the rights of war and peace book iii natural law and enlightenment classics Knud Haakonssen General Editor Hugo Grotius uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu ii ii ii iinatural law and iienlightenment classics ii ii ii ii ii iiThe Rights of ii iiWar and Peace ii iibook iii ii ii iiHugo Grotius ii iiTogether with Grotius’s Prolegomena to the ii iiFirst Edition of De Jure Belli ac Pacis ii ii iiEdited and with an Introduction by iiRichard Tuck ii iiFrom the edition by Jean Barbeyrac ii iiMajor Legal and Political Works of Hugo Grotius ii ii ii ii iiliberty fund ii iiIndianapolis ii uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motif for our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word “freedom” (amagi), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 b.c. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash. Frontispiece: Portrait of Hugo de Groot by Michiel van Mierevelt, 1608; oil on panel; collection of Historical Museum Rotterdam, on loan from the Van der Mandele Stichting. Reproduced by permission. ᭧ 2005 Liberty Fund, Inc. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 09 08 07 06 05 c 54321 09 08 07 06 05 p 54321 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Grotius, Hugo, 1583–1645. [De jure belli ac pacis libri tres. English] The rights of war and peace/Hugo Grotius; edited and with an introduction by Richard Tuck. p. cm.—(Natural law and enlightenment classics) “Major legal and political works of Hugo Grotius”—T.p., v. 1. Includes bibliographical references. isbn 0-86597-432-2 (set: hard) isbn 0-86597-436-5 (set: soft) isbn 0-86597-433-0 (v. 1: hc) isbn 0-86597-437-3 (v. 1: sc) 1. International law. 2. Natural law. 3. War (International law). I. Tuck, Richard, 1949– . II. Title. III. Series. kz2093.a3j8813 2005 341.6—dc22 2004044217 isbn 0-86597-435-7 (v. 3: hc) isbn 0-86597-439-x (v. 3: sc) liberty fund, inc. 8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite 300 Indianapolis, Indiana 46250-1684 contents volume 1 Introduction ix A Note on the Text xxxv Acknowledgments xxxix the rights of war and peace, book i 1 volume 2 the rights of war and peace, book ii 389 volume 3 the rights of war and peace, book iii 1185 Appendix: Prolegomena to the First Edition of De Jure Belli ac Pacis 1741 Bibliography of Postclassical Works Referred to by Grotius 1763 Bibliography of Works Referred to in Jean Barbeyrac’s Notes 1791 Index to This Edition 1815 the rights of war and peace book iii Book III <516> u chapter i u Certain General Rules, shewing what, by the Law of Nature, is allowable in War; where also the Author treats of Deceit and Lying. I. We have already seen, not only who may make War, but for what I. The Subject and Design of Reasons too they are permitted to engage in it. We are now to enquire this Book. 1 what is allowable in War, and how far, and in what Circumstances it is so. And this we must consider, either simply in itself, or with Regard to some antecedent Promise. What is simply in itself allowable in War, shall be considered first from the Law of Nature, and then from that of Nations. To begin with what Nature allows. I. (1) St. Augustin says, that in the midst of War itself, Faith is to be observed, and Peace endeavoured, Ut in ipsis bellis, &c. Ad Bonifac. Comit. Epist. LXX. Esto ergo, etiam bellando, pacificus, Epist. CCV. Ad eundum Bonifac. There is in Proco- pius, Vandalic. Lib. I. (Cap. XVI.) a fine Discourse of Belisarius to his Soldiers, wherein he shews, that those who make War, ought not to abandon Justice. Paulus Orosius says, that Civil Wars are made in this Manner, when unavoidable, by Chris- tian Princes, in the Times of Christianity. Ecce, Regibus & temporibus Christianis,&c. Lib. VII. The same Historian, speaking of Theodosius, defies all the World to in- stance, from the first founding of Rome, a single War undertaken so justly and so necessarily, and so successfully terminated, through the divine Providence, that nei- ther the Battles, during it, had been very bloody, nor Victory attended with cruel Revenge. Grotius. 1185 1186 chapter i II. In War all II. 1. And here we must observe, First, That in Things of a moral Nature, Things neces- 1 a sary to the End as we have often said before, those Means which conduce to a certain are lawful. End, do assume the very Nature of that End: And therefore we are sup- a Victor. De posed to be authorised to employ those <517> Things, which are (in a jure belli, n. 15. moral, not a physical Sense) 2 necessary to the obtaining our just Rights. By Right I understand what is strictly so called, and imports that 3 Power of acting which is intirely founded on the Good of Society. Wherefore, b B. ii. ch. 1. as we have remarked elsewhere, b if I cannot otherwise save my Life, I §3.n.3. may, by any Force whatever, repel him who attempts it, tho’, perhaps, he who does so is not any ways to blame. Because this Right does not properly arise from the other’s Crime, but from that Prerogative with which Nature has invested me, of defending myself. 2. By which also I am impowered to invade and seize upon what be- longs to another, without considering whether he be in faultorno,when- c Victor. ubi ever what is his threatens me c with any imminent Danger; but I am not supra, n. 18, 39, 55. to claim a Property in it, for that is not necessary to the End in Question, but only to detain it till my Security be sufficiently provided for; as we d B. ii. ch. 2. have elsewhere d declared. So by the Law of Nature I have a Right to § 10. take from any one what he has of mine, 4 and if this cannot easily be II. (1) See B. II. Chap. V. § 24. Num. 2. and Chap. VII. § 2. Num. 3. 2. Our Author does not mean Things essentially bad, and which, as such, cannot be lawful in any Case, or to any End whatsoever; but only those, which a Man could not do otherwise, without the necessary Connection they have with a lawful End. See what he says afterwards, at the End of Paragraph 6. Things bad in their Nature are indeed generally not necessary, with Regard to the Necessity in Question. But, admitting they were, as that is not impossible; and that a Person, for Instance, could not obtain or preserve his just Rights but by Adultery, Blasphemy, Sacrilege, Abju- ration of the Religion he believes true; the Innocence of the End wouldneitherhinder the Means from being utterly unlawful, nor discharge him from the Obligation of renouncing the most lawful Pretensions, rather than to employ such Means. 3. Facultatem agendi in solo Societatis respectu. See our Author’s Preliminary Dis- course, § 7, 8. Not that the other Kinds of Rights which impose an imperfect Obli- gation, do not contribute to the Good of Society. But they are not absolutely nec- essary to maintain it in Peace; and therefore they cannot be pursued by the Methods of Force. 4. See above, B. II. Chap. VII. § 2. what is allowable in war 1187 effected, I may take what is equivalent to it; and e this I may do too for e Sylv. in verb. bellum, part 1. the Recovery of Debt. And in those Cases I become Proprietor of what n. 10. ver. I have taken, because there is no other Way of redressing the Inequality prima. that was to my Disadvantage. 3. So likewise where the Punishment is just, there all Manner of Vi- olence and Force, and whatever is a Means necessary to execute that Punishment, or is a Part of it, is just too; as Devastations by Fire, or otherwise, provided that they exceed not the Bounds of Equity, but bear a Proportion to the Offence committed. III. We must remember, Secondly, That this our Right is not to be ac- III. What is lawful and counted for only by the first Occasion of the War, but also from other right does not subsequent Causes; as in a Suit of Law, where the contending Party does arise only from the Occasion of often acquire and find out a new Right, after the Process is commenced, the War, but which was not thought of before. Thus they, who join with him that also from inci- dent Causes in invades me, whether they be Allies or Subjects, do give me a Right of the Course of defending myself against them likewise. Thus they who engage with it. others in an unjust War, especially in a War which they might or ought to have known to be unjust, are thereby obliged to reimburse the Charges, and to repair the Damages of it, because it is through their Fault that they are sustained. Thus too, those who come into the Mea- sures of a War, undertaken without any warrantable Reason, are them- selves culpable, and obnoxious to Punishment, in Proportion to the In- justice that accompanies their so doing; according to Plato’s 1 Opinion, who justifies the Continuance of a War, Till the Guilty are compelled to undergo the Punishment which the Party offended shall inflict upon them.