitation thenational ). Ethnically 128 purelySoviet a invention and imposition. it would bewrong tomodern conclude that Centralwere Asian“nationalities” corresponding their and trans-culturalthe multi-ethnic, challenged “nationalities” states history oftheregion, five the of creation the while words, other In local people.AsMorrisonhasargued: This explanationtends to ignorerole the elitesof local expectationsthe and of established states five the that throughdelimitation were national simply conclude constructsimposed from outside. to simplistic too is it Nevertheless, 129 130 131 132 133

The

See above, note 116,p.2. Series, May, p.2. A. “TheRootsKhalid, in theEarly of Uzbekistan: NationMaking Soviet Union”, CAP Papers 167, CERIA Ibid. 2017 Morrison, A., “Stalin’s GiantPencil: DebunkingaMythAboutCentral Asia’ s Borders” 1995, pp.225–41. Sabol, Ethnictions or one people? consciousness Sovietamong CentralAsians”, Survey, See above, note 131. 128

Inaddition, theKarakalpakASSR was created.of Central Thus,themap ‘Divide and rule’ thesis is evoked in many works, including for example: Bennigsen,A.“Several na- stan. importantly the JadidsinUzbekistan andthe Alash Orda inKazakh - local between nationalistintellectuals and theSoviet state – most grewnew nationalunits oftenan of out uneasy political alliance in Central Asiawas fragile,localand badly inneedof allies (…) organizationParty inMoscow. Inthethe 1920s Soviet regime [Delimitation] was not atop-down process driven by the Central . S., “The creation of Soviet Central Asia:the1924 delimitation”,national Central Asian Survey, 14(2), 131 130 129 In Central In Asia however, thiswasseismic a shift: before the 133 Haugen points out that, “in most cases, the new bordersmost cases,thenew “in of that, Haugenpointsout 132 In reality,In werethese nationalities - 24(3), 1979, 51– pp. , Eurasianet, February 64; - Central Asia were the result of real discussions and negotiations that involved Legacies of Division members of the various Central Asian population groups as well as representa- tives of the central Soviet authorities”.134 Hirsch concludes that:

[T]here is significant evidence that the delimitation was not just Moscow-driven but was in large part a collaborative effort between Moscow-based leaders and local (national) communist elites from former Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm who had made common

cause with the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s. Many local commu- h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 nists—and the Jadids in particular—saw “the nation” as a means for promoting economic and cultural modernization. Some of them helped shape the national delimitation of 1924 through their participation in the Territorial Committee of the Central Asian Bureau…135

Ideas of the nation and nationalism had arrived in Central Asia before the Novem- ber Revolution and consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia; indeed, such ideas were central to the worldview of the Jadids.136 Moreover, as Haugen notes, “although the designations such as ‘Uzbek’ or ‘Turkmen’, and so on, did not hold any prominent position in Central Asian society by the end of the 19th century, it does not necessarily imply that the entities established with those names 25 137

Crucially,years later Haugen were artificial goes on constructs”.to note that the SSRs created through national delim- itation “corresponded to the historical and social realities of Central Asia to a much greater extent than has usually been recognized” largely because of the role of Central Asian actors.138 Morrison goes further, arguing that delimitation was primarily a response to local demand:

[Delimitation was] a response to the strength of nationalist move- ments that had emerged in many parts of the former Russian empire during the period of the revolution and civil war. It led to a sincere, if perhaps misguided attempt to create nation-states where none had existed before, and this in turn was because both Lenin and Sta- lin believed that ‘backward peoples’ could never attain socialism unless it came within a nationalist framework.139

Yet concluding that delimitation was not simply an imposition from above is not equivalent to ignoring its negative impacts. In particular, the policy of engag- - ing with elites and the intelligentsia, and the desire to reflect popular nation alist movements gave the process a majoritarian impetus. Significant groups of

134 See above, note 116, p. 237. 135 See above, note 115, p. 162. 136 See above, note 114, p. 134. 137 See above, note 116, pp. 237-238. 138 Ibid., p. 237. 29 139 See above, note 131. 30 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST delimitation was,delimitation ultimately, intended toprogram furtherthe of state-spon traditionalbonds and reorganizing tribal peopleintothe ethnic nationalities, Soviet SocialistRepublics –inorder to legitimise itscontrol. Bythe eliminating nate traditionalloyalties by creatingloyalitiesnew – to nationsestablishedas 140 develop their own distinctcultures,only but withinthe Soviet framework. message of gular . Different Sovietwere “nationalities” allowed to Thus, theSoviet policyacceptedforms theuseof“national” to promotesin- a Soveticus” withoutany attachmentto theparticular ethnicityandreligion. citizens to thelevelgiven,unquestionable of an aimed toalso it create“Homo a tradictory – aim.Thus, while theSoviet regime elevated the ethnicidentityof its nic) identities, theSovietpolicy pursued a second nationality – apparently con- Alongside delimitationandthecreationthe pursuitof national (eth- of national Policy andtheNationality Creation of‘HomoSoveticus’ as Samarkand, Bukhara, OshandKhujand. long lived alongside each other, andinmulti-ethniccities and urban areas such regions such as thesouthof the Kyrgyz SSR, where ethno-linguisticgroups had remainedindigenous “minorities” each republic, within particularly inborder 141 142 144 143 145 146 dissent on territories, divergent interpretations of the culturalheritage” Thus, the Soviet state “accepted inner-Sovietcontradictions nationalist and own people. native couldspread language, their ideas among and anti-capitalist anti-clerical believedhis colleagues Lenin and only that native teachers cadres,and usingthe promote culturaland ethnic‘samobytnost’ (uniqueness and ). Indeed, policy withthelong-termality aim of creating “Homo Soveticus” could also Despite this apparent contradiction, the regime did not see any conflict: a nation- ernization”. ethnic-based entities“asaway of achieving centralization andsocialistmod a meansto anend.Ultimately, theSoviet regime sawof such the establishment

Post-Soviet Identities, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2011,pp.162-166. Abashin, S.,“Nation-constructioninpost-Soviet CentralAsia”, inBassin,M.andKelly, C. (eds), See above, note 116,p.235. See above, note 110,pp.417-418. Co, 2001,p.20. in Fragner,“‘Soviet B.G., Nationalism’:Legacy AnIdeological to theIndependent Republicsof Central Asia”, Ibid., Ibid., See above, note 116,p.234. inCentralIdentity Asia andthe Muslim World p.418. path ofCommunism. paraphrased as “only the mother tongue can trulysetpeople on the of Ilminskiy, oneoftheRussian leading missionaries, which can be inform [diverse languages].sity Soviet state adopted the method [T]he surestcontent in way to unity [communist ideals]was diver pp. 14and20. 146 142 In another important sense, Inanotherimportant the Soviet regime needed to elimi- Slezkineargues thatLeninbelieved that: 143 140 , Schendel.W, andZurcher, E.(eds), N.Y.: Tauris & - Soviet and 141 145

as 144 - - sored evolution.147 Nevertheless, the essential contradiction at the heart of Legacies of Division Soviet policy cannot be ignored. On the one hand, there were serious efforts to establish ethno-federalism through indigenization (‘korennizatsiya’) and invest- ment in native . On the other, there was a consistent drive to get the different “nations” to assimilate – particularly through “language Rus- ofsification” Soviet policy, – and particularly even eventually in the to 1920s, merge148 (“sliyaniye”) others emphasize after drawing the assimilatory together 149 (“sblijeniye”). While some scholars focusAccording on the “affirmative” to Gorenburg, action this strategycontra- h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 diction between “acknowledgement of national self-determination” and “aims natureto ensure (Russification) gradual drawing of Soviet together policy. of nations for the purpose of their even- tual merger” drove nationality policy throughout seventy years.150 Others have self-determination position, and a more authoritarian, assimilatory one.151 compared nationality policy to a pendulum, swinging between the affirmative, Nationality Policy, Kinship and Clan ideal were undermined by the persistence of traditional kinship relations, which didSoviet not efforts fade under to foster the both Soviet ethno-national regime. While identities national and delimitation affiliation toand the its Soviet pro- motion of ethnic identity (and the Soviet social engineering projects discussed below) were designed to discredit and replace traditional notions of collective identity, “sub-ethnic” identities not only survived, but were in some respects strengthened.

In some ways, traditional kin networks served to counteract the alienat- ing effects of the bureaucratic state,152 while the more colonial elements of Soviet rule reinforced traditional kin and clan identities and networks.153 As Schatz explains, Soviet campaigns to root out traditional practices – including – from legitimate public space gave the people reason to bonds of kinship which were, of their nature, easily concealed.154 Moreo- hidever, underground their affiliations: kin networks Soviet attemptsprovided toa means refashion of accessing society strengthenedscarce goods in the all-pervasive ‘gray market’ that developed under Soviet regime.155

In addition to these unintended consequences of Soviet policies, Moscow’s indi-

147 See above, note 115, p. 164. 148 See for example, above note 109 and above note 110. 149 See for example, Gorenburg, D. “Soviet Nationalities Policy and Assimilation”, in Arel, D., Ruble, B. et al (eds), Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and , Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp. 273-304. 150 Ibid., pp. 301-2. 151 Shcherbak, A. et al, “History of the Soviet national policy: Swing of the pendulum”, Politicheskaya Nauka, 1, 2016, pp. 100-109. 152 Akiner, S., The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p. 53, in Spehr, S. & Kassenova, N., Kazakhstan: constructing identity in a post-Soviet society, Asian Ethnicity, 13:2, 2012, p. 136. 153 Collins, K., Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.46 154 See above, note 23, p.xxii, 14. 31 155 Ibid., p.xxiii, 19. 32 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST 159 160 Soviet state. center within which “favored” clanscouldinteract withandmanipulate the networked into their respectivegovernment clans, institutionsbecameapower could easily favourCentralSince local theirkin. Asian ‘elites’ were extensively administrativein local appointments organs were overseen byelites, local who gious orpolitical. or denigratingeliminating alternative ideas,whether traditional,cultural, reli - used asameansto promote andentrench ideology,byin particular including the educationsystem with the promotion of Communist ideology. Education was The Soviet CulturalRevolution coupled thedevelopment of massliteracy and The Soviet “” rect ruleinCentralAsia served topowerbases.clan institutionalise 156 cipation of women. purgingof native elites, thereplacementevenand of alphabets theeman- were many andvaried, rangingfrom thepromotion ofstate atheismto the The manifestations oftheculturalrevolution ushered inby theSoviet regime early decree,the Separation of23January1918, “On ofChurch from State and promoted theideaofasecular,not atheisticor anti-religious but state. While,an In theimmediate aftermath oftheNovember 1917 Revolution,the Bolsheviks Religion Underthe Soviet Regime bonds traditions, cultural and and institutions,inorder to social increaseto commitment theSoviet ideology. of influence the disrupt to designed icy 158 157

University Press, 1979. Abazov, R.,Culture andCustoms oftheCentral AsianRepublics, Greenwood Press, 2007,p. 45. See above, note 109,p.155.

See for example,Fitzpatrick, S., Ibid., See above, note 153,pp.96-98. p.99. differences indigenous populationsandRussians. between consolidating the by Soviet attempting identity to reduce the social Second, the Sovietization addressed policy aperceived obstacle to society. Sovietized totally a of aim their reflect to society of zation toriesnew forms and theand art), modern of social organi‘new’ - his- “scientific” written (including setting cultural new the system, theirof ruletheSoviet authorities carefully crafted theeducation throughout theof ble part Soviet the First, nation. seven decades strengthen andgraduallythe Soviet makeidentity an insepara it - that dimensions were etizationtwo had policy intended to further identity. Thecultural and socialchanges introduced by the Sovi- cultures andthecreation a newSoviet of culture andnewSoviet the[A]t centerSoviet of policies was thedismantling traditional of 157 158 AsAbazov hasnoted: 160 In all cases however, Inall thecommon thread was apol- Education intheSoviet 1921–1934 andSocialMobility Union 159 156 Many key , Cambridge School from Church”, proclaimed Soviet Russia a and abolished the Legacies of Division privileged role of the ,161 in these years, the Bolsheviks were largely pragmatic in their policy on religion.

This policy of pragmatism was particularly true towards , with the new authorities fearing that any perception of anti-Islamic policy in - ity.162 Indeed, Islam was even considered as an anti-imperialist bulwark, with the region could only alienate the population from the fledgling Soviet author h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 an oppressed and colonized people.163 At the same time, the Bolshevik strategy someof co-opting Communist the Jadids leaders and finding other Centralsympathy Asian for intellectuals what they saw to foster as a religion their own of aims in the region necessitated a degree of acceptance of Islam.164 religion turned towards the aggressive promotion of state atheism. The regime directedHowever, its within policy a towards decade the of theeventual Revolution, construction the official of a society Soviet discoursebased purely on on the atheistic notions of . Religion was presented as a threat to the Soviet state, indeed to the very foundations of Soviet ideology.165 A push to root out religion from both the public and private lives of Soviet citizens determined state-religion relations.

Starting in the mid-1920s, the initially relaxed – or at least lukewarm – attitude to Islam was abandoned, and the state began what amounted to a crusade against the faith. The authorities argued that Islam was “the most serious obstacle” to - tional, juridical and social institutions. The regime pursued a policy of totalelim- inatingsocialist the modernisation role of Islam in and the used public this sphere, as justification and interfering to close with Islamic private educabeliefs and practices, through the pursuit of an aggressive anti-religious secularisation programme.166 Soviet attempts to undermine commitment to Islam in Cen- tral Asia began in 1925, with efforts to discredit Muslim clerics, though these attempts proved largely unsuccessful in establishing pro-Soviet sympathies among the local population.167 A more concerted Soviet assault against religion began in 1928. Islamic “mektebs” (elementary schools), “madrasas” (colleges) – which had numbered 15 000 before 1917 – were closed, as were and shari’a 168 courts; all “waqfs” (Islamic endowment) properties were confiscated in 1930.

161 Moss, V., “The Orthodox Church: At The Crossroads (from 1900 to present)”, Romanitas, available at: http://www.romanitas.ru/eng/THE%20ORTHODOX%20CHURCH%20-%20I.htm. 162 Khalid, A., Islam After Communism, University of California Press, 2014, p. 62. 163 See above, note 112, p. 130. 164 Ibid, pp. 127- 130. 165 Bobrovnikov, V., “We Have Done Away with the Tsars of this World, Now Let Us Attack the Heavenly One” in Dmitrów, E. et. al. (eds.), in the Soviet Scholarship of Islam, Warsaw: Instytua Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2014, p. 36. 166 Kehl-Bodrog, K., “Religion is not so strong here”: Muslim religious life in Khorezm after socialism, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008. 167 See above, note 5, p. 12. 168 Broxup, M., “Soviet Perception of Militant Islam”, in Malik H. (ed.), Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign 33 Policy toward and the , Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, p. 20. 34 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST Cultural Revolution in1929–1934,andthenagain in1938–1940. gle for Socialism!”.active Themost periods for theSVB were theyears ofSoviet atheism under thesloganmilitant with “The Struggle against Religion isa Bezbozhnikov, or SVB), established in 1925. Its message was toreligion supplant of whichtant wasGodless” (SoiuzVoinstvuiushchikh “The LeagueoftheMilitant the society, in religion Soviet regime also establishedcounter-religious of organizations, themostimpor influence the weaken to designed move another In rupting theinfluenceofIslam. the region, particularly intherealms ofgender relations andfamily life, was designed to spark immediatechanges to andfundamental traditionallife in “surrogate proletariat” tovictims ofpatriarchal be ,termsin Marxist functioning thus notdel (Women’s Bureau)leaders considered womenMuslim all inCentralAsia making thembreed pigs,eatpork ordrinkalcohol. sacred dates. Theregime alsoforcedto Muslims violate theirreligious precepts, prevent theobservance of traditionalreligious dutiesandrituals,holidays and observance of religious rites and practices. Thus, the Communist party tried to A further strategy pursued by theSoviet regime was tothe private challenge en’s Day. Communist partyactivists in Tashkent launcheditto mark InternationalWom - Union, suchasAzerbaijan).The “Hujum” began campaign inMarch 1927, when terparticularly Islam, inTajikistan(and elsewhereand Uzbekistan intheSoviet and changethe attire of Muslim women – played a central role inefforts to coun- The so-called “Hujum”(literally, to– acampaign campaign “assault”) “unveil” 169 permissive approach to thepractice ofreligion incertainareas andby certain Yet after the startof the World War II,policyshifted once more, withamore destroyed. the transmissionknowledge ofIslamic were fundamentally damaged,ifnot ies, disappeared,elitethe Islamic and was dismantled;theprimarymeans for sphere: thephysical manifestationssuch asmosques and seminar ofIslam, Throughof thesevarious all efforts,was Islam largely driven from thepublic 170 171 172 173 174 175 as part of a strategy to find Soviet allies among the native Muslim population in CentralAsia. Muslim native the among allies Soviet find to strategy a of part as feudal patriarchal asthisillustrates, society”; women’s liberation was pursued it wantedthat to “liberate oppressed CentralAsian women from thechains of

Seeabove, note 5,p.12. Ibid. Ibid., Ibid., p.12. See above, note 165,p.36. port: Praeger Publishers, 2001,pp.216-225. See for example,Keller, S.To Moscow, NotMecca: TheSoviet Campaign Against IslaminCentral Asia, West- See above, note 157,p.2. pp.11-12. 169 175 The campaign was The campaign later co-opted by Soviet regime, which declared 170 As Massel has argued, AsMassel theSoviet CommunistpartyandZhe 171 . By and large, theSoviet campaignof unveiling women 174 173

172 Strug- dis - - - - groups.176 At the same time, the Soviet emphasis on national, ethnic identity Legacies of Division saw the emergence of strong secular, ethno-national identities among Central such identities.177 Thus, Khaled has summarised the legacy of Soviet cultural rev- olutionAsians, andas the the “de- creation of new of political public lifeand and cultural appearance elites firmly of Islam committed as nation to- ality”.178

Emancipation of Women h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 impacts on the lives of women in Central Asia, the Soviet authorities expanded educationIn parallel and to thebasic aforementioned literacy, focusing Hujim in particular campaigns, on whichgirls and had women. significant The regime vigorously promoted female education and literacy classes, set quotas for female students at and even prosecuted men who did not allow their wives and daughters to attend schools.179 These policies are best under- stood as elements in a strategy to transform women into active citizens, breaking their allegiance to tradition and family, in an effort to persuade them to identify with a larger political community. Yet autonomous female political activity was discouraged or openly banned.180 In effect, the policy attempted to patriarchal control with state control.

Purges of ‘Anti-Soviet’ Groups

One key component of the so-called Cultural Revolution was the purging of local started in 1928 and targeted primarily the Jadid intellectuals, together with elites. The second wave of (after the first one perpetrated in 1917-1921) Those targeted were either sent to , exiled or executed.181 A third , in wealthy1937-8, targetedpeasants native (‘’) communist and nomads leaders (‘bays’), and communist religious figures cadres. and Thus scholars. it was - Communist leaders, who were removed.182 According to statistics maintained notby the only Russian the local Federal intelligentsia Security and Service, leading (the community FSB, the successorfigures, but of alsothe KGB),local between January 1935 and June 1941 19,840,000 individuals were arrested and seven million were executed by the government throughout the Soviet Union.183

176 Akbarzadeh, S. “Islamic Clerical Establishment in Central Asia”, South Asia, Vol. XX, no. 2, 1997, pp.73-74 177 Ibid,, p.2. 178 See above, note114, p. 142-3. 179 Edgar, A., “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet Emancipation of Muslim Women in Pan-Is- lamic perspective”, Slavic Review, 65 (2), 2006, pp. 259-260. 180 Ibid., p.263-264. 181 Ayagan, B. “It’s too early to close the discussions about political purges”, National Digital History, http://e-history.kz/ru/publications/view/625; and Eniseyeva, V., “The reason of death - shooting”, Mysl Journal, May 2015, available at: http://mysl.kazgazeta.kz/?p=6079. 182 Ibid. 183 Federal Security Bureau, Russian Federation, information available at: https://www.nur. 35 kz/1489957-kak-unichtozhalas-kazakhskaya-intellig.html. 36 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST links withIslamicculture andwiththeethnicaffiliations. Latin andtheCyrillicwere alphabets forcibly introduced in aneffort to break script was imposed, replacingin Soviet theLatinalphabet Central Asia.Boththe script tobic in the1920s. 1939-40 In however,alphabet theLatin the Cyrillic or Iranor to otherpartsoftheSoviet Union,suchasRussia andUzbekistan. China, to fled thousands manywhile violence, and relateddiseases emigrated. Atone thirdleast wasalone population oftheKazakh to lost famine, zation policywassocial catastrophe. a resisted, Localpopulations rebelledor of This thesedentarisation andimplementation and collectivipoor planning - 184 munal property. Thegovernment confiscated almostalllivestock andcrops. ture, forciblyinto sedentarising thepeople collective farms (kolkhoz)com- with embarkedpolicy of forcibly ona breakingdown the centuries-oldnomadiccul members Therefore,of theproletariat. from 1927 onwards, the Soviet regime Soviet ideologues were convinced nomads could notbeconsideredthat as societies. transformationeconomic ofthesocial,andcultural structure ofCentralAsian was far more “handson”their Tsaristthan predecessor,to leading dramatic a ple, wereto able continueto their traditional way of life. The Soviet position had been under the Russian rulemuchlongerthanany other CentralAsian peo- ing thenomadicway oflife. Indeed, as discussed above, evenwho theKazakhs, rist regimethe traditionalchallenge did not social norms in theregion –includ- Empire for halfacenturybeforeof theSoviet theestablishment Union,theTsa- Although CentralAsia had been under the direct control of the Tsarist Russian andCollectivisationSedentarization (1927-1932) during the20 of TheCentral alphabets alphabet. Asian peoplewere changed severaltimes of theCulturalAnother element Revolution was thereplacementof thenative Replacement ofAlphabets 185 186 187 tion, uprisingsoremigration to Iran. zation ledtoresultas a thelossof70% of thepopulation, of deathsfrom starva- For example,it isestimated in theWest that Mangystauregion, Soviet collectivi-

nation building”,, Vol AsianEthnicity 5,No1,2004,p.64. Zardykhan,Z. “Russians demographicand inKazakhstan legacy change:imperial waythe Kazakh and of 1981, pp.132-133. See for example, M,“TheCollectivization Olcott, Drive inKazakhstan”, Russian Review 120–6. protsessov”,demograficheskikh obuslovlennost’ “Sotsial’naiya Tatimov,M. 1991”, GermanHistorical Institute, Moscow, February 16–17,2017,p.3 at theinternational conference “The Great Friendship? The Soviet Union as aPoly-Ethnic State, 1953– zar to Akyn. HowMattered Nationality intheSoviet Atomic City of Shevchenko/“. Paper presented Nabiyev,Z., “Stepnaia tragediia”, some 1,750,000 had died fromdied had 1,750,000 some execuand epidemics starvation, - aKazakh populationofapproximately 4,120,000in1930,[Of] th century. The Soviet governmentinitiated switch a from theAra- Adaiskoe vosstanie“FromS. 1929–1930, 5 inGuth, 2010, p. Almaty Kob- 187 Kazakhexperts assertthat: 184 Nauka, Alma-Ata,1989, pp. , Vol. 40, no. 2,April 185 186

-

tions by 1939—over 40 per cent of the entire population (this is in Legacies of Division addition to deaths from natural causes); 200,000 fled into neigh- bouring countries and remained there ... and 453,000 took refuge in neighbouring Soviet republics, also remain there permanent- ly.188

Thus, in Central Asia, the Soviet policy of collectivization – pursued throughout the USSR – had particular and profound effects. First, it challenged and over- turned a traditional nomadic ways of life which had persisted for centuries, h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 exacerbating the process of undermining traditional cultural and social norms which was being pursued through the Cultural Revolution policies. Second, the implementation of the policy resulted in massive loss of life, and the depopula- tion of certain parts of the region. Soviet power had thus created the foundations for the later Soviet myth that resettlement in the region was “populating” the “empty” desert.189

Industrialisation, Urbanisation and Immigration

The fourth pillar of the Soviet “modernization” project which impacted upon the ethnic and religious constitution of the Central Asia region under the Soviet Union was the industrialization of the region, and the immigration which accom- panied it.

The Soviet authorities’ industrialisation programme began in the 1930s, in Kazakhstan. Pursued with determination, the industrialization policy produced- its desired result: Central Asia became an integral part of the Soviet economy, with a high degree of economic specialization and a consequential dependence on other Soviet regions. The policy had even more profound consequences how- ever, as many thousands of engineers and semi-skilled workers of Slavic origin from other parts of the Soviet Union came to the region to organize the socialist economy190. Between 1926 and 1939, an estimated 1.7 million people left Euro- pean Russia to settle in Central Asia; 47 new cities and 230 workers’ colonies were established.191 Another feature of the industrialization programme was the implementation of grand infrastructure projects, such as the construction of the Great Fergana Canal, in 1939. The main purpose of this canal was to draw and thereby to achieve ‘Soviet cotton independence’. Projects such as this were waters from the Syr-Darya River to irrigate the cotton fields in , advertised with a strong nationalistic message.192 used to foster affinity to the Soviet Union and the ethno-national state: they were

188 120–6; cited by Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity, p. 45. 189 SeeTatimov, above, M. note Sotsial’naiya 187, Guth, obuslovlennost’p.3. demograficheskikh protsessov, Nauka, Alma-Ata, 1989, pp. 190 Peyrouse, S., “The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language”, Occasional Paper # 297, Woodrow Wilson Center, Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, 2008, p.2. 191 Ibid., p.2 192 Tiechmann, C. “Cultivating the Periphery: Bolshevik Civilizing Missions and Colonialism in Soviet Central Asia”, in Conrad, H. and et. al. (eds), Ordering the Colonial World around the 20th Century. Global and 37 Comparative Perspectives, 2009, p.51. 38 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST n afraie cin mie, r ehp ee a cmua apartment”? “communal a even perhaps or empire”, action “affirmative an traditionalUnion a empire, or was “empirean it ofnations”,“federation”,a experience in CentralAsia presents a formidableWas challenge. theSoviet tral Asia,particularly KazakhstanandNorthernKyrgyzstan. Cen of profile ethnic the in shift dramatic a wasresult The Union. Soviet the of voluntary and forced migration resulted in an influx of peoples from other parts purges ofintellectualselitesand resultedof theregion, inthedepopulation both ine which accompaniedthecollectivization programme ofthe1930s and the 193 ethnic, culturaland religious traditions. of millions, crushed entire undermined nations,and,inallowing nodissent, USSR was atotalitarianstate stripped thataway freedoms, destroyed the lives playSoviet about sense a of nostalgia era.For negative thosewitha view,the one ofcolonization, considerablenumbers, particularly older people, candis has fully embracedmany While itsSovietpast. tend to viewtheSoviet period as Since theirindependence from theSoviet Union,noneoftheCentralAsian states 7 nie) were established for “kulaks” andother “anti-Soviet” groups. From(spetsposele settlements” “special the mid-1950s, so-called 1929until anti-Soviet wealthy peasants),alongsideindustrialspecialistsandworkers. wereof Uzbekistan for openedup resettlement the of exiled “kulaks” (allegedly region. ManyNorthern partsof Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan andtheFergana region forced immigration,as aresult of theexile of “punished”ethnicgroups to the as partof the industrialization programme, Central Asiaexperienced waves of Alongside the voluntarymigration of Russian workers coming to the region Mass Migration to Central Asia 194 195 196 197 promotion of ethnic identity (misrepresentedsub- “affirmativeidentity with as ethnic action”) promotionof The Sovietregime inCentralAsia was mass ofcontradictions:a combined the it Black Sea region,Black mainly toand Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan from to theFerghanaValley; and40,000 Greeks were exiled from the from theVolga Region; approximately 60,000 TurksMeskhetian were resettled deported to the KazakhandUzbekSSRs; 1.2 million were deported were deported toof Central the“emptiedlands” Asia: 172,000 were 1938 and 1945 those from nationsbranded asbeing“disloyalto Soviet system”

ledge, 2016,p.208. Ubiria, G., 2010, remi.revues.org/5196. A Focuslution: onCentralAsia”, Revue européenne des migrations internationalesvol. [Online], 26, no3, See, Rahmonova-Schwarz, D. “Migrations during the Soviet Period and intheEarly Years of USSR’s Disso Ibid. 1993, pp.123–35. Shahrani, N., “Soviet Centralof Asia andthechallenge the Soviet legacy”, CentralAsian Survey, Issue 12, 2, See above, note 187,Guth. C onclusions SovietCentralin Nation-Building theof Making Asia:The Kazakh and Uzbek NY:Nations , Rout- 196 For scholars, classifyingtheSoviet 195 Thus, while thefam- 194 Between 193 197 - - - - jugation; national self-determination with assimilation; for the Legacies of Division disadvantaged with the punishment of entire social and ethnic groups. Soviet policy in the region included, on the one hand, the promotion of ethnic identity and on the other, the objective of creating ‘Homo Soveticus’ without attachment to ethnicity or religion

Moreover, while the purported ideology, objectives and rhetoric remained avow- edly anti-imperial and modernist, in practice, many aspects of Soviet rule came 198 to resemble other colonial empires. Thus, despite the fundamental differences h i s t o r y f e c n a l g – 1 7 0 9 between Soviet and the Tsarist policies in the region, the Soviet system still cre- ated asymmetrical center-periphery relations, with power remaining highly centralized. In its nationality policy, its policy on religion and culture and its programmes of collectivization and industrialization, the Soviet centre directly imposed a fundamentally new kind of society on the peoples of Central Asia.199 Together, the effects of these policies on the ethnic and religious composition of the Central Asian states, and on modern understandings of both ethnicity and religion, have been profound.

- lics” which would later emerge as independent nations. The delimitation pro- cessNational ignored delimitation the intermingling along linguistic of ethno-linguistic lines established groups the fiveand “nationalled to the repub crea- and rehabilitation of the ethnic and religious minorities of the former Russian tion of states with significant “reciprocal minorities”. The process of recognition action”, seeking as it did to promote the advancement of minorities within the SovietEmpire Union. in the However,early Soviet as periodthese minoritieshas been erroneously were, in their qualified respective as “affirmative republics, majorities, it led to the elevation and promotion of “titular” ethnic groups above the non-titular, in particular through the promotion of “national” languages and other policies. Moreover, the creation of “national territories” along ethno-lin- guistic lines entrenched the marginalization of smaller, minority communities, such as the Lyuli, the Uighur and the Dungan.

The Soviet Cultural Revolution, with its focus on dismantling traditional social and cultural structures, had a massive impact on the practice of Islam. The Soviet attack on Islam under the banner of aggressive state atheism has had numerous lasting effects. Arguably the most widespread has been the tight regulation of religious practice and the promotion, to varying degrees in the different states, - lims” who are more demonstrative in their faith. of a form of state-sanctioned Islam which is in conflict with “independent Mus Finally, mass migration into the region – both voluntary, in the context of indus- trialization, and involuntary, in the context of the of those considered a threat to the Soviet state – led to massive changes in the ethnic and religious make-up of the region, and thus the five states which emerged from the Soviet

198 Dave, B., Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language, Power, Routledge, 2007, p.13. 39 199 See above, note 116, p. 236. 40 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST guage –have theirroots intheSoviet pastofthesestates. toemploymentand of educational denial the basis oflan opportunities onthe the proscription of heterodox andso-called“non-traditional”Islamic groups, and religious discrimination intheindependent CentralAsian republics –from dictory,is clear.one thing The roots ofmanycontemporary patterns ofethnic of the Soviet authorities may have beenunclear, shifting or even plainly contra - region, particularlyand Kyrgyzstan. inKazakhstan Thus,while themotivations the in religion significant a as Christianity Orthodox Russian of establishment manyin in Centralplaces Asia. At these movementssame time, the ledto the communities minority ethnic significant of establishment the in resulted space Soviet the of parts other from and workers Russian of influx The Union. - 2 RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN

Victoria Catliff

Despite the many differences between them – including in respect of levels of - gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan bears many similarities. All four states tightly religiosityregulate religious and religious practice, affiliation through – astate legal policy regime on whichreligion requires in Kazakhstan, the registra Kyr- tion of religious associations as a pre-condition for many aspects of religious life. legal restrictions on religious worship and practice; preaching and proselytiza- tion;Pursuant import to and these dissemination registration regimes,of religious each materials; state has clerical established training; significant and lay education. Thus, the registration regime in each country has the effect of limiting freedom to manifest religion, in effect imposing conditions on the exercise of religious freedom. Unregistered religious activity is subject to administrative – and in some case criminal – sanction.

There is evidence that each of the states applies its registration requirements selectively, effectively sanctioning or permitting established “traditional reli- gions” and banning or curtailing the activities of “foreign ”. These two cat- is not, as a rule, elaborated in law. Nevertheless, the distinction conditions the applicationegories are of ill-defined, the rules and framework. the distinction Moreover, between the nature “traditional” of the andregistration “other” regimes established in each state is such that, even where applied equally, it dis- advantages smaller and less well-established religious communities, which can struggle to meet the often complex and onerous requirements. Thus, the legal regime governing the registration of religious groups gives rise to both direct and indirect discrimination against groups practicing minority, non-traditional or heterodox faiths. These groups in turn experience the limitation – or outright denial – of their religious freedom, and can face legal sanction and other forms of discrimination as a result.

In each of the countries, the effect of the registration regime is to privilege his- torically long-standing (“traditional”) religious communities in the region. In all four countries, the dominant traditional religion is either “orthodox” 41 42 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST or a particular national manifestationnational particular or a Islam Sunni of “cultural” Islam or “ethnic” 2 1 n ygztn fr xml) tog nmnly needn, ae significant havesway over government policy. independent, nominally though example), for Kyrgyzstan, in tered religionsAdministrationSpiritual communities(suchasthe of Muslims Confessional self-regulatingbodies for thelimited numberoflarge, duly regis for example, compulsory review of religious literature prior to publication. registration,inspection, censorship and monitoring. These functions include, religious affairs agencies in eachstate exercise regulatory multiple functions: of religiouslimitation practice for duly registered organisations. Specialised The regulatory regime extends beyond registration,controlalso including and private actors. evidencethe legal that regime operates to legitimisereligious discrimination by bodies against members of unregistered religious communities. There is also tion, there isevidence of harassment andinterference by policeandother state practicefacecan legal commonlysanction, formthe in ofonerousaddi fines.In broad societaleffects. Asnoted, individuals involved inunauthorisedreligious The demarcation ofauthorisedfrom unauthorised religious associationshas nesses andMormons. ceived to be“Western”,Seventh suchasBaptists, Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Wit and (2) Proselytising Christian Protestantdenominations, especially those per andTablighiment ofUzbekistan(IMU) in Kyrgyzstan Jamaat andKazakhstan; ist andso-calledradicalgroups Islamic suchasHizb-u-Tahrir, theIslamicMove - the region,Shiites, suchastheAhmadisand andcontemporaryrevival Islamist (non-Sunni)historicthose with both communities, including Muslim roots in across the four states, two broad categories can bediscerned: (1) Heterodox of discrimination Whiletheprecise asaresult. impacts vary between countries, restric tions ontheirfreedom of religion, significant andare exposed to sanctionandotherforms face groups religious other effect, in discriminatory rectly process, or as aresult of failure to comply withrequirements which are indi By contrast,resulta as of eitherdirect discrimination during theregistration practice theirreligion freely, ingeneral anddonot, experience discrimination. state regulationand monitoring –members of thesereligious groups areto able problemsregistrationin whileso – and remainingtosubject comprehensive tioned andaccepted religion. These state sanctionedreligionsexperience donot largeence ofa Russian Orthodoxthis tooChristian minority meansthat sanc- isa promoted by the government.and Kyrgyzstan, InKazakhstan thehistoric pres pp. 125-126,available at: Trust, registered,been onthe groundsAhmadiyya that was “threat a to religious security”.See Equal Rights Religious Affairs to deny registrationin 2009 to theAhmadiyyacommunity, although had previously it In Kyrgyzstan, for example,the SpiritualAdministration of Muslims (DUM) lobbied theCommission of ogy ofEurasia, 2009. have toreligiosity beMuslims? Exploring intheFerghana valley, LITVerlag,Studies intheAnthropolHalle - with their ethnonational identification. See, for further discussion: Hilgers, I. and Hann, C., A complex outcome of Soviet policies, which blended theMuslimidentityof Kyrgyz, KazakhsandUzbeks Looking forLooking Harmony: AddressingKyrgyzstan in andInequality Discrimination 18 December , 2016, http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Kyrgyzstan_EN_0.pdf 2 Beyond the regulatory regime, there are further Why doUzbeks . ------1 striking similarities between the four states in respect of the state policy on reli- Legacies of Division gious practice. Most obviously, all four states have – to varying degrees – used the threat of terrorism to justify limitations on freedom of religious practice. In groups have been banned as “extremist” despite a lack of credible evidence that theyTajikistan are involved and Uzbekistan in, or promote, in particular, violence significant or pose numbersa threat to of public minority safety. religious

Finally, there is ample evidence that the nature of the legislative regime on reli- gious practice in these four states legitimises discrimination on the basis of reli- gion or belief by private actors. This paper examines evidence of discrimination

in both the workplace and in places of education against those seen as demon- religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan strably or overtly religious, particularly women who wear the hijab in a way which is seen as inconsistent with the culture of the state, and men who wear beards. there are remarkable similarities between patterns of religious discrimination inThus, these this four paper countries. finds that It concludes – despite that, their in many all four differences states, the and strict specificities regulatory – regime is the wellspring for these patterns. In all countries, this framework per- strict requirements of international law and gives rise to both direct and indirect discriminationmits limitations against on freedom members of religion of religious which minoritycannot be faiths. justified This in frameworklight of the also serves to legitimise discrimination by state and private actors in a range of those found in breach of regulation requirements – to discrimination in employ- mentsettings, for rangingthose considered from the applicationto be too demonstrably of fines – or religious.even criminal penalties – for

1 Legal Framework on Religious Freedom and Non Discrimination

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have all, in the years since they gained independence, acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)3 which protects both the right to freedom of religion and belief and the right to non-discrimination on grounds including religion.4 - tion: all have accepted the individual communications mandate of the Human RightsMoreover, Committee, the four5 states and all have have not provided simply periodic“ticked the reports box” into respectthe Committee of ratifica on

3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 1966. Kazakhstan - stan acceded on 04 Jan 1999; and Uzbekistan acceded on 28 September 1995. 4 Ibid.,signed Articles on 2 December 18, 2 and 200326. and ratified on 24 Jan 2006; Kyrgyzstan acceded on 7 October 1994; Tajiki 5 Optional Protocol I to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 1996.

1994; Tajikistan acceded on 04 Jan 1999; and Uzbekistan acceded on 28 September 1995. Kazakhstan signed on 25 September 2007 and ratified on 30 June 2009; Kyrgyzstan acceded on 7 October 43 44 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST Article 18 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan religious beliefs”. vides a “guarantee therights andliberties for every person irrespective of (…) providenot express an non-discrimination provision,instead but 17 pro Article - performance of religiousand ceremonies”.rituals, cults, The Constitution does others ortoassociationwith in practiceno religion, toand participate inthe to determine herorhisreligious preference, to practiceany religion or alone Constitution, In Tajikistan,the right to freedom of religion isguaranteed in Article26ofthe basis of(…)convictions (…) andotherstatusaswell asothercircumstances”. 16(2) providesArticle one may“[n]o that tosubject be discrimination on the gious associations and ministers of religion intheactivity ofstate authorities. convictions or to renounceprohibits them.Article7also theinvolvementof reli - religion andthatnoonecanbeforced to express his or her religious or other state.“secular” gyzstan isa Article7providesthere that isnostate ormandatory choose and have religious andotherconvictions”. Article1providesKyr that other persons any religionto ornot confessreligion” a the rightand to “freely conscience and belief”, theright including to “confess individually orjointly with bility ofeveryone before thelaw. protectionperson,equal ties ofa oftheserights by thestateresponsi andequal has interpreted this Articleasguaranteeingof rights equality andresponsibili a right to non-discrimination onthebasisofreligion.Court The Constitutional Article 14 provides the right toand non-discrimination, equality which includes universalor limit and civil human rights andresponsibilities before thestate”. onlyconscience, subject to therequirementsuch freedom that specify not “must Article 32oftheConstitutionKyrgyz Republic the implementationofCovenant. 6 law andprotection againstforms all of discrimination, including onthebasis stitutions. Article22 of the Constitutionof Kazakhstan toand non-discrimination ongroundsreligion including intheirrespective con- Atlevel,the national fourall states guarantee therights to freedom of religion 11 10 9 8 7

First PeriodicFirst Report: Kyrgyzstan, UNDoc.CCPR/C/113/Add.1, 3December 1999; tober 2009; HRC, SecondPeriodic Report: Kazakhstan , UN Doc. CCPR/C/KAZ/2, 12 February 2015; HRC UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Constitution ofthe Republic ofUzbekistan,1992,Article 18. of theRepublicConstitution of Tajikistan, 30 November 2003), 26. 1994 1999 (as amended inandArticle See above, note 7,Article32. ticle 76.2oftheConstitutionKazakhstan”, 29March 1999. Ar- 14.1, Article 13.2, Article interpretationof official the “On 7/2, ResolutionNo. Council Constitutional Constitution oftheKyrgyz Republic, 2010,Article22. stan, UNDoc.CCPR/C/UZB/4, 13October 2013. PeriodicReport: UzbekistanUN Doc.CCPR/C/UZB/3,, 4June2008; 2000; HRC, Second Periodic Report: Uzbekistan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UZB/2004/2, 3 August 2004; HRC, 22 September 2011; HRC, FirstPeriodic Report: Uzbekistan, UNDoc.CCPR/C/UZB/99/1, 15 February CCPR/C/TJK/2004/1, 11 April2005; HRC, SecondPeriodic Report: Tajikistan,UN Doc.CCPR/C/TJK/2, Report: Kyrgyzstan, UNDoc.CCPR/C/KGZ/2, 23May 2012; HRC, First Periodic Report: Tajikistan, UNDoc. 10 which provides “[e]achperson that has theright independently First Periodic Report: Kazakhstan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/KAZ/1, 5 Oc- 8

6

11 guarantees beforeof equality the HRC 9 guarantees “freedom of 7 , guarantees freedom of FourthPeriodic Report: Uzbeki- HRC, Second Periodic Third - - - of and convictions. Article 31 guarantees freedom of individuals “to Legacies of Division profess or not to profess” any religion. Article 61 provides that religious associ- ations are to be separate from the state and that the state is not to interfere in their activities. The Law on the Freedom of Conscience echoes and buttresses the constitutional provisions.12

While the strong record of international participation by these states and the protections provided in their constitutions are welcome, the national legal frameworks are not without weaknesses. Thus, it is notable that in Kazakhstan, the constitution permits greater restriction of this right than is provided under religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan of the right to manifest religious beliefs, not the right to hold such beliefs; and second,the ICCPR, Article in two 18(3) respects: permits first, such Article limitation 18(3) only of the as providedICCPR permits by law limitation and only as necessary to “protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamen- tal rights and freedoms of others”. Conversely, the absence of an explicit right to non-discrimination in the Constitution of Tajikistan – as opposed to the vague guarantee of equal enjoyment of rights and liberties – is inconsistent with inter- national law. On the other hand, it should be noted that Uzbekistan has devel- oped no constitutional jurisprudence interpreting, applying, and elaborating the constitutional guarantees of equality in the religious sphere.

Moreover, as will be noted below, other laws in these states – in particular laws on the regulation and registration of religious groups – have the effect of limiting freedom of religious practice, and of discriminating both directly and indirectly against minority religious groups. Thus, in each of the four states, the national have yet to ensure that the rights provided by the international instruments to whichlegal framework they are party reflects are aguaranteed deep inconsistency in their national in a very law. real sense, the four states

2 Laws on the Regulation of Religious Associations

Registration Requirements for Religious Associations

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is the enforcement and application of comprehensive,One of the most mandatory significant and drivers onerous of religious state registration discrimination (and re-registration)in Kazakhstan, requirements for religious associations. These registration requirements are set out in statutes governing religious activity, often euphemistically titled laws on the freedom of religion. These laws also set out categories of recognised reli- gious association, and in some cases, also regulate other forms of religious enti- ties and buildings.

Registration is the foundation of the regulatory regime for religious practice:

12 Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, Law No. 289- XII of 14 June 1991, as amended by Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Amendments and Supplements to the Law of the Republic Of Uzbekistan “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations”, Law 45 No. 618-I of 1 May 1998. 46 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST and branches throughoutAstana thecountry. and significance republican of city region, each from 300 least at with arateor cities,while oblasts level,the national at 5000 signatories are required, regional level mustinclude500 anapplication signatures from at leasttwo sep- to createframework a for regulatingthe practice ofreligion inthecountry. on ReligiousKazakhstan Activityand Religious Associations was passedin2011 has the mostcomplex andonerous requirements. The Law of the Republicof number of citizens for ofareligiousthe establishment association–Kazakhstan In respect of the first requirement – the need to evidence the support of a certain Support forRegistration ofaReligious Association others. than conditions challenging more significantly imposing some with states, between the variation significant is there requirement, of classes both of respect – to those theauthoritytowith make registration decisions . Nevertheless, in third, eachlaw provides a degree ofdiscretion –either explicitly or implicitly dence relatedto thebeliefsof thereligiousfunctioning and community;and second, the laws impose a requirement to provide extensive documentaryevi- support for the registration of the association by acertainnumberof citizens; evidence to requirement a impose laws the first, features: common three have Laws regulatingthe registration of religious associations in thefour countries favour large establisheddenominations. of the registration regime is to disadvantageminority religions and sects and gious literature is also subjecttobe demonstrated, licensing.Aswill the effect gious education, proselytizationand dissemination andthepublication of reli- associations: as discussed in section 2.3, in many of the states in question, reli- Moreover,penalties. regulationis notlimited to theregistrationof religious criminal or administrative significant to rise giving prohibited, are instruction territory,unregisteredand religious activityprivateand religious practiceand fourall states permit only registered religious associations to operate ontheir 17 16 15 14 13 al. tion procedure, classifyingreligious associationsintoregional, local, and nation- of religiousliquidation and associations. TheLaw creates three-tier a registra- Articles 12to 19are dedicated registration, to theestablishment, reorganisation gious Associations in theKyrgyz Republic some. The Law of the Kyrgyz Republicon theFreedom of Conscience and Reli- In theother states, therequirements are similarinnature, though lessburden- natures from50 citizens residentleast at intherelevantor city.

14 lic”, 31December 2008, №282. Lawof theKyrgyz RepublicFreedom“On of Conscience and Religious Organisations intheKyrgyz Repub - Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., ciations” amended22December2016. Law of the Republic11 of OctoberKazakhstan, 2011 No. 483-IV religious“On activity andreligious asso At level,the local toapplication an registersig - include must association an Article 12. 16

17 requires that associations applying 15 Atthe 13 - for registration must submit a document with the full personal details of at least Legacies of Division 200 citizens indicating their support for the association.18 The Law also requires that the list of citizens be notarised and approved by a local authority in each location that it wishes to practice.19 In Uzbekistan, Article 11 of the Law on Free- dom of Conscience and Religious Organisations,20 provides that associations seeking registration must submit to the relevant authorities a notarised list of supporters containing the signatures of 100 Uzbekistani citizens over the age of 18.

Tajikistan maintains by far the least oppressive requirements in respect of the

number of adherents of a religious belief who must be listed in order to register religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan a religious association: Article 9(1) of the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan On Conscience and Religious Associations21 provides only that “the founders of reli- gious associations may be at least 10 Tajik citizens that have common religion and reached the age of 18 years”. However, it is noteworthy that Article 11 of the Law also sets the minimum population which must reside in a given area before country where an estimated 98% of the population identify as Muslim, this is a different classifications of mosque can be established; given that Tajikistan is a

Documentarysignificant interference Evidence with Required religious for freedom.Registration of a Religious Association respect of the requirement to provide documents in order to secure registration asThere a religious is also association. significant variationIn Kazakhstan, between the thelaw legalrequires regimes applicants in the for states regis in- tration as a local religious association to provide: a “charter” for the putative association, signed by the leader or head of the association; minutes of a con- stitutive meeting; list of the persons who founded the association; documents - paymentconfirming of thecharges location for state of the registration; association; and printed documents materials relating setting to theout electionthe his ortory, appointment fundamental of beliefsthe leader and or doctrine head of ofthe the association. religion; documents22 There are confirming additional requirements for registration at the regional and national level, including in par- ticular documentation of the individuals (500 and 5000 respectively) listed as supporting the registration application.23

In Kyrgyzstan, the list of documents required for registration includes, in addi- tion to the details of the 200 citizens supporting the application: the religious organisation’s charter; minutes from its initial meeting; information about the religious organisation and its practices; and information about the religious group’s history, attitude towards the family, marriage and the health of its adher-

18 Ibid., Article 8, Para 3 and Article 10. 19 Ibid., Article 10, Para 2. 20 See above, note 12, Article 11. 21 Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Conscience and Religious Associations”, Law No. 739 of 28 June 2011, Article 9(1). 22 See above, note 13, Article 15(3). 47 23 Ibid., Articles 15 and 16. 48 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST Religious Affairs. registrationmust provide a statement consentfrom thestate Committee for for applicants that in requirement,very significant and additional, one imposes organisation inTajikistan. decide to follow, or not. which statesexperts that make recommendation, a which relevantbodies public issued the Rulesfor ConductingReligious Expertise(theRules),Article 13of legal status,andfor which thedocumentaryrequirements are fewer. also permits the establishment of religious communities, which do not have as isrequired intheother three inthelegislation countries. the LawUzbekistan, In requires thesubmission of many ofthesamedocuments a state-appointed “expert”. registrationreligiousas a associationtoreviewtheological passa conducted by For example,Article 6of the 2011 in Kazakhstan, Law requiresfor an applicant acceptable. doctrine whichthe putative concludesthat religioussocially associationisnot each case,suchrefusalIn subjectiveis basedona or assessment oftheology and submission ofvarious items– have ofsupportingdocumentation beenmet. citizens, of number specified a from support documented – requirements tive ations may, andindeed have, refused such registrationeven where theobjec- states, the statutory bodies responsible for the registration of religious associ groups of beliefs the of applying for registration which occurs to varying evaluation degreesstates. in all four In all or assessment of pattern wider a reflects sent from astate body responsible for religious affairs in order to be registered, The requirement intheUzbekistaniLaw, thatreligious groups mustsecure con- Assessment andDecisiononRegistration Applications gious information materials andreligious items.” as otherreligious(religious) documents,spiritual educationprogrammes, reli- assessed through examinationdocuments aswell“constituent of the applicant’s on theexpert’s evaluationelements oftherelevantof thetheological religion, ents. 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 the valuesystem oftheexamined religion tosocial values theimportant cus- the religiousdetermination assessment a should include ofthe“conformity of for the useof religious experts.provides, The manual among other things, that and Analytical Centre for the Matters of Religions, issued a non-binding manual

“About Approval of the Rules for Conducting Religious Expertise”, No.162of30December 2014. Government of the RepublicDecreeof Kazakhstan, oftheChairman of theAgencyfor Religious Affairs Ibid. See above, note 13,Article6. Ibid., See above, note 12,Articles10-11. Ibid., See above, note 21,Article13(5). See above, note 17,Article10,Para 2. 24 The requirements are broadly similar for the establishmentof a religious Article 11. Articles 13(1)and(6). 28

31 In2013, the government’s Research and Development 25 29 Itshouldbenoted howeverthe Tajikistani that law The Law statesthe assessment shouldbebased that 30 InDecember 2014, the state 27 However, italso 26

- Legacies of Division socially undesirable though not prohibited by law”.32 There are examples of cases tomarywhere established in society” andreligions an evaluation have failed of “specificto obtain beliefs registration (…) which following are deemed expert assessment: the Ahmaddiya Muslim Community, for example, had its application for registration denied on the basis of an expert analysis written from the per- spective of Sunni Islam.33

Laws in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also include theological review (scrutiny by “state confessional experts”) as a part of the registration process or part of the wider regulation of religious practice.34

religious organisations have been refused registration by the State Commission religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan on Religious Affairs (SCRA), despite satisfying the application A significant requirements number of set out in the 2008 Law. For example, in 2009 the SCRA refused to register the Ahmadiyya community, a minority Muslim which is considered heretical by many other Muslims, despite having registered the community under an earlier Law. This happened after the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan called for the activities of the Ahmadiyya be suspended as they posed a “threat to religious security”.35 The Ahmadiyya community appealed this decision up to the level of the Supreme Court and at each level, the decision of SCRA was upheld. In its judgment, the Supreme Court noted that the registration of the Ahmadiyya community might lead to “interfaith hostility” between Sunni Muslims and the Ahmadiyya creating a “real threat to public order and stability in the country.”36

In both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, statutory authorities have refused to register religious groups whose theology or ideology is considered unacceptable. How- ever, it should be noted that in both countries, many such religious communities have been proscribed by public bodies acting under the auspices of anti-ter- ror legislation, as discussed below. Once again, such decisions are made in the whose subjective assessment of the content of a particular religious faith is the keycontext determinant of laws which of whether provides an organisationsignificant discretion is considered to public “extremist”. representatives,

32 Research-and-Development Analytical Centre for the Matters of Religions, Guidance Manual on the Mat- ters of Conducting a Religious Expertise, 2013, p. 14, available at: www.din.gov.kz/details/ndownload. php?fn=291&lang=rus. 33 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, 23 December 2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/66/Add.1, Para 34. 34 Kazakhstan Law No. 483-IV 11.10.2011, “On Religious Activities and Religious Associations”, Article 6; Kyrgyzstan Law No.282 31.12.2008, “On Freedom of Religion and Religious Organisations”, Article 10, part 3, Article 11, parts 4 and 8, Article 12, part 4 (foreign missionaries), part 22 (religious literature); Tajikistan Law No.3 26.03.2009, “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, Article 17 and Article 22, part 3 (religious literature – production, export, import and distribution is allowed only fol- lowing state confessional expertise); Uzbekistan Law 1998, “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations”, Article 19 (religious literature only) and Regulations 21.04.2204, Article 7 (foreign pub- lished religious materials only). 35 rferl.org, 30 December 2011, available at: . 49 36 RadioDecree Free of the Supreme / Radio Court Liberty, of the Kyrgyz “Kyrgyz Republic, Officials Case Reject No. Muslim AD-130/13, Sect”, 10 July 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyz_officials_reject_muslim_sect/24438562.html 50 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST religious ceremonies. address did not meethealthandsafety requirements necessary for performing istration was refused to a religious organisation onthegrounds its legalthat InMalakhovsky andPikulmet. vBelarus, theHRC considered acasewhere reg - in only exceptionalcircumstances, where therequirements of Article 18(3) are ments which have theeffectfreedom oflimiting of religionbe permissible will The UNHumanRights Committee (HRC)registration hasconcludedthat require - turn requires both a strong degree of justification to meetoneofthepurposes provided under Article18(3). necessity in Strict enjoymentof therights protected bystrictlybe 18(1) must Article necessary the on impact which requirementsregistration that fact the underlines finding restrictive measures where possible. that other that premises could befound for religious ceremonies. why theregistrationaddress satisfy this requirement,must in particular given essary and proportionate, concluded but that thestate had failed to demonstrate premises satisfy health andsafety requirements couldbeconsidered both nec- others. Indeed, insomecaseswhere state agencieshave defended such require - order, safety, healthor morality, or to theprotection of the rights andfreedoms of public relevantindirectlytoeven be can these how see to difficult is it bership, ments to provideextensive an toof documentsand list havemem- minimum a one ofthepurposes set outinArticle18(3). Indeed, inrespect oftherequire- Tajikistangyzstan, meet thetestcan and Uzbekistan of strictnecessity to meet Kyr Kazakhstan, in regimes registration the that argue to indeed difficult is It the fundamentalrights andfreedoms ofothers”. 18(3), be strictly “necessary to protectsafety, public order, health,or morals or missible undertheICCPR therefore, inthewordsmust, thelimitation ofArticle religious belief,asprotected by Article18(1) of theICCPR.order In to beper registrationrequirements representon thefreedomlimitation a to manifest religious worship, observance, practiceteaching.and Self-evidently therefore, gious associationisnecessary inorder to ensure thelegalityof many aspectsof should berecalledIt of the statesin all that under review, registration asareli- crimination. ciations violatesthe right both to freedom of religion, andtheright to non-dis In each of the four states under review, theregistration regime for religious asso NatureDiscriminatory ofRegistration Regimes 41 40 39 38 37

CCPR/C/GC/34, 2011,Para 34. intrusive” measures. See HRC, tions ontheright to freedom of expressionbe overbroad”,not “must requiringthe adoptionof“least Generalits In FreedomsNo. 34on Comment Expression,and of Opinion theHRCrestric emphasised that Ibid. Ibid., Para 7.5. 2005. HRC, ICCPR, Article18(3). Malakhovsky andPikul vBelarus , CommunicationNo. 1207/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/1207/2003, 38 The Committee noted a requirementthat religious that General Comment No. 34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc. 41

37 40

andtheadoptionof the least 39 The Committee’s - - - - - ments, there has not been an attempt to indicate strict necessity. In Kazakhstan, Legacies of Division for example, the Agency for Religious Affairs has sought to justify the 50-signa- tory threshold for local registration on the basis that “religious organisations which carried out no activities for years, such as the Brothers in Christ (Chris- tadelphians), the Church of the Last Testament (Vissarions)” and others would fail to re-register, resulting in an “updating and systematisation of the country’s religious area”.42

Moreover, in their application, the registration regimes in all four states is such that freedom of religion is limited not uniformly, but in a way which limits free-

dom only for those who adhere to or profess certain religious beliefs. Evidence religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan gathered by the Equal Rights Trust indicates that registration requirements are applied in ways which discriminate both directly and indirectly.

The nature of the registration regime in each country is such that it creates sig- a subjective assessment of the values and beliefs of the religious group seeking registration.nificant scope This for thecreates exercise space of for discretion, direct discrimination with officials againstin statutory groups authorities profess- ing minority religious beliefs, including in particular (but not limited to) those who practice heterodox denominations of Islam, the predominant faith in all four countries.

In Kazakhstan, as discussed above, this assessment is explicit, in the form of the mandatory theological review by a designated religious “expert”. Imposing a requirement that religious groups “pass” a review aimed at assessing the sub- stance of their theology and doctrine is manifestly inconsistent with Article 18 of the ICCPR. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief has noted, any “sub- stantive as opposed to formal review of the statute or charter of a religious organisation” is “impermissible”,43 while the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has noted that “it cannot be the business of the State to enforce particular theological interpretations by measures of administrative law”.44 Sub- stantive theological review as part of the registration process is particularly – though not exclusively – problematic in a context, such as that in Kazakhstan, state. where there is a majority religion which enjoys significant support from the groups have been de-registered in Kazakhstan. For example, the legal registra- tionIt is ofthus the a Din-Muhammad matter of significant Tatar-Bashkir concern Mosquethat a number in Petropavlovsk of non-Hanafi was revokedMuslim after it expressed an intention to remain independent of the Hanafi school; its

42 Committee for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Report on the Situation with Religious Free- dom in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014, p. 8. 43 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Guidelines for Review of Legislation Per- taining to Religion or Belief, 19 June 2004, p. 11, available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/13993?down- load=true. 51 44 See above, note 33, Para 33. 52 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST religious communitieshaveproscribed been byunder the bodies acting public 2007, and thegroup is effectively banned. ers. the Agencyfor Religious Affairs citing negative “expert opinions” from examin- order andstabilityinthecountry”. between Sunni MuslimsandtheAhmadiyyaity” creating a“real threat to public the registration oftheAhmadiyya communitymight lead to “interfaith hostil- decision of SCRA was theSupreme upheld.Ina2014 judgment, Court noted that religiousas a associationto thelevelof theSupreme each level, Courtand at the relevantLaw. The Ahmadiyya the refusal has appealed community to register it factthat ithasmettheprocedural requirements for registration setoutinthe SCRA hasrepeatedly refused to register theAhmadiyyacommunity, despite the of religioustion associations speaks forAs noted itself. above, inKyrgyzstan,the tion process, the practice ofthestatutory authorities responsible for registra - In other states, where theologicalreview is not anexplicitaspect of the registra - ment. groups may bedenied registration statuswhen viewed unfavourably by govern tion which are permitted. Humanrights organisations have notedreligious that the state, inpractice, to exert tight control over the typesof religious associa secure theconsentofCommittee for Religious Affairs. This requirementallows Uzbekistan, asnotedIn above,to applicants registerreligious a associationmust liquidated in 2013. re-registrationwas application rejected andacourtorderedthe mosque be that 45 refusing to register Jehovah’s Witnessesassociations. and localauthorities continue to apply theprovision declared unconstitutional, amend theLawaccordingly. Asof2016, however, theLawbeen amended has not significance”,local “of issue an wasnot tion requiredJogorkuand Keneshthe to authority approvalof supportersof thelist wasas theques- unconstitutional, Chamber heldinterthe Constitutional appeal, alia The congregations inquestionappealedtherefusal on a numberof grounds. On on theFreedom ofConfession Religiousand Associations in theKyrgyz Republic. of Jehovah’s Witnesses seeking to register in their locality, asrequired by theLaw ities refused to “approve” thelistof 200 signatories produced by congregations against minority religious groups. Between 2011 and 2013, severalauthor- local provisions in laws governing registration create scope for direct discrimination A very differentfromcase, also Kyrgyzstan,illustrates theextentto which vague 50 49 48 47 46

46 2014, available at: Bayram,J., “KAZAKHSTAN: M.andKinahan, Religious freedom survey”, Forum, News 18 Service at: Corley,F., “TAJIKISTAN: Jehovah’s Witnessesbanned”, Ashwin, S., 3 March 2016,available at:http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2155. Bayram, M., “KYRGZSTAN: Impunity for officials, mob and torturers ignoring law”, See above, note 36. Ibid.

49 http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1036 In Tajikistan,In Jehovah’s Witnesseshavelegallybeen not registered since Gender, State inSoviet andPost-Soviet andSociety Russia, Routledge, 2000,p.67. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1939 45 All Ahmadiyya All mosques Muslim were closed in 2012, with 47

50 Forum18 October, News Service 18 2007, available Inaddition, asinUzbekistan,many . that the requirement that for local 48

. Forum, News Service 18 March - - auspices of anti-terror legislation, as discussed below. Legacies of Division

In addition to enabling direct discrimination by those involved in administer- ing the registration process, the requirements for registration themselves – the securing of a number of signatures, and the provision of documents – are indi- rectly discriminatory. While these requirements apply equally to all those seeking to establish a religious association, the conditions disproportionately disadvan- tage smaller, less well-established and heterodox organisations. Smaller groups can experience problems in securing the requisite number of signatures in sup- port of their application for registration, particularly where there is a require-

ment to secure support in a small geographical area. Those practicing heterodox religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan willing to record their support for the belief system. Moreover, smaller and less well-establishedor otherwise stigmatised groups, withbeliefs fewer may humanalso struggle and other to find resources, sufficient may supporters experi- - ments for registration. ence practical and procedural difficulties in meeting the documentary require In Kazakhstan, the sheer number of small religious groups which have been - inatory impact which the registration process has on the right to practice reli- gionforced on to an close equal due basis to difficulties with others. in Accordingregistration to underline the Agency the for indirectly Religious discrim Affairs, as of October 2012, the 2011 Law resulted in the closure of more than 1,400 reli- gious associations, 32% of those which existed before the Law came into force.51

In Kyrgyzstan, many religious minorities, such as Hare Krishna devotees and Catholics, simply cannot identify 200 members in some areas to support an application to register a religious association, meaning they are not able to reg- ister at all.52 Indeed, one expert advised the Equal Rights Trust that for many organisations, it is impossible to assemble 200 people together to support an application, as such an assembly is prohibited unless the relevant religious organisation is registered.53 Moreover, the requirement that the list of support- ers be notarised and approved by a local authority in each location that it wishes to practice gives rise to a number of problems. In addition to the practical and administrative burden, individuals in some religious communities, such as the made.54 In late 2016, the Equal Rights Trust was advised that, since the new Law Baha’icame into are unwillingforce in 2009, to be no identified, religious meaning organisation that athat list isof not200 Muslim citizens or cannot Russian be Orthodox has been registered; indeed, since 2012, no new dioceses of the Rus-

51 The News, “The number of religious organisations in Kazakhstan decreased by 32%”, The News, 25 Octo- ber 2012, available at: https://thenews.kz/2012/10/25/1241977.html; Agency for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Report on the situation with religious freedom in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014, p. 3, available at: https://www.kazembassy.ge/REPORT.pdf. 52 Forum 18, “Kyrgyzstan UPR submission”, UPR Info, June 2014, Para 12, available at: http://www.upr-info. ; Bayram, M., “Kyrgyzstan: “Don’t meet for worship”“, Forum 18 News Service, 13 August 2009, available at: org/sites/default/files/document/kyrgyzstan/session_21_-_january_2015/forum_18_-_forum_18.pdf. 53 See Equal Rights Trust, above, note 2. 53 54 Seehttp://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1336 above, note 52. 54 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST affairs andlocalpoliceforces have thepower to imposefines. police officers are not authorised to impose on-the-spot fines heads of central internal file and rank while process: or intervention judicial any without dures religionKazakhstan, offencesto canbesubject summaryadministrative proce proselytisation inany form positivewithout ‘state confessional expertise’ and Article 490(3) imposes forliability the carrying out of missionary activity and carry andcanresultmonetary penalties on organisationalin bans activity. offenceations isan underadministrative law. Administrative violationstypically states,of theregistration violation provisions in laws set out onreligious associ if theypenalties criminal engagethe practicein of theirfaith. Across four the bers of thesegroups maytosubject be administrative andinsomecaseseven groups which areduly not registered are inbreach of law,and assuch,mem - However, of much greaterfour inall concern is thefact states,that, religious faiths inquestion. the equalenjoyment of the right to freedom of religion of those who practice the interferenceby andintrusion,including thirdrisk at puts parties.This in turn legalcapacity, access to socialgoods and services and state protection against including status, legal of benefits the of groups affected the depriving of effect of theregistration requirements themselves,of registration thedenial has the resultor asa crimination inapplication, of theindirectly discriminatory nature majority faiths, recognised by thestate. Whetherarising asaresultof direct dis members of minority religious groups when compared with thefollowers of of legalThe denial registration isdiscriminatorydisadvantagesit initself,that 3 sian Orthodox Church have beenregistered. 58 57 56 55 and theconstructionof religious buildings. significance” religious of objects content, religious of materials other and ature issue, printingand(or) distributionof religious publication, literthe “import, of religiousthe “conduct country including ceremonies rituals, (or) meetings”; on organisationalactivity andadministrative expulsion(deportation) from the (in caseofrepetitionpermanent and following administrativean bans penalty) months) three (typically temporary fines, of form the in responsibility trative stan onReligious Activity andReligious Associations which resultin adminis rangeArticle 490 a sets out of violationstheLaw association. of theRepublic of Kazakh religious unregistered an of activity the financing or in ticipating administrativeestablished an bility offence for thosefound topar- leading, be Article 489 of the Code of the Republicon Administrativeof Kazakhstan Lia-

Ibid., Article490(1). Ibid. 2014, Article489 (9-11),490(1,4-5). See, for example,Code of Administrative Offences oftheRepublicLawof Kazakhstan, No. 235 of 5July See Equal Rights Trust, above, note 2. Religion Impacts ofNon-Registration onFreedom of 55 58

Inaddition to thisprohibition, 57

56 In ------of 300 Monthly Legacies of Division Financial Indicators and a three-month ban on organisational activity. Article due490(7) registration provides (or that reregistration); deportation is penalties the penalty range for from leadership a fine of a religious entity by a person, nominated by a foreign religious centre without agreement and similarly in case of the involvement of minors. 59

The Code of the Kyrgyz Republic on administrative liability also establishes administrative offences for violation of the registration procedure set out in Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations in the Kyrgyz Republic. Article 395 on violation of legislation on religious asso- ciation, establishes offences for, inter alia, non-registration of a religious group, religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan and violation of rules related to the organisation and conduct of religious meet- up to 5 monthly accounting indicators (for 2016 this is set at KGS 100 (USD 1.47 GBPings, 1.14processions EUR 1.31). and other ceremonies, established by law resulting in a fine of

The Code of Administrative Violations of the Republic of Tajikistan establishes administrative liability for myriad violations of the Law of the Republic of Tajik- istan On Conscience and Religious Associations, including: (1) on production, import, export, distribution of religious literature and items and materials of on preaching and proselytising activity; and (4) on international relations by religious organisations.significance; (2) Article on citizens 474 and receiving its 4 parts religious carry penalties education in abroad;the form (3) of 60

Uzbekistanfines ranging imposes from 50 both to 500 administrative Accounting Indicators. and criminal liability for violation of rules regarding registration of a religious association. Article 240 of the Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Administrative Liability creates an administrative offence for violation of legislation on religious organisations. Article 216.2 of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan also establishes a criminal offence for the same violation. groups are at risk of various forms of harassment by the police and other state bodies.In addition In Kyrgyzstan, to prosecution for example, and fines, the both Trust registered spoke with and aunregistered representative religious of the Ahmaddiya community who explained that as a consequence of the lack of legal registration, Ahmaddiya adherents experience harassment by police and other state bodies.61 There are also examples of police raids against members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community, despite the aforementioned court decision in favour of the community. In August 2015, for example police in Osh raided a Jehovah’s Witness service, shouting at the attendees and beating one of the

59 Ibid., Article 490(7). 60 Code of Administrative Violations of the Republic of Tajikistan, 31 December 2008 Articles 474 and 478; Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on the State Budget 2016, Article 23. The accounting indicator for 2016 is set at TJS 40 (=$USD, 4.50, GBP 3.50, EUR 4.05). 61 See Equal Rights Trust, above, note 2, citing Equal Rights Trust interview with M., a representative of the 55 Ahmadiyya community, , 24 November 2014. 56 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST the organisation hadbeenreregistered by theauthorities. costal Church, were subjectto repeated intimidation by state agents,even after tion Forum 18 hasdocumented casesinwhich membersoftheNewLife Pente- 4 men. 66 65 64 63 62 September 2016 to which a Committee for Religious Affairs is subordinated. Ministry fornew a tion, Religious AffairsCivil and Society was establishedin afterIn Kazakhstan, serial reorganisations of the statutory religious affairs func- are unregistered orinbreach oflaw. ous aspectsofreligious practice.and to closedownreligious associationswhich religious associations whichare registered bylaw, to reviewauthorise vari and - ration functions.Inaddition,these bodies have powers to monitor and regulate passing awiderange of policy-making,education andsensitisation and collabo Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan andUzbekistanhave broadly similarmandates, encom- established by law inthefour countries, the regulatory bodies in Kazakhstan, ing powers. In common the similarities with between the registration regimes fourall countries, statutory bodies onreligious affairs operatewide-rang with - beyond thestraightforwardof registration denial to minorityreligious groups. In The regulatoryregime establishedineachcountryhasdiscriminatory impacts talking to apedestrianabouttheirfaith. ova and Olga Mishina, who were unable to overturn a fine imposed by police for 18 reported onthecaseoftwo femaleJehovah’s Witnesses,Nadezhda Chesnok dination. registration,als, consideration and lawof citizen complaints, enforcement coor drafting, monitoring and analysis, education, reviewpublic of religious materi According to itsstatuteexercises it policy-making, functions including legal ist groups isdiscussedbelow. internationalexperts toare benon-violentbut nevertheless banned asextrem- severe Thetreatment penalties. of religious groups which are considered by under anti-terror or anti-extremistexposing legislation, adherents to even more tries, many religious groups which are notlegally registered are alsoproscribed the situationinUzbekistanandTajikistanis rather different. Inthese coun- numbers ofindividualsgroups and subjected being to administrative penalties, While in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, non-registration has resulted in significant

istry ofculture and sportoftheRepublic of Kazakhstan”. approvalof theStatute of the Republicanstate “Committee establishment on religious affairs of the Min - Order of the Minister of culture andsport of the Republic No. of 145 Kazakhstan of 30 May 2016 the “On Ibid. 2014,p.9,availableService, at:http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1939&pdf=Y. Bayram,J., “KAZYKSTAN: M.andKinahan, Religious Freedom Survey, 20 March 2014”, Forum 18News odihr/187436?download=true. Warsaw”,Meeting, sion Implementation OSCE, OSCE, “Statement by theEuropean Association of Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses OSCE HumanDimen Ibid. 62 Regulation ofReligious Associations Similarly, inKazakhstan,theinternational non-governmental organisa- 66 Kyrgyzstan hasaSCRAsubordinate to thePresident, which accord- September 2015, p. 2,available at:http://www.osce.org/ 64

63 Alsoin2015, Forum 65 - - - - - ing to its statute, most recently updated in November 2015, exercises sweeping Legacies of Division functions, including notably: the “interruption” of activity of religious associa- tions, which are causing damage or threatening the health, morals, rights and legal interests of citizens, bases of constitutional order, state security in accord- ance with legislation in force. 67

The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On conscience and religious associa- tions” establishes an authorised state body on religious affairs whose functions include the registration of religious associations, and the analysis of the activ- ities of duly registered religious associations.68 In Uzbekistan, a Committee on

Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers was established in March 1992, religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan and continues to operate today.69 Among a wide range of tasks and functions, the Committee is empowered to licence religious educational establishments, and to provide expertise on products of a religious character, including both printed and electronic materials.70

- cise control is in the review religious materials, giving rise to the potential for discriminatoryOne significant restrictionarea in which on the these publication, statutory import bodies and are dissemination, empowered to of exer reli- gious materials. The religious association laws in each of the four states require some or all literature and information materials containing religious content to undergo expert review prior to dissemination.71

Nevertheless, there is some variation in the nature and extent of the regulatory review. Thus, in Tajikistan, the law provides a blanket requirement for theolog- ical approval: Article 22(3) of the Law states that “[p]roduction, export, import, sale and distribution of religious literature, as well, and other religious articles and materials is allowed only after obtaining the conclusion of the state theolog- ical expertise”. By contrast, in Kazakhstan, the law imposes only two conditions: licensedfirst, that to religious do so; second, literature that mayreligious only literature, be distributed other inthan registered for personal religious use, maybuildings, be imported registered into religiousthe country education only after facilities obtaining and approval premises after specifically a theo- logical examination. In practice, these requirements have been applied in ways which disadvantage minority religious groups: in 2012-13, for example, the 2012-13, the Agency for Religious Affairs refused permission to a Jehovah’s Wit- ness community to import monthly magazines, on the basis that the magazines “discouraged secular education, encouraged family break-ups and contained positions that might outrage members of traditional Christian denominations”.72

67 Order of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 220 of 3 November 2015 “On the Statute on the State Commission on religious affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic”, available at: http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/ view/ru-ru/61761. 68 Ibid. 69 Order of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On the formation of the Committee for religious affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan”, 7 March 1992, available at: http:// www.religions.uz. 70 Ibid. 71 See above: note 13, Article 9; note 17, Article 22; note 21, Article 22; note 12, Article 19. 57 72 Ibid., Para 38. 58 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST 77 76 75 74 imposed for thepossessionofKoran onamobilephone. 73 espouses “extremist”views. and theirmembersprosecuted undercriminallaw,the group onthebasisthat fourciation, all states laws maintain under which religious groups canbebanned Beyond thelegalregime governing theregistrationand operation religious asso 5 criminal charges against those harbouring it. is effectivelytosubject in homes and banned seizuredestruction, with and Uzbekistan arguably presents themostextreme example: religious literature Such restrictions,Such however,are to subject limitations. “[s]tates parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such acts.”. prohibitedbe bylaw. shall violence” or hostility that tion, clarified HRChas The racialnational, or religious hatredconstitutes that incitement to discrimina of the ICCPR where it is necessary to protect, inter alia the right to manifest areligion or belief, where thisis prescribed by law and As noted above, Article18(3) of the ICCPR permits restriction or of limitation cannot bejustifiedunderinternational humanrights law. discriminate against members of religious minority communities in ways which face legitimategenuine, threats,anti-terror laws havestates waysin applied been which all while that, evidence significant is there Yet organisation. rorist tor in efforts to reduce threats to thestate andter posed insurgent, by violent, resources and ceded authority,significant bothpolicyandoperational,to thesecurity sec devoted have states four all level, domestic the terror”.At on “war tionally, theregion hasbeenpresented theforefrontas beingat of the so-called toall, can stan varying degrees, betermedsecurity states”. “national Interna-

Abdelfattah Amor, UNDoc.A/58/296, 2003,Paras 134-135. theSpecial Rapporteuron freedom religion of orbelief: eliminationall forms of religious of intolerance, Mr. religion orbelief , UNDoc. A/HRC/RES/14/11, 2010, Para 4; UN GeneralAssembly, Report submitted by RightsHuman Council, intolerance andofdiscriminationbased on religion orbelief, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/37, 2007, Para 14; ParaIbid., 8; seeabove, noteParas 33, 70(e); Rights60 and Human all formsof Council,Elimination of Doc. Human Rights Council,General Comment No.22:Rightto Freedom Conscience ofThought, andReligion, UN extremist, separatist, fundamentalistandotherprohibited organisations.” threat to socialsecurity or social order”, and Article244.2 “Creation, leadership, participationinreligious, Uzbekistan”, Article244.1. “Preparation, storage, distribution or demonstration of materials, containing a race, ethnicorreligious enmity”,order Article159ontheconstitutional “Infringement of theRepublicof to thecarryingofextremist out activity”; CriminalCode Article 156 of Uzbekistan, “Incitement ofnational, in relation to which a courthasmadedecision the liquidationor prohibitionabout of activity inrelation 299-1(2) “Organisationof activity religioussocial associationand of a organisationor otherorganisation, tion intheactivity ofillegalsocial andother associations”; Criminal code of theKyrgyz Republic,Article See, for example: CriminalCode RepublicArticle 404 of “Creation,Kazakhstan, leadership and participa- , 7April2016,availableNews Service at: Bayram, M.,“UZBEKISTAN: “His only faultwas to have some sermons on his mobile phone”, Forum 18 August 2013,available at: Bayram, M.andKinahanJ., “UZBEKISTAN: Religious Freedom Survey 2013”, Forum, 18News Service Organisations Laws onExtremism andBansonReligious CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 1993,Para 7. requires“[a]ny that propaganda for war” and“[a]ny advocacy of Freedomreligion of belief:or mandate theof Special Rapporteurfreedomon of http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1862 75 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistanand Uzbeki- http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2165. , public safety., public Moreover, Article20 73 Five-year sentences have been 77 Moreover, should be it 74 . 76 8 - - - - noted that the purposes for which the right to freedom of religion may be limited Legacies of Division imposing restrictions in order to combat terrorism must be derived strictly from concernsunder Article regarding 18(3) dopublic not includesafety, or“national as means security”; to prevent as such, propaganda justifications for war for or incitement as proscribed under Article 20. As such, the HRC has criticised Kazakhstan for example, for its “broad formulation” of “extremist” offences and called for laws to be brought “into full compliance” with its international human rights obligations.78

As this criticism of Kazakhstan indicates, while it may be legitimate to monitor 79 and even to curtail the actions of groups that are inciting violence or terrorism, religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan there is little question that all four states in the region have used the spectre of freedom of religion. In Kazakhstan, for example, researchers working with the Equalterrorism Rights to Trustjustify were legislation told that and in policyApril 2016, which a isrepresentative in conflict with from the a governright to- ment agency visited their child’s school to make a presentation on terrorism and extremism. She stated that in the presentation, the representative:

[P]laced our church “New Life” among sects (including the Church of “Jesus Christ” and “Jehovah’s Witnesses”). On one of the slides it was written: Destructive cults are those religious, neo-religious and other groups and organisations that have inflicted material, psychological or physical harm to society or its members or those that are suspected capable of inflicting such harm”80

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in particular have applied their criminal provisions on countering extremism to criminalise groups and individuals involved in peace- ful religious observance, in ways which directly contradict their international human rights obligations. A statement by the organisation the Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights Defenders of Uzbekistan and others during Uzbeki- stan’s most recent Universal Periodic Review elucidates the problem:

[I]n its fight against “religious extremists,” the Uzbek authori- ties fail to make a distinction between individuals who endorse or advocate violence and individuals who practice their beliefs peacefully albeit outside strict state controls. Thus, Muslims believers are arrested and charged with “extremist” crimes because of non-violent religious activities such as praying outside state-sanctioned mosques, studying “non-approved”

78 HRC, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kazakhstan, CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/2, 9 August 2016, Para 13. 79 See above, note 75. 80 Equal Rights Trust, In the Name of Unity: Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kazakhstan, 18 De- cember 2016, citing Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, Written infor- mation received from the Church “New Life”, April 2016, available at: http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ 59 .

ertdocumentbank/Kazakhstan_EN_0.pdf 60 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST of or participation inreligious extremist organisation. of materialsthreata containing direction to establishment, security and public and Article244 of theCode, which prohibits bothproduction anddissemination “Attemptsto overthroworderthe constitutional Republic ofthe of Uzbekistan” the largest numbersofprosecutions to date have beenmadeunderArticle159 state-endorsedthe interpretationAccordingof Islam. toInternational, Amnesty ise individuals pursuingindependentreligious beliefwhich contradicts with In Uzbekistan, a rangeIn Uzbekistan, of Criminal Code provisions 85 84 83 82 81 tection of safety.public Under Article 244 of religious beliefislimited in ways which are notstrictly necessary for the pro- sions in theCriminal Code are broadly drafted, creating arisk that manifestation alone. 12,000 individualshad beenimprisoned on chargesof religious extremism According to Uzbekistanicivil society organisations, by August 2015, over and publicorder”. committing other acts aimedagainst theestablishedrulesofconductinsociety of civil concord, dissemination and destabilisingfabrications,of calumnious and aswellpanic amongthepopulation, as theuseof religion for purposes of breach forcalls and , or violent eviction,creating or aimed at dissemination of materialsideas ofreligious containing extremism, , Article244-1 alreadyPrior to itsamendment, punished: “Production, storageor offences under the Code of Administrative Offences have alsobeenextended. and internet restrictions. In addition,thepossibilityof deportationfor certain or terroristist organisations”; increasedand massmedia,telecommunications duction, storage or disseminationof theideas or symbols ofreligious extrem- involvingunder 16in“illegal” people religious organisations;on “proban a - prosecution; increasedterms, jail between including 20 years 15and for jail ened to allow: criminalprosecutionsa previous without Administrative Code the following amendmentsinto law: Articles 244-1 and 244-2 have beenharsh It should benoted on 25 that April 2016, the signed many expressions ofheterodox religious belief–issubjectto criminalpenalty. of religion“use to violate civilconcord” vague– a term which couldencompass

4 October 2016,available at: http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2221. Bayram,“UZBEKISTAN:M., ContradictoryAnalyses”, “Expert Four People Fined”, Forum, News Service 18 files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016 able at:https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur62/1086/2015/en/. Amnesty International, 216, 221,242,244and246. Criminal Code of the Republicof Uzbekistan, Code No. 2012-XIIof 22 September 1994, Articles 156, 159, sion1_E.pdf. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session16/UZ/JS1_UPR_UZB_S16_2013_JointSubmis- Joint Submission1, to the Universal Periodic Review onUzbekistan, 2012, Para 4.2,availableat: 84 Throughout 2016, rightshuman organisations suchasForum 18 regious literature ormeetingwith other believers. Secrets andLies: Forced Confessions underTorture inUzbekistan, 2015, p. 18, avail- , 2016, p. 629, availableat: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 1 of the Criminal Code, for example the 82 have beenused to penal 83 These and other provi- 81 85 and - - Amnesty International86 documented other cases of arrest and imprisonment Legacies of Division of religious dissidents on extremism charges. In June 2016, for example, Forum 18 documented the case of two men who were convicted of participation in a religious extremist organisation; the case focused, among other things, on the discovery of a CD containing a sermon on the Islamic .87

The authorities in Tajikistan have used laws including the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on the Fight Against Extremism to prohibit and close down religious groups which are not considered by outside observers to pose a genuine threat to public safety or security. In its 2016 report on Tajikistan, the

Commission on International Religious Freedom noted that the “Tajik govern- religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan ment’s list of groups banned as extremist includes non-violent religiously-linked groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jamaat Tabligh, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Group 24 (a Tajik political opposition group)”.88

The most well-known case of a religious organisation being banned under anti-extremism legislation in Tajikistan is that of the Islamic Renaissance Party, a registered political party which had been granted special status under the peace settlement reached after the country’s long civil war.89 In August 2015, following repeated public attacks by the State Committee for Religious Affairs in the lead up to national elections, the Justice Ministry formally banned the party, giving it until 7 September 2015 to cease all activities.90 Following the ban, over a hundred IRPT members were arrested; while many were released, 13 leading members were placed on trial, with the two deputy leaders sentenced to life in prison, while 11 others received lengthy prison sentences.91

There is concerning evidence that states in the region are seeking to further increase sanctions in this area. In December 2016 Kazakhstan adopted a new “Law on Amendments and Additions to Various Laws on Questions of Coun- tering Extremism and Terrorism,” drafted by the security service (KNB), which introduces new sanctions to the criminal and administrative codes. In the same year, Articles 2441 and 2442 of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan were amended, increasing prospective jail terms.92

86 Amnesty International, “Fish Farmer Tortured, Jailed after Unfair Trial”, Amnesty International, 19 Febru- ary 2016, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR6234742016ENGLISH.pdf. 87 Bayram, M., “UZBEKISTAN: Large Fines for “Illegal” Religious Literature”, Forum 18 News Service, 7 June

88 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report: Tajikistan, 2016, p. 2, avail- able2016, at: available http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/tajikistan. at: http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2185. 89 Forum 18, “TAJIKISTAN: Religious Freedom Survey 2016”, Forum 18 News Service, 7 January 2016, avail- able at: http://www.forum18.org/analyses.php?region=31. 90 Ibid. 91 Amnesty International, “TAJIKISTAN: 14 high-ranking members of political opposition party sentenced to long prison terms in unfair trial”, Amnesty International, 7 June 2016, available at: https://www.amnes- ty.org/en/documents/eur60/4214/2016/en/. 92 Bayram, M., “UZBEKISTAN: Harshened Criminal and Administrative Code Punishments”, Forum 18 News 61 Service

, 15 June 2016, available at: http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2189. 62 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST while thegirls inquestionwere readmitted to theschool. fired, was official school a case, one least at in that and cases, such investigate Kyrgyzstan,in our researchers received also evidencethe authoritiesdid that 94 puts pressure [on those] who wear hijab”. theybecause were wearingthe administrationAlso, hijab. Muslim college of a “[s]chool childrenthat: wereallowed not to goto theschoolinAk-Talaadistrict totions not her to admit classes.Similarly,in Kyrgyzstan, one interviewee stated dresslong headscarf and a (and) thedirector oftheschoolgave verbalinstruc- authorities of herdaughter’swearshe didnot schoolhad“demandedthat a InternationalKazakhstan Bureau Rightsof Human andRuleof Law the that womantold researchers for theEqualRights Trust’s partnerorganisation,the a remarkably similarpicturefour inall states. For example,one in Kazakhstan, fourin all countries.Testimony given to EqualRights Trust researchers paints forms of attire, which are seen as demonstrating abeliefinIslam, are common Examplesof direct discriminationagainst girls who wearother and thehijab Discrimination inEducation ing thehijab. strably devoutmen who Muslims,inparticular wear beards and women wear- ples of discrimination affecting ineducationandemployment, primarily demon constitutions. Research by theEqualRights Trust four inall states found exam- actors, despitelegal the guarantees ofnon-discrimination providednational in toof religious thenormalisationandlegitimisation discrimination by private fourIn all countries, theregulatory framework described above contributes 6 93 told ourresearchers that: ered by EqualRights Trust researchers contradicts Astudentfrom thisaccount. laterthere denied that wasany formalon wearingban testimony thehijab, gath- prostitutes”.Head oftheStateWhile theDeputy Committee for Religious Affairs footage of police stopping 10 women in hijabsonthestreet, claiming they were (…) condemned women wearing “uncharacteristic” dress and state TV showed Tajikistan,In Forum 18hasreportedMarchin that 2015, “President Rahmon

Ibid., citingEqual Rights Trust interview withMyskal andBakhtiyar, , 23June2014. www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Kyrgyzstan_EN_0.pdf cember 2016, citing EqualRights Trust interviewFarida, with ,25June2014, availableat: EqualRights Trust, Lookingfor Harmony: Addressing in Kyrgyzstanand Inequality Discrimination , 18 De Discrimination byDiscrimination Non-State Actors there was acommission entrance at the University andchecked gious clothes.these When rules came into force, morning every heelssers, andnationalclothes,however they cannot wear reli - trou- and suit office black wear should students the Decree this wearing ofMuslim clothes atthe University. Inaccordance with in Tajikistan students for university withthe aim to restrictthe [T]he Education publishedaDecreethe about Ministry uniform 93 However, itshouldbenoted that . 94 http:// - - the clothes of every student; those who were wearing religious Legacies of Division clothes were not admitted to the premises.95

In Uzbekistan, the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations prohibits the wearing of religious clothing in public places, including places of education;96 this is supported by an administrative offence under Article 1841 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility.97 In practice, the application of these provisions has disproportionately disadvantaged women and girls who wear the hijab, one of the most visible forms of religious attire. The Equal Rights Trust’s researchers in the country recorded testimony from women whose daughters

had been told to stop wearing the hijab or face expulsion from the school. One religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan woman stated that:

[O]ne day the school director called me to the school. The direc- tor and my daughter’s teacher yelled at me, asking why I was forcing my child to wear the headscarf. The director asked me if I was an extremist. I was stunned, and cried. I noticed that the teacher was wearing a Christian cross on her neck and asked, “if you are a believer, why can’t my daughter be?” The teacher said that wearing any type of jewellery with a cross or moon is not prohibited; only the headscarf. Afterwards, the school director threatened me, saying that he was going to call to the SNB as I am forcing my children into religion. I was terrified as I knew what they could do. I decided not to confront them and agreed that my daughter would come to school without it. 98

Discrimination in Employment

As in the sphere of education, so in the area of employment, research by the Equal Rights Trust found examples of direct discrimination against Muslims considered more overtly and demonstrably religious in all four countries under review, with religious attire again being the principle basis for unfavourable treatment.

Those interviewed in Kyrgyzstan gave examples of direct discrimination against Muslim men who have beards and women who wear hijabs. In Talas, Baktygul, a focus group participant recounted the case of a man who was told that he would only be accepted for a job in a bank if he shaved his beard,99 while another respondent detailed the case of a friend who was told to remove her headscarf if

95 Equal Rights Trust interview with B.R, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 4 December 2016. 96 See above, note 12, Article 11 and Article 14. 97 Code of Administrative Responsibility of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Code No. 2015-XII of 22 September 1994, Article 184. 98 Equal Rights Trust, After the Padishah Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan, citing Equal Rights Trust interview with G., a Muslim woman, Tashkent, November 2014, available at: http:// . 63 99 See above, note 93, citing Equal Rights Trust interview with Baktygul, Talas, 23 June 2014. www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Uzbekistan_EN.pdf 64 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST not tonot hireMuslim”. a body heistold how canhebecomeadeputyofdistrictissaidinorder head?It Naryn stated simplywantsMuslim] a “[if that: to statea position at a get orlocal she was to continueworking inakindergarten. 100 wasE., forced to resign from herbecause she refusedjob to remove her hijab; Uzbekistan canresult indismissal or other forms of discrimination. One woman, head andneck,ratherthe shorter than headscarf, which is traditionally worn in where several women explained howwearing headscarf coverslong that a the EqualRights Trust researchers recorded similar testimonies in Uzbekistan, ing arab style clothesandwear secularclothes”. byment representativesauthority local who “explainedshould stopI that wear- she stoppedthat their market helpingher husband at following stall, harass - In another case, aninterviewee in Gafurovsky Sogdiysky , region stated 101 102 103 104 105 Muslims requesting timeoffto attend prayers. policy regarding placesofeducation,asfollows: strably religious. Onewoman recountedof theshift in government theimpact and direct discrimination againstconsidered Muslims more overtly anddemon In Tajikistan,Equal Rights Trust researchers also recorded cases of harassment other employees intheworkplace,

Ibid., Ibid., citingEqual Rights Trust interview withKarybek, Naryn, 25June2014. Irsalat, Batken, 18June2014. Irsalat, Ibid., citingEqualRights Trust focus group, Batken, 18 June 2014, and EqualRights Trust interview with Ibid., citingEqual Rights Trust interview withKuban, Naryn, 25June2014. Equal Rights Trust interview withSF, Khudzhand,Tajikistan, 4December2016. Equal Rights Trust interview withSM,Tajikistan, 7December2016. citingEqual Rights Trust interview withFarida, Naryn,25June2014. the face oval). lim headscarf (that covers head andneck andleaves openonly (thatcovers does head but notcoverneck) as thenot but Mus- covertheir thehead in traditional Tajik way –withthe scarf hand reached anagreement that women would beallowed to theand theone hand regional education council onthe other good teachersvery were sacked. Finally, religious teachers on to taketheoff scarves whenlot of A the commission will visit. had to leave the job. Thosewho didnotwant to lose the job had theteachers were sacked immediately.womenlot of A teachers ingly. theIf themembers of commission sawthereligious attire, adhered to andthe teachers were wearingthe clothes accord- commission visited school to check whetherthe new rules were demanding alotfrom usattheHowever, beginning. aspecial goodwe atmosphere, hada very the administration was not clothes.todue But thefact that schoolour was private and that school teachers and university could not wear religious all the[I]n 2014 teachers and wehad ameeting were all told 101 104 Our researchersOur recorded also cases ofharassment by 102 andoffailure to accommodate theneeds of 103 100 105

Onefocus group respondent in - - Legacies of Division dren under the age of three from dismissal.106 In another case, a woman stated thatthe only she hadreason been she subject was not to harassmentfired being that by tax the inspectors law protects at the women small with business chil she owned, because of her decision to start wearing the longer headscarf.107

7 Regional Patterns of Religious Discrimination

Through this review of the main dimensions of religious discrimination in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, a number of cross-cutting patterns emerge: religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan Old and New

The principal patterns of religious discrimination in Central Asia today can only be properly appreciated and fully understood from a historical perspective as a continuation and adaption of the comprehensive Soviet state regulation of reli- gious expression, personnel and activity. Soviet control of religion in the four states restricted ‘traditional’ religious communities (Orthodoxy and Islam), lim- - ity with Soviet state policy and doctrine, while forbidding and repressing the itingmanifestation their sphere of any of ‘non-traditional’,influence and ensuring Western their or foreign compliance religious and groups.compatibil The rangesame patternof non-traditional, persists across politicised post-Soviet Muslim Central movements Asia today, and Westernalbeit fortified evangel in- icalthe adaptationgroups exist to andchanged can take circumstances advantage inof which the globalised a now significantly circulation expanded of ideas, communications, funds, and people.

The four Central Asian states have inherited a set of tools for containing the threat which religion was perceived to pose to an earlier security-obsessed and totalitarian state. These tools were devised, honed, and perfected for a context in which the state aggressively promoted and imposed an avowedly atheist, Marx- ist-Leninist ideology to which religious belief of any sort was a rival faith for the allegiance of the population and religious association of any sort was a rival the pre-eminence of Islamic culture (rather than the Islamic faith per se), still necessitatesauthority. A newa defence official against nationalism perceived in thesereligious states, challenge. while often incorporating

Regulation and its Discriminatory Impacts

As demonstrated, these four states exhibit a common set of issues which arise in the context of markedly similar systems of religious regulation. All have retained a Soviet-derived apparatus for the close state control and supervision of religion, consisting of a scheme of mandatory state registration of religious organisations

106 See above, note 100, citing Equal Rights Trust interview with E., a Muslim woman, November 2014, Tash- kent. 65 107 Ibid., citing Equal Rights Trust interview with A., a Muslim woman, November 2014, Tashkent. 66 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST ‘War onTerror’ andthe emergence of CentralAsia asacriticalstrategic the- codes havethe criminal in articles introduced been the wake in ofthepost-9/11 extremism in thefour countries, buttressed by corresponding newor expanded terrorismof combating and extremism. Speciallaws against terrorism and rity issue,asgovernments have passed increasingly restrictive laws in the name In eachstate, theregulationof religious affairssecu- has alsobecomea national Securitisation or discriminatory. respect to thesematters, isbroad andtheresultingdecisions are often arbitrary personnel,universityment rectors or bureaucrats,in decision-makingwith vantstate officials,whether security investigators, judges, national lawenforce - At every stage of the regulatory process, the scope of discretion allowed the rele- selective ordiscriminatory enforcement. training for of seminarians—all these are objects bothof state regulationand its forprimary,at or students pupils secondary, tertiaryand religiousand stages Haj pilgrims exiting thestates and foreign clerics entering); religious instruction churches, religious schools); travel across borders for religious purposes (study, premisesthe constructionof ecclesiastical of pulpits; in andout (mosques, scriptures; the observance of religious rites and services; the activities of clergy dissemination, and saleofreligious publication, materials,import, including gious life,individual,and communal as ofreligious actors, layThe clerical. and associations post-registration.encompasses variousIt aspectsofquotidianreli- close statecontinuing entails supervision and controlof theaffairs ofreligious tion withthecomprehensive regulatory regime setforth inthelaws on religion, The comprehensive remit ofthestate statutory bodiesfor religion, inconjunc- ditional faiths are delegitimisedinthepublicmind. ther consequence of this regulatory environment, inwhich minority or non-tra- respectaccess toand education, ofhousing,employment, socialservices fur- is a sanctions andcriminalprosecution. Discrimination on thebasisofreligion in adherents ofunregistered religious associations to harassment, administrative advantagenon-traditionalminority and organisations. Non-registration exposes through theapparentlyof ruleswhichapplication equal disproportionately dis of the selective or arbitrary enforcement of registration requirements, and also groups.Islamic Discrimination takes theform ofrefusal to register onthebasis religionstional particular, in principally protestantnon-mainstreamsects and expression generally,toalso but discriminate againstadherents of non-tradi - each country,In theregulatory system notonly operates to curbreligious and injunctionsto lengthy custodial sentences. fines from ranging penalties, criminal administrativeand to subject are lations to discharge these varied regulatory functions. Violations of the religious regu- and missionary activity. Statutory bodies in eachcountryhave beenestablished worship, religious services,materials, literatureeducation objects, ritual and and ofregulationof religious affairs,of houses the establishmentof including - atre of counter-terror operations. The security services have come to play an Legacies of Division enlarged role.

The authorities in the four states have treated an increasingly wide range of reli- gious activity as falling under prohibited categories. The actual and purported vulnerabilities of states in the region to terrorism – proximity to Afghanistan, porous borders allowing movement of terrorist groups, availability as staging area and recruitment pool for terrorist groups, for example – have been eagerly endorsed and reinforced by the Central Asian leaderships anxious to preserve their hold on power.108 The counter terror and counter-extremism laws have

become both surgical and blunt instruments of religious discrimination. Over- religious discrimination kyrgyzstan, in kazakhstan, tajikistan and uzbekistan - - tionedbroad or religious imprecise associations, definitions usually of ‘terrorist’ Islamist. and ‘extremist’ have effectively crim inalised membership in or affiliation with a range of non-desirable or unsanc Internal Contradictions

Thus, in all four states, the legal framework on freedom of religion and non-dis- crimination has contradiction at its heart. The states profess to respect religious freedom and non-discrimination; they have willingly assumed international treaty obligations, and have constitutional protections which provide clear (if imperfect) guarantees for both rights. However, there remains a fundamental and unresolved contradiction between the assertion of rights of freedom of con- science and non-discrimination, on the one hand, and the restrictive statutory and regulatory regime established under laws on “religious freedom” on the other. Such laws impose strict limits on the exercise of religious freedom, and are applied in ways which discriminatorily deny such freedom to those from minority, heterodox or non-traditional religious groups. In so doing, they ren- der the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and non-discrimination essentially meaningless.

108 Heathershaw, J. and Megoran, N., “Contesting danger: a new agenda for policy and scholarship on Central 67 Asia”, International Affairs, 87:3, 2011, p. 589–612. 68 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST lation of 29.4consists million of Uzbekslation (80%), Russians (5.5%), Tajiks (5%), (9 %), Uighurs (1 %), Dungans (1 %), and other ethnic groups (6 %). of approximately 5.7 million consists of Kyrgyz (69 %), Uzbeks (14 %), Russians 3 2 1 Uighurs (1.4%), TatarsGermans (1.1%). (1.3 %)and including Kazakhs(63 %), Russians (24 %), Ukrainians (2.1 %), Uzbeks (2.9 %), diverse is origin.home Kazakhstan to more than140 peoples andethnicgroups, - under the Soviet regime, they each contain sizeable minority communities of were explicitly createdis designated that as‘ethno-stans’- ethnichomelands diverse demographics,their mono-ethnicnames.Whileall notwithstanding Kyrgyzstan,Kazakhstan, Tajikistan haveand Uzbekistan inherited all ethnically identifying potential solutionsand bestpractices. regional,in nature, inthehopeofidentifying common causesandorigins, and this paper is to identify patterns of discrimination which are transnational,or the ways in which ethnic and linguisticdiscrimination manifests. The aim of policy and politics on ethnicity. Nevertheless, there contemporary are marked similarities between thestates in and historic both in differences significant surprising: the ethnicmake-up of the states varies considerably, andthere are experiences andproblemsdiscrimination.This ishardlylinguistic of ethnicand gins. Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistanand Uzbekistaneach have their own tive issue inpost-Soviet Centralone whichAsia, but has Soviet roots and ori emergedhas language Discrimination ofethnicityand on thebasis distinc a as Victoria Catliff 3 (15.3 %), Russians (1.1 %) andTurkmens (0.3 %). istan’speople includesTajiks of8.3million population (79.9 per cent),Uzbeks States parties -Tajikistan UNDoc.HRI/CORE/1/Add.128, 18February 2004,Para 3. United NationsInternationalRightsHuman Instruments, States parties -Kyrgyzstan, UNDoc.HRI/CORE/KGZ/2008, 22December2008, Para 14. United NationsInternationalRightsHuman Instruments, States parties -Kazakhstan, UNDoc.HRI/CORE/KAZ/2012, 19September 2012,Para 11. United NationsInternationalRightsHuman Instruments, AND UZBEKISTAN KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN OF ETHNICITYANDLANGUAGE IN DISCRIMINATION ONTHEBASIS Coreformingdocument theof part reports of Coreformingdocument theof part reports of Coreformingdocument theof part reports of 3 Finally, Uzbekistan’s popu- 1 Kyrgyzstan’s population 2 Tajik - - - Kazakhs (3%), (2.5%), Tatars (1.5%), other groups (2.5%).4 Legacies of Division lation of 29.4 million consists of Uzbeks (80%), Russians (5.5%), Tajiks (5%), Kazakhs (3%), Karakalpaks (2.5%), Tatars (1.5%), other groups (2.5%).5

The demographic data illustrates the complexity of interethnic relations in the Central Asian states. Thus, it is noteworthy that – despite the ethnic names of the

the “titular” . Indeed, in Kazakhstan, less than two thirds of the pop- kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan ulationstates – is no ethnic more Kazakh. than 4 in It everyis also 5 noteworthy people in any that, state with identifies the exception as a member of Uzbek of- istan, each of the states is home to at least one large ethnic minority community: Kazakhstan again is the most extreme example, with more than a quarter of the also home to one large minority group. Uzbekistan is the outlier in this respect, population identified as ethnic Russian, but both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are data points to another particularity of the region: each state is home to at least onethough “reciprocal even here, minority” there are – that four is, significant an ethnic minority group which populations. is the titular Finally, ethnic the group of a neighbouring state. Moreover, more than 25 years after the fall of the than Tajikistan. Soviet Union, there are significant ethnic Russian populations in all states other later the Soviet Union –were central to shaping the modern ethnic make up of theAs will Central be discussed Asian states. below, Moreover, the policies the legacy of outside of Soviet powers policies – first in particular the Tsars, con and- tinue to shape understanding of ethnicity, and experiences of discrimination and disadvantage. All four states have inherited a distinctly Soviet concept of ethnic- than a concept of ethnicity which is a matter of birth or choice or culture. The understandingity, which signifies of nationality a juridified as (formalised,a juridical status legally perpetuates. cognisable) Insofar identity, as ratherethnic identity and primary language (“mother tongue”) typically, though not univer- sally, coincide across the region, patterns of ethnic and linguistic discrimination tend to reinforce or support one another. Discrimination against ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan, for example, is buttressed by, and indeed can take the primary form of, limitations on the use of the in education and the media. This same pattern is found in Kyrgyzstan regarding education and the very limited availability of Uzbek language media post 2010.

The primary patterns of discrimination across the region operate in favour tit- ular ethnic groups – the bearers of the nominal (titular) ethnicity in each state: Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan, Tajiks in Tajikistan and Uzbeks in Uzbekistan – and disadvantage “non-titulars”, a general term encompassing 1) titular ethnicities of the neighbouring Central Asian states – “reciprocal minori- ties”, 2) ethnic Russians, and 3) other smaller minorities such as Lyuli, Uighurs,

4 The Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uzbekistan, viewed 23 June 2017, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html. 5 The Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uzbekistan, viewed 23 June 2017, available at: 69 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html. 70 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST ing, employment) may benovel inform and characterthey but canequally be ethnic groupstitular for access to socialgoods or resources (education, hous ethnic groups. Other contemporary practices which have the effect of favouring tral’authority mediating amongtheclaimsandneeds of and non-titular titular changed inindependentCentralAsia since there ostensibly isnolongeran ‘neu- toand acceptable non-Russians. The meaning of indigenisation hasnecessarily Russians oroutsiders, in partto make theentire Soviet system more legitimate ment of (politically reliable)or native local cadres to thebureaucracy to replace a long-standingSoviet practice of‘indignenisation’ (korenizatsia): therecruit- gyzstan, Tajikistanand Uzbekistanrepresent insome ways the continuationof ethnic groupsfor (private positionsofauthority KyrKazakhstan, in public) and ods. Contemporary discriminatory practices which favour members of titular and theway inwhich they were governed in theSoviet andpost-Soviet peri understandable given theway inwhich the four states came to beconstituted Discrimination in favourethnic communityis,to of the titular agreat extent, crimination andotherprotections. basis of a failure to enforceand legislativeconstitutional applicable non-dis figure as aregional pattern. Rather, ethnic discrimination typically arises on the functionally discriminatory laws andregulationson thebasisofethnicity donot operate to disadvantagelinguistic (andtherefore ethnic) minorities, facially or ethnic groups priorities or preferences,laws and governinguse whichlanguage the exceptionphenomenon. With of citizenship laws grantingexpatriate titular ethnic discrimination as suchislargelynegative a ratherpositivea than legal – asarulegrounded in theregulatory or legislative regime. Thatis to say, Kyrgyzstan,basis of ethnicity inKazakhstan, Tajikistan andUzbekistanare not Unlike discrimination onreligious grounds, discriminatory practices onthe authorities can serve asalicense for discriminatory treatmentby private actors. be overlappingcan and mutually reinforcing: discriminatory treatmentby the private sector formssharply of discriminationbe need not demarcated and which disproportionately affected ethnicUzbeks in1990and and2010. Public violence (rioting), most notoriously theethnicviolence in Southern Kyrgyzstan has alsotakehousing, but theform of hate crimes and organised inter-ethnic courts. Intheprivate sector, discrimination occurs primarily inemployment and or unwillingness to enforcedecisions thosejudicial which do issue from the attention; adversedecisions; aversion judicial an and toprosecutions bringing of disproportionateobject the prisons): be and minority communitiescan police inatory operationjustice systemof the (lawenforcement, prosecution, courts, likeinstitutions assume theformalso can schools.It oftheinvidious or discrim in administrativeticipation posts, aswell andpolitical as employment in public Discrimination sectorin thepublic typically involves representation andpar- and private sectors. arelanguage ethnicity and readily discerned fourthe in states acrosspublic both Nonetheless, characteristic regionalforms of discrimination on thegrounds of patterns common of presence the despite differences significant exhibit which the targetwith the policiesofstates, communitiesandwith ethnic/linguistic Dungan. The severity and nature of patterns of discrimination vary significantly - - - - - seen as representing an extension of the logic of the Soviet ‘indigenous’ prefer- Legacies of Division ence scheme to other domains. Inevitably, systems, policies and practices which favour titular ethnic groups – whether directly or indirectly – discriminate against members of other ethnic groups.

- omy and ‘nationality’ (ethnicity), before reviewing the commonalties in the con- temporaryThis paper constitutionalfirst sketches the and complex legal framework Soviet approach on ethnic to andethnoterritorial linguistic discrimi auton- nation. The paper then surveys and analyses regional patterns of discrimination kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan arising on the basis of ethnicity, focusing on those which are transnational or regional in nature or effect.

1 History and Context: Soviet Legacy and Contemporary Politics

Contemporary patterns of ethnic and linguistic discrimination in the four states under review are very much a consequence of the distinctive manner in which - tity, and of the patterns of internal migration within the Soviet space which the theregime Union engendered. of Soviet Socialist The Soviet Republics leadership, (USSR) commencing defined and withregulated Lenin ethnic and Stalin, iden instrumentalised national (ethnic) self-determination (nationalism) as part of a programme to achieve a multicultural socialism. To that end, the Soviet author- ities established both the constitutional scheme of ethno-territorial federalism in the 1920s and 1930s6 and the complementary nationalities regime which (autonomy) that established all five7) for Central multiple Asian purposes republics (identity as ethnic documents, homelands employment and education, governance). Indeed, as has been noted: juridified ethnicity (‘nationality’ The world’s first state of workers and peasants was the world’s first state to institutionalize ethnoterritorial federalism, classify all citizens according to their biological nationalities and formally prescribe preferential treatment of certain ethnically defined pop- ulations.8

obligatoryThe Soviet internal regime passport placed a – significant the propiska focus – the on primary identification Soviet identity of nationality. docu- ment.Nationality9 Nationality was officially was determined registered on for the all basis Soviet of descent citizens and as designated “point 5” in from the a (changing) official tally of nationalities compiled on the basis of census data.

6 See Zhussipbek, G., “History of the Central Asian region”, in this publication, section 5 7 See discussion of the concept of nationality in Equal Rights Trust, In the Crosscurrents: Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Ukraine, 2015, p. 123, available at: http://www.equalrightstrust.

Discrimination%20and%20Inequality%20in%20Ukraine.pdf 8 Slezkineorg/sites/www.equalrightstrust.org/files/ertdocs/In%20the%20Crosscurrents%20Addressing%20 Y., “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism”, Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2, 1994, p. 415. 9 Pipko, S. and Pucciarelli, A. J., “The Soviet Internal Passport System”, The International Lawyer, Vol. 19, No. 71 3, 1985, pp. 916–7. 72 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST Germans and Koreans to Kazakhstan. Georgia to UzbekistanandKyrgyzstan, for example,as were Pontic Greeks, Volga ically suspector undesirable: were deported places of exile for so-called enemy nationsandother communities deemed polit wereistan andUzbekistan further complicated by thefacttheythat served as The demographics and socialdynamics ofSovietKyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajik drive for industralisation. tionally, ethnicRussians were encouraged to resettle inCentralAsia, duringthe communities of co-exiles withethniccollective farms being commonplace.Addi linguistic communities. linguistic the republicscensus data, on thebasisoflinguistic having beencreated around conducted was 1920s the in republics Asian Centralfive the of delineation The As noted by Tukmadiyeva, 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 culture, politicsand administration language, andemployment –includingquo- communications, and media education, higher of fields the in policies enisation corresponding structuresauthority was ofpublic only Indig- point. thestarting ernance. Theoriginaldemarcationof territories of the and theestablishment Ethnic discrimination was insome senses inherent intheSoviet mode of gov and Tajikistan. the FerghanaValley which was parcelledbetween out Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, ethnicTajiks in Uzbekistan,for example), particularly in ethnicity ofneighbouringof thetitular minorities”: populations states (ethnic “reciprocal of groups significant included states Asian Central Moreover,most ple –received noterritorial autonomy atall. most marginalisedand smallest minoritiestheDungan,– Uighur, Lyuli, for exam- nationalities (Karakalpaks, Pamiris) received lesser territorial autonomies. The a modified a and Turkmen (initially), andKyrgyz andTajiks (subsequently). tral AsianSoviet SocialistRepublics (SSRs) were created for Kazakhs, Uzbeks mismatch between ethno-linguistic groups andautonomous homelands. Cen enough were accorded territorial homelands(autonomies), a resultingwith nationalities; onlynot encompassall those deemed numerous or concentrated authorities. bydiscrimination,including and sion, violence the acquiescenceof orwith ports ofcitizens.

Ibid. See above, note 5,1,12,13,15and16. Events insouthern Kyrgyzstan, June2010,Paras 33-46. Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission Ibid. Ibid. See above, note 5,1,12,13,15and16. Vol. 12,2016. Tukamadieva,“PropiskaM., Toolas a ofDiscrimination in CentralAsia”, CentralFellowship Asian Papers, 14 propiska

13 hs ra a poe a atclr lspit o ehi ten- ethnic for flashpoint particular a proved has area This 10 regime,and propiska 11 However, theSoviet territorial autonomy scheme could 16

all Centralall Asianstates, havebar Kazakhstan, retained , Report ofthe IndependentInternational Commission into the of Inquiry 15 These groups were typically settledin status is thus inscribed is thus in thepass- status 12 Otherregional en masse from - - - - - Legacies of Division perceived “backwardness” of these nationalities within the wider Soviet tas in some fields – favoured titular ethnic groups, in order to overcome the Empire”,17 in reference to its policy of raising the perceived material and cul- turalUnion. level Thus, of somethe non-European have described peoples the Soviet of the Union Soviet as anUnion “Affirmative to a supposed Action scheme of ethno-territorial autonomy joined with ethnic preferences condi- tionedEuropean a complex standard dynamic exemplified of power by the and Russians. resources In effectin which however, non-titular the complex ethnic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and language in kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan

Moreover,groups suffered while Moscowsignificant assumed disadvantage the central when regulatory compared role with for titular ethnic groups. affairs and inter-ethnic relations,18 its policies – particularly the compulsory and volun- tary resettlement policies – fostered tensions with local populations.19 In Kazakh- stan, for example, the forced resettlement of Germans, Poles, Koreans, and Russians led to a situation in which ethnic Kazakhs became a minority,20 only becoming the largest ethnic group in 1989.21 how central Soviet policy stirred ethnic tension in Kazakhstan is the attempt, in the Gorbachev era, to replace a popular Kazakh First A moreSecretary specific with example an ethnic of Russian - Gennadiy Kolbin – provoking violent disturbances, and equally violent suppression by Soviet security forces.22

Since Independence

The collapse of the USSR and its fragmentation into independent republics nec- essarily meant the collapse of the overarching Soviet multinational project. In its place, the leadership in post-Soviet Central Asian republics has – to varying degrees, and with differences in approach – pursued a national or nation-build-

(anding project legally focussed grounded) on titular the titular nationalism nationality and andtitular reflected privilege in variesa corresponding across the fourideology states, and non-titular policies. Althoughethnic groups the nature experience and degreecomparative of officially disadvantage promoted in all of them, as a result of such policies.

A notable example of this aggravated status is the question of state policy on language, an issue which is inexorably linked with ethnicity. In Kazakhstan, for example, where the ethnic Kazakh population constitutes less than two thirds - isation), aims to promote Kazakh identity in part through use of the .of the total This (63%), has the meant state that nation-building a constitutional policy provision (Kazakhification mandating or Kazakhthe use

17 Martin, T., The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939, Cornell University Press, 2001. 18 Ibid. 19 Ubiria, G., Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia: The Making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations, Routledge 2015, pp 208-17. 20 Kadyrshanow, R., The ethnopolitical situation in multinational Kazakhstan, 1996, pp. 13-14. 21 Minorities and Participation in Public Life: Kazakhstan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2003/WP.9, October 2004, p. 5. 73 22 TheDave, so-called B., United Zheltoksan Nations Office(Kazakh of thefor December)High Commissioner Uprising forof 17 Human December Rights, 1986. 74 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST language and tolanguage develop linguisticdiversity. states as oneofitsobjectives theneedto enhance theunifyingrole ofthestate aimed at appeasinginterethnic tensions and promoting intercultural dialogue, in thepredominantly Uzbekpopulated SouthernKyrgyzstanin 2010, ostensibly the President in April2013, following thesecond wave of interethnic violence Unity andInter-EthnicNational Relations in theKyrgyz Republic”, approved by creatingspace for discriminatory interpretation.The “ConceptonStrengthening Kyrgyz. levelsin all at education of proportion the increasing and arenas; scientific and Kyrgyz; increasing theuse of Kyrgyz economic, in thesocio-political, cultural list of activities aimed at: increasing the numberof people who speak anduse clearly touse oftheKyrgyz boostthe extensivean sets out since it language, to the Constitution, Kyrgyz is the state language, with Russian an official lan official guage. an Russian with language, state the is Kyrgyz Constitution, the to issues also arise in theothercountries in theregion. InKyrgyzstan, according regardingThe situation use may language most stark be but in Kazakhstan, aim. legitimate a achieving of means proportionate a as justified be cannot and the basisofethnicity, itputsminority groups inthat disadvantage,a particular at in particularby ethnicminorities – may constitute indirect discrimination on whichmore ismuch widely understood byin general, thepopulation is used and as Uzbek. regardingcept forsupport thedevelopmentsuch use ofminoritylanguages, and and Ukrainians (21.5%). ethnic minority groups is very low: ethnicRussian (25.3%), Germans (24.7%) 30 29 28 27 26 of Russian (the second official language) alongside Kazakh in the public sector 25 24 23 demonstrated by thefactUniversitythat entrytests are nowexclusively offered Tajiks being thelargest ethnic minority in thecountry, has noticeably declined, as has not beenconsistently implemented in practice. tion. understood by 94% Kazakh is of understoodthe population, by 74% of the popula is home toKazakhstan speakersyetof languages, of amultitude while Russian is whounderstand Russian all Accordingnot Kazakh. but to the2009 census, rectly discriminatingagainst ethnic Russians, Uzbeksethnic minoritygroups, and

Ibid., pp.142-143. Ibid., p.153. EN_0.pdf. http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Kyrgyzstan_ at: available 142, p. 2016, December EqualRights Trust, Lookingfor Harmony -Addressing in Kyrgyzstan Discrimination andInequality , Constitution ofKyrgyzstan 2010,Article10. Ibid. Ibid., addressing-discrimination-and-inequality-kazakhstan. December 2016, pp. 126-127, availablehttp://www.equalrightstrust.org/resources/name-unity-at: EqualRights Trust, that Russian shallbeusedonparwithKazakhinstate institutionsandlocaladministrative bodies. as thestateestablishes Kazakh Article 7oftheConstitutionKazakhstan also providesbut language, 25 andthelevel of understanding of spoken (letalonewritten)among Kazakh 27 p.22. 29 However,the provision respect with to Russianis vague ambiguous, and Besides reference to Russian andEnglish, “there isnothingintheCon 30 InUzbekistan,theuseof and respect for the Tajikdespite language, In the name of unity -AddressingtheKazakhstanIn in unity name of and Inequality Discrimination , 26 Thus, the policyof discontinuing the use of Russian – 28 The underlying intention was 24 This has the effect of indi 23 - - - - in Uzbek, limit access to tertiary education and public sector employment.31 Legacies of Division

The loss of the broader multinational Soviet framework and of the mediating - nic make-up of the Central Asian states. The economic as well as the social con- sequencesand directing of therole Soviet of Moscow break-up have have also resultedled many in non-titular significant groupschanges to to emigrate the eth

‘repatriation’ of Russians from the Central Asian states to the Russian Federa- tion,altogether. but also There of communities has been significant of other ‘irridenta’—that post-independence is of membersemigration, of residentnotably kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan ethnic communities to their respective kin-states (e.g. ethnic Greeks in Kazakh- stan to Greece, ethnic Germans in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to Germany, eth- nic Poles to ).32 This phenomenon is common to post Soviet space and has been termed “the unmixing of peoples”.33

In a similar vein, there has been some degree of immigration of co-ethnics from outside the region to their respective titular states (e.g. ethnic Kazakhs from China to Kazakhstan).34 As a general rule, however, “reciprocal minorities”, or co-ethnics from within the region – such as ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan – have remained in the neighbouring states. Nevertheless, as a result of post-Soviet and in each of them the titular nationality represents a greater proportion of the population“unmixing” than the stateson the presenteve of independence. a significantly Kazakhstan simplified presents demographic a particularly pattern, stark example: having been a minority in their own country before 1989, due to the compulsory resettlement of Germans, Poles, Koreans, Chechens and Rus- sians into Kazakhstan,35 following independence in 1991, the state embarked on a policy of encouraging the repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs living outside of Kazakhstan. This, coupled with the continued of non-Kazakhs, par- ticularly from “Slavic” or “European” nations, and higher birth rates among - tion as a proportion of the whole.36 Kazakhs has resulted in a significant increase in the size of the Kazakh popula Another feature of the Soviet regime – the propiska – has endured, albeit in a modified form. In Uzbekistan, modifications to the regime after independence

31 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and , Uzbekistan: Tajikistan, visited 2016, available at: http://minorityrights.org/minorities/tajiks-2/; Equal Rights Trust, After the Padishah Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan, December 2016, pp. 135-136,

32 Iglicka, K., “Are they Fellow Countrymen or Not? The Migration of Ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan to Poland”,available International at: http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Uzbekistan_EN.pdf. Migration Review, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1998, p. 1007. 33 Brubaker, W.R., “Aftermaths of empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1995, p. 189. 34 Bonnenfant, I. K., “Constructing the homeland: Kazakhstan’s discourse and policies surrounding its ethnic return-migration policy”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2012. 35 See above, note 5, pp. X-Y. 36 , Minority Rights: Cultural Diversity and Development in Central Asia, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2003/WP.9, October 2004; DevelopmentUnited Nations Programme, Office of the Status High of Commissioner Oralmans in Kazakhstan for Human: Almaty Rights, 2006, p. 9, available at: http://web. 75 pdf. archive.org/web/20120306224600/http://www.undp.kz/library_of_publications/files/6838-29587. 76 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST bourers, who travelacross the country. and social benefits: the system particularly affects economic itinerant migrantla individuals inUzbekistan,affecting access to housing, employment, healthcare in violationof theconstitution. Discrimination 2 in accessingsocialbenefits. stricter,migrants in Kyrgyzstan experiencealso Kazakhstan and disadvantages made theregime more strict 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 teeof Racial ontheElimination Discrimination: (CERD) expressedKazakhstan respect therights. For example,in its2014 reviewthe Commit - ofKazakhstan, for inadequate protection ofConvention rights, andinsome case for failure to monitoring committees, bodieswhich haveof thestate beencritical authorities thus subjectto the observations andrecommendations of the respective treaty on thebasis ofrace,nation colour, Theyethnic origin. and national, aredescent, of RacialDiscrimination, which requires states to prohibitforms all ofdiscrimi Covenantrights, the Internationaland Convention formsof all ontheElimination Rights, Article2(2) of which guarantees non-discrimination in theenjoyment of free-standing right; theInternationalCovenant on Economic, and Cultural Social rightspolitical andArticle26 of which provides for non-discrimination as a cle 2(1) of which provides for non-discrimination in theenjoyment ofcivil and notablyincluding theInternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights, Arti- are boundby therelevantnon-discrimination obligations respecting ethnicity, fourAll states are signatories torightshuman theprincipal instrumentsand tration to those affiliated with those agencies. those with affiliated those to tration rules, allowing 59 state bodies and organisations to grantpermanent regis Mirzoyev signed a decree on 7October 2016 relaxingthe Tashkent residency or possiblyconsequence asaofPresidentPresident Karimov’s demise,acting session of a rentalagreement. since theyoutside the capital, privilege state employeesrequire and still pos- continue to disproportionately disadvantageethnic minority groups residing committee recommendations regarding theretention ofthepropiska system,

Vol. 12,2016,pp.12-13. Tukamadieva,“PropiskaM., Toolas a ofDiscrimination in CentralAsia”, CentralFellowship Asian Papers, Ibid. persons inTashkent cityandTashkent region, available at:http://lex.uz/ru/law_collection/?id=3183. permanent Decreeof Ministers No.336oftheCabinet onmeasures for thefurther improvementregimeof the of report ofUzbekistan, UNDoc.CCPR/C/UZB/CO/4, August 2015,Para 20. See, for example, UnitedRights NationsHuman Committee, Concluding onthe fourth observations periodic Uzbek experience, Routledge, 2015,chapter 3. This phenomenon is comprehensively explored in Turaeva, inCentral R.,Migration andIdentity Asia: The Uzbek Constitution1992,Article28. 132-133, available at:http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Uzbekistan_EN.pdf. Trust, residencepermanent in thecityofTashkentand theTashkent region 2011, as discussed in EqualRights Decree on theImprovement of the Passport System 1999, Law onthecategories of citizens subject to Presidential Decree on the“Regulationson thePassport System intheRepublicof Uzbekistan” 1994, Legal Framework onEthnic andLinguistic After the Padishah Addressing inUzbekistan, DiscriminationandInequality December 2016, pp. propiska (registration) ofcitizens of theRepublicforeignof Uzbekistan, citizens and stateless 43 37 withdeleterious effects for freedom of movement, 42 38 Whiletheregime in Uzbekistanis undoubtedly Maintenance ofpropiska disadvantagesmany 39 However, perhaps inlight ofrecent UN 41 Nevertheless, rules thesenew 40 - - - concern about the low number of complaints made under ICERD provisions and Legacies of Division the lack of court cases concerning racial or ethnic discrimination, and invited the state to examine the effectiveness of the legal and judicial systems in providing remedies to victims of .44

The gap between international obligations and domestic legislation remains and against discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and race.45 However, leg- significant.islative provisions All four are states generally afford weak,constitutional ineffective, guarantees or altogether of equal absent. protection While kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan extreme manifestations of discrimination, such as bias-motivated violence (hate crimes) and incitement to violence and discrimination () are prohib- ited by Criminal and Administrative Liability Codes,46 there is inadequate legis- lative protection against discrimination in the public and private sectors. None 47 as required by international law.48 Moreover, while laws in other areas of life of– such the fouras employment states has specific, legislation, comprehensive for example anti-discrimination– contain some non-discrimina legislation, - international law.49 tion provisions, the scope and definition of these provisions is inconsistent with Civil society organisations are impeded by the poor legislative anti-discrimina- tion framework in bringing complaints and asserting rights against discrimina- -

Periodiction. Some Review have ofattributed Kazakhstan the inlack 2014, of jurisprudence the Kazakhstan on International discrimination Bureau to defi for nitional deficiencies and vague terminology. In a submission to the Universal- nitions of legal terms and concepts which prevent individuals from establishing thatHuman discrimination Rights and thehas Ruleoccurred of Law and (KIBR) which criticisedresults in “anthe misapplicationabsence of clear of defi law, with potential cases of discrimination often being decided on other grounds in

44 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Kazakhstan, UN Doc. CERD/C/KAZ/CO/4-5, 2010, Para 21. 45 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 30 August 1995, Article 14; Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 27 June 2010, Article 16; Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, 30 November 1994, Article 17; Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, December 8, 1992, Article 18. 46 See, for example: Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, No. 226-V of 3 July 2014 (as amended up to Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 501-V of April 9, 2016), Articles 54 and 174; Criminal Code of the

Code No. 2012-XII of 22 September 1994, Articles 56 and 156; 47 SeeKyrgyz discussion Republic, in 1 Equal October Rights 1997, Trust, № 68, Looking Articles for 55 Harmony and 299; - CriminalAddressing Code Discrimination of the Republic and of Inequality Uzbekistan, in Kyrgyzstan, December 2016, p. 56; Equal Rights Trust, In the name of unity - Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kazakhstan, December 2016, p. 44; Equal Rights Trust, Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Tajikistan (forthcoming), section 2.2.2; Equal Rights Trust, After the Padishah Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan, December 2016, pp. 43-44. 48 See, for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non- discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2009, Para 37. 49 See discussion in Equal Rights Trust, Looking for Harmony - Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kyrgyzstan, December 2016, section 2.2.3; Equal Rights Trust, In the name of unity - Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Kazakhstan, December 2016, section 2.2.3; Equal Rights Trust, Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Tajikistan (forthcoming), section 2.2.3; Equal Rights Trust, After the 77 Padishah Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan, December 2016, section 2.2.3. 78 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST ed. the comprehensive citizenship laws, which each Central Asianstate has adopt- including notably therules regarding registration of and ethnicity (nationality) as wellstatus) of ethnicity(ethnicityasa as therulesagainst discrimination, role and identification the regulating procedures and rules the consider must legalassessmentof the An framework the stateson ethnicdiscrimination in practice”. 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 provision. purposes of identity documentor passport; contains asimilar Uzbek legislation may choose the ethnicityofeither parentregistercannot (but as mixed) for the fromof the that parents; where theparents’ ethnicityis divergent, thechild law,by Under Kazakh descent. for instance, theethnicityofachildisderived however,cases all In legallydefined remainsa status, identity cognisable ethnic Ethnic Kyrgyz are entitledto awaiver of residency requirements KyrgyzstanBoth recognise andKazakhstan “right a of return” ethnic basis. on an often self-identifyasUzbeks inorder to increase employment opportunities. Tajikthe of “members RightsTrust,byEqualUzbekistan, fied the in community means ofavoidingpose hasbecomea oraverting discrimination. Thus, asidenti- and/or ethnicity, the basisoflanguage electionofethnicityfor registrationpur- policy includes therepatriationpolicy of foreign-born so-called ethnicKazakhs, many, lation retains it. forbid theSoviet practicelegis- Uzbek of compulsoryindicationethnicitybut as wellethnic identity an civicas a Kyrgyzand one.TheKazakh Constitutions citizenship laws ofthestates, citizens in theCentralAsian states effectively bear provide“right a ofreturn”),mentioned inthe is not ethnicity (nationality) and of ethnicity(save, asnoted below, for Kyrgyzstanwhich andKazakhstan both

51 countries withvery smallKazakhminorities: Iran, Afghanistan, and come from theneighbouring countriesof China ethnic Oralman Law oftheKyrgyz Republic No.70onCitizenshipoftheKyrgyz Republic 2007,Article14(2). See above, note 36. Annex 1to theDecree ofthePresident oftheRepublic ofUzbekistan26.02.99no.UP2240,point7 Republicno. 852,point3.4; Statute of Kazakhstan ofthePassport System oftheRepublicof Uzbekistan, of Republic Republicstateless of Kazakhstan, document andrefugee Resolution document, of the Government of the the of citizen a of passport identity cardKazakhstan, of a citizen of theRepublicresidenceof Kazakhstan, permitof a foreigner in the the of destruction and confiscation surrender, replacement, on Marriage(Matrimony)Kazakhstan andFamily 2011, Article 65, Rules for the processing, issue, The Constitution oftheRepublic1995, Article 19 ofKazakhstan (1); The Code of theRepublicof permanent residence inthecityofTashkent andtheTashkent region 2011. Decree on theImprovement of the Passport System 1999, Law onthecategories of citizens subject to Presidential Decree on the“Regulationson thePassport System intheRepublicof Uzbekistan” 1994, XII onCitizenshipoftheRepublic ofUzbekistan1992. RepublicNo. 70onCitizenship of theKyrgyz Republic2007; Lawof theRepublic No. 632- of Uzbekistan Lawof theRepublic on citizenship of theRepublicof Kazakhstan 1991; Lawof Kazakhstan of theKyrgyz http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRKZStakeholdersInfoS20.aspx Universal Periodic Review of Kazakhstan: Civil and Political Rightsand Freedoms InternationalKazakhstan Bureau for Human Rights andRule of Law andothers, Whilecitizenship as aformal matter ineachstate isentirely independent 56 thelargest communitiesofwhom are to befound inChina.Kazakhstan Kazakhs who have immigrated tosince Kazakhstan its independence in 1991. 50 (Kazakh 53

In the context of significant discriminatory policies and practices on 52 : Оралмандар), Оралмандар), or “returnee”, is an official term used by

, Mongolia , Uzbekistan, Pakistan Russia, Kazakh . , 2014, Para 2,availableat: Kyrgyzstan and alsofrom authorities to describe 55 Kazakhstan’s Submission to the Oralman usually oral 54

- has established a regime whereby returning oralmany are entitled to naturali- Legacies of Division support, but subject to residency requirements.57 sation (citizenship) on the basis of a simplified procedure as well as additional 3 Regional Patterns of Ethnic Discrimination and Disadvantage

As might be expected in states with the complex history and modern demogra- phy of the four Central Asian republics which are the focus of this study, in each kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan country, there are many and varied patterns of discrimination and disadvantage affecting different ethnic groups. However, the focus of this paper is on iden- tifying those transnational patterns of discrimination which have a particular relevance at the regional level, and as such, this section of the paper focuses on those issues which are evident in more than one state, and which appear preva- – albeit with different manifestations – across the region.

Groups Exposed to Discrimination and Disadvantage

As noted above, the cross-cutting regional patterns of discrimination in Central in each state, and the correlative disadvantage of minorities. However, the expe- riencesAsia reflect of these the entrenched minority groups privileged are far status from afforded uniform. to Research the titular in ethnic the four group dif- ferent countries which are the focus of this paper reveals a kind of “hierarchy” of minority groups, with those at each level experiencing discrimination with greater severity. The three levels in this hierarchy can be considered as: (1) eth- nic Russians; (2) reciprocal minorities (titular ethnic groups from neighbouring states); (3) marginal, or smaller, minority groups.

Ethnic Russians

370,000 (6.4%) in Kyrgyzstan, 1.65 million in Uzbekistan (8.4%) and 3.68 mil- lionThere (21.5%) are significant in Kazakhstan numbers – withof ethnic Tajikistan, Russians where in three Russians of the constitute four states just – 1.1 % of the population, being the only exception. Yet despite the size of the - itous decline since the end of the Soviet period, a consequence of the so-called “unmixing”ethnic Russian of the population populations in the in theregion region. today,58 these figures represent a precip

Russians into Central Asia, who were encouraged, incentivised, or required for professionalAs discussed or by bureaucratic Zhussipbek, reasonsthe Soviet to relocateperiod saw to the significant periphery. resettlement59 Throughout of the Central Asian region, Russians were engaged in the administration of the

57 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1991, Article 16 (1). 58 Brubaker, W.R., “Aftermaths of empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1995, p. 189. 79 59 See above, note 5, pp. X-Y. 80 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST soutnumbered Kazakhsontheeve ofthebreak-up oftheUSSR. FollowingGreat. Catherine the decades of Soviet resettlementpolicies, Russian - sian migration,largely for agriculturelive-stock and raising, sincethedays of extensiveof zone a been had Rus Kazakhstan - northernRussia, of and flank ern migration for historicaland settlement, reasons.abutted Kazakhstan thesouth- sians inCentralAsia never achieved thelevelsstates, itdid in theBaltic ethnicity becameasource ofresentment. Although, discrimination against Rus - theRussiansbecame independent, confronted a sudden loss of status; Russian during the Soviet period. However, once the peripheral (non-Russian) republics the universalspeaking tongue, Russians enjoyed asetofcorrelative advantages ing astheygroupethnic /national didthedominant oftheSoviet Unionand generalpattern in theformer Soviet Union. Formerlybroad aprivileged minority,a represent- reflects today Asia Central in Russians ethnic of position The minorities who sharedthe majorityofpopula with ethnicityandlanguage a different ethnicmajority. Thus, the current Central Asianstates inherited large erogenous Ferghanavalley region,the major urban and centres –instates with Soviet policyhadtheeffect of“stranding”ethnic groups –particularly inthehet- ticularly inurbanareas. existed, and where different ethno-linguistic communities had co-existed, par- lished the borders of five SSRs in a region where no such borders had previously nities exist asaconsequence of Sovietdelimitation policy, national which estab- neighbouringa state. Asdiscussed elsewherethese commu- inthispublication, minority ethnicgroupleast onesubstantial which ethnic is groupthe titular of As noted above, each of the four Central Asianstates under review is home to at Reciprocal Minorities ties discussedbelow. communi- minority marginal small, the of that definitelythan is better and ties, foursian minorityinall states isgenerally betterof reciprocalthat than minori a constitutionally-protectedNevertheless, status. the positionofethnicRus - to thereduced useof the Russianeven language, incases wherehas thelanguage discrimination primarilypolicies whichconsequence oflanguage a as have led As discussed below, ethnicRussians intheCentralAsia region today experience harassment anddiscriminationinareas suchasemployment. early-post Soviet period, Russians in CentralAsia found themselves targets of or industrial initiatives. as Russians were incentivised to migrate to participate inmajoragricultural ment and administration. Resettlementfor alsocameabout economic purposes, Soviet state, andwere, disproportionately asaresult, represented in govern 63 62 61 60

See above, note 5,pp.X-Y. No.2, (Summer1992) 269-291. Brubaker, W.R.,, “Citizenship Struggles inSoviet Successor States” International Migration Review, Vol. 26, See above, note 5,pp.X-Y. See above, note 5,pp.X-Y. 60 63 Kazakhstan exhibited Kazakhstan a distinctive pattern of Russian Dividing the region broadlylinguistic lines,the along 61

62 inthe - - - tion in one of their neighbouring states. Legacies of Division

Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have Uzbek populations, though the scale of the group in Kyrgyzstan (14%)64 dwarfs that of Kazakhstan (2.9 %).65 Tajik- istanis home to the largest recorded reciprocal minority: more than 15% of thepopulation is Uzbek.66 to bothTajiks (5%) and Kazakhs (3%),67 though some commentators have sug- gested that the ethnic Tajik According population to could official in statistics,fact be much Uzbekistan higher, with is home the 68 difference accounted for by misrepresentation during the census. Of these com- kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan munities, three merit particular attention because of their size and their particu- larly charged relations with the dominant (titular) ethnicity: ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan, and ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan.

Ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan were the primary victims of two outbreaks of interethnic violence in the country in 1990 and 2010. A report by the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, which investigated the causes and consequences of the 2010 violence, found that the majority of those who were injured or killed during the violence were Uzbek, and the majority of property damage affected Uzbek homes.69 Yet despite the fact that ethnic Uzbeks were more likely to be victims of the violence, ethnic Uzbeks were also over-represented among those who were subject to criminal proceedings related to the violence: 79% of those who were accused of criminal offences related to the violence were ethnic Uzbek.70 The authorities have been criticised for failing to address the root causes of the 2010 in the criminal justice system, in employment and in public life.71 conflict, and there is evidence of continued discrimination against ethnic Uzbeks As noted, Tajikistan is home to the single largest reciprocal minority in the region, with 15% of the population identifying as ethnic Uzbek, though even 72 Tensions between the Uzbek minority and the government and the majority this is a reduction from the Soviet period, when the figure was closer to 25%. in 1994 in the Vaksh valley, in 1996 when there was a coup attempt led by two ethnichave flared Uzbeks, at various and 2006, points after since a border the country dispute became between independent, Tajikistan and including Uzbek-

64 United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, Core document forming part of the reports of States parties - Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc. HRI/CORE/KGZ/2008, 22 December 2008, Para 14. 65 United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, Core document forming part of the reports of States parties - Kazakhstan, UN Doc. HRI/CORE/KAZ/2012, 19 September 2012, Para 11. 66 United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, Core document forming part of the reports of States parties - Tajikistan UN Doc. HRI/CORE/1/Add.128, 18 February 2004, Para 3. 67 The Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uzbekistan, viewed 23 June 2017, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html. 68 Pillalamarri, A., “The Tajik Tragedy of Uzbekistan”, The Diplomat, available at: http://thediplomat. com/2016/09/the-tajik-tragedy-of-uzbekistan/. 69 Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, 2011, p. ii, Para. 3 70 Ibid., p. 39. 71 pdf. 72 MinoritySee above, Rights note 27,Group, available World at:Directory http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Kyrgyzstan_EN_0. of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Tajikistan: Uzbeks, visited 81 2016, available at: http://minorityrights.org/minorities/uzbeks-3/. 82 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST apart fromapart marginalisation.their social and They thedesignation“gypsy” are to these groups: they have nothingincommonwiththeRoma inCentralEurope years to(tsigane,decades. Theterm last the roma) “gypsy” isinfactinapposite and whichsubcontinent have beensettledfor periods ranging from hundreds of share apresumptive origin outside the region, inAfghanistan, Iran andtheIndian ofthe four Each have countriesall heterogeneouswhichpopulations, “gypsy” Lyuli region. discrimination and disadvantage,and their presencecountries in the in multiple of these groupsattention, meritparticular given their experiencesparticular of marginalisation,and political are particularly vulnerableto discrimination. Two minority groups.ginal” These groups,due to their social size and theirsmall groups, eachofthefour CentralAsian states also hasanumberof smaller, “mar- ethnic reciprocalminority and Russian significant to home being to addition In Marginal Minorities the useofUzbeklanguage. Tajiks in employment andhigher education is largely afunctionof promotion of mist extremists orirredentists.78 As discussed below, discrimination against and asTajiks havethose groups beenamongst presented by theregime asIsla has promoted identity andpromotedthe Uzbeknational the Uzbeklanguage, has demonstrablyUzbekistan worsened in thepost-Soviet period, as thestate education,andculturalment, expression) for Uzbeks.77of Tajiks The status in selves at a disadvantage in the face of official preferential treatment (in employ and Samarkand,Uzbekistan.76 Tajiks within inSovietfound Uzbekistan them- thus leaving theprincipalurbanconcentrations of Tajik-speakers, in Bokhara Sovietthe Uzbek within Republic Socialist (SSR) to separateof a thestatus SSR, in 1929 to elevate oftheTajik thestatus Autonomous Republic(formed 1924) Tajiksdates in Uzbekistan from early Soviet times,when thedecision was made pressurelationist marginalisation.75 andlinguistic Thesubordinate of status tematic state policy of whichUzbek nationalism has exposed them to assimi TajTajiks havein Uzbekistan beensubjectto disadvantageas aresult of the sys- istan. 78 77 76 75 74 73 under-representation inpoliticallife. has reduced opportunities andcontributedin educationandemployment, to

See above, note 30. 115–133 Adams, L.,“Ethnicitythe politicsofheritageinUzbekistan”, and CentralSurvey, Asian 2013, Vol.32, No. 2, in the NewEurope, Routledge 1998 Horsman, S., “The TajikMinority inUzbekistaniPolitics”, inCordell, andDemocratisation K.,ed.,Ethnicity Folz, R.,”The Tajiks ofUzbekistan”, Central AsianSurvey, 1996, 15(2),213-216 state. Reporting Ergasheva,“UzbeksZ. andShams,B., Facein Increasingly Obstacles TajikState”, InstituteWar of andPeace Ibid. 73 More recently, thegovernment’s focus on promoting theTajik language , 2014, availableat: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbeks-face-obstacles-increasingly-tajik- 74 - - - referred to by various ethnonyms, but are typically called Lyuli or Mughat; the Legacies of Division term “Lyuli” is most widely use and is adopted here, albeit advisedly.79

The Lyuli have distinctive occupational and ritual features, including endogamy, which set them apart from the surrounding population, even though sharing the local vernacular. There are different sub-groups within the wider Lyuli popula- tion, each of which have distinct cultural and linguistic sub identities and typi- cally speak distinctive dialects of Tajik, and are concentrated in Tajikistan and 80 Uzbekistan. kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan

Under the Soviet Union, the various Lyuli groups were forcibly sedentarised, along with other nomadic minority populations, and settled in rural , apart from populations which traditionally had inhabited the larger cities, in distinct . The Lyuli “gradually adopted an almost entirely sed- entary lifestyle and became an integral part of the social structures of Soviet society” albeit “generally at its periphery”.81

After the Soviet collapse, the residential segregation and cultural differences of Lyuli groups exposed them to new forms of discrimination. They became increas- ingly subject to discrimination in education and employment particularly, and assumed marginal occupations such as peddling, scrap-mongering, and begging. Stigmatisation and marginalisation of the Lyuli across the new Central Asia are thus a recent phenomenon; whereas they were accommodated in multicultural USSR, they have been targeted to greater or lesser degree by the new regimes and societies of the post-Soviet states.

In Kyrgyzstan, the disadvantages of the Lyuli community in Kyrgyzstan concern lack of identity documents, access to housing, employment and education.82 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern about the lack of educational participation by and opportunities for Lyuli children.83 In 2013, UNICEF reported that only around 40% of school-age Lyuli children actually attended school and that, in a community numbering around 4,000 people, only 80 had completed the tenth grade and just two had completed higher educa- tion.84 According to research conducted by Equal Rights Trust, in Uzbekistan, the Lyuli are arguably the most stigmatised and marginalised ethnic group in the country, who face discrimination in almost every area of social, economic and political life.85 Despite this, the state does not recognise discrimination against the Lyuli, leading the CERD to express concern that the situation of the Lyuli had

79 Wixman, R., The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook, Routledge, 1988, p. 40. 80 Marushiakova, E. and Popov, V., Gypsies in Central Asia and the , Palgrave Macmillan 2016, pp 9-16 81 Ibid. 82 See above, note 27, p. 148. 83 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc. CRC/C/KGZ/CO/3-4, 7 July 2014, Para 18. 84 UNICEF, Education Equity Now! A regional analysis of the situation of out of school children in Central and and the Commonwealth of Independent States – Summary brochure, 2013, pp. 12-13 85 Equal Rights Trust, After the Padishah: Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan, 2016, pp. 83

137-150, available at: http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Uzbekistan_EN.pdf. 84 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST ical activities within Kyrgyzstan. organization,is under“governmentit control”participatedoes not and inpolit pendent researcher on Uighurs has stated whilethat is Uighura “major” Ittipak institutions. quotes intheUighurhave language) beenremoved from schools and cultural or figures historical and writers academic, Uighur of portraits as (such culture schools’ curriculum, while any visualreferences to theUighurand language modules on the“History of Uighur People” have beenremoved from theUighur ernment does not [such as language schools ernment does and charity]”.not [suchaslanguage grievances of Kyrgyzstan’s Uighurand meeting needs when population thegov contributing tocontributing areduction inthenumberofstaffandstudents. Russian only hasresultedconditions in unequal for Uighur speaking students, curriculum andentrancethe national with tests for highand schools in Kazakh are undergoing adeep crisis”: the use of Uighur texts which are inconsistent Research by theEqualRights Trustfound inKazakhstan “Uighur that schools interests ofChina”. states to protect theirrights, particularly ifthey involve any issues related to the tralAsia isincreasing Uighurs result, a (…)as on Centralcount cannot Asian states. Indeed, one academic has noted that “China’s economic influence in Cen evolvingrelations between theirhomestatesChina, Russia and their home and the Uighurity populations, have become,insome ways, unwittingpawns inthe and thedifferencesof the populations in culturewith themajor- andlanguage tively) are particularly exposed to discrimination. In additiontosize thesmall KyrgyzstanIn the Uighur andKazakhstan, (1% and 1.45% populations respec Uighurs not beenrecognised “asaform ofracial discrimination” by thestate. 91 90 89 88 87 86 is inits28 independence. An Uighur(Kyrgyz-Uighur association,Ittipak UnityAssociation) In Kyrgyzstan, thesituationfor Uighurhas alsodeteriorated populations since the political activitiesthe political ofUighurs and meetingsofUighurs are attended by the recent“in years, theKyrgyzstani authoritieshave started to monitor andrestrict Trust research inKyrgyzstan;activistspolitical local reported to theTrust that:

See above, note 86. Influence”, EurasiaNet, November 2014, Chinese Fearavailable at:http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71096 Still Cautious, Uighurs “Kyrgyzstan’s C., Maza, See above, note 23 2016 as cited in EqualRights Trust, Addressing Inthe inKazakhstan nameofUnity: DiscriminationandInequality , InternationalKazakhstan Bureau forRights Human andRuleof Law, interviewExpert H., July with 2016, Studies Program atGeorge Washington University,3 Feb. 2015, Canada:, http://www.refworld.org/docid/560b96564.html political groups,minority including activities (2012-2015) andauthorities, includingsociety state protection provided to victimsofviolence anddiscrimination;Uighur Immigration andRefugee Board of Canada, Kyrgyzstan: Treatment by oftheminority [Uighur] Uighur Doc. CERD/C/UZB/8-9,13May 2013,Paras 312-315. Committeeof on theEliminationRacialDiscrimination, , p.139,available at:http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Kazakhstan_EN_0.pdf. th year and “plays a strong role in conflict prevention by addressing the 89 , p.139. 87 91 This opinion is corroborated by EqualRights , citing a Professora , citing from the InternationalDevelopment Eighth to Ninth Periodic Report: Uzbekistan , UN , 12February 2015, 90 KGZ105071.E, However, aninde 88 Furthermore, 86 availableat: - - - - - authorities”.92 Help towards the Uighurs from China seems to provoke a harsher Legacies of Division response than advocating for rights for former Soviet Uighurs. For example, if China requests arrest or extradition of its Uighur citizens resident in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz government is likely to oblige them”.93 Indeed, between 2001 and 2011, around 50 Uighurs seeking asylum were reportedly extradited from Kyr- gyzstan to China.94 The CERD has expressed its concern that: “[a] discriminatory approach is applied regarding registration procedures and recognition of refu- gee status with respect to foreign Uighurs (…), placing them in risk of harass- 95 ment by the police and refoulement”. kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan

4 Patterns of Discrimination and Disadvantage countries, in light of historical, political, economic and social factors. Neverthe- Asless, noted, in the patterns Central Asiaand experiencesregion, a number of discrimination of distinctly regionalvary significantly patterns ofbetween ethnic discrimination – with common roots and similar manifestations – can be iden-

Discriminatorytified. Violence

The most serious pattern of ethnic discrimination in the region is that of interethnic violence and associated hate speech. Far and away the most seri- ous and large-scale incidents of such violence have occurred in Kyrgyzstan, but lesser forms of harassment and violence have occurred in Kazakhstan and other nowparts divided of the region between as well. Tajikistan, Mixed Uzbekistan, communities and where Kyrgyzstan. violence has flared up are frequently to be found in the Fergana Valley, a once-unified territory which is In Kyrgyzstan, interethnic violence, centred around Osh and Jalalabad, in June 2010 claimed close to 500 lives and resulted in nearly 2000 injured.96 Although the great majority of those who suffered the effects of violence in the riots were ethnic Uzbeks, the great majority of those detained and prosecuted in the after- math of the riots were similarly ethnic Uzbeks.97 Almost 80% of those brought up on criminal charges following the violence were Uzbek, including 24 of 27 charged with murder.98 Moreover, the Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission, established to investigate the causes and consequences of the violence, found that police and military sweeps after the restoration of order directly targeted and brutal- ised Uzbeks.99 As discussed below, the vulnerability of ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kazakhstan endures, even years after the events of 2010. The Committee on the

92 See above, note 27, pp. 149-151, 93 See above, note 86. 94 See above, note 27, pp. 149-151, 95 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc. CERD/C/KGZ/CO/5-7, 19 April 2013, Para 17. 96 See above, note 68. 97 See above, note 96. 98 See above, note 68, Para 202. 85 99 Ibid., Paras 199-201 86 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST involved in the conflict “identified themselves by ideology”. regional definite a (and therefore had ethnic)dimension, scholars have war, notedmost oftheparties that civil Tajik the While case. each in community ity seen widespreadnot violence, despite ethnic size of thereciprocal the minor In contrast withneighbouring Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistanhaveand Uzbekistan tended to downplay andfail to investigate suchincidents. of themurder of anethnicKazakhbyethnic Tajik. an the latter involving large-scaleriots and skirmishes in threein thewake villages haveinvolving beenincidentsinsouthernKazakhstan ethnic Uzbeks Tajiks, and the violence in Osh and Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan. the violenceinOshandJalalabad of ruralnumber ., roughly contemporaneous withthough unrelated to stan, episodic incidents of interethnic attacks were reported in 2010 from a violence, smallerincidents have occurred elsewhere intheregion. InKazakh While Kyrgyzstan has seen the largest andmostsevere outbreak of interethnic 100 fourall In ethnicgroups countries,themajorityofthoseinnon-titular donot –both for ethnicRussians andfor otherminoritygroups. causes This problems of communication –andhence creates a barrier to equal participation status. official of degrees varying given been has Russian though language, official the designated been has group ethnic titular the of language ethnic Russians, reciprocal minorities and marginalgroups. four Inall states, the the Centralregion,Asia affectingthreeall oftheethniccategories aboveset out – use is a centralLanguage andlanguage issue for ethnic minorities throughout Language 101 102 103 104 105 lence. and sanctions imposed on those charged and convicted” inthewake of the vio attitudes based on ethnicityininvestigations, prosecutions, condemnations the root causesoftheviolence,andexpressed “reportsconcern at of biased of the ICERD in 2013, criticised of progressthe lack by thestate inaddressing of RacialElimination Discrimination,reviewing Kyrgyzstan’s implementation authorities, and in employment, asaconsequenceoftheviolence. authorities, andinemployment, Uzbek minority continueto experience problems ininteraction withthestate stan, hasacted asabulwark against interethnic violence. speculated that theauthoritariannature of the regimes, particularly in Uzbeki-

See above, note 94,Para. 6. See above, note 27,pp.136-147 of Racial Discrimination , 2010,Para 26). Kazakhstan Government on Implementation ofthe International Convention onthe Elimination ofall forms Minorities and others, In Malybai, Shilik,Mayatas,Malovodnoe, and elsewhere Aktau (Center for Legal Aid to the Ethnic Minority Rights Group, State ofthe World’s Minorities andIndigenous Peoples 2015 downloads/Accord%2010_3The%20Tajik%20civil%20war_2001_ENG.pdf Akiner, S.andBarnes,C.,“TheTajikCivil war: causesanddynamics”, availablehttp://www.c-r.org/at: in Drobizeva, Z,andothers(ed.) Fane,D.,” Ethnicity andRegionalism throughStability inUzbekistan:Maintaining Authoritarian Control”, 100

Research by theEqualRights Trust in2015 and 2016 foundthe that Kazakhstan NGO Comments on the Fourth andFifth Periodic Reports ofthe inthe Post-Soviet World, 1996. 102 More recently, in2015, there 103 Lawenforcement have 105 104 Someauthorshave , 2015,p.139. 101

- - - have a good (or any) command the titular language and are therefore often at a Legacies of Division disadvantage in various areas of economic, social, civil and political life, where the titular language is used. The chief patterns of discrimination and disadvan- tage affecting non-titular language speakers are found in education (lack of non-titular language streams in primary and secondary instruction and lack language as condition of employment), engagement with public services (lack of non-titular language tuition), employment (requirement of fluency in titular media and communications (lack of availability of broadcast and print media in kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan non-titularof non-titular languages). language official documents and communications), and, of course,

Prior to the collapse of the USSR and the establishment on independent states, lingua franca, the language of inter (really trans-)-ethnic communication. It is still in very wide the enjoyed a pre-eminent status as the official Russian population as a proportion of the whole),106 Kyrgyzstan,107 and (to a lesseruse in degree)Kazakhstan Uzbekistan (historically and Tajikistan.the most Russified, It enjoys andconstitutionally today with the protected largest 108 and Kyrgyzstan109 although not in statusit is the as native an official tongue language of the large in Kazakhstan ethnic Russian populations in many countries, butUzbekistan because or reciprocal Tajikistan. and The other Russian non-titular language minoritiesis significant continue not merely to be because much - guage. Thus, state policies and actions which restrict the availability of Russian languagemore likely resources to be fluent and inthe or public able touse use of Russianthe Russian than language the titular have (national) the effect lan of disadvantaging all non-titular minorities, not only Russians.

As discussed above, approximately 75% of the largest ethnic minority groups in - sian is spoken (albeit as a second language) almost universally (94%), among bothKazakhstan ethnic minoritiesdo not speak in Kazakhstan the official (includingstate language ethnic – Russians,Kazakh. Conversely, but also Uighur, Rus Uzbek, Ukrainian, Korean, German, Azerbaijani, Tatar, Armenian, and Dungan) and the majority of ethnic Kazakhs.110 Among minorities, the levels of Kazakh competence are low (ethnic Russian 25.3%, Germans 24.7% and Ukrainians 21.5%.).111 The Equal Rights Trust has found that minorities are thus severely disadvantaged by the increasing tendency for public services, public employment and education to be mediated in the Kazakh language, despite the protected con- stitutional status of Russian.112

Russian translations of official communications

106 Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic Of Kazakhstan, 2011, pp. 21–22, 107 National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009, Book I: Main social and demographic characteristics of population and number of housing units, 2009, Table 4.2, p. 53, available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ demographic/sources/ census/wphc/Kyrgyzstan/A5-2PopulationAndHousingCensusOfTheKyr gyzRepublicOf2009.pdf 108 See above, note 22. 109 See above, note 26, Article 10. 110 See above, note 105. 111 Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Results of the 2009 National Population Censusof the Republic Of Kazakhstan, 2011, pp. 21–22, 87 112 See above, note 27, pp. 133-143 88 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST Inter-ethnic Relations. topursuant education, and the2013 Presidentialand Unity ConceptonNational the statequences), with promotinguse ofKyrgyzthe culturaland public in life In Kyrgyzstan, aparalleltendency has developedwith different (albeit conse practice. (e.g. courtdocuments),though mandated by law,are oftenforthcoming not in 113 decision-makingpolitical are reducing opportunities for the Uzbekminority”. reporting “Tajik-focusedthe exclusionpolicies and language ofminorities from Uzbek speakingminority. According to anInstitute of War andPeace Report - have involved thepromotion oftheTajikdespitelanguage, thepresence of alarge In Tajikistan, asinKazakhstan andKyrgyzstan, statepolicies nation-building 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 cation. urbancentres, the Tajik is restrictedlanguage initsavailabilityedu- in mediaand largest singleand are minoritypopulation in two thedominantelement major is mirroredThe situation where, inUzbekistan, although Tajiks constitute the concerns by theCESCR of access to media, both issues Uzbek language which have beenhighlighted as Problems centreof accessto onlack and lack educationintheUzbeklanguage n bodat su dw (wn t te lgt f h onr) n remained and owners) the closed or were subsequently converted of to Kyrgyz-language. flight the to (owing down shut broadcast) and ment. to theirlackofcommandKyrgyz. owing situation social in hostility wellas employmentas securing in difficulties continues to bewidely used, Russian speakers in theKyrgyz Republicconfront has appreciably diminished. the availabilityUzbek-language ofboth instruction andUzbek-language media minority.non-titular of theprincipal language the wake In ofthe2010 violence, much lesssetoutmeasuresall, for the supportof Uzbek use,despite itsbeingthe through afocus onKazakhethnicidentity, languageandculture. by thegoverning regime, which seeks to promoteidentity national Kazakhstani pursued policy “Kazakhification” so-called the of manifestation a itself is life lic

Minority Rights Group, State ofthe World’s Minorities andIndigenous Peoples 2015 appeal. 2015, availablehttps://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/27/kazakhstan-journalloses-shutdown-at: RightsHuman Watch,Loses Journal Shutdown “Kazakhstan: Appeal”, RightsHuman Watch, 27February See above, note 27,p.133. Inter-Ethnic Relations intheKyrgyz Republic”, 10April2013,№74. Decree of thePresident of the Kyrgyz Republicthe ConceptonStrengthening“On Unity and National See above, note 68,p.154. Ibid., Ibid., See above, note 73. U.N. Doc.E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3, Para 11. United NationsCommittee onEconomic,Culturaland Social Rights: Concluding Tajikistan,Observations: Tajikistan, U.N. Doc.CERD/C/TJK/CO/6-8. United NationsCommitteeof Racial on theElimination Discrimination, See above, note 30. 114 123 p. 156. p 158. The tendency towardsof Russian diminished acceptance use and inpub 113 Tajikmedia are language to alsosubject repression; in Mavlonov and Russian-languagemedia have beensubjectto discrimnatory enforce- 116 121 The Concept omits mention of the Uzbek language at at The Conceptomitsmentionof theUzbeklanguage andCERD. 117 Alsointhewake oftheriots,Uzbekmedia(print 119 122

118 Concluding Observations: Though Russian , 2015,p.139. 115

120 - -

Sa’di v Uzbekistan, held that Uzbekistan had violated Article 27 in conjunction Legacies of Division with Article 2 of the ICCPR by denying the registration application of the Tajik language newspaper “Oina”.124 Moreover, while Karakalpak and Uzbek are both recently been replacing the Karakalpak names of populated places, geographical features,official languages and administrative in the Karakalpak divisions autonomous with Uzbek republic, language “the names government only”.125 has

As parties to the ICCPR, all four Central Asian states have obligations to prohibit discrimination on the basis of language, as well as on the basis of ethnicity. In kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan addition, under Article 27 of the ICCPR, ethnic and linguistic minorities have the right “in community with others” to use their own language. This latter obliga- where ethnic minorities in all four countries experience problems. Moreover, as discussedtion is particularly by the Equal relevant Rights in Trust the fields in its assessmentof education of and Kazakhstan’s public media, laws, areas pol- icies and practices on discrimination, while there may be reasonable limits on the ability of the state authorities to provide information and services in a range of different languages, where a common language of communication – such as Russian – exists and is not used, this can raise concerns about indirect discrimi- nation on the basis of ethnicity.126

Education

As indicated above, across the four states, ethnic discrimination in education is largely, if not entirely, a function of language regulation, inequalities in the public provision of education in different languages, and resulting barriers in access for ethnic minority groups. Schools and educational institutions providing minori- ty-language instruction are generally limited, with numbers being reduced. In general, Russian language instruction has fared better than instruction in the languages of reciprocal minorities and marginal groups, though even here there are causes for concern. The unequal language provision is maintained at pri- mary, secondary and tertiary levels.

In Kazakhstan, minority language primary and secondary instruction is gen- relevant language (Uighur, Tajik, Uzbek), apart from Russian-language instruc- tion,erally which available is more only generallyin areas with available. sufficiently Nevertheless, high numbers the numbers of speakers of Russian of the language schools are reducing.127 Other minority language schools, particularly Uzbek and Uighur, are also in decline: there were only 14 Uighur and 2 Tajik

124 Mavlonov and Sa’di v Uzbekistan, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1334/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004, 2009, Para 8.7. 125 Minority Rights Group, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Uzbekistan: Karakalpaks, visited 2016, available at: http://minorityrights.org/minorities/karakalpaks/ 126 See above, note 23, pp. 134-135. 127 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Reviews of National Policies for Education: Secondary , Overview of the education system of Kazakhstan, 2014, p. 27, available at: http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/reviews-of- national-policies-for-education-secondary-education-inkazakhstan/overview-of-the-education-system- 89

of-kazakhstan_9789264205208-4-en#page5. 90 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST longer inUzbek. universityall entrance exams beconducted ineither Kyrgyz or Russian, andno ment changeditspolicyto requiretestingall that secondary at school level and in one in the west of the country, “five years ago, 80 per cent of classes of cent per 80 ago, years “fivecountry, the of west the in town one in to Uighur culture andcultural figures. have been eliminated from the Uighur-stream schools, together with references the role of Kazakhs inthehistory of thepolity. Thus,Uighur history modules history teaching toin particular minimisetherolemagnify and ofnon-Kazakhs regulationlanguage also throughbut changestochanges towith thecurriculum, government have hadeffect ontheprovision of education notsolely through offers only Russian and Kyrgyz and theother has closed. institutions of higher education which formerly offered courses in Uzbekone materials may be deficient. crimination hasexpressedstaff and curricula, minority language concern that receive educationintheirownlanguage, In Kyrgyzstan, while theConstitutionguarantees the right for minorities to schools in 2013. 137 128 languages. minority in working teachers qualified of lack the and groups minority to ing CRC have bothcriticised the state forof textbooksa lack for children belong Yetidentifying asUzbek. 15%ofthepopulation almost with theCERDand As noted, Tajikistan ishome to thelargest oftheregion’s reciprocal minorities, 129 130 131 132 133 134 136 135 children receiving instructioninUzbek. Between 2002 and2012, there has been a62% reduction inthenumbers of have eliminated the latter, insome cases owing to acut-off in state funding. whichabad hadpreviously offeredKyrgyz both instruction andUzbeklanguage hasbeendecreasing.vided in theUzbeklanguage SchoolsinOshandJalal- also diminishedintheSouth,though notinthecapitalandNorth.

sixth to eighth periodic report ofTajikistan, U.N. Doc CERD/C/TJK/CO/6-8, 24October 2012 See,for example, Committee of on the RacialElimination Discrimination, Concluding onthe observations UN Doc.CERD/C/KAZ/6-7,5August 2013,Para 10 Committeeof Racial ontheElimination Discrimination, Doc. CERD/C/KAZ/CO/4-5, Para 9 Committeeof Racial ontheElimination Discrimination, the Eliminationofallforms ofRacial Discrimination,2010,Para 26. Fifth Periodic Reports of the Kazakhstan Government onImplementation ofthe International Convention on Center for LegalAid to theEthnic Minorities and others, See above, note 26,Article10,paragraph 3. See above, note 27,p154. Ibid., at: http://www.tol.org/client/article/23290-tough-talk-on-kyrgyz-schools.html. Ibraimov,and Akmatov, B. T., “Tough Talkon Kyrgyz Schools”, Transitions Online London, ascited inEqual Rights Trust, above, note 27. EqualRights Trust, with Interview X.,anexpert inmulti-lingual education, 30 November 2016, Osh and on HumanRights Kyrgyz Republicarticles of the of International Covenanton Civil and Political Rightsto theCommitteeUN of Kyrgyzstan, 2014, pp.3-4; YouthRights Human Group etal, United NationsCountry Team inKyrgyzstan, p. 155. 137 In 2014, In the Institute ofWar andPeace Reporting reported that , 2014,Para 14. 135 128 Further, theCommittee of on theEliminationRacial Dis The number of schools offering instruction inRussian has 129 Moreover, policies of thecentral theKazakhisation Joint UNCTJoint submissionfor theUniversal2015 PeriodicReview 130 133 Atthe tertiary level,one ofthetwo 131 theproportion ofeducationpro- Sixth andSeventhPeriodic Reports: Kazakhstan, Concluding Kazakhstanobservations: , 2010, UN Kazakhstan NGO Comments onthe Fourth and NGO report onthe implementation by 134 In2014, the govern , 6August2012, available 136 , Para. 18. 132 - - - were taught in Uzbek and 20 per cent in Tajik. Now it is the other way round”.138 Legacies of Division Moreover, as in Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks who have managed to access school- as there are no universities offering courses in Uzbek, other than those focused oning Uzbek in their literature own language or training experience to provide significant primary challenges education at in the Uzbek. tertiary139 level,

The CERD has criticised Uzbekistan for failing to make adequate provision

the promotion of minority languages, including the Tajik language, and at the kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan decreasefor education in the in number minority of schoolslanguages, providing noting education the “insufficient in minority support languages”. given 140to Even when Tajik schools are available, the lack of prestige of Tajik and the exclu- sive reliance on Uzbek in public life mean that Tajik parents may well choose to send their children to Ubek schools so as not to impair their access to higher education and public employment.141 Moreover, as in Kyrgyzstan, tertiary edu- cation is effectively denied to the largest minority ethnic – group Tajiks – since University entrance tests are exclusively in Uzbek;142 the lack of access to tertiary education in Tajik is a further disincentive for parents who may otherwise wish their children to receive education in Tajik.

Employment

There is evidence in all four countries of underrepresentation of ethnic minor- ities in the labour force, with issues of language being a clear barrier in some cases, while examples of direct discrimination, stemming from or ste-

Inreotypes, Kazakhstan, can also discrimination be identified. in employment – as in education – is closely linked with language. This problem is particularly acute in the public sector, where abil- some cases, it will be a legitimate, genuine occupational requirement that pub- licity employeesto speak Kazakh speak –the the state official language. state language Nevertheless, – is a thefrequent CESCR requirement. has noted that In parties to the ICESCR “should ensure that any language requirements relating to employment (…) are based on reasonable and objective criteria.143 In Kazakh- stan, the Equal Rights Trust found evidence that language requirements were imposed in some cases in the absence of such criteria.144 Both the International Labour Organisation Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions .and Recommendations and the CERD have called on the state to take effective measures to increase the representation of non-Kazakh ethnic groups in the civil

138 Dustmurod, Z, Uzbek-Language Education Declines in Tajikistan, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, available at: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbek-language-education-declines-tajikistan 139 See above, note 73. 140 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the combined eighth and ninth periodic reports of Uzbekistan, U.N. Doc CERD/C/UZB/CO/8-9, 14 March 2014, Para. 10. 141 See above, note 30. 142 Ibid, 143 See above, note 47, Para 21. 91 144 See above, note 23, p. 143. 92 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST havereports been ofdiscrimination againstethnic Uzbeks inTajikistan,both in groupsover taking Uzbek businesses. ethnic Uzbeksfrom central theirpositionsin governmentor local of Kyrgyz and therethe aftermath ofthe2010 conflict, were reports ofsummarydismissals of of industry in theregion, and asaresult of direct discrimination in hiring. In sequence ofthe2010 violence inthesouthofcountry,resulta as of thelack In Kyrgyzstan, ethnicUzbeks experience disadvantagein employment asacon- service,”. 145 excluded from employmentopportunities”. andeducational ister themselvesUzbeks as be not thus inthehopeofhidingtheirethnicityand has beenreported It in employment. nation “manyin Uzbekistan, that Tajiks reg- Reciprocalminorities in othercountriestheregion alsoexperience discrimi 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 minorities in the public sector”.minorities in thepublic the governmentedged that yethas not designed mechanisms to recruit ethnic In June2015, Kyrgyzstan’s President Atambayev is reported to have “acknowl- in theregion, makepositions in law6% of all uplessthan enforcement bodies. ticularly insouthKyrgyzstan: Uzbeks, who constitute 28-29% of thepopulation lowrate ofrepresentationof ethnicminorities in lawenforcement bodies,par- gyzstani NGOHumanRights Movement Bir-Duino–Kyrgyzstan highlighted the the police.Inits2015 particular report to theOSCEHumanDimension, the Kyr nificantly underrepresented in the ranks of the civil service and public sector, in nation by association. of offences related to the2010 interethnic violencewere vulnerableto discrimi while others statedtry” those whose that family members had beenconvicted “Wethat have noindustry,and factoriesno plants as inthenorthofcoun- foundethnic Uzbeks that the southfaced in problems: multiple stated oneman grounds inaccessingemployment. on thestateCESCR called to endpersistent discrimination onethnicandother from thestate. receivedassistance not had conflict the during businesses their lost who those

paragraph 9. thecombined sixthand seventh periodic reports Kazakhstan of , CERD/C/KAZ/CO/6-7, 14March 2014, United Nations Committeeof on theEliminationRacialDiscrimination, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63866. “Kyrgyzstan: Where theRestaurants inOshHave NewNames”,, 12 eurasianet.org July 2011, availableat: Kyrgyzstan, UNDoc. CERD/C/KGZ/CO/5-7, 19April2013, Para 8; See also,for example,Vela., J, United NationsCommitteeof Racial ontheElimination Discrimination, Kyrgyzstan, UNDoc.CERD/C/KGZ/CO/5-7, 19April2013,Para 8. United NationsCommitteeof Racial ontheElimination Discrimination, See above, note 27,p.144. Human RightsHuman MovementBir-Duino, www.osce.org/odihr/184061?download=true. freedomsthe in framework Human DimensionImplementationof OSCE, Meeting Freedom House, nations-transit/2016/kyrgyzstan link/318396/443576_en.html http://www.ecoi.net/local_ at: available RightsHuman Watch, World Report– Kyrgyzstan 2016 , See above, note 30. 145 147 Nations inTransit: Kyrgyzstan, 2016, availableat: https://freedomhouse.org/report/ Moreover, Research by theEqualRights Trust in2015 and 2016 148 Inaddition,ethnicUzbeks andother minorities are sig- 150 Kyrgyzstan: Situationwith the fundamentaland rights human In its July In 2015 Observations,Concluding the 151 146 In2013, CERD hasnotedmany that of Concluding on observations 152 2015, availablehttp:// at: Concluding Observations: Concluding Observations: Conversely, there 149 - - - public and private sector organisations.153 Legacies of Division

In addition to the experiences of employment discrimination affecting ethnic the region of discrimination in employment against the Lyuli. The CERD has expressedRussians and its concern reciprocal about minorities, discrimination there is and significant disadvantage evidence experienced throughout by the Lyuli in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and has expressed concern at the lack of information provided by Kazakhstan on the position of the Lyuli.154 Inter- views conducted by the Equal Rights Trust with 95 Lyuli in Uzbekistan found kyrgyzstan, and language in kazakhstan, discrimination tajikistan on the basis of ethnicity and uzbekistan that 83 had never been employed.155

Political Representation and Participation

In all four states, the three branches of government and the public services are dominated by representatives of the titular nationality.

The ethnic composition of representative political institutions (parliaments and councils) and of the civil service in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan reveals proportionately. In Kyrgyzstan, the proportion of ethnic Uzbeks in the Jogorku Kenesh,significant executive substantive bodies, inequality, the police in thatand ethnicthe judiciary minorities is well are below not represented their 14.6 % share of the population. Of the 90 deputies elected to the Jogorku Kenesh in 2007, six were ethnic Uzbeks; of the expanded number of 120 in 2010, only 3 were ethnic Uzbeks.156 The numbers improved somewhat in the 2015 elections, when 15 out of the 120 elected representatives were from “ethnic minorities”157, after a 2011 legislative requirement that candidate lists of political parties had to include a 15% minimum of ethnic minorities.158

In Uzbekistan, at the 2009 parliamentary elections, only 13 of the 150 deputies of the Legislative Chamber were from minority groups (only 3 ethnic Tajiks); in the 2014 elections the number rose to 17 (but only 2 ethnic Tajiks); and in the 2014 Senate elections 7 senators were from ethnic minority groups (no Tajik- s).159 Tajikistan’s political bodies are also unrepresentative, and both the CERD160 and the HRC 161 have expressed concern at the low levels of representation of ethnic minorities in the parliament.

153 See above, note 79. 154 See above, note 136, Para 11, note 139, Para 13, and above note 144, Para. 20. 155 See above, note 84, p. 146. 156 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Fifth to Seventh Periodic Reports: Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc. CERD/C/KGZ/5-7, 8 June 2012, Table 3. 157 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections 4 October 2015: OSCE/OIDHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report, 2016, p. 20. 158 Article 60 of the Constitutional Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On the Election of the President of the Kyrgyz

159 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan, Addendum, UNRepublic Doc. CERD/C/UZB/CO/8-9/Add.1, and the Deputies of the Jogorku 2 June Kenesh 2015, of p.the 6. Kyrgyz Republic”, 2 July 2011, Law № 68 160 See above, note 122, Para. 12. 161 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of 93 Tajikistan, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TJK/CO/2, Para 25. 94 EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST the region have notassumed aprincipalrole inensuring theprotection ofrights workfalls short of international standards, andenforcement isweak.Courts in theless, while there are protectionsthe anti-discrimination in place,law frame- is aconsequence ofpolicyandpractice ratherof law than and regulation. Never work thanof the generalfailure to adhere to non-discrimination obligations. It contemporary CentralmatterAsia islessa problematic ofa regulatory frame- Unlike religious discrimination, however,discrimination in linguistic ethnic and minority communitiesineachcountry. diminishing use ofRussian,discriminatory with effects ontheprincipalethnic has ledtoin turn reduction a intheprovision forand the minoritylanguages, language which is – by definition – also the language of the ethnic majority. This in eachcountryhave focusedon promoting in particular theuseofnational Statepopulation. titular policies designed to fosteridentity sense a of national economic social,and cultural domination ofpolitical, affairs ineachstate by the With afew,exceptions, notable thepattern across the region isoneofincreasing policies andunderstanding. fourin all language countries owes agreatdeal to inherited Soviet structures, and ethnicity of grounds the on discrimination that fact the of reflection a are smaller,marginal another sensehowever,minorities. In these commonalities ethnic Russianand atleastone reciprocal population, minority, together with the ethnicmake-upof thestates inquestion,eachofwhich ishome toan both the differences betweento them.This is inpartattributable thesimilarities in transnational regional, significant pattern of ethnic and linguisticdiscrimination across the four states, despite a is there clear, makes assessment this As 5 C whole.in thecountryasa population deputies elected,all roughly commensuratethe size of theethnicKazakh with Uighurs, Uzbeks, and Dungans. Indeed, up onlyethnic Kazakhsmaking 66% of groups are represented intheMazhilis, mentary elections resultedwhere inasituation moreten than different ethnic tions, designatesThe results deputiestoparliament. the of the2016 parlia through theAssembly ofthePeoplewhich, ofKazakhstan, among other func- ethnic minorities inthelegislativeprocess,making policy and in large part on theother hand, hasmadesome progressKazakhstan, towards integrating 162 163 total numberofdeputiesintheMazhilis. ment onprevious elections: in2007 ethnic Kazakhsrepresented 77% of the

Oka,N., ls.z “pae Mzii i fgrs n fcs, 4 ac 21, vial at: available 2016, March 24 faces”, and figures politika/16440-obnovlennyj-mazilis-v-cifrah-i-licah.html in “Updated Vlast.Kz, English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/194.pdf. Kazakhstan,Table 2,Institute ofDeveloping Economies, March 2009, availablehttp://www.ide.go.jp/ at: onclusion IDE Discussion PaperIDE andElections underAuthoritarianism:Ethnicity No.194, The Case of 162 The2016 markedMazhilis isa improve- including Russians,including Ukrainians, Koreans, 163

. https://vlast.kz/ - - against ; the jurisprudence in all four states is thin and ineffec- tive.

Discrimination and disadvantage affecting non-titular ethnic groups arises as - ment, local councils, state bureaucracy) and by ordinary citizens. The primary –a resultthough of by the no conduct means ofonly both – driverthose actingof discrimination in an official is capacity language (law policy. enforce The promotion of the use of national languages has come at the expense of both provision for minority languages and for Russian, the language of inter-ethnic communication. This in turn has created barriers to access and participation for minority groups in respect of public services and education, and as a conse- quence, employment.

There is a clear need both an effective system of enforcement of the existing non-discrimination provisions, backed by the requisite political will at the high- - work in which is applied to ensure equal participation for minor- ityest ethniclevels ofgroups. government, and for a more affirmative legal and regulatory frame Each of the countries which constitute the region referred to today as “Central Asia” has its own unique history, geography, culture and demography. Since independence, the five states in the region have followed different paths. Yet they also share a common history. First under the Tsars and then as part of the Soviet Union, the region was, for centuries, ruled by powers in St Petersburg and Moscow.

Equal Rights Trust research in four of the five Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – has found that this shared history has also resulted in shared experiences of ethnic and religious discrimination. In this publication, we set out to identify and explore these transnational and regional patterns of discrimination and disadvantage. Drawing on, and expanding upon, the Trust’s research, the papers in this publication identify distinct regional patterns of discrimination and disadvantage. Each of the four states main- tains a legal framework which tightly regulates the practice of religion, leading to direct and indirect discrimination against those practicing minority or heterodox faiths. All four states are home to large ethnic minorities: ethnic Russians and at least one “reciprocal” minority – an ethnic group which is the majority group in one of the neighbouring states. As such, the promotion of the ethnic majority language, at the expense of both minority languages and Russian, the language of “inter-ethnic communication”, leads to discrimination and disad- vantage in many areas of life.

The overarching conclusion of these papers is that these common patterns of discrimination are the consequence of a shared history – the legacy of divisions which the Central Asian states inherited. This publication aims to foster discussion of these common causes and manifestations of discrimination, and to catalyse debate about potential solutions.

The Equal Rights Trust is an independent international organisation whose purpose is to combat discrimination and advance equality worldwide.

This report has been prepared with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the Equal Rights Trust and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

www.equalrightstrust.org