THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
The Order of the Divine Names in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of the
School of Philosophy
of The Catholic University of America
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
©
Copyright
All Rights Reserved
By
Brian Thomas Carl
Washington, D.C.
2015
The Order of the Divine Names in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas
Brian T. Carl, Ph.D.
Director: John F. Wippel, Ph.D.
St. Thomas Aquinas indicates that his Summa theologiae is intended to teach beginners in
theology according to a suitable order of learning. There has been a lengthy and famous scholarly
conversation, prompted by M.-D. Chenu’s work, about the order of Thomas’s Summa theologiae.
Relatively little has been said by scholars, however, about the order of particular sections of the
Summa theologiae, such as his presentation of the divine names in Ia qq. 3-26. Fernand Van
Steenberghen has also remarked on the need for a study of Thomas’s derivation of the divine names
in his three treatises on God, found in the Summa contra Gentiles, Compendium theologiae, and Summa
theologiae. This dissertation examines the order of the divine names in Thomas’s three treatises on
God, with special attention to the philosophical order of argumentation. Its purpose is to expose, as
far as possible, the rationale—or set of principles, influences, and reasons—informing Thomas’s
order of presentation concerning the divine names.
The first chapter begins with a consideration of the meaning of order. Because items are ordered insofar as they are distinct, the first chapter then considers a taxonomy of the kinds of
divine names distinguished by Thomas, concluding with a consideration of the distinction of the
positive attributes from one another.
The second chapter examines principles that seem likely to influence the order of the divine
names. These principles include the order of science, the order of the triplex via, and the order of the
transcendentals.
The third chapter investigates some of the most important historical sources that influence
Thomas’s treatises on God. These include Aristotle’s Physics 8 and Metaphysics 12, Pseudo-Dionysius’s Divine Names, Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing 8, and the first book of Peter the Lombard’s
Sentences.
The fourth through sixth chapters then investigate, in turn, the order of the divine names in the treatises on God found in Thomas’s Summa contra Gentiles, Compendium theologiae, and Summae theologiae. The order in the three treatises varies in certain ways. In each case, a close examination of the order of argumentative dependence through which Thomas derives the divine names is complemented by a consideration of the impact of the principles and historical influences that were treated in the second and third chapters.
This dissertation by Brian T. Carl fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by John F. Wippel, Ph.D., as Director, and by Kevin White, Ph.D., and Gregory T. Doolan, Ph.D., as Readers.
______John F. Wippel, Ph.D., Director
______Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader
______Gregory T. Doolan, Ph.D., Reader
ii
To Katy
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CONTENTS
Abbreviations ...... ix
Acknowledgments ...... x
Introduction
1. The Question of the Order of the Divine Names ...... 1
2. Status quaestionis ...... 3
3. Method and Structure of the Present Work ...... 5
Chapter 1: Distinction of the Divine Names
Introduction ...... 7
1. The Meaning of Order ...... 7
2. The Distinction of the Divine Names ...... 12 1. Taxonomy of the Kinds of Divine Names ...... 12 2. Distinction Among the Positive Names ...... 25 3. Implications of the Distinction of the Names for their Order ...... 41
Chapter 2: Criterion of Order
Introduction ...... 44
1. The Order of Science ...... 44 a. Overview of the Order of Science ...... 44 b. Science and the Knowledge of Separate Substances...... 49 c. The Orders of Instruction, Discovery, Judgment, and Resolution ...... 54
2. The Order of the Triplex Via ...... 60 a. The Uses of the Triplex Via in Thomas’s Writings ...... 63 (i) Correlation with Distinct Arguments for One Conclusion ...... 64 (ii) Association with Particular Divine Names ...... 69 (iii) Characterizing the Signification of One Positive Name...... 71 (iv) Distinguished from Knowledge that God Exists ...... 72 (v) Other texts ...... 80 b. Conclusions about the Order of the Triplex Via ...... 80
iv
3. The Order of the Transcendentals ...... 83 a. De Veritate 21.3 on the Order of the Transcendentals ...... 85 b. The Transcendentals and the Divine Names ...... 90
Chapter 3: Historical Precedents
Introduction ...... 92
1. The Order in Aristotle ...... 92 a. The Order in Physics VIII ...... 93 b. The Order in Metaphysics XII ...... 97 (i) The first mover’s perfection ...... 98 (ii) The unity or multiplicity of the first mover ...... 105 (iii) The operation of the first mover ...... 106
2. The Order in Dionysius’s Divine Names ...... 110 a. Context and Purpose of the Divine Names ...... 111 b. The Order in the Divine Names ...... 118
3. The Order in Avicenna’s Metaphysics ...... 135
4. The Order in Peter Lombard’s Sentences ...... 147
Chapter 4: The Summa contra Gentiles
Introduction ...... 160
1. The Order of Argumentative Dependence ...... 162 a. Conclusion of the Arguments for God’s Existence as Principles ...... 162 b. Two Lines of Argumentative Dependence ...... 165 (i) Emergence of a Second Line of Dependence in SCG 1.15 ...... 166 (ii) The Multiplicity of Conclusions in SCG 1.16 ...... 167 (iii) Overview Concerning the Two Lines of Dependence ...... 174 c. Some Critical Chapters in the Order of Argumentative Dependence ...... 176 (i) The Absolute Simplicity of God ...... 176 (ii) Divine Incorporeality ...... 177 (iii) Identity of God with His essence ...... 181 (iv) Identity of Essence and Existence in God ...... 182 (v) The Absence of Accidents in God ...... 186 (vi) Divine Perfection ...... 189 (vii) The Likeness of Creatures to God ...... 194 (viii) Divine Goodness ...... 195 (ix) Divine Infinity ...... 197 (x) Divine Intelligence ...... 200 (xi) Divine Will ...... 206 (xii) Divine Power as the Principle of Created Effects ...... 208 v
d. Successive Character of SCG 1.44-102 ...... 213
2. Principles of Order in the Contra Gentiles ...... 215 a. The Role of the Order of Science ...... 215 b. The Role of the Triplex Via ...... 219 (i) The Twofold Division of Divine Names ...... 219 (ii) The Application of the Via Remotionis ...... 222 (1) The Termination of the Via Remotionis ...... 222 (2) Strictness of the Application of the Via Remotionis? ...... 228 (iii) The Role of the Via Eminentiae ...... 233 (iv) Conclusions Concerning the Role of the Triplex Via ...... 236 c. The Role of the Order of the Transcendentals ...... 239 d. Conclusions Concerning the Principles of Order ...... 242
3. The Role of Historical Influences on the Order ...... 243 a. SCG 1.15-27 ...... 243 b. SCG 1.28-43 ...... 248 c. SCG 1.44-102 ...... 248 d. SCG 2.1-22 ...... 250
4. Summary Concerning the Order ...... 251
Chapter 5: The Compendium theologiae
Introduction ...... 253
1. The Order of Argumentative Dependence ...... 253 a. Argumentation for God’s Existence ...... 254 b. Argumentative Dependence in the Order of the Divine Names ...... 255 (i) The via remotionis ...... 255 (1) Immutability and eternity ...... 256 (2) Divine simplicity and unity ...... 261 (3) Conclusions concerning CT 1.4-17 ...... 269 (ii) Establishing the eminence of divine perfection ...... 271 (1) Divine infinity and infinite power ...... 271 (2) Divine perfection ...... 273 (3) Divine naming ...... 276 (4) Conclusions concerning CT 1.18-27 ...... 277 (iii) Divine operation ...... 277 (1) Divine intelligence ...... 278 (2) Divine will ...... 279
2. The Role of the Principles of Order ...... 279 a. The order of science ...... 280 b. The order of the triplex via ...... 280 c. Theological purpose as a principle of order ...... 281 vi
3. Conclusions ...... 286
Chapter 6: The Summa theologiae
Introduction ...... 288
1. The Order of Argumentative Dependence ...... 288 a. Argumentation for God’s existence in ST 1.2.3 ...... 289 (i) The first way ...... 289 (ii) The second way ...... 293 (iii) The third way ...... 294 (iv) The fourth way ...... 295 (v) The fifth way ...... 295 (vi) The identification of God as first being ...... 296 b. The divine substance through the via remotionis in ST 1.3-11 ...... 297 (i) Divine simplicity in ST 1.3 ...... 300 (ii) Divine perfection in ST 1.4 ...... 303 (iii) Divine goodness in ST 1.6 ...... 306 (iv) Divine infinity in ST 1.7 ...... 309 (v) Divine omnipresence in ST 1.8 ...... 311 (vi) Divine immutability in ST 1.9 ...... 312 (vii) Divine eternity in ST 1.10 ...... 315 (viii) Divine unity in ST 1.11 ...... 315 (ix) Conclusions concerning ST 1.3-11 ...... 317 c. Knowing and naming God in ST 1.12-13 ...... 318 d. The divine operation through the via eminentiae in ST 1.14-26 ...... 321 (i) Divine knowledge in ST 1.14 ...... 322 (ii) Divine life in ST 1.18 ...... 323 (iii) Divine will in ST 1.19 ...... 324 (iv) Divine love, justice, and mercy in ST 1.20-21 ...... 325 (v) Divine providence in ST 1.22-24 ...... 326 (vi) Divine power in ST 1.25 ...... 327 (vii) Divine beatitude in ST 1.26 ...... 330 (viii) Conclusions concerning ST 1.14-26 ...... 330 e. Conclusions concerning the order of argumentative dependence ...... 331
2. The Role of Principles of Order ...... 332 a. The role of the order of science ...... 332 (i) Essence and properties: the formal constituent? ...... 332 (ii) The order of the scientific questions ...... 342 (iii) The distinction between essence and operation ...... 345 b. The role of the triplex via ...... 346 c. The role of the transcendentals ...... 354 (i) Argumentative dependence and the transcendentals ...... 355 (ii) The order of propriety ...... 360 vii
d. Modes of existing as a principle ...... 363
3. The Role of Historical Influences ...... 369 a. Aristotle and Avicenna ...... 369 b. Dionysius ...... 370 c. Peter the Lombard ...... 371 d. The Summa fratris Alexandri ...... 372
4. Conclusions ...... 374
Conclusion
1. What is Common to the Thomas’s Three Treatises on God ...... 376
2. Distinctive Features of the Orders of the Three Treatises on God ...... 381 a. The Placement of Goodness, Unity, and Infinity in the SCG ...... 382 b. The Peculiarities in the Order of the Compendium theologiae ...... 383 c. The Later Placement of Immutability and Eternity in the ST ...... 384
3. The Significance of the Order of the Divine Names ...... 386
Bibliography ...... 391
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ABBREVIATIONS
CT Compendium theologiae De ente De ente et essentia De malo Quaestiones disputatae de malo De pot. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei De prin. nat. De principiis naturae De spir. creat. Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis De sub. sep. De substantiis separatis De ver. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate In De an. Sententia libri De anima In De caelo In libros Aristotelis De caelo In De div. nom. In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio In De hebd. Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus In De Trin. Super Boetium De Trinitate In Eth. Sententia libri Ethicorum In Meta. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio In Perierm. Expositio libri Peryermenias In Phys. In octos libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio In Post. Expositio libri Posteriorum In Sent. Scriptum super libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi LR Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi QD De anima Quaestiones disputatae de anima Quodl. Quodlibeta Resp. 108 Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 108 articulis SCG Summa contra Gentiles ST Summa theologiae
ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I extend my heartfelt thanks to everyone among my family, friends, and teachers who have assisted me in various ways during the writing of this dissertation. I am especially grateful to my wife, Katy, for her kind and patient support, without which my work would be impossible. I am forever indebted to Msgr. John F. Wippel, the director of this dissertation, for his thorough and insightful comments and his wise counsel throughout the writing process. I am also deeply thankful for the generous material support provided by Mrs. Catharine Ryan and by the Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception at the Dominican House of Studies, where I have taught while completing this dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION
A. THE QUESTION OF THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE NAMES
It pertains to the wise man to order, and the human wisdom unaided by revelation culminates in the consideration and contemplation of the highest cause, God.1 For St. Thomas
Aquinas, sacra doctrina—the subject of the Summa theologiae—represents an even higher wisdom than that available to the philosophers, and this sacra doctrina has God Himself for its very subject.
Furthermore, in Thomas’s commentaries—on philosophical and theological works and on Sacred
Scripture—we find him frequently concerned with explaining the rationale behind the order of a work, from its most general outline down to each of its particular sections. Given all of this, it cannot be that Thomas would have composed his major personal treatises on God in a haphazard way, without a conscious concern for the order of procedure.
It is therefore surprising that among students of Thomas relatively little attention has been given to examining the order in which he proceeds in his treatises on God. Hesitation to take up this question is understandable, since God is absolutely beyond our comprehension and is, in this life, beyond any positive grasp on our part of what He is.2 It may seem problematic to suggest that human beings could be concerned with any proper or best order of considering the names of God.
There is some merit to this concern. But because we can only think and speak about God, in this life, through a multiplicity of divine names, we have no choice but to consider them in some order
1 SCG 1.1 [Leon. Man. 1]: “Multitudinis usus, quem in rebus nominandis sequendum philosophus censet, communiter obtinuit ut sapientes dicantur qui res directe ordinant et eas bene gubernant. Unde inter alia quae homines de sapiente concipiunt, a philosopho ponitur quod sapientis est ordinare.” Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2 982a18-19 [McKeon 691]: “For the wise man must not be ordered but must order.” 2 Along similar lines, Ghislain Lafont has suggested that understanding the ordo disciplinae of the Summa theologiae carries special difficulty. See Ghislain Lafont, Structures et méthode dans la Somme théologique de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Brouges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 17: “Donc distinguer l’Ordo disciplinae. Et par conséquent apprécier tout d’abord l’aporie. Tout objet de connaissance résiste à la systématisation, car le réel est plus et autre que les cadres de notre esprit. Mais nul objet ne résiste davantage que la Parole de Dieu.” 1
2 or another. It is therefore reasonable to inquire about Thomas’s reasons for his order of procedure in each of his treatises on the divine nature; these are found in his Summa contra Gentiles, Compendium theologiae, and Summa theologiae.
This dissertation’s examination of the order of the divine names in Thomas’s writings will ultimately be concerned with two related questions. First, what is the rationale or plan that structures
Thomas’s presentation of the divine names in each of his works? As we shall ultimately see, it may be that a set of complementary reasons informs Thomas’s procedure, rather than a solitary rationale.
Second, what significance or importance is there about the order of the divine names? Does it make any difference that the divine names should be treated in one order as opposed to another?
Because of Thomas’s concern for deriving God’s characteristics through philosophical argumentation, the order in which he treats the divine names is, in large measure, a function of the order of argumentative dependence, according to which the derivation of the divine names ultimately depends upon the conclusions of the proofs for God’s existence. This dissertation will also therefore examine, in as much detail as the limitations of space will allow, the order of argumentative dependence in the Summa contra Gentiles, Compendium theologiae, and Summa theologiae.
Fernand Van Steenberghen remarked in 1980 on the need for a study of Thomas’s derivation of the divine attributes from the conclusions of the argumentation for God’s existence in these three treatises on God. My hope is that this dissertation, in its attention to the orders of argumentative dependence in these three parallel treatises, will be a first step towards the production of such a study.3
3 See Fernand Van Steenberghen, Le problème de l’existence de Dieu dans les écrits de s. Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain-la- Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1980), 296: “Nous n’allons pas entreprendre l’étude exhaustive de la déduction des attributs divins telle qu’elle a été réalisée par S. Thomas à trois reprises, dans la Summa contra Gentiles, le Compendium theologiae et la Summa theologiae. Il y faudrait un nouveau volume, qui pourrait tenter un jour un historien de S. Thomas: il serait intéressant de marquer l’évolution éventuelle de sa pensée dans ces trois traités parallèles.” 3
B. STATUS QUAESTIONIS
Very little secondary literature directly addresses the question of the order of the divine names in Thomas’s treatises on God. Two articles, by Lawrence Dewan and Leo Elders, have each commented on the order of qq. 3-11 of the Summa theologiae. Dewan aims to show that Thomas’s order of procedure is inspired by themes from Aristotle’s Metaphysics; he focuses especially on the order of qq. 3-6 (simplicity, perfection, goodness), associating the order of these questions with the order of formal, efficient, and final causality.4 Elders’ brief article helpfully compares the order of ST
1.3-11 with the parallel sections in the Contra Gentiles and Compendium theologiae, while attempting to account for the manner in which the derivation of the divine names is grounded in the conclusions of the argumentation for God’s existence.5
There have been many studies and articles over the last century devoted to the question of the order of the Summa theologiae as a whole. Most famously, Marie-Dominique Chenu has interpreted the structure of the Summa theologiae in terms of a Neoplatonist exitus-reditus scheme.6
Chenu’s thesis garnered much attention and started a lively debate that has spanned decades.7 Yet as
4 Lawrence Dewan, “Aristotelian Features of the Order of Presentation in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae, Prima pars, qq. 3-11,” in Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James Weisheipl, O.P., ed. R. James Long (Toronto: PIMS, 1991), 41-53, esp. 48-51. 5 Leo Elders, “L’ordre des attributs divins dans la Somme théologique,” Divus Thomas 82 (1979): 226-232. Brian J. Shanley also offers brief remarks about the structure of ST 1.2-26 in the commentary section of his translation of ST 1.1-13. See Brian J. Shanley, “Commentary,” in Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on the Divine Nature, tr. Brian J. Shanley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 178-181. 6 Marie-Dominique Chenu, “Le plan de la Somme théologique de saint Thomas,” Revue thomiste 47 (1939): 93- 107; Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1950), 255-76. 7 Studies discussing this question have included the following: André Hayen, Saint Thomas d’Aquin et la vie de l’église (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1952); Henricus Schillebeeckx, De sacramentele heilseconomie (Antwerp: Nelissen, 1952); Yves Congar, “Le sens de ‘l’économie’ salutaire dans la ‘théologie’ de S. Thomas d’Aquin (Somme théologique),” in Festgabe J. Lortz, ed. E. Iserloh, vol. 2 (Baden-Baden: Bruno Grimm, 1957), 73-122; Eric Persson, “Le plan de la Somme théologique et le rapport ratio-révélation,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 56 (1958): 545-75; Ghislain Lafont, Structures et méthode dans la Somme théologique de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Brouges: Desclée De Brouwer, 1961); Albert Patfoort, “L’unité de la Ia Pars et le movement interne de la Somme théologique de S. Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 47 (1963): 513-44; Otto H. Pesch, “Um den Plan der Summa Theologiae des hl. Thomas von Aquin,” Münchener theologische Zeitschrift 16 (1965): 128-37; Albert Patfoort, Saint Thomas d’Aquin: les clefs d’une théologie (Paris: FAC-éditions, 1983); Marie-Vincent Le-Roy, “Review of Saint Thomas d’Aquin: les clefs d’une théologie,” Revue thomiste 84 (1984): 298-303; Thomas F. O’Meara, “Grace as a Theological Structure in the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas,” 4
Ghislain Lafont pointed out in 1961, most of the controversy and debate engendered by Chenu’s thesis has remained at the level of the structure of the Summa theologiae as a whole, often without descending to the order of its particular sections.8 Lafont’s work helpfully comments on the order of the treatise on God in the Summa theologiae, in the larger context of examining the structure of the
Summa as a whole; he is also concerned with comparing the treatise on God in the Summa theologiae to those found in the Contra Gentiles and Compendium. Despite its value, Lafont’s treatment of ST 1.2-26 is rather brief, amounting to less than fifty pages, and his attention is frequently directed to the implications his discussion has for the question of the order of the Summa as a whole.9
Despite the relative lack of lengthy attention to the question of the order of Thomas’s treatises on God, one does find occasional remarks about the significance of the order of the divine names. So, for example, one finds both Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Jan Aertsen explaining the order of the divine attributes in the Summa theologiae in terms of the order of the transcendentals.10
Similarly, authors who have written on the centrality of the doctrine of divine simplicity in Thomas’s thought offer remarks about the manner in which the order of the other divine attributes follows from the divine simplicity.11 Finally, it is not uncommon to find remarks about Thomas’s order of procedure with reference to the elements of the triplex via.12
Recherches de théologie ancienne et médievale 55 (1988): 130-53; Leo Elders, “La méthode suivie par saint Thomas d’Aquin dans la composition de la Somme de théologie,” Nova et Vetera 66 (1991): 178-92; Wilhelm Metz, Die Architektonik des Summa Theologiae des Thomas von Aquin. Zur Gesamtsicht des thomasischen Gedankens (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998); Brian Johnstone, “The Debate on the Structure of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas: From Chenu (1939) to Metz (1998),” in Aquinas as Authority, ed. Paul Van Geest, Harm Goris, and Carlo Leget (Utrecht: Peeters, 2001), 187-200. 8 Lafont, Structures et méthodes, 33-34. 9 Lafont, Structures et méthodes, 35-79. 10 For references, see below, pp. 84-85. 11 See, for example, Peter Weigel, Aquinas on Simplicity: An Investigation into the Foundations of his Philosophical Theology (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), 30-44; Peter Burns, “The Status and Function of Divine Simpleness in Summa theologiae Ia, qq. 2-13,” The Thomist 57.1 (1993): 1-26; Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2005), 92. 12 See, for example, Michael Ewbank, “Diverse Orderings of Dionysius's Triplex Via by St. Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 52 (1990): 82-109; Gregory Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 49-55; Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 35-37. 5
C. METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT WORK
This work will consider the order of the divine names in Thomas’s three treatises on God’s existence and nature: SCG 1.13-2.22, CT 1.3-36, and ST 1.2-26. In order to prepare for direct examination of these texts, the first two chapters will consider background principles. Because there can only be order among any set of items insofar as those items are distinct, chapter one will consider the distinction of the divine names. I will present a taxonomy of the divine names in
Thomas’s writings. This will be followed by a close consideration of the distinction of God’s positive attributes from one another. This problem draws special attention from Thomas himself, especially in In Sent. 1.2.1.3, which will receive extended treatment.
The second chapter will then consider some principles that seem likely to influence the order of the divine names: these are the order of science, the order of the triplex via, and the order of the transcendentals. In each case, the goal will be to examine these topics insofar as they might serve as criteria according to which Thomas structures his presentation of God’s characteristics.
The third chapter will consider some important historical influences, a knowledge of which will better prepare us for an examination of Thomas’s treatises on God. This chapter will treat the relevant portions of Aristotle’s Physics 8 and Metaphysics 12, the Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius,
Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8, and the first book of Peter the Lombard’s Sentences. For all of these works except for Avicenna’s Metaphysics—upon which Thomas did not write a commentary—we will devote primary attention to Thomas’s commentaries, since these will provide insight into Thomas’s understanding of these texts.
The fourth through the sixth chapters will then consider, in turn, the orders of the divine names in the Summa contra Gentiles, Compendium theologiae, and Summa theologiae. In each case, we will first analyze in detail the order of argumentative dependence according to which Thomas derives 6 each of the divine names. Since nearly all of Thomas’s arguments are grounded either in (a) the conclusion of one of his arguments for God’s existence or (b) a previously derived divine name— there are some instances in which Thomas offers de novo argumentation for a given divine characteristic13—this analysis will yield an understanding of how the divine names are ultimately grounded in the argumentation for God’s existence. After the analysis of the order of argumentative dependence, we will then consider the role played by the principles of order and historical influences treated in the second and third chapters. We will see that these factors, in combination, do much to expose the rational plan involved in Thomas’s presentation of the divine names—but we will need to consider carefully whether we have uncovered a single, unambiguous rationale.
13 For example, see the treatment of the de novo argument for divine eternity in SCG 1.15, below p. 166. CHAPTER ONE: DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE NAMES
The purpose of the first two chapters will be to consider material from the writings of St.
Thomas Aquinas that can serve as an appropriate background for the examination of the orders of the divine names in the Summa contra Gentiles, Compendium theologiae, and Summa theologiae (henceforth referred to as the three summae). These chapters will investigate some of the possible principles or rationales according to which one might expect Thomas to order the divine names, so that the subsequent examination of the three summae will be more fruitful.
1. THE MEANING OF ORDER
It is fitting to begin with a treatment of Thomas’s understanding of the meaning of order.1
Order is a term used by Thomas in a variety of contexts, such as his discussions of the order among certain sensible substances, among the powers of the soul, and among the divine Persons of the
Trinity. Thomas never gives a treatment of the notion of order as it pertains specifically to the divine names, so we will draw from three texts on the notion of order as it is treated in the context of the order of the Persons in the Trinity.2 The elements of the notion of order derived from these texts will help to structure the remainder of this first chapter.
The first treatment of the notion of order concerning the divine Persons is found in In Sent.
1.20.1.3 qc. 1 (ca. 1254-55).3 In this context Thomas observes that order includes three things in its meaning (ratio): priority and posteriority, distinction, and the notion (ratio) whereby the order is contracted (as by a difference) to a species. He explains first that there is only order among some
1 For a discussion of Thomas’s notion of order, see Brian Coffey, “The Notion of Order According to St. Thomas Aquinas,” The Modern Schoolman 27.1 (1949): 1-18. 2 I do this mostly because these are cases in which Thomas's presentation of the meaning of order is the clearest. 3 Thomas’s Commentary on Book 1 of the Sentences dates from roughly 1254-55. See Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, tr. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 424-25. 7
8 group insofar as one thing is said to be prior to another, whether this is priority according to place, time, or something else of this kind. Second, there can be no order except among items (in some way) distinct—however, Thomas notes that this is something more presupposed than signified by the name ‘order.’ Third, there are different kinds of order, according to the different notions or reasons (rationes) according to which items can be ordered (and can consequently be compared to one another). This ratio for the order is what contracts order, taken as a genus, into its species: for example, into order according to place, order according to dignity, or order according to origin.4 It is this last species of order—the order of origin—that concerns the divine Persons.5
In a second text, Resp. 108 a. 50 (ca. 1265-27),6 Thomas repeats the claim that there cannot be order except among distinct items, but he adds the qualification that the distinct items must also share or agree in something, or else there can be no order among them. 7 For example, a man, a triangle, and a chimera may be distinct items, but there cannot be an order among them in the way
4 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Pariensis Bk. 1, d. 20, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux 1929), 509 {henceforth In Sent. 1.20.1.3 qc. 1 [Mand. 1.509]}: “Respondeo dicendum, quod ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet: rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum, secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia hujusmodi. Includit etiam distinctionem, quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet. Includit etiam tertio rationem ordinis, ex qua etiam ordo in speciem contrahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum locum, alius secundum dignitatem, alius secundum originem, et sic de aliis: et ista species ordinis, scilicet ordo originis, competit divinis personis.” 5 Although the theological content of In Sent. 1.20.1.3 qc. 1 is beyond our purposes, one feature of Thomas’s solution in this question is worth noting. Although the ratio of order contains the three mentioned components—priority and posteriority, distinction, and the specifying difference of the kind of order—only the latter two apply in the case of the order of origin among the Persons of the Trinity. That is, the Son is from the Father as from His origin (and there is thus an order of origin or order of nature in the Trinity) without it being the case that the Father is properly said to be before or prior to the Son. In this way the notion of order—like every other term applied to God—is modified by the removal of everything unfitting to God. 6 Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, revised edition, tr. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press), 353. 7 Resp. 108, a. 50 [Leon. 42.287:608-22]: “Ordo enim non est nisi aliquorum distinctorum conuenientium in aliquo; que enim in nullo conueniunt nullum habent ordinem ad inuicem.” It should be noted that here Thomas states only one necessary condition for order; he does not suggest that it is a sufficient condition. This is reflected in a text with parallel language from In De div nom. 4.1 #283 [Marietti 89], which concerns the order among the angels. There Thomas explains that three things belong to this order: distinction with community, cooperation, and an end. The latter two elements make it so that the angels, which are distinct but share in generic community, are actually members of an order. 9 that there can be an order among three men in an army. Thomas does not specify whether the requisite community must be generic, specific, numerical, or analogical. However, it would seem that any of these kinds of community are possible while still admitting order among the distinct items.
Thomas also treats the issue of the order among the divine Persons in Summa theologiae
1.42.3. Instead of offering a complex account of the notion of order like that found in the Sentences
Commentary, he simply observes that “order is always said through relation to some principle.”8 As there are different kinds of principles among ordered items, so there will be distinct kinds of order.
Thomas mentions order according to place (the principle of which is the point), order according to understanding (the principle of which is the principle of a demonstration), and order according to each of the causes (the principle of which is the cause in question).9 What we find here is that
Thomas has distilled the notion of order down to one element, comparison or relation to a principle.
Each of the examples that he gives involves a principle in the sense of that to which reference is made in establishing the order, as a point is the principle of a line. However, it must be acknowledged that the point itself is a principle of order in a specific way, corresponding to one of the species of order identified by Thomas in In Sent. 1.20.1.3 qc. 1. That is, a point is not a principle according to dignity or according to understanding, but rather according to place. We can therefore take the third element of the notion of order identified in the first text as implicit in this third text's pared presentation.
8 ST 1.42.3 [Leon. 4.439]: “Respondeo dicendum quod ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter, scilicet secundum situm, ut punctus, secundum intellectum, ut principium demonstrationis, et secundum causas singulas; ita etiam dicitur ordo.” 9 Thomas reaches the same conclusion as that reached in the Sentences text (see footnote 3 above): there is among the divine Persons order of origin, albeit without any priority, insofar as there is a divine Person that is from another but not posterior to another, and not caused by another. For a discussion of the relationship between efficient causality and order, see F.X. Meehan, “Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas” (Ph.D. Dissertation in Philosophy: The Catholic University Press, 1940), 128-30, 380-81. For his discussion of the Trinitarian processions, which do not involve efficient causality, see Meehan, 171-73. 10
From these texts, we can distinguish two different meanings of “principle of order.” One might call these (1) the principle by which and (2) the principle from which. There is first the principle of order in the sense of the reason or notion (ratio) that contracts the order to a particular species of order, as discussed in In Sent. 1.20.1.3 qc. 1. This principle by which is, in practical terms, the criterion of comparison among the members of the order. For example, place, nobility, and origin are principles of order in this first sense. Second, there is the principle in the sense in which St.
Thomas discusses a principle of order in ST 1.42.3, as that from which order proceeds. This is also the principle to which comparison is made in establishing or recognizing the order. For example, a point is the principle of the order of the parts of a line as that from which the line proceeds and as that to which comparisons (by place) are made. It is perhaps helpful to note that this principle from which (or principle to which comparison is made) need not be itself a member of the order: according to Thomas, the point that is the principle of a line is not a part of the line.10 Nevertheless, in some other cases the principle to which comparison is made is also the first member of the order.
For example, in the order of understanding, the principle of a demonstration (a self-evident premise) is itself something understood and is consequently a member of the order of understanding.11
To summarize, we should highlight three elements of the notion of order as Thomas understands it. First, there is the distinction of the members of the order: there is no order except
10 See In Phys. 1.1 #5 [Marietti 4]: “Principium vero importat quendam ordinem alicuius processus; unde aliquid potest esse principium, quod non est causa: sicut id unde incipit motus est principium motus, non tamen causa; et punctum est principium lineae, non tamen causa.” The context is that Thomas is distinguishing the terms principle, cause, and element, in order to explain the introductory section of Aristotle's Physics. Principle is a term with wider application than cause, because every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause. For example, the terminus a quo of a motion (or as he puts it here, id unde incipit motus) and the point are principles of a motion and a line, but not causes of them. The point that is the principle of a line is not its material cause, and it is therefore not a part of a line. See also De prin.nat. 3 [Leon. 43.42-43: 59-123]. Cf. Meehan, 170-73. 11 All discursive reasoning is a movement from the understanding of one thing to the understanding of something else. See De ver. 2.3 ad 3 [Leon. 22/1.52-53: 332-41]: “Nec tamen sequitur quod cognoscendo effectum per hoc quod [Deus] essentiam suam cognoscit sit aliquis discursus in intellectu eius. Tunc enim solum dicitur intellectus de uno in aliud discurrere quando diversa apprehensione utrumque apprehendit, sicut intellectus humanus alio actu apprehendit causam et effectum et ideo effectum per causam cognoscens dicitur de causa discurrere in effectum.” 11 among distinct items. However, there must be some kind of community among the distinguished items, or there can be no order. Second, there is the principle by which the comparison of the members is made: this is the criterion of the order (or, in practical terms, the rule by which comparison is made among the members of the order). Third, there is the principle from which the order proceeds—this is also the principle to which comparison is made in establishing or recognizing the order—and this is either a first member of the order or something outside the order in reference to which the order is established.
These three elements of the notion of order suggest to us three questions that need to be addressed in seeking out possible rationales for the order of the divine names. (1) In what way are the divine names distinct from one another? (2) What are possible principles by which the order of the divine names might be established? That is, what are some of the possible criteria of order? (3)
What is the principle from which the order of divine names proceeds (or the principle to which the order of the divine names is referred)? Is this principle the first of the names, or is it something outside of the order of the names?
There is little to be said in these preliminary chapters about the third question, because (as will be seen below) the Summa theologiae differs from the other two works in this respect, and these preliminary chapters are concerned more with what is common to the three works rather than with what differentiates them. To anticipate what will be set forth in the study of the Summa contra
Gentiles, however, it should be noted that Thomas will in that work explicitly identify one divine name—immutability—as the first member of the order and as the name from which a series of demonstrations in the way of removal (via remotionis) will follow.12 Consequently, the first two
12 SCG 1.14 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam remotionis, accipiamus principium id quod ex superioribus iam manifestum est, scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immobilis.” This follows upon his having offered in SCG 1.13 two versions of the argument from motion for God’s existence. 12 chapters will consider, in turn, the first two questions just mentioned: In what ways are the divine names distinguished from one another? What are some of the possible principles by which the divine names might be ordered?
2. THE DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE NAMES
Under the heading of the distinction of the divine names, we need to consider three topics.
First, not every name predicated of God is the same kind of name, and so it will be helpful to consider a taxonomy of the kinds of divine names.13 This taxonomy will provide an important resource for analyzing the orders found in the two Summae and the Compendium. Second, it will be necessary to consider how a particular class of divine names—the positive names that are predicated essentially or substantially of God—are distinguished from one another. Third, I will comment on the possible implications that the distinctions among the divine names will have for their order.
A. TAXONOMY OF THE KINDS OF DIVINE NAMES
It is appropriate to begin by offering two points of clarification concerning Thomas's terminological practice with regard to the terms nomen and attributum. First, nomen can be translated in a wider sense as “name” or more strictly as “noun” (a term distinguished grammatically according to syntactic role). In at least two contexts concerning the divine names, Thomas's use of nomen is in the latter, stricter sense;14 but for the most part when he speaks of a divine nomen he does not restrict himself to nouns.
Second, throughout his career Thomas tends to reserve the term attributum for what we will call below the positive or proper divine names (such as goodness, power, and wisdom). Almost
13 I take the phrase “taxonomy of the divine names” from Gregory P. Rocca. My presentation of this taxonomy is indebted to his, but it differs in a few ways. See Gregory Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 322-24. 14 See In Sent. 1.22.1.1 obj. 3 and ad 3 [Mand. 531-33] and ST 1.13.1 obj. 3 and ad 3 [Leon. 4.139-40]. 13 without exception, Thomas does not speak about negative attributes, and wherever he gives an example of an attribute, it is one of the positive names.15 As a text both exemplifying this tendency and offering a reason for it in terms of what Thomas associates with a divine attribute, one can look to In Sent. 1.10.1.5 ad 4:
All the divine attributes are principles of production in the mode of an efficient exemplar [cause]; as all good things imitate [divine] goodness, and all beings [imitate the divine] essence, and likewise for the others.16
It is only the positive names that can be said to be principles of production in the manner of an efficient exemplar—by contrast, a negative name serves to indicate what belongs to creatures but is denied of God. Compared to attribute, name (nomen in the broader sense) is a less restrictive term that can be used for the positive attributes as well as for negative, relational, metaphorical, and personal names. This distinction in typical usage between nomen and attributum suggests that it may be fruitful to distinguish between the order of the divine names in general and the order of the divine attributes in particular; it may also prove fruitful to take up the order among the negative names in a given work as a special question.
For now, it will suffice to say that by the divine names I mean those names that can serve as terms in propositions about the divine (de divinis), including the name God.17 Understanding divine
15 For two exceptions, see In Sent. 1.8.exp [Mand. 1.208], where Thomas asks why truth, immutability, and simplicity are the only attributa essentialia treated by Peter in d. 8, and In Sent. 1.28.1.2 ad 3 [Mand. 1.676], where Thomas explains that unbegotten (something said properly of God the Father) would remain as an attribute of the divine essence (quasi attributum essentiae), even if paternity were denied of God; and he gives as similar examples of an attributum essentiae immense and uncreated, which are negative names. However, he uses these three same terms (ingenitum, increatus, immensus) in In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 2 [Mand. 1.541] as examples of negative nomina, and he explains there that all such names are founded upon the ratio of some affirmative name. 16 In Sent. 1.10.1.5 ad 4 [Mand. 1.272]: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnia attributa divina sunt principium productionis per modum efficientis exemplaris; sicut bonitatem omnia bona imitantur, et essentiam omnia entia, et sic de aliis.” 17 If it is objected that this would imply that a term such as ‘man’ would be a divine name in light of the true proposition de divinis “God creates man,” it should be noted that “God creates man” is more properly expressed as a proposition as “God is creating man” or “God is the creator of man;” and creating and creator are divine names (a participle and a noun, respectively). 14 names in this general way, we will distinguish five classes of names: negative, positive, personal, relative, and metaphorical.18 We will also need to draw the distinction between concrete and abstract names. After this initial presentation, we can turn to an early text in which Thomas comments on ways of dividing the divine names.
(1) Negative names. A negative divine name is a name that, although it may serve as the predicate of a true affirmative proposition, nevertheless signifies the removal or negation of something from God. A negative divine name is thus somewhat akin to the term blind, which, when predicated of a human being, signifies the privation of seeing.19 An affirmative proposition with a negative name as the predicate is therefore always equivalent in meaning to some negative proposition. For example, “God is immaterial” is equivalent to “God is not material.” Negative names include more obvious examples such as immaterial, incorporeal, and immutable, all of which have a negative prefix that signals the negative character of the name. However, some negative names lack any negative prefix but are nevertheless negative in their meaning. Negative names that are perhaps less obvious include simple and one. For example, “God is simple” is equivalent to
“God is not composite.” Similarly, “God is one” is equivalent to “God is not divided.”20
18 Our purpose here is only to give an initial summary of the different kinds of names that Thomas distinguishes. This will allow us to describe the orders found in the two Summae and the Compendium in an important and helpful way. The fivefold division I present is not meant to preclude the possibility that one or another type of name is reduced to another type in some way. 19 As Thomas repeatedly affirms, however, we deny things of God not because of any defect on His part, but because of His eminence. E.g., see ST 1.12.12 [Leon. 4.136]. Thomas himself also calls incorporeal, infinite, and one names “said privatively of God” in ST 1.11.3 ad 2 [Leon. 4.112]: “Et licet in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum modum apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.” 20 For a qualification to this claim, see Quodl. 10.1.1 [Leon. 25.124: 91-94]: “Et ideo unitas in diuinis non dicitur nisi remotiue, quantum ad id quod superaddit enti, quamuis ponat aliquid, secundum quod includit ens: est enim unum ens indiuisum.” Unity is said of God not so as to express something positive in God, but only to deny division; but insofar as transcendental one includes being, the name does posit something in God. 15
(2) Positive names. A positive divine name or attribute is a name that expresses something positively about the divine.21 The examples of positive names given by Thomas include being (esse), goodness, wisdom, power, justice, and life. The positive names are taken from what are typically called pure perfections, both those that are transcendental (such as being and goodness) as well as those that are, in creatures, determined to a certain genus (such as wisdom, life, and justice).22
Throughout his career, Thomas will assert that such names are said properly (proprie) of God.23 He also says that such names are predicated substantially (substantialiter) and essentially (essentialiter) of
God, and that they signify the divine substance24—although we must be careful to note that these do
21 For Thomas’s use of this language, see for example In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.69]: “Alii vero consideraverunt modos perfectionis, ex quibus dicta nomina sumuntur: et, quia Deus secundum unum simplex esse omnibus modis perfectus est, qui importantur per hujusmodi nomina, ideo [Dionysius et Anselmus] dixerunt, quod ista nomina positive Deo conveniunt.” In this text, Thomas contrasts the position of Dionysius and Anselm with that of Avicenna and Maimonides. We will treat this text in detail below, pp. 32-41. 22 Strictly speaking, transcendental perfections are pure perfections, as the notion of a pure perfection is something that it is absolutely and in every way better to be than not to be (Anselm), or alternatively, a perfection that does not include matter or defect in what it signifies. However, as a matter of terminology, I will typically reserve the term ‘pure perfection’ for the non-transcendental pure perfections, such as knowledge and justice, while referring to being and goodness as transcendental perfections. Also, while I have not found Thomas calling such perfections pure perfections, what he does say is that certain names (such as knowledge) signify perfections absolutely, whereas other names (such as sensation) include in their signification the defective manner in which sensible creatures participate in those perfections. See e.g. In Sent. 1.22.1.2, SCG 1.30, ST 1.13.3 ad 1. 23 In Sent. 1.22.1.2 [Mand. 1.533-36]; ST 1.13.3 [Leon. 4.143]. In these texts, the claim that the positive divine names are predicated properly seems equivalent to denying that these names are predicated metaphorically. The opposition of propriety to metaphorical or symbolic naming follows Albert’s usage: see Albert’s De div. nom. 1.1 [Cologne 37.2]: “. . . de nominibus symbolicis, quae non proprie dicuntur de Deo, sed per quandam similitudinem.” In In De div. nom. 1.2 #69 [Marietti 21], Thomas adds that the divine names are “proper signs that we use, so far as is possible, for knowing the divine.” Thomas notes that these signs “are called proper for knowledge of divine things for us, because it is not possible for divine things to become known to us in another way besides this. Nevertheless, we do not use signs of this sort in the knowledge of the divine in such a way that our mind stops with them, judging God to be nothing more than such things.” To say that the positive names are predicated proprie or that, as signs, they allow a proper knowledge of God does not preclude the claim that such names do not express a knowledge of what God is in Himself. 24 Thomas makes the claim that divine names such as goodness and wisdom are predicated substantially as early as In Sent. 1.22. exp. [Mand. 1.544]. In In Sent. 1.2 exp. [Mand. 1.77], he characterizes God as a name that can be considered “quantum ad id cui imponitur, quod est substantia significata per nomen; et sic est nomen naturae, quia ad significandum divinam naturam est impositum.” Cf. In Sent. 1.4.1.2 ad 2 [Mand. 1.135]. Similarly, Thomas does attribute to Peter, in the Sentences Commentary, the view that positive names signify the divine substance, earlier in In Sent. 1.22 exp. [Mand. 1.543]: “Hic ponit quasdam regulas de nominibus pertinentibus ad unitatem essentiae et quasdam de proprietatibus pertinentibus ad proprietatam personarum. De pertinentibus ad unitatem essentiae ponit quatuor; prima est, quod a se et absolute dicuntur; secunda, quod significant substantiam; tertia, quod de singulis personis dicuntur; quarta, quod de omnibus sunt dicenda in singulari et non in plurali. De pertinentibus ad proprietatem personarum ponit tres: prima est, quod relative dicuntur; secunda, quod non praedicant divinam substantiam; tertia est, quod non de 16 not express the same thesis.25 Thomas also sometimes employs a prepositional construction to posit an attribute in God: for example, he asks in ST 1.14.1 whether there is knowledge (scientia) in God, rather than asking (as he does in SCG 1.44) whether God is intelligent (intelligens).26
Thomas also distinguishes, among positive names, between a name of nature (nomen naturae) and a name of operation (nomen operationis). Thomas draws this distinction in a number of texts, in the context of asking whether or not the name God (Deus) is a name of nature or a name of operation.27 These texts all include an objection, inspired by Damascene, in which it is argued that
Deus (from the Greek theos) must be a name of operation, because it is derived etymologically from terms that signify various divine operations. Thomas responds to this objection and defends the claim that Deus is a nomen naturae by appealing to the distinction between that from which a name is imposed (in general, we would call this the word's etymology) and that which a name is imposed to signify (the word's signification).28 Thomas’s favorite example with regard to this latter distinction is the case of the name “stone” (lapis), which he says is imposed from the fact that a stone strikes the foot (laedit pedem).29 Although Deus (in its ultimately Greek etymology) might be imposed from
omnibus personis dicuntur.” Cf. De pot. 7.5 and ST 1.13.2, where Thomas explicitly claims in his own right that the positive names or attributes signify the divine substance. 25 In brief, by claiming that these names are predicated substantialiter or essentialiter, Thomas indicates that they are predicated of the divine nature (as what is common to the three divine persons) rather than of a particular divine person. But when in his later writings he claims that such names signify the divine essence or substance, he is making a stronger claim about the positive but non-quidditative knowledge of God expressed through such names. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 541, n. 139. 26 See ST 1.13.2 [Leon. 4.141]: “Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso.” Thomas uses the phrase “positing something in Him” to describe what it is that a positive divine name does—or rather, in context, what certain proponents of a totally negative theology (such as Maimonides) deny that affirmative names do. Cf. SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43-44]. 27 See In Sent 1.2.exp.; LR 2.3.1; ST 1.13.8. The claim that Deus is a nomen naturae is a claim that Thomas also defends by the authority of Ambrose: see In Sent. 1.2.exp. Cf. In De div. nom. 12.1 #948. 28 Thomas also draws this distinction in ST 1.13.2 ad 2, in order to defend the claim that some names are predicated substantially of God. 29 ST 1.13.8 [Leon. 4.157]: “Sicut enim substantiam rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus, ita substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius operatione vel proprietate: sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis.” Thomas does not use the example of the name stone in his earlier treatments of the 17 certain divine operations, nevertheless it is imposed in order to signify the divine nature.30 A nomen naturae, then, is just a name that signifies the nature of a thing, as distinguished from its operation.31
God (Deus) is therefore a name that signifies the divine nature, just as man signifies human nature.32
(3) Personal names.33 By a personal name, I mean any name (whether concrete or abstract) that is properly predicated only of one divine Person, but not of another. It is because the divine
Persons are really distinct that there are distinct, proper personal names.34 These names pertain to what Thomas calls discrete (or Trinitarian) theology rather than to the unitive theology concerned with what belongs to the divine essence in common.35 For example, Father and paternity are properly predicated of the first divine Person, but not of the second divine Person. There are also negative names (such as unbegotten) that follow upon and are reduced to the personal names: the first divine Person is unbegotten, but the second is not. Knowledge of these personal names depends upon revelation, and the personal names themselves will not play a major role in this dissertation.
distinction between the etymology and the signification of the name Deus, although it is an example he uses in other contexts, such as discussion of whether the name person is said properly about the divine: see In Sent. 1.23.1.2 ad 1 [Mand. 559]: “Contingit autem quandoque quod substantia alicujus rei nominatur ab aliquo accidente quod non consequitur totam naturam de qua nomen illud dicitur; sicut lapis dicitur ex eo quod laedit pedem, nec tamen omne laedens pedem est lapis, vel e converso.” 30 Thomas does observe that Deus can be considered a nomen operationis insofar as it is imposed from the divine operations; see In Sent. 1.2.1.5 exp. [Mand. 1.77-78]. 31 Thomas also asserts that angelus and homo are nomina naturae: cf. In Sent. 2.9.1.4 ad 2; Quodl. 2.1.1 ad 1. Cf. In Sent. 1.25.1.1 ad 5 and De pot. 9.2 ad 11, where Thomas explains the appropriateness of the term natura, instead of essentia, in the Boethian definition of person. 32 It should be noted that the name man signifies human nature by signifying the ratio of human nature, which is expressed by the definition of man. By contrast, the name God signifies the divine nature, but not by means of a ratio of the divine nature that can be expressed by a definition. This issue will be treated below in consideration of In Sent. 1.2.1.3. 33 Some of the personal names could be classed under the positive names, but given that the personal names are not of central concern in this dissertation, I will use “positive name” for the attributes (the names positively predicated of the divine essence), not for the personal names (the names predicated of a particular divine person). 34 In Sent. 1.22.1.3 [Mand. 1.538]: “In Deo autem non est invenire aliquam realem distinctionem nisi personarum, quae sunt tres res; et inde venit multiplicitas nominum personalium significantium tres res.” 35 See In Sent. 1.22.1.4 [Mand. 1.541] for the distinction between unitive and discrete theology. 18
(4) Relative names. In God the only real relations are those that distinguish the Persons of the Trinity. Every relation of God to creatures is posited in Him only secundum rationem rather than secundum rem. Some divine names—such as Lord or Creator—signify such relations of God to creatures. Thomas also calls these two examples temporal names, since they signify the relation of the eternal God to temporal creatures and therefore do not signify ab aeterno but ex tempore.36 His main concern when treating these names as temporal is to show that they can be truly predicated of
God without contradicting His eternity. Of these particular relative names, only the name creator receives special attention from Thomas in the two Summae and the Compendium.
Thomas also considers the case of positive names that compare God to creatures, such as first cause or highest good. Such names are only predicated of God.37 Names such as these do receive some special treatment in the three works. Furthermore, as we shall see, in SCG 1.30,
Thomas indicates that the super-eminent way in which perfections attributed to God exist in Him cannot be signified except either by names imposed only through negation—such as eternal or infinite—or by names also imposed “through His relation to other things, as when He is called first cause or highest good.” He then explains that we “cannot grasp about God what He is, but [only] what He is not and how other things are related to Him.”38 Insofar as these are positive names said
36 ST 1.13.7 [Leon. 4.152-54]. 37 Rocca, 324. 38 SCG 1.30 [Leon. Man. 32]: “Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum. Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum.” 19
“through relation,” we could consider them to also be quasi-relative names.39 Rocca refers to such names as names of eminence.40
(5) Metaphorical names. Thomas brings up the category of metaphorical names typically when discussing the question of whether any names are predicated properly (proprie) of God. In these contexts, he holds that some names are indeed predicated properly of God, although there are other names that are predicated metaphorically (metaphorice or translative). For example, in In Sent.
1.22.1.2, he notes that whereas cognitio and scientia can be properly predicated of God, sensus cannot be. The reason that the former names can be said properly of God is that they signify absolute perfections, whereas the name sensus in its very signification includes the imperfect mode in which an animal, as a material and sensible being, receives the perfection of cognition.41 Thomas in this context also refers to St. Anselm of Canterbury, to whom he attributes the view that the absolute perfections are those things which it is simply and in every way better to be than not to be. So even though an animal by possessing sensus possesses a perfection that comes from and is exemplified by
God, nevertheless the name sensus is not said properly of God Himself: only the names that signify absolute perfections are said properly of God. Other examples of metaphorical names given by
Thomas include stone and lion, which signify “corporeal forms according to [their] determinate mode of participating esse or life, or some divine perfection.”42 Thomas devotes no special treatment
39 We will note later that there is also a quasi-relative character about the name power, which St. Thomas considers to be a positive name that is predicated substantially of God. As a positive name, power signifies the divine essence, but it signifies the divine essence as the principle of created effects: it can be said then that the name power implies a relation to creatures, even though the name signifies the divine essence. We will find that this serves in part to explain the late placement of this name both in the Summa contra Gentiles and in the Summa theologiae. 40 Rocca, 324. 41 See also In De div. nom. 13.4 #999 [Marietti 372], where Thomas explains that Dionysius distinguishes between the intelligible processions of God (from which are taken the positive names or attributes) and sensible processions that are the basis of metaphorical or symbolic naming: “Dicit autem intelligibiles ad differentiam eorum quae symbolice vel metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, quorum significationes sunt sensibiles.” 42 In Sent. 1.22.1.2 [Mand. 1.535]: “[O]mnis cognitio est exemplata a divina cognitione, et omnis scientia a divina scientia. Hoc igitur nomen 'sensus' est impositum ad significandum cognitionem per modum illum quo recipitur materialiter secundum virtutem conjunctam organo. Sed hoc nomen 'cognitio' non significat aliquem modum 20 in any of the three works to any particular metaphorical names, and so their role in this dissertation will also be minor.
Finally, we should also note the distinction between abstract names and concrete names. In
ST 1.13.1 ad 2, Thomas notes that in our knowing and naming of corporeal things, the knowledge of which is connatural to our intellects, there is a distinction between concrete names and abstract names on account of the composite character of these connatural objects of knowledge.43 A concrete name signifies the subsistent thing, which is (in the case of corporeal things) a composite of form and matter. An abstract name signifies the form by itself, understood as that whereby a thing is such as it is.44 For example, man is a concrete name that can signify this man, a subsistent and composite thing; while humanity is an abstract name that signifies the form whereby a man is a man.
Both abstract and concrete names can serve as divine names. Thomas notes that abstract names
(such as goodness or wisdom) have the advantage of signifying God’s simplicity, while concrete names (such as good or wise) have the advantage of signifying His perfection and subsistence.
However, both kinds of names fall short of His mode of being: God is not composite, and He is not the intrinsic formal cause of any corporeal substance, and so neither concrete nor abstract names
participandi in principali sua significatione. Unde dicendum est, quod omnia illa nomina quae imponuntur ad significandum perfectionem aliquam absolute, proprie dicuntur de Deo, et per prius sunt in ipso quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum significandi, ut sapientia, bonitas, essentia et omnia huiusmodi; et haec sunt de quibus dicit Anselmus. . . quod simpliciter et omnino melius est esse quam non esse. Illa autem quae imponuntur ad significandum perfectionem aliquam exemplatam a Deo, ita quod includent in sua significatione imperfectum modum participandi, nullo modo dicuntur de Deo proprie; sed tamen ratione illius perfectionis possunt dici de Deo metaphorice, sicut sentire, videre et hujusmodi. Et similiter est de omnibus aliis formis corporalibus, ut lapis, leo et hujusmodi: omnia enim imponuntur ad significandum formas corporales secundum modum determinatum participandi esse vel vivere, vel aliquam divinarum perfectionum.” See Anselm, Monologion c. 15 [Schmitt 1.28-29]; Proslogion c. 5 [Schmitt 1.104]. 43 ST 1.13.1 ad 2 [Leon. 4.139-40]: “Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est.” 44 Ibid.: “Et quia in huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia, sunt composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens, sed magis quo aliquid est: inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo aliquid est album.” 21 entirely befit Him.45 Thomas will use abstract and concrete versions of names for all of the kinds of names distinguished in this section.
As noted, the personal and metaphorical names will play only a minor role in this dissertation. The strictly relative names, such as the temporal names Lord and Creator, will also play a somewhat minor role, insofar as they are not the subject of much extended treatment by Thomas.
What I have called the quasi-relative names will play a more important role. The negative names and the positive names (or attributes) will, however, receive the most extended attention: in large part the purpose of this dissertation will be to inquire after the rationale behind the order of the negative and positive names, taken both as separate groups and together.
With a general understanding of the sorts of divine names, we turn now to an early text in which Thomas explicitly discusses the division of the divine names. In In Sent. 1.22.1.4, Thomas seeks to defend St. Ambrose’s division of the divine names (as cited by Peter),46 while explaining the fundamental harmony among Ambrose, Augustine, and Dionysius. In the body of this article,
Thomas divides divine names into the proper and the metaphorical. The proper names name God according to what is in Him per prius and in creatures per posterius, whereas the metaphorical names name Him “through a likeness taken from creatures.” Thomas then subdivides the proper names
45 Ibid.: “Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad significandum simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius: quamvis utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc vitam.” 46 The text from De fide c. 2 is given in the Mandonnet edition [Mand. 1.528] as: “Quo purius niteat fides, tripartita videtur derivanda distinctio. Sunt enim nomina quaedam quae evidenter proprietatem personamque deitatis ostendunt; et sunt quaedam quae perspicuam divinae majestatis exprimunt veritatem. Alia vero sunt quae translative, et per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur.” The critical edition of Peter Lombard’s Sentences 1 d. 22 cap. 1 [Grottaferrata 1.178] differs slightly: “Quo purius niteat fides, tripartita videtur derivanda distinctio. Sunt enim nomina quaedam quae evidenter proprietatem deitatis ostendunt; et sunt quaedam quae perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt quae translative per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur” (my emphasis in italics). The critical edition of Ambrose, De fide 2 [CSEL 78.58] has the following, which differs significantly in the absence of the final sentence: “[Q]uo purius niteat fides, tripertito videtur derivanda distinctio. Sunt enim evidentia indicia, quae proprietatem deitatis ostendant, sunt quae similitudinem patris et fili, sunt etiam quae persipicuam divinae maiestatis exprimant unitatem. Proprietatis itaque sunt generatio, deus, filius, verbum. . . .” 22 into the names of unitive theology (the positive names predicated in common of all three divine persons) and the names of discrete theology (the personal names).47 In this way, Thomas defends
Ambrose’s tripartite division of divine names into metaphorical, positive, and personal.
In the reply to the second objection, Thomas reduces the negative names to the positive and personal names, explaining that “every negation is caused by some affirmation. . . . whence it follows that negative names are reduced either to the unity of the essence, like ‘uncreated’ and ‘immense,’ or to the distinction of persons, like ‘unbegotten.’”48 Similarly, the temporal (relative) names are addressed in the reply to the third objection, where Thomas explains that they too can be reduced to the positive names. For example, the name Lord can be reduced to the divine power, since it concerns the power by which God governs every creature.49
Having defended the adequacy of the Ambrosian division of divine names, in the reply to the fourth objection, Thomas attempts to reconcile Damascene’s different division (the details of
47 In Sent. 1.22.1.4 [Mand. 1.540-41]: “Ipsemet enim dividit divina nomina in ea quae translative dicuntur, quae appellant symbolicam theologiam, et in ea quae proprie dicuntur, quae scilicet per prius in Deo sunt: et hoc dividit in unitam theologiam, quantum scilicet ad ea quae praedicantur de tribus personis communiter; et in discretam theologiam, quantum ad ea quae ad singulas personas pertinent. Ex quo etiam patet in promptu sufficientia hujus divisionis. Quia Deus vel nominatur per id quod prius in ipso est et per posterius in creaturis, vel per similitudinem a creaturis sumptam. Si secundo modo, sic sunt ea quae translative dicuntur. Si primo modo, hoc erit dupliciter: illud enim quod per prius in Deo est, vel est commune, et sic pertinet ad majestatis unitatem; vel est proprium personae, et sic pertinet ad distinctionem Trinitatis.” If it is surprising that Thomas describes only metaphorical names as being per similitudinem (given that the real likeness of creatures to God is what makes it possible to take the positive names from creaturely perfections), it may help to note that his terminology here follows that of Albert: cf. Albert, De Div. nom. 1.1 [Cologne 37.2]: “. . . de nominibus symbolicis, quae non proprie dicuntur de Deo, sed per quandam similitudinem.” 48 In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 2 [Mand. 1.541]: “Ad secundum, quod negatio quaelibet causatur ex aliqua affirmatione. Et sic etiam in divinis ratio negativorum nominum fundatur supra rationem affirmativorum: sicut hoc quod dicitur incorporeus, fundatur supra hoc quod est esse simplex. Unde patet quod nomina negativa reducuntur ad unitatem essentiae, sicut ‘increatus’ et ‘immensus,’ vel ad distinctionem personarum, sicut ‘ingenitus.’” 49 In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 3 [Mand. 1.541]: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis hujusmodi nomina non ponant aliquid temporaliter in Deo, quia relationes illae temporales realiter in creaturis sunt, et in Deo solum secundum rationem, tamen inquantum innascuntur ex operationibus Dei in creaturas, dant intelligere aliquid quod in Deo est absolute; sicut relatio dominii dat intelligere in Deo potestatem qua universam creaturam gubernat. Unde patet etiam quod ista nomina reducuntur ad illa quae pertinent ad unitatem majestatis, sicut ‘Creator, Dominus’ et hujusmodi, vel ad distinctionem personarum, sicut ‘missus, incarnatus’ et hujusmodi.” 23 which need not concern us)50 with Ambrose’s. To this end, Thomas proposes that the one divine essence “can be named in two ways, as follows from what has been said, either with respect to what is in God, or in accordance with the understanding of the intellect, which understands (accipit) Him according to some comparison to a creature.”51 According to this distinction between two different ways in which God can be named, Thomas offers two divisions of the divine names.
If God is named according to that which is in Him, there will be a threefold diversity of names according to the three things which are found in every thing, namely essence, power (virtus), and operation; which indeed differ really in other things, but are in Him one in reality and distinct in ratio. . . . But if God is named through the understanding of the intellect by a comparison to a creature, this too will be twofold: either according to those things of the creature which are removed from Him, and thus there will be negative names; or insofar as there is implied in names some relation of causality with respect to a creature, the conditions of which are removed from God; and thus there will be those names that imply a relation to others, from which God is distinguished by essence.52
In this early text, Thomas thus envisions two distinct approaches in naming God and dividing up the divine names. The first names God according to what is in Him, with a consequent division of divine names that corresponds to the most fundamental characteristics found in every thing: essence, power, and operation. The second approach names God according to the manner in which the human intellect understands Him, which is by comparison with creatures. Since the human
50 In Sent 1.22.1.4 obj. 4 [Mand. 1.540]: “Praeterea, Damascenus, I De fide orthodoxa 9 ponit aliam divisionem divinorum nominum, dicens, quod quaedam significant pelagus substantiae infinitum, et non quid est, ut hoc nomen ‘qui est;’ quoddam autem est nomen operationis, ut ‘Deus;’ quaedam autem significant id quod assequitur substantiam, ut ‘justus, bonus’ et hujusmodi; quaedam vero habitudinem ad ea a quibus distinguitur, scilicet ad creaturas; quaedam significant id quod non est, ut ‘incorporeus, immensus’ et hujusmodi.” For the text referenced in Damascene, see De fide orthodoxa 1.9 [Buytaert 48-50]. For discussion of this phrase “infinite sea of substance,” see Joseph Owens, “Aquinas— ‘Darkness of Ignorance’ in the Most Refined Notion of God,” in Bonaventure and Aquinas: Enduring Philosophers, ed. Robert W. Shahan and Francis J. Kovach (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 69-86, esp. 71-73. 51 In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4 [Mand. 1.542]: “Unitas autem majestatis potest nominari dupliciter ut patet ex dictis, vel secundum id quod in Deo est, vel secundum acceptionem intellectus, qui accipit ipsum secundum aliquam comparationem ad creaturam.” 52 Ibid.: “Si nominetur Deus quantum ad id quod in ipso est, erit triplex diversitas nominum secundum tria quae in unaquaeque re inveniuntur, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; quae quidem in aliis realiter differunt, in ipso autem sunt unum re et distincta ratione. . . . Si autem nominetur Deus per acceptionem intellectus in comparatione ad creaturam, et hoc erit dupliciter: vel inquantum ea quae sunt creaturae removentur ab ipsa, et sic erunt nomina negativa; vel secundum quod importatur in nominibus aliquis respectus causalitatis ad creaturam, cujus conditiones a Deo removentur; et sic erunt illa nomina quae important habitudinem ad alia, a quibus Deus distinguitur per essentiam.” 24 intellect cannot have any quidditative knowledge of God, but knows Him only by removing from
Him what He is not and by comparing Him to creatures insofar as they are His effects, as a consequence in this second approach there is a twofold division between naming according to remotion and naming relationally. The contrast between the two approaches hinges upon the difference between attempting simply to name God and what is in God, as opposed to emphasizing the limited manner in which one is able to know and name God at all. In other words, the latter approach is more sensitive to the epistemological limitations of divine naming; whereas the former attempts, so far as is possible, to name God according to what is truly in Him.
This selection from In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4 is crucial for distinguishing between the approach of the Summa contra Gentiles on the one hand and that of the Summa theologiae on the other with regard to the order of the divine names.53 As one small hint that the Summa theologiae adopts the first approach—naming God according to what is in Him—it should be noted that in the Summa theologiae it is asked whether scientia and voluntas are in God; by contrast, in the Summa contra Gentiles,
Thomas asks whether God is intelligens and volens. Furthermore, as Kretzmann has observed in his study of the first book of the Contra Gentiles, Thomas’s procedure is constituted by two methods, one guided by the way of remotion (what Kretzmann calls the eliminative method), the other by relational comparisons (what Kretzmann calls the relational method).54 This corresponds perfectly to the second approach described in In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4. Further evidence of the correspondence between this early text and the structures of these two summae will be offered in the later chapters of this dissertation. For now, we should note that we shall have to be careful about adopting any developmental thesis as regards the differences between the order of the divine names in these two
53 The difficult case of the Compendium theologiae will be addressed later. 54 Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 140. 25 summae: Thomas had already envisioned two fundamentally distinct ways of approaching the order of the divine names at the beginning of his career, and he implements these two approaches in the two summae.
All this being said, the two approaches distinguished in In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4 leave much to be determined as regards the precise order of the divine names. For example, the bare description of the first approach in this text does not specify anything about the order of procedure among the names pertaining to the divine essence or to the divine operation—it only holds more generally that names of power and operation follow after names of the essence. The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter will be concerned with principles that may inform the concrete details of the order of the divine names.
B. DISTINCTION AMONG THE POSITIVE NAMES OF GOD
Having discussed the way in which the divine names are distinguished into various kinds, it remains to be considered how one positive name is distinct from another. To highlight the difficulty posed by the distinction of the positive divine names, it will help to say a word about the distinction of the negative names. As stated above, the predication of a negative name (such as immaterial) is equivalent in meaning to a negative proposition that denies that God possesses some characteristic
(such as materiality). The negative names of God are distinct, just because the things that they remove from God are distinct.55 Because a negation posits nothing in the subject (that is, in what is signified by the subject term) of the negation, there need not be any worry about the distinction of
55 In Sent. 1.22.1.3 [Mand. 1.537-38]: “. . . Deum possumus nominare et secundum quod in se est, et secundum quod est ad creaturas se habens. Et hoc dupliciter: vel secundum negationes quibus conditiones creaturarum a Deo removentur; et inde veniunt nomina negativa, quae multitudinem recipiunt ex creaturarum conditionibus quae de Deo negantur, et praecipue quae consequuntur universaliter omnem creaturam, ut immensus, increatus, etc. . .” (emphasis added). 26 the negative names implying any kind of composition or division in God. It is rather the case that the negative divine names serve to remove any suggestion of composition or division from God.
When it comes to the positive names, however, Thomas holds that these names do express something positively about the divine essence, even though they fall short of expressing any knowledge of what God is in Himself. He also claims (particularly in later texts) that each of these names signifies one and the same thing, the divine essence. This position raises a twofold difficulty.
On the one hand, that the names all signify one and the same thing would seem to suggest that the various positive divine names are just synonyms, such that saying God is good does not mean anything different from saying that God is wise. If, on the other hand, the positive divine names are distinct from one another, this would seem to suggest some diversity or multiplicity on the part of
God. Thomas deals with both of these objections—the problem of the synonymy of the divine names and the problem of implicit multiplicity in God—in numerous texts.56
The problem of implicit multiplicity is particularly salient with regard to the positive names taken from pure perfections. Whereas even in creatures the transcendentals are the same in reality and only logically distinct, one and the same creature’s justice and wisdom are distinct in reality. We will examine the texts from the two Summae and the Compendium on these questions in the chapters devoted to each of those works: in this preliminary chapter I will treat two texts from Thomas's
Sentences Commentary: In Sent. 1.2.1.2 and In Sent. 1.2.1.3. In both of these texts, Thomas treats the issue of the multiplicity of divine names and the problem of synonymy together.
56 For texts on the issue of the multiplicity in God seemingly implied by the distinction of positive names, see especially In Sent. 1.2.1.3, SCG 1.31, LR 2.1.1, Resp. 108 pr. and 1-3, and ST 1.13.4. For texts on the problem of synonymy, see In Sent. 1.2.1.2; In Sent. 1.2.1.3; In Sent. 1.22.1.3; SCG 1.35; LR 2.1.1; CT 1.25; De pot. 7.6; ST 1.13.4. 27
In In Sent. 1.2.1.2, Thomas asks whether in God there are several attributes.57 Against this suggestion, he presents two objections that maintain that a plurality of attributes is inconsistent with being maximally one (maxime unum), and that a plurality of operations (which is implied by distinguishing between divine intellect and will) is inconsistent with the divine simplicity, because
“the operation of one simple thing is one.”58 The plurality of divine attributes thus seems to be inconsistent with divine unity and simplicity.
Both of the sed contra arguments of this article are worth noting. In the first, Thomas cites
Anselm, saying that “whatever it is simply better to be than not to be is to be attributed to God.”
Because wisdom, goodness, and similar things fall under this description, they must be in God.59 In the second, he cites the opinion of Averroes and attributes to Aristotle (in particular, to Metaphysics
5.16) the view that what is simply perfect contains within itself all of the excellences (nobilitates) found in all genera. It follows, then, that power, goodness, and “whatever else there is of excellence
(nobilitatis) in each thing” is in God. There is, therefore, a plurality of attributes in God.
In the body of this article, Thomas begins by asserting that whatever there is of being and goodness (entitatis et bonitatis) in creatures is entirely from the Creator, while imperfection is not from
Him, but occurs from creatures insofar as they are ex nihilo.60 Although this particular explanation for
57 From the content of the article, it is clear that by attribute Thomas means what we have called the positive names. 58 In Sent. 1.2.1.2 obj. 1-2 [Mand. 1.61-62]: “Videtur quod in divina essentia non sit pluralitas attributorum. Illud enim est maxime unum quod omnino a pluralitate removetur. Albius enim est, secundum Philosophum, III Top., quod est nigro impermixtius. Sed divina essentia est summe una, quae est principium totius unitatis. Ergo in ea nulla pluralitas attributorum cadere poterit. Item, unius simplicis est operatio una. Sed divina essentia est una et simplex. Ergo habet tantum unam operationem. Diversorum autem attributorum sunt operationes diversae, sicut scientiae scire et voluntatis velle, et sic de aliis. Ergo in De non invenitur diversitas attributorum.” 59 In Sent. 1.2.1.2 [Mand. 62]: “Contra, sicut dicit [Anselmus], omne quod simpliciter melius est esse quam non esse, Deo est attribuendum. Sed sapientia, bonitas et hujusmodi simpliciter sunt melius esse quam non esse. Ergo sunt in Deo.” The Mandonnet text has “Augustinus” instead of Anselmus, but n. 3 on p. 62 acknowledges that Thomas’s reference is to Anselm. See Anselm, Proslogion c. 5 [Schmitt 1.104]. Cf. In In Sent. 1.22.1.2 [Mand. 1.535], which discusses the proper and non-metaphorical predication of these positive divine names. Cf. De ver. 2.1 s.c. 2 [Leon. 22/1.38]. 60 In Sent. 1.2.1.2 [Mand. 1.62]: “Respondeo dicendum, quod quidquid est entitatis et bonitatis in creaturis, totum est a Creatore: imperfectio autem non est ab ipso, sed accidit ex parte creaturarum, inquantum sunt ex nihilo.” 28 the imperfection of creatures seems to be found in Thomas's writings only in the Sentences
Commentary,61 what follows is a common theme throughout his career: a cause possesses in a more excellent and noble way whatever perfections it causes in other things.62 It follows from this that all of the perfections of creatures, which are caused by God, must exist in God in a most excellent way and without any imperfection; and Thomas concludes from this that those perfections that are diverse in creatures must be one in God, on account of His highest simplicity.63
In the remainder of the body of a. 2, Thomas clarifies his claim that all the attributes are one in God. He observes that it must be said that wisdom, goodness, and similar attributes are each in
God in that each is the divine essence itself, so that they are all one in reality.64 However, because each of these attributes is in God “according to its truest meaning (ratio), and the meaning (ratio) of wisdom is not the meaning (ratio) of goodness,” it follows that these attributes are distinct in ratio
“not only on the part of the one reasoning, but by the character of the thing itself [i.e., the divine
61 This argument for imperfection from a creature's being ex nihilo does not seem to occur again in Thomas's writings, except at In Sent. 1.3 div. [Mand. 1.88] in the presentation of arguments for God's existence. Thomas does use the premise that creatures are ex nihilo in ST 1.9.2 s.c. 2 [Leon. 4.91] to argue for the mutability of creatures (cf. Albert In I Sent. 3.2 ad 4 [Borgnet 25.94), and in SCG 2.30 [Leon. Man. 116] and De pot. 5.4 ad 10 [Marietti 2.140] he discusses the sense in which creatures are susceptible to returning to nothingness, because they are ex nihilo. Other arguments from the created character of a finite being to its imperfection, compared to God, might be given—for example, one might argue from the fact that a created being only participates in esse in a limited way—but Thomas does not argue later in his career immediately from the fact that a creature is ex nihilo that it must be imperfect. 62 It is noteworthy that Thomas does not explicitly appeal to the axiomatic principle omne agens agit sibi simile here in order to defend this claim concerning the pre-eminent existence of an effect in its cause. For discussion of the role that this axiom plays elsewhere in the Sentences Commentary with respect to human knowledge of God, see Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on Our Knowledge of God and the Axiom that Every Agent Produces Something Like Itself,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 154-55. 63 In Sent 1.2.1.2 [Mand. 1.62]: “Quod autem est causa alicujus, habet illud excellentius et nobilius. Unde oportet quod omnes nobilitates omnium creaturarum inveniantur in Deo nobilissimo modo et sine aliqua imperfectione: et ideo quae in creaturis sunt diversa, in Deo propter summam simplicitatem sunt unum.” In terms of the order of argumentation, it is to be noted that neither divine simplicity nor the attributes of goodness and wisdom have yet been discussed or proved at this point in the Sentences Commentary. In contrast to the two Summae and the Compendium, in this work the discussion of whether the multiplicity of attributes is consistent with the divine simplicity precedes any discussion of particular attributes. 64 Ibid.: “Sic ergo dicendum est, quod in Deo est sapientia, bonitas et hujusmodi, quorum quodlibet est ipsa divina essentia, et ita omnia sunt unum re.” 29 essence].”65 This crucial claim—that the meaing or intelligible content (ratio) that distinguishes one attribute from another is not only ex parte ipsius ratiocinantis but is ex parte rei, quae Deus est—will be the subject of extended discussion in the following article, a. 3.
In a. 2, Thomas moves on immediately from this assertion to the claim that God is not a purely equivocal cause of things. The assertion that the rationes of the positive attributes are somehow in God (and not only the human intellect, which derives its knowledge of the attribute from creatures) serves to exclude pure equivocation, because in purely equivocal predication of a name the intelligible contents (rationes) according to which the name is predicated are utterly diverse.66 Rather God, according to His form, produces similar effects: not univocally similar, but analogically, insofar as “from His wisdom is derived every wisdom, and similarly for the other attributes, according to the teaching of Dionysius.”67 God is the exemplar form of things, not only with regard to the divine ideas, but according to the divine attributes, which are “in His nature.”68
65 Ibid.: “Et quia unumquodque eorum est in Deo secundum sui verissimam rationem, et ratio sapientiae non est ratio bonitatis, inquantum hujusmodi, relinquitur quod sunt diversa ratione, non tantum ex parte ipsius ratiocinantis, sed ex proprietate ipsius rei.” 66 De prin. [Leon. 43.46: 27-29]: “Equiuoce predicatur quod predicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et secundum diuersam rationem. . .” Cf. In Sent. 1.2.1.3 s.c. 3 [Mand. 1.65]: “Praeterea, sapientia non dicitur aequivoce de Deo et creatura. . . . Sed ea quae praedicantur de pluribus secundum rationes omnino diversas, aequivoce praedicantur.” 67 Ibid. [Mand. 1.62-63]: “. . . et inde est quod ipse non est causa rerum omnino aequivoca, cum secundum formam suam producat effectus similes, non univoce, sed analogice; sicut a sua sapientia derivatur omnis sapientia, et ita de aliis attributis, secundum doctrinam Dionysii.” The axiom omne agens agit sibi simile (see footnote 44 above) is arguably present implicitly here, although Thomas proceeds to emphasize God's exemplar formal causality (according to the divine essence itself, not just according to the divine ideas) rather than His efficient causality: this is consistent with Bernard Montagnes' thesis that in the Sentences Commentary Thomas emphasizes the exemplar formal causality of the divine essence rather than efficient causality (and the similarity subsequent to it) with regard to the analogy between creatures and God. See Bernard Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après saint Thomas D’Aquin (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1963), 91-93. 68 Ibid. [Mand. 1.63]: “Unde ipse est exemplaris forma rerum, non tantum quantum ad ea quae sunt in sapientia sua, scilicet secundum rationes ideales, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt in natura sua, scilicet attributa.” For a full treatment of God’s exemplar causality according to His attributes and His ideas, see Gregory Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008); on the relationship between the exemplarism of the divine essence and the exemplarism of the ideas in Thomas’s Sentences Commentary, see especially pp. 86-87. 30
Thomas then notes that some have suggested that the attributes differ only by what these names connote in creatures. He does not elaborate on the meaning of this suggestion here, but
Thomas would have been familiar with such a view from his teacher, Albert, who, in an article from his Sentences Commentary, while addressing the question of whether the attributes in God are one or plural (the same question as Thomas’s In Sent. 1.2.1.2), expresses this view as follows:
It must be said that the attributes are compared to two things, namely, to the substance of the cause in which they exist, and to the effects that they connote. And in the first way, they signify one [thing] because of simplicity: whence it cannot be inferred, if God is goodness and wisdom, that He is two: because this is a comparison to the cause in which the attributes exist. [The attributes] are compared in another way to the things they connote, and in this way they are in a qualified sense plural, but not simply plural: because they are signified as the rationes of several things.69
Abert thus employs the notion of connoted effects to distinguish and multiply the divine attributes, and this is just the view that St. Thomas criticizes in In Sent. 1.2.1.2. In De pot. 7.6 Thomas also explains this suggestion that the attributes are distinguished by connoted effects in connection with an exclusively causal account of the meaning of a divine name: taken in this way, to say God is good means only that God is the cause of good creatures, while saying He is wise means only that He is the cause of wise creatures.70 On this view, the name good or wise is attributed to God just insofar as it connotes the goodness or wisdom caused by God.
Against this suggestion that the attributes are distinguished by connoted effects, Thomas offers two brief arguments. First, a cause does not receive anything from its effect, but vice versa: therefore, God is not wise because the creature receives wisdom from Him; rather, the creature is
69 Albert, In I Sent. d. 3 a. 4 [Borgnet 25.95]: “Dicendum quod attributa duplicem habent comparationem, scilicet, ad substantiam causae in qua sunt, et ad effectus quos connotant. Et primo modo [significant] unum propter simplicitatem: unde non possum inferre, si Deus est bonitas et sapientia, quod ipse sit duo: quia sic fit comparatio ad causam in qua sunt attributa. Aliam comparationem habent ad connotata, et sic sunt secundum quid ut plura, licet non simpliciter plura: quia significantur ut rationes plurium.” I have read significant here for significantur. 70 De pot. 7.6 [Marietti 2.201]. Thomas also treats this exclusively causal account of divine naming, which he also associates with Maimonides, in In Sent 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.67-68] and ST 1.13.2 [Leon. 4.141]. 31 wise because it imitates the divine wisdom. Second, Thomas explains that God would be good or wise even if no creatures ever existed, and so it cannot be the case that what distinguishes divine goodness from divine wisdom is the connotation of distinct perfections in creatures.71
Finally, Thomas very briefly addresses the problem of synonymy: “Nor would the same thing be in every way signified through one [divine attribute] and through another, in the way that the same thing is signified through synonymous names.”72 Crucial here is the qualification “in every way” (omnino), which allows what Thomas has argued for in this article, that the divine wisdom and goodness, etc., are one in reality: the positive attributes are predicated of what is absolutely one and simple (the divine essence), but according to different meanings (rationes). We shall see that Thomas's emphasis shifts somewhat concerning this point in the following text, In Sent. 1.2.1.3.
To summarize Thomas's answers concerning the problems of implicit diversity and synonymy in In Sent. 1.2.1.2, regarding the former problem, Thomas explains that each of the attributes predicated of the divine essence is the divine essence itself, so that no real multiplicity or diversity is implied on the part of the divine essence. However, each of the attributes is predicated of
God according to its distinct intelligible content (ratio), and Thomas affirms that this distinction of intelligible content (ratio) is not entirely on the part of the intellect's reasoning, but is from the very character of the divine essence itself. With regard to the problem of synonymy, Thomas's brief explanation asserts that the same thing is not in every way signified by each of the divine attributes, but rather each is predicated according to its distinct intelligible content (ratio). Synonyms signify the same thing in the same way, and so the divine attributes are not synonyms.
71 In Sent. 1.2.1.2 [Mand. 1.63]: “Quidam autem dicunt, quod ista attributa non differunt nisi penes connotata in creaturis: quod non potest esse: tum quia causa non habet aliquid ab effectu, sed e converso: unde Deus non dicitur sapiens quia ab eo est sapientia, sed potius res creata dicitur sapiens inquantum imitatur divinam sapientiam: tum quia ab aeterno creaturis non existentibus, etiamsi nunquam futurae fuissent, fuit verum dicere, quod est sapiens, bonus et hujusmodi.” 72 Ibid.: “Nec idem omnino significaretur per unum et per aliud, sicut idem significatur per nomina synonyma.” 32
We will now turn to the next article of the Sentences Commentary. It should be noted that In
Sent. 1.2.1.3 was not a part of the Commentary as first drafted, but was inserted during the revision of the Commentary in Paris.73 It is helpful to take note of the thematic connection between this article and the Responsio de 108 articulis, which was composed in Rome, 1265-67/8.74 The somewhat lengthy attention given to this text is justified by Thomas's own insistence on the importance of the issue. So important does Thomas deem the thesis defended in In Sent. 1.2.1.3 that he asserts that
“almost the entire understanding of those things said in the First Book [of the Sentences] depends upon this.”75
73 Although it has been long known that In Sent. 1.2.1.3 is a later composition, until recently it was thought that its composition dated to Thomas's time at Rome, 1265-67/8. For this opinion, see Antoine Dondaine, “Saint Thomas a- t-il disputé à Rome la question des attributs divins? (`I Sent.´, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3),” Bulletin Thomiste. Notes et Communications 3 (1933): 171-182; “Saint Thomas et la dispute des Attributs Divins (I Sent., d. 2, a. 3), Authenticité et origine,” Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 8 (1938): 253–262. Dondaine reasonably but incorrectly surmised that the text of In Sent. 1.2.1.3 was a part of the second Sentences Commentary, a part which Thomas ordered inserted into his original Commentary after abandoning the second. In the possible edition of Thomas’s second Sentences Commentary edited by L. Boyle, we find that Lectura romana 2.1.1 is a parallel text to In Sent. 1.2.1.3. If the Lectura romana is deemed to be the authentic second Commentary, then In Sent. 1.2.1.3 should not be considered a fragment of the second Sentences Commentary on this basis alone. See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 412, for Torrell’s expression of doubts concerning the authenticity of the Lectura romana edited by Boyle. Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, “Lire saint Thomas autrement,” introduction to Leonard Boyle, Facing History: a Different Thomas Aquinas (Louvain-la-Neuve: Federation Internionale des Instituts d'Etudes Médiévales, 2000), xxi-xxiv. Adriano Oliva has recently shown, on the basis of codicological and internal textual evidence, that In Sent. 1.2.1.3 was indeed not in the first published version of the Parisian Commentary; however, it was inserted into the Commentary at Thomas's request no later than 1255. See Adriano Oliva, Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la Sacra doctrina : avec l'édition du proloque de son commentaire des Sentences (Paris: Vrin, 2006), 109-117, 130-39. It should be noted that certain elements of In Sent. 1.2.1.3 seem to be inspired and influenced by the Dominican (and future Pope Bl. Innocent V) Peter Tarentaise's own Commentary, Bk. 1, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3. See Peter Tarentaise, In IV Libros Sententiarum Commentaria (Ridgewood: The Gregg Press, 1964), 20-21. Thomas's In Sent. 1.2.1.3 postdates Peter Tarentaise's parallel a. 3, but only by one or two academic years—not by ten or more years as previously thought. It is likely that Thomas drafted In Sent. 1.2.1.3 in response to some controversy in Paris prompted by Peter Tarentaise's a. 3, which itself elaborates on claims made in Thomas's In Sent. 1.2.1.2. 74 The Responsio de 108 articulis was composed as a private response to inquiries posed by the Master of the Dominican Order (Bl. John of Vercelli) concerning criticisms that had been made about the Sentences Commentary of Peter Tarentaise. The Responsio de 108 articulis begins with a three-paragraph introduction that concerns the same topic as In Sent. 1.2.1.3; aa. 1-3 and 51 also concern broadly the same topic. Antoine Dondaine argued for the Roman composition of In Sent. 1.2.1.3 in part on the basis of the connection between this text and the Responsio de 108 articulis, but Adriano Oliva has shown that In Sent. 1.2.1.3 was composed in Paris before 1255. See the previous note. 75 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.66]: “Ad cujus rei evidentiam, ut diligenter explicetur, quia ex hoc pendet fere totus intellectus eorum quae in I libro dicuntur, quatuor oportet videre.” The same claim is also found in LR 2.1.1. 33
Thomas comments on four issues in In Sent. 1.2.1.3: (1) the meaning of the term ratio, (2) how it is that a ratio may be said to exist or not exist in a thing, (3) whether the rationes by which the attributes differ are in God, and (4) whether the plurality of the rationes of the divine attributes is in
God, or if it only arises from the activity of the human intellect thinking about God.
Concerning the first point, Thomas carefully distinguishes the meaning of the term ratio as it is used in this context: he explains that by the term ratio he means “that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name: and among those things that have a definition, this is the very definition of the thing.”76 For example, the ratio of wisdom (taken as a divine attribute) is that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of the divine name wisdom. Typically, a ratio is the same as the definition of the thing named, but Thomas explains that not everything that has a ratio has a definition: for example, the ratio of quality (one of the ten categories) cannot be a definition, because as a supreme genus quality cannot be defined through a genus and difference.
Concerning the names said of God, Thomas then claims that “the intelligible content (ratio) of the wisdom which is said of God is what is conceived from the signification of this name, even though the divine wisdom itself cannot be defined.”77
76 Ibid.: “Quantum ad primum pertinet, sciendum est, quod ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei definitio, secundum quod Philosophus dicit, IV Metaph., text. 11: 'Ratio quam significat nomen est definitio.'” 77 Ibid.: “Et sic patet quod ratio sapientiae quae de Deo dicitur, est id quod concipitur de significatione hujus nominis, quamvis ipsa sapientia divina definiri non possit.” Thomas then clarifies that strictly speaking the term ratio itself, as a term of second imposition, signifies the intention of a conception of the mind (just like other terms of second imposition, such as definition) rather than the conception itself. It is a name (such as wisdom) that signifies the conception (such as the conception of wisdom); the term ratio is a term of second imposition that signifies the intention of a conception, and the ratio of something is what the intellect apprehends from the signification of the name of that thing. If this apprehended intelligible is definable, then the ratio is its definition; if it is not definable, nevertheless there can be a less expressible (or inexpressible) grasp of the ratio. As becomes clear from the subsequent discussion (and from the corresponding treatment in Resp. 108 pr., 1-3), Thomas seems at times content in practice to treat ratio and conception as equivalent terms, but I would emphasize the importance of the subtle distinction between ratio (as that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name) and conception (as that which a name signifies and that by which the thing named is understood): doing so will allow us to say that the ratio of wisdom is somehow in God, even if we want to avoid saying that the conception of wisdom is in God. 34
Having clarified what is meant by the term ratio in the present discussion, Thomas proceeds to explain the second point identified above, which concerns how it is that a ratio is said to be in a thing (res). He begins by clarifying that neither the intelligible content (ratio) nor the mind’s conception exists in the thing as their subject.78 However, the ratio “is said to exist in the thing, insofar as in the thing outside the mind there is something that corresponds to the conception of the mind, as the signified [corresponds] to the sign.”79 I take the ambiguity of Thomas's 'something' here to be crucial. The conception is exclusively in the mind as its subject, but insofar as outside the mind there is something corresponding to the conception as its signatum, the intelligibility (ratio) apprehended from the name is said to exist in the extramental thing.
Thomas proceeds to explain that a concept of the intellect can be related in three ways to the thing that is outside the mind. First, the concept can be a similitude of the thing existing outside the mind. Such a concept has an immediate foundation (fundamentum) in a thing outside the mind,
“insofar as the thing itself, from its conformity to the understood [intention], makes it that the intellect is true, and that the name signifying that understood [intention] is properly said of the thing.” Thomas gives as an example the concept conceived from the name man.80 Second, in other cases what a name signifies is not a similitude of a thing existing outside the mind, but is “something which follows from the mode of understanding the thing that is outside the mind; and the intentions that our intellect devises are of this kind.” Thomas has in mind the concepts corresponding to terms
78 Concerning the manner in which ratio and conception are distinct, see the previous note. 79 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.66-67]: “Et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. Non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extra animam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo.” 80 Ibid. [Mand. 1.67]: “Unde sciendum, quod ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine 'homo'; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur.” 35 of second intention, such as genus and species: for example, the intellect attributes to animal the name and intention of genus, but this is not because a genus as such exists outside the mind. In such a case, the thing existing outside the mind is only the remote foundation of the concept.81 In a third way, what is signified by a name sometimes has neither a proximate nor a remote foundation outside the mind, “such as the concept of a chimera.” Such a false concept is neither a similitude of a thing outside the mind (since a chimera does not exist); nor is this concept something that follows from the mode of understanding some thing truly (rem aliquam vere).82 Thomas concludes, concerning the second point, that an intelligibility (ratio) is properly said to be in a thing outside the mind when the concept of the intellect is a similitude of the thing.83 In such a case, the thing is the proximate foundation of the intellect's concept.
With this subtle and complex set of distinctions concerning ratio, concept, thing, and foundation, Thomas proceeds to address the third question raised above: Are the rationes of the attributes in God? He frames his answer to this question with reference to two sets of opinions about the meaning of the positive divine names: the opinions of Avicenna and Maimonides on the one hand, and of Dionysius and Anselm on the other.
Treating Avicenna and Maimonides together, Thomas attributes to them a twofold way of negation and a twofold way of causality, according to which the import of the positive divine names
81 Ibid.: “Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis 'genus' non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit.” 82 Ibid.: “Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa.” 83 Ibid.: “Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei.” 36 may be understood.84 Regarding the way of negation, Thomas explains that a divine name can be understood according to the way of negation in two ways: either such a name is understood to remove something unfitting from God, or it is understood as something that follows from a negation. In the former way, the divine name wise would serve only to remove from God the defects belonging to creatures lacking wisdom. As for the latter, Thomas gives two examples: it is in this way that the name one follows from God's being undivided (a negative name), and from His being immaterial, it follows that He is intelligent. According to those who understand such names only according to the way of negation, “all those names are found more to remove [something from] rather than to posit something in God.”85
But Thomas also attributes to Avicenna and Maimonides (taken together) a way of causality, which is also subdivided into two. In the first way, a perfection is attributed to God because God produces that perfection in creatures: for example, God would be called good simply because He
84 Thomas begins by attributing to Avicenna and Maimonides the view that “the thing which is God is a certain subsistent existence; nor is something other than existence in God: whence they say that He is existence without essence.” In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.67]: “Quidam enim dicunt, ut Avicenna et Rabbi Moyses, quod res illa quae Deus est, est quoddam esse subsistens, nec aliquid aliud nisi esse, in Deo est: unde dicunt, quod est esse sine essentia. Omnia autem alia quae Deo attribuuntur, verificantur de Deo dupliciter secundum eos: vel per modum negationis, vel per modum causalitatis.” Mandonnet has indicated references here to the De intelligentiis c. 1 and to the Guide for the Perplexed Bk. 1 cc. 47-48. The De intelligentiis is a pseudo-Avicennian work, edited and published by R. De Vaux as the De causis primis et secundis et de fluxu qui consequitur eas, in Notes et textes sur l’Avicennisme latin aux confins des XII-XIII siècles (Paris: Vrin, 1934), 88-140. I have been unable to find an unambiguous source text in this work for Thomas’s reference. That being said, Avicenna does indicate in his Metaphysics 8.4 that necesse esse lacks a quiddity, although this is after having identified essence/quiddity and esse within God. Prima philosophia 8.4 [Van Riet 2.402]: “Primus igitur non habet quidditatem, sed super habentia quidditates fluit esse ab eo.” As for Maimonides, we find the following concerning God in the Latin Maimonides in Bk. 1 c. 56 (in the enumeration of chapters found in the 1520 Paris Latin edition); Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum 1.56 [1520 Paris: fol. 21v]: “Sed est necesse esse semper cui nihil accidit, et iccerco est non in essentia: et vivus non in vita, et potens non in potentia, et sapiens non in sapientia.” The purpose of this chapter is to establish that God exists, is living, is power, and is wise, without possessing these as accidents added to His substance. For literature on both Avicenna’s and Maimonides’ influence on Thomas with respect to divine naming, see David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1986), 51-70. For discussion of Maimonides and Thomas on divine naming, see Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 298-300; Alexander Broadie, “Maimonides and Aquinas on the Names of God,” Religious Studies 23 (1987): 157-70; Mercedes Rubio, Aquinas and Maimonides on the Possibility of the Knowledge of God (Amsterdam: Springer, 2006). Rubio’s study contains a lengthy treatment of In Sent. 1.2.1.3. 85 Ibid. [Mand. 1.68]: “Unde, secundum eos, omnia ista nomina potius sunt inventa ad removendum, quam ad ponendum aliquid in Deo.” 37 makes good creatures.86 In the second way, a perfection is attributed to God on account of some comparison made between God's ways and the ways of a creature: for example, God would be called holy insofar as His way of producing effects is like the way of holy creatures, or He would be called irate because He acts in a way like that of the irate creature.87 But, Thomas contends, both of these “ways of causality” would not yield anything more than equivocal predication of these perfections, and creatures would not have any likeness to the Creator, even in their being good or wise. Furthermore, on this account, the attributes—as signifying only a logical relation of God to creatures—would not differ from the temporal names, which can only be said to have a remote
(rather than a proximate) foundation in God. Because a ratio is not properly in a thing that is only the remote foundation of a concept, it would follow that, on this suggested view, the rationes of the attributes are not in God.88
86 The source for this view in Maimonides is his claim that positive attributes can be understood as indicating God’s action or works—this is the only sense in which Maimonides will allow a positive attribute to have any positive meaning, but not as a characterization of the divine essence itself. See Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum 1.53, 1.57, especially the end of 1.53 [1520 Paris: fol. 21r]: “Ratio autem est quod iste dispositiones quae attribuuntur ei, sunt dispositiones operum suorum, non quod ipse sit qualitatibus subiectus.” For Avicenna, see the latter half of the following claim in Metaphysics 8.7 [Van Riet 2.431]: “Cum vero dicitur bonus, non intelligitur nisi quia hoc esse liberum est a commixtione eius quod est in potentia et imperfectione, et haec est negatio, vel si dixerit quod suum esse est principium omnis perfectionis et ordinationis, et haec est relatio.” 87 Ibid. [Mand. 1.68]: “Item per modum causalitatis dupliciter: vel inquantum producit ista in creaturis, ut dicatur Deus bonus, quia bonitatem creaturis influit, et sic de aliis, vel inquantum ad modum creaturae se habet ut dicatur Deus volens vel pius, inquantum se habet ad modum volentis vel pii in modo producendi effectum, sicut dicitur iratus, quia ad modum irati se habet.” For this view in Maimonides, see Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum 1.52 [1520 Paris: fol. 20v]: “Omnis autem qui apprehendit aliquod operum ipsius nominat creatorem nomine dispositionis ex qua provenit illud opus: et vocatur nomine sumpto ab opere illo.” 88 Ibid.: “Et secundum hanc opinionem sequitur quod omnia nomina quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, dicantur aequivoce, et quod nulla similitudo sit creaturae ad Creatorem ex hoc quod creatura est bona vel sapiens vel hujusmodi aliquid; et hoc expresse dicit Rabbi Moyses. Secundum hoc, illud quod concipitur de nominibus attributorum, non refertur ad Deum, ut sit similitudo alicujus quod in eo est. Unde sequitur quod rationes istorum nominum non sunt in Deo, quasi fundamentum proximum habeant in ipso, sed remotum; sicut nos dicimus de relationibus quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur; hujusmodi enim relationes in Deo secundum rem non sunt, sed sequuntur modum intelligendi, sicut dictum est de intentionibus. Et sic, secundum hanc opinionem, rationes horum attributorum sunt tantum in intellectu, et non in re, quae Deus est; et intellectus eas adinvenit ex consideratione creaturarum vel per negationem vel per causalitatem, ut dictum est.” Because the view being criticized here denies that the rationes of the attributes are in God, the force of adinvenit here would seem to be “devises” or “invents” rather than “discovers.” For the reference to Maimonides, see Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum 1.55 [1520 Paris: fol. 21r]: “Scito quod similitudo est comparatio inter duo, et omnia duo inter quae non est comparatio non ascendit in cor quod sit inter ea similitudo ulla. 38
Against the collected opinions of Avicenna and Maimonides, Thomas presents the opinions of Dionysius and Anselm, who hold that “whatever of perfection is in creatures exists preeminently in God.”89 The preeminence of these perfections is understood in three ways: first, with respect to universality, since all perfections, which are not joined together in any one creature, are united in
God; second, with regard to plenitude, since God possesses every perfection without any deficiency or limitation, unlike the manner in which creatures possess perfections; third, with regard to unity, since the perfections that are diverse in creatures are one in God. On this view, the concepts formed by our intellect from the signification of the divine names are “truly similitudes of the thing, which is
God, although deficient and not complete, just as [is the case] with other things that are similar to
God.”90 Given the thesis articulated above—that a ratio is properly said to be in a thing, as the proximate foundation of a concept, when the concept is a similitude of the thing—it follows that the rationes of the attributes are not only in the intellect, but are in God, the proximate foundation of the concepts corresponding to these names. It follows from this, Thomas adds, that “whatever follows upon wisdom as such rightly and properly belongs to God.”91 That is, given the positive attribution
Similiter inter quae non est similitudo nec inter ea est comparatio, cuius rei exemplum est quod non dicitur quod iste calor est similis huic tincturae, nec ista vox est similis huic dulcedini, et hoc est notum per se. Quoniam ergo nulla comparatio est inter nos et creatorem, nec potest esse, scilicet inter ipsum et id quod est extra ipsum, sequitur quod nulla sit similitudo.” 89 Ibid.: “Alia vero dicunt, ut Dionysius et Anselmus quod in Deo praeeminenter existit quidquid perfectionis in creaturis est.” Mandonnet provides references here to Divine Names 13 and Monologion 3. For the reference to Dionysius, see Divine Names c. 13, Saracen translation [Dionysiaca 1.537-39]: “Etenim theologia de omnium causa et omnia et simul omnia praedicat, perfectum ipsum et sicut unum laudat. Igitur perfectum quidem est non solum sicut per se perfectum, et secundum se ipsum a se ipso uniformiter segregatum, et totum per totum perfectissimum, sed et sicut superperfectum secundum omnium excessum, et omnem quidem infinitatem terminans, super omnem autem terminum extentum, et a nullo captum aut comprehensum, sed extendens se ad omnia simul et super omnia indeficientibus immissionibus.” For Anselm, see Monologion 3 [Schmitt 1.16]: “Quod autem maxime omnium est, et per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, et omnino quidquid aliquid est id necesse est esse summe bonum et summe magnum, et summum omnium quae sunt.” 90 Ibid. [Mand. 1.69]: “Secundum ergo hanc opinionem, conceptiones quas intellectus noster ex nominibus ex nominibus attributorum concipit, sunt vere similitudines rei, quae Deus est, quamvis deficientes et non plenae, sicut est de aliis rebus quae Deo similantur.” 91 Ibid.: “Et ex hoc contingit quod quidquid sequitur ad sapientiam, inquantum hujusmodi, recte et proprie convenit Deo.” 39 of wisdom (or another attribute) to God, one may also attribute to God whatever belongs to or follows from wisdom (or another attribute) as such.
Concerning the opinions of Avicenna and Maimonides on the one hand and Dionysius and
Anselm on the other, Thomas then clarifies that these seemingly inconsistent opinions are not in fact contrary to each other, if one takes into account the reasons behind each view. On the one hand, the former opinion (which favored restricting one's understanding of the attributes to versions of the way of negation and the way of causality) arose because their proponents “considered created things themselves, upon which the names of the attributes are imposed, as this name 'wisdom' is imposed upon a certain quality, and this name 'essence' upon a certain reality that is not subsistent.”
Because quality and non-subsistence do not belong to God, these thinkers said that God is esse without essence and that wisdom itself is not in Him.92 By contrast, the latter thinkers “considered the modes of perfection from which these names are taken.” God is perfect in every way (omnibus modis) according to His one simple esse, a truth that is reflected through these positive names: and therefore these thinkers said that these names belong to God positively.93
According to Thomas, neither of these opinions implies the negation of the other. The former thinkers would not say that any mode of perfection is lacking to God, and the latter thinkers would not posit quality or anything non-subsistent in God.94 Concerning the third point of discussion (whether the rationes of the attributes are in God), Thomas concludes that they are truly in
92 Ibid.: “Quia primi consideraverunt ipsas res creatas, quibus imponuntur nomina attributorum, sicut quod hoc nomen 'sapientia' imponitur cuidam qualitati, et hoc nomen 'essentia' cuidam rei quae non subsistit: et haec longe a Deo sunt: et ideo dixerunt, quod Deus est esse sine essentia, et quod non est in eo sapientia secundum se.” 93 Ibid.: “Alii vero consideraverunt modos perfectionis, ex quibus dicta nomina sumuntur: et, quia Deus secundum unum simplex esse omnibus modis perfectus est, qui importantur per hujusmodi nomina, ideo dixerunt, quod ista nomina positive Deo conveniunt.” 94 This conciliatory approach, particularly concerning the views of Maimonides, does not appear explicitly in Thomas’s later works. In his later works, particularly in De pot. 7.5 [Marietti 2.196-200] and ST 1.13.2 [Leon. 4.141], Thomas refrains from explicitly mentioning Avicenna as a target of criticism, but he continues to name Maimonides, without claiming that Maimonides’ position can be reconciled with the Dionysian view adopted by Thomas. 40
God, “because the ratio of a name pertains more to that from which the name is imposed than to that upon which it is imposed.”95 Despite the fact that a name such as wisdom is first imposed upon a creaturely quality, nevertheless the ratio of wisdom concerns a mode of perfection that is not, as such, limited to the predicament of quality.
Finally, concerning the fourth point—whether the multiplicity of the rationes is in any way realized on the part of God Himself—Thomas explains that the plurality of these rationes arises from the fact that God exceeds our intellect. The human intellect in this life cannot by one concept receive these many modes of perfection, in part because it only receives knowledge of these perfections from creatures (in which these perfections are diverse, existing according to diverse forms), but more fundamentally because the human intellect could never, by one concept, understand the simple unity of the divine perfection.96 Thomas quickly addresses the problem of synonymy, by claiming that these positive divine names are not synonyms because these names signify diverse rationes.97 In the remaining section of the corpus, Thomas proceeds to defend the claim
95 Ibid.: “Sic ergo patet tertium, scilicet quod rationes attributorum sunt vere in Deo, quia ratio nominis magis se tenet ex parte ejus a quo imponitur nomen, quam ex parte ejus cui imponitur.” It should be noted that this is not identical to Thomas's familiar way of drawing the distinction between that from which a name is imposed and that which a name is imposed to signify: in his phrasing and meaning here he seems to reflect Peter Tarentaise's way of speaking in his Commentary on the Sentences, 1.2.1.3. See Innocentii Quintii Pontificis Maximi, In IV Libros Sententiarum Commentaria (Ridgewood: The Gregg Press, 1964), 20-21. In this text, Peter writes: “Ratio proprie dicitur intentio intellectus perceptibilis, quae per nomen rei alicuius, vel per eius definitionem significatur: hanc enim necesse est praeconcipi ab intellectu, a quo nomen imponitur, et postmodum secundum illam nomen imponitur.” Many of the elements of Thomas's In Sent. 1.2.1.3 show the influence of Peter's a. 3. 96 As he frequently does in parallel discussions, Thomas cites Zachariah 14:9, “In that day the Lord will be one, and His name will be one,” in support of the claim that in the beatific vision there will no longer be a multiplicity of divine names. However, unlike any of the parallel texts, in this case Thomas then adds the qualification that even in the beatific vision, a multiplicity of names would result if the intellect seeing God “were to impose a name on the thing that it saw, and were to name it by the mediation of a concept that it had of it.” Ibid. [Mand. 1.70]: “Si autem intellectus noster Deum per seipsum videret, illi rei posset imponere nomen unum: quod erit in patria; et ideo dicitur Zach., ult., 9: In die illa erit Dominus unus, et nomen ejus unum. Illud autem nomen unum non significaret bonitatem tantum, nec sapientiam tantum, aut aliquid hujusmodi, sed significata omnium istorum includeret. Sed tamen sit intellectus videns Deum per essentiam imponeret nomen rei quam videret, et nominaret mediante conceptione quam de ea habet, oporteret adhuc quod imponeret plura nomina: quia impossibile est quod conceptio intellectus creati repraesentet totam perfectionem divinae essentiae.” 97 Ibid. [Mand. 1.70]: “Unde nomina illa non sunt synonyma, inquantum significant rationes diversas.” 41 that the multiplicity of the divine attributes can be said to be ex parte Dei, insofar as the multiplicity results from the fact that God exceeds the created human intellect. There is therefore something in
God that corresponds to the many concepts of the divine names, and this something is the divine perfection, which exceeds the power of any created intellect in its plenitude and its simultaneous possession of every mode of perfection.98
Throughout our study these two texts from the Sentences Commentary will prove crucial for interpretation of the three summae—above all, the claim that the plenitude of the divine perfection is that to which the diverse rationes of the attributes correspond will be fundamental.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE NAMES FOR THEIR ORDER
What can this somewhat lengthy consideration of the distinction of the divine names tell us about the order among them? As stated above, items can only be ordered insofar as they are distinct, but they must also share in some community. As we have seen, the divine names can be grouped in kind, as negative, relative, positive, metaphorical, and personal. Leaving aside the personal, relative, and metaphorical names, the positive names and the negative names are distinct only secundum rationem. However, one can distinguish between the way in which the positive names are distinct in their intelligible content (in ratione) and the way in which the negative names are distinct.
98 Ibid. [Mand. 1.70-71]: “Et ideo pluralitati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in re quae Deus est: non quidem pluralitas rei, sed plena perfectio, ex qua contingit ut omnes istae conceptiones ei aptentur. . . . Et sic patet quartum, quod pluralitas istorum nominum non tantum ex parte intellectus nostri formantis diversas conceptiones de Deo, quae dicuntur diversae ratione, ut ex dictis patet, sed ex parte ipsius Dei, inquantum scilicet est aliquid in Deo correspondens omnibus istis conceptionibus, scilicet plena et omnimoda ipsius perfectio, secundum quam contingit quod quodlibet nominum significantium ista conceptiones, de Deo vere et proprie dicitur; non autem ita quod aliqua diversitas vel multiplicitas ponatur in re, quae Deus est, ratione istorum attributorum.” In defending this concluding claim, Thomas also offers some implicit criticism of one aspect of the opinions attributed to Avicenna and Maimonides above: these criticisms concern the twofold way of causality. Thomas explains that God is not good because He makes good things; nor is He good because one can compare His way to the ways of good creatures. Rather, because He is good, He makes good things that, by their participating in His goodness, may be compared to His way of being good. We will see this same criticism, albeit explicitly directed only against Maimonides, in other texts. 42
As discussed at some length, the positive names (or attributes) differ in ratione in that these names signify concepts that are diverse similitudes of the one and simple divine essence; and from the signification of these names, the human intellect apprehends a ratio that escapes any definition.
Because the intellect's concept is a true (but deficient) similitude of the divine essence, the latter can be said to be the proximate foundation of the ratio apprehended through the concept. This is the foundation for distinguishing the attributes secundum rationem. As for the community of the attributes, they are all identical with the simple divine essence: they thus enjoy a numerical unity. Now, there is order among items insofar as those items are distinct. Because the multiplicity of the divine attributes is not only ex parte intellectus but is also ex parte Dei, it may be suggested as a possibility that the order of the divine attributes, although it is secundum rationem,99 may be in some way according to the character of the divine essence itself. That is, it is possible that one order of the divine attributes might be superior to another insofar as that order somehow better corresponds to something of the mode of the divine perfection, just as the multiplicity of the divine attributes is in a way ex parte Dei, because of the plenitude of divine perfection. Whether or not a study of the order of the attributes in the two Summae and the Compendium will support such a suggestion will need to be considered later in this dissertation.100
As for the negative names, each is distinguished by the characteristic of creatures that is removed from God. Because the negative names posit nothing in God, the community among these names arises just by reason of the fact that each of these names can be truly predicated of God. It is not a community according to numerical identity like that among the positive attributes.101 The
99 Thomas confirms this in In Sent. 1.35.1.1 ad 2 [Mand. 1.811-812]: “Et sicut proprie dicitur ens, ita proprie dicitur sciens et volens, et hujusmodi: nec est ibi aliqua pluralitas vel additio, vel ordo in re, sed in ratione tantum.” 100 I attempt to address this question in the conclusion. See below, pp. 386-87. 101 Thus, I would suggest that it is not proper to say, for example, that God's atemporality is His immateriality: God is atemporal in that He is not temporal, and He is immaterial in that He is not material. But temporality is not the same as materiality, and so atemporality is not the same as immateriality, even if the divine essence of which these names 43 significance of the order of the negative names themselves, then, would seem to be at most grounded in some order among the creaturely characteristics that these names remove from God: but this is not something ex parte rei quae est Deus.
Ultimately, this dissertation is concerned not just with the order among the negative names or the order among the positive names, but with the order among the divine names in general. It may be the case that, even if there is in a way less significance to the order of the negative names taken by themselves, nevertheless the order of the negative names understood in their relation to the positive names may be important. As we shall see especially in our study of the Summa contra Gentiles, the question of how to make the transition from the demonstration of negative names to the argumentation for positive names seems to have been a difficult issue in Thomas's mind. It may be that how one goes about arguing for the negative names—including their order—will have implications for how one understands and defends the attribution of the positive names.
are truly and exclusively predicated is one and simple. To say that God's atemporality is His immateriality is comparable to saying that a man's blindness is his deafness, insofar as the negative divine names can be compared to terms of privation that are predicated of creatures. CHAPTER TWO: CRITERION OF ORDER
In this chapter we will treat three principles by which the divine names might reasonably be ordered: the order of science (along with related notions such as the order of learning and the order of resolution), the Dionysian triplex via, and the order of the transcendentals.
1. THE ORDER OF SCIENCE
Given that Thomas presents the divine names in the context of philosophical and theological consideration of the divine essence, one should expect that the notion of science derived primarily from Aristotle might play a signficant role in determining the order of the divine names.
As we shall see, science in the strict sense is an ordered knowledge, a knowledge in which the order of human understanding parallels the causal order of reality. At the least, Aristotle is especially concerned with the proper order of scientific questioning. On the other hand, the limits of human scientific consideration of the immaterial and divine should cause us to question whether the
Aristotelian order of science can indeed properly determine the order of speculation in divinis.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ORDER OF SCIENCE
There is some difficulty in offering any short, precise summary of the order of science as it is treated by the Posterior Analytics or Thomas's Commentary on that work.1 The Posterior Analytics is intended to represent an overview of the general method of science from the point of view of the
1 In order to examine the order of science as Thomas understands it, we will consult two sources in conjunction: the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle and the Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, especially q. 6. It may be objected that Thomas's remarks in the Commentaries on Aristotle do not necessarily represent his personal philosophical views. This being granted, what is at issue is whether or not the Aristotelian notions of science and the order of science can serve to explain the order of the divine names in any of St. Thomas's personal writings. That is, I present this material from the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics in order to be able to pose and answer the question: Was Thomas influenced by Aristotle in this specific way, that his presentation of the order of the divine names is indebted to an Aristotelian account of the order of science? Furthermore, I will present material from the Commentary on the De Trinitate and the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics without attending to the question of whether there is any significant development in Thomas's thought between the former work (which predates the Summa contra Gentiles) and the latter (which postdates the Summa theologiae): questions about any such developments will be reserved for the later chapters of this dissertation concerning the two Summae and the Compendium. 44
45 logician, leaving to each of the sciences the determination of further questions about their own specific methods.2 The account given by the Posterior Analytics of the general method of science is intended to cover, for example, both mathematics and natural philosophy, as well as the mixed and subalternated sciences.
It also might seem that a summary account of the order of science in the strict sense (that is, the science resulting from demonstration propter quid) would not, in itself, be helpful in the present circumstance. For reasons that will be explained below, there can be no propter quid reasoning concerning God or any separate substance, and so one might not expect that the order of science in the strict sense will inform the order of the divine names. At the least, however, demonstration propter quid and the science resulting from such demonstration comprise the standard in reference to which demonstration quia and the metaphysical consideration of separate substance (as the causes or principles of its subject of study) are to be understood. A few comments about the character of and requirements for demonstration propter quid are therefore appropriate.
Demonstration propter quid is a syllogism resulting in scientific knowledge, which is reasoned and certain knowledge of necessary fact. The order of reasoning in a demonstration propter quid parallels the order of reality, insofar as it expresses the real cause of the fact demonstrated, as the cause of that fact and of no other.3 The cause of knowing the conclusion (causa cognoscendi) is identified as the real cause by the very ordering of the premises and the conclusion.4 The fact demonstrated is expressed by the conclusion, in which a property (propria passio) is predicated of a
2 Throughout, my comments on science are indebted to the licentiate thesis by James Weisheipl, Aristotelian Methodology: A Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle (Thesis: Pontifical Institute of Philosophy, Dominican House of Studies, 1958), ed. John R. Catan. 3 In Post. 1.4 [Leon. 1*2.19: 79-102]. 4 In Post. 1.7 [Leon. 1*2.31: 95-97]: “Et ideo rationabiliter cognitio horum principiorum est causa cognitionis conclusionum, quia semper quod est per se est causa eius quod est per aliud.” Here the principles at issue are first principles. 46 subject.5 The middle term or medium of the demonstration is a definition, either of the subject or of the property.6 Demonstration propter quid requires that one possess a knowledge of both the existence and the quiddity of the subject, as well as the nominal definition of the property, prior to even posing the question about the inherence of the property in the subject.7
Now, demonstration propter quid is so called because it provides the answer to the question propter quid, which asks why a property belongs to its subject. This suggests to us a way of explaining the order of science: we can consider the relationships of priority among Aristotle's four scientific questions: an est, quid est, utrum est or quia, and propter quid.8
First, the question an est asks simply whether something exists. This question can be asked concerning either the subject of the science or of the property that is to be demonstrated. As for the former, it typically does not pertain to a science to prove the existence of its own subject: rather, the existence of the subject must be presupposed by the science.9 As for the latter, the existence of some properties will be presupposed by a science, because the existence of some properties is evident to
5 In Post. 1.2 [Leon. 1*2.10: 17-21]: “. . . id cuius sciencia per demonstrationem queritur est conclusio aliqua in qua propria passio de subiecto aliquo predicatur, que quidem conclusio ex aliquibus principiis infertur.” 6 In Post. 1.2 [Leon. 1*2.11: 46-49]: “... et ideo de subiecto oportet precognoscere et quid est et quia est, presertim cum ex diffinitione subiecti et passionis sumatur medium demonstrationis.” Cf. In Post. 2.1 [Leon. 1*2.177:250- 266]: “Videtur hic Aristotiles dicere quod diffinitio passionis sit medium in demonstratione. Set considerandum est quod diffinitio
Knowing of something whether it exists, the question that immediately follows is what it is
(quid est). This question goes beyond mere understanding of the signification of the name of the thing, by asking what the thing is in itself. Not only does an affirmative answer to an est lead one to pose the question quid est: indeed, one must first know that a thing exists before one can reasonably inquire after what it is. What one grasps apprehensively as the answer to the question quid est is given expression as a definition, and it is this definitional answer to quid est that can serve as the middle term in a demonstration.
Insofar as one seeks the answer to the question quid est through a reasoning process, there is a process of inquiry between acknowledging that something exists (answering an est) and arriving at knowledge of a definition (properly answering quid est). In two texts, Thomas refers to this process of inquiry that prepares the way for answering quid est by the question quomodo est. First, in a text from the Commentary on the Physics 4.1, the question quomodo est is presented as an intermediate step between answering an est and answering quid est, in the context of commenting on Aristotle's discussion of place: “[Aristotle] says that just as it pertains to the natural [philosopher] to determine about the infinite if it is or not, and how it is, and what it is, so too about place.”12 Second, in the prooemium to ST 1.3, Thomas interjects the question quomodo est between an est and quid est: “Knowing
10 In Post. 1.2 [Leon. 1*2.11: 63-71]. 11 Ibid. 12 In Phys. 4.1 #406 [Marietti 202]: “Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod sicut ad naturalem pertinet determinare de infinito, si est vel non est, et quomodo sit, et quid sit, similiter etiam et de loco.” It should be noted that this presentation of an est, quomodo est, and quid est is found in the Latin translation of Aristotle upon which Thomas is commenting, at the very beginning of Book IV. 48 of something whether it is, it remains to be inquired how it is, so that what it is may be known.”13
On Thomas’s view, the reasoning process according to which one inquires quomodo est must involve the comparison of the subject one seeks to know to other things, because to know what a thing is is to know it as distinct from other things.14 This is why we begin, in seeking a definition, by identifying a thing’s remote genus; we then proceed through comparisons to find its proximate genus and, ideally, its specific difference. In this process, one seeks after the essential and defining characteristic of the thing by considering those of its properties or conditions which are at first better known.15 It is impossible for a human being to arrive at a definition except through this comparative reasoning process, and I contend that it is this reasoning process that Thomas has in mind when he inserts the question quomodo est between an est and quid est.
Compared to the first two scientific questions, the questions quia (or utrum est) and propter quid are more complex, in that they possess what Aertsen (following a suggestion by Rudolf Boehm) has called a “katallel” structure: these questions ask something about something else.16 That is, they ask whether something is predicated of a subject (utrum est / quia) and why this is so (propter quid).
13 ST 1.3. pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit.” Cf. ST 2-2.8.2 for a similar pairing of the questions quid sit and quomodo sit. I will return to and emphasize the importance of this text from ST 1.3.pr. in chapter six. Concerning this text’s account of the question quomodo sit, David Twetten asserts that it “could rightly be described as Aristotelian: one examines the properties of an x that is already known to exist in order to arrive at its definition.” David Twetten, “Aquinas’s Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of ‘God,’” The Thomist 69 (2005), 237. 14 SCG 1.14 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscimus, quanto differentias eius ad alia plenius intuemur: habet enim res unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium ab omnibus aliis rebus distinctum. Unde et in rebus quarum definitiones cognoscimus, primo eas in genere collocamus, per quod scimus in communi quid est; et postmodum differentias addimus, quibus a rebus aliis distinguatur; et sic perficitur substantiae rei completa notitia.” SCG 3.46 [Leon. Man. 275]: “Per hoc autem quod scitur de re quid est, scitur res prout est ab aliis distincta: unde et definitio, quae significat quid est res, distinguit definitum ab omnibus aliis.” 15 In Post. 2.14 [Leon. 1*2.224: 42-50]: “Deinde cum dicit: Post hoc autem etc., ostendit qualiter sint accipiende differencie. Et dicit quod postquam acceperimus per divisionem generis in species quid sit genus, puta utrum sit in genere qualitatis uel quantitatis, oportet ad inuestigandum differencias considerare proprias passiones, que, sicut dictum est, sunt signa manifestancia formas proprias specierum, et hoc oportet primum facere per aliqua communia.” 16 Aertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 16. See R. Boehm, Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche, Zu Aristoteles' Abhandlung “Über das Sein und das Seinde” (Metaphysik Z), (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff: 1965), 177. 49
The question utrum est is thus answered by a demonstration quia (but also by a demonstration propter quid).17 The question propter quid asks why the property belongs to the subject, and it is thus the question that asks after the insight expressed by a propter quid demonstration taken as a whole.
One can make the following general statements about the order of the scientific questions in science that achieves demonstration propter quid: an est is the first question to be asked concerning anything. Answering an est requires only a knowledge of what the thing's name signifies. Knowing an est, one immediately wants to know quid est. One is able to pose the questions utrum est / quia and propter quid about a subject, only on the basis of a prior knowledge of its existence (an est) and quiddity (quid est). Answering the questions quia and propter quid about the inherence of a property in a subject is achieved principally by finding answers to quid est concerning the property, although in some cases that the property inheres in the subject (answering the quia question) is already evident
(e.g., to the senses) prior to demonstration. Searching for the answer to the question quid est will involve a reasoning process, according to which one considers the properties and conditions of the thing whose definition is sought and compares it to other things: and Thomas characterizes this intermediate process between knowing an est and knowing quid est by the question quomodo est.
B. SCIENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCE
Science in the strict sense, which results from demonstration propter quid, is thus only possible when one is capable of answering the question quid est about the subject of the demonstration and when that subject has properties which answer the question utrum est and are distinct from its essence. Regarding the former requirement, Thomas consistently denies that human
17 In Post. 1.10 [Leon. 1*2.40: 138-142]: “Vbi notandum quod, cum sciencia proprie sit conclusionum, intellectus autem principiorum, proprie scibilia dicuntur conclusiones demonstrationis, in quibus passiones predicantur de propriis subiectis.” This texts references the distinction between science (the knowledge of demonstrated conclusions) and understanding (the knowledge of self-evident principles) as two intellectual virtues.
50 beings can possess any knowledge in this life of what God (or any separate substance) is. As for the latter, the simplicity of the divine essence precludes any distinction of properties from the divine essence.18
Thomas affirms throughout his career that human beings are incapable, in this life, of answering the question quid est concerning God. We cannot grasp what God is in the way that we are able, at least to some extent, to grasp the essences of corporeal substances. As Wippel observes, in defending this claim Thomas is motivated both by epistemological concerns and by a respect for the transcendence of God.19 This issue will need to be treated in some further detail in the chapters of this dissertation devoted to the two Summae and the Compendium. For now, I will restrict my focus to
Thomas's remarks concerning the impossibility of scientific knowledge, in the strictest sense, concerning separate substance, in a text from the Commentary on the Metaphysics. In this text, the impossibility of answering the question quid est concerning separate substance is explained by way of contrast with the science resulting from demonstration propter quid.
18 This claim takes property in the strict sense as a proper or per se accident. God cannot be said to have any such properties: there is nothing that belongs to God that is distinct from His essence but is intrinsically caused by His essence. For commentary on the meaning of a per se accident or proper accident, see also Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 142. (As a matter of terminological practice, Thomas tends to use the term property to refer to some of the divine names of discrete, Trinitarian theology.) In light of the fact that the divine simplicity precludes any real distinction between properties and essence in God, the following claim by te Velde could be considered quite problematic: “If one were to possess a definition of God, such a definition would enable one, in principle, to derive demonstratively all truths to be known about God from the concept of His essence, including the truth of His existence. It would enable us, not only to understand that God, for example, is good, but also to grasp the divine goodness itself” (Rudi te Velde, “The First Thing to Know about God: Kretzmann and Aquinas on the Meaning and Necessity of Arguments for the Existence of God,” Religious Studies 39.3 (2003), 257). Even if per impossibile there were a definition of God (this is absolutely impossible because God is not contained in any genus), still such a definition would not allow any demonstration of really distinct properties, as the divine simplicity precludes any real distinction of properties. There is no causal relationship between God’s essence and His goodness, because His essence simply is His goodness; and so there is no possibility of a propter quid demonstration of God’s goodness from a knowledge of His essence. Even in the beatific vision, one’s quidditative knowledge of God’s essence would not allow one to demonstrate, from His essence, some properties distinct from His essence—there simply are no such properties. To possess quidditative knowledge of the divine essence would be to know all of the positive divine attributes at once. Cf. above, p. 40 n. 96, the discussion of Thomas’s remarks concerning the beatific vision, in which “His name will be one.” 19 John F. Wippel, “Quidditative Knowledge of God,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 216. 51
Commenting on a passage from Metaphysics VII, c. 17, Thomas explains that the character of scientific questioning befits composite realities, that is, beings composed of form and matter. When asking propter quid, sometimes we want to know about the cause which is the form in matter, and at other times we want to know about the efficient or final cause of the form in matter.20 In every case, however, the question propter quid is a question that befits a matter-form composite. Following
Aristotle, Thomas gets at the same point by a different route by explaining that the question quid est when asked of a sensible substance can itself be understood as an implicit propter quid question: for example, to ask “what is man?” is equivalent to asking “why is Socrates a man?” or “what is it that makes Socrates a man?” Socrates is a man because that which answers to the question “what is man?” belongs to him, as his essence, which is individuated by matter.21 Even the question quid est therefore implicitly possesses what was above called a katallel structure—it asks something about something else. Thomas concludes from this that in questions of this kind (i.e., quid est questions), one is asking about the cause of the matter, that is, why the matter has the nature that is defined by the answer to quid est.22 If this is so, then the question quid est as a scientific question should be understood to be restricted to composites of matter and form. In general, it can be said that insofar as scientific questioning seeks after the resolution of a being to its principles and causes, scientific questioning properly befits the composite rather than the simple.23
20 In Meta. 7.17 #1656-1657 [Marietti 396]: “In quaerendo autem propter quid de aliquo, aliquando quaeritur causa, quae est forma in materia. . . Aliquando autem quaeritur causa ipsius formae in materia quae est efficiens vel finis.” Cf. Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 17. 21 In Meta. 7.17 #1663 [Marietti 397]: “Quaestio enim quid est, quaerit de quidditate propter quam id, de quo quid est quaeritur, praedicatur de quolibet suorum subiectorum, et convenit suis partibus. Propter hoc enim Socrates est homo, quia convenit ei illud, quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est homo.” 22 In Meta. 7.17 #1668 [Marietti 397]: “Quare manifestum est quod in talibus quaestionibus quaeritur 'causa materiae,' idest propter quid materia pertingat ad naturam eius quod definitur.” 23 Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 17: “What is questionable is characterized by composition.” This being said, one should not conclude that therefore one should deny essence or quiddity to God or separate substance: as we saw above, Thomas characterizes this as the error of Avicenna and Maimonides in In Sent. 1.2.1.3. Also, see In Meta. 7.9 #1460 [Marietti 357-58] for a discussion of definition, in which it is explained that a definition must consist of several words 52
Following Aristotle, Thomas immediately draws this very conclusion: there can be no scientific questioning about simple substances that are not composed of matter and form. One cannot ask about the formal cause in their matter or about the efficient or final cause of the form in their matter: and thus there is not any questioning about simple substances.24 He explains this by noting that the framing of a scientific question presupposes that certain things are already known, in reference to which one asks a question about what is not known. For example, a science presupposes both the existence and the quiddity of the subject, in order to ask whether some property belongs to the subject and why it does. Simple substances, however, “are either entirely known or entirely unknown.”25 Neither can there be any teaching (doctrina) concerning the simple substances in the way in which one teaches about the subject of a speculative science, because such teaching is the generation of science through coming to know propter quid.26
If there can be no questioning or teaching concerning simple substances, then how can they be known by the philosopher? As Thomas, following Aristotle, immediately concludes in this same text from the Commentary on Book VII of the Metaphysics, there must be some other way of questioning appropriate to the consideration of simple substances.27 In particular, in both questioning and teaching concerning simple substances, “the quiddities of which we do not know,”
because “it is necessary that a distinction make known distinctly the principles of a thing, which come together to constitute the essence of the thing.” That is, the very character of definition is proportionate to the composite. 24 In Meta. 7.17 #1669 [Marietti 397-98]: “Infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis; dicens, quod ex quo in omnibus quaestionibus quaeritur aliquid de aliquo, sicut de materiae causa, quae est formalis vel causa formae in materia, ut finis et agens: palam est, quod in substantiis simplicibus, quae non sunt compositae ex materia et forma, non est aliqua quaestio.” 25 In Meta. 7.17 #1669 [Marietti 398]: “In omni enim quaestione, ut habitum est, oportet aliquid esse notum, et aliquid quaeri quod ignoramus. Tales autem substantiae, vel totae cognoscuntur, vel totae ignorantur, ut in nono infra dicetur. Unde non est in eis quaestio.” 26 In Meta. 7.17 #1670 [Marietti 398]: “Et propter hoc de eis etiam non potest esse doctrina, sicut est in scientiis speculativis. Nam doctrina est generatio scientiae, scientia autem fit in nobis per hoc quod scimus propter quid. Syllogismi enim demonstrativi facientis scire, medium est propter quid est.” I will comment more on the connection between science and teaching below. 27 Aertsen emphasizes this “other mode of questioning” that is necessary concerning simple substances. See Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 46. 53 previously known effects must serve as the medium of demonstration.28 Unlike the science resulting from propter quid demonstration, in which one demonstrates through a causal definition, by contrast the medium of demonstration in any argumentation concerning simple substance must be an effect known through the senses. That we cannot know the quiddities of simple substances is the reason why we can only employ demonstrations quia concerning them: no knowledge of the quiddity of a simple substance or its property is available to play the role of a middle term in our reasoning. To put it another way, science in the strict sense as articulated above is proportioned to the power of the human intellect insofar as it depends upon sense experience in order to know the essences of sensible substances. Whatever knowledge can be had concerning separate substance must therefore be somehow derived from the knowledge of sensible substances.29
Now, as we shall see in the chapters devoted to the three summae, Thomas apparently experienced some hesitation about exactly which of the claims made concerning God according to philosophical reasoning can be said to be demonstrated in the strict sense. Although Thomas will eventually explicitly state that the divine attributes are known with certainty according to philosophical reasoning, nevertheless throughout his career he hesitates to call the arguments for the attributes demonstrations. However, inasmuch as there seems to have been some development in
Thomas’s thinking on this score, this issue is better left for the later chapters of this dissertation devoted to the three summae.
28 In Meta. 7.17 #1671 [Marietti 398]: “In cognitione enim harum substantiarum non pervenimus nisi ex substantiis sensibilibus, quarum substantiae simplices sunt quodammodo causae. Et ideo utimur substantiis sensibilibus ut notis, et per eas quaerimus substantias simplices. Sicut Philosophus infra, per motum investigat substantias immateriales moventes. Et ideo in doctrinis et quaestionibus de talibus, utimur effectibus, quasi medio ad investigandum substantias simplices, quarum quidditates ignoramus.” 29 In Meta. 7.17 #1648 [Marietti 395]: “Quamvis enim substantiae separatae non sint eiusdem speciei cum substantiis sensibilibus, ut Platonici posuerunt, tamen cognitio istarum substantiarum sensibilium est via ad cognoscendum praedictas substantias separatas.” Cf. In De div. nom. 2.4 #180. 54
C. THE ORDERS OF INSTRUCTION, DISCOVERY, JUDGMENT, AND RESOLUTION
Before leaving behind the order of science, it will be helpful to offer some brief remarks on some related notions with respect to which Thomas discusses “ways” or “orders.” Throughout his career, Thomas frequently employs the notions of instruction (disciplina), discovery (inventio), judgment (iudicium), and resolution (resolutio) to describe the ways or orders associated with the discursive character of human reasoning.
(a) First, concerning the order of instruction, Thomas famously announces at the beginning of his Summa theologiae, in the prologue to the entire work, that he will proceed in a manner that befits the instruction of beginners.30 In part, this requires that he will treat the things necessary to learn theology according to the order of instruction (ordo disciplinae), rather than treating theological questions in the way that befits other kinds of works, such as the exposition of texts or the disputation of questions. What does Thomas mean by the order of instruction? In the prologue of the Summa theologiae, a connection between learning and science is suggested: the things necessary for coming to know in a scientific way (ea quae sunt necessaria talibus ad sciendum) must be handed on according to the order of learning (traduntur secundum ordinem disciplinae). Similarly, in the text just studied from In Meta. 7.17, we saw Thomas conclude from the fact that there cannot be science in the strict sense concerning separate substance that neither can there be any teaching.31
This connection between science and teaching is expressed succinctly in In Meta. 1.1: commenting on Aristotle's claim that the sign of knowing scientifically is the ability to teach,
Thomas explains this as a consequence of the claim that each thing is perfect in its act when it can
30 ST pr. [Leon. 4.5]: “Quia catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes erudire, secundum illud Apostoli I ad Corinth. iii: tanquam parvulis in Christo, lac vobis potum dedi, non escam; propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium.” 31 In Meta. 7.17 #1670 [Marietti 398]: “Et propter hoc de eis etiam non potest esse doctrina, sicut est in scientiis speculativis.” 55 make another like itself.32 Just as the sign of something's possessing heat is that it can heat another, in the same way the sign of possessing science is the ability to teach, “which is to cause science in another.”33 Knowledge through demonstration enables one to teach, because a demonstration is “a syllogism that makes one to know scientifically, as is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics.”34
This close connection between science and teaching is explained at greater length in De veritate q. 11,
Thomas's De magistro. In De ver. 11.1, Thomas parallels the generation of natural forms, the development of virtuous habits, and the acquisition of knowledge. In each of these cases, there is a role for genuine proximate extrinsic causality in the coming to be of the forms in question. In the particular case of instruction or learning, Thomas argues that the role of the teacher is to act as an extrinsic cause by assisting the learner in doing what he could in principle do on his own. In this way, a teacher is like a physician, who by his activity as a cause assists the healing power of nature in his sick patient. A teacher thus leads a student from ignorance to scientific knowledge in the same way that one would direct oneself in discovery: this is to proceed by reasoning from the knowledge of universal and self-evident principles to the knowledge of conclusions. Thus “one is said to teach another insofar as he shows to the other through signs the path of reasoning which he follows in himself by [his] natural reason, and thus the natural reason of the disciple through these things proposed to him, as through certain instruments, arrives at knowledge of the unknown.”35
32 In Meta. 1.1 #29 [Marietti 10]: “Signum scientis est posse docere: quod ideo est, quia unumquodque tunc est perfectum in actu suo, quando potest facere alterum sibi simile, ut dicitur quarto Meteororum.” De ver. 11.1, the next text to be considered, also cites the Meteorology to support the claim that “each thing is perfect when it can generate something like itself” in its fifth sed contra. For discussion of the connection between science and the ability to teach, see Jan Aertsen, “Thomas von Aquin: Alle Menschen verlangen von Natur nach Wissen,” in Philosophen des Mittelalters (Darmstadt: 2000), 186-201. 33 Ibid.: “Sicut igitur signum caliditatis est quod possit aliquid calefacere, ita signum scientis est, quod possit docere, quod est scientiam in alio causare.” 34 Ibid.: “Artifices autem docere possunt, quia cum causas cognoscant, ex eis possunt demonstrare: demonstratio autem est syllogismus faciens scire, ut dicitur primo Posteriorum.” 35 De ver. 11.1 [Leon. 22/2.351: 325-35]: “Processus autem rationis pervenientis ad cognitionem ignoti inveniendo est ut principia communia per se nota applicet ad determinatas materias et inde procedat in aliquas particulares conclusiones et ex his in alias; unde et secundum hoc unus alium dicitur docere quod istum decursum 56
We can conclude that the order of instruction does not differ, as an order, from the order of discovery; and the order of discovery should itself be understood as the order of the acquisition of science, according to which one arrives at previously unknown conclusions by reasoning from self- evident first principles.36 Confirming this connection with the order of science, Thomas concludes
De ver. 11.1 by observing that everything he has just said about discovery and instruction serves to explain Aristotle's meaning in saying that “Demonstration is a syllogism that causes science.”37 In a.
2 of q. 11, Thomas then clarifies that strictly speaking, one should not call a man who discovers conclusions through demonstration on his own a teacher of himself: a teacher is one who already possesses the perfect action of science in himself, so as to cause it in another through teaching.38
Discovery is thus in one way contrasted with instruction, as discovery is strictly speaking what one does without assistance from a teacher, whereas learning or instruction is the acquisition of knowledge with the assistance of a teacher.
(b) In other contexts, Thomas distinguishes between the order or way of discovery, on the one hand, and the order or way of judgment on the other. Insofar as it is discursive, human thought proceeds both from principles to conclusions and from conclusions back to principles: it is this as it were circular character about discursive thought that Thomas captures by the back-and-forth language of discovery and judgment. A key text expressing the central elements of this distinction is
ST 1.79.8, in which Thomas argues that reason is not a distinct power from intellect in man. In this
rationis, quem in se facit ratione naturali, alteri exponit per signa, et sic ratio naturalis discipuli per huiusmodi sibi proposita sicut per quaedam instrumenta pervenit in cognitionem ignotorum.” 36 The order of discovery (along with the order of instruction) will thus differ somewhat from one science to another, insofar as each science has its own peculiar methodology and order. 37 De ver. 11.1 [Leon. 22/2.351: 340-42]: “Et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus in I Posteriorum quod 'demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire.'” 38 De ver. 11.2 [Leon. 22/2.355]: “Doctrina autem importat perfectam actionem scientiae in docente vel magistro; unde oportet quod ille qui docet vel magister est habeat scientiam quam in altero causat explicite et perfecte sicut in addiscente acquiritur per doctrinam.” 57 text Thomas compares the act of reasoning to the act of understanding by noting that the former is to the latter as motion is to rest. In the way of inquiry or of discovery, reasoning as a sort of motion proceeds from the understanding of simple first principles. It would seem that Thomas has in mind the self-evident principles from which scientific reasoning proceeds: for example, the principle of non-contradiction. By contrast, “in the way of judgment, by resolving it returns to first principles, according to which it examines what it has discovered.”39 Because motion and rest are not referred to distinct powers, it is not the case that reasoning and understanding are the acts of distinct powers; rather, they are acts of a single power, the human intellect.
Despite the apparent simplicity of this text, the richness implied by its technical vocabulary must be acknowledged: here Thomas uses the language of resolution or analysis (resolvendo) to characterize the way of judgment, in contrast with the way of discovery, which proceeds from first principles.40 To appreciate this vocabulary, we must turn to an important earlier text, In De Trin. 6.1.
In this text, Thomas distinguishes between the way of composition (synthesis) and the way of resolution (analysis); this distinction corresponds to the distinction between reason and intellect. We saw in ST 1.79.8 that Thomas characterizes the difference between reason and intellect in terms of
39 ST 1.79.8 [Leon. 5.274]: “Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat.” Cf. ST 1.79.10 ad 3, which presents a series of interpretations of epistemological language from Damascene, for a similar use of the verb examinare, which is said to occur according to certain principles (ad aliqua certa) concerning the things that are excogitatum in the way of inquiry or discovery. 40 For treatments of resolution in Thomas’s writings, see John F. Wippel, “‘First Philosophy’ according to Thomas Aquinas,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 60-66; Jan A. Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics: the via resolutionis in Thomas Aquinas,” The New Scholasticism 63 (1989): 405-18. I would also acknowledge the presence of the language of circular return, which is another complex and difficult issue: Thomas often uses the language of resolution and of the circular in conjunction, as in In DN 4.7 #376 [Marietti 122]: “[M]anifestum est enim quod Anima, discurrendo de uno ad aliud sicut de effectu in causam vel de uno simili ad aliud vel de contrario in contrarium, ratiocinatur multipliciter; sed omnia ista ratiocinatio diiudicatur per resolutionem in prima principia, in quibus non contingit errare, ex quibus Anima contra errorem defenditur, quia ipsa prima principia simplici intellectu absque discursu cognoscuntur et ideo eorum consideratio, propter sui uniformitatem, circularis convolutio nominatur.” My thanks to Therese Cory for pointing out this text to me. 58 motion and rest; in In De Trin. 6.1 he characterizes the difference between them in terms of multiplicity and unity, observing that “reason differs from intellect as multitude [differs] from unity.”41 He then explains the difference between the ways of composition and resolution in terms of the mind’s passage between unity and multiplicity: in the way of resolution, the mind “gathers one simple truth from many [things],” whereas in the way of composition the mind “comprehends a multitude in one.”42
To explain his meaning, Thomas distinguishes between composition and resolution in two orders: secundum rationem and secundum rem. Composition and resolution secundum rationem concern intrinsic causes or principles. In this order, composition proceeds from the more universal to the more particular, while resolution proceeds from the less universal to the more universal, ultimately arriving at the most universal notions, such as being. By contrast, composition and resolution secundum rem concern extrinsic causes: composition proceeds from cause to effect, while resolution proceeds from effect to cause. Resolution secundum rem ultimately terminates in the knowledge of
“the supreme, maximally simple causes, which are the separate substances.”43
The language of resolution can be used in a variety of specific contexts, as we will see in now turning to ST 1.79.9. Whereas ST 1.79.8, which concerns whether reason is a distinct power from intellect, offers a general statement of the distinction between the ways of discovery and judgment— albeit one best suited to the circular character of discursive reasoning out from and back to the first principles of demonstration, such as the principle of non-contradiction—in the very next article,
41 In De Trin. 6.1 [Leon. 50.162]: “Differt autem ratio ab intellectu sicut multitudo ab unitate.” 42 In De Trin. 6.1 [Leon. 50.162]: “Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum uiam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem ueritatem; et rursum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis secundum uiam compositionis uel inuentionis, in quantum intellectus in uno multitudinem compreendit.” 43 In De Trin. 6.1 [Leon. 50.162]: “Ultimus ergo terminus resolutionis in hac uia est cum peruenitur ad causas supremas maxime simplices, que sunt substantie separate.” 59
Thomas employs the distinction between inquiry or discovery on the one hand and judgment on the other, but with reference to a different sort of first principle. This article asks whether the
Augustinian distinction between higher and lower reason is a distinction between two powers.
Thomas argues that it is not, because the Augustinian distinction between higher and lower reason is made with reference to the distinction between the eternal and the temporal, which are not objects of knowledge that can serve to distinguish human powers of knowing. That being said, with respect to human knowing, the eternal and the temporal are related to each other in a specific way: “one of them is the means for coming to know the other. For according to the way of discovery, through temporal things we arrive at a knowledge of eternal things.” In support of this, Thomas cites
Romans 1:20, according to which the invisible things of God are known through created things. By contrast, “in the way of judgment, by eternal things already known we judge concerning temporal things, and according to the laws (rationes) of eternal things, we dispose temporal things.”44
Now, these remarks in a. 9 might seem to characterize the distinction between discovery and judgment in a manner inconsistent with that found in a. 8: here, eternal principles are last in the order of discovery but, in the order of judgment, they are taken as the standard for judging about temporal things. We can reconcile aa. 8 and 9 by noting that there are just two different kinds of first principles at issue in the two texts, corresponding to the distinction between the orders secundum
44 ST 1.79.9 [Leon. 5.275-76]: “Haec autem duo, scilicet temporalia et aeterna, comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud Apostoli, ad Rom. 1: Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: in via vero iudicii, per aeterna iam cognita de temporalibus iudicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum temporalia disponimus.” Any confusion about the plural form of “eternal things,” given the uniqueness of the eternal God, can be alleviated by remembering the same passage from Romans 1:20 cited in ST 1.79.9: there the Apostle Paul speaks of “the invisible things of God.” Joseph Owens makes this same point in “Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator,” in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: the Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (New York: SUNY Press, 1980), 6. We have already encountered a similar use of a plural form for the divine in Thomas's use of the phrase de divinis. Cf. In De div. nom. 2.3 #160 [Marietti 52]: “Loquitur autem pluraliter de divinis vel propter pluralitatem Personarum vel propter pluralitatem nominum quae ipsi Deo attribuuntur.” 60
rationem and secundum rem. In a. 8, the claim is that according to the way of discovery, human
reasoning proceeds from first principles grasped by the act of understanding to arrive at discovered
conclusions; and in the way of judgment, one returns to these same first principles and examines
one's discovered conclusions in light of them; all this would seem to pertain to the order secundum
rationem, since we are dealing with the movement of the mind to and from first principles of reasoning. In a. 9, the way of discovery proceeds from temporal things understood as effects to a knowledge of things eternal as extrinsic causes, while according to the way of judgment, one then scrutinizes or examines temporal things in light of the eternal causes one has discovered. This corresponds to the order of resolution and composition secundum rem.
With respect to any characterization of an argument or discussion as pertaining to the way of judgment, one must identify what the “first” is to which reasoning returns and according to which it examines: the “first” might be a principle in the order secundum rationem or an extrinsic cause in the order secundum rem. That being said, any particular instance of the way of judgment has the aspect of a return relative to an order of discovery, and as we have already seen, Thomas seems content to understand the order of discovery as the order of the acquisition of science.45
2. THE ORDER OF THE TRIPLEX VIA
Throughout his career Thomas depends upon the Dionysian triplex via in order to
supplement an Aristotelian account of the order of science and the limits of a scientific
45 In chapter six, concerning the Summa theologiae, it will be necessary to consider one claim concerning the order given by Garrigou-Lagrange, which is that ST 1.3.4 represents the summit of the way of discovery, with everything that follows (even the consideration of the rest of the divine names) following the way of judgment. I will present and respond to this suggestion in chapter six. 61
consideration of God as the cause of created effects.46 One should expect that in one way or
another, the triplex via will factor into the rationale for the order of the divine names.
We can begin with a simple question: What is the order of the triplex via in Thomas's
writings? Unfortunately, this question admits of no easy answer—or rather of no single answer at all.
Although Thomas's interpreters frequently report the paradigmatic order of the triplex via in his
thought as causality, negation, and eminence, careful studies of the order of the triplex via in
Thomas's writings reveal the manner in which Thomas employs diverse orderings of the triplex via in
distinct contexts.47 Of the six possible orderings of the three parts of the threefold way, all but one
(eminence, negation, causality: ENC) appear at least once in Thomas's writings, with the majority of cases roughly split between CNE and CEN.48 The order ECN appears one time, in ST 1.13.8 ad 2, a
text in which Thomas reports the order of the triplex via in this way in order to explain the signification of the name God as a nomen naturae, with a reference back to ST 1.12.12, in which
Thomas had offered the order as CNE. The alteration of the ordering in these two successive questions exemplifies Thomas's willingness to adapt his presentation of the triplex via to particular contexts, i.e., to specific instances of knowing and naming God. Similarly, Thomas mentions the
46 Cf. David Twetten, “Aquinas’s Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of ‘God,’” The Thomist 69 (2005), 203- 50. Twetten argues for the interweaving of Aristotelian and Dionysian elements in Thomas’s understanding of the logic of argumentation for God’s existence. To speak of the “Dionysian triplex via” could give the impression that the triplex via is itself a fully articulated theme within the writings of Dionysius. All I mean to imply is that the triplex via as a theme is derived, by Thomas and his contemporaries, from the Divine Names c. 7, from the phrase (in John the Saracen’s translation) [Dionysiaca 1.403- 404]: “in omnium ablatione et excessu, et in omnium causa.” For discussion of the relationship between Thomas and Dionysius concerning the triplex via, see Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 2005), 31-35. 47 See Michael Ewbank, “Diverse Orderings of Dionysius's Triplex Via by St. Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 52 (1990): 82-109; and Gregory Rocca, 49-55. Cf. Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 35-37. 48 Rocca, 50; Ewbank, passim, esp. 105. 62
ordering NEC only twice, once in his Commentary on the Divine Names 7.4 (where he repeats
Dionysius’s order), and once in passing in Lectura romana 3.1.2 ad 2.49
Now, the authors of two of these studies just mentioned (Michael Ewbank and Gregory
Rocca) seem to disagree about whether any particular ordering of the triplex via can be identified as
the most fundamental. Rocca is reticent regarding any such far-reaching conclusions. By contrast,
Ewbank offers a number of claims serving to characterize each ordering of the triplex via employed by Thomas according to its peculiar features, with respect to its purpose or the context in which it appears.50 Two of his key conclusions, which are generalizations concerning the manner in which a
given order is employed (with respect to its context and purpose), can be summarized as follows:
(1) He holds that the orders CNE and NCE both concern a knowledge of the divine nature that can be distinguished from a knowledge of God's existence. Concerning the order CNE, he says,
“[W]hat characterizes the application of this ordering is the fact that the existence of God is taken as already established, and that knowledge is sought of His nature.”51 Concerning the order NCE, he
says, “Negation is preeminent when one proceeds to a more specific knowledge of immaterial
substances.”52 Presupposing God's existence, the order NCE is employed by Thomas when he is emphasizing the leading role played by the via negationis in our coming to know something of God in
this life, in light of our inability to grasp the quid est of God in this life. Ewbank rightly notes that
the via negationis or via remotionis plays such a leading role in SCG 1.15-29 and ST 1.3-11.53
49 In De div. nom. 7.4 #731 [Marietti 274-75]. LR 3.1.2 ad 2 [Boyle 108]. See above, p. 32 n. 73, for qualifications concerning the question about the authenticity of the Lectura romana. Even if we should take the authenticity of the Lectura romana for granted, it is an unedited reportatio, so perhaps we shouldn’t place any great weight on the order of the elements of the triplex via in this instance. 50 What is at issue, both in Ewbank's paper and in the following remarks, are the cases in Thomas's writings where Thomas mentions all three elements of the triplex via in a single text, in one of the possible orderings. These are the texts with reference to which Ewbank considers the question of the order of the triplex via. 51 Ewbank, 94. 52 Ibid., 98. 53 Ibid., 98-99. 63
(2) Ewbank contends that the order causality, eminence, negation (CEN), particularly as it is
considered by Thomas in his Commentary on Romans 1:19, is the foundational order in reference to
which the other orderings should be understood; and furthermore, he asserts that CEN is the order that governs Thomas's procedure in the Summa theologiae.54
A. THE USES OF THE TRIPLEX VIA IN THOMAS’S WRITINGS
My central purpose in this section is to argue that there is not, in Thomas's thought, any one absolutely fundamental order of the triplex via. For the purposes of my dissertation, however, what is really necessary is the more modest claim that we cannot bring to bear upon an analysis of the order of the divine names in Thomas's writings some previously established single “order of the triplex via.”55 I will ultimately present what I think is a more helpful way of thinking about the range of contexts in which and purposes to which the triplex via is employed by Thomas.
Both Ewbank and Rocca proceed by classifying texts according to their respective orderings of the elements of the triplex via (as instances of NCE, CEN, CNE, etc.). After this sorting, they offer generalizations about the texts' common features, such as context, manner in which the triplex via is employed, and the kind of knowledge of God at issue. It is by this procedure that Ewbank arrives at the conclusions listed above. A weakness of this approach is that it runs the risk of begging the question concerning the claim that Thomas always has precise systematic reasons for employing a given ordering of the triplex via. If this is assumed to be the case, then it is true that sorting the instances of the triplex via by ordering should allow one to make clear generalizations
about when and why Thomas employs each ordering. In my estimation, what can result from such a
54 Ewbank, 104-106. 55 By contrast, as will be seen below, Thomas is exceedingly clear concerning the order of the transcendentals, and one can very reasonably ask the question of whether the order of the transcendentals, as this is treated in De ver. 21.1, is part of Thomas's rationale for the order of the divine names. 64
procedure is a temptation to force exceptions to fit a rule.56 Furthermore, a related weakness of
Ewbank's analysis is that he does not acknowledge some of the cases where features that he
associates with one ordering of the triplex via are in fact also associated with other orderings.
Operating on the assumption—shared by both Ewbank and Rocca—that Thomas employs
the triplex via in a manner sensitive to context and purpose, I will proceed by offering some
groupings of the texts in which Thomas explicitly mentions all three elements of the triplex via,
according to important similarities in context or the role played by the triplex via.57 I would offer the
following groupings, with the caveat that this is not the only possible way to sort the texts, and some
texts will fall under more than one heading.58
(i) The triplex via is correlated with distinct arguments for one conclusion
There are texts in which the triplex via is treated as a set of three distinct ways of approaching argumentation for a specific claim concerning God. There are two examples of this usage, both in
Thomas's Commentary on the Sentences. With respect to these two texts, it will be necessary to try to identify the feature of each argument that justifies the association with one of the elements of the triplex via.
The first text is In Sent. 1.3 div. (an example of CNE), in which Thomas presents material from the text of the Lombard as four arguments for God's existence, aligning each with one of the three Dionysian ways (with a distinction between two different ways of eminence).59 The first
56 I would suggest that Ewbank's study, despite its many strengths, does at certain points give in to this temptation. I will offer remarks about what Ewbank does with particular texts in my own presentation of the texts in the following pages. This being said, in the end, I will defend what I take to be some of Ewbank's central insights. 57 I am inspired in my identification of these headings largely by Ewbank's conclusions. 58 If Rocca and Ewbank both follow something akin to the method of division (first dividing up the instances of the triplex via by ordering of its elements and then looking for trends), it might be said that I follow something like the method of similarity here (first finding similarities in context and purpose in the employment of the triplex via, and then asking whether they are associated with particular orderings). 59 In Sent. 1.3 div. [Mand. 1.88-89]. It should be noted that Ewbank does not take In Sent. 1.3 div. to concern, strictly speaking, argumentation for God's existence. Rather, the arguments in this text are taken to concern the divine 65
argument, associated by Thomas with the via causalitatis, asserts that for whatever has being (esse)
from nothing, there must be something from which its being flows. Since every creature is from
nothing, they must be from some one first principle, which is God.60 This argument evidently
belongs to the way of causality because it argues from the being of creatures, understood as an
effect, to the existence of a cause of being.
The second argument is taken from the via remotionis, according to the principle that “beyond
every imperfect thing it is necessary that there be something perfect, with which no imperfection is
admixed.” The argument then proceeds in two stages, noting (1) that bodies are imperfect insofar as
they are finite and mobile and (2) that mutable incorporeal substances are also imperfect, ultimately
yielding the conclusion that “beyond every mutable species, such as souls and angels, there must
exist some being (ens) incorporeal, immobile, and perfect in every way, and this is God.”61 This
argument would appear to belong to the via remotionis for one of two reasons (or perhaps for both): because it proceeds from a negative claim concerning creatures, namely, that creatures are imperfect, or because it concludes that there exists something incorporeal, immobile, and perfect (all of which are negative characteristics), which is acknowledged to be God.
nature. See Ewbank, 92. I am following Wippel's interpretation, presented in Metaphysical Thought, 400-404, according to which these should be taken as arguments (albeit incomplete ones) for God's existence. It is crucial to Ewbank's interpretation that In Sent. 1.3 div. does not concern argumentation for God's existence, because he contends that the order CNE is associated with consideration of the divine nature or divine attributes, not with whether God exists. See Ewbank, 106-107. 60 In Sent. 1.3 div. [Mand. 1.88]: “Prima ergo ratio sumitur per viam causalitatis, et formatur sic. Omne quod habet esse ex nihilo, oportet quod sit ab aliquo a quo esse suum fluxerit. Sed omnes creaturae habent esse ex nihilo: quod manifestatur ex earum imperfectione et potentialitate. Ergo oportet quod sint ab aliquo uno primo, et hoc est Deus.” 61 In Sent. 1.3 div. [Mand. 1.88-89]: “Secunda ratio sumitur per viam remotionis, et est talis. Ultra omne imperfectum oportet esse aliquod perfectum, cui nulla imperfectio admisceatur. Sed corpus est quid imperfectum, quia est terminatum et finitum suis dimensionibus et mobile. Ergo oportet ultra corpora esse aliquid quod non est corpus. Item, omne incorporeum mutabile de sui natura est imperfectum. Ergo ultra omnes species mutabiles, sicut sunt animae et angeli, oportet esse aliquod ens incorporeum et immobile et omnino perfectum, et hoc est Deus.” 66
The third and fourth arguments both belong to the via eminentiae, according to a distinction of two ways that eminence can be understood: according to esse, and according to knowledge.62 The third argument, which Thomas explains according to the way of eminence in esse, contends that
“good and better are said through comparison to the best.” Because we find that a created spirit is better than a body, but that its goodness is not from itself, it must be that something that is best exists as the source of goodness in both created spirits and bodies.63
The fourth argument, which belongs to the way of eminence in knowledge, argues that whatever is recognized as more or less beautiful is so recognized by comparison to some principle of beauty, through proximity to which the one is called more beautiful than the other. Thomas makes a comparison between the beauty of corporeal and spiritual things, concluding to the existence of some principle of beauty from which both are beautiful, but which the spiritual creature more closely approximates.64 Both the third and the fourth arguments of In Sent. 1.3 div. are apparently characterized as belonging to the way of eminence because they argue from the gradation found in created things to the existence of some preeminent cause or principle.65
The second text that correlates various arguments for the same conclusion with the elements of the triplex via is In Sent. 1.35.1.1 (NCE), which argues for the conclusion that knowledge (scientia)
62 Ibid. [Mand. 1.89]: “Alia duae rationes sumuntur per viam eminentiae. Sed potest dupliciter attendi eminentia, vel quantum ad esse vel quantum ad cognitionem.” 63 Ibid.: “Tertia ergo sumitur ratio per viam eminentiae in esse, et est talis. Bonum et melius dicuntur per comparationem ad optimum. Sed in substantiis invenimus corpus bonum et spiritum creatum melius, in quo tamen bonitas non est a seipso. Ergo oportet esse aliquod optimum a quo sit bonitas in utroque.” 64 Ibid.: “Quarta sumitur per eminentiam in cognitione, et est talis. In quibuscumque est invenire magis et minus speciosum, est invenire aliquod speciositatis principium, per cujus propinquitatem aliud alio dicitur speciosius. Sed invenimus corpora esse speciosa sensibili specie, spiritus autem speciosiores specie intelligibili. Ergo oportet esse aliquid a quo utraque speciosa sint, cui spiritus creati magis appropinquant.” 65 Thomas does not explain why the third argument (which concerns gradation in goodness) pertains to eminence in esse or why the fourth argument (arguing from gradation in beauty) concerns eminence in knowledge, but that the third argument concerns a comparison with respect to modes of existence and the fourth argument concerns a comparison with respect to degrees of knowability (and consequently of beauty) is clear within Peter’s text. See Sentences 1.3 cap. 1 [Grottaferrata 1.69-70]. It is helpful to recall that Thomas’s text here is a part of his divisio textus, which is similar to the expositio sections of his Commentary in its approach. 67 belongs to God. Thomas presents three arguments for this conclusion. The first is characterized as being according to the via remotionis: after a quick argument for God's immateriality, Thomas argues for there being scientia in God, because any form existing in itself and separate from matter must be of an intellectual nature.66 The argument belongs to the via remotionis because it takes as its starting point the immateriality of God, a negative characteristic.67 This classification of the argument for divine knowledge from immateriality is confirmed by In Sent. 1.2.1.3, examined at length above: an argument can belong to the via negationis if it argues from a prior negation, even where the conclusion of the argument is not itself negative.
The second argument, associated by Thomas with the via causalitatis, is an argument similar to the fifth way from ST 1.2.3. Thomas argues for the intelligence of the first cause, which must be recognized as responsible for the tendency in every non-cognitive agent towards its final end.
For every agent has some intention and understanding of the end. But some cognition, establishing the end and directing the means to the end, precedes every desire of the end. But in certain [cases] that cognition is not conjoined to the [thing] tending to the end; whence it is necessary that it be directed by some prior agent, as the arrow tends to a determinate place by the determination of the archer; and thus it is in all [things] which act by the necessity of nature, since the operation of these [things] is determined by some intellect establishing the nature.68
66 In Sent. 1.35.1 [Mand. 1.809]: “Prima igitur via, quae est per remotionem est haec: cum a Deo omnis potentia et materialitas removeatur, eo quod ipse est actus primus et purus, oportet essentiam ejus esse denudatam a materia, et esse formam tantum. Sicut autem particulationis principium est materia, ita forme debetur intelligibilitas: unde forma principium cognitionis est; unde oportet quod omnis forma per se existens separata a materia, sit intellectualis naturae: et si quidem sit per se subsistens, erit et intelligens; si autem non sit per se subsistens, sed quasi perfectio alicujus subsistentis, non erit intelligens, sed principium intelligendi: quemadmodum omnis forma non in se subsistens non operatur, sed est operationis principium, ut caliditas in igne. Cum igitur ipse Deus sit immunis ab omni materia, et sit per se subsistens, quia esse suum ab alio non dependet, oportet quod ipse sit intelligens et sciens.” We should recall that in In Sent. 1.2.1.3, Thomas associates argumentation for divine intelligence with the via negativa, as something that follows from God's immateriality. 67 See Gregory Doolan, “St. Thomas Aquinas and Divine Exemplarism” (Ph.D. Thesis: The Catholic University of America, 2003), 178. 68 In Sent. 1.35.1 [Mand. 1.809-810]: “Secunda via, quae est per causalitatem, est haec. Omne enim agens habet aliquam intentionem et desiderium finis. Omne autem desiderium finis praecedit aliqua cognitio praestituens finem, et dirigens in finem ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed in quibusdam ista cognitio non est conjuncta ipsi tendenti in finem; unde oportet quod dirigatur per aliquod prius agens, sicut sagitta tendit in determinatum locum per determinationem sagittantis; et ita est in omnibus quae agunt per necessitatem naturae; quia horum operatio est determinata per intellectum aliquem instituentem naturam.” 68
Thomas concludes the argument by indicating that this institutor naturae69 must itself act by intellect
and will, allowing him to conclude that this first cause is intelligent. This argument belongs to the
way of causality because it begins from a creaturely effect—the order towards natural ends in non-
cognitive natural agents—and concludes with an assertion about God as the cause of this effect.
Although the argument begins from final causality, the mode of causality attributed to God is
efficient causality as the institutor naturae.
The third argument is similar to the third and fourth arguments from In Sent. 1.3 div., and
Thomas associates this argument with the via eminentiae. Thomas argues:
For when a characteristic is found in several things to a greater and greater degree insofar as they approach something, that characteristic must be found maximally in that thing [that they approach]. For example, heat is found maximally in fire, and insofar as mixed bodies more closely approach fire, they are hotter. But we find that insofar as things more closely approach to the first [being], they participate in knowledge more nobly; as men surpass brutes, and angels surpass men; whence it is necessary that in God the most noble cognition is found.70
The argument seems to appeal to gradations in knowledge that are correlated with degrees of
simplicity: as creatures more nearly approach God in simplicity, they participate in more noble
knowledge, just as mixed bodies are hotter as they more closely approach the simplicity of pure fire.
I would suggest that this argument belongs to the via eminentiae because it appeals to a gradation
found in created things and reaches as a conclusion that there is something that possesses
knowledge in a most noble or eminent way. In this, the argument is said to belong to the via
eminentiae for the same reason as the third and fourth arguments from In Sent. 1.3 div.
69 For the term institutor naturae in another version of this argument, see SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43-44]. 70 In Sent. 1.35.1 [Mand. 1.810]: “Tertia via, quae est per eminentiam, est haec. Quod enim invenitur in pluribus magis ac magis secundum quod plures alicui appropinquant, oportet ut in illo maxime inveniatur; sicut calor in igne, ad quem quanto corpora mixta magis accedunt, calidiora sunt. Invenitur autem quod quanto aliqua magis accedunt ad primum, nobilius cognitionem participant; sicut homines plus quam bruta et angeli magis homines; unde oportet quod in Deo nobilissima cognitio inveniatur.” 69
In both of these texts, the three elements of the triplex via have been separated and applied to
distinct arguments for the same conclusion. Here it is the argument itself, rather than a particular divine name, that is associated with one of the elements of the triplex via. We will return to the issue
of associating the elements of the triplex via with modes of argumentation below.
(ii) The elements of the triplex via are associated with particular divine names
In another set of texts, rather than assign the three elements of the triplex via to distinct
arguments for the same conclusion, Thomas instead associates particular divine names with one or
another of the Dionysian ways.71 These texts are In DT 6.3 (NCE), Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #115 (CEN), and Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #117 (NCE). In the first of these texts, which will be treated at greater length below, Thomas associates negative names such as immaterial and incorporeal with the via negativa, as one would expect.72
In the second text, Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #115 (CEN), Thomas explicitly associates answering
the question an est with the way of causality, whereas names such as immobility and infinity are associated with the way of negation:
Nevertheless, man can know God from [sensible] creatures in three ways, as Dionysius says in his book, the Divine Names. In one way, through causality. Because creatures of this kind are subject to deficiency and change, it is necessary to reduce them to some immobile and perfect first principle. And in this way it is known of God whether He is. In a second way, through the way of excellence. For not all things are reduced to a first principle, as to a proper and univocal cause, as when man generates man, but rather to a cause both common and eminent. And in this way, it is known that He is above all. In the third way, through the way of negation. Because if He is an eminent cause, nothing of those things which are in creatures can befit him; just as also neither can a celestial body be
71 As we have seen, associating a given name with an element of the triplex via and so associating an argument are not mutually exclusive claims. In Sent. 1.2.1.3 talks about the manner in which names belong to the via causalitatis, via negationis, and via eminentiae, but in two cases it is said that a name belongs to one of these ways because of the character of the argument for that name: intelligence belongs to the via remotionis because it follows from immateriality, and Thomas claims that “quidquid sequitur ad sapientiam, inquantum hujusmodi, recte et proprie convenit Deo” in the context of explaining the via eminentiae [Mand. 1.69]. 72 In DT 6.3 [Leon. 50.168: 156-168]. 70
properly called heavy or light, or hot or cold. And in this way we call God immobile and infinite and whatever else of this kind is said.73
Ewbank asserts that this text, as an instance of the order CEN, “explicates what lies behind St.
Thomas’s reordering of the Dionysian notions in terms of causality, excellence, and negation. It is
this fifth order which accords with the foundational order concerning the divine being.”74 For
Ewbank, this text is an interpretive key for all of Thomas’s diverse orderings of the triplex via.75
In the third text, Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #117 (NCE), which comments on Romans 1:20, positive names such as goodness, wisdom, and power are associated with the way of negation; but then everlasting power is associated with the way of causality; and divinity (which is presented as the common good of the universe towards which all things tend) is associated with the way of eminence. Concerning the association of positive names with the via negationis, Thomas explains:
But he says ‘invisible things’ in the plural because the essence of God is not known by us according to that which it is, namely insofar as it is in itself one. It will be known by us in this way in heaven, and then ‘the Lord will be one and His name [will be] one,’ as it is said in the final chapter of Zachary. But [the divine essence] is made known to us through certain likenesses found in creatures, which participate in multiple ways in that which is one in God. Accordingly, our intellect considers the unity of the divine essence under the notion of goodness, of wisdom, of power and others of this kind, which in God are one. Therefore he calls these the invisible things of God, because that one thing in God, which corresponds to these names or notions, is not seen by us. . . . For the invisible things of God are known through the way of negation; [His] sempiternal power, through the way of causality; [His] divinity, through the way of excellence.76
73 Super Ad. Rom. 1.6 #115 [Marietti 22]: “Potest tamen homo, ex huiusmodi creaturis, Deum tripliciter cognoscere, ut Dionysius dicit in libro De divinis nominibus. Uno quidem modo per causalitatem. Quia enim huiusmodi creaturae sunt defectibiles et mutabiles, necesse est eas reducere ad aliquod principium immobile et perfectum. Et secundum hoc cognoscitur de Deo an est. Secundo per viam excellentiae. Non enim reducuntur omnia in primum principium, sicut in propriam causam et univocam, prout homo hominem generat, sed sicut in causam communem et excedentem. Et ex hoc cognoscitur quod est super omnia. Tertio per viam negationis. Quia si est causa excedens, nihil eorum quae sunt in creaturis potest ei competere, sicut etiam neque corpus caeleste proprie dicitur grave vel leve aut calidum aut frigidum. Et secundum hoc dicimus Deum immobilem et infinitum et si quid aliud huiusmodi dicitur.” 74 Ewbank, 104. 75 Ewbank, 106. 76 Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #117 [Marietti 1.22]: “Dicit autem pluraliter invisibilia quia Dei essentia non est nobis cognita secundum illud quod est, scilicet prout in se est una. Sic erit nobis in patria cognita, et tunc erit Dominus unus et nomen eius unum, ut dicitur Zac. ult. Est autem manifesta nobis per quasdam similitudines in creaturis repertas, quae id quod in Deo unum est, multipliciter participant, et secundum hoc intellectus noster considerat unitatem divinae essentiae 71
Thomas’s association of the positive names such as goodness, wisdom, and power with the via negationis may be surprising, but this association can be explained in two complementary ways. First, as we have seen above in In Sent. 1.2.1.3, a name can belong to the via negationis because it follows from a previous negation, even if the subsequent name is itself positive. For example, Thomas associates intelligence as a divine name with the via negationis, because it follows from immateriality.
Second, the text of Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #117 suggests that there is a negative element in the signification of the attributes, insofar as the divine essence to which the attributes correspond is not seen by us and is known to exceed the created perfections from which these names are taken. In the knowledge of God through the attributes, there is a recognition of the manner in which such names fall short.77 This suggestion finds confirmation in the next set of texts.78
(iii) The triplex via characterizes the signification of one positive name
In other texts, the triplex via is employed to explain the predication or signification of a single positive name, such as wisdom. These texts are In Sent. 1.4.2.1 ad 2 (CNE); De pot. 7.5 ad 2 (CNE); and De pot. 9.7 (NCE). The example given in all three of these texts is wisdom: God is affirmed as the cause of creaturely wisdom, which creaturely wisdom can in turn be denied of God, not because
sub ratione bonitatis, sapientiae, virtutis, et huiusmodi, quae in Deo unum sunt. Haec ergo invisibilia Dei dixit, quia illud unum quod his nominibus, seu rationibus, in Deo respondet, non videtur a nobis. . . . Nam invisibilia Dei cognoscuntur per viam negationis; sempiterna virtus, per viam causalitatis; divinitas, per viam excellentiae” (reading respondet rather than respondent, following R. Busa, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 1980), vol. 5, p. 447). 77 Rocca finds Thomas's explication of the text of Romans 1:20 by the triplex via “somewhat contrived.” See Rocca, 52. Perhaps the order of the triplex via in this text should not be thought of as particularly significant (insofar as the order in this case is in response to the text of Romans 1:20, which mentions the invisible things of God, His everlasting power, and His divinity); nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that Thomas is very clear about associating positive names with the via negationis. 78 We should also note the connection of Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #117 with In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4. Thomas characterizes Romans 1:20 as being concerned with showing “in what way knowledge of this kind [i.e., of God through natural reason] is received” [Marietti 1.22]. It is noteworthy that Thomas here employs the order NCE—with negation playing the leading role and even being associated with the divine attributes—to explain a text that he characterizes as concerned with the manner in which the knowledge of God is received by the human intellect. In In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4, we have seen Thomas distinguish between naming God according to what is in Him and naming Him according to how knowledge of him is received by the human intellect. The latter method is characterized by St. Thomas as a two-part method of negation and comparison, again with negation taking the lead. The via negationis takes the lead when there is an epistemological emphasis. 72
of any defect in God, but because God exceeds the wisdom of the creature. For example, in In Sent.
1.4.2.1 ad 2, Thomas writes that according to Dionysius: “God is wise, and not wise, that is, as others are wise (in whom wisdom differs from the one who is wise); but He is super-wise, insofar as wisdom is in Him in a more noble way than may be signified by the name.”79 Rocca emphasizes that
in many texts, Thomas identifies the eminence of God as the reason for negation: we deny things of
God not because of His defect, but because of His eminence.80
With regard to the ordering of the triplex via, it is noteworthy that all three of these texts
conclude with the via eminentiae. This could suggest to us a connection between these texts and In
Sent. 1.2.1.3 (NCE), considered at length above, in which the opinion of Anselm and Dionysius is
presented as a corrective complement to an overly restrictive account of the signification of a
positive divine name: the claim that the perfections of creatures exist pre-eminently in God allows
one to say that a divine name such as wisdom is positively predicated of God. With regard to the
signification and predication of the positive names, the way of eminence complements the
impoverished twofold way of other thinkers.
(iv) The knowledge of God through the triplex via is distinguished from knowledge of
whether God exists
At this point it should be recalled that Ewbank's central contentions are that the order CEN
concerns “the foundational inquiry concerning the divine being,” including a consideration of God's existence and nature; and that, by contrast, the orders CNE and NCE concern the divine nature as distinguished from a knowledge of God's existence. In a set of texts of peculiar interest for evaluating these two conclusions, Thomas offers a distinction between—or at least mentions
79 In Sent. 1.4.2.1 ad 2 [Mand. 1.139]: “Deus est sapiens, et non sapiens, scilicet sicut alia, ut differat in eo sapientia a sapiente; sed est supersapiens, inquantum est in ipso nobiliori modo sapientia quam significetur per nomen.” 80 Rocca, 52, esp. n. 11. 73
separately—knowledge concerning the existence of God (answering an est) and further knowledge
concerning His conditions or argumentation clarifying one's confused knowledge of Him.81 These texts are In DT 1.2 (CEN), In DT 6.3 (NCE), SCG 3.49 (CEN), ST 1.12.12 (CENE), and Super Ad
Rom. 1.6 #115 (CEN).
In the first text, In DT 1.2 (CEN), which asks whether the human mind can arrive at a knowledge of God,82 Thomas asserts that of those knowing that God exists, one knows more perfectly than another, because the cause is more perfectly known from its effect, the more that the relation (habitudo) of the cause to the effect is understood. In the case of causes whose effects do not
attain to equality with their cause, the relation of cause to effect is better understood according to
three things: “according to the progression of the effect from the cause, and insofar as the effect
follows upon a likeness of its cause, and insofar as it falls short from following the cause perfectly.”
It should be noted that there are elements of both causality and eminence associated with the knowledge that God exists: one knows God as a cause that exceeds His effects, and one then seeks
to know more perfectly the relation of this eminent cause to His effects. Thomas thus continues:
And thus in three ways the human mind advances in the knowledge of God, although it never arrives at knowing what He is, but only whether He is: in a first way, insofar as His efficacy in producing things is known more perfectly; in a second way, insofar as He is known as the cause of nobler effects, which because they bear some likeness of Him, better disclose His eminence; in a third way, He is better and better known as distant from all those things which appear among His effects. Thus Dionysius says in the Divine Names that He is known as the cause of all, and exceeding all, and by the removal of all.83
81 This general description of a class of texts is the primary one under which Ewbank's key text (Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #115) falls. As we shall see, by no means is this text alone in distinguishing between knowing quia Deus est and the investigation of His nature. Ewbank's conviction is that the order CEN, as explained by this text from this Commentary on St. Paul, provides the interpretive key both for the order of procedure in the Summa theologiae, as well as for understanding the other orderings of the triplex via. See Ewbank, 104-105. By contrast, Ewbank holds that the order NCE “occurs in relation to demonstration of the nature of immaterial substances or the divine being.” Similarly, CNE “appears in contexts in which knowledge of God's nature is considered, although such is established in procedures which constitute incomplete demonstrations.” See Ewbank, 106. 82 [Leon. 50.80: 1-4]: “Circa primum queruntur quatuor. . . secundo utrum [mens humana] possit ad Dei notitiam peruenire.” 83 In DT 1.2 [Leon. 50.84-85: 96-117]: “Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est, alio perfectius cognoscit: quia causa tanto ex effectu perfectius cognoscitur, quanto per effectum magis appreenditur habitudo cause ad effectum. Que 74
In this text, Thomas offers an account of progress in the knowledge that God exists, through
causality, eminence, and negation. Progress on all three fronts seems to be possible, even for one
already knowing (in a less perfect way) that God exists. In this text, the triplex via is applied to
progress in the knowledge of God that is posterior to the knowledge that He exists, according to the
order CEN. This runs counter to Ewbank's thesis that it is the orders NCE and CNE that are
employed in the context of a knowledge of the divine nature that is posterior to a knowledge that
God exists.84 Nevertheless, I would grant to Ewbank that this text is evidence of another important
feature of his thesis: that knowledge that God exists includes both elements of causality and
eminence.85 God is known to exist as a cause that exceeds His effects, a cause to which the effects
are not equal.
The second text in this group is In DT 6.3 (NCE), mentioned above as a text that explicitly associates negative names such as incorporeal with the via negationis. In this text, Thomas first argues that we can only know that God is, but not what He is. This leads Thomas to note that in the knowledge whether something is, one must first know at least in a confused way what the thing is.
In the knowledge of corporeal things, Thomas explains, confused cognition occurs when one knows a thing’s proximate or remote genus and some apparent accidents and thus has some nominal knowledge (for example, to know man as a mostly hairless animal or living thing) without knowing
quidem habitudo in effectu non pertingente ad equalitatem sue cause attenditur secundum tria: scilicet secundum progressionem effectus a causa, et secundum hoc quod effectus consequitur de similitudine sue cause, et secundum hoc quod deficit ab eius perfecta consequtione. Et sic tripliciter mens humana proficit in cognitione Dei, quamuis ad cognoscendum quid est non pertingat set an est solum: primo secundum quod perfectius cognoscitur eius efficacia in producendo res; secundo prout nobiliorum effectuum causa cognoscitur, qui cum eius similitudinem aliquam gerant, magis eminentiam eius commendant; tertio in hoc quod magis ac magis cognoscitur elongatus ab omnibus his que in effectibus apparent. Vnde dicit Dionisius in libro De diuinis nominibus quod cognoscitur ex omnium causa et excessu et ablatione.” 84 Ewbank, 106. 85 Ewbank, 105. 75 the definition.86 Now, God does not belong to any genus, and He has no accidents, and so Thomas offers the way of negation in place of a generic grasp of the divine quiddity, and comparisons to creatures according to causality and excess in the place of a knowledge of any apparent accidents of
God.87 He concludes: “Therefore in this way we know concerning immaterial forms whether they exist, and we possess concerning them, in place of a knowledge of what they are, a knowledge through negation, through causality, and through excess.”88
Strictly speaking, this text treats the confused knowledge of what God is as prior to the knowledge that He is; nevertheless, this would also allow for progress in one's knowledge that God exists, insofar as one already knowing that God exists can come to possess a less confused knowledge of God. If nothing else, it can be said that this text blurs the line between knowledge that
God exists and knowledge of God's nature. This is most appropriate, given that no knowledge of the divine nature in this life ever serves to answer quid est: one only ever knows an Deus sit. In this case, then, Thomas treats the confused knowledge of the divine nature necessary for knowing that
86 In DT 6.3 [Leon. 50.167-68: 115-132]: “Et tamen sciendum quod de nulla re potest sciri an est nisi quoquo modo sciatur de ea quid est, uel cognitione perfecta, uel saltem cognitione confusa; prout Philosophus dicit in principio Phisicorum quod diffinita sunt precognita partibus diffinitionis: oportet enim scientem hominem esse et querentem quid est homo per diffinitionem scire quid hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat. Nec hoc esset nisi aliquam rem quoquo modo conciperet quam scit esse, quamuis nesciat eius diffinitionem: concipit enim hominem secundum cognitionem alicuius generis proximi uel remoti, et aliquorum accidentium que extra apparent de ipso. Oportet enim diffinitionum cognitionem sicut et demonstrationum ex aliqua preexistenti cognitione initium sumere. Sic ergo et de Deo et
God exists according to the order NCE. Taken in this way, In DT 6.3 suggests that not only are causality and eminence involved in the knowledge that God exists: negation too plays a role. I would suggest that this is reflected in the very conclusion of at least some of the demonstrations of God's existence, such as the first way from ST 1.2.3: “it is necessary to arrive at some first mover, which is moved by nothing else, and this everyone understands to be God.”89 God as first mover is the cause of motion; He is first above all other movers; and He is not moved by anything else.90 The elements of the Dionysian triplex via are thus present from the beginning, in one's demonstrated knowledge that God exists. Although we associate the demonstration of God's existence especially with the way of causality (insofar as such demonstration proceeds from an effect to the cause), nevertheless the confused knowledge of what God is involved in such demonstrations is according to all three elements of the triplex via.91
One other observation about In DT 6.3 is in order: as we shall see below, it is a close parallel to SCG 1.14’s description of the manner in which one advances in philosophical knowledge about
God beyond knowing that He exists. It is worth noting, therefore, that In DT 6.3 correlates the elements of the triplex via with a two-part method of negation and comparison:
89 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur: et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.” 90 See SCG 1.30 [Leon. Man. 32] for an assertion by Thomas that the mode of God's eminence is expressed in one way by calling God “first cause.” 91 Advancing a similar claim with which I am sympathetic, David Twetten argues that the nominal definition of God at work in the five ways (understood as existential quia demonstrations) from ST 1.2.3 is informed by the triplex via. He bases his argument in particular on ST 1.13.8 ad 2, where Thomas says that the name God “has been imposed to signify something existing above all, which is the principle of all and removed from all.” (ST 1.13.8 ad 2 [Leon. 4.158]: “Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat naturam divinam. Impositum est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et remotum ab omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes Deum.”) Twetten contends that the nominal definition at work in a given argument for God’s existence need not include both eminence and negation, but only one of the two; although it always include causality. See Twetten, “Aquinas’s Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of ‘God,’” The Thomist 69 (2005), 203-50, esp. 205-206, 247-49. For example, while Twetten agrees that “first unmoved mover” is a nominal definition of God including elements of eminence, negation, and causality, he notes that the fourth way’s nominal definition (a maximally perfect cause of perfections) does not seem to involve negation. 77
[B]ut in the place of knowledge of a genus we possess concerning these substances a knowledge through negations. . . . but in a place of accidents we possess concerning the aforementioned substances their relations to sensible substances, either according to the relation of cause to effect, or according to the relation of excess.92
We have seen this two-part method outlined in In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4, and I have suggested that it is
this two-part method that governs the structure of Book I of the Contra Gentiles.
The third text, SCG 3.49 (CEN) primarily concerns the limitations of angelic knowledge of
God through their own essences; however, towards the end of the chapter, Thomas offers some
remarks comparing angelic knowledge of God to the human knowledge of God in this life:
Nevertheless, a separate substance knows about God, through its own essence, that He is; and that He is the cause of all; and eminent over all; and removed from all, not only from what exists, but even from what can be conceived by the created mind. We too can attain, in some way, this knowledge of God: for through effects we know about God that He is and that He is the cause of others, preeminent over others, and removed from all.93
In this text, Thomas twice mentions separately the knowledge that God exists and the knowledge of
other things about God, the latter being correlated with the elements of the triplex via. This is not to
disassociate the triplex via from the via causalitatis, but only to note that Thomas seems to take (1)
God’s existence and (2) His identification as the cause of others as two things pertaining to the via
causalitatis. That is, we can distinguish between the claim “God exists” and the claim “God is the
cause of creatures,” even if the former can only be demonstrated by reasoning from effect to cause.
As in the first two texts, the elements of the triplex via (in this case in the order CEN) are associated
here with knowledge of God posterior to the knowledge that He exists—with the qualification that
the knowledge that God exists is also associated with the via causalitatis.
92 Ibid. [Leon. 50.168: 159-61, 172-76]: “Set loco cognitionis generis habemus in istis substantiis cognitionem per negationes. . . . [L]oco autem accidentium habemus in substantiis predictis habitudines earum ad substantias sensibiles, uel secundum comparationem cause ad effectum, uel secundum comparationem excessus.” 93 SCG 3.49 [Leon. Man. 280]: “Cognoscit tamen substantia separata per suam substantiam de Deo quia est; et quod est omnium causa; et eminentem omnibus; et remotum ab omnibus, non solum quae sunt, sed etiam quae mente creata concipi possunt. Ad quam etiam cognitionem de Deo nos utcumque pertingere possumus: per effectus enim de Deo cognoscimus quia est et quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens, et ab omnibus remotus.” 78
In the fourth text, ST 1.12.12 (CENE), Thomas is concerned with the general question of whether we can arrive at a knowledge of God in this life through natural reason. As in many other
texts, Thomas affirms that from sensible things, we cannot arrive at a knowledge of the divine
essence in itself, “because sensible creatures are effects of God not adequate to the power of the
cause.” The essence of God cannot be disclosed through a knowledge of sensible creatures.
However, Thomas continues:
But because they are His effects, dependent on their cause, from them we can be brought as far as to know about God whether He is; and to know about Him those things which must belong to Him insofar as He is the first cause of all, exceeding all His effects; and [to know] the difference of creatures from Him, namely that He is not something among those things which are caused by Him; and that these things are not removed from Him because of His defect, but because He super-exceeds them.94
Once again, we can distinguish two stages in this text. First, there is the knowledge that God exists, a
knowledge at which we arrive from a consideration of God's effects. Second, beyond knowing that
God exists, there is knowledge (1) of the things that must belong to God as the eminent first cause
and (2) of the difference of creatures from God, who super-exceeds creatures.
One peculiarity about this text is that eminence is mentioned twice, paired first with the way
of causality and then with the way of negation. First, Thomas explains that we can know about God
what must belong to Him insofar as He is the first cause of all, exceeding all His effects. The
suggestion is that one arrives at a knowledge of what belongs to God, posterior to one's recognition
of Him as the supereminent cause of all. This is not to deny the association of the knowledge of
94 ST 1.12.12 [Leon. 4.136]: “Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere, quod divinam essentiam videat: quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae non adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilibum cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci: et per consequens nec eius essentia videri. Sed quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea quae necesse est ei convenire secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata. Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad creatures, quod scilicet omnium est causa: et differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum quae ab eo causauntur; et quod haec non removentur ab eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.” 79
God’s existence with the via causalitatis, but Thomas also apparently associates with the via causalitatis
a knowledge of other things that must belong to God insofar as He is the eminent first cause.95
Continuing, Thomas notes that one also comes to recognize God as distinct from all of His effects,
removing from Him what belongs to creatures, not because of His defect, but because of His
eminence. In this peculiar case, the order of the elements of the triplex via is CENE. In this case, it is
not that the via eminentiae constitutes a distinct second or fourth “step;” rather, what we find is that
Thomas presents the via eminentiae as complementing and conditioning the other two ways.96
Finally, the text that Ewbank himself takes to be the interpretive key for the order of the
triplex via is Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #115, which I also included under group (2) above, the cases where
one or more elements of the triplex via are explicitly associated with argumentation for a particular
divine name. 97 In this text not only is there a distinction between the knowledge that God exists and
subsequent knowledge of His nature: in this case, Thomas explicitly associates the former with the
way of causality and the latter with the way of negation. The way of eminence is presented as it were
as a middle step, between the knowledge that God exists and the knowledge of what He is not.
Now, in light of remarks that I have already offered, I do not think that this text (and its
order—CEN) should be taken as the fundamental presentation of the order of the triplex via or as
the key for interpreting all of the diverse orderings of the triplex via in Thomas's writings. In
95 This will be an important association later, for example in discussion of the first argument for God’s universal perfection in ST 1.4.2, in which Thomas reasons from the identification of God as the first efficient cause to the conclusion that God must not lack any of the excellences contained with any genus: this argument can be understood as belonging to the via causalitatis, insofar as Thomas is reaching a conclusion about what must belong to God, insofar as He is the eminent first cause. See below, pp. 304-305. 96 Ewbank interprets the text as an instance of CNE, not acknowledging the role of eminence earlier in the text. Without the earlier mention of eminence, the text would fit in with Ewbank’s thesis, according to which the order CNE is associated with considerations of the divine nature rather than God’s existence. I would also suggest a connection between this text and In Sent. 1.2.1.3, in which the via eminentiae is presented as a complement to an impoverished understanding of the via causalitatis and via negationis. Here in ST 1.12.12, the via eminentiae complements both the via causalitatis and the via negationis. 97 Super Ad Rom. 1.6 #115 [Marietti 1.22]. 80
summary, in a number of texts, the entire triplex via (including cases of ENC, CNE, CEN, and
CENE) is taken to pertain to the knowledge of God's nature that is posterior to a knowledge of His
existence. The order CEN cannot be distinguished from the other orders in this regard. That being
said, what Ewbank emphasizes on the basis of this text—that a consideration of the divine nature
according to the via negativa is posterior to a knowledge of the existence of the eminent cause—has
been suggested by many of the other texts considered in this section. Indeed, I would add that In DT
6.3 suggests that in the knowledge that God exists, there must be a confused knowledge of God according to all three elements of the triplex via.
(v) Other texts employing the triplex via
Finally, I would suggest that the remainder of the texts in which Thomas explicitly identifies
the three elements of the triplex via do not present any particular features that serve to distinguish their context or purpose from the general issue of how we know and name God in this life. These texts include: In Sent. 1.3.1.3 (CNE), In DT 6.2 (CEN), LR 3.1.2 ad 2 (NEC), ST 1.13.1 (CEN), ST
1.13.10 ad 5 (CEN), ST 1.84.7 ad 3 (CEN), and De malo 16.8 ad 3 (NCE). As a point in favor of
Ewbank's general thesis that CEN is the primary ordering of the triplex via in Thomas's writings, it should be noted that it is the most common ordering among these texts. However, this is a rather weak generalization that admits of exceptions: it is not a hard and fast rule.
B. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE ORDER OF THE TRIPLEX VIA
To bring to a close our consideration of the order of the triplex via, I would offer the
following general remarks. First, by approaching the question of the order of the triplex via by
grouping the texts in which Thomas explicitly mentions all three elements according to similarity in
the manner in which the triplex via is employed, it becomes clear that it is difficult to offer any exceptionless generalizations concerning the cases in which Thomas mentions a given ordering. 81
Second, as we have seen in the case of discussion of the signification and predication of the positive divine names, Thomas explicitly affirms that all three elements of the triplex via are involved in knowing and naming God according to such names. At the height of what can be said about God positively in this life, all three elements of the triplex via play a role and cannot be taken as independent of one another. Although Thomas does, in a variety of texts and in a variety of ways, associate one element or another of the triplex via with some particular aspect of knowing or naming
God, nevertheless it can always also be said that all three elements of the triplex via are already interwoven, at least in the background, in any instance of knowing or naming God. To judge that
“God is not a body” may belong to the via negationis, but one's confused knowledge of the existence of the subject of this proposition already also involves the elements of causality and eminence. That is, to follow the way of negation is not to proceed as it were without the assistance of the ways of causality and eminence.
Third, as regards the issue of the connection of the three elements of the triplex via with modes of argumentation, we should briefly revisit In Sent. 1.2.1.3. In this text, we have seen that
Thomas attributes to Avicenna and Maimonides a twofold way of causality and a twofold way of negation, and he credits both Anselm and Dionysius for the way of eminence. According to the way of causality, God is named from His effects, and He is named according to a comparison made between Himself and creatures (e.g., He is called irate because He acts in a manner similar to angry men). The first of these ways of causality lines up with the mode of argumentation associated with the via causalitatis in In Sent. 1.3 div. and 1.35.1: an argument belongs to the via causalitatis because it argues from an effect to the existence of the cause. As for the way of negation as it is treated in In
Sent. 1.2.1.3, Thomas observes that a name belongs to the way of negation either because it removes something from God (e.g., incorporeal) or because it follows from a prior negation—for example, 82
God’s intellectuality follows from His immateriality. According to this latter negative way, a divine
name belongs to the negative way because it follows from an argument that takes the predication of
a negative name as a premise. Finally, Thomas indicates that recognition of the eminence of the
divine perfection with respect to a divine attribute such as wisdom implies that “whatever follows
upon wisdom as such rightly and properly belongs to God.”98 The via eminentiae as a way of
argumentation thus yields further positive conclusions from previously established divine attributes.
Combining these details from In Sent. 1.2.1.3 with the texts treated in this section, we can
schematize Thomas’s usage of the elements of the triplex via as follows:
via causalitatis via negationis via eminentiae Signification: A name means (or that God is the (1) that something is that the named is understood cause of the removed from God perfection belongs such): perfection from OR properly and pre- which that name (2) that the named eminently to God is taken perfection in God is not identical with a creature’s perfection Argumentation: The argument (1) from an effect from a prior negative (1) from some gradation proceeds: to God’s name, concluding to found in creatures to existence as the another name, whether pre-eminent perfection cause negative or positive100 in God OR OR (2) from the (2) from one positive claim that God is name to another positive the first cause, to name attribute to Him what must belong to Him as the first cause99
98 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.69]: “Et ex hoc contingit quod quidquid sequitur ad sapientiam, inquantum hujusmodi, recte et proprie convenit Deo.” 99 The best text for associating this type of argument with the via causalitatis is ST 1.12.12. 100 It should be noted that Thomas will sometimes characterize a name as belonging to the via negationis because the argument for it belongs to the via negationis—even where the name argued for is positive. Intelligence belongs to the via negationis because it is argued for from immateriality. See In Sent. 1.2.1.3. 83
In general, what we have found is that a name can be associated with one or another of the
elements of the triplex via for a variety of reasons, and it is generally the case that in all knowledge of
God in this life, all three elements of the triplex via play at least some role. To offer a metaphor, the three elements of the triplex via can be thought of as three instruments in a musical trio. At some times (as in the understanding of the signification and predication of the positive names), the musical instruments play simultaneously; at some times, one instrument may take the lead, with the
others falling into the background; and even if at some point a given instrument plays solo, it does
so only against the backdrop of what has already come before in the presentation of themes in
which the efforts of all three instruments were integrated.
What all this suggests, as regards the order of the divine names, is that we cannot take any
previously established, precise account of the order of the triplex via for granted in our analysis of the
two Summae and the Compendium. We should expect to discover the careful interweaving of these
three elements of the triplex via throughout the discussion of the divine names. That being said, any
satisfactory account of the order of divine names will need to be expressed in the language of the
triplex via and with reference to the interdependence of the elements of the triplex via: at a minimum,
it will be necessary to indicate which element of the triplex via is leading the way at various points in
the order.
3. THE ORDER OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
In Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas, Jan Aertsen relates a
number of times a comment that St. Thomas makes in In Sent 1.8.1.3, that the four divine names
that are also transcendental terms (being, one, true, and good) “precede the other divine names: this 84 follows from their commonness.”101 Aertsen interprets this comment by Thomas to mean that “[t]he order among these four names is based on the order of the communissima.”102 Unsurprisingly, then,
Aertsen presents these four divine names—being, one, true, and good—in this order. He does not draw attention to the fact that this is not the order in which Thomas treats these four divine names in either of the two Summae or in the Compendium.103
In a similar manner, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange explains the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae in terms of the order of the transcendentals. Garrigou-Lagrange articulates his position in response to a long-debated question among Catholic theologians (including Thomists,
Scotists, and Suarezians) about the identity of the divine attribute that is formally constitutive of the divine essence in the order of understanding.104 He notes that among Thomists there have historically been two main candidates for this status as formally constituting the divine essence: these are subsistent being itself and thought thinking itself.105 Favoring the former solution, Garrigou-
Lagrange argues that the remaining divine attributes are demonstrated from ipsum esse per se subsistens according to the order of the transcendentals.106
101 In Sent. 1.8.1.3 [Mand. 1.201-203]. Cf. Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 83, 360, 363. 102 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 363. 103 It could be that there is a distinction between the order of these divine names considered in themselves and the order of presentation; this possibility will be addressed in the later chapters of this dissertation. 104 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, v. 2, tr. Bede Rose (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949), 3-13. Like many other interpreters of Thomas, Garrigou-Lagrange's use of the term attribute does not reflect Thomas's typical practice of reserving the term attributum for the positive names. This seems to be no more than a terminological issue: I would just remind the reader that when I use the term attribute, I typically mean a positive name. 105 Ibid., 10-11. 106 In order to reconcile this claim with the order of divine names found in the Summa theologiae (esse, bonum, unum, verum), Garrigou-Lagrange does two things. First, he argues that simplicity (especially as treated in q. 3 a. 7) is equivalent to transcendental unity (thus placing it after the treatment of the divine esse in q. 3 a. 4). Second, concerning the discussion of divine truth, he notes that he has rearranged the order relative to the Summa theologiae “for the sake of a simpler arrangement,” even though “St. Thomas rightly discusses [truth] after the question of knowledge.” Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, v. 2, tr. Bede Rose (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949), 35-36, esp. n. 4. 85
We will consider both Aertsen's and Garrigou-Lagrange's positions in greater detail in
chapter six, because they both make their claims about the significance of the order of the
transcendentals vis-à-vis the order of the divine names with primary reference to the order in the
Summa theologiae. For now, it is necessary only to consider briefly the order among the transcendentals.
A. DE VERITATE 21.3 ON THE ORDER OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
Yet again, we can begin by asking the simple question: What is the order of the
transcendentals? Thankfully, in this case, there is a relatively straightforward answer. First, we should
briefly rehearse Thomas's notion of a transcendental. In De ver. 1.1, Thomas explains that the terms
one, true, and good (as well as thing and something) add to the term being, not by adding anything
extraneous to being, but rather by expressing general modes that follow upon every being but are not expressed by the name being.107 One adds the notion of undividedness; true adds the notion of
relation to intellect; and good adds the notion of relation to appetite. These transcendentals are
convertible with being, as every being is one, true, and good, and everything that is one, true, or
good is a being. The transcendental terms (of which being is the first) differ only logically, secundum
rationem, rather than in reality.
What, then, is the order among these transcendentals? Thomas systematically expounds their
order in De ver. 21.3.108 In this text, the question is whether good is logically (secundum rationem) prior
107 De ver. 1.1 [Leon. 22/1*2.5]: “Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens, unde probat etiam Philosophus in III Metaphysicae quod ens non potest esse genus; sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur, quod dupliciter contingit. . . . Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens . . .” I will leave behind the terms res and aliquid in this section, not because they are unimportant as transcendentals, but only because they are not explicitly identified by Thomas as divine names. Furthermore, the next text we will consider (De ver. 21.3) offers an explanation of the order of the transcendentals without explicit reference to thing or something. 108 Res and aliquid are not treated in this text. For a helpful discussion of the manner in which thing and something can be integrated into the order of the transcendentals, see Michael Rubin, Beauty and the Order of 86
to true.109 Thomas begins his response by noting that both true and good have the character of
perfections. As perfections, the order among them can be considered in two ways, “in one way from
the side of the perfections themselves, in another way from the side of what is perfected.” With
regard to the former, Thomas explains that the true is prior to the good, because the true is
perfective of something according to the character (ratio) of its species, whereas good is perfective
not only according to the species but also according to the being (esse) which it has in reality. It follows that the meaning (ratio) of good includes more than the meaning of true, and it includes and presupposes the meaning of true within itself. In turn, Thomas explains, true presupposes one: “the notion of the true is completed by the apprehension of an intellect; but anything is intelligible insofar as it is one.” The ratio of the true is completed by the intellect’s operation: being is true as the extramental foundation of truth, which is formally realized in the intellect’s operation.110 But the intelligibility of being depends upon unity, and so one is prior to true. Thus “the order of these transcendental names is such, if they are considered in themselves, that after being is one, then true after one, and then after true good.”111
This order among the transcendental names taken in themselves is supported by Thomas's
remarks in other texts. For example, In Sent. 1.8.1.3 contains an assertion that one is the closest to
Transcendentals in St. Thomas's Thought (Master's thesis (philosophy), Catholic University of America, 2011), 30-32; Cf. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 110, 220, 223, 261, cited by Rubin in nn. 69, 71-72, 74. 109 De ver. 21.3 [Leon. 22/3.598]: “Tertio quaeritur utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum.” 110 See Wippel, “Truth in Thomas Aquinas,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2007), 66. 111 Ibid. [Leon. 22/3.598: 40-63]: “Responsio. Dicendum quod tam verum quam bonum, sicut dictum
being, because it adds only a negation.112 In ST 1.5.2, Thomas confirms that being is prior secundum rationem to good. In ST 1.16.4, Thomas takes up the same question considered in De ver. 21.3
(whether good is prior secundum rationem to true), and again he argues that true is prior to good, absolutely speaking.113 There is no reason for dispute or doubt about the order secundum rationem of these transcendental perfections considered in themselves: the order is being, one, true, good. Each of the names after being expresses something not expressed by the name being itself, in such a way that each name in the order presupposes the prior name; each name adds something only logically or conceptually (secundum rationem) to being. It is this order among the transcendental perfections considered in themselves that both Aertsen and Garrigou-Lagrange apply to the order of the divine names.
In De ver. 21.3, however, Thomas goes on to consider whether true is prior to good “from the side of the things perfected,” and he concludes that in this sense good is in fact prior to true.
The key to understanding Thomas’s arguments here is to note that each of these transcendental names picks out the relational character possessed by being insofar as it is perfective—truth is perfective of intellect, and goodness is perfective of appetite. Transcendental truth of being is being’s perfective character in relation to the intellect. Transcendental goodness is being’s perfective character in relation to appetite. In this second section of De ver. 21.3, Thomas is concerned with the order of these transcendental perfections from the side of what they perfect, that is, with respect to intellect and appetite.114 He offers two arguments for the claim that, taken in this way, good is prior
to true.115
112 In Sent. 1.8.1.3 [Mand. 1.200]. 113 ST 1.16.4 [Leon. 4.211]: “Respondeo dicendum quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius est quam bonum.” 114 This serves to clarify why Thomas is concerned only with the order of good and true, without any remarks about where one falls in this latter order. 115 For Aertsen’s treatment of this passage, see Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 285-86. 88
First, Thomas argues that the good extends itself to more things than the true, because the only sorts of things that can be perfected by the true are those intellectual beings that can immaterially receive a thing’s form (ratio) without its mode of existence, as the mind knows a stone without taking on the stone’s material mode of existence. By contrast, the good perfects things that receive a form according to material existence, as the stone itself is good: “therefore all things desire the good, but not all things know the true.”116 Here Thomas is concerned not with truth of being, but rather with truth of intellect: what is known enjoys truth of being, and truth of intellect follows from knowing truth of being.117 Only an intellectual being can receive truth of intellect as a perfection, and so good as desired by all is more common than truth of intellect. Truth of intellect is not coextensive with being or with goodness, and so truth of intellect can be less common than the good. 118 In this way, then, good is prior to true as more common.
Second, Thomas explains, even those things that can be perfected by both the good and the true—that is, intellectual beings—are perfected by the good before they are perfected by the true, because whatever exists is already perfected by the good (to some extent) just by its participating in esse.119 In other words, a human being’s goodness as a substantial existent is prior causally to the
116 De ver. 21.3 [Leon. 22/3.598-99: 64-85]: “Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex parte perfectibilium, sic e converso bonum est naturaliter prius quam verum duplici ratione: primo quia perfectio boni ad plura se extendit quam veri perfectio; vero enim non sunt nata perfici nisi illa quae possunt aliquod ens recipere in se ipsis vel in se ipsis habere secundum suam rationem et non secundum illud esse quod ens habet in se ipso; et huiusmodi sunt solum ea quae immaterialiter aliquid recipiunt et sunt cognoscitiva; species enim lapidis est in anima, non autem secundum esse quod habet in lapide. Sed a bono nata sunt perfici etiam illa quae secundum materiale esse aliquid recipiunt, cum ratio boni in hoc consistit quod aliquid sit perfectivum tam secundum rationem speciei quam etiam secundum esse, ut prius dictum est. Et ideo omnia appetunt bonum sed non omnia cognoscunt verum; in utroque enim ostenditur habitudo perfectibilis ad perfectionem quae est bonum vel verum, scilicet in appetitu boni et cognitione veri.” 117 For the distinction between truth of being and truth of intellect, see Wippel, “Truth in Thomas Aquinas,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2007), 65 ff. 118 Thomas does clarify that truth of intellect is convertible with being in ST I.16.3 ad 1 [Leon. 4.210]: “Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato.” However, truth of intellect is not identical secundum rem with being; nor is it coextensive with being. Cf. In Sent. 1.8.1.3 [Mand. 1.199]. 119 In ST I.5.1 ad 3, Thomas will clarify that just insofar as a thing exists as a substance, it is good secundum quid; but insofar as a thing is good simpliciter, it has being secundum quid, i.e., as actualized by the accidents that are its proper perfection. 89
truth of his intellect, which is achieved only through operation.120 Thus, good is in this way causally
prior to the true. From these two arguments, Thomas has concluded that, when one compares good
and true with respect to the things they perfect, good is prior to true both according to commonness
and according to causal priority.121
In articulating this second version of the order of the good and the true in De ver. 21.3,
Thomas cannot be concerned with good and true insofar as they are coextensive with being, or else
they could only be regarded as equally, maximally common (communissima).122 By contrast, in the text
from In Sent. 1.8.1.3 to which Aertsen refers to defend the claim that the order of the divine names
is the order of the transcendentals, Thomas is concerned with the order of the transcendental
perfections considered in themselves as identical and maximally common but logically distinct.
There Thomas argues for the priority of the divine name qui est from the priority secundum intentionem
of being relative to one, true, and good, which priority is established because “being is included in
the understanding of them, but not vice versa.”123 As I will explain later in discussion of ST 1.13.11,
in this later text Thomas does not appeal only to the commonness of being in order to defend the
priority of the name qui est, and this will provide an important clue for deciphering the order of the
divine names that are also transcendental names.
120 Thomas has in mind here causal priority, although one can also say that a human being exists for some time before he ever thinks. 121 De ver. 21.3 [Leon. 22/3.599: 86-93]: “Secundo quia illa etiam quae nata sunt perfici bono et vero, per prius perficiuntur bono quam vero; ex hoc enim quod esse participant perficiuntur bono, ut dictum est; ex hoc autem quod cognoscunt aliquid perficiuntur vero. Cognitio autem est posterior quam esse, unde et in hac consideratione ex parte perfectibilium bonum praecedit verum.” 122 In Sent. 1.8.1.3 [Mand. 1.199]: “Respondeo dicendum, quod ista nomina, ens et bonum, unum et verum, simpliciter secundum rationem intelligendi praecedunt alia divina nomina: quod patet ex eorum communitate.” 123 In Sent. 1.8.1.3 [Mand. 1.200]: “Cujus ratio est, quia ens includitur in intellectu eorum, et non e converso.” It should be noted that although Thomas does explicitly claim that one is prior to true and good secundum rationem in this text, he does not commit himself to any claim concerning the priority secundum rationem of true relative to good. 90
Thus, we find in Thomas’s De ver. 21.3, which is his single most careful text concerning the
order of the transcendentals, a twofold ordering. The first and more familiar is the order of the transcendental perfections considered in themselves: this order is being, one, true, good. It is this order that both Aertsen and Garrigou-Lagrange cite as the order of these divine names. The second is the order of the same perfections, but considered with respect to the things that they perfect, in which case good is more common than true but just as common as being. Although Thomas does not offer any remarks concerning the placement of one in this order, at the least we can suggest that, like good, it is equally common with being. Given that in both the Summa contra Gentiles and in the
Summa theologiae, the divine name good precedes the divine name true, it will be helpful to refer to
this second order of the transcendentals in the later chapters of this dissertation.
B. THE TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE DIVINE NAMES
One final point concerning the transcendentals is appropriate. Given that both the divine
names and the transcendental names are distinct only secundum rationem, one might raise the question
of the relationship between the transcendental names and the divine names. For example, as a
transcendental, does the name goodness transcend not only the categories but also the distinction
between creature and God? That is, are both created goodness and divine goodness subsumed under
the good that is coextensive and convertible with being? Against such a suggestion, it must be
recalled that ens commune, the subject of metaphysics, does not include the divine being (which is
rather the cause of ens commune). But being taken as a transcendental term is just being as most
common, that is, as ens commune. The transcendental names besides being are convertible with being
and differ from being only secundum rationem: but the being with which they are convertible and from 91 which they differ does not include divine being. It should therefore not be assumed that a term is transcendental in such a way as to transcend the distinction between creature and God.124
Having considered possible rationales for the order of the divine names, we are better prepared for fruitful consideration of the two Summae and the Compendium in the later chapters of this dissertation.
124 Aertsen offers a helpful consideration of this issue in Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 372-78. CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
This chapter will treat a selection of historical examples of the order of divine names that may have influenced Thomas’s order. We will examine Aristotle’s Physics 8 and Metaphysics 12, the
Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius (henceforth Dionysius), Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing 8, and
Peter the Lombard’s Sentences 1.1
1. THE ORDER IN ARISTOTLE
In Physics 8 and in Metaphysics 12, Aristotle investigates the characteristics of the first mover.2
As we shall see later, Thomas’s ordering of the divine names bears several clear marks of Aristotle’s influence.
1 Other works considered but not included in this chapter are the Elements of Theology and Platonic Theology of Proclus, St. Augustine’s De Trinitate, St. John Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa, the Proslogion of St. Anselm, Moses Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, and the Summa fratris Alexandri. Of these, Augustine, Damascene, and Maimonides exert the greatest direct influence on Thomas’s understanding of divine naming, but I have not encountered enough direct parallels or points of influence concerning the order of the divine names to warrant special sections devoted to these sources in this chapter. On the other hand, the Summa fratris Alexandri Bk. I presents significant overlap in content with Thomas’s Summa theologiae 1.1.-43, and it will be helpful to compare these two summae in chapter six of this dissertation. I will suggest that, at least with regard to this section of his Summa, Thomas likely had the Summa fratris Alexandri in mind as a target of his criticism of theological works that multiply questions and proceed contrary to the ordo disciplinae. For discussion of the state of the question concerning the authorship of the Summa fratris Alexandri—so called because it is not the work only of Alexander of Hales, but also of certain companions in the Franciscan order—see Kenan B. Osborne, “Alexander of Hales,” The History of Franciscan Theology, ed. Kenan B. Osborne (Franciscan Institute: New York, 2007), 13-18. For our purposes, all that is important is that almost all of Book 1 would have been completed long before the composition of Thomas’s Summa theologiae. 2 It might be objected that it is not evident that Aristotle intended to demonstrate the existence or characteristics of a divine substance in Physics 8. Joseph Owens, for example, asserts that the argumentation in Physics 8 concludes at most to the existence of a celestial soul. See Joseph Owens, “The Conclusion of the Prima Via,” in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: SUNY Press, 1980), 142. For our purposes, what is important is an awareness of the order of presentation concerning the attributes of the first mover in the Physics, so that we can inquire whether or not this order has some influence on Thomas’s presentation of the order of the divine names. Also, Thomas, in his Commentary on the Physics, does apparently identify Aristotle's first mover with God. See In Phys. 8.23 #1172 [Marietti 628]: “Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus naturalibus, in primo principio totius naturae, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen.” In SCG 1.13, however, Thomas understands the argument from motion as first establishing the existence of an unmoved mover, which might be identified as God or as some created mover, like a celestial soul. In the latter case, it takes further argumentation to establish God’s existence, as the ultimate final cause of this unmoved mover’s activity. For discussion, see the two-part article by Jean Paulus, “La théorie du premier moteur chez Aristote,” Revue de philosophie 33 (1933): 259-94, 394-424; Anton Pegis, “St. Thomas and the Coherence of the Aristotelian Theology,” Mediaeval Studies 35 (1973), 67-117. As Wippel explains, Pegis disagrees with Paulus about whether, for Thomas, the first mover of Physics 8 can be identified with God. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 428-31. 92
93
A. THE ORDER IN PHYSICS 8
As Thomas comments, in contrast to the earlier books of the Physics that discussed motion in a more general way, Physics 8 “begins to apply motion to things,” reaching conclusions not about mobile being as such but about the order of particular mobile beings that constitute the universe.3
This shift to particulars provides the foundation for investigation of the character of the first mobile and the first mover. To emphasize this point, it is worth noting that Book 7, the last of the books belonging to what Thomas says is commonly titled De naturalibus, does contain a proof of the existence of a first immobile mover, but it contains no claims about the condition or characteristics of this mover.4 Only in Book 8 does this investigation into the character of the first mover begin, and the claims developed concerning the first mover depend upon Aristotle’s conclusions concerning the first mobile.
Book 8 of Aristotle’s Physics begins with a consideration of the eternity of motion. Aristotle first attempts to demonstrate the eternity of motion, and, as Thomas explains in his Commentary,
Aristotle then “uses the perpetuity of time and of motion as a principle for proving that the first principle exists, both here and in Metaphysics 12.”5 For Aristotle, the eternity of motion is a
3 In Phys. 8.2 #972 [Marietti 505]: “Dicit ergo primo, quod ad propositum ostendendum debemus incipere ab his quae primo determinata sunt in Physicis, ut eis quasi principiis utamur. Per quod dat intelligere, quod praecedentes libri, in quibus de motu in communi determinavit, et propter hoc appellantur universaliter de Naturalibus, habent quandam distinctionem ad hunc librum octavum, in quo iam incipit motum ad res applicare.” 4 This proof in Book 7 is only briefly stated, following the longer treatment of (a) the principle that whatever is moved is moved by another (which is proved from the continuity of mobile body) and (b) the principle that a regress to infinity in moved movers is impossible (which is proved from the impossibility of an infinite motion in a finite time). See Physics 7.1 242a16-243a3 [McKeon 340-42]; In Phys. 7.2 [Marietti 455-57]. St. Thomas characterizes the first mover of Physics 7 as immobile—immovable—in In Phys. 7.2 #891 [Marietti 455]: “Si non movetur, habetur propositum, scilicet quod aliquid sit movens immobile; quod est proprietas primi moventis;” and in #894 [Marietti 456: “Manifestum est ergo quod hoc quod unum moveatur ab altero, non procedit in infinitum: sed stabit alicubi, et erit aliquod primum mobile, quod scilicet moveatur ab altero immobili.” There is some difficulty about whether the argumentation of Physics 7 can justify the conclusion that the first mover is immovable rather than just unmoved. Scott MacDonald raises this difficulty in his consideration of the argument from motion as presented in SCG 1.13; see Scott MacDonald, “Aquinas’s Parasitic Cosmological Argument,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 119-55, esp. 146-52. 5 In Phys. 8.2 #986 [Marietti 509-10]: “Et praeterea, perpetuitate temporis et motus quasi principio utitur ad probandum primum principium esse, et hic in octavo et in XII Metaph.” Thomas makes a similar claim about the role of 94 presupposition in all of the subsequent argumentation concerning the existence and condition of the first mover.
In Book 8 c. 6, Aristotle takes up proof of the existence of a first mover that is immobile so as to be exempt from all change, both substantial and accidental. Without entering into the details of his argument, we can observe that his argument begins from the eternity of motion: “Since there must always be motion without intermission, there must necessarily be something, one thing or it may be a plurality, that first imparts motion, and this first mover must be unmoved.”6 Beyond the existence of an absolutely immobile first mover, Aristotle also concludes in c. 6 that the first mover is eternal and one. As regards the former, the eternity (in the sense of perpetuity)7 of the first mover follows immediately from the claim that the first mover is not subject to substantial corruption.8
Aristotle argues for the existence of an absolutely immobile mover from the perpetuity of motion in general, and so it should be no surprise that he immediately concludes that the first mover must be eternal as well.
As for the claim that the first mover is one, Aristotle initially states his conclusion that the first mover is eternal in a hypothetical form, raising the question of whether the first mover is one or many: “Motion, then, being eternal, the first mover, if there is but one, will be eternal also: if there are more than one, there will be a plurality of such eternal movers.”9 He immediately offers an
the perpetuity of time and motion in argumentation for Aristotle’s argumentation in SCG 1.13, while commenting on this as an apparent weakness of his arguments vis-à-vis the Catholic faith; [Leon. Man. 14]: “Praedictos autem processus duo videntur infirmae. Quorum primum est, quod procedunt ex suppositione aeternitatis motus: quod apud Catholicos supponitur esse falsum. Et ad hoc dicendum quod via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse est ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi, qua posita, minus videtur esse manifestum quod Deus sit.” 6 Physics 8.6 258b10-12 [McKeon 373]. 7 We should distinguish carefully between eternity in the sense of perpetuity and eternity in the Boethian meaning. Thomas emphasizes eternity in the Boethian meaning as a divine name in the Summa theologiae, but not in the Summa contra Gentiles (except in passing) or Compendium theologiae; in these latter two works, Thomas focuses on divine eternity as the absence of a beginning or end to God’s existence. 8 Physics 8.6 258b33-259a8 [McKeon 374]. 9 Physics 8.6 259b7-8 [McKeon 374] (translation slightly modified to replace ‘movent’ with ‘mover’). 95 argument in favor of the conclusion that the first mover is one from a version of the principle of parsimony: it is only necessary to assume the existence of one immobile first mover in order to account for the perpetuity of motion in general.10 In the remainder of c. 6, Aristotle offers further arguments in support of the same conclusions already reached (that the first mover is immobile, eternal, and one).
Chapters 7–9 of Book 8 focus not on the first mover, but on the character of the first mobile. In a brief aside in c. 6, Aristotle argues for the perpetuity of the first mobile, without yet making any presumptions about what the first mobile is. In these subsequent chapters, he argues that the first motion must be rotary locomotion, because only this sort of motion can be perpetual.
The first mobile can thus be identified with the outermost heavenly sphere, and it is the motion of this sphere that is caused by the first mover.
The tenth and final chapter of Book 8 returns to a focus on the first mover, beginning with
Aristotle's announced intention to demonstrate that the first mover is without parts (or is indivisible) and without magnitude: this is equivalent to demonstrating that the first mover is incorporeal, as
Thomas notes in his Commentary.11 In a preliminary section, Aristotle offers arguments for two premises that will be employed in his argumentation: nothing finite can cause motion during an infinite time, and it is impossible for a finite magnitude to possess an infinite power or force. After offering a summary account of the argumentation for what he has concluded thus far (that the first mover is the single, immobile mover of the first mobile, a sphere undergoing perpetual continuous motion), Aristotle proceeds to argue for the conclusion that the first mover lacks magnitude. If the first mover did have magnitude, this would either be an infinite magnitude or a finite magnitude.
10 Physics 8.6 259a7-13 [McKeon 374]. 11 Physics 8.10 266a10-12 [McKeon 390]; In Phys. 8.21 #1141 [Marietti 610]. 96
However, it was proved in Physics 3.5 that an actual infinite magnitude is impossible; and so if the first mover has a magnitude, it could only be a finite magnitude. Aristotle concludes that “the first mover is indivisible and is without parts and without magnitude.12 Leaving aside evaluation of the merits of Aristotle’s argument, it should be noted that in the order of argumentation, the claim that the first mover possesses an infinite power (understood as a power for causing locomotion over an infinite time without fatigue or diminution of power) depends upon the acceptance of a first mobile that undergoes a perpetual motion.13 Furthermore, the claim that the first mover possesses an infinite power is prior to the claim that the first mover is incorporeal.
To summarize, the order of the characteristics of the first mover in Physics 8 is as follows: absolute immobility, eternity (in the sense of perpetuity), unity (in the sense of uniqueness), infinite power (at least to be a cause of rotary locomotion), incorporeality. The list of characteristics treated in the Physics is thus rather abbreviated. The order appears to be a function of the order of demonstration: the argumentation offered by Aristotle for each of these characteristics logically depends upon the assertion of the prior characteristic. The effect from which the quia demonstrations for immobility, eternity, and unity proceed is the eternity of motion in general.
Argumentation for the infinite power and incorporeality of the first mover depend upon the more specific claim that the first mover causes a perpetual motion, i.e., the rotary locomotion of a heavenly sphere. Aristotle thus arrives at his final and most important claim concerning the first mover by a consideration of the manner in which the first mover's power for causing locomotion must exceed the capacity of any body.
12 Physics 8.10 267b21-27 [McKeon 394]. 13 The infinite power attributed to the first mover in Physics 8 should be distinguished from the intensive infinity of essence that Thomas attributes to God. The infinite power attributed to the first mover is just a capacity for finite work over an everlasting time without fatigue or diminution of power—not the intensively infinite power necessary, for example, for the act of creation. For discussion, see Norris Clarke, “The Limitation of Act by Potency,” The New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 178-83; esp. 182 n. 29. 97
B. THE ORDER IN METAPHYSICS 12
In Metaphysics 12 cc. 6-10 one finds a more thorough treatment of the characteristics of the first mover.14 Furthermore, in his Commentary on this work, Thomas goes beyond the explicit content of the Aristotelian text to attribute characteristics such as will to the first mover. Thomas also organizes the Aristotelian consideration of the first mover under the heading of terms such as perfection, unity, and operation, suggesting parallels to his own presentation of the divine names, particularly in the Summa theologiae. It will therefore be necessary to attend here both to the content of Metaphysics 12.6-10 as well as to Thomas's Commentary on these chapters.
Metaphysics 12.6 contains Aristotle's argumentation for the existence of an eternal and unmovable substance. The details of this argument are beyond our purposes, but it must be noted that, just as in Physics 8, the argument explicitly depends upon the claim that motion and time are without beginning or end, a claim which Aristotle only very briefly defends in the Metaphysics. He also simply asserts what was the subject of long discussion in Physics 8.7-9, that the only movement that can be perpetually continuous is rotary locomotion. Aristotle concludes that there must be an eternal substance, separate from all moved things, which is in some way the cause of the locomotion of the eternal first mobile. Because an unmovable mover acts perpetually without even the potentiality for ceasing to so act—otherwise the eternity of motion would not be necessary—
Aristotle concludes that such a mover must be a principle “whose very essence is actuality.”15 This leads to the immediate conclusion that “these substances must be without matter,” because matter is
14 I will focus my attention on cc. 6-10 (and primarily cc. 6 and 7) of Book 12, in part because of the somewhat independent character of this treatment of separate substance, even relative to the first five chapters of Book 12. Whereas Physics 8.6 and 8.10 must be interpreted in the context of the larger project of Physics Book 8, Metaphysics 12.6- 10's treatment of separate substance contains only brief reference to the first five chapters of Book 12 and displays no obvious dependence upon the other books of the Metaphysics. See Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), 83-94 (esp. 91-92) for helpful commentary on the methodical order of the treatises found in the Metaphysics. 15 Metaphysics 12.6 1071b20 [McKeon 878]. 98 a principle of potency for change.16 Aristotle then summarizes again that the order of reasoning here is as follows: the eternity of an unmoved mover implies its pure actuality, and its pure actuality implies its immateriality.17
In Metaphysics 12.7, Aristotle reiterates his conclusion that “there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.” Thomas notes that at this point
Aristotle turns from having proven the existence of “an eternal, immaterial, immovable substance whose essence is actuality” to a consideration of the characteristics of this substance (ad inquirendum conditionem ipsius substantiae).18 In his remarks concerning the organization of Aristotle's subsequent discourse, Thomas contends that Aristotle first considers the perfection of this substance; second its unity or plurality; and third its operation.19 I will organize the following summary according to
Thomas's outline.
(i) The first mover's perfection
Aristotle begins this section by observing that it is the objects of intellectual cognition and appetite that move other things without being moved, and thus he concludes that an eternal unmoved mover must be both the primary intelligible and the primary appetible. The unmoved mover therefore causes motion as a final cause, as an object of love, an end for the sake of which
16 Metaphysics 12.6 1071b21 [McKeon 878]. 17 Metaphysics 12.6 1071b21-22 [McKeon 878]. 18 In Meta. 12.7 #2519 [Marietti 590]: “Postquam Philosophus ostendit aliquam substantiam esse sempiternam, immaterialem et immobilem, cuius substantia est actus, procedit ad inquirendum conditionem ipsius substantiae.” We noted above the difference between asserting that the first mover is unmoved and asserting that it is immovable (n. 4). Thomas here reads Aristotle as having proved the existence of a first immovable mover. This would seem to be justified, since at this point it has already been established that this first mover is pure actuality, without any potentiality. 19 By this general outline, Thomas sees in Aristotle's organization some of the central elements of the order he employs in his own writings. 99 the first mobile moves. Thomas characterizes this section of Aristotle's text as being concerned with
“how perfection is found in the first mover.”20
Thomas proceeds to elaborate on Aristotle's claim that simple, actual substance is the first among intelligibles,21 explaining that substances are more intelligible than accidents, because the latter are defined through the former. Furthermore, simple substances are more intelligible than composite substances. He concludes: “And among simple [things], which are in the genus of substance, act is more intelligible than potency: for potency is defined by act. It follows, therefore, that the first intelligible is a simple substance, which is actuality.”22
Next, Aristotle asserts that the good and the desirable in itself belong to the same order as the intelligible.23 Thomas interprets this assertion as an argument for the perfection of the first
20 In Meta. 12.7 #2523 [Marietti 591]: “Quia ostenderat primum movens esse intelligibile et appetibile, restat modo ostendere ex hoc, quomodo in primo movente perfectio invenitur. . . . Primo ostendit perfectionem primi moventis ex eo quod est intelligibile. Secundo ex eo quod est appetibile.” 21 In the Latin Aristotle (Moerbeke’s translation), the claim is precisely: “Intelligibilis autem altera coelementatio, secundum se; et huius substantia prima, et huius que simplex et secundum actum.” Aristoteles Latinus, vol. 25.3.2, Metaphysica 12.7 [Vuillemin-Diem 257]. I have cited the Moerbeke translation, following J. Reilly’s explanation that Thomas used the Moerbeke translation exclusively for his Commentary on Metaphysics 12, without any explicit citations of other translations. See J. Reilly, “The Alia Littera in Thomas Aquinas’ Sententia Libri Metaphysicae,” Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 559-83, esp. 562, 580. The term coelementatio designates an ordering of pairs or opposites; Cf. In Meta. 1.8 #127 for a case in which the term coelementatio is applied to the Pythagorean thesis that there are five fundamental contrarieties (for a total of ten first principles). In In Meta. 12.7 #2523 [Marietti 591], Thomas takes Aristotle's mention of a coelementatio to refer to the parallel coordination between the order of movers and the order of intelligibles: “Dicit primo, quod sicut moventia et mota habent suam coordinationem, ita intelligibilia habent suam coordinationem: quam quidem coelementationem intelligibilem vocat, eo quod unum intelligibile est primum principium intelligendi alterum, sicut etiam unum movens, alteri est causa movendi.” 22 In Meta. 12.7 #2524 [Marietti 591]: “Et inter simplicia, quae sunt in genere substantiae, actus est prius intelligibile quam potentia: nam potentia definitur per actum. Relinquitur igitur, quod primum intelligibile sit substantia simplex, quae est actus.” It is surprising that Thomas here refers to the genus of substance as including both composite (i.e., corporeal) and simple (i.e., incorporeal) substances, and that among the latter is included the “first intelligible,” which for Thomas is God. For Thomas, corporeal and incorporeal substance do not belong to the same natural genus, and God does not belong to any genus whatsoever. One solution to this difficulty can be given by Gregory Doolan’s explanation that substance can be understood as a metaphysical genus, including both corporeal and incorporeal substances. See Doolan, “Aquinas on Substance as a Metaphysical Genus,” in The Science of Being as Being, ed. Gregory T. Doolan (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 99-128. Doolan also takes up the question of how God can be identified as “first in the metaphysical genus substance” (127). We might also take the apparent inclusion of the “first intelligible” within the genus substance here as a reflection of Aristotle’s view, rather than as an expression of Thomas’s personal view, which follows Avicenna by excluding God from any genus. For such a reading, see Houser, “The Language of Being and the Nature of God,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84 (2011): 120, 123. 23 The term in the Latin Aristotle is coelementatio. See the remarks in n. 21 above for the meaning of this term. 100 mover from its being appetible, as the object loved by the first mobile. In particular, Thomas comments:
Therefore, just as the notion (ratio) of intelligible substance is prior to the notion of intelligible accident, it is the same with the goods that correspond proportionally to these notions. Therefore the supreme good (optimum) will be a simple substance, which is actuality, which is the first among intelligibles. And so it is manifest that the first mover is the same as the first intelligible and the first appetible, which is the supreme good.24
The first mover is the supreme good, because the supreme intelligible must be the supreme appetible: and as already established, this is a simple substance whose essence is actuality. Following
Aristotle, Thomas then clarifies that the first mover can be good as a final cause, even though it is immovable; for something can be a final cause not as what is produced by some activity, but still as that for the sake of which an activity is performed.25 In the latter case, the existence of the final cause is not posterior to the activity directed to the final cause: and so there is no difficulty about asserting that the first mover is both a final cause and something immovable.
Aristotle next concludes that this eternal mover must be absolutely immobile, in no way susceptible to being other than as it is.26 Thomas characterizes this claim as serving to show how perfection is found in the first mover, by a comparison to the first mobile.27 Thus, whereas the first mobile is susceptible to rotary change of place—but not to change in any other category—the first mover must be absolutely immobile. Thomas understands Aristotle's argument to be that “the first mover is not moved with that motion with respect to which it is a mover, just as the first cause of
24 In Meta. 12.7 #2527 [Marietti 591]: “Sic igitur, sicut ratio intelligibilis substantiae est prior quam ratio intelligibilis accidentis, sic se habent bona, quae proportionaliter respondent his rationibus. Sic igitur optimum erit substantia simplex, quae est actus, quod est primum inter intelligibilia. Et sic manifestum est, quod primum movens idem est quod primum intelligibile et primum appetibile, quod est optimum.” 25 In Meta. 12.7 #2528 [Marietti 591]. 26 Aristoteles Latinus, vol. 25.3.2, Metaphysica 12.7 [Vuillemin-Diem 257-58]: “Quoniam autem est aliquid mouens ipsum immobile ens, actu ens, hoc non contingit aliter se habere nullatenus.” 27 In Meta. 12.7 #2523 [Marietti 591]: “Quia ostenderat primum movens esse intelligibile et appetibile, restat modo ostendere ex hoc, quomodo in primo movente perfectio invenitur. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim ostendit ex ratione intelligibilis et appetibilis perfectionem ipsius secundum se. Secundo per comparationem ad primum mobile.” 101 alteration is not altered: therefore the first mover is not moved with a circular motion.” But because locomotion is the fundamental motion (and rotary locomotion the first among locomotions), if the first mover does not move with rotary locomotion, then it does not undergo any motion at all.28 The argument for the absolute immobility of the first mover thus depends upon the division and ordering of the species of motion.
At this point, Aristotle remarks, apparently concerning the first mover, that it exists of necessity, from which it follows again that “its mode of being is good.”29 Thomas, however, takes it that Aristotle's remarks about necessity here concern not the existence of the first mover, but rather the motion of the first mobile.30 He then interprets Aristotle's subsequent distinction of three kinds of necessity (necessity by violence, necessity from the end, and absolute necessity) as serving to clarify that the motion of the first mobile is necessary from the end: the first mobile is a self-mover that moves itself not with absolute necessity, but for the sake of the beloved first mover.31 Thomas elaborates on Aristotle's conclusion that “[o]n such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature”32 as follows:
But it must be understood that since Aristotle here says that the necessity of the first motion is not absolute necessity, but a necessity which is from the end, that the end is the principle that he later calls God, insofar as assimilation to Him is attained through motion: but the assimilation to that which is volitional and intelligent—which he shows God to be—is attained according to will and intelligence, just as artifacts are assimilated to the artisan, insofar as in them the will of the artisan is fulfilled: it follows that the entire necessity of the first motion is subject to the will of God.33
28 In Meta. 12.7 #2531 [Marietti 592]: “Primum enim movens non movetur illo motu, quo movet, sicut primum alterans non alteratur: non igitur movetur circulariter: et per consequens nullo modo potest moveri: et sic non potest aliter et aliter se habere. . .” 29 Metaphysics 12.7 1072b12 [McKeon 880]. 30 In Meta. 12.7 #2531 [Marietti 592]: “. . . unde sequitur, quod primus motus sit existens in mobili ex necessitate: hoc enim est necessarium, quod non potest non esse.” 31 In Meta. 12.7 #2531-33 [Marietti 592]. 32 Metaphysics 12.7 1072b13-14 [McKeon 880]. 33 In Meta. 12.7 #2535 [Marietti 592]: “Attendendum est autem, quod cum Aristoteles hic dicat, quod necessitas primi motus non est necessitas absoluta, sed necessitas, quae est ex fine, finis autem principium est, quod postea 102
Here and later in his presentation, Thomas includes the divine will among the divine characteristics at least implicitly present in Aristotle's account. In this argument, the crucial moment is the comparison of God to an artisan: whatever is produced as from the mind of an artisan must be produced freely, according to will.34 Thomas also indicates here that Aristotle shows God to be intelligent, but he does not specify where or how Aristotle accomplishes this. For this, we must turn to a sequence of arguments treated by Thomas in In Meta. 12.8.
Thomas begins In Meta. 12.8 by observing that, at this point in Metaphysics 12.7, Aristotle
“compares the first, which causes motion as [something] intelligible and desirable, to that which understands and desires it: for it is necessary, if the first mover causes motion as the first understood and desired, that the first mobile desire and understand it.”35 Where Aristotle offers remarks that might appear to concern only the first mover, Thomas interprets Aristotle as speaking first about the soul of the first mobile, and then by comparison about the first mover. When Aristotle says “its course of life is like the best which we enjoy for a short time” and that its operation is pleasure (or delight),36 Thomas takes these comments to refer to the soul of the first mobile, which contemplates and loves the first mover as the first intelligible and appetible.37
It is at this point, on Thomas’s reading, that Aristotle transitions to arguing for the supreme intelligence and delight found in the first mover.38 The argument begins by clarifying that the soul of
nominat Deum, inquantum attenditur per motum assimilatio ad ipsum: assimilatio autem ad id quod est volens, et intelligens, cuiusmodi ostendit esse Deum, attenditur secundum voluntatem et intelligentiam, sicut artificiata assimilantur artifici, inquantum in eis voluntas artificis adimpletur: sequitur quod tota necessitas primi motus subiaceat voluntati Dei.” 34 Because an artisan produces effects according to exemplars in the mind, an artisan is not determined by nature to produce only one possible effect. The artisan is free, according to will, to produce this or that effect. 35 In Meta. 12.8 #2536 [Marietti 593]: “Hic Philosophus comparat primum quod movet sicut intelligibile et desiderabile, ad id quod intelligit et desiderat ipsum: necesse est enim, si primum movens movet sicut primum intellectum et desideratum, quod primum mobile desideret et intelligat ipsum.” 36 Metaphysics 12.7 1072b14-16 [McKeon 880]. 37 In Meta. 12.8 #2536-38 [Marietti 593-94]. 38 In Meta. 12.8 #2539 [Marietti 594]: “Ostendit, quod in primo intelligibili est adhuc perfectior intelligentia et delectatio quam in intelligente et desiderante ipsum.” For a treatment of this argument, see John F. Wippel, “Thomas 103 the first mobile must be related to the first mover, which is an “intelligible substance subsisting through itself,” as a receptive intellect is related to the intelligible object that it attains in its act of understanding. Thomas compares the relationship between the intellect of the first mobile and the first mover to the relationship described by the Platonists between the human intellect and the separate Forms, according to which the human intellect becomes actual through contact with and participation in the separate Forms.39 In a similar way, “the intellect of the first mobile becomes intelligent in act through some contact with the first intelligible substance.”40 Having concluded that the first intelligible substance is the cause of the understanding and delight of the intellect of the first mobile, Thomas then advances as a principle that “that by reason of which every other thing enjoys a given perfection is that perfection to a greater degree.”41 It follows from this that “whatever divine and excellent [thing] is found in the intellect attaining [its object], such as to understand and to take delight, is found to a much greater degree in the first intelligible which it attains.”42 Thomas then identifies the first intelligible—now understood as intelligent in its own right—as God.
Aristotle continues at this point by noting that “if, then, God is in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better that compels it yet more. And He is in a better state.”43 Aristotle concludes that God possesses life, because “the actuality of thought is life,
Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 263-66. 39 In Meta. 12.8 #2542 [Marietti 594]: “Relinquitur igitur, quod talis est comparatio intellectus primi mobilis ad illam primam intelligibilem substantiam moventem, qualis est secundum Platonicos comparatio intellectus nostri ad species intelligibiles separatas, secundum quarum contactum et participationem fit intellectus actu, ut ipse dicit.” 40 In Meta. 12.8 #2542 [Marietti 594]: “Unde intellectus primi mobilis fit intelligens in actu per contactum aliqualem primae substantiae intelligibilis.” 41 In Meta. 12.8 #2543 [Marietti 594]: “Propter quod autem unumquodque tale, est illud magis;” translation by John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 265. Wippel relates this principle to one advanced by Aristotle in Metaphysics 2.1 and paraphrased by Thomas as: “Unumquodque inter alia maxime dicitur, ex quo causatur in aliis aliquid univoce praedicatum de eis” (#292 [Marietti 85]). 42 In Meta. 12.8 #2543 [Marietti 594]: “Et ideo sequitur quod quicquid divinum et nobile, sicut est intelligere et delectari, invenitur in intellectu attingente, multo magis invenitur in intelligibili primo quod attingitur.” 43 Metaphysics 12.7 1072b23-25 [McKeon 880]. 104 and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal.”44 This connection between thought and life is also suggested by Aristotle in De anima 2.2, where Aristotle counts thinking among the kinds or modes of living, along with sensation, locomotion, nutrition, and growth. In that place, he also qualifies his assertion that self-nutrition belongs to all living things by noting that this is true at least of mortal beings.45 It is thus sufficient, on Aristotle's view, to conclude from something's possessing intelligence that it also possesses life. Accordingly, here in
Metaphysics 12.7, Aristotle can conclude that “God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.”46 Thomas emphasizes
Aristotle's recognition here of the identity of God and His actuality and life, a life characterized as most good and eternal.47
After reaffirming a point developed earlier in Metaphysics 12 (as well as in Metaphysics 9)—that actuality is absolutely prior to potentiality, with the consequence that beauty and perfection are also prior absolutely in the universe—Aristotle summarizes his conclusions concerning the first mover as follows:
It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place.48
44 Metaphysics 12.7 1072b25-27 [McKeon 880]. 45 De anima 2.2 413a23-25, 413a32 [McKeon 557]. 46 Metaphysics 12.7 1072b27-28 [McKeon 880]. 47 In Meta. 12.8 #2544 [Marietti 594-95]. 48 Metaphysics 12.7 1073a3-12 [McKeon 881]. 105
It should be noted that the argumentation for the incorporeality of the first mover, to which
Aristotle here refers and which he briefly summarizes, is not found within in the Metaphysics; instead, this is a brief summary of the argumentation found in Physics 8, examined above. Likewise, the mention of the priority of locomotion among the species of motion per se refers to a doctrine developed in Physics 8.7. In his Commentary, Thomas acknowledges these moments of dependence on argumentation properly developed within the Physics.49 Even if Thomas's own arguments for the existence of God and the various divine names are properly metaphysical, such methodological purity is not to be found in the Metaphysics of Aristotle.
(ii) The unity or multiplicity of the first mover
Thomas begins In Meta. 12.9 (which comments on Metaphysics 12.8) by noting again that what
Aristotle has said so far about the characteristics of the first mover pertains to “the perfection of immaterial substance,” but that what follows here is a consideration “of its unity or multiplicity.”50
The details of Aristotle's treatment of this issue are not as important for our purposes as the material that fell under the heading of perfection above. The following points should be noted.
Aristotle distinguishes between the essentially immobile first substance, which causes the rotary locomotion of the outermost heavenly sphere, and other eternal separate substances that are responsible for the rotary motions of the spheres of the planets. Each independent heavenly motion must be explained by a distinct separate substance, because “eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing.”51 This leads him to conclude that the number of such separate substances must equal the number of the motions of the heavenly bodies,
49 In Meta. 12.8 #2548 [Marietti 595]. 50 In Meta. 12.9 #2553 [Marietti 597]: “Postquam Philosophus ostendit perfectionem substantiae immaterialis, hic inquirit de unitate vel multitudine eius.” 51 Metaphysics 12.8 1073a27-28 [McKeon 881]. 106 with an order among them corresponding to the order among the motions of the heavenly bodies.52
The question of the number of the separate movers thus becomes the question of the number of heavenly motions, and Aristotle is thus led into a lengthy discussion of astronomy, on which
Thomas comments in detail in lec. 10. In commenting on Aristotle's conclusions about the number of separate substances, Thomas observes: “But if only the first principle is called God, there is only one God, as follows from what has been said.”53 Here Thomas reflects a shift on Aristotle’s part back to speaking about the first immobile mover of the outermost sphere as unique, corresponding to the unity of the heavens; he adds to what Aristotle says, however, by explicitly identifying only the supreme immobile mover as God.54
(iii) The operation of the first mover
Beginning lect. 11 of his commentary on Book 12 of the Metaphysics, Thomas notes that
“[a]fter the Philosopher has determined about immaterial substance with regard to its perfection and with regard to its unity, now he settles certain difficulties pertaining to its activity.”55 Thomas explains that Aristotle must answer difficulties that arise from the claims, defended earlier, that “the first immaterial substance causes motion as an intelligible [object] and as a desirable good.”56 From the more extrinsic account of the first mover as an intelligible and a desirable good, questions arise concerning the intrinsic character of its operation.
52 Ibid. 1073a35-b7 ff. [McKeon 882]. 53 In Meta. 12.10 #2597 [Marietti 604]: “Si autem solum principium vocetur Deus, est unus tantum Deus, ut ex praedictis patet.” 54 Metaphysics 12.8 1074a35 [McKeon 884]: “So the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number; so too, therefore, is that which is moved always and continuously; therefore there is one heaven alone.” 55 In Meta. 12.11 #2600 [Marietti 606]: “Postquam Philosophus determinavit de substantia immateriali quantum ad eius perfectionem et quantum ad eius unitatem, nunc determinat quasdam dubitationes pertinentes ad actionem eius.” 56 Ibid.: “Ostensum est enim supra, quod prima immaterialis substantia movet sicut intelligibile, et sicut bonum desiderabile. Et ideo dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima determinat quaedam dubia circa primam immaterialem substantiam, quantum ad hoc quod est bonum intelligibile et intellectus. In secunda quantum ad hoc quod est bonum appetibile. . .” 107
The principal difficulties to be addressed concerning the operation of the first mover concern “how the intellect of the first mover is related to its act of understanding” and “how it is related to its intelligible [object].”57 With regard to the former difficulty, it is here that Aristotle establishes that the first mover must be identical with its act of understanding. Otherwise, one would have to admit some potency—albeit actualized potency—in the first mover. But this cannot be, if the first mover is pure act. As Thomas explains, if the first mover's act of understanding is distinct from itself, then the essence of the first mover would be related to its act of understanding
“as potency to act and as perfectible to perfection.”58 With regard to the second difficulty, Aristotle establishes that what the first mover understands is itself, for the highest intelligence must know the most intelligible and best object: thus “it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks.”59 As
Thomas puts it, “since [the first mover] is most noble and most powerful, it is necessary that it understand itself, and that in it the intellect and the thing understood be the same.”60 To this,
Thomas adds, going beyond Aristotle’s text, that God also understands everything distinct from
Himself by understanding Himself.61
Finally, in Metaphysics 12.10 (which is treated by In Meta. 12.12), Aristotle poses a question concerning the good, the order of the universe, and the goodness of the first mover. The question is this: How is the good or the highest good found in the universe? Is there one separate and
57 In Meta. 12.11 #2601 [Marietti 606]: “Movet autem primo duas quaestiones. Prima est, quomodo intellectus primi moventis se habeat ad suum intelligere. Secunda, quomodo se habeat ad suum intelligibile.” 58 In Meta. 12.11 #2602 [Marietti 606]: “Si autem intellectus primi intellectus intelligat quidem actu, sed principale eius bonum, quod est operatio eius, sit aliquid aliud ab ipso, 'quia eius intelligentia,' idest operatio intellectualis ipsius non est hoc quod sua substantia, comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, et perfectibile ad perfectionem.” 59 Metaphysics 12.9 1074b33 [McKeon 885]. 60 In Meta. 12.11 #2613 [Marietti 607]: “Cum igitur ipsum sit nobilissimum et potentissimum, necesse est quod intelligat seipsum, et quod in eo sit idem intellectus et intellectum.” 61 In Meta. 12.11 #2614 [Marietti 608]: “ Nec tamen sequitur quod omnia alia a se sint ei ignorata; nam intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia.” Cf. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” 266-67. 108 independent good, or is the good found in the order of the parts of the universe?62 Thomas presents the question in this way:
The form of any whole which is one through a certain ordering of parts is its order: thus it follows that [its order] is its good. The Philosopher therefore asks whether the nature of the whole universe has the good and the highest good (optimum), that is, its proper end, as something separate from itself, or if it has the good and the highest good in the order of its parts, in the way in which the good of any natural thing is its form.63
Now, the universe does not possess substantial unity; rather, it possesses a unity of order, and its form is this very order. The question, then, is whether the good of the universe taken as a whole is just its order, or if the good of the universe is something separate and independent of the parts.
Aristotle's answer to this question is that the universe possesses the good in both ways; as
Thomas puts it, “the universe has a separate good and a good of order.”64 The universe's separate good is the first mover, and the first mover as the ultimate end of all natural motions is the principle of the order (and intrinsic goodness) of the universe as a whole. Comparing the ordered universe and the first mover as principle of order to the relationship between an army and its commander,
Aristotle remarks that the commander does not exist for the sake of the order of the army; rather, the order of the army is for the sake of the commander, upon whom that very order depends.65 In a similar way, the universe possesses its own goodness insofar as it is ordered, but that order depends upon and is for the sake of the highest good, the first mover. Following upon assertions made earlier
(in In Meta. 12.7) that the universe depends upon the first mover according to the intelligence and will of the latter, Thomas here concludes that “the separate good, which is the first mover, is a better
62 Metaphysics 12.10 1075a12-14 [McKeon 885]. 63 In Meta. 12.12 #2627-28 [Marietti 612]: “Forma autem alicuius totius, quod est unum per ordinationem quamdam partium, est ordo ipsius: unde relinquitur quod sit bonum eius. [#2628] Quaerit ergo Philosophus utrum natura totius universi habeat bonum et optimum, idest finem proprium, quasi aliquid separatum a se, vel habeat bonum et optimum in ordine suarum partium, per modum, quo bonum alicuius rei naturalis est sua forma.” 64 In Meta. 12.12 #2629 [Marietti 612]: “Primo enim ostendit, quod universum habet bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis.” 65 Metaphysics 12.10 1075a14-16 [McKeon 886]. 109 good than the good of order which is in the universe. For the whole order of the universe is on account of the first mover, namely as what is in the intellect and will of the first mover is exhibited in the ordered universe.”66 Thomas elaborates on this claim as follows:
And the very nature of each thing is a certain inclination implanted in it by the first mover, ordering it to its due end. And from this it follows that natural things act for the sake of the end, even though they do not know the end, since they acquire their inclination to the end from the first intelligence.67
Going beyond the explicit content of the Aristotelian text, Thomas again affirms that the first mover orders the universe by intelligence and will, adding now that the first mover accomplishes this by giving to all things their natural inclinations.
Finally, we should highlight how Metaphysics 12.10 concludes, with the famous quotation from the Iliad in support of the claim that the good disposition of the universe requires one ruling principle: “The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be.”68 Thomas concludes his own
Commentary: “And this is what he concludes, that there is one ruler of the whole universe, namely the first mover, [which is] both the first intelligible object and the first good, which above he called
God, who is blessed for ever. Amen.”69
To summarize, the order of the characteristics of the first mover in Metaphysics 12.6-10
(including the points of apparent repetition and with Thomas's elaborations in brackets) is as follows: immobility, eternity, pure actuality, immateriality, [perfection], supreme intelligibility,
66 In Meta. 12.12 #2631 [Marietti 612]: “Ita etiam bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, est melius bonum bono ordinis, quod est in universo. Totus enim ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicatur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis.” 67 In Meta. 12.12 #2634 [Marietti 613]: “Et ipsa natura uniuscuiusque est quaedam inclinatio indita ei a primo movente, ordinans ipsam in debitum finem. Et ex hoc patet, quod res naturales agunt propter finem, licet finem non cognoscant, quia a primo intelligente assequuntur inclinationem in finem.” 68 Metaphysics 12.10 1076a6 [McKeon 888]. The reference is to Iliad 2, line 204. 69 In Meta. 12.12 #2663 [Marietti 616]: “Et hoc est quod concludit, quod est unus princeps totius universi, scilicet primum movens, et primum intelligibile, et primum bonum, quod supra dixit Deum, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.” Curiously, Thomas does not refer to the first mover here as immobile, but we should remember that the earlier conclusion that the first mover is the primum intelligibile and primum bonum depended on immobility. 110 supreme desirability, supreme goodness, absolute immobility, (necessity),70 [will], [intelligence], contemplation, life, pleasure, incorporeality, unity/multiplicity, identity of understanding and essence, self-contemplation, supreme goodness as the end of the order of the universe, unity. As regards the rationale behind this order, Thomas offers no explicit remarks except that the eternity of the first mover is the principle of all of the argumentation. I would offer three observations.
First, the order of these characteristics can be divided, as Thomas presents Aristotle's text, into the consideration of the first mover's (i) existence, (ii) perfection, (iii) unity or multiplicity, and
(iv) operations. Second, prior to consideration of the first mover's perfection, Aristotle establishes the first mover's immateriality through its pure actuality: that the first mover's essence is pure actuality is the principle from which the first mover's separation from matter is established. This is to say that the simplicity of the first mover is an important principle, established soon after its existence. Third, although Thomas attributes to Aristotle the view that the first mover is an efficient cause, nevertheless what structures the reasoning concerning the perfection and operations of the first mover is the assertion that the first mover is the final cause of the motion of the first mobile.
2. THE ORDER IN DIONYSIUS’S DIVINE NAMES
Thomas's Commentary on the Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius (henceforth Dionysius), most likely composed while Thomas was at Rome after 1266, contains a wealth of material relevant to the topic of this dissertation.71 In it, one finds that Thomas offers explicit attention to the issue of the order in which Dionysius proceeds through his consideration of the divine names.
70 It should be recalled that Thomas interprets the remarks about necessity as referring to the necessity of the first motion, not the necessity of the existence of the first mover. 71 For the dating of the Commentary on the Divine Names, see Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 434. Torrell notes that Thomas makes use of the Moerbeke translation of the Categories, which was completed in March of 1266, in his Commentary on c. 13 of the Divine Names. 111
A. CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF THE DIVINE NAMES
A few introductory remarks concerning the context, scope, and purpose of Dionysius's treatise, as it is interpreted by Thomas in his Commentary, will be appropriate. Thomas carefully compares the Divine Names to the other works in the Dionysian corpus—including the lost or fictitious works to which neither Thomas nor we have access—so as to place the Divine Names in a wider context and to understand its purpose. Thomas's most important remarks in this regard occur in In De div. nom. 1.3. There Thomas observes that Dionysius draws a distinction between three different modes of naming God: these are not the three elements of the triplex via, but rather (a) naming God through removal (negative theology), (b) naming God as cause (affirmative theology), and (c) naming God symbolically or metaphorically (symbolic theology). As Thomas recognizes, these ways of naming God correspond, in turn, to the projects of the Mystical Theology, the Divine
Names, and the Symbolic Theology (which is lost, if it ever existed).72 We can say a brief word about each of these modes of naming God.
Following Dionysius, Thomas characterizes the mode of naming God through removal as the manner “of the saints conformed to God, namely the prophets and apostles. . . who as far as possible in this life praise God in a maximally proper way through removal from all existents.”73 He then notes that “this is the ultimate at which we can arrive concerning divine knowledge in this life,
72 In De div. nom. 1.3 #104 [Marietti 31-32]: “Dicit ergo, primo, quod nunc procedendum est, in hoc libro, ad manifestationem divinorum Nominum intelligibilium, idest quae non sumuntur a rebus sensibilibus symbolice, sed ex intelligibilibus perfectionibus procedentibus ab Eo in creaturas, sicut sunt esse, vivere et huiusmodi, ita quod congregentur quaecumque nomina ad praesens negotium pertinent, ex sacris Scripturis; et quod his quae dicta sunt in isto capitulo, sit utendum sicut quadam regula, ad quam in toto praesenti opera oportet respicere. Cum enim praemissa sint tria genera Dei nominationum, de primo, qui est per remotionem, agitur in Mystica Theologia; de secundo, qui est per intelligibiles processiones, in hoc libro; de tertio, qui est per sensibiles similitudines, in libro de Symbolica Theologia.” See also O’Rourke, 28-30. 73 Ibid. #83 [Marietti 28]: “Deinde, cum dicit Istis deformes. . . assignat primum modum Dei nominationum, qui scilicet fit per remotionem et dicit quod mentes Deo conformatae sanctorum, scilicet Prophetarum et Apostolorum, unitae, idest coniunctae praedictis immissionibus et susceptionibus, secundum imitationem Angelorum, non quidem aequaliter Angelis sed sicut est possibile in hac vita, laudant Deum maxime proprie per remotionem a cunctis existentibus.” 112
[to know] that God is above all that which can be thought by us, and therefore the naming of God which is through removal is maximally proper.”74 In the context of In De div. nom. 1.3, this is not a claim about the philosophical order or the knowledge of God through natural reason; rather,
Thomas is commenting here on the knowledge through removal associated with a supernatural mode of union with God in this life.75 According to this way of removal, one removes everything from God, including the positive names belonging to the mode of naming God as cause. Dionysius presents this radical negative theology not in the Divine Names, but in the Mystical Theology. By contrast, in c. 7 of the Divine Names, the triplex via (on Thomas’s reading) serves to explain how it is that the positive name wisdom is said of God—it is said of God as the super-eminently wise cause of wisdom whose wisdom is not identical with the wisdom of creatures.
I would suggest therefore that we should distinguish between the two roles of negative theology in Dionysius’s writings. There is first the radical negative theology of the Mystical Theology; there is second the negative moment (the negative element of the triplex via) in the affirmative causal theology of the Divine Names, according to which the via negationis serves as a necessary qualification concerning the predication of a positive name. The two roles of the via negationis are related: one can pursue the program of the Mystical Theology precisely because the positive names are said of God in a manner that involves the recognition that they can also be denied because of God’s transcendence.76
74 Ibid.: “Hoc enim est ultimum ad quod pertingere possumus circa cognitionem divinam in hac vita, quod Deus est supra omne id quod a nobis cogitari potest et ideo nominatio Dei quae est per remotionem est maxime propria.” 75 Ibid.: “[E]tenim illi qui sic laudant Deum per remotionem, per illuminationem Dei vere et supernaturaliter sunt hoc edocti ex beatissima coniunctione ad Deum; qui Deus, cum sit omnium existentium causa, ipse nihil est existentium, non quasi deficiens ab essendo, sed supereminenter segregatus ab omnibus.” We will find a broadly similar claim concerning the primacy of the via remotionis in knowing God in SCG 1.14, but in that context Thomas's claim will be seen to pertain to philosophical reasoning rather than to a knowledge dependent upon grace and revelation. 76 Rocca offers in a qualified manner a similar distinction: “It is hard to escape the conclusion that to some degree Dionysius recognizes two kinds of negative theology: one is exoteric and forms a dialectic with the assertions of affirmative theology, while the other is an esoteric mystical unknowing based on the dark ascents. This second type is not a part of discursive theology at all since its primary act is silence and its object is the God beyond reason” (Rocca, 21). Rocca may be correct in saying that Thomas “will tend to emphasize a domesticated version of the Dionysian via 113
As for the mode of naming God through causality, these names signify what Dionysius calls the intelligible processions of God in creatures. Thomas explains that Dionysius calls these the intelligible processions in contrast to the names that are said symbolically or metaphorically; the latter names include something sensible in their signification.77 As we shall see below in consideration of the order of these names of intelligible processions, these are (or at least include) the positive names or attributes discussed at some length in chapter one of this dissertation. These names are thus those taken from the transcendental and pure perfections of creatures, and Thomas indeed recognizes the distinction between transcendental and (non-transcendental) pure perfections in Dionysius.78 The project of the Divine Names is to present these causal names of God.79
One important feature of the mode of naming God through causality as it is presented in the
Divine Names is that Dionysius is not concerned with offering philosophical argumentation to establish that God is good, existent, or wise: on his view, that such names can be predicated of God is known by virtue of revelation.80 Thomas acknowledges that Dionysius appeals only to revelation
negativa, inasmuch as in his hands it becomes a ‘way’ comfortably at ease within the contours of his positive theology” (Rocca, 25). It is true that one doesn’t find the radically negative program of the Mystical Theology presented in Thomas’s writings. This being said, we will find that this more radically negative theology does exert some influence on SCG 1.14, in which Thomas defends the primacy of the via remotionis. Cf. John D. Jones’s introduction in The Divine Names & The Mystical Theology , tr. John D. Jones (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999), 15-26, 89-103. Jones also argues for a distinction between two negative theologies in Dionysius. 77 See In De div. nom. 1.3 #104 [Marietti 31-32], cited above in n. 72. Cf. In De div. nom. 13.4 #999 [Marietti 372]: “Dicit autem intelligibiles ad differentiam eorum quae symbolice vel metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, quorum significationes sunt sensibiles.” 78 See In De div. nom. 1.3 #102, where transcendental perfections are called perfect providences and non- transcendental pure perfections are called particular providences: “[D]icit quod sancti Theologi non solas istas Dei nominationes nobis commendant quae sumuntur a providentiis aut provisis, perfectis aut particularibus (ut per providentias, intelligamus perfectiones rebus communicatas, ut bonitatem et sapientiam; per provisa autem, ipsas res participantes huiusmodi perfectiones, ut hominem aut solem: quorum perfectae quidem providentiae dicuntur quae sunt universales, ut bonum, existens et huiusmodi; particulares autem quae alicui generi rerum conveniunt, ut sapiens et iustum.” 79 For Thomas’s acknowledgement of this focus of the Divine Names, see In De div. nom. 1.3 #104 [Marietti 31- 32], cited above in n. 72. 80 Thomas does recognize that Dionysius offers philosophical argumentation for God’s omnipresence in Divine Names c. 3; see In De div. nom. 3.1 #235-36 for an argument for divine omnipresence from divine infinity. This particular text parallels the order of ST 1.7-8, which respectively concern infinity and omnipresence. Also, as we shall see below, in In De div. nom. 13.2, Thomas does interpret one section of c. 13 as offering five arguments (rationes) for attributing unity to God. 114 to justify the divine attributes, but he will himself offer argumentation from natural reason for them.81 Thomas’s attitude towards the demonstrability of the positive names will be a topic of further consideration in the later chapters of this dissertation.
Finally, the third mode of naming God distinguished in the first book of the Divine Names is naming God symbolically or metaphorically through names taken from His sensible effects, as when
He is called a lion. The lost or fictitious Symbolic Theology concerns these names, and Dionysius claims that this work is and must be longer than both the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology.82 Because symbolic or metaphorical names do not play an important role in the two Summae or the Compendium, we can leave them behind.
In his Sentences Commentary, Albert agrees that knowledge of the causal processions (or attributes) depends upon revelation, and thus although Albert affirms that philosophers can know the existence and unity of God, he denies that they can know the divine attributes (such as wisdom) with certain knowledge by natural reason. See Albert, In I Sent. d. 3 a. 1 ad 1 & ad 2; d. 3 a. 2 [Borgnet 25.93]: “Dicendum, quod non cognoverunt nisi quia est et quid non est, non quid est, ut habitum est prius. Licet enim cognoverunt quaedam attributa ipsius, non tamen habuerunt de ipsis cognitionem certam.” Cf. Albert, In De div. nom. c. 1 [Cologne 37/1.8]: “Deus autem non est causa proportionata alicui effectui, et ideo nullo modo potest esse terminus resolutionis, quae est per rationem. Et ideo philosophi non cognoverunt ipsum sicut terminum resolutionis suae, sed ex termino suae resolutionis aliqualiter devenerunt in cognitionem eius, quia viderunt simplex, quod est componibile, non esse in fine simplicitatis et causam proportionatam non esse universalem causam totius entis. Et propter hoc in multis erraverunt de deo, quia non potuerunt per rationes philosophicas directe in cognitionem eius devenire.” Albert argues that philosophical theology is so limited because it knows God as the first mover, a cause proportioned to motion as an effect. God as cause is known philosophically only according to His causality as a mover, not according to His creative causality. See Albert, In I Sent. d. 3 a. 1 ad 2 [Borgnet 25.92]: “Ad aliud dicendum, quod in Philosophia causa physica proportionata est causato, et motor mobili: sed quia proportionatum in virtute causandi non potest esse primum quod habet influentiam ad omnia, ideo extendit se ratio ad probandum illud esse, licet non probat nisi quia est tantum, et non possit determinare proprietates ejus. . . . Unde patet, quod [Philosophus] cognovit quod eminet super creata; sed rationem eminentiae, et differentiam, et proprietatem sui esse non potest per rationem aliquis investigare. Unde etiam circa talia attributa inveniuntur Philosophi multos errores dixisse: circa esse vero Deum, sive quia est, et quod unus est, pauci Philosophi qui vere erant Philosophi, erraverunt.” I will suggest later that Thomas’s usage of the phrase virtus essendi to describe that which God must possess by virtue of the identity between essence and esse in Him serves as a corrective to Albert’s limitation, at least early in his career, of the philosopher’s knowledge of God to what follows from what we could call the virtus movendi. 81 For Thomas’s recognition of Dionysius’s dependence on scriptural revelation for the causal names, see e.g. In De div. nom. 1.1 #11, 1.2 #44, 1.2 #65. 82 Dionysius, Mystical Theology 3, trans. (from Latin Dionysius) by Simon Tugwell, in Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1988) [hereafter Tugwell], 183-84; Latin Dionysius, De mystica theologia 3 [Dionysiaca 1.587-91]. Albert’s commentary used John the Saracen’s translation of Dionysius’s Mystical Theology. 115
That Thomas associates each of these three modes of naming God with a particular
Dionysian work suggests the following question: Should we expect that any one of these three
Dionysian works might serve as a model for the content or order of the treatments of God in the three summae? The Symbolic Theology can be easily dispatched (even as a sort of hypothetical model, given that it is lost or fictitious): Thomas never takes up the symbolic names in an extended way in his treatises on God. They only come up when Thomas is concerned with distinguishing the manner in which the attributes are predicated properly, i.e., non-metaphorically.
To answer whether any of the other Dionysian works could be a model for the content and order of the Thomistic treatises on God, we should consider Dionysius's own most explicit remarks concerning the orders of affirmative and negative theology, which are found in the second chapter of the Mystical Theology. Dionysius explains that negative theology must proceed “in a way opposite to the affirmations.” He continues:
When we were making affirmations, we began with the first and moved down through the intermediate ones to the most remote, but here we ascend from the most remote toward those that are more primary and then again through the intermediate ones to the topmost ones, removing them all so that we may have an unveiled knowledge of that unknowing which is veiled all round by all that is knowable in all beings, and see that supersubstantial darkness which is hidden by all the light in beings.83
83 Mystical Theology 2 [Tugwell 168]; De mystica theologia 2 [Dionysiaca 1.583]: “Oportet autem (sicut arbitror) ablationes laudare contrarie quam positiones; etenim illas, et a primis incipientes et per media ad ultima descendentes, ponebamus; hic autem, ab ultimis ad principaliora ascensus facientes, et per media rursus ad extrema, omnia auferimus ut revelate cognoscamus illam ignorantiam, ab omnibus noscibilibus in omnibus existentibus circumvelatam, et supersubstantialem illam videamus caliginem, ab omni lumine in exsistentibus occultatam.” In practice, in cc. 4-5 of the Mystical Theology, Dionysius proceeds as follows. In c. 4, after an initial affirmation that the eminent cause of all is not without substance, life, reason, or mind, Dionysius removes from God all His sensible effects, in this order: body, shape, form, quality, quantity, weight, place, visibility, tangibility, perceptibility, disorder and disturbance, powerlessness, subjection to chance, the need for light, variation, corruption, division, privation, passivity, flux: he concludes that God neither possesses nor is He any sensible thing [Dionysiaca 1.594-96]. In c. 5, he removes from God soul, mind, phantasia, opinion, reason, intellect, being spoken, being understood, number, order, magnitude, smallness, equality, similitude, rest and motion, silence, power, light, life, substance, eternity, time, intelligibility, knowledge, truth, kingship, wisdom, unity, deity, goodness, Spirit, filiation, paternity, anything known by us or to any other existent, non-existence, existence [Dionysiaca 1.597-602]. 116
Although Thomas did not write his own commentary on the Mystical Theology, he would have been familiar with Albert’s commentary.84 In elaborating on the Dionysian text just quoted, Albert explains that in the affirmative theology of the Divine Names, which names God as the cause of the intelligible processions found in creatures, the order of the names is derived from the commonness and nobility of these processions, such that this affirmative theology begins with the names good and being as the most common and noblest perfections.85 By contrast, in negative theology, which removes from God every creaturely perfection (not because of any defect in God but because of His eminence), the order proceeds by ascending from the least noble to the most noble.86
Given that Thomas's treatises on God are not concerned exclusively with the removal of created perfections, it is clear that the Mystical Theology would not have been a model for the entire content or order of their treatment of the divine names. Although it is true that in certain sections of his treatises, Thomas focuses on the via remotionis, nevertheless what Thomas removes from God in these sections does not include the transcendental or pure perfections: unlike Dionysius, Thomas does not proceed to remove from God even goodness and existence.87 In the later chapters of this dissertation, however, it will be necessary to consider whether this Dionysian order of negative
84 Albert composed his commentaries on the Dionysian corpus at Cologne, while Thomas was working as his assistant. 85 Albert, In MT 2 [Cologne 37*2.465]: “Deinde ostendit diversitatem inter negationes et affirmationes divinas et dicit, quod in affirmationibus divinis incipimus a primis et nobilioribus et per media descendimus usque ad ultima, sicut primo dixit de deo in libro De hypotyposibus, quae sunt propria ipsius in se, deinde in libro De divinis nominibus proprias processiones ipsius intelligibiles, et inter has etiam primo nobiliores, sicut bonum et ens, et ultimo sensibilia symbola, in libro De symbolica theologia.” 86 Ibid. [Cologne 37*2.465-66]: “Sed in negationibus divinis est e contrario, quia oportet nos negando res a deo incipere ab ultimis, idest ab infimis, et per principaliora ultimis, quae sunt media, ascendere ad extrema, idest ad summa, sicut si primo dicamus, quod non est lapis et quod non est leo et sic de aliis sensibilibus, et deinde quod non est vivus nec vita etc., ut hoc modo procedentes in negationibus cognoscamus illam ignorantiam, idest divinam eminentiam ignotam nobis, revelate sine aliquo velamine creaturae, ipsam, dico, circumvelatam ab omnibus noscibilibus quae sunt in omnibus existentibus; in omnibus enim rebus quae cognoscuntur per suas formas, ipsae formae sunt imagines divinae pulchritudinis, per quarum negationem venimus in illud occultum quod velate repraesentabatur in eis.” 87 Thomas does observe that one can deny names such as goodness or wisdom of God, according to the modus significandi of these names, but not according to the res significata. See ST 1.13.3. But unlike in the Mystical Theology, this negation is not the focus of attention; instead, Thomas notes that such names can be denied in order to qualify the manner in which they are affirmed. 117 theology—proceeding from the lowest to the highest—informs the predominantly negative portions of any of Thomas's treatises, namely SCG 1.14-27, CT 1.4-26, and ST 1.3-11.88
As for the Divine Names, for similar reasons we should hesitate to assume that it is the closest fit among Dionysius’s works as a model for the content and order of Thomas's treatises on God. In the three summae, Thomas does not devote himself exclusively to consideration of positive names, as he also includes consideration of negative names. The Divine Names itself is devoted to the affirmative theology that names God as the cause of created perfections—of the intelligible processions of God in creatures—and does not include any direct consideration of the via remotionis.89 Nevertheless, it might be that the Dionysian order of the positive names in the Divine
Names could have influenced portions of Thomas's order in his treatises on God.
I would suggest that there in fact is a Dionysian work—albeit a lost or fictitious one—to which, at least in Thomas’s mind, the treatises on God in both the Compendium theologiae and the
Summa theologiae do broadly correspond. In his Commentary on the Mystical Theology, Albert observes that affirmative theology is treated by Dionysius not only in the Divine Names, but also in the lost or fictitious Theological Outlines (Theologicae hypotyposes). It is evident from Albert's remarks that he in fact thinks this work is titled De hypostatibus, as he only characterizes it as a treatise on the properties of the Trinity.90 Thomas, however, translating hypotyposes as “characteristics,” describes this as a work that considers “those things that pertain to the unity of the divine essence and the distinction of
88 The characterization of these sections as predominantly negative will require appropriate qualifications to be offered later. 89 That is, there is no section of the Divine Names in which the primary focus is the removal of creaturely characteristics from God. This being said, there is on Thomas’s reading the acknowledgement of a negative element in the predication of the causal names, according to the triplex via. Furthermore, in his Commentary, Thomas at a number of points brings in negative notions such as simplicity and infinity to clarify Dionysius’s claims. See the discussion of the Commentary on c. 9 of the Divine Names below. 90 See Simon Tugwell, Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 170 n. 2. See also Albert’s In I Sent. 22.A.1 ad 5 [Borgnet 25.567], where Albert says that Dionysius calls this work “De Hypostasibus, id est, de personis.” 118 persons.”91 This described plan better fits ST 1.2-43 and CT 1.3-67, which each present in turn unitive theology of the divine essence and discrete Trinitarian theology.
Of course, a lost or fictitious work can offer us no concrete help as a historical parallel, but at least we will not be quick to assume that the Divine Names, among the works of the Dionysian corpus, is a perfect model for the Thomistic treatises on God. Nevertheless, the order of the divine names in the Divine Names merits careful attention. It is in his Commentary on the Divine Names that
Thomas exhibits his most pronounced concern for the issue of the order of the divine names, by offering precise remarks about the rationale underlying their order in this work.
B. THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE NAMES IN THE DIVINE NAMES
The presentation of the causal divine names (or the intelligible processions of God, as
Dionysius calls them) begins properly in c. 4 of the Divine Names. In brief, the order of the names treated in each of the chapters is as follows:
c. 4: good, light, beauty (as well as questions on evil) c. 5: being (and the divine ideas) c. 6: life c. 7: wisdom (and how God knows and is known) c. 8: power/virtue, justice c. 9: greatness and smallness, sameness and otherness, etc. c. 10: omnipotence, Ancient of Days c. 11: peace (and the meaning of life per se, wisdom per se, etc.) c. 12: Holy of Holies, King of Kings, Lord of Lords, God of Gods c. 13: perfect, one
Concerning the priority of good as a divine name, Thomas first offers a rationale based on a
Platonic thesis: he observes that the Platonists placed matter, which they did not distinguish from privation, in the order of non-being. Yet because matter desires the good, it must be that the
91 See In De div. nom. pr. #1 [Marietti 1]: “Nam in libro quodam, qui apud nos non habetur, qui intitulatur ‘de divinis Hypotyposibus’ idest characteribus, ea de Deo tradidit quae ad unitatem divinae essentiae et distinctionem personarum pertinent.” 119 causality of the good extends itself even to matter, that is, to non-being. Consequently, the good must be “a more universal and higher cause than being, since its causality extends itself to more things.”92 However, Thomas notes that Dionysius seems only to touch upon this Platonic rationale for the priority of the good in c. 4; he explains that Dionysius seems to have another reason, based upon the project of the Divine Names, which is to treat the divine names that manifest the processions into creatures from God, insofar as He is the cause: “But that which has the character of a cause first and universally is the good.”93 Thomas first explains the subordination of formal and material causality to final causality, with the consequence that the good as an end has priority as a cause over these two forms of causality.94 As for efficient causality, Thomas offers the following: every agent makes something like itself insofar as it is perfect, because the perfect is that which can make something like itself. But the perfect possesses the ratio of the good, and so the good is first in the order of efficient causes as well. Having argued for the supremacy of the good both as end and as agent, Thomas concludes that whatever God gives to creatures, including esse, life, or any other
92 In De div. nom. 3.1 #226 [Marietti 75]: “Et ad huiusmodi nominationem accipiendam, considerandum est quod Platonici, materiam a privatione non distinguentes, ponebant eam in ordine non-entis, ut dicit Aristoteles in I Physicorum. Causalitas autem entis non se extendit nisi ad entia. Sic igitur secundum eos causalitas entis non se extendebat ad materiam primam, ad quam tamen se extendit causalitas boni. Cuius signum est quod ipsa maxime appetit bonum. Proprium autem est effectus ut convertatur per desiderium in suam causam. Sic igitur bonum est universalior et altior causa quam ens, quia ad plura se extendit eius causalitas.” 93 In De div. nom. 3.1 #227 [Marietti 75]: “Et quamvis Dionysius hoc tangere videatur in sequenti capitulo, tamen aliam rationem huius ordinis considerasse videtur. Intendit autem in hoc libro agere de divinis Nominibus manifestantibus processiones creaturarum a Deo, secundum quod est Causa rerum. Id autem quod habet rationem causae, primo et universaliter est bonum.” 94 This priority of the good as a final cause will be an issue in the analysis of both the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae. This priority is crucial for a proper understanding of the principle that bonum est diffusivum sui, as Thomas notes in In Sent. 1.34.2.1 ad 4 [Mand. 1.796]: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod bonum dicitur diffusivum per modum finis, secundum quod dicitur quod finis movet efficientem.” See Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on God’s Freedom to Create or Not,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington DC, The Catholic University of America Press, 2007) 238-39. 120 similar perfection, proceeds from the divine goodness and pertains to the goodness of the creature.95
With respect to causality, therefore, good is the first of the divine names.96
Having explained the priority of the good as a causal divine name, Thomas proceeds in c. 4 to offer an account of the rationale of the order of the Divine Names:
But if each of the processions that the divine names manifest be considered, we see that there are three attributes in things from the divine goodness: first, as they may exist in themselves and be perfected; second, as they may be compared to one another; third, as they are ordered to an end.97
The overall structure of cc. 5-13 arises, on Thomas’s reading, from these three sorts of characteristics or attributes found in things from the divine goodness: their existence and other perfections, the manner in which they can be compared to one another, and their ordination to an end. Perhaps surprisingly, Thomas does not explain the order of the Divine Names in terms of an explicit exitus-reditus structure, but rather according to the sorts of creaturely characteristics that are ex divina bonitate, culminating in the ordination of creatures to an end.98 (This being said, it becomes clear later in the Commentary that Thomas does conceive of the ordination of creatures to their end
95 In De div. nom. 3.1 #227-28 [Marietti 75]: “Quod apparet duplici ratione: primo quidem, quia bonum habet rationem finis; finis autem, primo, habet rationem causae. Nam forma est causa inquantum facit materiam esse actu; materia autem fit actu primo quando ab agente incipit. Secundo, quia agens agit sibi simile, non inquantum est ens quocumque modo, sed inquantum est perfectum. Perfectum enim, ut dicitur in IV Meteorologicorum, est quod potest sibi simile facere. Perfectum autem habet rationem boni. Sic igitur, quidquid Deus facit creaturis, sive esse sive vivere et quodcumque aliud totum ad bonitatem pertinet creaturae. Et ideo dicit quod nominatio est perfecta, inquantum omnia comprehendit et est manifestativa omnium divinarum processionum.” 96 As we shall see, Thomas will endorse the claim that good is the first name with respect to causality in ST 1.5.2 ad 1 and ST 1.13.11 ad 2. 97 In De div. nom. 4.1 #262 [Marietti 87]: “Si autem singulae processiones considerentur, quas divina Nomina manifestant, tria videmus ex divina Bonitate esse rebus attributa: primo quidem, ut in se sint et perficiantur; secundo, ut ad invicem comparentur; tertio, ut ordinentur in finem.” 98 Christian Schäfer, in his Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite: An Introduction to the Structure and the Content of the Treatise On the Divine Names (Leiden: Brill, 2006), does interpret the Divine Names in terms of procession and return—or rather, in terms of procession (pro&odoj) [cc. 4-7], abiding/halt (monh&) [cc. 8-11], and return (e\pistrofh&) [cc. 12-13]. See Schäfer 179 for his schematic outline of the structure of the Divine Names. Schäfer does recognize the somewhat different emphasis in Thomas’s account, in which the fundamental division is according to (1) the perfections from the divine goodness, (2) the comparatio ad invicem, and (3) the ordinatio in finem. See Schäfer 180. 121 in terms of a return to the first principle, insofar as God is the ultimate end of the universe.99 The notion of circular return also plays an important role later in c. 4 and in Thomas’s Commentary on this chapter.)100
As for the first member of the division (the being and other perfections of creatures),
Thomas offers the following:
But if things are considered in themselves, the first and more common thing found in them is esse; second, to live; third, to know; fourth, to be just or virtuous. And according to this order [Dionysius] proceeds concerning the divine names: first after the good, [he treats] being (ens) in the fifth chapter; second, life in the sixth chapter; third, wisdom in the seventh; fourth, virtue and justice in the eighth.101
The order of chapters five through eight of the Divine Names is a descending order, established according to the commonness of the creaturely processions from which the names are taken.102 Esse is the more common,103 followed by life as a less common perfection—not every existent is a living thing. In order to preserve the priority by commonness of the seventh chapter, Thomas characterizes this chapter as being concerned with knowledge more generally and not just with wisdom, which is the habitual perfection of knowledge. Given the content of Dionysius’s c. 7, which concerns how God knows and how God is known, Thomas’s maneuver is reasonable. Finally, virtue
99 So, for example, see In De div. nom. 11.1 #886 [Marietti 331], in which Thomas explains that for Dionysius the divine peace is the end of all things. See also In De div. nom. 12.1 #956 [Marietti 357]: “[S]ic enim et Deus diffundendo sua dona et multiplicat et rursus per opus providentiae multiplicia reducit in ordinem unius finis.” The universe in its multiplicity is ordered back towards God as its ultimate final cause, but it is the theme of ordination towards a final cause rather than the theme of reditus that dominates Thomas’s presentation. 100 See esp. the discussion of circular motion in In De div. nom. 4.7 as well as the discussion of love in In De div. nom. 4.12. 101 In De div. nom. 4.1 #263 [Marietti 87]: “Si autem ipsae res in se considerentur: primum et communius, quod in eis invenitur, est esse; secundo, vivere; tertio, cognoscere; quarto iustum esse vel virtuosum. Et secundum hunc ordinem, de divinis Nominibus prosequitur: primo quidem post bonum, de ente in 5o capitulo; secundo, de vita in 6o; tertio, de sapientia in 7o; quarto, de virtute et iustitia in 8o.” 102 See n. 73 above for remarks on Albert’s Commentary on the Mystical Theology, in which he explains that for Dionysius affirmative theology proceeds through the positive names according to the order of their commonness and nobility. Thomas’s account of the order of cc. 5-8 of the Divine Names agrees with this assessment. 103 Thomas refrains from saying “most common” out of deference to the thesis that the causality of the good extends beyond that of being. 122 and justice—habitual perfections of intelligent creatures—are less common than knowledge, since not every intelligent creature possesses them, and so these are the subject of the eighth chapter.104 As
Thomas construes cc. 5-8 of the Divine Names, their order is straightforwardly explained in terms of the commonness of these perfections among creatures.
Concerning the characteristics of creatures according to the relation of one with another, in his outline in c. 4 Thomas divides these into relation according to something intrinsic and relation according to something extrinsic. With respect to the former, “one thing is called similar or equal to another, same or diverse, on account of agreement in substance, quantity, or quality; and he treats these in the ninth chapter.”105 The relation of one to another according to something intrinsic begins with the recognition of some sort of generic community.106 In c. 9 Dionysius treats greatness, smallness, sameness, otherness, similitude, dissimilitude, rest, motion, and equality, explaining how each of these names can be predicated of God.107
Two features of Thomas’s commentary on c. 9 stand out. First, the meaning of all of these divine names is derived from the meaning of these terms as used to refer to creatures, such that with respect to each of the names Thomas must explain in some detail the various ways in which the term is applied to creatures. For example, Thomas explains that great is said of creatures according
104 Although translators and interpreters of Dionysius typically render the first topic of c. 8 as “power,” Thomas (encountering virtus in the Latin) treats it as virtue, by which he understands a perfect power. A virtue in a human being, for example, is the habitual perfection of a power of the soul. 105 In De. Div.nom. 4.1 #264 [Marietti 87]: “Comparatio autem rerum ad invicem attenditur secundum duo: primo, secundum aliquid intrinsecum, prout una res dicitur alteri similis vel aequalis, eadem vel diversa, propter convenientiam in substantia, quantitate aut qualitate et de his agit in 9o capitulo.” 106 It may be helpful here to note the distinction Thomas draws between difference and diversity. Difference presupposes agreement in some respect, such as generic agreement, whereas diversity “obtains between things which are diverse of themselves” (Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 315 n. 72). See SCG 1.17 [Leon. Man. 17], cited by Wippel. 107 Thomas introduces c. 9 by noting that here Dionysius “determines concerning the names of which which are taken according to processions in which a relation to another is implied.” This affirms the place of c. 9 within the outline offered by Thomas in his commentary on c. 4. See In De Div. nom. 9.1 #797 [Marietti 300]: “Hic determinat de nominibus Dei quae sumuntur secundum processiones in quibus importatur habitudo ad alterum.” 123 to excess, and one creature can exceed another in quantity (i.e., continuous quantity), in place, or in number (i.e., discrete quantity).108
Second, Thomas explains how these relative names function as divine names by relying upon the notions of infinity (greatness, smallness, dissimilarity), omnipresence (greatness, smallness, otherness, and motion), immutability (sameness, self-likeness, rest, and equality), and unity (equality).
There are also mentions of the divine simplicity (self-likeness, equality) and of the likeness of creatures to God (likeness, unlikeness), something that Thomas treats in connection with the divine perfection in the two summae.109 The treatment of all of these notions together in c. 9 of the Divine
Names is a good historical parallel to the treatment of the same notions in qq. 3-4 and 7-11 of the
Prima pars (with particular emphasis on the elements from qq. 7-11). To be fair, this historical parallel perhaps has more to do with how Thomas interprets and explains Dionysius’s Divine Names c. 9 rather than with the explicit content of that chapter. This parallel will be exploited in our later consideration of the Summa theologiae.
In the outline found in c. 4, Thomas next divides comparison according to something extrinsic between comparison insofar as things are contained under “one part”110 and comparison insofar as they are contained under “one measure;” the discussions of omnipotence and “Ancient of
Days” in the tenth chapter are associated with these two kinds of comparison to something extrinsic. He then adds that “peace and tranquility of order follow this ordering” (presumably the
108 Within the structure of the Divine Names itself, it would appear that for Dionysius c. 9 concerns causal names taken from what God causes in creatures, just like the previous chapters. These names—great, small, same, other, like, unlike, rest, motion, equal—seem to be taken from Plato’s Parmenides, in which all of these terms appear as pairs in the dialectical conversation between Parmenides and young Aristotle. See Parmenides 137b-166c [Cooper 371 ff.]. As Dionysius attributes being, life, and wisdom to the One, so he attributes these names as well. 109 In De. div. nom. 9.1 #806, #808, #811, #812, 9.2 #815, #823, 9.3 #831, #832, #834, 9.4 #837, #841, #844. 110 I suspect that perhaps una parte should read uno principio, given that in c. 10 Thomas describes God as omnipotent as the universal principle of esse. 124 ordering of things by the divine power and in time), and so peace is treated in c. 11.111 However, in his Commentary on c. 10, Thomas begins by describing cc. 5-9 as having concerned “the divine names that signify the perfections present within things either absolutely or according to the relation of one to another,” suggesting that the contents of cc. 10-11 do not fall under the heading of relation to one another according to something extrinsic, which was the heading offered in the outline in c. 4. Thomas instead says that in c. 10 Dionysius “explains the names which are said of
God according to the notion of the universal principle of esse and of the duration of things.”112
Thomas explains Dionysius’s treatment of omnipotence according to the greatness of God’s power with regard to scope, stability, productive fecundity, and attractiveness (i.e., the power for returning creatures back to itself).113 Furthermore, within c. 10 it becomes clear that the name “Ancient of
Days” is to be understood in terms of divine eternity, as eternity is the measure of the aevum and of time. There is thus still a relational character about the content of c. 10, but what is at issue is not so much the relation of creatures to one another (with comparison to God as extrinsic standard), but rather their relation collectively as creatures to Him as their principle.
Thomas explains at the beginning of the Commentary on c. 11 that the previous chapters have explained the divine names taken from the perfections of creatures. He continues:
For each thing desires its perfection, which it participates from God, and it loves it; and when it has arrived at it, its appetite is quieted, in which quiet rest and the nature of peace consists. And therefore in this chapter Dionysius determines the divine peace and also those perfections proceeding from God into creatures, insofar as they are considered in the
111 In De div. nom. 4.1 #264 [Marietti 87]: “[S]ecundo vero, secundum aliquid extrinsecum, sive secundum quod continentur sub una parte sive secundum quod continentur sub una mensura et de his agit in 10o, ubi agitur de Omnipotente et Antiquo dierum; hanc autem ordinationem sequitur pax et tranquilitas ordinis, unde in 11o agitur de pace.” 112 In De. div. nom. 10.1 #847 [Marietti 320]: “Postquam Dionysius exposuit divina nomina quae signant perfectiones rebus inhaerentes vel absolute vel secundum comparationem unius ad alterum, hic exponit quaedam nomina quae dicuntur de Deo, secundum rationem universalis principii esse et durationis rerum. Dicitur enim Deus omnipotens, inquantum est universale principium omnis esse rerum; antiquus vero dierum dicitur, inquantum est principium omnis durationis.” 113 In De div. nom. 10.1 #851 ff. [Marietti 320-21]. 125
abstract: for esse considered in the abstract is called esse per se, and likewise for the other [perfections].114
Having considered the various divine names taken from the creaturely perfections that flow from
God into creatures, c. 11 concerns the divine name peace, which is taken from the rest achieved by a creature when it has achieved its perfection or proper good.115 Peace is therefore a name for God’s perfection and simple goodness, and as we cannot express what this is in itself, we can only offer praise of the divine peace from the peace that God produces in things.116 The focus of c. 11 is therefore the peace found in creatures, which is analyzed in terms of unity and concord, particularly with respect to God as the final end and ultimate good of the universe. In the original outline given in the Commentary on c. 4, Thomas had characterized the theme of peace as following upon the ordering of things by God: here we see this articulated in terms of final causality and proper goods.
As we shall see, Thomas’s interpretation of peace perhaps renders it somewhat redundant, as c. 13 will also present perfection in terms of a thing’s proper good.117
114 In De div. nom. 11.1 #876 [Marietti 330]: “Superius, Dionysius exposuit divina nomina quibus signantur perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas. Unaquaeque enim res appetit suam perfectionem, quam a Deo participat et amat eam et cum adepta eam fuerit, quiescit appetitus eius, in qua quiete consistit quies et ratio pacis. Et ideo in hoc capitulo Dionysius de pace divina determinat et etiam de ipsis perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, secundum quod in abstracto considerantur: esse enim in abstracto consideratum dicitur per se esse et similiter de aliis.” 115 In De div. nom. 11.1 #880 [Marietti 330]: “Est autem considerandum quod proprie aliquid habere pacem dicitur in seipso, ex eo quod quiescit appetitus eius in proprio bono adepto.” 116 In De div. nom. 11.1 #880 [Marietti 330]: “Hanc inquam divinam pacem secundum quod in se est quia laudare non sufficimus, oportet quod laudemus eam hymnis pacificis, idest laudibus sumptis ex hoc quod pacem in rebus facit.” 117 As for the perfections considered in the abstract, Thomas explains that unlike the Platonists, Dionysius does not posit esse per se or life per se as distinct subsistent formal principles. Rather, Dionysius identifies God as the unitary cause of all of these participated perfections. Nevertheless, Dionysius employs the language of life per se, esse per se, etc., and what is signified by such expressions demands clarification. Thomas explains that by esse per se or life per se, Dionysius designates either divine perfections or the creaturely perfections considered in the abstract, abstracting even from universality and particularity. It is the latter—perfections considered absolutely in the abstract—that are said to be participated by creatures. God Himself remains above all such participants and participated perfections as their unparticipated cause. In this general claim, which applies to all of the perfections and causal names at issue in the Divine Names, we find a more general version of a thesis presented in c. 1 of this dissertation, which is that with regard to the transcendental perfections in particular, we should not identify a divine perfection with a transcendental perfection. That is, God is neither identical with nor does He fall under ens commune or bonum in communi; and similarly He is neither identical with nor does He fall under the abstract life per se participated by creatures. Thomas does in other texts speak of God, subsistent esse itself, as participated by creatures. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 109-24. 126
The brief c. 12 concerns certain scriptural names of God such as “Lord of Lords.” In the outline in his Commentary on c. 4, Thomas characterizes cc. 12-13 as being concerned with the divine names taken from creatures insofar as they are ordered to an end. In this outline, c. 12 is said to concern providence. Thus in his Commentary on c. 12, Thomas refers to the prior chapters of the
Divine Names as having concerned “the emanation of perfections from God into creatures,” and he interprets all of the names treated in c. 12 as concerning the divine governance: providence and divine knowledge are designated by “God of Gods,” the power for ordering things according to divine wisdom by “Lord of Lords,” the execution of divine governance by “King of Kings,” and the ultimate effect of divine government by “Holy of Holies.”118 The interpretation of all of these names in connection with the notion of providence is consistent with the outline from Thomas’s
Commentary on c. 4. As for the genitive construction of these scriptural names, Thomas notes that this way of speaking indicates both the causality and eminence of the divine perfection. God is the cause of all holiness, but possesses a holiness that exceeds that of any creature.119
Thomas sums up well his understanding of the order of the Divine Names up to this point with the closing lines of his Commentary on c. 12: “For thus God, by diffusing His gifts, both multiplies and through the work of providence reduces the multiplicity back into the order of one end.”120 From His goodness, God causes multiplicity—both of creatures and of their perfections.
According to their multiplicity and their various participations in these perfections, these creatures can be compared to one another as greater and smaller, same and different, like and unlike, etc. This
118 In De div. nom. 12.1 #939 [Marietti 354]. 119 In De div. nom. 11.1 #954-55 [Marietti 356-57], esp. #955: “Dicit ergo primo quod Deus, qui est omnium causa, supereminenter omnibus, habet plenitudinem bonitatis super omnia alia. Ideo ad designandum hunc excessum quo excedit omnia, dicitur in Scripturis ‘Sanctus Sanctorum’et reliqua, idest Rex regum, Dominus dominantium et Deus deorum: designantur enim, in isto modo locutionis, emanatio quaedam a causa superiori, ut intelligatur, cum dicitur Sanctus Sanctorum, quod ab Ipso emanat sanctitas in omnes alios et sic de aliis.” 120 In De div. nom. 12.1 #956 [Marietti 357]: “Sic enim et Deus diffundendo sua dona et multiplicat et rursus per opus providentiae multiplicia reducit in ordinem unius finis.” 127 varied multiplicity is directed by divine providence towards peace in a unity of order and ultimately towards God Himself as the final cause and ultimate good of the universe.
We can say then that on Thomas’s reading final causality is a growing theme throughout the later chapters of the Divine Names—it already plays an important role especially in c. 11’s discussion of peace—and c. 13 represents the culmination of this trend. Thomas explains the late placement of perfect and one in this chapter in c. 4’s outline by characterizing perfection and unity as “the very end at which things arrive through providence and governance.”121 Again at the beginning of his
Commentary on c. 13, he repeats that Dionysius “explains here the divine names that pertain to the end of providence; for it is the end of providence that each thing should reach its proper perfection, and furthermore that all should be led back to one end, and therefore he speaks here about the perfect and the one.”122 It is in terms of final causality—the proper perfection of each creature as well as the unity of order of the universe—that Thomas finds an explanation for the late placement of perfect and one in the Divine Names. Everything proceeds from the divine goodness and is directed towards intrinsic perfection and coordinated unity.
Beyond this explanation from final causality, Thomas also sees in the late placement of perfect and one a summarizing, encapsulating character: to call God perfect and one repeats briefly, brevissimo sermone, what has been said at some length in the consideration of the various causal divine names taken from particular creaturely perfections.123 God is not only good, existent, living, and wise
121 In De div. nom. 4.1 #265 [Marietti 87]: “Sed circa ordinem rerum in finem, duo sunt consideranda. . . et ipse finis ad quem res per providentiam et gubernationem perveniunt et hoc pertinet ad 13o capitulum, in quo agitur de perfecto et uno.” 122 In De div. nom. 13.1 #957 [Marietti 359]: “Postquam Dionysius exposuit divina nomina quae ad rationem providentiae pertinent, hic exponit divina nomina quae pertinent ad providentiae finem; est enim providentiae finis ut singula perfectionem propriam consequantur et ulterius omnia reducantur in unum finem et ideo dicitur hic: de perfecto et uno, ut ex titulo patet.” 123 In De div. nom. 13.1 #959 [Marietti 359]: “Sic igitur, brevissimo sermone, omnia quae supra de Deo dicta sunt, in nomine perfecti et unius comprehenduntur.” 128
(names of various perfections)—He is all of these things simultaneously. Thomas explains that possession of many characteristics either (i) successively according to time or (ii) dividedly according to parts falls short of the manner in which God possesses all perfections simultaneously: “for that which possesses many things not at once (simul) but successively is imperfect because it is mutable: for motion is the act of the imperfect. But what possesses many things not together (simul) but dividedly, according to its parts, is composed and is not truly one.”124 Hence to call God perfect and one is the briefest expression of His simultaneous possession of all perfections, including all those expressed by the causal names (such as being and life). In this way all of the causal names are subordinated to and subsumed by the names perfect and one.125
As for the notion of perfection and the manner in which it is predicated of God, one finds here in In De div. nom. 13.1 one of Thomas’s most careful discussions of the notion of perfection, in his attempt to unpack what are, in the Dionysian text, brief but complicated assertions about the divine perfection. The details of this exposition of perfection need not concern us here, but some elements of it will be cited for comparison in the later chapters of this dissertation: in particular, the manner in which infinity and immutability serve as components of the intelligible content (ratio) of the divine perfection will be instructive for our consideration of the order in ST 1.4-11.126
124 In De div. nom. 13.1 #959 [Marietti 359]: “Sed Deus habet omnia in seipso neque successive secundum tempus neque divisim secundum partes, sed simul; et ideo, quia sic habet omnia simul, laudatur sicut perfectum et sicut unum: quod enim habet multa, non simul sed successive, imperfectum est quia est mutabile: motus autem est actus imperfecti; quod autem habet multa, non simul sed divisim, secundum suas partes, est compositum et non vere unum.” 125 This will be paralleled in the Summa theologiae by the manner in which Thomas subordinates the discussion of divine goodness to divine perfection. 126 This detailed explanation of perfection is found in In De div. nom. 13.1 #962-68 [Marietti 359-60]. We can schematize the analysis as follows. (1) Particular modes of creaturely perfection not attributed to God: (i) perfection insofar as a thing attains its proper good through something extrinsic and accidental (as air is perfected by light or man is perfected by grace) (ii) perfection insofar as something exists through a natural form that is not identical with itself, as in all material creatures (iii) perfection insofar as something exists through a form identical with itself (as a created immaterial substance) but is still dependent upon something else for its existence (perfectum secundum seipsum sed non a se) 129
After treating the divine perfection, Thomas proceeds to explain Dionysius’s account of divine unity.127 Thomas notes that Dionysius attributes unity to God first insofar as God is “all unitedly” as the united, perfect cause of created multiplicity, and second insofar as God as one is the cause of everything. Curiously, it seems that one is attributed to God according to the via causalitatis—God is called one insofar as He is the cause. Such a notion finds confirmation in an earlier passage from the Commentary on c. 1, in which Thomas observes that Dionysius attributes unity to God for two reasons. First, the intelligible content (ratio) of the one is undivided being, and so God is called one insofar as He is divisible neither actually nor potentially—although the
(iv) the superior perfection of one of a creature’s parts or principles over another, insofar as it is composite in any way, as for example in man (a composite of form and matter) soul is most perfect, and in the human soul (the essence of which is the principle of really distinct powers) the intellect is most perfect All of the above is offered to explain Dionysius’s claim that God is (i) per se perfectum (ii) et secundum seipsum (iii) a seipso uniformiter segregatum (iv) et totum per totum perfectissimum. (2) Characteristics of creaturely perfection removed from God (all pertain to creaturely finitude): (i) creaturely perfection is opposed to infinity (in the quantitative sense), because a perfect creature is a whole that will not admit of any further addition; this is to say that quantitative infinity is an imperfection (ii) creaturely perfection involves arriving at a terminus according to the creature’s nature, but God is perfect without limit (iii) creaturely perfection involves containment within certain limits, but God is perfect in a way that is neither grasped nor comprehended All of the above serves to explain Dionysius’s claim that God is (i) omnem quidem infinitatem terminans,(ii) super omnem autem terminum extentum (iii) et a nullo captum aut comprehensum. (3) Characteristics proper to the intelligible content (ratio) of divine perfection: (i) Whereas a creature is imperfect whose power does not extend itself to the fulfillment of its proper work, God is called perfect in that His power (virtus) extends itself to all its works without succession or termination, while He absolutely exceeds His effects (ii) Whereas a creature is imperfect either when it strives for perfection (like a boy growing towards adulthood) or when it withdraws from perfection (like an old man)—or is imperfect just as subject to mutability—by contrast, God is perfect so as to be subject to no increase or decrease (iii) Whereas a creature is imperfect when it lacks something it ought to possess (as a man who lacks a hand or wisdom is imperfect)—and even a creature that does possess whatever it is supposed to have is still perfect not simpliciter but secundum suam naturam—by contrast, God is called perfect simpliciter as prepossessing all perfection in Himself (iv) Whereas a creature is called imperfect when it cannot make something like itself, God is perfect insofar as He diffuses His perfection from above to all creatures, and not according to diverse givings, but unceasingly while remaining the same in Himself; nor is God diminished by His giving. 127 As Cristina D’Ancona Costa has observed, against the background of Neoplatonism, the late placement of one as a name for the first principle of all—and especially the separation of this name from its typical pairing with the good and its apparent subordination to the name being—is quite peculiar. Cristina D’Ancona Costa, “La notion de l’un dans Thomas D’Aquin,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 64.2 (1997), 318 ff.: “L’adhésion de l’auteur à la communis opinio néoplatonicienne semble cependant souffrir une exception éclatante, à propos précisément de la dénomination du premier principe comme ‘Un.’” 130 emphasis here is more purely negative, this reason seems compatible with the first reason given in c.
13.128 Second, the name of unity is attributed to God because He communicates unity to things. This latter way of speaking would even seem to place unity among the causal perfections or intelligible processions at issue in cc. 4-8 of the Divine Names.129 But how can unity, a negative notion, be treated in a manner that is apparently similar to the causal divine names such as good and being?
We can find an answer to this question by examining Thomas’s account of what he identifies as Dionysius’s five arguments for the claim that the one is a cause or principle of all—this is the prelude to explaining how one is attributed to God. The details of these arguments for one as the principle of all need not concern us, but we should note how Thomas describes them. The first argument proceeds from an account of the participation of all existents (and of all participated perfections) in unity;130 the second argues from the logical priority of unity (compared to every
128 In De div. nom. 1.2 #55 [Marietti 18]. Here Thomas explains that some creatures that are one actually are nevertheless potentially divisible insofar as they are composite and not absolutely simple. God is one in a way that surpasses creatures because He is absolutely simple. 129 I noted earlier that Thomas treats unity as a negative divine name: in the early Quodl. 10.1.1, he explains that unity expresses something negative about God, with only the qualification that it does posit being (ens), because the notion of one is undivided being. We have also seen above, in treatment of De ver. 1.1, that Thomas treats transcendental unity as adding only a negation of division to being. See above, pp. 85-86. This squares nicely with the first reason Thomas gives for why Dionysius attributes unity to God—God is not divisible. Quodl. 10.1.1 [Leon. 25.124: 91-94]: “Et ideo unitas in diuinis non dicitur nisi remotiue, quantum ad id quod superaddit enti, quamuis ponat aliquid, secundum quod includit ens: est enim unum ens indiuisum.” 130 This first argument, which receives the lengthiest attention from Thomas, runs as follows: “That in which some [things] participate is the cause of the participants (as whiteness is the cause of white things); but there is nothing among existents that does not participate in the one; therefore the one is the cause of all existents.” In De div. nom. 13.2 #972 [Marietti 363]: “Id quo aliqua participant est causa participantium, sicut albedo est causa alborum; sed nihil est existentium quod non participet uno; ergo unum est causa omnium existentium.” Thomas goes on to clarify how Dionysius (1) defends the minor premise here (that there is nothing among existents that does not participate unity) and (2) responds against an objection (that the one cannot be a cause of multitude because it is a part of multitude). #973-76 [Marietti 362-63]. In #976, there is further discussion of the manner in which all participated perfections participate unity, and it is here that the intrinsic unity of things seems to be spoken of as a positive participated perfection, seemingly against the view that one adds only indivision, secundum rationem, to being. (To be clear, to classify one as only logically distinct from being is not to deny that one is not real. See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 207.) There is, furthermore, the notion of unity as the unification of all participated perfections. Thus, God would be called one as the supereminent cause of unity, in the same way that He is called wise as the supereminent cause of wisdom; and to call God one implicitly includes His wisdom and all other participated perfections. In this way, both unity and wisdom would be conceived as positive, proper perfections or divine attributes. Thomas does not adopt such a view of unity as a divine attribute in his personal works, but, as we shall see, there is introduced in ST 1.11.4 a notion of God as maximally one. Even there, however, unity will be explained as something said negatively or privatively. 131 multitude) to its natural priority as a principle;131 the third concerns the unity that is the form of the whole universe;132 the fourth argument concerns not only this same form of the whole universe but also the idea (species) in the mind of “the one who is the author of the universe;”133 and the fifth argues that everything complex is reduced to elemental parts that are unities.134 Leaving aside the fifth argument, Thomas asserts that the first two arguments “proceed according to the opinion of
Plato.”135 Both the third and fourth arguments concern the unity of order that is the form of the whole universe, the fourth insofar as this form is preconceived by the divine mind.
For treatments of Thomas’s understanding of participation, see Cornelio Fabro, Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain: Louvain, 1961); R. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (New York: Brill, 1989); Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 94-132; Ralph McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 161-248. 131 In De div. nom. 13.2 #977 [Marietti 364]: “Illud a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi, est naturaliter prius et quodammodo principium. Sed unum est huiusmodi quia sine uno non invenitur aliqua multitudo, sed invenitur aliquod unum absque omni multitudine. Unum igitur est prius omni multitudine et principium eius. Cuius signum apparet in numeris, quia unitas est ante omnem numerum, qualitercumque multiplicetur.” #981: “Patet ergo ex praemissis, quod unum quinque modis habet rationem principii. . . [secundo] modo, sicut universale a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi.” I take the convertitur here in a logical sense, so that this argument represents a condensed and somewhat tame example of the Platonic via abstractionis: natural priority as a principle follows from priority secundum rationem. Thomas does not call any attention to the distinction between the one convertible with being and the one that is a principle of number. While the latter one is for Thomas a positive accidental characteristic in the genus of quantity, the one that is convertible with being adds only a negation to being secundum rationem. In other words, for Thomas the one convertible with being is not a principle really distinct from being. 132 In De div. nom. 13.2 #978 [Marietti 364]: “[P]onit tertiam rationem, quae procedit ex quadam suppositione, scilicet, quod omnibus omnia sint unita. Hoc enim negant soli illi qui non ponunt unum principium omnium, sicut illi qui dicunt quod bonum et malum sunt duo prima principia et quod mala non coordinantur bonis. Sed cum ex supradictis sit manifestum esse unum principium omnium quod est bonum, necesse est omnia omnibus coordinata esse et unita. Quaecumque autem uniuntur ad invicem, se habent sicut partes unius totius quod per eorum unitionem constituitur. Sic igitur, si omnia omnibus sunt unita, necesse est quod omnia conveniant in uno toto; et sic, omnia participabunt uno, sicut partes participant forma totius. Erit igitur unum, principium omnium.” That this argument concerns the unity of order of the universe becomes apparent especially from how Thomas characterizes the third argument in his summarizing remarks. In De div. nom. 13.2 #981 [Marietti 364]: “Patet ergo praemissis, quod unum quinque modis habet rationem principii. . . . [T]ertio modo, sicut formatio eius et principium formale, ex quibus componitur totum.” 133 In De div. nom. 13.2 #979 [Marietti 364]: “[P]onit quartam rationem ex eadem suppositione procedentem: quae enim ad invicem sunt unita, non solum conveniunt in una forma totius, sed etiam secundum aliquam unam praeexcogitatam speciem unita esse dicuntur, sicut partes domus quae uniuntur in una forma domus, praeexcogitata ab artifice. Sic igitur, si omnia omnibus sunt unita, non solum conveniunt in una forma totius, sed etiam conveniunt in hoc quod sunt unita omnia secundum unam formam, ab Eo excogitatam qui est Auctor universorum. Ipsa enim unitas universi procedit ab unitate divinae mentis, sicut forma domus quae est in materia, provenit a forma domus quae est in mente artificis.” 134 In De div. nom. 13.2 #980 [Marietti 364]. 135 In De div. nom. 13.2 #981 [Marietti 364]: “Patet ergo ex praemissis, quod unum quinque modis habet rationem principii: uno modo, sicut participatum participantium; alio modo, sicut universale a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi. Et hi duo modi procedunt secundum opinionem Platonis.” 132
Now, I would suggest that these four arguments suggest two different ways in which unity could be regarded as a distinct creaturely characteristic from which God could be named according to the via causalitatis. The first two, the arguments characterized as secundum opinionem Platonis, seem to point to a notion of unity as a perfection participated by every existent, as a distinct principle.136 This could be taken as the sort of positive characteristic from which, for Thomas, God can be named properly, positively, and analogically, in the way that God is called good or wise. Although we should not assume that Thomas never notes that something is secundum opinionem Platonis except to disagree with it, in this case I would emphasize that Thomas does not in his personal works treat unity as a positive perfection participated by all existents or as a positive divine name. Rather, for him unity adds to being a negation and differs from it only secundum rationem, and transcendental one is thus identical with being secundum rem.137 For Thomas, to call God one is not to express anything positive beyond what one says in calling God ipsum esse: Thomas is emphatic that one is said of God by negation or privation, by the denial of division from Himself.138 Even if one doesn’t take these first two arguments as suggesting unity as a perfection to be predicated positively of God, still they conceive of unity as a distinct characteristic or principle in creatures, an effect from which one could reason to the unity of God according to the via causalitatis. But again, for Thomas the transcendental unity of all created existents is identical secundum rem with their being; hence transcendental unity is not a really distinct effect from which reasoning according to the via causalitatis could proceed anew.
The third and fourth arguments, however, suggest another meaning of unity that is a really distinct effect, a meaning of unity already highlighted earlier in the Commentary on the Divine Names:
136 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads 6.9. For Plotinus, unity is not identical with being but is prior to it. A being is a being because of unity, for whatever loses unity loses being. But there is always multiplicity in being, and so unity is prior to being. By contrast, for Thomas unity as transcendental is convertible and identical in reality with being. 137 By contrast, the unity that is the principle of number is a positive accidental characteristic in the genus of quantity; but this quantitative unity is not predicated of God, because God is immaterial. 138 Quodl. 10.1.1; ST 1.11.4 ad 1. 133 this is the unity of order of the whole universe, the form of the whole that is pre-conceived by the divine mind. Thomas notes that both the third and fourth arguments proceed from the assumption that there is such a unity about the whole universe, that “all are united to all.”139 For Thomas, a unity of order is the accidental form of an aggregate of distinct substances; this accidental form is really distinct from the substances themselves, and so this is a really distinct effect from which one could argue according to the via causalitatis. I would point to SCG 1.42 and ST 1.11.3 as places where
Thomas does offer just such an argument from the unity of the universe to the unity of God.140
However, the conclusion of this argument is not that God is called one positively, but rather just that there is only one God. From a really distinct effect—the unity of the order of the universe—
Thomas concludes that God is called one negatively.
Thus we can distinguish in the Divine Names, as Thomas interprets it, two fundamental reasons for attributing unity to God: (i) because God as the universal cause possesses all perfections unitedly and (ii) because He is the cause of the unity found in creatures.141 Thomas seems willing to endorse the former reason, noting that calling God perfect and one encapsulates brevissimo sermone all of the praises contained in the Divine Names. This aspect of unity as a divine name is emphasized in
In De div. nom. 13.3, where Thomas notes that for Dionysius unity is attributed to God as the
139 In De div. nom. 13.2 #978-79 [Marietti 364]: “Deinde, cum dicit: Et si omnibus. . . ponit tertiam rationem, quae procedit ex quadam suppositione, scilicet, quod omnibus omnia sint unita. . . . Deinde, cum dicit: Et aliter . . . ponit quartam rationem ex eadem suppositione procedentem: quae enim ad invicem sunt unita, non solum conveniunt in una forma totius, sed etiam secundum aliquam unum praeexcogitatam speciem unita esse dicuntur, sicut partes domus quae uniuntur in una forma domus, praeexcogitata ab artifice.” 140 SCG 1.42 [Leon. Man. 38-39]: “Omnium diversorum ordinatorum ad invicem, ordo eorum ad invicem est propter ordinem eorum ad aliquid unum. . .” ST 1.11.3 [Leon. 4.111]: “Tertio, ab unitate mundi. . . 141 Cf. D’Ancona Costa, 322: “Le premier principe, selon cet auteur, est dit ‘un’ (i) en tant qu’il est toutes les choses selon un mode unitaire et transcendant; (ii) en tant qu’il est cause de l’unité, qui à son tour est en toute chose la condition de l’être. . . (i) est une formulation négative. . . (ii) établit, entre l’unité ‘pure’ du premier principe et l’unité en tant que caractère des choses, le même rapport que celui subsistant, selon l’hypothèse platonicienne des Formes, entre chaque forme et ses participations particulières.” 134 universal and absolutely simple cause that possesses all the perfections found in creatures.142 As regards the latter reason, however, because of his contention that unity as convertible with being adds only a negation secundum rationem to being, Thomas cannot embrace unqualifiedly this aspect of the Dionysian account of divine unity.143
To conclude our discussion of the order of the divine names in Dionysius’s Divine Names— as this is interpreted by Thomas—we can summarize as follows. Good is the first name as the first among the causal names and as the principle of all the other causal divine names, which flow from the divine goodness. Being, life, wisdom, virtue, and justice follow after good as divine names according to their commonness among creatures, in descending order. Thomas reads cc. 9-10 as concerning divine names that arise from comparisons among creatures, both to one another (c. 9) and to God as the first cause and measure of all (c. 10). Although c. 11 is classed with cc. 9-10 in
Thomas’s outline in the Commentary on c. 4, what emerges in his Commentary on c. 11 is the increasingly important role of final causality: peace is a divine name taken from the rest achieved by creatures when they achieve their ends, both their intrinsic perfections and the unity of concord with other creatures. On Thomas’s interpretation, c. 12 (which treats names like Lord of Lords) concerns providence, which Thomas describes as reducing the multiplicity of creation into the unity of a single end. Finally, c. 13’s treatment of perfect and one plays the role, for Thomas, of presenting the end towards which providence directs all creatures: insofar as God Himself is this ultimate final end
142 In De div. nom. 13.3 #984 [Marietti 367-68]: “Est autem advertendum quod tria supra dixerat de uno, scilicet: quod sit omnium causa; quod sit singulare vel simplex et indivisum; et quod omnia in se praeaccepit. Unde per haec tria unitatem Deo attribuens. . .” See D’Ancona Costa, 327: “Cet ‘un’ qui se dit de Dieu sert à manifester, comme on l’a déjà dit, les trois notions suivantes: (i) la causalité universelle; (ii) la simplicité absolue; (iii) la possession d’avance de tous les effets.” 143 Here I cannot quite agree with D’Ancona Costa, who contends: “Nulle part dans ce chapitre il ne manifeste le moindre désaccord à l’ègard des raisons dont s’autorisent les néoplatoniciens pour concevoir le premier principe comme Un séparé, voire hypostatique.” I take it that in this case Thomas’s identification of the view that one is distinct from and prior to being as secundum opinionem Platonis is in fact an expression of his disagreement. 135 of all, the encapsulating or summarizing character of the names perfect and one is thus integrated into the structure of the Divine Names.
3. THE ORDER IN AVICENNA’S METAPHYSICS
Next, we can turn to the order of the divine names—and of the project of metaphysical theology in general—found in Avicenna’s Metaphysics.144 The goal here is only to give brief attention to specific points of Avicennian influence, both in terms of what Thomas positively appropriates as well as that with which he disagrees. I am aided throughout this section by two recent studies by R.
E. Houser.145 I agree with Houser that familiarity with Avicenna’s metaphysical theology provides an extremely helpful background for examining the order of argumentation in the Prima pars qq. 2-26, especially in qq. 2-11.
In the dispute concerning the subject of the metaphysical science, Thomas sides with
Avicenna, for whom the subject of metaphysics is being insofar as it is being. As a science, metaphysics seeks to demonstrate its subject’s properties and to determine its causes, ultimately arriving at a knowledge of God as the cause of being.146 Thus it is that, while Book 1 of Avicenna’s
Metaphysics settles the question of the subject of metaphysics, the question of the existence of God as
144 All citations are from Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, 2 vols., ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain: E. Peeters, 1977). I have also consulted the English translation from the Arabic found in The Metaphysics of the Healing, tr. Michael E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005). 145 R. E. Houser, “The Language of Being and the Nature of God in the Aristotelian Tradition,” Proceedings of the ACPA 84 (2011), 113-32; “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” International Philosophical Quarterly 51.3 (2011), 355-75. 146 Philosophia prima 1.2 [Van Riet 1.13]: “Ideo primum subiectum huius scientiae est ens, inquantum est ens; et ea quae inquirit sunt consequentia ens, inquantum est ens, sine condicione.” For a treatment of this question with respect to Avicenna, see Jon McGinnis, Avicenna (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 149-54; Amos Bertolacci, “Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God’s Existence and the Subject Matter of Metaphysics,” Medioevo 32 (2007): 69-97. For treatments of Thomas’s appropriation of the Avicennian solution to this problem concerning the subject of metaphysics, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 11-22; Wippel, “The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 33-39; Peter Furlong, “The Latin Avicenna and Aquinas on the Relationship between God and the Subject of Metaphysics,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83 (2009): 120-140. 136 necessary esse is properly taken up in Book 8, after the determination of the properties of being as being in the intervening books.
Avicenna’s argumentation for the existence of necessary being begins with a stage arguing against an infinite regress of causes in each of the four lines of causality. The conclusion of this first stage of argumentation is that for each of the lines of causality, the series must terminate at a first cause.147 At this point, Avicenna has four first causes, and two questions might arise: (a) whether any of these four first causes is necessary being and (b) whether any of these four first causes can be identified with one another.148 As Houser explains, Avicenna immediately focuses on the first efficient cause, explaining why it is the first efficient cause that is necessary being, while leaving behind the “firsts” in the other lines of causality—by contrast, Thomas will identify God as the first exemplar, efficient, and final cause of all things.149
Avicenna goes about identifying the ultimate first efficient cause with God by arguing that it is evident that the first efficient cause must be necessary and one: the unicity of necessary being was established (then only hypothetically) in Book I of his Metaphysics.150 Avicenna concludes that God is the unique necessary esse and is the efficient cause of the existence of everything distinct from
Himself, which things have only possible esse.151 The necessary existence and unity of God then serve
147 The finitude of efficient and material causes is treated in 8.1-2, and the finitude of final and formal causes is treated in the first part of 8.3. Avicenna introduces the question of God’s existence at the beginning of Philosophia prima 8.1 [Van Riet 2.376]: “Postquam autem pervenimus ad id in hoc libro nostro, oportet ut perficiamus eum per cognitionem primi principii universi esse, inquirentes an sit et an sit unum nec habens compar nec simile, et ut ostendamus ordinem eius in esse, et ordinationem eorum quae sunt praeter ipsum et ordinem eorum et dispositionem reductionis eorum ad ipsum, adiuti auxilio eius. Primum vero quod de hoc incumbit nobis est hoc scilicet ut ostendamus quod causae omnibus modis finitae sunt, et quod in unoquoque ordine earum est principium primum, et quod principium omnium illorum est unum, et quod est discretum ab omnibus quae sunt, ipsum solum ens necesse esse, et quod ab ipso est principium sui esse omnis quod est.” 148 Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 361. 149 Ibid. 150 Philosophia prima 1.7 [Van Riet 1.49-55]. 151 Philosophia prima 8.3 [Van Riet 2.395-96]: “Incipiam ergo et dicam quod, cum dicitur principium primum agens, vel primum principium absolute, necesse est esse unum. Cum autem dicitur causa prima materialis et causa prima formalis et cetera huiusmodi, non est necesse esse unam quemadmodum hoc debet in necesse esse. Nulla enim earum 137 as the starting points from which Avicenna develops his philosophical account of the divine nature—these constitute for Avicenna what we called above the principles from which the order of divine names proceeds. Houser explicates this argumentation in two stages: first, there is an intrinsic account of the divine nature on the basis of Avicenna’s metaphysical principles; second, there is an extrinsic account that relates God to creatures, particularly according to goodness and knowledge.152
In the first stage (8.4-5), Avicenna offers a series of claims concerning God that are seen to follow from His necessary existence and His unity. Following Houser, we can identify ten claims advanced in 8.4 concerning God, in the following order: 153
1. God is in no way multiplied, such that as an individual He is identical with His essence, but not in such a way as to preclude negating things of Him and comparing Him relationally to things with caused esse.154 2. God does not have a quiddity but an “anity” (nisi anitatem).155 3. God is necessary existence itself.156 4. There is no composition of quiddity and existence in God. (By contrast, in everything else, quiddity and existence are distinct and existence is caused.)157 est causa prima absolute, sed necesse esse est principium etiam illarum primarum. Ex hoc igitur et ex eo quod praediximus, manifestum est quod necesse esse unum numero est, et patuit quod, quicquid aliud est ab illo, cum consideratur per se, est possibile in suo esse, et ideo est causatum et paene innotuit quod in causalitate sine dubio pervenitur ad ipsum. Unde quicquid est, excepto uno quod est sibi ipsi unum et ente quod est sibi ipsi ens, est acquirens esse ab alio a se, per quod est sibi esse, non per se.” 152 Houser, “The Language of Being and the Nature of God in Aristotle,” 123. 153 This is a brief summary of the contents of Prima philosophia 8.4, close to that given by Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 362-65. 154 Houser presents Avicenna’s claim more simply as the identity of God and His essence. In context, Avicenna’s purpose is to preclude a misunderstanding of the claim that the divine essence is not multiplied in any way. In this, I would suggest against Houser’s reading of 8.4-5 that one cannot neatly divide these two chapters into (1) what follows from God’s existence and (2) what follows from His unity (see Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 365; the first thing established in 8.4 involves an appeal to divine unity. Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.398]: “Scias autem quod, cum nos dixerimus et probaverimus quod necesse esse nullo modo multiplicatur et quod essentia eius est pure una, purissima vera, non intelligimus per hoc quod ab ipso removeantur omnia quae sunt et quod non habeat relationes ad ea quae sunt; hoc enim impossibile est; ab omni enim quod est, negantur multi et diversi modi essendi, quia quicquid est ad alia quae sunt, habet aliquem modum relationis et comparationis, et praecipue id a quo fluit omne esse; sed, per hoc quod dicimus ipsum esse unius essentiae quae non multiplicatur, intelligimus quod ipsum est sic in sua essentia, et deinde consequuntur ipsum vel relationes affirmativae vel negativae multae, et ipsae sunt comitantes essentiam et sunt causatae essentiae et sunt post esse essentiae, nec sunt constituentes essentiam nec sunt pars eius.” 155 Prima philosophia 8.4 [Van Riet 2.398-99]: “Redibo igitur et dicam quod primum non habet quidditatem nisi anitatem.” 156 Prima philosophia 8.4 [Van Riet 2.399]: “[D]ico quod necesse esse iam intelligit ipsum necesse esse.” 157 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.399]: “Dico igitur quod necesse esse non potest esse eiusmodi ut sit in eo compositio, ita ut sit hic quidditas aliqua quae sit necesse esse et illi quidditati sit intentio aliqua praeter certitudinem eius, 138
5. God has no quiddity.158 6. God has no genus.159 7. God has no differentia.160 8. God has no definition.161 9. There is no demonstration (propter quid) of God, as there is no cause of God.162 10. God is not a (categorical) substance.163
The second thesis, that God (or “the first,” as Avicenna here refers to Him) has no quiddity but an
“anity,” requires some explanation. The Latin anitas is Gundissalinus’s translation—which also looks like a partial transliteration—of the Arabic ’anniyya.164 In the Latin, anitas can be compared to quidditas, as the question an sit is compared to the question quid sit. In form, then, anitas appears to be an abstract noun indicating “whetherness” as opposed to “whatness.” Since an sit is the question of whether a thing exists, there is thus some connection between anitas and existence. Van Riet has indicated in a footnote that anitas can be understood here as esse.165 While it is clear that anitas is closely connected with esse, though, Avicenna in some places seems to distinguish in some way
quae intentio sit necessitas essendi.” The defense of this claim and the claim that other things have a quiddity distinct from existence runs from Van Riet 2.399.02-402.47. 158 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.402]: “Primus igitur non habet quidditatem, sed super habentia quidditates fluit esse ab eo.” For discussion, see Brian J. Shanley, “Commentary,” in Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on the Divine Nature, tr. Brian J. Shanley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 209. 159 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.402]: “Primus etiam non habet genus.” 160 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.403]: “Et ideo non habet differentiam.” 161 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.403]: “[I]deo non habet definitionem.” 162 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.403]: “Nec fit demonstratio de eo quia ipse non habet causam. Similiter non quaeritur de eo quare: tu enim scies postea quod eius actio non habet quare.” See Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 365: “Here Avicenna is speaking of the stronger ‘demonstration of the reasoned fact’ that proceeds from cause to effect; he has already used ‘demonstration of the fact’ to prove God’s existence by proceeding from effect to God as cause.” 163 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.403]. Here Avicenna explains that the meaning of substance is “res habens quidditatem stabilem, cuius esse est esse quod non est in subiecto,” and in this sense God is not a substance as are the things in the category of substance. On the “definition” of substance in Avicenna and Thomas, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 228-234; Etienne Gilson, “Quasi Definitio Substantiae,” St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, ed. Armand Maurer et al. (Toronto: PIMS, 1974), vol. 1, 111-29. 164 Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 362. For discussion of this term, see Albert Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (II),” Angelicum 52.4 (1975): 572 ff. Judy explains (p. 575) that ’anniyya comes from ’an or ’anna, meaning “that,” so it might be construed on the basis of etymology as “thatness.” That anitas appears to be a transliteration of ’anniyya is therefore accidental. 165 Prima philosophia 8.4 n. 84 [Van Riet 2.399]. 139 between them.166 Albert Judy concludes that the Arabic ’anniyya also suggests “presence and individuality,” and he suggests that the best general rendering of ’anniyya/anitas would seem to be
“the individual essence, considered as existent.”167 Houser similarly indicates that ’anniyya can be construed as individual essence or individual existence, and in this case he interprets ’anniyya as meaning “individual existence,” and thus he takes the second thesis to be an initial advancement of the claim that God’s essence or quiddity is one with His existence.168
That Avicenna goes on to deny that God has a quiddity could thus cause some confusion, but we can understand this as the claim that God does not possess a quiddity as something distinct from His invidivual existence: if one attributes quiddity to God, it must be in recognition that His quiddity is not other than His existence. God is thus contrasted with those things which do possess a quiddity that is other than their individual existence (praeter anitatem) and which must therefore be caused.169
Houser rightly observes that the final thesis listed above—that God is not a categorical substance—is perhaps the most significant as regards comparison to Aristotle’s account of separate substance.170 He also notes that the order of presentation here in Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.4 parallels that of Thomas’s ST 1.3, which concerns divine simplicity.171 Houser argues more broadly that the
166 See e.g. Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.401-402]: “Si autem fuerit hoc quod anitas sequatur quidditatem et comitetur eam per se, tunc erit hoc quod anitas in suo esse sequetur esse.” Albert Judy concludes that ’anitas (and the Arabic ’anniyya which underlies it) stands in clear opposition to quidditas, and, although notionally distinct from esse, it is closely related to it and implicated with existence.” Albert Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (II),” Angelicum 52.4 (1975): 574. See also the remarks on ’anniyya/inniyya found in the notes by Olga Lizzini in the recent Italian translation; Lizzini reports possible Latin translations of ’anniyya/inniyya as anitas or simply as esse; Avicenna, Metafisica, tr. Olga Lizzini and Pasquale Porro (Milan: Bompiani, 2002), 1302. 167 Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (II),” 578. 168 Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 362-63. 169 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.401]: “Item dico quod, quicquid habet quidditatem praeter anitatem, causatum est.” 170 Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 365. This is not to say that such a claim is original to Avicenna. 171 Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 368-69. 140
Summa theologiae reflects a more Avicennian order of the divine names, compared to the “more
‘Aristotelian’ order” found in the Summa contra Gentiles.172
In 8.5, Avicenna affirms and repeats much of what has already been established concerning
God, but with an emphasis upon divine unity and those things that follow from unity. Avicenna is primarily concerned with explaining how it is that God is in no way multiplied. At the beginning of
8.4 and at the end of 8.5, Avicenna also emphasizes that God is known through negations and relations, providing another historical source (besides Thomas’s reflections on Damascene) for what we will identify below as the twofold method of the Summa contra Gentiles.173 Houser correctly observes that this twofold Avicennian method can be correlated with the Dionysian triplex via insofar as both the via causalitatis and via eminentiae involve relation or comparison between God and creatures.174 It should be recalled, however, that Thomas (in In Sent. 1.2.1.3) accuses Avicenna of lacking an account of the via eminentiae, attributing to him (along with Maimonides) an impoverished understanding of the via causalitatis and via negationis.175 I will say a little more about Avicenna’s emphasis on negation and relation in the knowledge of God below.
172 Ibid., 368. 173 Philosophia prima 8.4 [Van Riet 2.398]: “Scias autem quod, cum nos dixerimus et probaverimus quod necesse esse nullo modo multiplicatur et quod essentia eius est pure una, purissima vera, non intelligimus per hoc quod ab ipso removeantur omnia quae sunt et quod non habeat relationes ad ea quae sunt; hoc enim impossibile est; ab omni enim quod est, negantur multi et diversi modi essendi, quia quicquid est ad alia quae sunt, habet aliquem modum relationis et comparationis, et praecipue id a quo fluit omne esse; sed, per hoc quod dicimus ipsum esse unius essentiae quae non multiplicatur, intelligimus quod ipsum est sic in sua essentia, et deinde consequuntur ipsum vel relationes affirmativae vel negativae multae, et ipsae sunt comitantes essentiam et sunt causatae essentiae et sunt post esse essentiae, nec sunt constituentes essentiam nec sunt pars eius.” See also Philosophia prima 8.5 [Van Riet 2.411]: “Cum autem designatur eius certitudo, non designatur nisi post anitatem, per negationem consimilium ab ipso et per affirmationem relationum ad ipsum, quoniam omne quod est ab ipso est, et non est communicans ei quod est ab ipso; ipse vero est omne quod est, et tamen non est aliquod ex his.” 174 Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 362 n. 27. 175 See above, pp. 35-37, for discussion. 141
In Metaphysics 8.6-7, Avicenna advances another sequence of divine characteristics, which according to Houser describe God “in relation to creatures and in terms of His primary activities.”176
These divine characteristics are in the following order:177
1. God is perfect and more than perfect.178 2. God is pure goodness.179 3. God is truth.180 4. God is pure intelligence.181 5. God knows Himself primarily and knows other things through knowing Himself, with no multiplicity on His part.182 6. God possesses joy and happiness.183
We can comment briefly on Avicenna’s treatment of each of these divine characteristics.
First, for Avicenna God is perfect, because there cannot be any distinction or gap between
God’s existence and the perfection appropriate to His existence: God’s perfection is not a further actualization beyond His necessary existence. This account of divine perfection could be construed in a purely negative and agnostic manner. Whatever perfection is appropriate to God’s existence, He possesses it as identical with His existence: but this says nothing positively about what belongs to the divine perfection. The only possible indication against such a purely negative reading is that
176 Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 365. 177 This is again a brief summary of Avicenna, following Houser’s presentation. Ibid., 365-66. 178 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.412]: “Necesse esse est perfectum esse. Nam nihil deest sibi de suo esse et de perfectionibus sui esse, nec aliquid generis sui esse egreditur ab esse eius ad aliud a se, sicut egreditur ab alio a se, verbi gratia ab homine: multa etiam de perfectionibus sui esse desunt unicuique homini et etiam sua humanitas invenitur in alio a se. Sed necesse esse est plus quam perfectum, quia ipsum esse quod est ei non est ei tantum, immo etiam omne esse est exuberans ab eius esse et est eius et fluit ab illo.” 179 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.412]: “Necesse esse per se est bonitas pura.” 180 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.413]: “Quicquid autem est necesse esse est veritas; veritas enim cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; igitur nihil est dignius esse veritatem quam necesse esse.” 181 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.414]: “Et [est] intelligentia pura, quoniam est essentia separata a materia omni modo.” 182 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.415-19]. 183 Philosophia prima 8.7 [Van Riet 2.432-33]. 142
Avicenna notes, in explaining why God is more than perfect, that all other esse is “an overflow from
His esse and is His (of Him) and flows from Him.”184
Second, Avicenna subordinates the notion of divine goodness to that of divine perfection, an example that Thomas will follow, especially in the Summa theologiae. Avicenna’s first argument for
God’s goodness begins with an appeal to the notion of the good as that which all things desire. He then immediately notes that what things desire is “existence and the perfection of existence” as such; understood in this way, “existence is pure goodness and pure perfection.”185 This leads Avicenna to conclude that “therefore necessary existence in itself alone is pure goodness.”186 Avicenna’s first argument for divine goodness appeals to the transcendental character of goodness: esse is goodness, and so necessary esse is pure goodness. I will later explain, in discussion of ST 1.6, that contrary to what one might expect, Thomas’s argument for the divine goodness does not turn on the transcendental character of goodness in this explicit way.
In his second argument for divine goodness, Avicenna emphasizes God’s beneficence as the first efficient cause rather than God’s identity as the ultimate final cause.187 This is consistent with the manner in which Avicenna derives all his claims concerning God from God’s role as the first efficient cause of existence. As Houser notes, this serves as a point of contrast with Aristotle, for whom the unmoved mover is a final cause, but it also differs from what we find with Thomas, who
184 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.412]: “Sed necesse esse est plus quam perfectum, quia ipsum esse quod est ei non est ei tantum, immo etiam omne esse est exuberans ab eius esse et est eius et fluit ab illo.” 185 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.412]: “Necesse esse per se est bonitas pura, et bonitatem desiderat omnino quicquid est; id autem quod desiderat omnis res est esse et perfectio esse, inquantum est esse. . . Id igitur quod vere desideratur est esse, et ideo esse est bonitas pura et perfectio pura.” 186 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.413]: “Igitur bonitas pura non est nisi necesse esse per se.” 187 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.413]: “Dicitur etiam bonitas id quod attribuit rebus suas perfectiones et suas bonitates. Iam autem claruit quod oportet ut necesse esse per se attribuat omne esse et omnem perfectionem essendi; hoc igitur modo est etiam bonitas cui non subintrat imperfectio nec malitia.” Cf. Houser, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” 366. 143 in the Summa theologiae identifies God as the universal exemplar, efficient, and final cause of all creatures.188
Third, Avicenna argues that God is truth in two ways. The first argument, again, appeals immediately to the transcendental character of truth: “Whatever is necessary esse is truth, for the truth of each thing is the peculiar character of its esse that is established for it; therefore nothing is truth more worthily than necessary esse.”189 The second argument begins from another way of understanding truth, as certain judgment concerning something’s esse. As God’s esse is the object of certain judgment with a permanence that is entirely through Himself and not from anything else, He is truth more worthily than anything else.190
Fourth, Avicenna argues that God is pure intelligence because He is “separated from matter in every way.”191 We noted above in our discussion of In Sent. 1.2.1.3 that Thomas attributes to
Avicenna a version of the via negationis that involves argumentation for a given divine name from a previous negation. One of the examples Thomas gives is arguing for divine intelligence from immateriality, and Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.6 is the source for this.192 As we shall see, a version of this argument is employed by Thomas in all three of his treatises on God; and in both the Compendium
188 To be precise, Thomas asserts that God is the first exemplar, efficient, and final cause of all goodness: ST 1.6.4 [Leon. 4.70]: “Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis.” 189 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.413]: “Quicquid autem est necesse esse est veritas; veritas enim cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; igitur nihil est dignius esse veritatem quam necesse esse.” 190 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.413]: “Iam etiam dicitur veritas id de cuius esse est certa sententia; igitur nihil est dignius hac certitudine quam id de cuius esse est sententia certa, et cum sua certitudine est semper et cum sua sempiternitate est per seipsum, non per aliud a se.” There is some ambiguity in the Latin Avicenna’s formulation, where it seems that truth is “that concerning whose esse there is certain judgment,” with the emphasis on esse as that which true judgment concerns. But Marmura (p. 284) gives this text as: “‘Truth’ is also said of the veridical belief in the existence [of something]. Hence nothing is more worthy of this reality than [the object] of veridical belief who, in addition to [being the object of] the veridical [belief], has permanence—with His permanence being due to Himself, not to another.” In this reading, it is the certain judgment concerning esse that is called truth. 191 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.414]: “Et [est] intelligentia pura, quoniam est essentia separata a materia omni modo.” 192 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.68]: “Similiter ex hoc ipso quod est immaterialis, est intelligens.” 144 theologiae and Summa theologiae, it is in fact the only argument advanced for divine knowledge or intelligence.
Fifth, concerning God’s knowledge, Avicenna agrees with Aristotle that in God knower, act of knowing, and known are all absolutely identical,193 but he adds to this that God knows other things (albeit in a universal way) through knowing Himself insofar as He is their cause.194 Avicenna’s primary concern in discussing the many objects of God’s knowledge is to preserve God’s absolute unity, and he transitions smoothly in Metaphysics 8.7 into explaining how the many divine names do not introduce multiplicity into God either.
In this context he asserts that “the primary characteristic (prima proprietas) of necessary esse is that He is and that He is being.” As regards the other characteristics (de aliis proprietatibus), “there are some in which the meaning is esse with a relation, and others in which this [meaning is] esse with a negation; but neither of these two makes it so that there must be multiplicity or variation in any way in His essence.”195 Avicenna seems to appropriate here the Aristotelian logical claim that a proper attribute—as distinguished from the essential attribute—includes the essential attribute in its definition. However, Avicenna clarifies that the only things that other divine characteristics besides esse add to esse is either a relation or a negation.196 He then offers a few examples to clarify his
193 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.414]: “Sed, quia est intelligentia per se et est etiam intellectum per se, tunc etiam est intellectum a se; igitur ipse est intelligentia apprehensionis et intelligens apprehensor et intellectum apprehensum.” 194 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.418-19]: “Sed necesse esse non intelligit quicquid est, nisi universaliter, et tamen cum hoc non deest ei aliquod singulare, et ideo ‘non deest ei id quod minimum est in caelis et in terra,’ et hoc est de mirabilibus quod non potest imaginare nisi qui fuerit subtilis ingenii. Sed quomodo sit hoc, ratio haec est: quia enim ipse seipsum intelligit et quod ipse est principium omnis quod est, utique intelligit principia eorum quae sunt ab eo et quicquid nascitur ab eis, et quod quicquid est ex rebus omnino est necessarium esse propter eum.” 195 Philosophia prima 8.7 [Van Riet 2.429-30]: “Et cum certus fueris quod prima proprietas de necesse esse est quia est et quia est ens, scies deinde quod de aliis proprietatibus quaedam sunt in quibus intentio est esse cum relatione et quaedam sunt hoc esse cum negatione; nulla autem harum duarum facit in sua essentia debere esse multitudinem ullo modo nec variationem.” 196 The parallel between this account of divine names and Thomas’s account of the transcendentals in De veritate 1.1 is striking. 145 meaning; here is a selection of some of these examples, which clarify what a given divine name means beyond affirming necessary esse:197
1. When one calls God a substance, one negates esse in a subject. 2. When one calls God one, one negates division. 3. When one calls God an intelligence, one negates mixture with matter, with the understanding of some sort of relation to the things God knows besides Himself. 4. When one calls God first, one affirms a relation to the universe. 5. When one calls God powerful, one affirms a relation to that whose existence is caused by Him. 6. When one calls God good, one negates admixture with potency and imperfection; or one affirms a relation, insofar as God is the source of every perfection and all order.
Among these examples, Avicenna also mentions the names living, willing, and liberal. 198 This text would seem to be the source for Thomas’s characterization of Avicenna in In Sent. 1.2.1.3, that
Avicenna understands the divine attributes in terms of the via negationis and via causalitatis, but not in terms of the via eminentiae. In the case of the name good in particular, Avicenna understands it only to negate potency and imperfection and to affirm God as the cause of perfection and order.
Sixth, finally, Avicenna treats divine joy (delectatio). He first observes that God “possesses beauty and pure splendor, and He is the principle of the beauty of every thing.”199 Avicenna then explains that “enjoyment is nothing but the apprehension of the suitable insofar as it is suitable,” such that sensible enjoyment concerns what is suitable to the senses, and intellectual enjoyment concerns what is suitable to the intellect. God possesses supreme intellectual enjoyment because He is the supreme intelligence who knows in a supreme mode Himself as the supreme object.200 Like
197 Philosophia prima 8.7 [Van Riet 2.430-31]. 198 I have omitted Avicenna’s explanations of living (vivus), willing (volens), and liberal (liberalis) from this list because of a lacuna in the Latin Avicenna as compared to the Arabic text. In the Arabic text, the discussions of willing and liberal both presuppose the discussion of living; but in the Latin text, a lacuna makes it so that the discussions of living and willing run together in a somewhat confusing manner. Cf. Marmura 296.23-33, Lizzini-Porro 835, and Van Riet 2.430-31.36-42. 199 Philosophia prima 8.7 [Van Riet 2.431]: “Igitur necesse esse habet pulchritudinem et decorem purum, et ipsum est principium pulchritudinis omnis rei.” 200 Philosophia prima 8.7 [Van Riet 2.432]: “[Q]uoniam delectatio non est nisi apprehensio convenientis secundum quod est conveniens; unde sensibilis delectatio est sensibilitas convenientis, et intelligibilis est ut intelligat 146
Avicenna, Thomas will conclude his discussion of the divine names in ST 1.26 with a discussion of divine beatitude.
I would offer one final observation about Avicenna and his influence on Thomas with regard to the divine names. I will later argue that one major contrast between the Summa contra
Gentiles and the Summa theologiae concerns which argument for God’s existence plays the dominant role in the subsequent argumentation for the divine names. As we shall see, SCG 1 attempts, as far as possible, to ground everything said philosophically about God in the conclusion of the argument from motion, i.e., in God’s immutability. By contrast, in the Summa theologiae, the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality—that God is the first, uncaused cause—becomes dominant as the principle for the subsequent argumentation. We can identify Avicenna as an important historical source for the problematic that informs this point of contrast.
Avicenna is insistent that an argument that seeks a cause of motion cannot terminate in knowledge of necessary esse as the cause of created esse, as one must sharply distinguish between an efficient cause of esse (which is the metaphysician’s understanding of efficient causality) and an efficient cause of motion (which pertains to the natural philosopher).201 In other words, natural philosophy of the sort presented by Aristotle’s Physics is not adequate for demonstrating God’s existence, but only the existence of a mover that need not be the metaphysical cause of being. As I indicated above, Albert expresses a broadly similar concern about the limits of a philosophical knowledge that begins with motion as an effect. Although Albert does allow that philosophers can demonstrate God’s existence and unity from motion, nevertheless they cannot demonstrate any of
conveniens. Iam ergo primus est excellentior apprehensor cum excellentiore apprehensione excellentioris apprehensi, et ideo est excellentior delectator cum excellentiore delectatione in excellentiore delectato, et hoc est in quo nihil comparatur ei.” 201 See Philosophia prima 1.1 [Van Riet 1.4-5], 6.1 [Van Riet 2.291-92]. 147 the positive attributes on this basis.202 I will suggest in the next chapter that SCG 1 represents
Thomas’s attempt to accomplish as far as possible what Avicenna and Albert held to be impossible, to ground everything said positively about the divine essence in the conclusion of the argument from motion.203
4. THE ORDER IN PETER THE LOMBARD’S SENTENCES AND IN THOMAS’S
COMMENTARY
Finally, we come to a brief consideration of the order of the divine names found in Book I of the Sentences of Peter the Lombard and particularly in Thomas’s first Commentary on that work.204
I will also make a few remarks about differences in the incomplete second Commentary, the Lectura romana, with the necessary caveat about its questionable authenticity. As indicated by the prooemium to the entire Summa theologiae, Thomas came to regard the Sentences and commentaries upon it as deficient with respect to the order of learning. A brief survey of the order of topics in Book I of the
Sentences and in Thomas’s Commentary will bear this out.
202 See Albert, In II Sent. d. 1 a. 8 [Borgnet 27.22]: “Dicendum, quod creatio proprie est opus divinum. Nobis autem videtur mirabile, eo quod non possumus in id, quia non subjacet demonstrationi rationis: et ideo etiam Philosophi non cognoverunt ipsum, nisi forte aliquis ex dictis Prophetarum: sed per demonstrationem nullus unquam investigavit ipsum. Apud aliquos quidem inveniuntur quaedam rationes probabiles: sed non probant sufficienter.” Cf. Albert, In I Sent. d. 3 a. 1 ad 1 & ad 2; d. 3 a. 2 [Borgnet 25.93]; Albert, In De div. nom. c. 1 [Cologne 37/1.8], cited above in c. 2 of this dissertation. This issue is connected with the question of whether, for Albert, the philosophers can demonstrate creation. See Timothy Noone, “The Originality of St. Thomas’s Position on the Philosophers and Creation,” The Thomist 60 (1996): 275-300, esp. nn. 30-34. Cf. Timothy Noone, “Albert the Great on the Subject of Metaphysics and Demonstrating the Existence of God,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 2 (1992): 31-52. Noone observes that even in his relatively early Physica (c. 1251), Albert hints that perhaps “the metaphysician would use efficient causality as one of the means by which to reach the First Cause” (p. 51, n. 39). For my purposes, all that is necessary is that we recognize in both Avicenna and Albert the limits of what can be demonstrated about God when one begins from the argument from motion. 203 I will set aside the controversial question of whether Thomas’s presentations of the argument from motion remain arguments from within natural philosophy or if they are instead properly metaphysical arguments. Even if Thomas transforms the argument from motion into a metaphysical argument, still in doing this he would go beyond Avicenna, who preferred only to advance an argument from efficient causality for the necessary being. 204 For general treatments of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, see Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard (Leiden: Brill, 1994), esp. vol. 1, pp. 227-302 for treatment of Sentences 1; Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. pp. 71-92 for treatment of Sentences 1. See also the short study on St. Thomas’s philosophy within his Commentary on the Sentences: Battista Mondin, St. Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy in the Commentary to the Sentences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). 148
The order of topics concerning divine names (including those found in sections primarily focused on the Trinity) in Thomas’s Commentary on Book I is as follows: the unity of God (In Sent.
1.2.1.1), the plurality of attributes (1.2.1.2-3), the existence of God (1.3 div.), the possibility of knowledge of God by created intellect (1.3.1.1), that God’s existence is not per se notum (1.3.1.2), the possibility of knowing God from creatures (1.3.1.3), [questions on the Trinity], whether esse is said properly of God (1.8.1.1), qui est as the first among divine names (1.8.1.3), eternity (1.8.2), immutability (1.8.3), simplicity (1.8.4), [Trinity], eternity (1.19.2), truth (1.19.5), [Trinity], the nameability of God (1.22.1), person as a divine name (1.23.1), unity (1.24.1), [Trinity], temporal names (1.30.1), [Trinity], knowledge (1.35-36), omnipresence (1.37.1-2), knowledge (1.38, 1.39.1), providence (1.39.2), predestination (1.40), election of the saints (1.41), power (1.42), infinite power
(1.43.1), justice (1.43.2.2), will (1.45-47).205 Fundamentally, the order here is determined by the
Lombard’s text, in which various questions concerning the divine essence are subordinated within a structure that is primarily concerned with questions about the Trinity.206
Several features of the order within Thomas’s first Commentary stand out. First, a number of times Thomas treats a given divine name out of place with respect to the order of discovery (at least as he presents this in his personal works): the most obvious example of this is In Sent. 1.2.1.1, in which Thomas answers the question of whether there is only one God before he has considered argumentation for the conclusion that God exists, which occurs in the divisio textus of In Sent. 1.3. In a similar manner, eternity is treated in d. 8 q. 2, before immutability in the following question; the
205 See the Index distinctionum, quaestionum et articulorum [Mand. 1.1093-1116]. 206 Peter announces the purpose of the first book of the Sentences with reference to the larger structure of the entire work, which is based on two Augustinian distinctions: that between things and signs, and among things between things to be enjoyed and things to be used. Book I concerns the Trinity, as the divine persons are to be enjoyed. See Sentences d. 1, c. 3 [Mand. 1.30]: “Omnium ergo quae dicta sunt, ex quo de rebus specialiter tractavimus, haec summa est, quod aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. . . . [A]ntequam de signis tractemus, agendum est, ac primum de rebus quibus fruendum est, scilicet de sancta atque individua Trinitate.” 149 omnipotence of the Son is treated in d. 20 q. 1 a. 1, before the omnipotence of God is treated beginning in d. 43; and providence (d. 39) and predestination (d. 40) are treated before the divine will (d. 45-47). Second, the frequent alternation between questions about the divine essence and questions about the Trinity—as well as the occasional question about the soul or angels—runs counter to Thomas’s order of procedure in the three summae, in which questions about the Trinity presuppose the establishment of certain claims concerning the simplicity, intelligence, and will of the divine essence. Third, a number of divine names are not the subject of any extended treatment. For example, perfection, goodness, infinity—which are treated together in order in the Prima pars—and beatitude are not the subject of any specific questions or articles.207
The best sources for identifying what order Thomas discerns in the Lombard’s text are in his prooemium to the whole work and in the divisiones textus attached to Peter’s prologue and to each distinction. With regard to the Sentences as a whole, Thomas’s prooemium explains that the content of the Sentences is divided into four topics that fall under the wisdom of God, with reference to Sirach
24:40 as providing the schema for the organization.208 Thomas’s first remarks on the wisdom of God concern the issue of the appropriation of this essential attribute to the person of the Son.209 The four topics (which Thomas associates with the four books of the Sentences) are “the manifestation of
207 Thomas does incorporate discussion of perfection in his Commentary on dd. 2 & 8, but it is not the explicit subject of any question or article. 208 The Latin text from Sirach reads: “Ego sapientia effudi flumina; ego quasi trames aquae immensae de fluvio; ego quasi fluvius Diorix, et sicut aquaeductus exivi de paradiso. Dixi: Rigabo hortum plantationum, et inebriabo partus mei fructum” (In Sent pr. [Mand. 1.1]). Here Thomas follows a common procedure for the prooemium to a Sentences commentary, by offering a quotation from the sacred scriptures that provides an explanatory schema for the organization of the four books of the Sentences. For comparison, see Albert, who cites Sirach 24:5-6 (Albert, In I Sent. pr. [Borgnet 25.1]), and Bonaventure, who cites Job 28:44 (Bonaventure, In I Sent. pr. [Quaracchi 1.1]). 209 In brief, the appropriation of an essential attribute is its special association with one or another of the divine persons, even though, as an essential attribute, it is common to all three of the persons. Thomas treats the appropriation of the attributes in ST 1.39.7-8 [Leon. 4.407-410]. 150 hidden truths about the divine,”210 “the production of creatures,”211 “the work of restoration,”212 and
“the pefection by which things are preserved in their end.”213 Concerning the first, it is in particular the mystery of the Trinity that was hidden (albeit reflected somehow in creaturely likenesses and in the enigmatic expressions of the Old Testament) before Christ’s revelation, and so Thomas says that the manifestation of the Trinity is treated by Book I of the Sentences.214
In In Sent. 1.1 div., Thomas attributes to Peter a concern for establishing and following an order of procedure (ordo agendi) based on the adoption of the Augustinian distinction between things and signs. This order pertains to the whole of the Sentences, as Peter assigns the treatment of things
(the Trinity, creation, and the Incarnation) to the first three books and the treatment of signs (the
Sacraments) to the fourth. In the divisio textus of Bk. I d. 2, Thomas explains that the content of sacra doctrina concerns God “either as the principle or as the end. . .; this doctrine will consider things, insofar as they proceed from God as from a principle, and insofar as they are returned to Him as to an end.”215 Thomas then proceeds to give two different outlines of the content of the Sentences (and of Bk. I in particular): an abbreviated one based on the Augustinian distinction between things and signs, and a more thorough one based on this exitus-reditus structure.
I would highlight two features of the outline based on exitus-reditus. First, both the Trinitarian processions (procession in the unity of the divine essence) and creation (procession into a diversity
210 Thomas first references all four topics before proceeding to elaborate on the first. In Sent. pr. [Mand. 1.1]: “Per sapientiam enim Dei manifestantur divinorum abscondita, producuntur creaturarum opera, nec tantum producuntur, sed restaurantur et perficiuntur: illa, dico, perfectione qua unumquodque perfectum dicitur, prout proprium finem attingit. Quod autem manifestatio divinorum pertineat ad Dei sapientiam, patet ex eo quod ipse Deus per suam sapientiam seipsum plene et perfecte cognoscit.” 211 In Sent. pr. [Mand.1.2]: “Secundum quod pertinet ad Dei sapientiam est creaturarum productio.” 212 In Sent. pr. [Mand. 1.3]: “Tertium, quod pertinet ad Dei sapientiam, est operum restauratio.” 213 In Sent. pr. [Mand. 1.4]: “Quartum, quod ad Dei sapientiam pertinet, est perfectio, qua res conservantur in suo fine.” 214 In Sent. pr. [Mand. 1.1-2]. 215 In Sent. 1.2 div. [Mand. 1.57]: “Cum enim, ut supra dictum est, sacrae doctrinae intentio sit circa divina; divinum autem sumitur secundum relationem ad Deum, vel ut principium, vel ut finem. . .; consideratio hujus doctrinae erit de rebus, secundum quod exeunt a Deo ut a principio, et secundum quod referuntur in ipsum ut in finem.” 151 of essence) fall under the exitus side of this structure. Second, Thomas notes that the unity of the divine essence and Trinity of Persons are treated from d. 2 to d. 34; and that beginning with d. 35,
Peter treats “of certain attributes in terms of which the causality of the divine persons with respect to the production of creatures is accomplished, namely of knowledge, power, and will.”216 The discussion of these divine attributes in the Sentences is not propadeutic for consideration of the
Trinity. Rather, they are considered exclusively in a manner that looks forward to Book II’s consideration of creation. Indeed, when Thomas discusses filiation and spiration, he must do so without having previously treated divine intellect or will. As noted above, this runs contrary to his procedure in the Summa theologiae.
Within the structure of Sentences 1, as Thomas reads it, it is primarily d. 8 that discusses the unity of the divine essence in a manner propadeutic for the consideration of the Trinity in dd. 9-
34;217 and as just stated, dd. 35-48 concern divine attributes such as knowledge, power, and will as preparatory for the discussion of creation.
With regard to d. 8, in this text the Lombard discusses “the truth, ‘property’ (proprietas), immutability, and simplicity of the essence of God,”218 a list that Thomas simplifies by noting that for Peter the veritas and proprietas of the divine essence amount to the same thing. Here we can helpfully note one of the definitions of truth considered by Thomas in the later De ver. 1.1, a definition Thomas attributes to Avicenna: “The truth of each thing is the proper characteristic
216 Ibid.: “[I]n secunda determinantur attributa quaedam, ex quorum rationibus completur causalitas in divinis personis respectu productionis creaturarum, scilicet de scientia, potentia, voluntate.” 217 In Sent. 1.8 div. [Mand. 1.193]: “Ostensa Trinitate personarum in unitate essentiae, hic incipit prosequi determinationem suam de his quae pertinent ad utrumque. Sunt autem in divinis tria, scilicet essentia communis, persona distincta, proprietas distinguens. . . [I]n prima determinat de essentia; in secunda de personis, IX dist. . . . Prima in tres, secundum tria attributa essentiae, quae prosequitur: primo enim determinat de essentiae unitate; secundo de incommutabilitate . . .; tertio de simplicitate.” 218 Sentences 1 d. 8 cap. 1 [Grottaferrata: 1.95]: “Nunc de veritate sive proprietate et incommutabilitate atque simplicitate divinae naturae vel substantiae sive essentiae agendum est.” 152
(proprietas) of its existence that is established for it.”219 This connection between truth, proprietas, and esse helps to under why Thomas begins his commentary on d. 8 with questions about the divine esse.
Thomas poses the question of why Peter only treats these divine characteristics, and he answers this question as follows:
And it must be said that the Master intends to treat only those things that pertain to the perfection of the divine esse, insofar as it is perfect esse. But perfect can be understood in three ways: in one way insofar as privation or non-being is excluded; and this [sort of] perfection is treated through truth or property (which are taken for the same thing, as was said). Or [perfect can be understood] insofar as potentiality is excluded; and immutability is posited with respect to this [perfection]. Or with respect to the integrity of His esse, with respect to which simplicity is posited: since whatever is in the simple is its very esse.220
Thomas finds Peter’s consideration of these three divine characteristics to be unified by the notion of perfection. From the earliest part of his career, Thomas deems it necessary to introduce the notion of perfection in order to bring unity and order to discourse about the divine.
Under the heading of the truth and property of the divine essence, Thomas treats divine esse and eternity, first posing in In Sent. 1.8.1.1 the question of whether esse is said properly of God. In the sed contra, he cites both Exodus 3:14 as well as Damascene and Maimonides in favor of the superiority of the name qui est as a maximally proper divine name.221 The priority of qui est as a name is then defended in In Sent. 1.8.1.3, a famous text concerning the transcendentals in which Thomas defends the priority of qui est as a divine name from the logical priority of being as compared to one,
219 De ver. 1.1 [Leon. 22/1*2.6]: “Veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei.” For the source in Avicenna, see Philosophia prima 8.6, where Avicenna is discussing truth as a characteristic of necesse esse; [Van Riet 2.413]: “Quicquid autem est necesse esse est veritas; veritas enim cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; igitur nihil est dignius esse veritatem quam necesse esse.” For discussion, see Wippel, “Truth in Thomas Aquinas,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 78-79. 220 In Sent. 1.8 exp. [Mand. 1.208]: “Et dicendum, quod Magister intendit tantum ea tangere quae pertinent ad perfectionem divini esse, inquantum est esse perfectum. Perfectio autem esse potest attendi tripliciter: vel secundum quod excluditur privatio vel non esse; et ista perfectio tangitur per veritatem vel proprietatem, quae pro eodem sumuntur, ut dictum est. Vel secundum quod excluditur potentialitas; et quantum ad hoc ponitur immutabilitas. Vel quantum ad integritatem ipsius esse; et quantum ad hoc ponitur simplicitas: quia quidquid est in simplici, est ipsum suum esse.” 221 In Sent. 1.8.1.1 [Mand. 1.194]. 153 true, and good. This is the text to which Aertsen appeals to justify his claim that “[t]he order among these four names is based on the order of the communissima.”222 We will critically evaluate this thesis about the relationship between the order of the divine names and the order of the transcendentals in c. 6 of this dissertation. Thomas then treats divine eternity beginning in In Sent. 1.8.2.1, prompted by
Peter’s citation of St. Jerome, who says that “God only is, He who does not know ‘was’ or ‘will be.’”223 Thomas asks whether the Boethian definition of eternity is sufficient (1.8.2.1), whether eternity belongs to God alone (1.8.2.2), and whether temporal words can be said of God (1.8.2.3).
We will see that the strong emphasis on the Boethian meaning of eternity is found in CT and ST but not in SCG.224 Concerning divine eternity, it should also be noted that in In Sent. 1.19.2.1, Thomas argues that eternity is the very substance of God, thus seeming to treat it as a positive notion and not just as the negation of temporality or of limited duration. However, in the reply to the third objection, Thomas explains that eternity is not as a divine name quite like goodness or being, since eternity names the mode of duration that is exclusively God’s rather than anything analogically common to God and creatures.225 We shall see a similar treatment of divine eternity as a positive notion in ST 1.10.2, in which Thomas will conclude not only that God is eternal but that He is His eternity.226
222 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 363. 223 Sentences I d. 8 [Mand. 1.187]: “Deus autem est, qui non novit fuisse vel futurum esse.” 224 As we shall see, the Boethian meaning of eternity as simultaneous possession of endless life is referenced in passing in SCG 1.15, but only as part of an argument for the weaker claim that God has no beginning or end—this sempiternity is what we might call the Aristotelian notion of eternity. 225 In Sent. 1.19.2.1 ad 3 [Mand. 1.469]: “Perfectioni autem participatae duplex nomen imponitur. Vel secundum rationem communem perfectionis illius; et tunc nomen est commune et ipsi principio communicanti et omnibus participantibus, secundum analogiam, sicut bonitas, entitas et hujusmodi. Vel secundum proprium modum quo recipitur vel est in aliqua creatura, ut patet quod cognitio participatur a Deo in omnibus cognoscentibus, et hoc nomen ‘sensus’ imponitur ad significandum cognitionem secundum aliquem modum determinatum habendi ipsam, et propter hoc non est commune omnibus. Similiter aeternitas nominat durationem secundum illum modum quo est in principio suo: et ideo aliae durationes participatae non dicuntur nomine aeternitatis.” 226 ST 1.10.2 [Leon. 4.96]: “Deus autem est suum esse uniforme: unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas.” 154
Contrary to his order of procedure in his personal treatises on God, Thomas follows the order found in the Lombard’s text by treating divine immutability after eternity. Thomas argues for
God’s immutability in In Sent. 1.8.3.1 from God’s being pure act,227 a notion that Thomas has referenced in several texts previously in his Commentary, but without having offered any argument for the assertion.228
Completing his treatment of the triplet of divine names inspired by Peter’s d. 8, Thomas then takes up the divine simplicity, offering just three articles concerning whether God is simple in every way, whether God is in the category of substance, and whether other categories are predicated of God. (After this follows a series of questions about whether and in what way certain creatures are simple; only the first of these touches directly on divine simplicity, by asking whether any creature is simple, which amounts to asking whether God alone is simple in the strictest sense.) The argumentation for God’s absolute simplicity is brief, occurring in three sed contra arguments without a distinct responsio.229 In 1.8.4.2, Thomas offers four reasons for the claim that God is not in the category of substance, a claim that Peter does advance in the text, following Augustine. Thomas briefly treats the argument in the Lombard’s text, which appeals to the notion of substanding as the meaning of substance.230 Thomas gives his lengthiest attention to a “more subtle argument from
Avicenna,” which argues for the composition of essence and esse in everything that belongs to a genus; because God is His very esse, He cannot belong to a genus.231 Although the thesis that God is
227 In Sent. 1.8.2.2 [Mand. 1.211]: “Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis motus vel mutatio, quocumque modo dicatur, consequitur aliquam possibilitatem, cum motus sit actus existentis in potentia. Cum igitur Deus sit actus purus, nihil habens de potentia admixtum non potest in eo esse aliqua mutatio.” 228 See In Sent. 1.2.1.1 ad 2, ad 3 [Mand. 1.61]; 1.4.1.1 sed contra 2 [Mand. 1.131]. 229 In Sent. 1.8.4.1 [Mand. 1.218-19]. 230 In Sent. 1.8.4.2 [Mand. 1.221]: “Prima ponitur in littera ex parte nominis sumpta. Nomen enim substantiae imponitur a substando; Deus autem nulli substat.” 231 In Sent. 1.8.4.2 [Mand. 1.222]: “Tertia ratio subtilior est Avicennae. . . . Omne quod est in genere, habet quidditatem differentem ab esse, sicut homo; humanitati enim ex hoc quod est humanitas, non debetur esse in actu; potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit. Et ratio hujus est, quia commune, quod praedicatur 155 not in the category of substance is not original to Avicenna, Thomas prefers Avicenna’s argumentation.
In In Sent. 1.8.4.3, Thomas asks whether any other category besides substance is predicated of God; following Augustine and Peter, Thomas defends the thesis that “everything that is said about God is said either according to substance or according to relation.”232 As a complement to the thesis that God is not contained in the genus of substance, it must nevertheless be said that certain names are predicated of God secundum rationem generis with respect to both substance and relation (or in other words according to the modus predicandi of substance or relation). As we saw above, (the
Latin) Damascene insists that positive divine names such as good and just do not show or express the divine essence, but signify only divine operatio.
As noted above, beginning in d. 35, Thomas follows Peter in treating divine attributes such as knowledge, will, and power; again, these are presented in preparation for Book II’s discussion of creation. As far as the order goes, Thomas discusses divine knowledge and the divine ideas in dd.
35-36 and 38-39, with a discussion of God’s omnipresence intervening in d. 37. From the end of d.
39 to d. 41, Thomas offers questions on providence, predestination, and election. In dd. 42-44 there are questions on the divine power, and finally from dd. 45-48 there are questions about divine will.
Thomas offers his remarks concerning the reason for the content and the order he discerns within the Lombard’s treatment of these divine attributes in In Sent. 1.35 div. In this text, Thomas first explains that Peter is concerned with those characteristics that belong to God as a perfect
de his quae sunt in genere, praedicat quidditatem, cum genus et species praedicentur in eo quod quid est. Illi autem quidditati non debetur esse nisi per hoc quod suscepta est in hoc vel in illo. Et ideo quidditas generis vel speciei non communicatur secundum unum esse omnibus, sed solum secundum unam rationem communem. Unde constat quod esse suum non est quidditas sua. In Deo autem esse suum est quidditas sua: aliter enim accideret quidditati, et ita esset acquisitum sibi ab alio, et non haberet esse per essentiam suam. Et ideo Deo non potest esse in aliquo genere.” 232 In Sent. 1.8.4.3 s.c., quoting from De Trinitate 5.8 [Mand. 1.224]: “‘Omne quod de Deo dicitur, aut secundum substantiam aut secundum relationem dicitur.” 156 efficient principle, as compared to the sort of efficient principles “that act through the necessity of nature,” whose character is constituted only by “power and perfect virtue, which the effect follows unless there be some impediment in the recipient.” Power alone is not a sufficient account of the manner in which God is the efficient principle of creatures, because He acts through will, which in turns requires knowledge.233 Concerning the order of these three attributes—knowledge, power, and will—Thomas offers the following:
The reason for the order is that knowledge extends itself to more things than power; for [knowledge] is of both good things and of evil things, of which power is not; [power in turn] also extends itself to more things than will, since will is only with respect to those good things which are, will be, or were; but power beyond this concerns an infinity of other things that [He] could make.234
It should be clear from Thomas’s assertions here that he is speaking about divine knowledge, power, and will in particular rather than about how common these characteristics are among creatures: it is the divine power and will that simply cannot do or will evil things and the divine power that
“concerns an infinity of other things that [God] could make.” Thomas articulates the order of these names in Peter’s presentation as arising from the respective ranges of objects for the divine knowledge, power, and will (considered as the characteristics of God according to which He is the efficient principle of creatures). God knows evil things, but He cannot make evil things or will evil; and there are many things that God could make, but He only wills those that He actually does make.
233 In Sent. 1.35 div. [Mand. 1.806]: “Antequam de creaturis determinet, prosequitur ea in quibus consistit perfecta ratio principii, secundum quod Deus creaturarum dicitur principium. Ratio autem principii efficientis in his quae agunt per necessitatem naturae sufficienter consistit in potentia et virtute perfecta, quam consequitur effectus, nisi sit impedimentum ex parte recipientis. Sed hoc non sufficit in his quae agunt per voluntatem; immo supra hoc exigitur scientia et voluntas, ut ostendit Philosophus in IX Metaph.” I have been unable to locate any such claim about the need for will in Metaphysics 9 or in Thomas’s Commentary on Metaphysics 9. Thomas may be referring to the discussion of rational potencies in Metaphysics 9.2. 234 In Sent. 1.35 div. [Mand. 1.806]: “Ratio autem ordinis est, quia scientia ad plura se extendit quam potentia; est enim tam bonorum quam malorum, quorum non est potentia; quae etiam ad plura se extendit quam voluntas, quia voluntas est tantum respectu illorum bonorum quae sunt, vel erunt, vel fuerunt; sed potentia ulterius est infinitorum aliorum quae facere posset.” 157
I would offer two final points concerning the treatment of knowledge, power, and will in the
Sentences and Thomas’s first Commentary. First, Peter treats divine omnipresence in d. 37, noting that it seems fitting to discuss how God is in all things after having discussed how all things are in
God through knowledge; 235 Thomas repeats this rationale in his division of the text.236 Second,
Thomas also explains that Peter subordinates providence, predestination, and election to the discussion of divine knowledge, because predestination is a sort of divine knowledge that carries special difficulty.237
Before leaving behind the Sentences, we should say a brief word about some of the differences in the incomplete Commentary recently edited and published under the title Lectura romana. As noted previously, there is some controversy about the authenticity of this work; so mentions of its content here should be taken as provisional. Also, as the Lectura romana terminates in the middle of d. 24 of
Sentences 1, omits dd. 18-22, and lacks divisiones textus, most of the texts we have considered from
Thomas’s first Commentary find no parallel in the Lectura romana. Nevertheless, on two points we can note interesting development.
First, immediately after LR 2.1.1, which is a relatively brief parallel to In Sent. 1.2.1.3,
Thomas adds a new article in LR 2.2.1: whether there is something supremely good. This is the new manner in which Thomas introduces the question of God’s existence in the Lectura romana, and he offers three ways of proving the existence of a highest good, “of which two are from Aristotle and one is from Augustine.”238 The first argument is taken from the order of the universe and argues for
235 Sentences 1.37 [Mand. 1.846]: “Et quoniam demonstratum est ex parte, quomodo omnia dicantur esse in Deo, addendum videtur hic, quibus modis dicatur Deus esse in rebus.” 236 In Sent. 1.37 div. 1 [Mand. 1.854]: “Ostenso quomodo res sint in Deo, hic ex incidenti ostendit quomodo Deus sit in rebus.” 237 In Sent. 1.35 div. [Mand. 1.807]: “[Determinat] in secunda de quadam specie scientiae Dei, quae specialem difficultatem affert, scilicet de praedestinatione.” 238 LR 2.2.1 [Boyle 95]: “Dicendum quod firmiter tenendum est esse aliquod summe bonum. Et hoc probatur tribus viis, quarum duae sunt Aristotelis et una est Augustini.” 158 a separate good of the universe, following the example of Metaphysics 12.10. The second argument argues against the possiblity of an infinite regress in final causes, such that there must be an ultimate final cause, which is the highest good. The third argument (the one Thomas attributes to Augustine) argues that imperfect things must take their origin from the perfect.239 Unlike the first Sentences
Commentary, Thomas is not content to allow Peter’s arguments in d. 3 to suffice as arguments for
God’s existence; instead he offers argumentation of his own prior to the discussion of God’s unity in LR 2.2.3. This seems to me to be a clear indication of Thomas’s desire to introduce in this new
Sentences Commentary a clearer order of instruction.
Second, in his commentary on divine simplicity in d. 8, Thomas expands the number of articles (beyond the three posed in the first Commentary) to ask whether God is simple (8.3.1), whether God is in the category of substance (8.3.2), whether God is a body (8.3.3), and whether in
God there are accidents (8.3.4).240 He has already posed the question in 8.1.1 whether God is His esse.241 In LR 8.3.2, he also adds that God does not have a definition and that there can be no (propter quid) demonstration of God.242 In all of this, I would suggest that Thomas appropriates a much greater degree of material from Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.4. As we have seen above in discussing
Avicenna, Houser has claimed that the content of ST 1.3 represents a shift towards a greater appropriation of Avicenna’s metaphysics in the discussion of divine simplicity, and I would note that such a turn also appears in LR 8.3.
Concerning the Lombard’s Sentences, while on the one hand we can reaffirm that commentaries on this work are Thomas’s primary target in his criticism of works that fail to follow
239 LR 2.2.1 [Boyle 95-96]. 240 LR 8.3.1-4 [Boyle 145-50]. 241 LR 8.1.1 [Boyle 139]. 242 LR 8.3.2 [Boyle 147]: “Ex hoc patet quod Deus definiri non potest, cum omnis definitio constet ex genere et differentiis. Et cum principium demonstrationis est definitio eius de quo fit demonstratio, sequitur etiam quod non potest fieri de Deo demonstratio.” 159 the ordo disciplinae and that multiply questions needlessly,243 still there are many points in the Sentences and in Thomas’s Commentaries to which it will be helpful to refer later in examining the order of the divine names in Thomas’s personal writings. In particular, I will suggest that at the least, dd. 35-
48 of Book 1 are a concrete influence in terms of content and rough order on Thomas’s ST 1.14-25.
With regard to all of the historical examples of the order of the divine names treated in this chapter, I will make frequent reference to the material treated here in the remaining chapters of this dissertation. We shall see that Thomas carefully integrates elements taken from all of these past thinkers into his personal accounts of the divine names. We will also be able to contrast the three
Thomistic treatises on God with one another according to shifts in his reliance upon these sources.
We will now turn to the order of the divine names in the Summa contra Gentiles.
243 I will later suggest that the Summa fratris Alexandri is another target of such criticism. CHAPTER FOUR: THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Begun in Paris some time prior to his departure (summer 1259) and completed in Italy, but probably before his time in Rome (September 1265), the Summa contra Gentiles contains Thomas’s first personal presentation of the divine names in a work structured entirely according to his own devices.1 This presentation is found in Book 1, cc. 15-102 and in the first 22 chapters of Book 2.
Thomas explains that the purpose of the Summa contra Gentiles is to manifest the truth which the
Catholic faith professes and to eliminate errors contrary to it.2 To this twofold end, and especially because those who do not accept the Christian scriptures cannot be otherwise refuted, Thomas notes in SCG 1.2 that “it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, to which all men are bound to assent.”3 In this way, Thomas hopes to show “how demonstrative truth agrees with the faith of the Christian religion.”4 As Thomas then explains in SCG 1.3, among the truths that the
1 According to Gauthier, in Paris Thomas completed an initial version of the first 53 chapters of Book I, which he then revised in Italy. See René-Antoine Gauthier, Somme contre les Gentils: Introduction par René-Antoine Gauthier, ed. Henri Hude (Éditions Universitaires, 1993), 10. 2 SCG 1.2 [Leon. Man. 2]: “Assumpta igitur ex divina pietate fiducia sapientis officium prosequendi, quamvis proprias vires excedat, propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides Catholica profitetur, pro nostro modulo manifestare, errores eliminando contrarios.” For discussion of the hypothesis that the Summa contra Gentiles was intended as a manual for missionaries, see Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, tr. Robert Royal (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 104-107. See also R. te Velde, “Natural Reason in the Summa contra Gentiles,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4 (1994): 42-44; Gauthier, 165-176. 3 Ibid.: “Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est.” 4 Ibid.: “Simul autem veritatem aliquam investigantes ostendemus qui errores per eam excludantur; et quomodo demonstrativa veritas fidei Christianae religionis concordet.” As Thomas explains in In DT 2.3, there are three roles that philosophical arguments can play in the work of theology: the proof of certain preambles of the faith that are demonstrable by natural reason; the clarification of the mysteries of the faith through certain similitudes known philosophically; and the refutation of errors and of arguments purporting to disprove truths of the faith. In SCG 1.2, Thomas announces in a general way the role that argumentation through natural reason can play in support of manifesting the Catholic faith and refuting errors, without referring yet to any distinction between the preambula fidei and mysteria fidei. It is in SCG 1.3 that Thomas then draws this distinction (albeit without using the term preambula), asserting that arguments of natural reason will serve to prove some of the truths of the Catholic faith, even if not all. SCG 1.2 should be taken as announcing the methodology for the entire work, even Book IV, which concerns treatment of the mysteria fidei. As Thomas notes in SCG 4.1, although the mysteria fidei cannot be proved through natural reason, “nevertheless it must be shown that [the truths of the faith known only through Scripture] are not opposed to natural reason, so that they may be defended from the attacks of unbelievers. This is the method set down in the first book of this work.” SCG 4.1 [Leon. Man. 426]: “Sed tamen ostendendum est quod rationi naturali non sunt opposita, ut ab impugnatione infidelium defendantur. Qui etiam modus in principio huius operis praedeterminatus est.” 160
161
Catholic faith professes, some are demonstrable through natural reason, “such as that God exists, that God is one, and others like this.” Other truths, however, such as the Trinity, cannot be demonstrated through natural reason.5 The first three books of the Summa contra Gentiles contain
Thomas’s presentation of philosophical arguments for those truths of the faith accessible to natural reason, while the fourth book concerns those truths that are beyond proof by natural reason. It should be noted that not every argument advanced in the first three books is demonstrative: as
Thomas indicates, in these books he will pursue “the manifestation of that truth which the faith professes and reason investigates, by presenting demonstrative and probable arguments.”6 For the most part, Thomas does not explicitly identify which of his arguments are demonstrative and which are probable.
The Summa contra Gentiles as a whole is thus structured according to how the human intellect knows the truths of the Catholic faith: the first three books concerns the truths accessible through natural reason, while the fourth concerns those that are not. Within the first three books, Thomas supplements his presentation of positive arguments for naturally knowable theological truths with refutations of various errors, and furthermore he establishes that his conclusions are in accord with the Christian faith, primarily by citing passages from Scripture.
Our treatment of the order of the divine names in the Summa contra Gentiles will consider three items: (i) the order of argumentative dependence; (ii) the influence of the principles of order treated in the second chapter of this dissertation; and (iii) the role of the historical influences treated in the third chapter.
5 SCG 1.3 [Leon. Man. 2]: “Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis.” 6 SCG 1.9 [Leon. Man. 8]: “Modo ergo proposito procedere intendentes, primum nitemur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles.” 162
1. THE ORDER OF ARGUMENTATIVE DEPENDENCE
One of the most striking features of the Summa contra Gentiles as compared to the Summa theologiae is Thomas’s usage of a much greater number of arguments for each of his conclusions. In the vast majority of cases, the arguments for a given conclusion in one chapter will depend upon something previously established concerning God in an earlier chapter, but occasionally there will be de novo arguments.7 As a consequence, it will prove helpful to undertake a detailed analysis of the order of argumentative dependence.
A. CONCLUSIONS OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE AS PRINCIPLES
We must begin with a treatment of the conclusions of Thomas’s argumentation for God’s existence in SCG 1.13, since the conclusions of these arguments serve as the principles of further argumentation about the divine names. In SCG 1.13, Thomas employs a total of five arguments for
God’s existence, including two versions of the argument from motion.8 These arguments thus yield four conclusions, three of which parallel (in varying degrees) the conclusions of the first, second, and fifth ways found in ST 1.2.3: these three conclusions assert the existence of a first absolutely unmoved mover, a first efficient cause, and a being by whose providence the world is governed.9
The other conclusion—that there must exist something that is supremely being (maxime ens)—is a
7 By a de novo argument I mean an argument for a conclusion about God not explicitly presupposing any earlier conclusions about God. 8 For detailed discussion of the two versions of the argument from motion in SCG 1.13, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 413-31; Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism, 54-83; Scott MacDonald, “Aquinas’s Parasitic Cosmological Argument,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 119-55. 9 For critical commentary comparing the final argument from SCG 1.13 with the fifth way from ST 1.2.3, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 434: Wippel notes that the emphasis in the argument in SCG 1.13 is not on finality in nature (as in the fifth way and in De ver. 5.2), but rather on the apparent order and design of the world. I will note below that there is a closer parallel to ST 1.2.3’s fifth way in SCG 1.44. 163 parallel to an initial or ancillary conclusion in the argumentation of the fourth way from ST 1.2.3, rather than to the ultimate conclusion of the fourth way.10
Beyond these four conclusions in SCG 1.13, two other fundamental descriptions of God appear in premises in subsequent argumentation. First, Thomas offers at the beginning of SCG 1.14 the statement that it has been shown that there exists “some first being, which we call God.”11 This would seem to be of little consequence, except that in his later argumentation Thomas appeals to the fact that God is the primum ens in order to justify further conclusions about God. For example, in
SCG 1.18, Thomas offers two arguments for the absence of composition in God by appealing to
God’s status as the primum ens.12 Now, one might just take Thomas to be offering primum ens as a sort of summary statement of what has been jointly established through the various arguments for God’s existence. While such a reading is possible, nevertheless Thomas clearly associates the name “first being” with the identification of God as the first efficient cause. In a text from De ente 4, Thomas says that a created intelligence (an angel) “has existence from the first being which is existence alone,
10 I would emphasize here the parallel between (i) the ultimate conclusion of this argument from SCG 1.13 and (ii) an ancillary conclusion from the fourth way in ST 1.2.3, rather than a strict parallel between all the content of the two arguments. Compare the following portions of the two texts. SCG 1.13 [Leon. Man. 14]: “Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex verbis Aristotelis. In II Metaphys. ostendit quod ea quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et maxime entia. . . . Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse aliquod quod est maxime ens. Et hoc dicimus Deum.” ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.32]: “Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaph. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis. . . . Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum.” Whereas the argument in SCG 1.13 immediately concludes that the maxime ens is God, the fourth way in ST 1.2.3 follows the assertion of the existence of the maxime ens with the assertion of the principle that whatever is the maximum in any genus is the cause of everything else belonging to that genus. From this Thomas concludes that the maxime ens is the cause of esse and of every other perfection: and this cause of perfections is what Thomas identifies as God. 11 SCG 1.14 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Ostenso igitur quod est aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, oportet eius conditiones investigare.” 12 The first of these arguments explicitly appeals to God’s status as primum ens. SCG 1.18 [Leon. Man. 17]: “Omne compositum posterius est suis componentibus. Primum ergo ens, quod Deus est, ex nullis compositum est.” The second appeals to the fact that God is “before all.” SCG 1.18 [Leon. Man. 18]: “Ante omnem multitudinem oportet invenire unitatem. In omni autem composito est multitudo. Igitur oportet id quod est ante omnia, scilicet Deum, omni compositione carere.” There are also arguments appealing to God’s status as primum ens in SCG 1.20 (that God is not a body), 1.21 (that God is His essence), 1.22 (that God’s essence is His esse), 1.25 (that God is not in a genus), 1.28 (that God is universally perfect), and 1.97 (that God is His life). 164 and this is the first cause that is God.”13 Similarly, in De ver. 21.4, Thomas writes that “all speaking about God understand that He is the efficient principle of all things, since all beings must flow from one first being.”14 Wherever Thomas appeals to God’s status as primum ens in a later argument, I will take the argument as properly grounded in the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality.
Second, an argument whose conclusion parallels that of the third way from ST 1.2.3 is found in SCG 1.15.15 This argument for the existence of something necessary through itself is also the first of a number of de novo arguments found in the first book of the Contra Gentiles. The identification of this necessary being as God depends upon an appeal to the conclusion that God is the first efficient cause.16 Wherever Thomas appeals to God’s status as the existence necessary through itself, I will take his argument as ultimately grounded in the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality.
Altogether, in SCG 1.13-15 we find six fundamental descriptions of God: 1) the first unmoved mover, 2) the first efficient cause, 3) the existence necessary through itself, 4) the supreme being, 5) the providential governor, and 6) the first being. I have listed these descriptions of God in this order to facilitate easier comparison with the Summa theologiae. Some—but not all—of these six
13 De ente 4 [Leon. 43.377]: “Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima que Deus est.” The terms ens primum and esse tantum are both derived from the Liber de causis. See Richard C. Taylor, “Aquinas, the ‘Plotiniana Arabica,’ and the Metaphysics of Being and Actuality,” Journal of the History of Ideas 59.2 (1998): 217 n. 3. 14 De ver. 21.4 [Leon. 22*3/1.601]: “Hoc enim Deum omnes de Deo loquentes intelligunt quod est omnium principium effectivum cum oporteat omnia entia ab uno primo ente effluere.” 15 The structure of this argument for God’s eternity is complex. (i) Thomas first argues for the existence of something necessary through itself; then (ii) he identifies that which is necessary through itself with God, by appealing to the earlier conclusion that God is the first cause; and (iii) he finally argues for the eternity of God by claiming that “everything necessary through itself is eternal.” SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per seipsum necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum sit causa prima, ut ostensum est. Est igitur Deus aeternus, cum omne necessarium per se sit aeternum.” The parallel to the third way from ST 1.2.3 is primarily with respect to the conclusion that there must exist something that is necessary through itself. Cf. ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis: quod omnes dicunt Deum.” 16 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per seipsum necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum sit causa prima, ut ostensum est.” 165 conclusions will serve as premises in the subsequent argumentation concerning the divine names.17 I will also refer to the arguments from motion as “the first way” and the argument from efficient causality as “the second way,” again to facilitate comparison with the Summa theologiae.18
B. TWO LINES OF ARGUMENTATIVE DEPENDENCE
Having indicated that he will primarily employ the via remotionis in his consideration of the divine substance—a declaration we will treat in detail later—Thomas concludes SCG 1.14 by indicating the principle from which a sequence of negations will follow: this is that God is in every way immobile,19 which is the negative aspect of the conclusion of the argument from motion.20
Thomas offers immutability here as a principle from which the order of the divine names will follow. Thomas could be taken to mean that the assertion of divine immutability is a premise at the head of a single sequence of ordered arguments, each of which concludes to a further negation concerning God.21 What we find, however, is that in the multiplication of arguments a line of argumentation emerges that is independent of the claim that God is immutable.
17 There are not any explicit appeals to the conclusion that an intelligent governor of the universe exists. See Kretzmann, Metaphysics of Theism, 88-89. There is one argument for divine intelligence in SCG 1.44 that depends upon the claim that the author of nature must establish the ends of natural things, but Thomas offers an independent argument for this claim without explicit appeal back to this conclusion in SCG 1.13. Furthermore, appeals to the conclusion that there exists something that is maxime ens are relatively few in number. 18 This will have to be qualified later, when I argue that the most important textual parallel to the first way of ST 1.2.3 is in SCG 1.16, not in 1.13. 19 SCG 1.14 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam remotionis, accipiamus principium id quod ex superioribus iam manifestum est, scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immobilis.” Scott MacDonald has raised the question of whether the argumentation in SCG 1.13 in fact justifies the conclusion that God is entirely immobile (i.e., unable to be moved) as opposed to being merely unmoved; see Scott MacDonald, “Aquinas’s Parasitic Cosmological Argument,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 119-55, esp. 146-52. 20 As indicated in c. 2 above, every argument for God’s existence involves some nominal definition of God in which there are combined at least two elements from the triplex via. In the case of the argument from motion, all three elements of the triplex via are involved: God is the first (eminence) unmoved (negation) mover (causality). In SCG 1.14, Thomas emphasizes only the negative aspect of this formula as the principle from which subsequent negations in the via remotionis will proceed. 21 For a strong statement of this interpretation, see, e.g., Joseph Owens, “Immobility and Existence for Aquinas,” St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: SUNY Press, 1980), 210: “In the Contra Gentiles, moreover, the basis from which the further characteristics of God are to be deduced is explicitly noted. It is the thoroughgoing immobility that was reached in the conclusion of the argument from motion.” Cf. Wippel, “Quidditative Knowledge of God,” 223 n. 31. 166
(i) Emergence of a second line of dependence in SCG 1.15
This emergence begins immediately in SCG 1.15: only the first two of Thomas’s five arguments for divine eternity are grounded in divine immutability. The third and fourth arguments both appeal to the claim that God is the first efficient cause; the latter of these arguments includes the previously mentioned de novo argument that parallels the third way from ST 1.2.3.22 Furthermore, although the fifth argument for divine eternity in SCG 1.15 is grounded in the conclusion of the argument from motion, the appeal is primarily to its positive aspect (namely, that God is the first mover) rather than to its negative aspect (that He is immobile): here Thomas argues from the supposed sempiternity of motion and time (on Aristotle’s account) to the sempiternity of the first mover.23 Although Thomas’s remarks at the close of 1.14 might give the impression that everything said about the divine nature will follow from God’s immutability, such a broad reading of his remark cannot be accepted, even on the basis of SCG 1.15.
We also find in SCG 1.15 the first instance of another trend repeated in some later chapters: we can distinguish multiple meanings of the divine name at issue. In this case, for the most part the chapter seems to concern eternity construed as sempiternity or substantial perpetuity rather than as the total absence of succession that is the “simultaneously complete and perfect possession of interminable life,”24 as Thomas will present the Boethian definition of eternity in ST 1.10.1.25 Only
22 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 15-16]. 23 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Ostendit etiam Aristoteles ex sempiternitate temporis sempiternitatem motus. Ex quo iterum ostendit sempiternitatem substantiae moventis. Prima autem substantia movens Deus est. Est igitur sempiternus.” Thomas then notes that this argument retains its force even if the sempiternity of motion and of time is denied, because if motion began, then it must have been preceded ultimately by something that did not begin to be. Here he arguably does appeal to the unmoved character of the first mover. “Negata autem sempiternitate temporis et motus, adhuc manet ratio ad sempiternitatem substantiae. Nam, si motus incoepit, oportet quod ab aliquo movente incoeperit. Qui si incoepit, aliquo agente incoepit. Et sic vel in infinitum ibitur; vel devenietur ad aliquid quod non incoepit.” 24 Consolatio Philosophiae 5 pr. 6 [Loeb 422]: “Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.” 25 ST 1.10.1 [Leon. 4.94-95]. 167 the conclusion of SCG 1.15’s second argument for divine eternity indicates this Boethian understanding of eternity, in that it concludes that God is “lacking a beginning and an end, possessing His entire being simultaneously, in which the notion of eternity consists.”26 By contrast, the first argument concludes only that God “is eternal, lacking beginning or end.”27
(ii) The multiplicity of conclusions in SCG 1.16
With an awareness of these two features of SCG 1.15—the multiplication of lines of argumentative dependence and the presence of multiple meanings of the divine name at issue—we can turn to SCG 1.16, which will prove crucial for analysis of the order of argumentative dependence. There is something of a divergence between the received title of SCG 1.16 (“that in
God there is not passive potency”)28 and the claim made by the introductory sentence (“it is necessary for Him not to be in potency.”) This divergence is reflected in the various conclusions of the chapter. In the following remarks, I will argue that the force of the conclusions of the arguments in SCG 1.16 in fact varies significantly. We can summarize the arguments as follows:
Premise, that God is: Conclusion: 1. sempiternal no potency to existence in God 2. first being and first cause no admixture of potency in God 3. necessary being per se no potency in God’s substance 4. first agent no admixture of potency in God; pure act
26 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Est igitur carens principio et fine, totum esse suum simul habens. In quo ratio aeternitatis consistit.” 27 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Nam omne quod incipit esse vel desinit, per motum vel mutationem hoc patitur. Ostensum autem est Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Est igitur aeternus, carens principio et fine.” Cf. Brian J. Shanley, “Eternity and Duration in Aquinas,” The Thomist 61 (1997), 540. Shanley treats the various arguments of SCG 1.15 as presenting distinct components of the Boethian understanding of eternity. The first argument concludes to the interminability of divine existence. This interpretation is not inconsistent with the point I am advancing here, that some of Thomas’s arguments in SCG 1.15 conclude only to sempiternity or substantial perpetuity rather than to the absence of succession. 28 The chapter titles of the SCG as they are received in the tables of contents and in the texts in the manuscript tradition exhibit some variation, and many chapters in the autograph lack a title. SCG 1.16 is not extant in the autograph, but many of the chapters surrounding it lack titles; on the other hand, the manuscript tradition is fairly consistent about the title of SCG 1.16 as it is given, except that a number of manuscripts add “sed est actus purus.” For discussion of the titles in the Contra Gentiles, see the treatment by Gauthier in the preface of vol. 15 of the Leonine edition, [Leon. 15.xxi- xxxviii]. In any event, we should not expect to make any definitive arguments about the contents of SCG 1.16 on the basis of its received title. 168
5. absolutely impassible, immutable no passive potency in God 6. de novo God only in act, in no way in potency
Later in the Contra Gentiles, Thomas argues for the attribution of active potency to God, and thus in no case should we take it to be that the denial that there is potency in God is a denial of His active potency.29 Given the distinction between active and passive potency—and that Thomas later attributes active potency to God—it might seem that in every case that Thomas denies that there is potency in God (or that God is in potency), we should read this as passive potency. In this case, we would take all of the conclusions of SCG 1.16 as roughly equivalent. In the following, however, I will argue that Thomas (1) only explicitly mentions passive potency in the conclusion of the fifth argument and (2) excludes potency to esse in the first argument, because he means something narrower by these terms.
SCG 1.16 begins with an argument grounded in eternity, following Thomas’s announcement at the beginning of the chapter that “if God is eternal, it is necessary for Him not to be in potency.”30 In this argument, Thomas appeals to God’s sempiternity or substantial perpetuity rather than to the stronger Boethian notion of eternity. This first argument concludes that there is no potency to existence (esse) in God.31
Thomas uses the term “pure act” only in the conclusion of the fourth argument, which appeals to the premise that “each thing acts insofar as it is in act” and rests on the assertion that
God is the first agent, and thus on the positive (that is, causal and eminent) aspect of the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality. The sixth argument reaches a similar conclusion, that God
29 SCG 2.7 [ Leon. Man. 97]. 30 SCG 1.16 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Si autem Deus aeternus est, necesse est ipsum non esse in potentia.” 31 SCG 1.16 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Omne enim id in cuius substantia admiscetur potentia, secundum id quod habet de potentia potest non esse: quia quod potest esse, potest non esse. Deus autem secundum se non potest non esse: cum sit sempiternus. In Deo igitur non est potentia ad esse.” 169 is “only in act and in no way in potency.”32 Furthermore, even though they do not assert that God is pure act, still the second and third arguments conclude in an apparently unqualified fashion that there is no potency in God. By contrast, the argument directly founded in the negative aspect of the first way—that is, in God’s immutability—concludes that in God there is no passive potency. This is the only argument that explicitly characterizes the potency denied of God as passive potency.
As for the final argument in SCG 1.16, it is a de novo argument that is in some respects a parallel to the version of the argument from motion found in ST 1.2.3.33 This argument concludes that something exists that is only in act and in no way in potency, “and this we call God.” We will appeal to the parallel between this argument and ST 1.2.3 in chapter six.
We thus find in SCG 1.16 different phrasings in the conclusions of each of the arguments: no potency to existence, no admixture of potency, no potency in God’s substance, pure act, no passive potency. Two of these—the exclusions of passive potency and of potency to existence—are conclusions ultimately grounded in the first way (and in its negative aspect), while the others are
32 SCG 1.16 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Ergo oportet devenire ad aliquid quod est tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia. Et hoc dicimus Deum.” 33 Thomas begins this argument by noting that “we see that something in the world exists which passes from potency to act.” He then argues that nothing can reduce itself from potency to act, and so for whatever is reduced from potency to act, there must be something prior by which it is reduced from potency to act. If this prior agent is also something that passes from potency to act, then again there must be some prior active source: “but this cannot proceed to infinity. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at something that is only in act and in no way in potency. And this we call God.” Although Thomas takes for granted the support for the premise that “this cannot proceed to infinity” found within SCG 1.13, still I characterize this final argument in SCG 1.16 as a de novo argument insofar as it appeals to no earlier conclusions concerning God. Rather, it concludes just as most of the arguments in SCG 1.13 do, with the assertion that “this we call God.” This being said, the reasoning in this final argument of SCG 1.16 is similar to one of the lines of supporting argumentation for the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in SCG 1.13. Although this final argument in SCG 1.16 does not explicitly mention motion or the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, it parallels the argument in ST 1.2.3 in a crucial respect: in ST 1.2.3 Thomas defines motion in a broad way as the reduction of something from potency to act. ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum.” The final argument in SCG 1.16 begins by recognizing the existence of “something that passes from potency to act.” As I will explain in c. 6 of this dissertation, the notion of motion involved in ST 1.2.3 is broad and not limited to physical motion in the strict sense (which is the act of potency qua potency, as defined in Physics 3.1); it is the same broad notion involved in this final argument of SCG 1.16. Furthermore, what ST 1.2.3 characterizes as a mover is what the final argument of SCG 1.16 proves to exist: SCG 1.16 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Ergo oportet esse aliquid aliud prius, quo educatur de potentia in actum.” I will appeal to the parallel between these two arguments in my analysis in c. 6 of this dissertation. See below pp. 292-93. 170 grounded in the second way or in the final de novo argument. These differences in the conclusions of
SCG 1.16 might be construed as different phrasings of essentially the same conclusion, particularly if one interprets any potency denied of God as passive potency. I would question this interpretation, based on how Thomas presents the implications of excluding passive potency from God later in the
Contra Gentiles.
The crucial text is from SCG 2.25, which concerns how it is that the omnipotent God can be said not to be able (non posse) to be or do something. Thomas notes that we distinguish between active potency, which is attributed to God (in SCG 2.7), and passive potency, which is removed from him (in SCG 1.16).34 Thomas then comments on the import of the terms passive potency and potency to existence:
Active potency is [potency] to acting, but passive potency [is potency] to existence. Whence there is potency to existence only in those things that have matter subject to contrariety. Since therefore there is not passive potency in God, God cannot [be or do] whatever pertains to His existence. Therefore God cannot be a body, or other things of this sort. Furthermore, motion is the act of this passive potency. Therefore God, to whom passive potency does not belong, cannot be changed. But it can be further concluded that He cannot be changed according to each species of change: such that He cannot be augmented or diminished, or altered, or generated or corrupted.35
This text presents both passive potency and potency to existence as limited in meaning, and Thomas identifies passive potency as potency to existence. Passive potency as it is presented here is found
34 The distinction between active and passive potency comes originally from Aristotle’s Metaphysics 9.1. In his Commentary, Thomas defines passive potency as “the principle [by] which something is moved by another, insofar as it is other.” In Meta. 9.1 #1777 [Marietti 425]: “Nam alio modo dicitur potentia passiva, quae est principium quo aliquid moveatur ab alio, inquantum est aliud” (reading quo for quod). Cf. In Meta. 9.1 #1782 [Marietti 425]: “Potentia autem passiva nihil aliud est quam principium patiendi ab alio.” Matter, as the internal principle according to which a corporeal thing can be moved by another, is the most important example of passive potency: In Meta. 9.1 #1782 [Marietti 425]: “Potentia enim passiva est in patiente, quia patiens patitur propter aliquod principium in ipso existens, et huiusmodi est materia.” 35 SCG 2.25 [Leon. Man. 111]: “Primo quidem igitur potentia activa ad agere est, potentia autem passiva ad esse. Unde in illis solis est potentia ad esse quae materiam habent contrarietati subiectam. Cum igitur in Deo passiva potentia non sit, quicquid ad suum esse pertinet, Deus non potest. Non potest igitur Deus esse corpus, aut aliquod huiusmodi. Adhuc. Huius potentiae passivae motus actus est. Deus igitur, cui potentia passiva non competit, mutari non potest. Potest autem ulterius concludi quod non potest mutari secundum singulas mutationis species: ut quod non potest augeri vel minui, aut alterari, aut generari aut corrumpi.” 171 only in material things,36 which have potency to existence in the sense of potency for substantial generation and corruption. According to the Aristotelian cosmology accepted by Thomas, this potency belongs only to sublunary bodies—the bodies whose matter is subject to contrariety.37 As an indication of how limited these notions are, we can note that on the basis of God’s lacking passive potency, Thomas excludes only corporeality and the physical changes associated with
36 Thomas does employ the term passive potency more broadly than just as the potency of matter itself. For example, Thomas identifies the potential intellect and the external senses as passive potencies/powers, whose operations are not (following Aristotle) physical motions. That being said, the senses and potential intellect are found only in corporeal creatures, i.e., animals and human beings (as well as in the separated human soul). A development occurs in Thomas’s usage of the term passive potency, however, in that he later explicitly identifies angels (created incorporeal substances) as having passive potency in several respects (ST 1.9.2); and he will argue immediately from the absence of passive potency in God to His being subsistent esse (De pot. 1.2). I will detail these developments below in c. 6 of this dissertation. 37 Cf. SCG 2.33 [Leon. Man. 121-22]: “Quae enim non habent potentiam ad non esse, impossibile est ea non esse. Quaedam autem sunt in creaturis in quibus non est potentia ad non esse. Non enim potest esse potentia ad non esse nisi in illis quae habent materiam contrarietati subiectam: potentia enim ad esse et non esse est potentia ad privationem et formam, quorum subiectum est materia.” See In Sent. 2.1.1.5 ad s.c. 8 [Mand. 2.40]: “Ad octavum dicendum, quod in caelo non est potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, secundum Philosophum.” There are other possible meanings of the phrase potentia ad esse in Thomas’s writings. In De ente 4, Thomas does characterize created separate substances as being “in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit.” Along similar lines, Thomas does in at least two texts use the phrase potentia ad esse to describe the potency of a creature’s essence with respect to esse: see the early Quodl. 9.4.1 and the late Q. d. de anima 6 ad 10. In the former text, Thomas says that “the very substance of an angel, considered in itself, is in potency to existence, since it has existence from another.” Perhaps Thomas’s most careful discussion of the notion of potency to esse occurs in In Phys. 8.21. In this text, he clarifies the sense in which the celestial bodies and created separate substances are said to lack potency to esse, even though they can be said to have potency to esse insofar as they are created. My contention is that potency to existence in the first argument of SCG 1.16 should be understood, terminologically, as potency to substantial generation and corruption, rather than as concerning either (i) the potency of a substance to accidental esse or (ii) the fact that essence is related to esse as potency to act in any creature. I would exclude the former alternative reading, because for Thomas, the celestial bodies are said to lack potency to esse, even though they are susceptible to accidental change with respect to place. See also De prin. nat. 1 for Thomas’s distinction between potentia ad esse substantiale and potentia ad esse accidentale. It is difficult to see how sempiternity alone could justify the exclusion of potency to accidental esse, given that, for Thomas, the celestial bodies could be sempiternal but still possess potency with respect to place. I would exclude the latter alternative reading because again it is difficult to see how one could reach such a strong conclusion from sempiternity alone. For Thomas it is entirely possible, philosophically speaking, that created separate substances and even the corporeal world might be sempiternal, but this does not imply that their essences are not in potency with respect to esse. 172 sublunary bodies.38 The restriction of passive potency to corporeal things reflects Aristotle’s positions in Metaphysics 9.1 and 9.8, as Thomas understands these texts in his Commentary.39
Throughout his career, Thomas attributes potency to angels (and to all created beings), characterizing the relationship between essence and esse in angels as a relationship of potency and act. What I am suggesting is that, as a terminological matter, Thomas does not at this point in his career characterize this potency in an angel’s substance as passive potency, because he identifies passive potency (as in SCG 2.25) with the potency to esse found only in material things. By this,
Thomas employs the term passive potency in a manner consistent with Aristotle’s usage in his
Metaphysics. This terminological precision is important, however, insofar as it impacts how we interpret the force of Thomas’s conclusions in SCG 1.16.40 At the very least, that Thomas uses the terms passive potency and potency to existence in a narrower sense later in the Contra Gentiles should place in serious doubt whether he intends for all of the conclusions in SCG 1.16 to be understood as equivalent in meaning.
38 Along similar lines, later, in SCG 2.55, Thomas excludes potency to non-existence from all created intellectual substances, precisely because they lack matter. SCG 2.55 [Leon. Man. 148]: “In omni quod corrumpitur, oportet quod sit potentia ad non esse. Si quid igitur est in quo non est potentia ad non esse, hoc non potest esse corruptibile. In substantia autem intellectuali non est potentia ad non esse.” Thomas makes clear later in the same chapter that potency to non-existence is the same thing as potency to existence [Leon. Man. 149]: “Quaecumque incipiunt esse et desinunt, per eandem potentiam habent utrumque: eadem enim est potentia ad esse et ad non esse.” 39 See In Meta. 9.1 #1770-72 [Marietti 424] for Thomas’s explanation that the account of active and passive potency in Metaphysics 9.1 concerns potency in mobile, corporeal things rather than in immobile, incorporeal things. See In Meta. 9.9 #1867-72 [Marietti 449-450] for the claim that Aristotle’s exclusion of potency from from eternal, incorruptible things is the exclusion of passive potency. We can also note the historical precedent for SCG 1.16’s first argument in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.6, which Thomas comments upon in In Meta. 12.5 #2494. This text is the locus classicus for Aristotle’s assertion that the first mover is pure actuality: the first mover’s essence must be actuality alone, because otherwise it could cease to be and would therefore not be necessarily sempiternal. Thomas provides a rather limited interpretation of this claim within his Commentary: all that is implied immediately by Aristotle’s claim that the essence of the unmoved mover is actuality is that the unmoved mover’s essence does not contain potency. Thomas provides as one example of what is excluded by this that the first mover cannot be fire or water, since these elemental bodies contain in their essences potency for substantial corruption and generation. 40 We will see later that Thomas presents a different account of passive potency in the Summa theologiae, according to which passive potency will be attributed to angels. 173
I would suggest that when SCG 1.16 concludes in two of its arguments that there is no potency to esse or passive potency in God, we should recognize these as limited conclusions compared to the exclusion of any potency whatsoever or the identification of God as pure act.41
These arguments founded upon the first way only exclude the passive potency associated with materiality42 and potency to substantial generation and corruption. Thomas would exclude the former from any angel and the latter even from the celestial bodies. By contrast, Thomas associates a stronger claim—that God is pure act—with the line of argumentation grounded in the proof of
God’s existence from efficient causality.43 He also associates the parallel strong negative claim—that
God unqualifiedly lacks potency—with God’s being the first cause.44 He also grounds these stronger claims in a de novo argument for God’s existence. This divergence of conclusions in SCG 1.16 comes to be of tremendous importance when Thomas later appeals to the stronger conclusions from SCG
41 Sylvester de Ferrara acknowledges these different conclusions in his commentary. See SCG 1.16 [Leon. 13.45-46]. Kretzmann reads SCG 1.16 as concerning two sorts of passive potentiality: (1) “potentiality for existence and for non-existence,” which he associates with the first, second, fourth, and sixth arguments; and (2) “passive potentiality in an existing thing,” according to which “mutability varies directly with passive potentiality,” which Kretzmann associates with the fifth argument. See Kretzmann, 120, esp. n. 7. We can provide further support to this claim about the limited meaning of the terms passive potency and potency to existence by inquiring whether any argument appealing to divine impassibility or perpetuity could justify the exclusion of all potency whatsoever from God. As for impassibility, the fifth argument in SCG 1.16, which appeals to impassibility, is clearly concerned with impassibility in terms of physical motion, given that Thomas appeals to the Aristotelian definition of motion from Physics 3.1. SCG 1.16 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Unumquodque, sicut natum est agere inquantum est actu, ita natum est pati inquantum est potentia: nam motus est actus potentia existentis.” As for sempiternity, for Thomas it is entirely possible, philosophically speaking, that created separate substances and the celestial bodies might be sempiternal, but by no means does this imply that they would lack all potency whatsoever. 42 I say “the passive potency associated with materiality” rather than “the passive potency of matter,” because throughout his career Thomas identifies both the external sense powers and the possible intellect as passive potencies/powers, but these are powers that belong only to corporeal creatures. As noted above (n. 40), later in his career Thomas will recognize passive potency in various respects in created separate substances. 43 As noted above, Thomas especially associates the identification of God as primum ens with His status as the first efficient cause of being. 44 As for the argument appealing to God’s status as necessary existence, it concludes that there is no potency in God’s substance, which could be interpreted in a weaker sense as only excluding the potency of matter; but if this is taken as a stronger conclusion, it is still grounded ultimately in the argument from efficient causality. 174
1.16: these later arguments are properly grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause or in the final de novo argument of SCG 1.16.45
(iii) Overview concerning the two lines of argumentative dependence
I have argued for two claims that will govern my analysis of the order of argumentative dependence in the Summa contra Gentiles: 1) Appeals to God’s status as primum ens or necesse esse should be understood as grounded in the argument from efficient causality rather than in the argument from motion. 2) Appeals to God’s being pure act or lacking all potency whatsoever must similarly be recognized as grounded in the second way rather than in the first—or in the sixth argument of SCG
1.16, the de novo argument for God’s existence. Equipped with these two claims, we can analyze the two primary lines of argumentative dependence in the Contra Gentiles. First, I will offer some summary results from such an analysis. In the next section, I will offer commentary on key chapters.
In the argumentation of SCG 1 and through 2.22, the conclusion of the second way emerges as the more fruitful principle for deriving conclusions concerning God. Up to SCG 2.22, we find that every single chapter justifies its central conclusion by at least one argument grounded ultimately in the argument from efficient causality. By contrast, many chapters—and occasionally lengthy sequences of chapters—go by without any arguments that can be grounded in the argument from motion. The following are some of the divine names or characteristics that can be grounded ultimately in the second way but not in the first: pure act (1.16), absence of all composition (1.18), identity of essence and esse (1.22), no accidents whatsoever (1.23), no difference (1.24), not in a genus (1.25), perfect (1.28), the likeness of creatures to God (1.29), goodness itself (1.38), no evil in
45 One can accept this conclusion, even if one hesitates to accept the above analysis of the limited scope of the notions of passive potency and potency to existence in SCG 1.16. Taking as the foundation of our claims about the order of argumentative dependence what Thomas says explicitly, it is sufficient for our purposes (a) that Thomas offers no argument establishing that the exclusion of passive potency and potency to existence implies the exclusion of all potency whatsoever and (b) that in his later arguments, Thomas repeatedly appeals explicitly to the exclusion of all potency from God (or to His being pure act) rather than to the exclusion of passive potency or of potency to existence. 175
God (1.39), the good of every good (1.40), the highest good (1.41), identity of understanding with essence (1.45), that God knows things other than Himself (1.49), that God wills things other than
Himself (1.75), that God is the cause of existing for all things (2.15), that it belongs to God alone to create (2.21), and omnipotence (2.22). While revising his original draft of SCG 1, Thomas also removed arguments grounded in the first way from the chapters concerning divine perfection46 and the claim that God is the good of every good.47
Furthermore, there are only five chapters in which Thomas offers more arguments grounded ultimately in the first way than arguments grounded ultimately in the second: these are 1.15
(eternity), 1.20 (incorporeality), 1.44 (intelligence), 1.89 (the absence of passions in God), and 2.7
(active power/potency)—and of these, only eternity happens to be for Thomas a peculiarly divine characteristic. In fourteen chapters, by contrast, Thomas offers a single argument grounded ultimately in the first way, along with several more (ranging from three to five) ultimately grounded in the second way.48 In general, the line of argumentative dependence grounded in the second way emerges as dominant.
46 Appendix ad primum et secundum librum Summae S. Thomae de Aquino Contra Gentiles 1.28 [Leon. 13.8*]: “Duorum imperfectorum illud est imperfectissimum quod ad perfectionem reduci non potest. Deus autem ad maiorem perfectionem quam habet nullo modo reduci potest, tum quia non est mutabilis, tum quia additionem non recipit. Si igitur non est in fine perfectionis, sequetur ipsum esse imperfectissimum, etiam imperfectius materia prima, quae per additionem formae perfici potest. Quod esse non potest, quia agens honorabilius est patiente et movens moto.” (For these deleted texts from the autograph, Gauthier records some edits made to this text prior to its deletion; I have in each case supplied what would appear to be, based on Gauthier’s transcription, the state of the text after edits but prior to deletion.) In this case, Thomas appeals both to divine immutability and to the identification of God as the first mover. 47 Appendix ad primum et secundum librum Summae S. Thomae de Aquino Contra Gentiles 1.40 [Leon. 13.12*]: “Unumquodque agens agit secundum rationem boni, ut ostensum est supra. Sed Deus est primum movens et agens, ut supra ostensum est, ad quod omnia agentia et moventia reducuntur. Igitur ipse est primum bonum, ad quod omnia bona reducuntur. Est igitur omnis boni bonum.” 48 These chapters concern immateriality (1.17), the absence of anything violent or contrary to nature (1.19), the identity of supposit and essence (1.21), that God is not the formal cause of a body (1.27), goodness (1.37), infinity (1.43), truth (1.60), first and highest truth (1.62), that the principal thing willed by God is the divine essence (1.74), that there are contemplative virtues in God (1.94), life (1.97), that God’s life is everlasting (1.99), beatitude (1.100), that God is His beatitude (1.101). 176
C. SOME CRITICAL CHAPTERS IN THE ORDER OF ARGUMENTATIVE DEPENDENCE
I will focus here on critical chapters in the order of argumentative dependence, particularly with respect to the roles of the two lines of dependence identified above. I will present select arguments in some detail, but the limitations of space will prevent an exhaustive treatment of all of
Thomas’s argumentation.
(i) The absolute simplicity of God (1.18)
In the order of the chapters devoted to the via remotionis, SCG 1.18 plays a critical role. Here
Thomas advances deductive arguments for the total absence of composition in God. He will then appeal in later chapters to the total absence of composition in God to argue for the exclusion of particular modes of composition.49
In his seven arguments in this chapter, Thomas appeals to the following premises:
1. There is no potency in God. (1.16) 2. God is the first being (1.13, 1.14) 3. God is the existence necessary through itself (1.15) 4. God is the first efficient cause (1.13) 5. God is the first cause, and must therefore be most noble (1.13) 6. God is the first and highest good (not yet explicitly established)50 7. God is prior to all things (1.14)
There is no appeal to the conclusion of the argument from motion or to God’s eternity or sempiternity. Rather, we find appeals to the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality, to the conclusion of the argument from SCG 1.15 that God is independent necessary existence, and even to a claim about God that has not yet been established in the order of argumentation, namely, that God is the first and highest good. The argument for simplicity appealing to God’s status as
49 By contrast, in ST 1.3.7, Thomas argues that God is totally incomposite, by both deductive arguments and an inductive argument, only after having excluded the various modes of composition; the claim that God is absolutely incomposite does not function as a premise in the arguments excluding the modes of composition. 50 Thomas will establish that God is the highest good in SCG 1.41 [Leon. Man. 37-38]. 177 necessary through Himself has roots in Metaphysics 5.5.51 Most importantly, the first argument in
SCG 1.18 appeals to the unqualified claim that there is no potency in God. Having taken note of the diverse conclusions in SCG 1.16, we are able to see that SCG 1.18 depends on a line of reasoning ultimately grounded in the argument from efficient causality or in the de novo argument of SCG
1.16.52
(ii) Divine incorporeality (1.20)
The lengthy SCG 1.20 concerns the thesis that God is not a body. Thomas offers ten arguments altogether, in which he appeals to the following premises:
1. God is not composite (1.18) 2. God is not in potency, being pure act (1.16) 3. God is immobile (1.13) 4. God is greater than our intellect (not explicitly established) 5. God is the first and greatest being (1.13, 1.14) 6. God is that than which nothing is nobler (not explicitly established)53 7. God is the first unmoved mover of the heavens (1.13) 8. God is the first mover (1.13) 9. God is the first mover (1.13) 10. God is the first mover (1.13)
As indicated above, Thomas appeals to the conclusion of SCG 1.18—that God is not composite— in order to exclude particular modes of composition. In this case, the first argument excludes composition of dimensive parts: because “every body, since it is continuous, is composite and
[something] having parts,” God as incomposite cannot be a body. The second argument appeals to
51 Metaphysics 5.5 1015b11-13 [McKeon 757]: “Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it cannot even be in one state and also in another, for if it did it would already be in more than one.” 52 As noted previously, within SCG 1.15 the argument for God’s being necesse esse per se is itself presented with a dependence on the argument from efficient causality. In this way, the argument from God’s being necesse esse per se in SCG 1.18 is grounded in the argument from efficient causality. 53 The argument in SCG 1.13 concluding that there exists a maxime ens is, as noted above, a parallel in some respects to the fourth way from ST 1.2.3; the former does not, however, explicitly conclude that God is most noble. 178 the strongest conclusion of SCG 1.16, namely, that God is pure act.54 The third argument is grounded in God’s immobility, the negative aspect of the conclusion of the argument from motion:
Thomas argues that every body is movable, and so God cannot be a body.55
The fourth argument through the sixth arguments in this chapter are noteworthy, in that it is possible that each of these arguments are only probable arguments rather than demonstrative, given some of the premises that Thomas employs. The fourth argument appeals to the premise that God must be greater than our intellect, something at least not yet explicitly established in the argumentation of SCG 1.56 The fifth argument too might be construed as a probable argument, given that Thomas depends upon the assertion that the distinction of the sensitive and intellectual powers in man requires that “above all sensible things there is something intelligible existing in reality,” which must not be a body, because every body is sensible rather than intelligible. If therefore God were not a body, He would not be the first and supreme being (primum et maximum ens).57 Likewise, the sixth argument might be classed as a probable argument, in that it argues
54 It might be asked why Thomas appeals to the strongest conclusion from SCG 1.16, rather than to the conclusion that God lacks passive potency or potency to esse. As noted above, in SCG 2.25 Thomas explains what follows from denying passive potency in God, and in this text he associates passive potency and potency to esse with those things having matter subject to contrariety, i.e., the matter of sublunary bodies. This leaves open the possibility that a thing can lack passive potency and potency to esse and yet still be a body, like the celestial bodies as Thomas understands them. This would explain why Thomas appeals to the stronger conclusions from SCG 1.16—that God lacks all potency and is pure act—in order to establish that God is not a body. 55 SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 18]: “Omne autem corpus naturale mobile est. Deus igitur non est corpus.” 56 The argument is as follows. Because every body is finite (Thomas appeals to Aristotle’s De caelo 1.5 for this), it is always possible to “transcend a finite body by the intellect or the imagination.” But then God would not be greater than our intellect. SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 18]: “Omne corpus finitum est: quod tam de corpore circulari quam de recto probatur in I Cael. et Mundi. Quodlibet autem corpus finitum intellectu et imaginatione transcendere possumus. Si igitur Deus est corpus, intellectus et imaginatio nostra aliquid maius Deo cogitare possunt. Et sic Deus non est maior intellectu nostro. Quod est inconveniens. Non est igitur corpus.” Inconveniens here might be construed as “unfitting” or as “impossible;” in the latter case, Thomas would be offering this as a stronger argument. There is also an interesting parallel between Thomas’s phrasing here, aliquid maius Deo cogitare, and the description of God in Anselm’s Proslogion 2 & 3. See for example Proslogion 2 [Schmitt 1.101]: “Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest.” Cf. SCG 1.10-11. 57 SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 18]: “Cognitio intellectiva certior est quam sensitiva. Invenitur autem aliquid subiectum sensui in rerum natura. Igitur et intellectui. Sed secundum ordinem obiectorum est ordo potentiarum, sicut et distinctio. Ergo super omnia sensibilia est aliquid intelligibile in rerum natura existens. Omne autem corpus in rebus 179 immediately from the excellence of life (understood as an act or as a formal principle) in living bodies to the conclusion that “that than which nothing is more excellent is not a body.”58 That God is “that than which nothing is more excellent” would seem to follow from the fourth way in SCG
1.13.
The bulk of SCG 1.20 is devoted to the seventh through the tenth arguments, which
Thomas calls “the arguments of the philosophers showing the same [conclusion], proceeding from the eternity of motion.”59 These arguments exhibit clear dependence on Aristotle’s Physics. Thomas’s seventh argument explicitly identifies God as the first mover of “the body of heaven,” which undergoes a sempiternal rotary motion. Thomas concludes from this, following Physics 8.6, that the first mover must be moved neither per se (as a body is moved) nor per accidens (as the soul of an animal body is moved). He then adds to this (1) that no body causes a locomotion without itself being moved and (2) that no power in a body causes motion unless it is moved. From this, he can conclude that God, as the first immobile mover of heaven, is neither a body nor a power in a body.60
The eighth argument receives a lengthy treatment, comparable within the first book of the
Contra Gentiles only to the extended defense of the the two versions of the argument from motion in
SCG 1.13. The argument is as follows: “No infinite power is a power in a magnitude. The power of
existens est sensibile. Igitur super omnia corpora est aliquid accipere nobilius. Si igitur Deus est corpus, non erit primum et maximum ens.” 58 SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 19]: “Quolibet corpore non vivente res vivens est nobilior. Quolibet autem corpore vivente sua vita est nobilior: cum per hoc habeat supra alia corpora nobilitatem. Id igitur quo nihil est nobilius, corpus non est. Hoc autem est Deus. Igitur non est corpus.” 59 SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 19]: “Inveniuntur rationes philosophorum ad idem ostendendum procedentes ex aeternitate motus, in hunc modum.” 60 SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 19]: “In omni motu sempiterno oportet quod primum movens non moveatur neque per se neque per accidens, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Corpus autem caeli movetur circulariter motu sempiterno. Ergo primus motor eius non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. Nullum autem corpus movet localiter nisi moveatur: eo quod oportet movens et motum esse simul; et sic corpus movens moveri oportet, ad hoc quod sit simul cum corpore moto. Nulla etiam virtus in corpore movet nisi per accidens moveatur: quia, moto corpore, movetur per accidens virtus corporis. Ergo primus motor caeli non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Hoc autem ad quod ultimo reducitur motus caeli sicut ad primum movens immobile, est Deus. Deus igitur non est corpus.” This “fork in the road” also appears in the second argument from motion in SCG 1.13. 180 the first mover is an infinite power. Therefore it is not in any magnitude. And thus God, who is the first mover, is neither a body nor a power in a body.”61 This is Thomas’s presentation of the culminating argument of Physics 8.10. The larger part of SCG 1.20 is devoted to defending the premises of this argument and responding to objections against its reasoning. This is followed by the brief presentation of the ninth and tenth arguments, which appeal respectively to the continuous and regular character of the first motion of heaven and to its endlessness.
We should note the limited character of what is established through these arguments that exhibit dependence on the Physics. In responding to one of the objections against the eighth argument, Thomas notes the following:
Through this argument it is not proved that God is not conjoined to a body as the rational soul [is joined] to the human body: but that He is not a power in a body as a material power, which is divided according to the division of the body. Whence it is also said of the human intellect that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. But that God is not united to a body as a soul, is [established] by another argument.62
The possibility that Thomas envisions here, as not yet excluded by this argument, is that God is an incorporeal entity joined to some body as the rational soul is joined to the human body.63 That God is not so joined to any body will be ruled out later, in SCG 1.27. I would suggest that this restriction applies to all of the arguments in SCG 1.20.64
61 SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 19]: “Nulla potentia infinita est potentia in magnitudine. Potentia primi motoris est potentia infinita. Ergo non est in aliqua magnitudine. Et sic Deus, qui est primus motor, neque est corpus neque est virtus in corpore.” 62 SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 20]: “Et ad hoc est dicendum quod per processum praedictum non probatur quod non sit Deus coniunctus corpori sicut anima rationalis corpori humano: sed quod non est virtus in corpore sicut virtus materialis, quae dividitur ad divisionem corporis. Unde etiam dicitur de intellectu humano quod non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Quod autem Deus, non sit unitus corpori sicut anima, alterius rationis est.” 63 On Thomas’s account, the rational soul is joined to the human body as its substantial form. This rational soul has several powers, which are really distinct from the soul and from one another. Among these powers, some are material powers, that is, powers seated in bodily organs; while others (the intellect and will) are immaterial powers that do not operate within a bodily organ. 64 This reading of the limited force of these arguments in SCG 1.20 is supported by the end of the chapter, where Thomas says that the arguments of this chapter destroy “the error of the first philosophers of natural things, who posited only material causes.” SCG 1.20 [Leon. Man. 22]: “Per hoc autem destruitur error primorum philosophorum Naturalium, qui non ponebant nisi causas materiales, ut ignem vel aquam vel aliquid huiusmodi.” That is, the ancient 181
(iii) Identity of God with His essence
SCG 1.21 contains five arguments for the conclusion that God is identical with His essence, employing the following premises concerning God:
1. There is no composition in God (1.18) 2. There are not any accidents in God (not yet established; coming in 1.23) 3. God does not exist in some matter (1.17, 1.20) 4. God is the first being (1.13) 5. There is not potentiality in God (1.16)
As in the previous chapter, Thomas begins with an argument appealing to the conclusion of SCG
1.18, that God is not composite, in order to exclude a particular mode of composition. The argument begins with the claim that a thing’s non-identity with its own essence would imply that there is something in it that is not its essence; but then there would be composition in it, which has been excluded from God, and so God must be identical with His essence.65 The final argument, which appeals to the total absence of potency in God, begins with the premise that “that which is not its essence is related, according to something of itself, to [its essence] as potency to act.” In support of this claim, Thomas advances that the essence, in the case of composite things, is signified
physicists who denied any distinction between matter and form are refuted by an argument showing that God is not a body, even if it remains a possibility to be later refuted that God is the formal cause of a body. Another interesting feature of SCG 1.20 is the role played in some of these arguments by the premise that motion is eternal, which is contrary to the Catholic faith. Thomas replies to this difficulty by noting that the motion of the heavenly bodies “will not fail either on account of a lack of power in [its] mover nor on account of a corruption of the mobile substance, since the motion of heaven does not appear to slow with the passage of time. Wherefore the aforementioned demonstrations do not lose their efficacy.” Thomas appeals to an empirical premise concerning the motion of the heavens—that their motions do not slow with time—to save the efficacy of these arguments. This is a different line of response from that offered in SCG 1.13, where Thomas considers a similar objection against the argument from motion. In that case, Thomas saves the argument from motion by transforming it into a disjunctive argument: if the universe and motion have always existed, then the argument from motion is successful as it stands; but if the universe and motion have not always existed, then a first mover would still be necessary. 65 SCG 1.21 [Leon. Man. 22]: “In omni enim eo quod non est sua essentia sive quidditas, oportet aliquam esse compositionem. Cum enim in unoquoque sit sua essentia, si nihil in aliquo esset praeter eius essentiam, totum quod res est esset eius essentia: et sic ipsum esset sua essentia. Si igitur aliquid non esset sua essentia, oportet aliquid in eo esse praeter eius essentiam. Et sic oportet in eo esse compositionem. Unde etiam essentia in compositis significatur per modum partis, ut humanitas in homine. Ostensum est autem in Deo nullam esse compositionem. Deus igitur est sua essentia.” 182
“in the manner of a form,” such as “humanity.”66 We should also note that the chapter does maintain a link in argumentative dependence to the first way, through its third argument, which depends upon the premise that God does not exist in matter.67
(iv) Identity of essence and existence in God (1.22)
Whereas SCG 1.21 maintains some link with the first way, there is no such link to be found in SCG 1.22. In this chapter, Thomas argues for the identity of esse and essence in God from the following premises about God:
1. God is the existence necessary through itself. (1.15) 2. God is the existence necessary through itself (1.15) 3. God is simple; God is the first cause (1.18, 1.13) 4. God is pure act (1.16) 5. God is not composite (1.18) 6. God is the first being (1.13, 1.14)
All of the reasoning employed in SCG 1.22—including the argumentation that emphasizes God’s being necesse per se esse—is ultimately grounded in the proof of God’s existence based on efficient causality.68
For now, I would highlight the fourth and sixth arguments. The former is an example of argumentation appealing to the claim that God is pure act. The argument begins by noting that esse
66 SCG 1.21 [Leon. Man. 23] “Quod non est sua essentia, se habet secundum aliquid sui ad ipsam ut potentia ad actum. Unde et per modum formae significatur essentia, ut puta, humanitas. Sed in Deo nulla est potentialitas, ut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod ipse sit sua essentia.” 67 SCG 1.21 [Leon. Man. 23]: “Formae quae de rebus subsistentibus non praedicantur, sive in universali sive in singulari acceptis, sunt formae quae non per se singulariter subsistunt in seipsis individuatae. Non enim dicitur quod Socrates aut homo aut animal sit albedo, quia albedo non est per se singulariter subsistens, sed individuatur per subiectum subsistens. Similiter etiam formae naturales non subsistunt per se singulariter, sed individuantur in propriis materiis: unde non dicimus quod hic ignis, aut ignis, sit sua forma. Ipsae etiam essentiae vel quidditates generum vel specierum individuantur per materiam signatam huius vel illius individui, licet etiam quidditas generis vel speciei formam includat et materiam in communi: unde non dicitur quod Socrates, vel homo, sit humanitas. Sed divina essentia est per se singulariter existens et in seipsa individuata: cum non sit in aliqua materia, ut ostensum est. Divina igitur essentia praedicatur de Deo, ut dicatur: Deus est sua essentia.” It is important to note that this argument would apply just as well to angels, which are subsistent and immaterial. Thomas usually holds that essence and supposit are identical in angels, but he denies this in Quodl. 2.2.2. For discussion, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 243-51. 68 See above p. 164. 183 names an act, “for something is not said to exist because it is in potency, but because it is in act.”69
Thomas continues by claiming that whatever possesses some act but is not identical with it is related to that act, as potency to act. If God’s essence were distinct from His esse, the former would have to be related to the latter as potency to act, implying that there would be potency in God.70 Since it has already been shown that God is pure act, having nothing of potency within Himself, it follows that
God’s essence is not other than His esse.71
The sixth argument appeals to the identification of God as the first being (primum ens).
Thomas begins by observing that “every thing exists by this, that it has existence (esse).”72 I translate per hoc quod here literally, rather than as “because,” since in this case we want to avoid assuming that the connection between the fact that something exists and its having esse is a causal relationship;
69 SCG 1.22 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Esse actum quendam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu.” The understanding of esse as act is critical within Thomas’s metaphysical understanding of finite being. See the critical De pot. 7.2 ad 9, in which Thomas characterizes esse as the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections [Marietti 2.192]: “Hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectior potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.” The understanding of esse as act in finite beings is carried forward, through analogy, in the attribution of esse to God, understood as pure and unreceived act. 70 SCG 1.22 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Omne autem cui convenit actus aliquis diversum ab eo existens, se habet ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: actus enim et potentia ad se invicem dicuntur. Si ergo divina essentia est aliud quam suum esse, sequitur quod essentia et esse se habeant sicut potentia et actus.” That essence-esse composition implies the presence of potency is central to Thomas’s argument for the presence of potency within angels in De ente 4. In context, the argument for essence-esse composition in the angels in De ente 4 is ultimately for the sake of establishing the presence of potency within them. The argument in De ente 4, after having established essence-esse composition in angels, then establishes that esse in them must be received from another that is esse tantum, that is, God—at this point Thomas proves God’s existence. He then appeals to the premise that “everything that receives something from another is in potency with respect to that [which it receives], and this which is received in it is its act,” in order to establish finally that there must be potency in angels. De ente 4. [Leon. 43.376]: “Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima que Deus est. Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius; ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas uel forma que est intelligentia sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita inuenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materia nisi equivoce.” This argument in SCG 1.22 (that essence-esse composition in God would imply the presence of potency) is more direct, by comparison; the argument rests upon the previous assertion that esse is an act. 71 SCG 1.22 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Ostensum est autem in Deo nihil esse de potentia, sed ipsum esse purum actum. Non igitur Dei essentia est aliud quam suum esse.” 72 SCG 1.22 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse.” 184
Thomas is not necessarily appealing here to anything other than the logical distinction between est taken as concrete and esse taken as abstract.73 Thomas also goes on immediately here to refer implicitly to God as having esse by His essence, so presumably God is meant to fall under this observation that a thing exists by having existence.74 Thomas continues by claiming that “no thing whose essence is not its esse exists by its essence.” Rather, it exists by participation ipsius esse, which could be rendered as “in/of its existence” or as “in/of existence itself.”75 This ambiguity will be important momentarily.76 Thomas then continues: “But that which exists by participation in something cannot be the first being: since that [in] which something participates, so that it exists, is prior to it. But God is the first being, to which nothing is prior. The essence of God is therefore His existence.”77
Thomas invokes here the notion of participation, which he develops most fully in In De heb. lect. 2.78 In that text, Thomas offers a general definition of participation as a thing’s reception in a particular fashion of what belongs to something else in a universal (or total) fashion.79 Thomas also
73 For this, see In De heb. 2 [Leon. 50.270-71]: “Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse et aliud per id quod dicimus id quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significatur in abstracto sicut et albedo; set quod est, id est ens et currens, significatur in concreto uelud album” 74 Thomas also employs the phrase Deus habet esse in some other texts. See, e.g., ST 1.26.1 ad 2 [Leon. 4.301]: “Sicut igitur Deus habet esse, quamvis non generetur; ita habet beatitudinem, quamvis non mereatur.” 75 SCG 1.22 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Nulla igitur res cuius essentia non est suum esse, est per essentiam suam, sed participatione alicuius, scilicet ipsius esse.” 76 Wippel cites this text as a case in which the meaning of esse is ambiguous, as here ipsius esse could refer to esse commune or to actus essendi. Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 121-22, n. 72. I would suggest that ipsius esse here can also be construed as referring to divine esse; in support of this, I would add that at this point in the Contra Gentiles, Thomas has not yet argued that God as divinum esse is really distinct from esse commune—this clarification comes in SCG 1.26. 77 SCG 1.22 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Quod autem est per participationem alicuius, non potest esse primum ens: quia id quod participat ad hoc quod sit, est eo prius. Deus autem est primum ens, quo nihil est prius. Dei igitur essentia est suum esse.” Elsewhere Thomas argues more directly that whatever is a being by participation must be caused by another. See e.g. ST 1.44.1 ad 1 [Leon. 4.455]: “Ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio.” For treatment of this text, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 117. 78 For treatments of Thomas’s understanding of participation, particularly as it is developed in In De heb. 2, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 96-131; R. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 8-20; McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, 161- 231. 79 In De heb. 2 [Leon. 50.271]: “Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud.” See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 96-97. 185 distinguishes three modes of participation: (1) that of a species in its genus or of an individual in a universal; (2) that of matter in form or of substance in accident; (3) that of an effect in its efficient cause.80 For Thomas, a finite being’s participation in esse can be understood in several ways, as
Wippel outlines: (a) as participation in esse commune; (b) as participation in its own esse or actus essendi; and (c) as participation in divinum esse or esse subsistens.81 The sixth argument in SCG 1.22 is remarkably ambiguous in this respect, as one could construe participation ipsius esse in any of these three senses: (a) as participation in ipsum esse in the sense of esse commune; (b) as participation in its own actus essendi; or (c) as participation in ipsum esse in the sense of esse subsistens. We can note, however, that esse commune is the actus essendi understood as common to every finite being; so even if one reads ipsius esse here as “in ipsum esse,” it would still be ambiguous whether ipsum esse is esse commune or esse divinum. I would suggest that Thomas’s ambiguity in this respect may be intentional, since at this point in the order of argumentation, he has not yet clarified that God as ipsum esse is esse subsistens and is thus distinct from esse commune—this claim comes later, in SCG 1.26.
Now, if we were to interpret participation ipsius esse here as participation in the being’s own actus essendi, then in the remainder of the argument either (a) Thomas refers to a being’s actus essendi as prior to it in a way that must be excluded from God’s relationship to His own esse, since nothing can be prior to God in virtue of His identification as the first being;82 or (b) Thomas is taking for
80 In De heb. 2 [Leon. 50.271]: “Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet uniuersaliter, dicitur participare illud, sicut homo dicitur participare animal quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Sortes participat hominem. Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens et materia formam, quia forma substancialis uel accidentalis, que de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc uel illud subiectum. Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et precipue quando non adequat uirtutem sue cause, puta si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate qua est in sole.” 81 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 120-21. 82 This raises the question of whether and how to construe the relationship between esse and ens with respect to the causes. Gilson’s view in Being and Some Philosophers is that esse can be understood as an efficient cause. Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 172: “Actual existence, then, is the efficient cause by which essence in turn is the formal cause which makes an actual existence to be ‘such an existence.’” For discussion and criticism of Gilson’s view, see Lawrence Dewan, “Étienne Gilson and the Actus Essendi,” Études maritainiennes 15 (1999): 94-96. Dewan emphasizes that esse is to be identified as an effect rather than as a cause. 186 granted that a being’s participation in its own esse is ultimately to be understood in terms of that being’s causal dependence upon divinum esse, in the third mode of participation.83 If, on the other hand, (c) we should interpret participation ipsius esse as participation in divinum esse—which would be participation in the third mode, the participation of an effect in its cause—then the remainder of the argument is clear, since God Himself as primum ens is identified as causally prior to the being that participates in ipsum esse. All three of these interpretations fit with the reading of primum ens I advanced above (that God is causally prior with respect to esse), and I would suggest that Thomas’s argument succeeds no matter how participation ipsius esse is interpreted. This supports the suggestion that perhaps Thomas’s ambiguity with the phrase participation ipsius esse is intentional.
(v) The absence of accidents in God (1.23)
Thomas’s arguments in SCG 1.23 appeal to the following premises:
1. The divine substance is existence itself (1.22) 2. God is not moved by another; God is not composite (1.18) 3. There is no potency in God (1.16) 4. God is immutable (1.13) 5. God is the cause of all things (1.13) 6. God is simplest substance (1.18)
In the first argument, Thomas depends upon the conclusion of the previous chapter, while once again invoking the notion of participation. In this case, he advances a claim derived from Boethius’s
De hebdomadibus, that “existence itself cannot participate in something that is not of its essence;
On the interpretation of participation ipsius esse in SCG 1.22 as participation in actus essendi, we would not need to follow Gilson’s view about esse as an efficient cause. It is rather sufficient to note that act is prior to potency and to the composite, and esse is, as the actus essendi, an act. We have seen above in SCG 1.16 that Thomas argues from the identification of God as first being to His being pure act. 83 It is a difficult question how to categorize a finite being’s participation in its own actus essendi with respect to the three modes of participation. Wippel has argued against understanding the participation of beings in esse in terms of the first or second modes of participation outlined above. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 103-110. However participation ipsius esse is read in SCG 1.22, for our purposes it is sufficient to note that the remainder of the sixth argument in SCG 1.22 only depends upon accepting that the esse in which a thing participates must in some sense be prior to it, in a manner that is excluded from God by virtue of His being the primum ens, “to which nothing is prior.” 187 although that which is can participate something else.”84 Thomas offers a justification for this thesis, noting that “nothing is more formal or simpler than existence. And thus existence itself can participate [in] nothing.”85 Existence cannot be related to anything else as potency to act, and it has no parts or components; and so existence itself cannot receive some other perfection so as to participate in it. Thomas then notes that the divine substance is existence itself, and therefore God can have nothing that is not of His substance. Given that an accident is something superadded to a thing’s substance, it follows that there cannot be any accidents in God.86 An important feature of this argument is that esse serves as a middle term, such that a claim made about esse as it is known in creatures—the impossibility that esse can participate in anything—is then extended through analogy to God, understood as ipsum esse. That esse serves as a middle term through positive, analogical predication will be an important consideration below.87
The second and fourth arguments are the only instances in SCG 1.21-25 in which Thomas appeals to the conclusion of the argument from motion. In both cases, the appeal is to the negative aspect of that conclusion. The second argument is a disjunctive argument, in which Thomas begins by noting that any accident in God would have to be caused, either by an extrinsic cause or by God’s substance.88 Thomas appeals to the fact that God does not suffer passion and is not moved by anything—a premise derived from the conclusion of the argument from motion—in order to
84 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Ipsum enim esse non potest participare aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare.” For the source in Boethius, see De hebdomadibus [Loeb 40]: “Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat.” 85 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Nihil enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest.” 86 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Divina autem substantia est ipsum esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de sua substantia. Nullum ergo accidens ei inesse potest.” 87 See below, pp. 228-230. 88 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 24-25]: “Omne quod inest alicui accidentaliter, habet causam quare insit: cum sit praeter essentiam eius cui inest. Si igitur aliquid accidentaliter sit in Deo, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam causam. Aut ergo causa accidentis est divina substantia, aut aliquid aliud.” 188 exclude accidents caused by something extrinsic.89 He then appeals to God’s total lack of composition to exclude accidents caused by something intrinsic. The argument runs as follows: if the divine substance were itself the cause of an accident in God, it could not be the case that the divine substance were both the cause and the recipient of this accident in the same respect, for this would be to posit something that is the cause of itself. Thus, if there were some accident in God caused by His substance, His substance would have to be both the cause of that accident and the recipient, according to some distinction of intrinsic principles, just “as corporeal [things] receive proper accidents by the nature of matter and cause them by form.” But this is to posit composition in God, which has been excluded in SCG 1.18 on the basis of arguments ultimately grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause.90
Thus, in this second argument, Thomas can exclude on the basis of immutability only the sorts of accidents caused by extrinsic causes, but not those caused by something intrinsic. (Accidents caused by something intrinsic would be proper and inseparable accidents, as distinguished from the separable accidents caused by something extrinsic.)91 Similarly, Thomas’s premise in the fourth argument that “it is of the nature of an accident to be or not to be in [a subject]” concerns accident
89 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 25]: “Si aliquid aliud, oportet quod illud agat in divinam substantiam: nihil enim inducit aliquam formam, vel substantialem vel accidentalem, in aliquo recipiente, nisi aliquo modo agendo in ipsum; eo quod agere nihil aliud est quam facere aliquid actu, quod quidem est per formam. Ergo Deus patietur et movebitur ab alio agente. Quod est contra praedeterminata.” 90 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 25]: “Si autem ipsa divina substantia est causa accidentis quod sibi inest; impossibile est autem quod sit causa illius secundum quod est recipiens ipsum, quia sic idem secundum idem faceret seipsum in actu; ergo oportet, si in Deo est aliquod accidens, quod secundum aliud et aliud recipiat et causet accidens illud, sicut corporalia recipiunt propria accidentia per naturam materiae et causant per formam. Sic igitur Deus erit compositus. Cuius contrarium superius probatum est.” 91 For a full discussion of this distinction, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 266-68. See In Sent. 1.17.1.2 ad 2 [Mand. 1.398]: “Subjectum diversimode se habet ad diversa accidentia. Quaedam autem sunt accidentia naturalia quae creantur ex principiis subjecti; et hoc dupliciter: quia vel causantur ex principiis speciei, et sic sunt propriae passiones, quae consequuntur totam speciem; vel ex principiis individui, et sic sunt communia consequentia principia naturalia individua. Sunt etiam quaedam accidentia per violentiam inducta, sicut calor in aquam, et ista sunt repugnantia principiis subjecti. Quaedam autem sunt quae quidem causantur ab extrinseco non repugnantia principiis subjecti, sed magis perficientia ipsa, sicut lumen in aere: et ita etiam charitas in anima est ab extrinseco.” 189 narrowly as separable accident rather than accident as a broader class that includes properties and inseparable accidents.92 By contrast, the chapter’s first argument excludes all accidents, by concluding that God “has nothing that is not of His substance.”93 Thus, argumentation ultimately grounded in the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality can exclude all accidents from
God, whereas argumentation grounded in immutability only excludes separable accidents. Any later appeal to the claim that “whatever is in God is God” is therefore ultimately grounded in the second way.
(vi) Divine perfection (1.28)
We saw above that it is necessary within some chapters of the Contra Gentiles to distinguish between different meanings of the divine names treated by Thomas—sometimes with reference to different historical sources for the different meanings.94 This is especially important in SCG 1.28, in which Thomas argues for what he understands as an Averroistic notion of universal perfection as a complement to what might be characterized as an Avicennian notion of perfection as completeness according to kind.
In brief, Avicenna speaks of necesse esse as perfect insofar as it “lacks nothing of its existence and of the perfections of its existence; nor does something of the genus of its existence pass from its existence to another [distinct] from itself.”95 Avicenna denies that necesse esse has any genus strictly
92 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 25]: “[A]ccidens enim de se natum est inesse et non inesse.” This formulation is how logic construes accident as one of the predicables, distinguished from property. 93 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de sua substantia.” This will be the version of SCG 1.23’s conclusion to which Thomas will later appeal in concluding, for example, that God’s act of understanding is identical with His essence in SCG 1.45. 94 SCG 1.15’s treatment of eternity includes both eternity in the Aristotelian sense (as substantial perpetuity) and in the Boethian meaning (as the complete and simultaneous possession of endless life), although it should be noted that the latter includes and surpasses the former. 95 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.412]: “Necesse esse est perfectum esse. Nam nihil deest sibi de suo esse et de perfectionibus sui esse, nec aliquid generis sui esse egreditur ab esse eius ad aliud a se.” Marmura renders this passage from the Arabic in a way that makes even clearer that the notion of perfection operative here is a notion of completeness. See Metaphysics 8.6 [Marmura 283]: “The Necessary Existent is thus perfect in existence because nothing 190 speaking, but he is willing to speak of the “genus” of necesse esse in order to advance the claim that necesse esse lacks nothing of the sort of perfection appropriate to its “genus” or kind. This says nothing, however, about whether necesse esse possesses the perfections of any other genus. By contrast, Averroes characterizes the perfection of God by saying that He does not lack the excellence (nobilitas) of any genus; and he calls this the way that God as first principle is universally perfect.96
Turning to SCG 1.28, we find that Thomas introduces his discussion by claiming that “God, who is not other than His existence, is a universally perfect being. And I call universally perfect that in which the excellence (nobilitas) of no genus is lacking.”97 Appropriating language from Averroes’
Commentary on the Metaphysics, Thomas introduces the sort of perfection that concerns him in SCG
1.28 as universal perfection. We should recall that Thomas cites Averroes’ Commentary on
Metaphysics 5 in the first sed contra of In Sent. 1.2.1.3.98 In that same text, Thomas explains that the eminence of divine perfection is to be understood with respect to three things, namely, universality,
belonging to His existence and the perfections of His existence is lacking in Him. Nothing of the genus of His existence is extraneous to His existence, existing in another.” 96 Averrois in Librum V Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Commentarius 5.14 [Ponzalli 182]: “Deinde dicit: Et quaedam modo universali, etc., idest: et diffinitio eorum universaliter est talis: perfecta sunt illa quorum nihil invenitur per quod dicuntur imperfecta in eis aut extrinsecum. Et ista est dispositio primi principii, scilicet Dei. Et forte intelligit per hoc quod dixit: Et quibus nihil est extra et a quibus nihil diminuitur ex eis quae sunt. Et potest intelligi per hoc quod dixit: Ita quod in eis non est nobilitas in unoquoque generum, idest quando de eis non diminuitur nobilitas ex eo quod invenitur in unoquoque generum” (reading extrinsecum for extrinsecus, according to the variant listed in the apparatus). The Latin Averroes calls this the way in which things are called perfect universaliter, and he attributes this mode of perfection to the first principle, God. 97 SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 29]: “Licet autem ea quae sunt et vivunt, perfectiora sint quam ea quae tantum sunt, Deus tamen, qui non est aliud quam suum esse, est universaliter ens perfectum. Et dico universaliter perfectum, cui non deest alicuius generis nobilitas.” 98 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.64]. 191 plenitude, and unity.99 The notion of universal perfection, which Thomas associates closely with
Averroes’ reading of Metaphysics 5.16, is thus one aspect of the eminence of divine perfection.100
SCG 1.28’s six arguments appeal to the following previously established premises concerning
God, and in each case Thomas states his conclusion as follows:
Premise: Conclusion: 1. God is His esse; God is subsistent esse (1.22, 1.26) universally perfect 2. God possesses esse as a whole (totaliter) (1.22) 101 universally perfect 3. God is the first being (1.13, 1.14) most perfect 4. God is pure act (1.16) most perfect 5. God is the first efficient cause (1.13) most perfect 6. God is His esse (1.22) universally perfect
We find no link of argumentative dependence to the conclusion of the argument from motion: all of
Thomas’s arguments are ultimately grounded in the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality (or in the de novo argument in SCG 1.16). Thomas had included two arguments grounded in the first way in an earlier version of SCG 1.28, but he removed them during revisions.102
We should highlight the first argument, in which Thomas continues to employ his metaphysics of participation. Thomas begins by noting that every excellence (nobilitas) belongs to each thing according to that thing’s existence: “for no excellence would be man’s by his wisdom,
99 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.68-69]: “Et haec eminentia attenditur quantum ad tria: scilicet quantum ad universalitatem, quia in Deo sunt omnes perfectiones adunatae, quae non congregantur in una creatura. Item quantum ad plenitudinem, quia est ibi sapientia sine omni defectu, et similiter de aliis attributis: quod non est in creaturis. Et iterum quantum ad unitatem: quae enim in creaturis diversa sunt.” 100 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 will provide clues to Thomas’s rationale behind the order of presentation after SCG 1.28: in particular, the treatment of unity (1.42) and infinity (1.43) present the other two aspects of the eminence of divine perfection mentioned by In Sent. 1.2.1.3. It is for this reason that I consider 1.28-43 as a group of chapters fundamentally associated with divine perfection. 101 After what I have identified as the second argument, Thomas offers the following. SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 30]: “Illa vero quae tantum sunt, non sunt imperfecta propeter imperfectionem ipsius esse absoluti: non enim ipsa habent esse secundum suum totum posse, sed participant esse per quendam particularem modum et imperfectissimum.” This does not seem to be a distinct argument for the chapter’s conclusion, but rather an elaboration of the metaphysical theses about participation and esse underlying the chapter’s first two arguments. Things that merely exist—rather than being subsistent esse—are imperfect (compared to God’s supreme, universal perfection) not because esse taken absolutely is imperfect, but rather precisely because such things participate esse in a particular and imperfect mode. 102 Appendix ad primum et secundum librum Summae S. Thomae de Aquino Contra Gentiles 1.28 [Leon. 13.8*]. 192 except that by it he should be wise,” and the same is true for any other excellence. That is, a perfection such as wisdom does not actually perfect except by making a man to be wise. It follows,
Thomas continues, that a thing’s mode of excellence (modus in nobilitate) is a function of the mode by which it has existence (esse), “for a thing, insofar as its existence is contracted to some special mode of greater or lesser excellence, is said to be, according to this, more or less excellent.” The key to what follows in Thomas’s argument is this correlation between (a) the contraction of a thing’s esse to a determinate mode of greater or lesser excellence and (b) the determinate excellence, greater or lesser, of that thing. This allows him to offer as a hypothetical that “if there is something to which belongs the whole power of existing (tota virtus essendi),” that is, something whose esse is not contracted to any determinate or particular mode, then “no excellence that belongs to any [thing] could be lacking to it.”103 Although Thomas does not explicitly mention participation, this notion is critical for understanding the contrast drawn here between what possesses esse in a contracted, partial mode and what possesses the whole power of existing without any such contraction. Thomas continues by observing that the entire power of existing would belong to anything which is identical with its own existence, “just as if there were some separate whiteness, nothing of the power of whiteness could be lacking to it.” Particular white things lack something of this power of whiteness because of some defect in the recipient, “which receives [whiteness] according to its [own] mode and perhaps not according to the whole power of whiteness.” Turning now to God, Thomas recalls that God is His esse, and so He “possesses existence according to the whole power of existence itself.
103 SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 29]: “Omnis enim nobilitas cuiuscumque rei est sibi secundum suum esse: nulla enim nobilitas esset homini ex sua sapientia nisi per eam sapiens esset, et sic de aliis. Sic ergo secundum modum quo res habet esse, est suus modus in nobilitate: nam res secundum quod suum esse contrahitur ad aliquem specialem modum nobilitatis maiorem vel minorem, dicitur esse secundum hoc nobilior vel minus nobilis. Igitur si aliquid est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alicui rei conveniat.” 193
He cannot therefore lack any excellence that belongs to some thing.”104 This is to say that God is universally perfect, in the sense distinguished at the beginning of the chapter. It is important to note that this argument involves a sort of double negation, even in its conclusion, insofar as God is said
(i) not (ii) to lack any of the excellences of other things: this allows the conclusion that God is universally perfect.105
This element of double negation is even more clear in the second argument, in which
Thomas offers a variation on the reasoning found in the first argument. He notes that “just as every excellence and perfection is in a thing according as it exists, so every defect is in it according as, in some way, it does not exist.” If excellence or perfection is according to existence, then defect is according to non-existence. But since God possesses esse totaliter, “so non-existence is totally absent from Him.” It follows that every defect is likewise absent from God, and “therefore He is universally perfect.”106 This double negation, resulting in the attribution of every excellence to God, helps us to understand how Thomas transitions from his emphasis on the via remotionis to the positive attribution of perfections to God.107
In none of SCG 1.28’s arguments is Thomas’s conclusion merely that God is perfect: he concludes either that God is universally perfect or that God is most perfect. Of the arguments that
104 SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 29-30]: “Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset; nam alicui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis. Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse. Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei conveniat.” 105 See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 516; Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on the Ultimate Why Question: Why is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever?” in The Ultimate Why Question: Why is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 94. 106 SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 30]: “Sicut autem omnis nobilitas et perfectio inest rei secundum quod est, ita omnis defectus inest ei secundum quod aliqualiter non est. Deus autem, sicut habet esse totaliter, ita ab eo totaliter absistit non esse: quia per modum per quem habet aliquid esse, deficit a non esse. A Deo ergo omnis defectus absistit. Est igitur universaliter perfectus.” 107 Kretzmann especially emphasizes the pivotal nature of SCG 1.28 in this respect. See Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism, 141-42. 194 conclude that God is most perfect, it is clear in one of these instances (the argument from the premise that God is the first efficient cause) that by “most perfect” Thomas means universally perfect.108 As for the other two, one could perhaps interpret these arguments as concluding to a more limited notion of perfection as completeness according to kind, albeit with the understanding that God is the most complete being. I call attention to a possible distinction between concluding that God is most perfect and that He is universally perfect, because this distinction is present in ST
1.4.109 In any event, universal perfection receives the primary emphasis in SCG 1.28.
Thomas also closely associates divine perfection with the notion of goodness: at the end of
SCG 1.28 he explains that God expresses His own perfection when He said to Moses “‘I will show you all good,’ as it is written in Exodus 33, by this leading Moses to understand that the fullness of all goodness exists in Him.”110 This association of perfection with goodness will continue in SCG
1.37’s consideration of divine goodness.
(vii) The likeness of creatures to God (1.29)
In SCG 1.29, Thomas advances the important thesis that there can be found in creatures a likeness to God. His sole argument depends upon a version of the principle omne agens agit sibi simile, in this case articulated, with a supporting principle, as “it is of the nature of action that an agent make [something] similar to itself, since each thing acts insofar as it is in act.”111 Thomas explains that when a cause exceeds its effect, the form of the effect is still somehow found in the cause, “but
108 This is the fifth argument. SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 30]: “Oportet igitur quicquid actu est in quacumque re alia, inveniri in Deo multo eminentius quam sit in re illa, non autem e converso. Est igitur Deus perfectissimus.” 109 ST 1.4.1 will argue that God is most perfect, whereas 1.4.2 argues that He is universally perfect. 110 SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 30]: “Hinc est quod, cum quaereret Moyses divinam videre faciem seu gloriam, responsum est ei a Domino, Ego ostendam tibi omne bonum, ut habetur Exod. 33, per hoc dans intelligere in se omnis bonitatis plenitudinem esse.” 111 SCG 1.29 [Leon. Man. 31]: “Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est.” 195 according to another mode and another intelligible content, by reason of which it is called an equivocal cause.”112 He gives as an example the sun, which, according to the Aristotelian cosmology, causes heat in sublunary bodies without itself being hot in the same way; nevertheless, “it is necessary that the heat generated by the sun possess some likeness to the active power of the sun, by which heat is caused in these lower [bodies], by reason of which the sun is called hot, although not with the same intelligible content.” In a similar way, creatures must bear some likeness to God, insofar as He causes all the perfections they possess.113 The reasoning of SCG 1.29 is thus grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause. Thomas goes on to explain that it is more fitting to say that a creature is like God, rather than that God is like a creature, since “that which is in God in a perfect way, is found in [creatures] by a certain deficient participation.”114
(viii) Divine goodness (1.37-41)
Thomas treats the goodness of God in five chapters, arguing successively that God is good, that God is goodness itself, that there cannot be evil in god, that God is the good of every good, and that God is the highest good. SCG 1.37 establishes that God is good through four arguments appealing to the following premises concerning God:
1. God is perfect (1.28) 2. God is the first unmoved mover (1.13) 3. God is being in act without potency (1.16)
112 SCG 1.29 [Leon. Man. 31]: Unde forma effectus in causa excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa equivoca dicitur.” 113 SCG 1.29 [Leon. Man. 31]: “Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde oportet quod calor a sole generatus aliqualem similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem activam solis, per quam calor in istis inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis similis aliqualiter dicitur in quibus suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a quibus tamen rursus omnibus dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi effectus non eodem modo possident calorem et huiusmodi quo in sole invenitur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc cum omnibus similitudinem habet et dissimilitudinem simul.” 114 SCG 1.29 [Leon. Man. 31]: “Secundum tamen hanc similitudinem convenientius dicitur Deo creatura similis quam e converso. Simile enim alicui dicitur quod eius possidet qualitatem vel formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam deficientem participationem invenitur, illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur. Non autem sic potest dici Deum habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec convenienter dicitur Deum creaturae similem esse: sicut nec hominem dicimus suae imagini esse similem, cui tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur.” 196
4. God is the being necessary through Himself and the cause of existence for all other things (1.13, 1.15)115
Thomas’s first argument appeals to the conclusion of SCG 1.28, that God is perfect. He cites
Nicomachean Ethics 2.6 for the claim that a thing is called good by its “proper virtue” and Physics 7.3 for the claim that a virtue is “a certain perfection.” This allows him to conclude that a thing is good because it is perfect, and that “each thing desires its perfection as its proper good.” Since God has already been shown to be perfect, it follows that He is good.116
In Thomas’s second argument, he resurrects the line of argumentation grounded in the conclusion of the argument from motion, by re-presenting the argument of Aristotle’s Metaphysics for divine goodness. The first unmoved mover causes motion as the first desired (primum desideratum), because it is final causes that cause motion while remaining unmoved; and what is first desired must be good, truly and not merely apparently.117 This is the only argument grounded in the argument from motion in the chapters on divine goodness.
There are no arguments in SCG 1.38-41 that can be grounded in the first way. I would point out an interesting de novo argument in SCG 1.38 (for the claim that God is His goodness), which argues against the possibility of an infinite regress in the line of final causes, with the result that there
115 This argument is important for its dependence on the principle that the good is diffusive of itself. Thomas appeals to the fact that God diffuses existence, in order to justify the attribution of goodness to God. 116 SCG 1.37 [Leon. Man. 35]: “Id enim quo unumquodque bonum dicitur, est propria virtus eius: nam virtus est uniuscuiusque quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Virtus autem est perfectio quaedam: tunc enim unumquodque perfectum dicimus quando attingit propriam virtutem, ut patet in VII Physicorum. Ex hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est quod perfectum est. Et inde est quod unumquodque suam perfectionem appetit sicut proprium bonum. Ostensum est autem Deum esse perfectum. Est igitur bonus.” See Nicomachean Ethics 2.6 1106a15-16 [McKeon 957]: “We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well;” Physics 7.3 246a14-15 [McKeon 346]: “[F]or when anything acquires its proper excellence we call it perfect, since it is then if ever when we have one as good as possible.” 117 SCG 1.37 [Leon. Man. 35-36]: “Ostensum est supra esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deus est. Movet autem sicut movens onmino immobile. quod movet sicut desideratum. Deus igitur, cum sit primum movens immobile, est primum desideratum. Desideratur autem dupliciter aliquid: aut quia est bonum; aut quia apparet bonum. Quorum primum est quod est bonum: nam apparens bonum non movet per seipsum, sed secundum quod habet aliquam speciem boni; bonum vero movet per seipsum. Primum igitur desideratum, quod Deus est, est vere bonum.” 197 must exist something that is good by its essence and not by participation—and “this is God.”118
Curiously, although SCG 1.40 (which concerns the claim that God is the good of every good) does appeal to God’s status as the ultimate end, Thomas does not justify this status by appeal to the argument from motion; rather, he indicates that this claim will be proved later, as he does in SCG
3.17.119 In that chapter, however, we find once again that all of its arguments are grounded ultimately in the second way rather than in the first.120
(ix) Divine infinity (1.43)
SCG 1.43’s treatment of divine infinity begins with some clarifications concerning the manner in which infinity belongs to God, since it cannot be attributed to Him according to any sort of quantity—either discrete or continuous—as He is absolutely simple and is not a body. Infinity can only belong to God according to what Thomas calls a spiritual magnitude, which can be understood as infinity either with respect to power or “with respect to the goodness and completeness of [a thing’s] own nature.”121 In the course of his argumentation, Thomas also refers to infinity of perfection as infinity of essence.122 Thomas notes that infinity of power follows upon infinity according to essence, and so his primary attention is given to the latter sort of infinity. He
118 SCG 1.38 [Leon. Man. 36]: “Unumquodque bonum quod non est sua bonitas, participative dicitur bonum. Quod autem per participationem dicitur, aliquid ante se praesupponit, a quo rationem suscipit bonitatis. Hoc autem in infinitum non est possibile abire: quia in causis finalibus non proceditur in infinitum, infinitum enim repugnat fini; bonum autem rationem finis habet. Oportet igitur devenire ad aliquod bonum primum, quod non participative sit bonum per ordinem ad aliquid aliud, sed sit per essentiam suam bonum. Hoc autem Deus est. Est igitur Deus sua bonitas." With the necessary caveat about the questionable authenticity of the Lectura romana, this argument from SCG 1.38 is a parallel to one of the arguments for God’s existence—as the highest good—in LR 2.2.1 [Boyle 95-96]. 119 SCG 1.40 [Leon. Man. 37]: “Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem boni accipiunt. Hoc autem Deus est, ut infra probabitur. Est igitur Deus omnis boni bonum.” 120 SCG 3.17 [Leon. Man. 241-42]. 121 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Cum autem infinitum quantitatem sequatur, ut philosophi tradunt, non potest infinitas Deo attribui ratione multitudinis: cum ostensum sit solum unum Deum esse, nullamque in eo compositionem vel partium vel accidentium inveniri. Secundum etiam quantitatem continuam infinitus dici non potest: cum ostensum sit eum incorporeum esse. Relinquitur igitur investigare an secundum spiritualem magnitudinem esse infinitum ei conveniat. Quae quidem spiritualis magnitudo quantum ad duo attenditur: scilicet quantum ad potentiam; et quantum ad propriae naturae bonitatem sive completionem.” 122 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 42]: “Relinquitur igitur Dei essentiam esse infinitam.” 198 also clarifies that infinity in this sense is a negative notion, because it denies that there is any terminus or end to the divine perfection.123 Infinity in this sense is infinity of perfection, and the notion of infinity serves to correct a possible misunderstanding that might arise from calling God perfect: God is perfect, but without limitation or determination.
The ten arguments of SCG 1.43 appeal to the following premises:
1. God is not in a genus; but His perfection contains the perfections of every genus (1.25, 1.28) 2. God is act in no way existing in another: not as form in matter, nor does His existence inhere in some form or nature (1.20, 1.22, 1.27) 3. God is pure act (1.16) 4. God is pure act (1.16) 5. God is the existence necessary through itself (1.15) 6. God is perfect of His essence and is His goodness (1.28, 1.38) 7. de novo: our intellect is extended to the infinite in its understanding124 8. God is the first cause of all things (1.13) 9. God has infinite power, because He moves in an infinite time (1.13, 1.20) 10. God is eternal and is uncaused (1.13, 1.15)
I would offer the following observations about the argumentation in this chapter. First, Thomas leads with an argument that emphasizes the close connection between infinity and perfection: God is infinite, because not only is He not limited by being contained in some genus, but His perfection contains the perfections of every genus.
123 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Ostendendum est igitur secundum huius magnitudinis modum Deum infinitum esse. Non autem sic ut infinitum privative accipiatur, sicut in quantitative dimensiva vel numerali. . . . Sed in Deo infinitum negative tantum intelligitur: quia nullus est perfectionis suae terminus sive finis, sed est summe perfectum. Et sic Deo infinitum attribui debet.” Cf. W. Norris Clarke, “Infinity in Plotinus: a Reply,” Gregorianum 40 (1959): 75-98. 124 It seems likely that this argument should be classed as dialectical or probable. The argument is that our intellect extends itself to the infinite in its understanding, “a sign of which is that, given any finite quantity, our intellect can think of a greater [one].” Thomas argues that this ordering (ordinatio) of the intellect to the infinite would be in vain (frustra esset) if there did not exist “some infinite intelligible thing.” But an infinite intelligible thing “must be the greatest of things. And this we call God. Therefore God is infinite.” I have classed this as a de novo argument, in that it is an independent argument for God’s existence—although one that does not seem demonstrative. SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 42]: “Intellectus noster ad infinitum in intelligendo extenditur: cuius signum est quod, qualibet quantitate finita data, intellectus noster maiorem excogitare potest. Frustra autem esset haec ordinatio intellectus ad infinitum nisi esset aliqua res intelligibilis infinita. Oportet igitur esse aliquam rem intelligibilem infinitam, quam oportet esse maximam rerum. Et hanc dicimus Deum. Deus igitur est infinitus.” 199
The second argument is important for its dependence on the principle that unreceived act is unlimited.125 In this case, Thomas grounds this principle in a version of another principle, that whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.126 Thomas argues that “every act inhering in another receives [its] termination from that in which it is [inhering], since that which is [received] in another is in it according to the mode of the receiver.” It follows from this that “an act existing in no [recipient] is terminated by nothing.” Since God is an act in no way existing in another—“for neither is He a form in matter, as was proved above; nor does His existence inhere in some form or nature, since He is His existence, as was shown above”—it follows that He is infinite.127 The fourth argument is similar, in its dependence on the principle that “every act with which potency is mixed has [some] termination of its perfection;” Thomas concludes that God must be infinite, because He is pure act without any potency.128
Furthermore, the ninth and tenth arguments both appeal to premises grounded in the first way, although the tenth also appeals to God’s status as uncaused,129 leaving only the ninth argument as grounded exclusively in the first way. This argument is closely dependent upon the argumentation in Physics 8, in that it argues for an infinite active power in God, from the claim that God causes a
125 For discussion of this principle, see W. Norris Clarke, “The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?” The New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 167-94; Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act is Unlimited,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 123-151. R. te Velde has argued against this principle; see Participation and Substantiality, 153-54. 126 For discussion of this principle, see John Tomarchio, “The Modus Principle in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,” (Ph.D. dissertation in Philosophy: The Catholic University of America, 1996). 127 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum.” 128 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Tanto actus aliquis perfectior est, quanto minus habet potentiae permixtum. Unde omnis actus cui permiscetur potentia, habet terminum suae perfectionis: cui autem non permiscetur aliqua potentia, est absque termino perfectionis. Deus autem est actus purus absque omni potentia, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus.” 129 It would be both surprising and problematic if eternity (in the sense of perpetuity) alone were sufficient to establish infinity, since Thomas holds that it is philosophically possible that God could create a creature with no temporal beginning or end. 200 motion over an infinite time, “which cannot be except by an infinite power, as was shown above.”130
We should note that this argument is grounded not in the negative aspect of the conclusion of the argument from motion—that is, immutability—but in its positive aspect, the identification of God as the first cause of motion. Now, Thomas had noted at the beginning of SCG 1.43 that one can infer infinity of power from infinity of perfection. Here he offers the reverse principle, that “an infinite power cannot exist in a finite essence,”131 and he depends on this claim to infer that the divine essence is infinite.132 Thomas then notes that this argument depends upon acknowledgement of the eternity of motion; if one does not posit this (and the Catholic faith denies it), then the infinite power of God will still have to be acknowledged, because “if the world was made after it first did not exist in any way, then the power of [its] maker must be infinite.”133 Here Thomas saves the force of the argument by having recourse to a recognition of God as the first efficient—and creative—cause.134
(x) Divine intelligence (1.44)
Thomas begins SCG 1.44 in the same way as most of the preceding chapters: “But from the foregoing, it can be shown that God is intelligent.”135 He offers seven arguments, appealing to the following premises:
1. God is the first, unmoved mover of all things (1.13)
130 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 42]: “Sed Deus non habet virtutem activam finitam: movet enim in tempore infinito, quod non potest esse nisi a virtute infinita, ut supra ostensum est.” 131 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 42]: “Virtus infinita non potest esse in essentia finita: quia unumquodque agit per suam formam, quae vel est essentia eius vel pars essentiae; virtus autem principium actionis nominat.” 132 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 42]: “Relinquitur igitur Dei essentiam esse infinitam.” It is rather surprising that Thomas accepts this sequence of argumentation, derived from Physics 8, as a way of establishing the intensive infinity of the divine essence. It is likely that this argument should be classed as probable or dialectical rather than demonstrative. 133 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 42]: “Haec autem ratio est secundum ponentes aeternitatem mundi. Qua non posita, adhuc magis confirmatur opinio de infinitate divinae virtutis. . . . Igitur, si mundus factus est postquam omnino prius non erat, oportet factoris virtutem esse infinitam.” 134 Thomas goes on to note that this conclusion—that God is the first creative cause—would still obtain even if the world and motion were eternal. 135 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest quod Deus sit intelligens.” As we shall see later, Thomas originally wrote a somewhat longer introduction to SCG 1.44. 201
2. God is the first mover (1.13) 3. God is the first mover (1.13) 4. God is in every way immaterial (1.17, 1.20, 1.27) 5. God is universally perfect (1.28) 6. God is the existence necessary through itself and the cause of being (1.13, 1.15) 7. God is the first subsistent act, from which all others are derived (1.13, 1.16, 1.26)
Thomas leads with four arguments that can be grounded in the conclusion of the argument from motion, followed by three that can be grounded only in the second way. This is one of the few chapters in which arguments grounded in the first way outnumber those grounded in the second.
The first argument is Thomas’s re-presentation of the argumentation from Aristotle’s
Metaphysics 12.7 for the intelligence of the first unmoved mover.136 The argument begins from the position, treated in SCG 1.13, that one must “reduce all mobile [things], as is probable, to one first self-mover.”137 Thomas then argues that the moving part of a self-mover must be an intelligence, itself moved by the first, unmoved mover as by something known and desired. Thus far, he has established only that there is something like an intelligent celestial soul, an intelligent part of a self- moving heavenly body. Characterizing the first, unmoved mover as the “first desirable” (primum appetibile), he then continues:
But not as [something] desirable to the sense appetite, for the sense appetite is not of the good absolutely, but of this particular good, because sense apprehension is also only of the particular; but that which is good and desirable absolutely (simpliciter) is prior to that which is good and desirable here and now. It is therefore necessary for the first mover to be desirable
136 For treatment of this argumentation, see above, pp. 102-103. 137 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Ostensum enim est supra quod in moventibus et motis non est possibile in infinitum procedere, sed oportet mobilia omnia reducere, ut probabile est, in unum primum movens seipsum.” Thomas refers back to SCG 1.13 [Leon. Man. 13]: “Quia vero, hoc habito quod sit primum movens quod non movetur ab alio exteriori, non sequitur quod sit penitus immobile, ideo ulterius procedit Aristoteles, dicendo quod hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod illud primum sit penitus immobile. Quo posito, habetur propositum: scilicet, quod sit aliquod primum movens immobile. Alio modo, quod illud primum moveatur a seipso. Et hoc videtur probabile: quia quod est per se, semper est prius eo quod est per aliud; unde et in motis primum motum rationabile est per seipsum moveri, non ab alio.” This represents a “fork in the road” in the second version of the argument from motion, in which Thomas attempts to show that even if there is a first self-mover, still there must be beyond this a mover that is entirely immobile. For discussion, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 427 ff. 202
as something understood. And thus it is necessary for the mover that desires it to be intelligent.138
Thus far, we have an argument for the intelligence of the first self-mover, which desires the unmoved mover according to intellectual appetite rather than sense appetite. Thomas’s arguments turns on the characterization of the unmoved mover as the primum appetibile—because the intelligible good is prior to the sensible good, the primum appetibile must be something “desirable as understood,” with the consequence that the first self-mover must be intelligent.
Thomas then transitions to arguing for the intelligence of the separate, unmoved mover, characterized as the first desirable:
Much more therefore the first desirable itself will also be intelligent: since the one desiring becomes intelligent in act by this that it is united to it as to [something] intelligible. Therefore God must be intelligent, having presupposed that the first mobile moves itself, as the philosophers held.139
What is supremely desirable as an intelligible good must itself be intelligent, because it must be itself actually intelligible, or else it could not function as the object of knowledge and desire for something intelligent. There must be some other premise, unstated here, for this argument to succeed. One possible assumption is that an actually intelligible substance is always itself intelligent.140 Given the dependence of this argument on Metaphysics 12.7, though, we should recall that Thomas advances as a principle in his Commentary on 12.7 (which is, to be clear, a later composition than the Contra
138 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Non autem sicut appetibile sensuali appetitu: nam appetitus sensibilis non est boni simpliciter, sed huius particulati boni, cum et apprehensio sensus non sit nisi particularis; id autem quod est bonum et appetibile simpliciter, est prius eo quod est bonum et appetibile ut hic et nunc. Oportet igitur primum movens esse appetibile ut intellectum. Et ita oportet movens quod appetit ipsum, esse intelligens.” 139 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Multo igitur magis et ipsum primum appetibile erit intelligens: quia appetens ipsum fit intelligens actu per hoc quod ei tanquam intelligibili unitur. Oportet igitur Deum esse intelligentem, facta suppositione quod primum motum moveat seipsum, ut philosophi voluerunt.” 140 Any attempt at a defense of this assumption—something beyond our present purposes—would require a lengthy consideration of the relationships among being, intelligibility, and intelligence. In brief, Thomas holds that whereas corporeal, sensible substances are only potentially intelligible in themselves, an incorporeal substance is both actually intelligible in itself and intelligent. 203
Gentiles) that “that by reason of which every other thing enjoys a given perfection is that perfection to a greater degree.”141
The second argument in SCG 1.44 works in tandem with the first. As we have seen, the first argument presupposes that motions can be traced causally to the motion of a self-mover (such as an ensouled celestial sphere). The second now proceeds on the contrary assumption, that “the reduction of mobile things is not to some first self-mover, but to a mover immobile in every way.”142
Thomas observes that the first mover is a “universal principle of motion, and he takes this to imply that the first mover causes motion through a universal form. But “a form is not found in a universal mode except in an intellect. It is therefore necessary for the first mover, which is God, to be intelligent.”143 It is difficult to see how this argument succeeds as it stands, since Thomas seems to transition from (a) the universality of the first mover’s causality as the mover (at least remotely) of every individual moved thing in the universe to (b) universality as the mode of what is grasped intellectually, as opposed to the particular mode of what is grasped by the senses.
The fourth argument, from immateriality to intelligence, would seem to be taken from
Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.6.144 Thomas also especially associates this line of argumentation with
Avicenna in In Sent. 1.2.1.3, offering it as an example of how a divine name can fall under the via
141 In Meta. 12.8 #2543 [Marietti 594]: “Propter quod autem unumquodque tale, est illud magis;” translation by John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 265. 142 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Idem necesse est sequi si fiat reductio mobilium non in aliquod primum movens seipsum, sed in movens omnino immobile.” This is the other path of the “fork in the road” suggested by the second argument from motion in SCG 1.13. See above, n. 138 in this chapter. 143 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Nam primum movens est universale principium motus. Oportet igitur, cum omne movens moveat per aliquam formam quam intendit in movendo, quod forma per quam movet primum movens, sit universalis forma et universale bonum. Forma autem per modum universalem non invenitur nisi in intellectu. Oportet igitur primum movens, quod Deus est, esse intelligens.” 144 Philosophia prima 8.6 [Van Riet 2.414]: “Et [est] intelligentia pura, quoniam est essentia separata a materia omni modo.” 204 negationis insofar as it follows from a prior negation concerning God.145 In the argument, Thomas contends that any incorporeal substance must be intelligent: “if forms are understood in act from this that they are without matter, [then] some thing must be intelligent from this that it is without matter.”146 But since God is immaterial in every way, He must be intelligent. As we shall see, a version of this argument is the only one that appears in ST 1.14.1.
The briefly stated fifth argument is the first instance of the line of argumentation for which
Thomas paved the way in SCG 1.28 by proving that God does not lack the excellence of any genus.
“But among the perfections of things the most powerful is that something is intellectual: for by this it is in some way all [things], having within itself the perfection of all [things]. Therefore, God is intelligent.”147 The argument thus briefly establishes why intelligence is a pure perfection, in order to justify attributing it to God. This precise line of argumentation—which we can call a pure perfection argument or an argument from universal perfection—appears explicitly a number of times within the Contra Gentiles.148
Finally, the sixth argument bears an interesting relationship to the argumentation for God’s existence in SCG 1.13. It begins as a de novo argument for the existence of an author of nature who establishes the ends of natural things, towards which they tend without themselves being cognitive.
The argument then appeals to God’s status as cause of the esse of all things and as the necessary
145 This same position is confirmed by In Sent. 1.35.1.1 [Mand. 1.809], in which the argument from divine immateriality to knowledge is characterized as an argument in the via negationis. 146 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Unde, si ex hoc sunt formae intellectae in actu quod sunt sine materia, oportet rem aliquam ex hoc esse intelligentem quod est sine materia.” 147 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, habens in se omnium perfectionem. Deus igitur est intelligens.” 148 Chapters containing explicit pure perfection arguments include SCG 1.44 (intelligence), 1.50 (God’s proper knowledge of things other than Himself), 1.54 (that the divine essence is the proper exemplar of singulars), 1.59 (truth), 1.91 (love), 1.97 (life), 1.101 (beatitude) and 2.7 (active power). There are also closely related arguments removing certain deficiencies or imperfections from God on the basis of His universal perfection, in chapters such as 1.56 (that God’s knowledge is not habitual), 1.57 (that God’s knowledge is not discursive), and 1.61 (that God is the purest truth without falsity). 205 being, in order to identify this author of nature as God.149 This sixth argument in SCG 1.44 thus bears the same sort of relationship to prior argumentation for God’s existence as the de novo parallel to the third way in SCG 1.15: what the de novo argument proves to exist is identified as God through the claim that He is the first cause.150 This de novo argument is also a close parallel to the fifth way of
ST 1.2.3—indeed, it is a closer parallel than the fifth argument in SCG 1.13.
Concerning SCG 1.45, which establishes that God’s act of understanding is identical with
His essence, we should note that all of its arguments are ultimately grounded in the second way rather than in the first.151 Three of the arguments—the first, second, and third—appeal to the total absence of accidents in God, the stronger conclusion from SCG 1.23, which was in turn ultimately founded upon the identification of God as the first cause rather than as the first immobile mover.
We also find appeals to the thesis that God is identical with His esse, in the first two arguments—and this too was something founded upon the second way. This is significant, because the identity of essence with understanding is, for Thomas, an exclusively divine characteristic. Although there were arguments—more or less effective, perhaps—in SCG 1.44 establishing the intelligence of the unmoved mover, the exclusively divine characteristic treated by SCG 1.45 is grounded ultimately in the second way rather than the first.
Examining the first argument in this chapter, we find that Thomas brings together several premises treated in his discussion of divine simplicity. Thomas begins by noting that understanding
149 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43-44]. Cf. SCG 2.15 [Leon. Man. 100-101], in which Thomas argues at length for this claim that God is the causa essendi for all things other than Himself. 150 See above, p. 164. 151 The arguments of SCG 1.45 appeal to the following previously established premises concerning God: 1. Whatever is in God is the divine essence; God is His essence; God is His esse (1.23, 1.21, 1.22) 2. The divine esse is His essence; there are no accidents in God (1.22, 1.23) 3. God is intelligent; perfections belong to God by His essence rather than by participation; God is the ultimate in goodness and perfection; God is the first [being] (1.44, 1.23, 1.28, 1.13) 4. God is pure act (1.16) 5. God is His goodness (1.38) 206 is an immanent activity rather than a transitive one: it remains in the one operating rather than passing into an external effect. If God is intelligent, then His act of understanding must be something within Him. But it has already been shown, in SCG 1.23, that “whatever is in God is the divine essence,” and so God’s understanding is identical with His essence—as well as with His existence and with God Himself, “for God is His essence and His existence.”152
(xi) Divine will (1.72)
In SCG 1.72 (and in the subsequent chapters through 1.88), Thomas considers divine volition. In SCG 1.72, he proves that God has will by eight arguments. Without analyzing all of these arguments, for our purposes it is most important that all but one of these arguments explicitly presupposes that God is intelligent. As Thomas introduces his first argument, “from this that God is intelligent, it follows that He has will.”153 Thomas begins this argument by observing that the understood good is the proper object of will, such that “it is necessary that an understood good, insofar as [it is] of this kind, be [something] willed.” Since what is understood is so named with respect to the one understanding, it also follows, according to Thomas, that “it is necessary that the
152 SCG 1.45 [Leon. Man. 44]: “Intelligere enim est actus intelligentis in ipso existens, non in aliud extrinsecum transiens, sicut calefactio transit in calefactum: non enim aliquid patitur intelligibile ex hoc quod intelligitur, sed intelligens perficitur. Quicquid autem est in Deo, est divina essentia. Intelligere ergo Dei est divina essentia, et divinum esse, et ipse Deus: nam Deus est sua essentia et suum esse.” We should also mention SCG 1.64, since in this chapter Thomas provides some brief comments about the order in which he plans to treat certain questions concerning divine knowledge, in cc. 65-71. This chapter begins by referencing SCG 1.63, in which Thomas had presented, dialectically, seven objections against the thesis that God knows singulars. These objections against God’s knowledge of singulars refer, in order, to the following characteristics of or claims about singulars: (1) the condition of singularity itself, as opposed to universality; (2) the fact that singulars do not always exist; (3) that some singulars come to exist contingently rather than by necessity; (4) that some singulars are caused by creaturely will; (5) that singulars are infinite, at least potentially; (6) that singulars are low or ignoble; and (7) that there is evil found in some singulars. The topics of SCG 1.65-71 correspond, in order, to these 7 objections: Thomas works to establish that God knows singulars as such (1.65), that He knows things that do not exist (1.66), that He knows future contingents (1.67), that He knows the motions of creaturely will (1.68), that He knows infinite things (1.69), that He knows lowly things (1.70), and that He knows evils (1.71). The order of these chapters thus corresponds to the order of the objections presented in SCG 1.63, but Thomas provides no indication as to why he presents the objections or the chapters responding to them in this particular order. Thus, although Thomas does offer explicit remarks here about his order of procedure in certain chapters, his remarks do not provide any insights concerning the order of the rest of the first book of the Contra Gentiles. 153 SCG 1.72 [Leon. Man. 69]: “Ex hoc enim quod Deus est intelligens, sequitur quod sit volens.” 207 one understanding the good, as such, be willing (volens).” Thomas seems to assume here that where the proper object of some operation is actually present, that operation must also be present—thus, where there is the understood good, there must also be the operation of the will.154 Thomas then notes that God understoods the good: because He is perfectly intelligent, “He understands being with the character (ratio) of the good. He is therefore willing (volens).”155
There may be other unstated premises here that are necessary to make this argument succeed. Perhaps the notion that the good is an end, something to be desired or loved, helps to explain why an understood good must also be willed (volitum). Thomas is in any event committed to the convertibility of understanding (intelligens) and willing (volens), such that anything that possesses the one must possess the other, and he is willing to extend this convertibility to the divine intelligence. For our purposes, what is most important is the manner in which Thomas reasons from the positive attribution of intelligence to the positive attribution of volition, a sequence repeated in all but one of the chapter’s arguments. We can characterize all of these arguments from divine intelligence as falling under the via eminentiae as Thomas characterizes it in In Sent. 1.2.1.3: an argument pertains to the via eminentiae when one argues for one positive name from a prior positive name.156 That nearly all of the arguments for divine will depend upon previously acknowledging divine intelligence will be an important consideration in our later analysis: here we do have a case
154 Such an assumption would seem to be consistent with Aristotle’s views in the De anima concerning the relationship between the actual presence of a proper object and an operation. For example, in the case of the external sense powers, Aristotle treats the relationship between the actually sensible and actual sensation in De anima 3.2, concluding that the actually sensible object only exists simultaneously with the activity of sensation. Apart from actual sensation, the sensible as such only exists potentially. De anima 3.2 426a15-20 [McKeon 584]: “Since the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty are one actuality in spite of the difference between their modes of being, actual hearing and actual sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and the same moment, and so actual savour and actual tasting, etc., while as potentialities one of them may exist without the other.” 155 SCG 1.72 [Leon. Man. 69]: “Cum enim bonum intellectum sit obiectum proprium voluntatis, oportet quod bonum intellectum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volitum. Intellectum autem dicitur ad intelligentem. Necesse est igitur quod intelligens bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volens. Deus autem intelligit bonum: cum enim sit perfecte intelligens, ut ex supra dictis patet, intelligit ens simul cum ratione boni. Est igitur volens.” 156 See above, p. 83. 208 where the order of the divine names is rather clearly a function of argumentative dependence. That is, in terms of the arguments he offers, Thomas must treat divine will after divine intelligence.
The only argument in SCG 1.72 that doesn’t presuppose God’s intelligence appeals to God’s status as the first agent. Thomas begins this argument by citing Metaphysics 1.2, that “the free is that which is the cause of itself,”157 concluding from this that what is free has the character (ratio) of what is through itself (per se). But the will is what primarily possesses freedom in acting, as it is primarily through will—through voluntary action—that one is said to act freely. From all of this, Thomas concludes that “it maximally befits the first agent, to whom it maximally belongs to act through
Himself, to act through will.”158 It is certainly clear that the first agent cannot be caused to act by anything exterior, and so the first agent must be free in some sense. I would suggest, however, that this is a dialectical or probable argument, given that freedom in this limited sense—the absence of external compulsion such that something only acts per se rather than by the instigation of another— can be attributed to things that do not possess will. In the very text from Metaphysics 1.2 cited by
Thomas, Aristotle attributes freedom in this sense to wisdom, the science sought in the Metaphysics.
That is, freedom in the sense at issue in Aristotle’s text is not convertible with the possession of will.
Thus, although there is one argument for divine volition in SCG 1.72 that does not appeal to divine intelligence, I do not think we should take this argument as demonstrative.
(xii) Divine power as the principle of created effects (2.1-22)
Thomas introduces SCG 2.1 with the claim that we must consider the divine operation, because perfect knowledge of anything requires a knowledge of its operation. Operation reveals “the
157 Metaphysics 1.2 982b25-27 [McKeon 692]: “But as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another’s, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake.” 158 SCG 1.72 [Leon. Man. 70]: “Liberum est quod sui causa est: et sic liberum habet rationem eius quod est per se. Voluntas autem primo habet libertatem in agendo: inquantum enim voluntarie agit quis, dicitur libere agere quamcumque actionem. Primo igitur agenti maxime competit per voluntatem agere, cui maxime convenit per se agere.” 209 measure and quality of power,” which in turn “shows the nature of a thing.”159 He then presents the distinction between what scholars usually refer to as immanent and transitive operation. The first sort of operation, immanent operation, “remains in the one operating and is a perfection of the one operating, such as to sense, to understand, and to will.” The second sort of operation, known as transitive operation, passes into an extrinsic effect rather than remaining within the agent. Thomas observes that such an operation is not the perfection of the one operating, but rather of the thing made, which is constituted by the operation—that is, such an operation perfects the extrinsic effect rather than the agent. Thomas gives as examples of the latter sort of operation “to heat, to cut, and to build.” Thomas proceeds to explain that whereas immanent operation was treated in SCG 1, in the consideration of divine knowledge and will, Thomas will treat transitive operation in SCG 2.160
Thomas advances the following claims in the early chapters of Book 2: that God is the principle of existing (principium essendi) for other things (2.6), that there is active potency/power in
God (2.7), that God’s power is identical with both his substance and his action (2.8-9), that God is the cause of existing for all (2.15), that God brings things into existence from no pre-existing subject or potency (2.16), that God alone can create (2.21), and that God is omnipotent (2.22). Thomas grounds only two of these claims in the conclusion of the argument from motion: that God is a principle of existing for other things and that there is active power in God. First, in SCG 2.6,
Thomas appeals to God’s status as first mover, in conjunction with the claim that “many [things] are brought into existence by the motions of heaven,” to establish that God is therefore a cause of the
159 SCG 2.1 [Leon. Man. 93]: “Rei cuiuslibet perfecta cognitio haberi non potest nisi eius operatio cognoscatur. Ex modo enim operationis et specie mensura et qualitas virtutis pensatur, virtus vero naturam rei monstrat: secundum hoc enim unumquodque natum est operari quod actu talem naturam sortitur.” 160 SCG 2.1 [Leon. Man. 93]: “Est autem duplex rei operatio, ut Philosophus tradit, in IX Metaphysicae: una quidem quae in ipso operante manet et est ipsius operantis perfectio, ut sentire, intelligere et velle; alia vero quae in exteriorem rem transit, quae est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et aedificare. . . . De prima quidem Dei operatione in praecedenti libro iam diximus, ubi est actum de cognitione et voluntate divina.” 210 existing of things.161 This makes clear that calling God a principle or cause of existing does not necessarily identify him as a creative cause—this is also confirmed by the fact that SCG 2.15 takes up the claim that God is the cause of existing for all things.162 Likewise, in SCG 2.7 there is one argument appealing to God’s status as a mover, in order to defend the claim that there is active potency in God.163
Thomas also deems it necessary to preface his discussion of divine power at the beginning of
SCG 2 with some clarifications about how power is said of God, compared to the divine names treated in Book 1. In SCG 2.7, Thomas explains that power is attributed to God in the sense of active power/potency. (As noted above, we find in this chapter one example of pure perfection argumentation.)164 In SCG 2.8-9, he clarifies that God’s power is identical both with His substance and with His action (that is, with His immanent operations, such as understanding and willing).165 In
SCG 2.10, he then clarifies that “nothing is its own principle;” as a consequence, we cannot say that the divine power is the principle of the divine action. Therefore “power is not said [to be] in God as a principle of action, but as a principle of [things] made.”166 Power is thus said to belong to God
161 SCG 2.6 [Leon. Man. 96]: “Cum igitur multa ex motibus caeli producantur in esse, in quorum ordine Deum esse primum movens ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit multis rebus causa essendi.” 162 For discussion of the distinction between a creative cause and a cause of esse—and in particular of the senses in which the latter can be attributed to a creature—see Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of Esse,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, 172-193. 163 SCG 2.7 [Leon. Man. 97]: “Omne quod agit potens est agere: nam quod non potest agere, impossibile est agere; et quod impossibile est agere, necesse est non agere. Deus autem est agens et movens, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur potens est agere: et potentia ei convenienter adscribitur activa, sed non passiva.” 164 See above, n. 149, in this chapter. 165 SCG 2.8 [Leon. Man. 97]: “Ex hoc autem ulterius concludi potest quod divina potentia sit ipsa Dei substantia.” The second argument in this chapter appeals to the claim that “nothing can be said of God by participation: since He is His very existence.” Ibid.: “Omnis potens qui non est sua potentia, est potens participatione potentiae alicuius. De Deo autem nihil potest dici participative: cum sit ipsum suum esse, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Est igitur ipse sua potentia.” SCG 2.9 [Leon. Man. 97]: “Ex hoc autem ostendi potest quod potentia Dei non sit aliud quam sua actio.” 166 SCG 2.10 [Leon. Man. 98]: “Quia vero nihil est sui ipsius principium, cum divina actio non sit aliud quam eius potentia, manifestum est ex praedictis quod potentia non dicitur in Deo sicut principium actionis, sed sicut principium facti.” Cf. the distinction between immanent and transitive operation found in SCG 2.1, cited above in n. 160. 211 through relation to the things He produces through creation, and not with respect to His immanent operations.167 Still, Thomas affirms that “the multitude of actions which is attributed to God, such as to understand, to will, to produce things, and the like, are not diverse things: since each of these actions in God is His very esse, which is one and the same.”168 This is an important re-affirmation of the divine simplicity.
In SCG 2.11, Thomas notes that power as a divine name implies the relation of God to His effects.169 In this same chapter, he also notes that various other things were predicated of God relatively in SCG 1: these include likeness to creatures (1.29), knowledge of creatures (1.49), being the mover of creatures (1.13), and being first (as primum ens, 1.13) and highest (as summum bonum,
1.41) relative to creatures.170 Now, the names knowledge, being (ens), and good do not of themselves express a relation to creatures; it is the addition of qualifiers such as “of creatures,” “first,” and
“highest” that indicates the relation. By contrast, the name power by itself implies a relation to creatures, because to say that God has power is to name Him as the principle of effects distinct from
Himself. We can find in the fact that power as a divine name implies relation a reason for its being placed in SCG 2, separate from the consideration of God in Himself in SCG 1.
In SCG 2.12, Thomas then argues that all of the relations predicated of God with respect to creatures are not really (realiter) in Him. To contend otherwise would imply that God would in some
167 SCG 2.10 [Leon. Man. 98]: “Manifestum est quod potentia dicitur in Deo per respectum ad facta, secundum rei veritatem; non per respectum ad actionem nisi secundum modum intelligendi, prout intellectus noster diversis conceptionibus utrumque considerat, divinam scilicet potentiam et eius actionem. Unde, si aliquae actiones Deo conveniant quae non in aliquod factum transeant sed maneant in agente, respectu harum non dicetur in Deo potentia nisi secundum modum intelligendi, non secundum rei veritatem. Huiusmodi autem actiones sunt intelligere et velle. Potentia igitur Dei, proprie loquendo, non respicit huiusmodi actiones, sed solos effectus.” 168 SCG 2.10 [Leon. Man. 98]: “Patet etiam ex praedictis quod multitudo actionum quae Deo attribuitur, ut intelligere, velle, producere res, et similia, non sunt diversae res: cum quaelibet harum actionum in Deo sit ipsum eius esse, quod est unum et idem.” 169 SCG 2.11 [Leon. Man. 98]: “Cum autem potentia Deo conveniat respectu suorum effectuum; potentia autem rationem principii habeat, ut dictum est; principium autem relative ad principiatum dicitur: manifestum est quod aliquid relative potest dici de Deo in respectu suorum effectuum.” 170 SCG 2.11 [Leon. Man. 98], passim. 212 way depend upon creatures171 or be changed by the fact that He creates them.172 Along these same lines, Thomas indicates in SCG 2.13 that these sorts of relations are said of God in a different way as compared to the other names predicated of God: “for all the other [names], such as wisdom or will, express His essence: but the aforementioned relations [do so] not at all, but only according to [our] mode of understanding.”173 Nevertheless, the predication of such relations is not false, because we know that such relations are really in creatures rather than in God.174 In SCG 2.14, Thomas then notes that the multiplicity of such relations, “even though they do not signify His essence,” does not suggest any real multiplicity in God or detract from the divine simplicity.175
171 The first argument in SCG 2.12 explains that if these relations were really in God, then either they would have to be an accident—which is impossible, because God has no accidents—or they would have to be identical with the divine substance itself. But in that case, the divine substance would in some way depend upon creatures, since it could neither be nor be understood without that to which it would be related by its very essence. SCG 2.12 [Leon. Man. 98-99]: “Huiusmodi autem relationes quae sunt ad suos effectus, realiter in Deo esse non possunt. Non enim in eo esse possent sicut accidentia in subiecto: cum in ipso nullum sit accidens ut in primo libro ostensum est. Nec etiam possent esse ipsa Dei substantia. Cum enim relativa sint quae secundum suum esse ad aliud quodammodo se habent, ut philosophus dicit in Praedicamentis, oporteret quod Dei substantia hoc ipsum quod est ad aliud diceretur. Quod autem ipsum quod est ad aliud dicitur, quodammodo ab ipso dependet: cum nec esse nec intelligi sine eo possit. Oporteret igitur quod Dei substantia ab alio extrinseco esset dependens. Et sic non esset per seipsum necesse-esse, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Non sunt igitur huiusmodi relationes secundum rem in Deo.” The reference is to Categories 7 6a35 [McKeon 17]: “Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing.” 172 The third argument in SCG 2.12 depends upon God’s immutability. Since there can only be real relations to what exists actually, it follows that if the relations of God to creatures are real, then He must undergo a change—the acquisition of real relations—by creating creatures. SCG 2.12 [Leon. Man. 99]: “Relationes praedictae dicuntur de Deo non solum respectu eorum quae sunt actu, sed respectu eorum quae sunt in potentia: quia et eorum scientiam habet, et respectu eorum dicitur et primum ens et summum bonum. Sed eius quod est actu ad id quod non est actu sed potentia, non sunt relationes reales: alias sequeretur quod essent infinitae relationes actu in eodem, cum numeri infiniti in potentia sint maiores binario, quibus omnibus ipse est prior. Deus autem non aliter refertur ad ea quae sunt actu quam ad ea quae sunt potentia: quia non mutatur ex hoc quod aliqua producit. Non igitur refertur ad alia per relationem realiter in ipso existentem.” 173 SCG 2.13 [Leon. Man. 99]: “Et sic etiam patet quod alio modo dicuntur de Deo praedictae relationes, et alia quae de Deo praedicantur. Nam omnia alia, ut sapientia, voluntas, eius essentiam praedicant: relationes vero praedictae minime, sed secundum modum intelligendi tantum.” 174 SCG 2.13 [Leon. Man. 99-100]: “Nec tamen intellectus noster est falsus. Ex hoc enim ipso quod intellectus noster intelligit relationes divinorum effectuum terminari in ipsum Deum, aliqua praedicat relative de ipso: sicut et scibile relative intelligimus et significamus ex hoc quod scientia refertur ad ipsum.” 175 SCG 2.14 [Leon. Man. 100]: “Patet etiam ex his quod divinae simplicitati non derogat si multae relationes de ipso dicuntur, quamvis eius essentiam non significent: quia sequuntur intelligendi modum.” 213
D. THE SUCCESSIVE CHARACTER OF SCG 1.44-102
The chapters from SCG 1.44-102 are fundamentally structured around five divine names: intelligence, truth, will, life, and beatitude. God is understood to be truth and to have will because
He is intelligent; to be living and blessed because He is intelligent and volitional. In terms of the arguments Thomas advances, this sequence of divine names exhibits a successive character that is more marked than that found in SCG 1.15-43. By this I mean that the order of these names seems to be a function of argumentative dependence in a rather straightforward way. For example, based on the arguments he offers, if Thomas were to argue for divine will before divine intelligence, he would be limited to a single argument based on God’s identity as the first efficient cause.
We should recall that Thomas associates with the via eminentiae the possibility of arguing from one positive divine name to another.176 In In Sent. 1.2.1.3, Thomas explains that the intelligible content (ratio) of a divine attribute such as wisdom is not only in our mind but is in God, insofar as our concept of divine wisdom has a proximate foundation in God. Our concepts of the divine attributes have a proximate foundation in God, because these concepts are truly likenesses, however deficient and incomplete, of God Himself—just as it is with the likeness of any creature to God. It follows from all this, Thomas indicates, that “whatever follows upon wisdom as such, rightly and properly belongs to God.”177 Here we can see the importance of the conclusion defended in SCG
1.29, that creatures are like God: this conclusion establishes the possibility of positively attributing creaturely perfections to God, particularly in such a way that we may reason from one positive attribute to another.
176 For treatment, see above, pp. 82-83. 177 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.69]: “Secundum ergo hanc opinionem, conceptiones quas intellectus noster ex nominibus attributorum concipit, sunt vere similitudines rei, quae Deus est, quamvis deficientes et non plenae, sicut est de aliis rebus quae Deo similantur. Unde hujusmodi rationes non sunt tantum in intellectu, quia habent proximum fundamentum in re quae Deus est. Et ex hoc contingit quod quidquid sequitur ad sapientiam, inquantum huiusmodi, recte et proprie convenit Deo.” 214
The sequence of divine names in SCG 1.44-102 thus belongs to the via eminentiae, with respect to the argumentation used to prove them. The possession of will follows from intelligence, according to the intelligible content (ratio) of will as intellectual appetite. Life is something that follows from intelligence and will, according to the rationes of intelligence and will as modes of life.
The positive divine names treated in SCG 1.44-102 are thus ordered with respect to the intelligible contents (rationes) of the names.
As for Thomas’s extended treatment of topics connected with each of these divine names, I would note the following. In each case, after having proved that God possesses the attribute in question, we find that Thomas alternates between (1) negation of the features of a creature’s participation in that attribute and (2) explanation of the perfect or eminent character of that attribute as it belongs to God. For example, after Thomas proves that God is intelligent in SCG 1.44, he proves in SCG 1.45 that God’s act of understanding is the same as His essence (which is not true of any creature) and in SCG 1.46 that God understands through nothing other than His essence (which is likewise not true of any creature). Then, in SCG 1.47, Thomas proves that God’s self- understanding is perfect, followed by a lengthy explanation of the perfection of His knowledge of creatures through His self-knowledge from SCG 1.48-55. This is followed by another round of negations (excluding habitual knowledge, discursiveness, and judgmental composition) in SCG 1.56-
58. This culminates in the attribution of truth in SCG 1.59, the negation of any real distinction between God and His truth in SCG 1.60, and the characterization of God’s truth as purest, first, and highest in SCG 1.61-62. Finally, Thomas treats particular claims about the objects known by God in
SCG 1.63-71. A similar pattern occurs in the treatments of divine will and divine power. 178
178 Immediately after proving that God has will in SCG 1.72, Thomas argues that God’s will is His essence and that the primary object of the divine will is the divine essence. This leads into a discussion of how God wills things other than Himself from SCG 1.75-87. This culminates in the attribution of free choice (liberum arbitrium) and some of the 215
2. PRINCIPLES OF ORDER IN THE CONTRA GENTILES
With regard to the general principles of order discussed in chapter two of this dissertation, this section will concern respectively the order of science, the triplex via, and the transcendentals. The first two of these discussions will serve to highlight the twofold division of the treatment of the divine names in the Summa contra Gentiles.
A. THE ROLE OF THE ORDER OF SCIENCE
We have already seen that Thomas characterizes the purpose of the Contra Gentiles as the defense of concord between the truth demonstrable by natural reason and the truth of the Catholic faith. After SCG 1.13’s presentation of argumentation for God’s existence, Thomas’s account of the methodology of Book 1 culminates in SCG 1.14. Thomas begins SCG 1.14 by insisting on the priority of the via remotionis as follows:
It therefore having been shown that there is some first being, which we call God, it is necessary to investigate His characteristics. But in consideration of the divine substance, the way of removal ought to be employed especially. For the divine substance by its immensity exceeds every form that our intellect attains: and so we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we can have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.179
passions and virtues to God, with the exclusion of all the passions that are not fitting, in SCG 1.88-96. Again, Thomas treats divine life in SCG 1.97, followed by the negation of any real distinction between God and His life and the assertion that God’s life is sempiternal in SCG 1.98-99. Finally, after SCG 1.100 introduces divine beatitude, Thomas again denies any real distinction between God and His beatitude in SCG 1.101; then he explains the perfection, uniqueness, and eminence of God’s beatitude in SCG 1.102. Similarly, after establishing that God has active potency in SCG 2.7, Thomas denies any real distinction between God’s power and substance or between His power and His action in SCG 2.8-9. He then explains how power is attributed to God, as something that “belongs to God in relation to His effects,” albeit according to a rational rather than a real relation, in SCG 2.10-12. Turning then to the claim that God is the creative cause of being in SCG 2.16, Thomas clarifies that it belongs to God alone to create in SCG 2.21 (a negative claim), followed by the assertion of divine omnipotence—a claim about the eminence of divine power—in SCG 1.22.
179 SCG 1.14 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Ostenso igitur quod est aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, oportet eius conditiones investigare. Est autem via remotionis utendum praecipue in consideratione divinae substantiae. Nam divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, sua immensitate excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo quid est. Sed aliqualem eius habemus notitiam cognoscendo quid non est.” 216
Thomas proceeds to explain that one advances towards knowledge of God as one removes more and more things from Him. In this way advancement in the knowledge of God is somewhat like advancement in knowing those things whose quiddities we do grasp, that is, those things whose definitions we know. In both cases, one advances in knowledge about something by coming to know it as distinct from other things. Yet, unlike the knowledge of items whose quiddities are positively grasped, we advance in the knowledge of God through negative differences. Thomas explains that one negative difference can contract another, distinguishing something from more and more things.
Concerning knowledge of God, he continues:
For example, if we should say that God is not an accident, through this He is distinguished from all accidents; then if we should add that He is not a body, we will distinguish Him from some substances; and thus, in order, He will be distinguished through negations of this sort from all those [things] besides Himself; and then there will be a proper consideration of His substance when He will be known as distinct from all. Nevertheless [this knowledge] will not be perfect, since it will not be known what He is in Himself.180
Thomas proposes a certain progress through the via remotionis, insofar as one negative difference can contract another. His example invokes the Aristotelian categories and the Porphyrian tree for the category of substance, and one imagines successively cutting away all those things that do not belong to God.181
180 Ibid.: “Sicut autem in affirmativis differentiis una aliam contrahit, et magis ad completum designationem rei appropinquant secundum quod a pluribus differre facit; ita una differentia negativa per aliam contrahitur, quae a pluribus differre facit. Sicut, si dicamus Deum non esse accidens, per hoc ab omnibus accidentibus distinguitur; deinde si addamus ipsum non esse corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiam ab aliquibus substantiis; et sic per ordinem ab omni eo quod est praeter ipsum, per negationes huiusmodi distinguetur; et tunc de substantia eius erit propria consideratio cum cognoscetur ut ab omnibus distinctus. Non tamen erit perfecta: quia non cognoscetur quid in se sit.” 181 This brief example of order among negative divine names is consistent with the Dionysian ordering of negative names from the Mystical Theology, insofar as it begins by denying the lower and less noble and proceeds to deny the higher and more noble. See above in c. 3, pp. 115-116. 217
We have seen above that Thomas introduces the final version of SCG 1.44 with the simple claim that God can be shown to be intelligent from what has been previously established. In a prior version of SCG 1.44, however, Thomas wrote the following:
Having examined, therefore, those [things] that pertain to the divine substance through the way of removal, we must inquire about those [things] that pertain to the divine operation, in which we must proceed especially through the way of likeness. Among these [things], we will first show God to be intelligent.182
The parallel between this text and SCG 1.14 is striking. Thomas first conceived of the relationship between SCG 1.15-43 and SCG 1.44-101 in terms of the distinction between substance and operation; in each case, there is a method that is to be especially employed—in one case, the via remotionis, in the other, the via similitudinis.183 This notion of a via similitudinis helps to confirm the dependence the reasoning that begins in SCG 1.44 on SCG 1.29, which argues for the likeness of creatures to God.
Given that his original articulation of the order of the Contra Gentiles invokes this notion of a via similitudinis, we should give it some brief consideration. To shed some light on the meaing of via similitudinis, I would point to In Post. An. 1.41, which suggests a special place for knowledge about
God based on likenesses, distinct from knowing what God is not, within the order of science. In this text (ca. 1272),184 Thomas comments on the impossibility of a strictly scientific consideration of separate substance, as follows:
182 Appendix ad primum et secundum librum Summae S. Thomae de Aquino Contra Gentiles [Leon. 13.15*]: “His igitur perscrutatis de his quae ad divinae substantiae cognitionem pertinent per viam remotionis, inquirendum est de his quae ad operationem eius pertinent, in quibus procedendum est praecipue per viam similitudinis. Inter quae primo ostendemus Deum esse intelligentem.” 183 Cf. In De Trin. 6.3 [Leon. 167] for a text in which Thomas also apparently distinguishes the via similitudinis from the via causalitatis: “Unde similitudines rerum sensibilium ad substantias immateriales translatas uocat Dionysius c. 2 Celestis ierarchie ‘dissimiles similitudines alio modo intellectualibus habentibus que sensibilibus aliter distributa sunt,’ et sic per uiam simlitudinis non sufficienter ille substantie ex his innotescunt. Neque etiam per uiam causalitatis, quia ea que ab illis substantiis inueniuntur effecta in his inferioribus non sunt effectus adequantes earum uirtutes, ut sic perueniri possit ad sciendum quod quid est de causa.” 184 Torrell, 343. 218
For we cannot through the speculative sciences know what they are in themselves, since the essences of these substances are intelligible through themselves [only] to an intellect proportionate to this [essence]; for a knowledge of them, through which their quiddity would be known, is not acquired through some prior [principles]. But through the speculative sciences it can be known concerning them whether they exist, and what they are not, and something according to a likeness found in lower things.185
Knowledge of whether a separate substance exists (an est) and knowledge of what it is not (quid non est) are here distinguished from what can be known about a separate substance “according to a likeness found in lower things.” This late text suggests that although Thomas removed the introductory text mentioning a via similitudinis from SCG 1.44, he did not abandon the notion that consideration of what is known about God through likenesses might be a distinct moment in our knowledge of God from the via remotionis, which focuses on answering quid non est. The claim that creatures are like God, defended in SCG 1.29, thus remains an important principle for reasoning concerning God.
Although Thomas removed the introductory text from SCG 1.44, he does not appear to have altered the placement of SCG 1.44 or the general structure of SCG 1.186 Furthermore, as noted above, in SCG 2.1 Thomas continues to identify SCG 1.44 as the beginning of his treatment of divine immanent operation.187 What is most important for our purposes is that apparently, in
Thomas’s mind, the distinction between substance and operation lines up well with a methodological difference between an emphasis on the via remotionis and an emphasis on another
185 In Post. 1.41 [Leon. 1*2.153-54]: “Si qua ergo res est que non habeat principa priora ex quibus ratio procedere possit, horum non potest esse sciencia, secundum quod hic sciencia accipitur prout est demonstrationis effectus. Vnde sciencie speculatiue non sunt de ipsis essenciis substanciarum separatarum: non enim per sciencias demonstriuas possumus scire quod quid est in eis, quia ipse essencie harum substanciarum sunt intelligibiles per se ipsas ab intellectu ad hoc proportionato, non autem congregatur eorum noticia, qua cognoscitur quod quid est ipsarum, per aliqua priora; set per sciencias speculatiuas potest sciri de eis an sint et quid non sunt et aliquid secundum similitudinem in rebus inferioribus inuentam.” 186 There are some revisions to the order of the chapters. For example, Thomas originally placed a chapter on divine life after his chapter on divine intelligence; and he placed a chapter on divine beatitude after the chapter explaining that God’s understanding is His essence. See Appendix ad primum et secundum librum Summae S. Thomae de Aquino Contra Gentiles [Leon. 13.16*-17*]. 187 See above, p. 208-209. 219 way that appeals to likenesses found in creatures. The order of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles is thus consistent with the order of science, but as this is modified in the special case of the separate substances.
Furthermore, Thomas apparently originally conceived of SCG 1.43 as the end of his special emphasis on the via remotionis. With this, we can now turn to consideration of the triplex via and of the twofold division of divine names that governs the Contra Gentiles.
B. THE ROLE OF THE TRIPLEX VIA
In this section, we will explore the role of the triplex via as a structuring principle in the
Contra Gentiles. What we will find is that Thomas emphasizes a twofold division of divine names, although it will be possible for us to articulate the order of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles in terms of the triplex via. Neither the twofold division nor the triplex via will provide a comphrensive rationale for the order of the divine names.
(i) The twofold division of divine names
As indicated in chapter one, in In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4, Thomas distinguishes between two fundamental approaches to divine naming. The first names God “according to that which is in
Him,” and Thomas identifies a tripartite division of divine names that follows upon this approach, in which the diversity of the divine names parallels the distinct items “found in everything, namely essence, power, and operation.”188 In the second approach, God is named “through the understanding of the intellect, which understands Him according to some comparison to a
188 In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4 [Mand. 1.542]: “Unitas autem majestatis potest nominari dupliciter ut patet ex dictis, vel secundum id quod in Deo est, vel secundum acceptionem intellectus, qui accipit ipsum secundum aliquam comparationem ad creaturam. Si nominetur Deus quantum ad id quod in ipso est, erit triplex diversitas nominum secundum tria quae in unaquaeque re inveniuntur, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; quae quidem in aliis realiter differunt, in ipso autem sunt unum re et distincta ratione.” As we shall see in chapter six, it is this first approach, with some modification, that explicitly structures the Summa theologiae 1.3-26. 220 creature.”189 This results in a bipartite structure, in that God is named (i) by negative names
“according to those things of the creature which are removed from Him” and (ii) by names implying a relation of causality to creatures “the conditions of which are removed from God.”190
As seen in the previous section, Thomas seems to have initially conceived of the order of the names in the Contra Gentiles in terms of the distinction between substance and operation, in conjunction with a methodological distinction between via remotionis and via similitudinis. Whereas
Thomas removed the explicit reference to the distinction between substance and operation in SCG
1.44 (although it still appears in SCG 2.1), he retained as a structuring principle the distinction between the via remotionis (what Kretzmann calls the eliminative method) and something like what he calls the via similitudinis (what Kretzmann calls the relational method). The treatment of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles is in this way structured according to the second approach described by
Thomas in In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4.
In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4 associates the bipartite division of divine names with an approach that names God according to how the human intellect understands Him. It would therefore seem to be divine naming undertaken with an overt awareness of our epistemological limits vis-à-vis the divine that befits dividing divine names into negative names and names involving relational comparison. In the first fourteen chapters of the Contra Gentiles, we find repeated emphasis on the limited capacity of the human intellect to understand God. Within these chapters, Thomas asserts that natural reason
“is deficient in divine matters,”191 that the human intellect is incapable of arriving at a knowledge of
189 Ibid. 190 Ibid.: “Si autem nominetur Deus per acceptionem intellectus in comparatione ad creaturam, et hoc erit dupliciter: vel inquantum ea quae sunt creaturae removentur ab ipsa, et sic erunt nomina negativa; vel secundum quod importatur in nominibus aliquis respectus causalitatis ad creaturam, cujus conditiones a Deo removentur; et sic erunt illa nomina quae important habitudinem ad alia, a quibus Deus distinguitur per essentiam.” 191 SCG 1.2 [Leon. Man. 2]: “Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est.” 221 what God is because of its dependence on the senses for knowing,192 that “we only truly know God when we believe Him to be above everything that can be thought by man about God,” that “the divine substance exceeds the natural knowledge of man,”193 that “we are unable to conceive in our minds what God is,”194 and that “the divine substance by its immensity exceeds every form that our intellect reaches.”195 By no means does Thomas abandon such views in the Summa theologiae, but in the Summa contra Gentiles this emphasis on our epistemological limits fits well with the work’s purpose (in its first three books) of exploring what can be shown by natural reason concerning some of the truths held by the Catholic faith.
Following upon these repeated moments of emphasis on our epistemological limits vis-à-vis the divine, in SCG 1.12 Thomas observes that “all divine names are imposed either by the removal of the effects of the divine from Him, or by some relation of God to His effects.”196 Surprisingly, any explicit mention of the triplex via is absent throughout the first two books of the Contra Gentiles.
Instead, Thomas offers the twofold division of names associated in In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4 with naming God according to how the human intellect understands Him. The division of divine names according to the triplex via can be reconciled with this twofold division, as Thomas indicates in In De
Trin. 6.3, but within the SCG the twofold division is emphasized.197
192 SCG 1.3 [Leon. Man. 3]: “Sensibilia autem ad hoc ducere intellectum nostrum non possunt ut in eis divina substantia videatur quid sit: cum sint effectus causae virtutem non aequantes.” 193 SCG 1.5 [Leon. Man. 5]: “Tunc enim solum Deum vere cognoscimus quando ipsum esse credimus supra omne id quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est: eo quod naturalem hominis cognitionem divina substantia excedit.” 194 SCG 1.11 [Leon. Man. 9]: “Sed quia hoc ipsum quod Deus est mente concipere non possumus, remanet ignotum quoad nos.” 195 SCG 1.14 [Leon. Man. 15]: “Nam divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, sua immensitate excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo quid est.” 196 SCG 1.12 [Leon. Man. 10]: “Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus.” 197 See In De Trin. 6.3, studied above in c. 2, which divides divine names into the negative and the relational, with the latter subdivided according to the relation of cause to effect and the relation of excess. Cf. Summa fratris Bk. 1, pars 2, inq. 1, trac. 1, q. 1, a. 1 [Quaracchi 1.495], in which the author names the “triplicem modum intelligendi sive 222
(ii) The application of the via remotionis in the Summa contra Gentiles
Throughout SCG 1, Thomas emphasizes this twofold division of names, and SCG 1.15 begins a sequence of chapters in which the via remotionis is employed. This raises for us two related questions: (1) At what point, if any, does the emphasis on the via remotionis end? (2) In the chapters emphasizing the via remotionis, does Thomas remain strictly within the bounds of the via remotionis?
(1) The termination of the via remotionis
As for the first question, there are two reasonable candidates for where the via remotionis concludes: SCG 1.28 and 1.43. The former asserts the universality of divine perfection, opening up an avenue for arguing for the whole range of positive divine attributes.198 As Kretzmann and Wippel have pointed out, this chapter finds its place within the via remotionis insofar as it asserts a kind of double negation, by concluding that God does not lack any excellence. Kretzmann favors the view that the via remotionis terminates in this chapter, indicating that what he calls the relational method begins after SCG 1.28,199 whereas Wippel has argued that Thomas continues to follows the via remotionis in the succeeding chapters, albeit in a qualified way in certain cases. For example, in SCG
1.37, Thomas argues for divine goodness, which is not “negative in its formal meaning,” although
“even in establishing God’s goodness Thomas has continued to use the process of successive negations” in his argumentation.200
nominandi Deum: ablatione, eminentia et causa,” and goes on to explain how each of these ways of naming God involves comparison to creatures. 198 As noted in passing a few times above in treatment of the order of argumentative dependence, there are a number of explicit instances of the pure perfection argument (or argument from universal perfection) in the chapters of SCG 1. See above, n. 149, in this chapter. We will say more about this line of argumentation below. 199 Kretzmann, 131: “Imperfection . . . is the last to be ruled out in an application of the eliminative method. Chapter 28, in which imperfection’s elimination is argued for, also marks the beginning of a new stage of Aquinas’s project, as we’ll see.” 200 Wippel, “Quidditative Knowledge of God,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: CUA, 1984), 227. I indicated above in c. 2 that for Thomas, a given divine name can belong to a particular element of the triplex via either with respect to the signification of the name or with respect to the argumentation by which that name is established. See above, p. 83. In this way, intelligent as a divine name can only be understood, in terms of its 223
One difficulty for Kretzmann’s view, which he acknowledges, is the placement of SCG 1.42-
43 on divine unity and infinity, which Thomas regards as negative names.201 On Kretzmann’s account, there is no mystery about the placement of intelligence, will, and so forth—the remaining divine names treated through the end of SCG 1—because they represent the implementation of the relational method opened up by SCG 1.28 and articulated in SCG 1.29-36 (which treat the likeness of creatures to God, the mutiplicity of divine names, and the analogical character of divine naming).
The placement of unity and infinity after goodness but before intelligence, however, is puzzling.
Kretzmann notes concerning infinity that it is closely tied to divine perfection. As we saw above in our treatment of the argumentation in SCG 1.43, to say that God is infinite is to say either that He is infinitely perfect or that He is infinitely powerful, with the one claim implying the other.202
Kretzmann thus concludes that the placement of infinity after perfection is appropriate, but “God’s uniqueness could have been introduced before perfection at least as well as after it.”203
The second possibility is that the via remotionis terminates in SCG 1.43, which treats infinity.
On this view, the placement of unity and infinity is no difficulty, since they are negative names. As we have seen above, the redacted text from the beginning of SCG 1.44 indicates that in Thomas’s mind, at least originally, the via remotionis is employed through SCG 1.43’s treatment of divine infinity.204
I would point to SCG 1.30 as providing supplemental evidence that Thomas thinks of SCG
1.15-43 as a unit. At the end of this chapter, Thomas notes that “the mode of supereminence by which the aforementioned perfections are found in God cannot be signified through names imposed
signification, with all three elements of the triplex via; but one can argue for divine intelligence through the via remotionis, as when one argues from God’s immateriality to His intelligence. 201 Kretzmann, 158-60. Cf. Wippel, “Quidditative Knowledge of God,” 226-27. 202 See above, pp. 197-198. 203 Kretzmann, 159-60. 204 See above, p. 216-17. 224 by us except either through negation, as when we call God eternal or infinite; or also through His relation to other [things], as when He is called first cause or highest good.”205 Here we find a variation on the earlier distinction, found in SCG 1.12, between negative and relational divine names: now Thomas indicates that in particular we can signify the mode of divine supereminence only through negative and relational terms. Thomas picks as his examples of such negative names eternal and infinite, which are the first and the last names treated in SCG 1.15-43. As for the relational names Thomas offers as examples, first cause is a name first treated in SCG 1.13, and as we have seen it is the most important principle of argumentation concerning the divine nature in SCG 1.15-
28; highest good will be treated by Thomas in SCG 1.41, making it the last of these relational names within SCG 1.15-43. Thomas has chosen as his examples the negative and relational divine names that bookend his treatment of the divine substance.206 This supports the claim that Thomas conceives of the entire sequence of chapters from SCG 1.15-43 as a group, all devoted to the work of the via remotionis.207
We should attend to what SCG 1.14 identifies as the goal of the via remotionis. Thomas indicates that through negations we will arrive at a proper consideration of the divine substance
“when He will be known as distinct from all.” Kretzmann interprets this “proper consideration” of the divine substance as a stage of discourse about God subsequent to what is achieved through the
205 SCG 1.30 [Leon. Man. 32]: “Modus autme supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum.” 206 It will also prove important for understanding the order of ST 1.3-11, in which divine eternity is demoted, as it were, from its role as the principle from which the order of argumentation proceeds to a role as a term signifying the mode of divine supereminent perfection. 207 To say that the special emphasis on the via remotionis ends after SCG 1.43 does not mean that the via remotionis is completely left behind. For example, the argument for divine intelligence in SCG 1.44 from divine immateriality is an instance of argumentation in the negative way, as Thomas explains in In Sent. 1.2.1.3. Cf. In Sent. 1.35.1. Furthermore, as noted above, every positive attribute includes an element of negation, with respect to the modus significandi; indeed, all three elements of the triplex via are involved in explaining the signification of any positive divine name 225 via remotionis: he takes Thomas to mean that once God is known as distinct from all things through the via remotionis, then there begins a proper consideration of His substance, through the relational method.208 Although I agree with Kretzmann that the divine names in SCG 1 are divided according to what he calls the eliminative and relational methods, I do not think that this passage in SCG 1.14 concerns the latter. Rather, a proper consideration of God’s substance is achieved just when He has been distinguished from all things through negations.
In support of this reading, we can look to SCG 3.39, in which Thomas associates knowledge of God through demonstration with the via remotionis:
Again, there is another knowledge of God, higher than the previous [forms], which is possessed about God through demonstration, through which one approaches more closely to a proper knowledge of Him: since through demonstration many things are removed from Him, through whose removal He is understood [to be] distinct from others. For demonstration shows God to be immobile, eternal, incorporeal, simple in every way, one, and other things of this kind, which we showed concerning God in the first book.209
Thomas then repeats a claim found in SCG 1.14, that a proper knowledge of a thing is achieved not only by affirmations but also through negations, “for just as it is proper to man to be rational animal, so too it is proper to him neither to be inanimate nor irrational.” But whereas a knowledge through affirmations yields a knowledge of what the thing is, by contrast, in a knowledge through negations
“what the thing is remains unknown.” Thomas concludes that “the proper knowledge that is
208 See Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism, 139, which includes Kretzmann’s translation of this passage from SCG 1.14: “But in that same chapter [14] he also promises to introduce another approach as soon as applications of the eliminative method have achieved a certain cumulative effect. ‘In this way, through negations of that sort, [derived] in order, [God] will be distinguished from everything that is other than himself. And then, when there is cognition of him as distinct from all [other] things, there will be a consideration focused on his substance. It will not be complete (perfecta), however, because there will not be cognition of what he is in himself.’ That consideration, focused on God’s substance, or nature, turns out to be a systematic derivation of some affirmative predications on the basis of the eliminative method’s distinctions between God and everything else.” 209 SCG 3.39 [Leon. Man. 263]: “Rursus, est quaedam alia Dei cognitio, altior quam praemissa, quae de Deo per demonstrationem habetur, per quam magis ad propriam ipsius cognitionem acceditur: cum per demonstrationem removeantur ab eo multa, per quorum remotionem ab aliis discretus intelligitur. Ostendit enim demonstratio Deum esse immobilem, aeternum, incorporeum, omnino simplicem, unum, et alia huiusmodi, quae in libro primo de Deo ostendimus.” 226 possessed concerning God through demonstrations” is of the latter sort, that is, a knowledge through negations.210 SCG 3.39 thus supports reading SCG 1.14 to mean that a proper consideration of the divine substance is achieved by, rather than something subsequent to, the via remotionis.211 It also includes unity—treated in SCG 1.43—as one of the names pertaining to the via remotionis through which God is known as distinct from all things.
Thomas indicates that a proper consideration of God’s substance consists in a knowledge of
Him as distinct from all things. At what point within the Contra Gentiles is this goal accomplished?
210 SCG 3.39 [Leon. Man. 263]: “Ad propriam autem alicuius rei cognitionem pervenitur non solum per affirmationes, sed etiam per negationes: sicut enim proprium hominis est esse animal rationale, ita proprium eius est non esse inanimatum neque irrationale. Sed hoc interest inter utrumque cognitionis propriae modum, quod, per affirmationes propria cognitione de re habita, scitur quid est res, et quomodo ab aliis separatur: per negationes autem habita propria cognitione de re, scitur quod est ab aliis discreta, tamen quid sit remanet ignotum. Talis autem est propria cognitio quae de Deo habetur per demonstrationes.” 211 One curiosity about this text from SCG 3.39 is that Thomas seems to closely associate the via demonstrationis with the via remotionis. Thomas offers only negative names—immobile, eternal, incorporeal, simple, one—as examples of the things known about God through the via demonstrationis. He also offers them in the same order in which they were treated in SCG 1. It is clear that Thomas thinks that God’s existence is something that can be demonstrated, and he uses the language of demonstration to describe the argumentation for God’s existence found in SCG 1.13; see e.g. SCG 2.6 [Leon. Man. 96]: “Ostensum est enim supra, per demonstrationem Aristotelis, esse aliquam primam causam efficientem, quam Deum dicimus.” The question, then, is whether Thomas intentionally refrains from describing argumentation for the positive divine names as demonstrative. Upon a close examination of Thomas’s usage of the terms demonstrare, demonstratio, demonstrabile, and demonstrativum in Books 1 and 2, we find that Thomas in fact stops using these terms to describe his arguments concerning God after SCG 1.25, a chapter in the midst of the negations that lead up to SCG 1.28’s discussion of divine perfection. Although these various forms of the term demonstrare appear some 46 times from SCG 1.1 to 1.25, in the remainder of Book 1 and in the first 27 chapters of Book 2, there are exactly four uses of these terms, none of them serving as descriptions of Thomas’s arguments for any of the positive names. Whatever Thomas’s reasons for refraining from describing the positive attributes as demonstrated, this should not cast doubt on the claim that the positive names can be proved with certitude by natural reason. See In Sent. 3.24.1.3 sol. 1 [Moos 3.773-74], in which Thomas indicates that natural reason can prove God’s intelligence: “Fidei substernitur naturalis cognitio quam fides praesupponit et ratio probare potest; sicut Deum esse et Deum esse unum, incorporeum, intelligentem et alia hujusmodi.” See also ST 1.39.7 [Leon. 4.407]: “Essentialia vero attributa sunt nobis magis manifesta secundum rationem, quam propria Personarum: quia ex creaturis, ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, possumus per certitudinem devenire in cognitionem essentialium attributorum; non autem in cognitionem personalium proprietatum, ut supra dictum est.” In this latter text, Thomas contrasts essential attributes with the properties of the Trinitarian persons; the former can be known with certainty by natural reason, whereas the latter cannot. Other terminology besides that of demonstration can indicate that Thomas’s conclusion is to be taken as certain: e.g., oportest esse, necesse est quod, and ostensum est (as a phrase describing an earlier conclusion) are all phrases Thomas employs to indicate a certain conclusion, and these sorts of phrases are found throughout SCG 1. In In De Trin. 2.3 [Leon. 50.99], Thomas also seems to equate the force of demonstrare and probare in his discussion of the preambula fidei: “Sic ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia possumus tripliciter uti: primo ad demonstrandum ea que sunt preambula fidei, que necesse est in fide scire, ut ea que naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi uel de Deo uel de creaturis in philosophia probata, que fides supponit.” For discussion of In De Trin. 2.3, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 380 ff. 227
We can identify one high point of this effort in SCG 1.25-27, where we learn that God is not in any genus, that the divine esse is distinct from esse commune, and that God is not an intrinsic formal cause of any creature. In particular, in SCG 1.26 Thomas devotes special attention to explaining the sources of the erroneous view that God’s esse is the esse of any creature. In this section Thomas clarifies that God is ipsum esse not as a part of creatures, but as above and distinct from all. Thomas explains that divinum esse is distinguished from all things precisely because nothing can be added to it, citing the Liber de causis, prop. 9, for the claim that “the first cause is distinguished from other things and is in some way individuated by the very purity of its goodness.”212
To borrow the famous phrase that Thomas will later employ in ST 1.4.2—that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens—we can say that if by SCG 1.22 Thomas has established that God is ipsum esse, it is in SCG 1.26 that he clarifies that ipsum esse must be per se subsistens, because ipsum esse is not esse commune but is independent of all creaturely esse.213 The per se subsistence of ipsum esse plays a role in the first argument of SCG 1.28: Thomas appeals to the hypothetical parallel case of a separate, subsistent whiteness—to which nothing of the power of whiteness could be lacking—to help justify the claim that God, as identical with His esse, must “possess esse according to the entire power of esse itself.”214
212 SCG 1.26 [Leon. Man. 28]: “Unde Commentator in libro de Causis dicit quod causa prima ex ipsa puritate suae bonitatis ab aliis distinguitur et quodammodo individuatur.” This claim about the manner in which God as ipsum esse is distinguished from all things—by the fact that He neither does nor can receive any addition—is especially important in Thomas’s De ente 4, which also cites Liber de causis 9. David B. Burrell argues that we can look to Avicenna and Maimonides as the chief influences on Thomas’s account of the distinction of God from the world. See Knowing the Unknowable God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1986), 3-4. I would suggest that SCG 1.26 indicates that Thomas sees in Liber de causis 9 the real key to articulating the distinction of God from the world. That being said, Thomas does attributes to Avicenna and Maimonides the view that God is subsistent esse in In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.67]. 213 I will advance a similar claim in c. 6 of this dissertation concerning ST 1.3: while it is true that ST 1.3.4 establishes the identity of essence and esse in God, it is ST 1.3.8 that proves that ipsum esse is per se subsistens. 214 SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 29-30]: “Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset: nam alicui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis. Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse.” 228
We can also point to SCG 1.43’s treatment of infinity as a moment that furthers our knowledge of God, through negation, as distinct from all things. A later text from ST 1.7.1 ad 3 suggests this, connecting divine infinity to the view that God is known as distinct from all things when He is identified as ipsum esse per se subsistens: “By this very [truth] that the esse of God is per se subsistent, not received in another, according to which He is called infinite, He is distinguished from all other [things], and other [things] are removed from Him.”215 The knowledge of God as infinite amplifies the knowledge of God as distinct from all things first achieved in SCG 1.25-27.
It is thus understandable that Kretzmann identifies the end of the via remotionis after SCG
1.27.216 On the whole, however, I think it best to say that the special emphasis on the via remotionis continues, albeit in a different way, through SCG 1.43. Also, as Wippel has emphasized, the via remotionis is never left behind completely, since even a name with positive formal content, such as goodness or intelligence, still includes a negative element, insofar as the modus significandi of the name is denied of God.
(2) Strictness of the application of the via remotionis?
If the placement of divine unity poses a problem for Kretzmann’s view—a problem we can resolve by recognizing that the special empahsis on the via remotionis continues through SCG 1.43— then this leaves a similar problem for my view: What about the placement of SCG 1.37-41 on divine goodness? To what extent does Thomas stay strictly within the bounds of the via remotionis in SCG
1.15-43? I would note that goodness is not alone, within SCG 1.15-43, as a positive divine name.
Most importantly, Thomas considers esse to be an analogical, positive divine name, even though it is
215 ST 1.7.1 ad 3 [Leon. 4.72]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, et alia removentur ab eo.” 216 As noted above, Kretzmann is still incorrect to place the proper knowledge of God’s substance in the relational method rather than in the via remotionis. 229 reached through the via negationis.217 In SCG 1.22, Thomas cites Boethius for the claim that “the divine substance is existence itself, and existence is from it,” and Thomas identifies this truth with the conclusion of his arguments.218
Confirming that esse is positively attributed to God, in the chapters that follow SCG 1.22, esse appears as a middle term and is positively predicated of God (or is said to belong to God) in premises. This occurs in SCG 1.23 (that God lacks accidents), 1.28 (on divine perfection), and 1.43
(on divine infinity). The first argument in SCG 1.23, examined at greater length above, appeals to the premise that ipsum esse cannot participate anything,219 because “nothing is more formal or simple than esse. But the divine substance is esse itself. Therefore it has nothing that is not of its substance.”220
Here ipsum esse serves as a middle term and is positively predicated of God. Similarly, in the first argument of SCG 1.28, Thomas argues that because God is His esse, He must possess “esse according to the entire power of esse itself.” From this, it is concluded that He must not lack any excellence belonging to any genus.221 In the second argument of SCG 1.43, Thomas positively attributes esse to
God as an act in order to argue that, because God’s esse is unreceived in anything, His esse must be
217 See Helmut Hoping, Weisheit als Wissen des Ursprungs: Philosophie und Theologie in der ‘Summa contra Gentiles’ des Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg: Herder, 1997), 137-38: “Bis ScG I., c. 27 werden ausschlieẞlich negative Attribute von Gott ausgesagt—mit Ausnahme der Identität von Sein (esse) und Wesen (essentia) in Gott, die allerdings über die ‘via remotionis’ begründet wird.” 218 SCG 1.22 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Boetius etiam dicit, in libro De Trin., quod divina substantia est ipsum esse, et ab ea est esse.” For the referenced text, see Boethius, De Trinitate 2 [Loeb 8-10]: “In divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est.” 219 This claim is taken from Boethius’s De hebdomadibus. See In De heb. 1.2 [Leon. 50.270] for the text from Boethius: “Quod est participare aliquo potest, set ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat.” 220 SCG 1.23 [Leon. Man. 24]: “Ipsum enim esse non potest participare aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. Nihil enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest. Divina autem substantia est ipsum esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de sua substantia. Nullum ergo accidens ei inesse potest.” 221 SCG 1.28 [Leon. Man. 29-30]: “Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset; nam alicui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis. Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse. Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei conveniat.” 230 infinite.222 Finally, the fifth argument of SCG 1.43 appeals to the claim that “existence itself absolutely considered is infinite, for it is possible [for it] to be participated in infinite ways.” If some esse is finite, therefore, its finitude must be caused in some way by something else; but the divine esse is totally uncaused, and so God must be infinite.223 In all three of these cases, we find either that esse—in the sense of the actus essendi—is predicated positively of God or that God is said to possess esse in an argument where esse serves as a middle term.
Earlier in the order of argumentation, both being (ens) and act are also predicated of God.224
In a later text from De pot. 7.7, Thomas acknowledges that even within argumentation establishing that God is a being in act (ens actu), the terms employed must be analogical, or else there will be a fallacy of equivocation.225 Within the Contra Gentiles, we find that Thomas frequently employs the names ens actu and primum ens as middle terms in argumentation.226
222 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum.” 223 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Ipsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinitis et infinitis modis participari possibile est. Si igitur alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet quod limitetur esse illud per aliquid aliud quod sit aliqualiter causa illius esse. Sed esse divini non potest esse aliqua causa: quia ipse est necesse per seipsum. Ergo esse suum est infinitum, et ipse infinitus.” 224 Cf. Rolf Schönberger, Thomas von Aquins ‘Summa contra Gentiles’ (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001), 43: “Thomas kennt aber gewiss auch positive Attribute: erste Ursache (prima causa); reine Wirklichkeit (actus purus); durch sich notwendig.” 225 In this text, Thomas is explaining the unacceptable consequences of assering that names said in common of God and creatures are purely equivocal. De pot. 7.7 [Marietti 204]: “Sequeretur etiam quod omnes demonstrationes a philosophis datae de Deo, essent sophisticae; verbi gratia, si dicatur, quod omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per ens actu, —et ex hoc concluderetur quod Deus esset ens actu, cum per ipsum omnia in esse educantur, —erit fallacia aequivocationis; et sic de omnibus aliis.” 226 See, for example, SCG 1.16, 1.21, 1.22, 1.25, 1.28, 1.37, 1.38, 1.72. Furthermore, even within the conclusions of the argumentation for God’s existence, there are elements of causality and eminence, and these serve as principles of further argumentation about God. As we saw above in considering the order of argumentative dependence, although Thomas gives the impression in SCG 1.14 that everything said concerning God will follow in a sequence of negations that begins with divine immutability, this does not turn out to be the case. Some of Thomas’s most important conclusions concerning God are grounded not in the argument from motion at all, but in the argument from efficient causality—and many of these conclusions are grounded in the positive (that is, causal and eminent) aspects of the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality rather than in its negative aspect. 231
Concerning the placement of divine goodness after perfection, therefore, I would say that goodness stands in a similar relationship to perfection as the positive assertion that God is ipsum esse stands in relation to divine simplicity; in both cases, we have a positive implication derived from the via remotionis. Both of these positive names fall under the via remotionis, as a method of argumentation.
Furthermore, in order to explicate the signification of the divine names ipsum esse and good, we must bring to bear all the elements of the triplex via, the res significata / modus significandi distinction, and
Thomas’s understanding of analogy. Both of these are names implying a relation of God to creatures
“the conditions of which are removed from God.”227 This is especially clear in the case of goodness: the treatment of divine goodness culminates in naming God as the highest good, which Thomas identifies as a relational name indicating the eminence of the divine perfection.
Given all of this, I think it best to say that Thomas does not stay rigidly within the bounds of the via remotionis in SCG 1.15-43, if this is understood as limiting himself to negative divine names or negative conclusions about God. Where arguments belonging to the via remotionis have positive implications—that God is pure act, that God is ipsum esse, that God is good and goodness itself—
Thomas does not refrain from such positive predications. When Thomas announces in SCG 1.14 that “the way of removal is especially to be employed in consideration of the divine substance,” I therefore think we should take the force of his “especially” (praecipue) as principally, in the first place—but not exclusively. On the other hand, as indicated above, the via remotionis can never be left behind completely, since any positive divine name includes an element of negation; and no positive divine name can ever express a quidditative grasp of God’s essence.
227In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4: “Si autem nominetur Deus per acceptionem intellectus in comparatione ad creaturam, et hoc erit dupliciter: vel inquantum ea quae sunt creaturae removentur ab ipsa, et sic erunt nomina negativa; vel secundum quod importatur in nominibus aliquis respectus causalitatis ad creaturam, cujus conditiones a Deo removentur; et sic erunt illa nomina quae important habitudinem ad alia, a quibus Deus distinguitur per essentiam.” 232
To further support this view about the role of the via remotionis in SCG 1.15-43, we can return to SCG 1.14 to examine the claims used to justify the priority of the via remotionis. Thomas indicates three reasons why the via remotionis is the appropriate method for consideration of the divine substance: (1) by His immensity, God exceeds every form that we can understand. (2) We cannot place God in a genus. (3) We cannot distinguish God from other things through affirmative differences.228 These are not claims self-evident to us or already demonstrated prior to SCG 1.14: in fact, they are claims that Thomas will demonstrate later, in the very chapters devoted to the work of the via remotionis. We find in SCG 1.24 that God cannot be determined by any positive difference; and in 1.25, that He is not in any genus whatsoever.229 Finally, SCG 1.43 establishes that God is infinite—it is at this point that we have demonstrated that the divine substance “by its immensity exceeds every form that our intellect attains.” All of this is to say that the very suitability of the via remotionis and the impossibility of a quidditative knowledge of God are themselves justified by the work of SCG 1.15-43.230 Most importantly, as shown in the analysis of argumentative dependence above, these claims are grounded ultimately in the identification of God as first cause rather than in
His immutability.231 That is, the very suitability of the via remotionis—and of beginning with immutability—is ultimately grounded in the second way.
228 SCG 1.14 [Leon. Man. 15]. 229 We also find in SCG 1.20 an initial reason why we cannot name a genus for God: Thomas denies that we can know the natural genus of anything incorporeal. 230 Cf. In De Trin. 1.2 [Leon. 50.84], one of Thomas’s classic texts for the impossibility of a quidditative knowledge of God. Here, too, we find that Thomas takes for granted the infinity of the divine essence in his explanation of the impossibility of a quidditative knowledge of God: Thomas cites the claim that the divine essence “in infinitum excedat quamlibet formam creatam.” For treatment of this, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 502-43. 231 As noted above, there is one argument for divine infinity that is grounded in the first way, but it is grounded in the positive aspect of its conclusion (that God is the first mover) rather than in the negative aspect (that He is immutable). Furthermore, Thomas saves the efficacy of this argument by turning it into a disjunctive argument that appeals to the alternative possibility that God is the first efficient cause of being. See above, p. 200. 233
(iii) The role of the via eminentiae
We can distinguish between what the via remotionis accomplishes in SCG 1.15-27 and what it accomplishes in SCG 1.28-43. I will argue that the latter set of chapters forms a coherent unit, treating a set of issues connected with Thomas’s understanding of the via eminentiae: the purpose of
SCG 1.28-43 is to establish divine eminence in a manner that paves the way for the order of argumentation found in SCG 1.44-2.22. The principal evidence for this claim will be the parallels between the contents of SCG 1.28-43 and In Sent. 1.2.1.3, the crucial text on the distinction of the divine attributes.232
In In Sent. 1.2.1.3, Thomas explains that on the deficient view he attributes there to Avicenna and Maimonides—which recognizes only a via causalitatis and a via negationis—“it follows that all names which are said of God and of creature are said equivocally, and that there is no likeness of a creature to Creator based on this, that the creature is good or wise or something of this kind; and
Maimonides says this explicitly.”233 By contrast, when one recognizes the universality of divine perfection, it follows that all creaturely perfections are likenesses of God by analogy.234 Furthermore, the central concern of In Sent. 1.2.1.3 is to explain how it is that the predication of a multiplicity of divine attributes does not contradict the divine simplicity. In the same text, Thomas explains that whereas Avicenna and Maimonides admit only limited versions of the via causalitatis and via negationis, we should with Dionysius and Anselm recognize “that whatever of perfection is in creatures exists
232 For treatment of In Sent. 1.2.1.3, see above, pp. 32-41. 233 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.68]: “Et secundum hanc opinionem sequitur quod omnia nomina quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, dicantur aequivoce, et quod nulla similitudo sit creaturae ad Creatorem ex hoc quod creatura est bona vel sapientia vel hujusmodi aliquid; et hoc expresse dicit Rabbi Moyses.” For discussion and references to Avicenna (and Pseudo-Avicenna) and to Maimonides, see above, pp. 36-38. 234 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.68-69]: “Et quia in illo uno praehabet omnia, ideo secundum illud unum causat omnia, cognoscit omnia, et omnia sibi per analogiam similantur.” 234 preeminently in God.” This eminence of the divine perfection is understood under three aspects: universality, plenitude, and unity.235
The topics treated in SCG 1.28-43 closely parallel to this discussion in In Sent. 1.2.1.3 (with the addition of the treatment of divine goodness in SCG 1.37-41). SCG 1.28 treats the universality of divine perfection, the first of the three aspects of the eminence of divine perfection. SCG 1.29 treats the likeness of creatures to God.236 After preliminaries concerning divine naming in SCG 1.30, 1.31 explains why the multiplicity of divine names does not contradict the divine simplicity. SCG 1.32-34 then treats the analogical character of divine naming. SCG 1.35 explains why the many divine names are not synonyms, and SCG 1.36 explains how it is possible to form propositions about God without contradicting His simplicity. Finally, Thomas treats unity and infinity in SCG 1.42 and 1.43; these correspond to the other two aspects of the divine eminence besides universality. On this reading, unity, like infinity, is understood as a negative characteristic that modifies our understanding of the divine perfection.237 To be clear, the sort of unity treated in SCG 1.43 is unity in the sense of uniqueness or unicity—that there is only one God—rather than in the sense of transcendental unity.238 This being said, I would suggest that unity in the sense of uniqueness is still a negative
235 In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.68]: “Alii vero dicunt, ut Dionysius et Anselmus, quod in Deo praeeminenter existit quidquid perfectionis in creaturis est. Et haec eminentia attenditur quantum ad tria: scilicet quantum ad universalitatem, quia in Deo sunt omnes perfectiones adunatae, quae non congregantur in una creatura. Item quantum ad plenitudinem, quia est ibi sapientia sine omni defectu, et similiter de aliis attributis: quod non est in creaturis. Et iterum quantum ad unitatem; quae enim in creaturis diversa sunt, in Deo sunt unum.” For discussion and references to Dionysius and Anselm, see above, p. 38. 236 We should emphasize again how critically important the likeness of creatures to God is for Thomas, both for understanding the signification of the positive divine names and for the possibility of reasoning from one positive attribute to another. This likeness of creatures to God is denied by Maimonides. 237 We will see in the Compendium theologiae that Thomas devotes one chapter to the claim that God is one (CT 1.15) and another to the claim that all of the divine perfections are one (CT 1.22). It would seem that SCG 1.42 plays both roles. 238 Cf. Aertsen’s discussion of the parallel text in ST 1.11.3; Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 368: “In the corpus of q. 11.3 Thomas gives three different reasons for the oneness of God. In fact these arguments relate not to transcendental unity but to the unicity of God: they are meant to refute polytheism. The question of unity and that of unicity, however, represent two different problems. Every being as being is undivided, but not every being is unique.” 235 notion: to claim that there is only one of something is to deny that there are many of it or many things of the same kind.239
We mentioned above the text from SCG 1.30 in which Thomas observes that “the mode of supereminence in which the aforementioned perfections are found in God cannot be signified through names imposed by us, except through negation, as when we call God eternal or infinite; or also through His relation to others, as when He is called the first cause, or the highest good.”240 As indicated in In Sent. 1.2.1.3, the via eminentiae is on the one hand the necessary complement to the via remotionis and via causalitatis, but on the other hand SCG 1.30 makes clear that the divine eminence is itself only expressed through negations and relations involving causality. There is in this way an interdependence among the elements of the triplex via, with respect to both the meaning of the divine attributes and the manner in which we express the eminence of divine perfection.241 This helps to clarify why it is precisely through the via remotionis that the eminence of divine perfection is to be established.
I have indicated that all of SCG 1.15-43 should be understood as belonging to the via remotionis. That being said, SCG 1.28-43 is concerned with establishing, through the via remotionis, the eminence of divine perfection. This serves to prepare for the work of the via eminentiae as a way of argumentation in SCG 1.44-102, in which most of Thomas’s arguments proceed from one positive name to another positive name.
239 Cf. Van Steenberghen, Le problème de l’existence de Dieu dans les écrits de s. Thomas d’Aquin, 298: “L’unicité est la non-pluralité. Un être est dit unique lorsqu’il exclut l’existence d’autres êtres de même nature: fils unique, copie unique etc.” 240 SCG 1.30 [Leon. Man. 32]: “Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum. Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum, ut ex supra dictis patet.” 241 In chapter six, I will argue that Thomas magnifies and clarifies this interdependence among the elements of the triplex via by his organization of ST 1.3-11. 236
(iv) Conclusions concerning the role of the triplex via and the twofold division of names
In the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas emphasizes a twofold division of divine names into negative names and names involving some relational foundation. The emphasis on this twofold division would seem to be a consequence of the fact that the Contra Gentiles is concerned with establishing what can be known about God through natural reason: for Thomas, this twofold division is a division of divine names according to how the human intellect knows and names God.
Although this twofold division provides a general structure for the order of the divine names, it does not give us a comprehensive rationale for the details of that order. In particular, the placement of goodness, unity (uniqueness), and infinity are difficult to square with identifying any single moment of transition from negative names to names involving relational comparison.
Although Thomas makes no explicit mention of the triplex via as a theme in SCG 1, he does mention both the via remotionis and the eminence of divine perfection. As we have seen, it is helpful to understand SCG 1.28-43 as a unit concerned with establishing the eminence of divine perfection and unfolding some of the consequences of that eminence. This is preparatory for the sequence of argumentation in the via eminentiae found in SCG 1.44-102.
As noted above in c. 2, one can take the three elements of the triplex via as indicating either ways of argumentation or aspects of the signification of a divine name. To argue from effect to cause belongs to the via causalitatis as a way of argumentation, whereas to call God wise includes the aspect of of causality insofar as God is the cause of creaturely wisdom. To argue from a prior negative name is an argument in the via remotionis, whereas a name is negative insofar as it removes something from God. Finally, to argue in the via eminentiae is either to argue from one positive name to another positive name, or to argue from the limited perfection of creatures to the eminence of the divine perfection; and a name belongs to the via eminentiae because it is a positive attribute. No name 237 belongs to the via eminentiae without also including elements of causality and negation: to know God as wise is to know Him as the eminent cause of the same creaturely wisdom that can be denied of
Him.
With these distinctions in mind, we can assign the via causalitatis to SCG 1.13, the via remotionis to SCG 1.15-43, and the via eminentiae to SCG 1.44-2.22. This assignment of the elements of the triplex via to these sections is according to the way of argumentation dominant in each section. In each case, however, this dominance admits of exceptions. First, one of the four arguments for God’s existence in SCG 1.13—the rough parallel to the fourth way—is an argument that Thomas characterizes as belonging to the via eminentiae. Second, throughout SCG 1.15-43 we find a number of arguments that belong to the via remotionis only insofar as the conclusions are negative, but not with respect to the mode of argumentation used to reach that conclusion. For example, the first argument in SCG 1.23 appeals to the prior positive claim that God is ipsum esse in order to conclude that He lacks accidents, although it should be recalled that the claim that God is ipsum esse was itself justified through the via remotionis. Furthermore, in SCG 1.42, Thomas offers several arguments belonging to the via causalitatis, arguing from the unity of the universe and its order to the unity of its first principle.242 Third, in SCG 1.44, one of Thomas’s arguments for divine intelligence is the argument from the via remotionis that we have mentioned several times—the argument proceeds from divine immateriality to divine intelligence. In none of these sections, then, does Thomas strictly limit himself to arguments associated with only one element of the triplex via.
242 As noted above, although Thomas gives the impression in SCG 1.14 that the entire via remotionis will proceed through a series of successive negations that begins with immutability, this breaks down in SCG 1.16, when the absolute exclusion of potency from God (or His identification as pure act) cannot be grounded in immutability. This has its most important consequence in SCG 1.22, when the denial of any real distinction between essence and esse in God can only ultimately be grounded in the conclusion of the second way. 238
As for the signification of the divine names, neither in this way does Thomas strictly limit himself to names associated with only one element of the triplex via in any given section of the work.
This begins in SCG 1.13: as noted in c. 2, the divine name that is the subject of any conclusion for
God’s existence always involves more than one element of the triplex via. For example, to say that
God is the first, uncaused cause involves all three elements. As for SCG 1.15-43, most of Thomas’s conclusions in these chapters are negative, but there are the positive moments identified above—act, esse, and goodness. Finally, as noted above, throughout SCG 1.44-2.22, Thomas alternates between negative and positive moments; for example, after arguing that God is intelligent, he argues that
God’s act of understanding is not really distinct from His esssence. All this being said, with respect to the signification of the divine names, we can generally assign the via remotionis to SCG 1.15-43
(with the exception of 1.22 and 1.37-41) and the complete triplex via to SCG 1.22, 1.37-41, and 1.44-
2.22.243
Although we can articulate the general order of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles according to the order causality, negation, eminence (CNE), the elements of the triplex via are interwoven in the details of the order in a way that defies any comprehensive brief formulation. As indicated in c. 2, the elements of the triplex via function more like instruments in a musical trio rather than as independent methods. For this reason, the triplex via does not by itself provide a comprehensive rationale for the order of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles. Nor does the twofold division of names—which Thomas explicitly mentions, rather than the triplex via—provide such a comprehensive rationale.244
243 Cf. Hoping, 138: “Beginnend mit ScG I, c. 28 wendet Thomas auch die ‘via causalitatis’ und die ‘via eminentiae’ an. Doch bleibt die ‘via remotionis’ für die Exposition des metaphysischen Gottesbegriffs weiterhin bestimmend, einmal wegen der Unzulänglichkeit unserer affirmativen Aussagen über Gott hinsichtlich ihres ‘modus significandi,’ zum anderen, weil uns das Wesen Gottes auf Erden letztlich unbekannt bleibt.” 244 Why can’t the triple via provide a comprehensive rationale for the order of the divine names? I would suggest that, in order for the triplex via to serve as a comprehensive rationale—a principle by which the order is derived—the 239
C. THE ROLE OF THE ORDER OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
As discussed in c. 2, we can distinguish two orders of the transcendentals in Thomas’s thought. The first is the order of the transcendental perfections considered in themselves, according to their logical distinction from one another. This more familiar order of the (four most commonly mentioned) transcendentals is being, one, true, good. The second is the order of these perfections considered with respect to the things that they perfect; this order is according to how common they are as received perfections in creatures. Thomas is clear that being and goodness are both equally common in this sense, and we noted above that transcendental unity would seem to be equally common, as a received perfection, as being, goodness, and truth of being.245 The truth that is a received perfection, however—that is, truth of intellect—is less common than both being and goodness, because intellect is less common. Of these two orders of the transcendentals, the latter is
order of the triplex via would have to be something that we could take for granted independently of and prior to the reasoning contained in SCG 1.15-2.22. Although Thomas will use the phrase ordo disciplinae only in the prologue to the Summa theologiae, it seems clear that the Contra Gentiles too is bound to an ordo inventionis, with respect to the order of argumentative dependence. What can we say about the order of discovery with respect to the triplex via? Thomas invokes with some frequency the Dionysian claim that we do not deny things of God because He is somehow deficient or less than creatures, but rather because of His eminence and excellence. This is consistent with what we find in SCG 1.14: the via remotionis is to be employed because God, by His immensity, exceeds every form that our intellect understands. Furthermore, we cannot offer concerning God a genus or an affirmative difference. Thus, the eminence of the divine perfection is the reason for the priority of the via remotionis. But as we have seen above, these same reasons that Thomas advances for the priority of the via remotionis are themselves claims reached as conclusions within SCG 1.15-43. Furthermore, as we discovered in our treatment of the order of argumentative dependence, these three claims (that God is not in a genus, is not determined by affirmative differences, and is infinite) are ultimately grounded not in immutability, but in the identification of God as the first efficient cause. The priority of the via remotionis cannot therefore be a matter of strict priority in the order of discovery. Thomas is not strictly constrained by the requirements of argumentative dependence to begin with immutability and eternity, as he does in SCG 1.15. For example, Thomas has all of the material he needs in order to prove that God is universally perfect or that creatures are like God in their perfections already in SCG 1.13’s identification of God as the first efficient cause; and from these conclusions, he could derive the positive attributes. But such a procedure would be inappropriate, because the most proper knowledge of God is through successive negations culminating in the knowledge of God as distinct from all, for the reasons Thomas offers in SCG 1.14. But because knowledge of these claims justifying the via remotionis is itself a product of SCG 1.15-43, we should not understand some order of the triplex via as an a priori rationale that can be taken for granted as a principle of order. 245 See above, p. 90. 240 consistent with the order of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles, since Thomas treats truth after both goodness and unity.
In his discussion of divine truth, Thomas in fact distinguishes between truth of intellect and truth of being, emphasizing the former more than the latter. Thomas first introduces the topic of truth in SCG 1.59 after a sequence of chapters in which he explains that God has a proper knowledge of all things, albeit without discursiveness (which characterizes the human intellect’s third operation) or judgmental composition (which belongs to the human intellect’s second operation).
The purpose of SCG 1.59 is to affirm that there is in God the “truth of enuntiables,” that is, that
God knows all the truths that we express through judgment, even though there is no composition in
His act of understanding. SCG 1.60 (which is titled “that God is truth”) then denies that there is any real distinction between God and the truth that is in Him, allowing the affirmation that God is truth.
Here we find an emphasis on truth of intellect. The first argument, for example, defines truth as “a certain perfection of understanding or of the operation of the intellect;” and the second defines truth as “a certain goodness of the intellect.” The third argument appeals to the previously established claim that there is truth in God—this is an appeal to the previous chapter. The fourth argument, however articulates a notion of truth as a property of being insofar as it imitates what is in the divine mind. Thomas then argues that God must be His truth, “whether we speak of the truth of intellect or of the truth of a thing.”246 Thomas thus attributes both truth of being and truth of intellect to God, but his arguments emphasize the latter more than the former.
246 SCG 1.60 [Leon. Man. 56]: “Licet verum proprie non sit in rebus sed in mente, secundum philosophum, res tamen interdum vera dicitur, secundum quod proprie actum propriae naturae consequitur. Unde Avicenna dicit, in sua metaphysica, quod veritas rei est proprietas esse uniuscuiusque rei quod stabilitum est ei, inquantum talis res nata est de se facere veram aestimationem, et inquantum propriam sui rationem quae est in mente divina, imitatur. Sed Deus est sua essentia. Ergo, sive de veritate intellectus loquamur sive de veritate rei, Deus est sua veritas.” 241
This emphasis on truth of intellect continues in SCG 1.61, in which the title is “that God is the purest truth.” The chapter announces its purpose as explaining that “in God there is pure truth, with which no falsity or deception can be admixed.” All of the arguments conclude that there cannot be error or deception in God’s knowledge. One of the arguments does mention truth as a transcendental property of beings, but this is used as a premise in an argument that concludes that
“there is no inequality between the divine intellect and things; nor can there be any falsity in the divine intellect.”247 Similarly, in SCG 1.62—whose title is “that the divine truth is the first and highest truth”248—we find that only one of Thomas’s four arguments directly concerns truth of being, in order to argue from the fact that “the divine esse is first and most perfect” to the conclusion that “its truth is the first and highest.”249 Two of the four arguments directly concern truth of intellect. One of these appeals to the premise that “in the divine intellect the intellect and that which is understood is in every way the same;” another appeals to the claim that “the truth of a thing is measured by the divine intellect.”250
Given that Thomas does not derive truth as a divine name exclusively from truth of being— or truth as a transcendental—it should be no surprise that he does not follow the order of the transcendental perfections considered in themselves in his treatment of the divine names. I will leave
247 SCG 1.61 [Leon. Man. 57]: “Nec tamen in rebus est falsitas: quia quantum unumquodque habet de esse, tantum habet de veritate. Nulla igitur inaequalitas est inter intellectum divinum et res; nec aliqua falsitas in intellectu divino esse potest.” 248 SCG 1.62 [Leon. Man. 57]: “Quod divina veritas est prima et summa veritas.” 249 SCG 1.62 [Leon. Man. 57]: “Sed divinum esse est primum et perfectissimum. Ergo et sua veritas est prima et summa.” 250 SCG 1.62 [Leon. Man. 57]: “Cum igitur in intellectu divino sit omnino idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, sua veritas erit prima et summa veritas. . . . Cum etiam Deus sit primus intellectus et primum intelligibile, oportet quod veritas intellectus cuiuslibet eius veritate mensuratur.” 242 a more detailed treatment of the relationship between the divine names and the transcendentals until chapter six.251
D. CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF ORDER
None of the principles of order we have considered can supply a comprehensive rationale that would allow one to derive the details of the order in which Thomas considers the divine names in the Summa contra Gentiles. That being said, we have seen with respect to the order of science that one can conceive of the difference between SCG 1.15-43 and 1.44-2.22 both in terms of the distinction between substance and operation and in terms of a methodological difference between the via remotionis and a method that appeals to likenesses of God found in creatures. This latter distinction lines up well with the twofold division of divine names that Thomas emphasizes in the
Summa contra Gentiles. With respect to the triplex via, we have also seen that the argumentation from
SCG 1.44-2.22 fits within the via eminentiae understood as a way of argumentation. We can also reasonably assign the via causalitatis to SCG 1.13 and the via remotionis to SCG 1.15-43. Finally, as we saw, we can distinguish between the purpose of the via remotionis in SCG 1.15-27 (which culminates in a knowledge of God as distinct from all things) and in 1.28-43 (which aims to establish the eminence of divine perfection and to elaborate on some of its consequences, to prepare for the work of SCG1.44-2.22).252 These principles of order account well for the general structure of
Thomas’s treatise on God, but they do not provide a comprehensive rationale from which we can derive the details of the order.
251 I do this both because Thomas treats the transcendentals explicitly within ST 1.3-26 and because both Garrigou-Lagrange and Aertsen make their claims about the importance of the transcendentals vis-à-vis the order of the divine names with reference to the Summa theologiae. 252 As noted above, however, SCG 1.43’s treatment of divine infinity solidifies our knowledge, through negation, of God as distinct from all things. 243
3. THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ON THE ORDER
Finally, we should give attention to the role of historical influences. As we shall see, this analysis will help to fill in some of the gaps concerning the details of the order of the divine names.
We will proceed through the four sections identified above: SCG 1.15-27, 1.28-43, 1.44-102, 2.1-22.
A. SCG 1.15-27
Comparing Thomas to his historical sources, we can identify two primary influences on the content of SCG 1.15-27: Aristotle and Avicenna. We can associate the contents of SCG 1.15-21,
1.23, and 1.27—eternity, absence of potency, immateriality, simplicity, absence of anything violent or unnatural, incorporeality, identity with essence, absence of accidents, not being an intrinsic formal cause—with Aristotle. All of the material treated in these chapters finds some precedent in Aristotle.
We find material from both Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics woven together, with some rearrangement. The general movement from eternity (1.15) to incorporeality (1.20) parallels the sequence of argumentation that culminates in the ultimate conclusion of Aristotle’s Physics. In SCG
1.20, Thomas is especially dependent upon the argumentation developed in Physics 8.10.253 Thomas also integrates material from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, such as the assertion that God is pure act in
1.16,254 the exclusion in 1.19 of anything violent or unnatural from God,255 the identification of God
253 See above, pp. 179-180. 254 In Meta. 12.5 #2494 [Marietti 584]: “Relinquitur ergo, quod oportet esse aliquod primum principium motus tale cuius substantia non sit in potentia, sed sit actus tantum.” 255 In Meta. 5.6 #841 [Marietti 227]: “Tertia conclusio est, quod, cum violentum sit quod movetur ab aliquo exteriori agente praeter naturam propriam, principia autem necessaria sunt simplicia et immobilia, ut ostensum est, necessarium est ut si sunt aliqua sempiterna et immobilia sicut sunt substantiae separatae, quod in illis non sit aliquid violentum nec praeter naturam.” 244 with His essence in 1.21,256 the exclusion of substance-accident composition in 1.23, 257 and the denial that God is a formal cause in 1.27.258
We find in the remaining chapters of SCG 1.15-27—that is, 1.22 and 1.24-26—the clear influence of Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.4.259 Whereas this chapter of Avicenna’s Metaphysics is expressly concerned with divine unity (in the sense of transcendental unity), Thomas subordinates the contents of SCG 1.22-27, which includes these notes of Avicennian influence, to the notion of simplicity, which he had first introduced in SCG 1.18. Although transcendental unity and simplicity are closely related notions, Thomas distinguishes them: unity is the absence of division (from the thing itself), but simplicity is the absence of composition. Something can be one without being simple, as for example, a corporeal substance is one but not simple.260 Thomas puts off explicit discussion of divine unity until SCG 1.42, although again he treats unity there in terms of uniqueness rather than in terms of transcendental unity.
256 See In Meta. 12.10 #2596 [Marietti 604]: “Sed primum principium cum sit quod quid erat esse, idest sua essentia et ratio, non habet materiam, quia eius substantia est endelechia, idest actus, materia autem est in potentia.” See also In Meta. 12.8 #2544 for Thomas’s discussion of the Aristotelian assertion that the first unmoved mover is life itself and actuality. Thomas sees the identification of the first principle with its essence as a consequence of its being pure actuality. 257 In Meta. 12.8 #2544 and 12.11 #2608 for the assertion of the identity of God with His act of understanding, a characteristic that is for Thomas exclusively divine. 258 In Meta. 12.8 #2547 [Marietti 595]: “His autem habitis, epilogando concludit manifestum esse ex dictis, quod est aliqua substantia sempiterna et immobilis, separata a sensibilibus.” 259 For a lengthy, careful study of the Avicennian influence—particularly of Metaphysics 8.4—on SCG 1.22, 1.25, 1.26, see the series of three articles by Albert Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles,” Angelicum 52.3 (1975): 340-84; “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (II),” Angelicum 52.4 (1975): 541-86; “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (III),” Angelicum 53.2 (1976): 185-226. Cf. Hoping, 145-58. Judy does not include SCG 1.24 as a focus of his study, because there aren’t the sort of explicit textual parallels between this chapter and the Avicennian text; however, he treats Avicenna’s rejection of any specific difference of the divine esse in “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (III),” 189. I would agree with Judy that his study documents “an extraordinarily detailed dependence of certain passages in the Summa contra Gentiles upon the fourth chapter, Tract VIII, of Avicenna’s Metaphysics.” Ibid., 213. 260 See also In Meta. 12.7 #2525 [Marietti 591]: “Ostendit consequenter differentiam inter unum et simplex: et dicit, quod unum et simplex non idem significant, sed unum significat mensuram, ut in decimo ostensum est; simplex autem significat dispositionem, secundum quam aliquid aliqualiter se habet, quia videlicet non est ex pluribus constitutum.” In this text, however, Thomas appears to be contrasting one as the principle of number with simple. 245
SCG 1.26’s rejection of the claim that God is the esse of any creature—or that He is esse commune—has a parallel in Avicenna, which precedes Avicenna’s exclusion of genus, difference, and related notions from necesse esse.261 Thomas also especially emphasizes the influence of Liber de causis 9 in spelling out the importance of this thesis.262 In SCG 1.27 we return to a claim that Thomas would associate with Aristotle’s Metaphysics: the realization that the first principle is not an intrinsic formal cause is the moment at which one has proved the existence of separate substance.
The contents of SCG 1.15-27 are thus associated with Aristotle and Avicenna—but what of their order? SCG 1.15-21, 1.23, and 1.27, containing content derived from Aristotle, seems a somewhat difficult case, since Thomas is weaving together material from both Aristotle’s Physics and
Metaphysics, and from more than one section of the latter work. As noted above, the beginning and end of SCG 1.15-20 have their roots in the Physics, but this sequence of argumentation also appears in Metaphysics 12.6-7, along with the identification of the unmoved mover as pure actuality. In
Metaphysics 12.6-7, the sequence of these divine characteristics is eternity, pure actuality, immateriality, incorporeality—a match for the order of SCG 1.15-17 and 1.20.263 Both SCG 1.18 and
1.19 are derived from argumentation found in Metaphysics 5.5, in which the absence of anything
261 See Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (II),” 579-86, for a careful treatment of the parallel between Avicenna and Thomas on this point. The most important parallel text is Prima philosophia 8.4 [Van Riet 2.402]: “Intentio autem de hoc quod dicimus quo ipse est esse exspoliatum condicione negandi ceteras additiones ab eo, non est quod ipse sit esse exspoliatum in quo communicet aliquid aliud esse.” I would agree with Judy’s assessment concerning this claim that divinum esse is not esse commune: “The Thomistic explanation of the difference between the divine being and common being is more systematic and more coherent than that of Avicenna.” Judy, 585. Judy does not mention, however, that Thomas closes the section that he cites as a parallel to Avicenna with a reference to the Liber de causis 9. 262 The Liber de causis is a work that Thomas would still, in 1259, identify as a work of Aristotle. See e.g. In De Trin. 6.1 q. 3 obj. 2 [Leon. 50.158], in which Thomas references the Liber de causis as follows: Set diuina excedunt omnem intellectum, ut Dionisius dicit I c. De diuinis nominibus, et Philosophus in libro De causis.” The Commentary on the De Trinitate dates to 1257-1259; see Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 345. 263 It should be recalled, however, that in the Metaphysics Aristotle simply recalls the line of argumentation from the Physics by which the first mover is shown to be incorporeal. This mention of incorporeality occurs quite a bit later in the sequence of characteristics, in the midst of the discussion of the perfection of the unmoved mover. See above, p. 104-105. 246 violent or unnatural is presented as a consequence of simplicity. We can account for the order of
SCG 1.15-20, then, by noting that Thomas weaves the material from Metaphysics 5.5 into an order of argumentative dependence fundamentally based on Metaphysics 12.6-7.
The sequence of chapters that exhibit indebtedness to Avicenna for their content—SCG
1.22 and 1.24-26—also seem to be basically indebted to him for their order, with some modification.
Thomas’s addition of accident as an item excluded from God in SCG 1.23 serves both to render the
Avicennian sequence more complete and to provide a deeper unity to SCG 1.23-25 by grounding them in a familiar logical doctrine. By this, I mean that SCG 1.23-25 treat together the five predicables or quinque voces of medieval logic, which are ultimately based on Aristotle’s Topics and
Porphyry’s Isagoge—but these notions would also be known to Thomas from Boethius’s
Commentary on the Isagoge and from Avicenna’s Logic.264 In SCG 1.23, Thomas distinguishes between proper and separable accidents, in order to exclude both from God. In SCG 1.24, he excludes difference, and in 1.25 he excludes both genus and definition. SCG 1.25 also exhibits dependence on Avicenna, in that Thomas also explains that there can be no (propter quid) demonstration of God.265 However, whereas Avicenna proceeds in the order genus, difference, definition, Thomas offers the opposite order: accident, property, difference, genus, definition. It could be that Thomas prefers this order on account of argumentative dependence, or because it proceeds from the “lower” among the predicables to the “higher.”
264 In Porphyry’s Isagoge, the five predicables are genus, species, difference, property, and accident; the medieval quinque voces, based on Topics 1.4-5, are genus, difference, definition, property, and accident. It is these latter five that are excluded from God in SCG 1.23-25. Thomas excludes these notions not only as logical notions but, more importantly, according to their metaphysical import. For Boethius’s commentary, see In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta, ed. Samuel Brandt, CSEL vol. 48 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1906). Concerning Avicenna’s Logic—particularly its first treatise, his version of the Isagoge (known as the Logica Avicennae)—and its Latin dissemination, see Albert Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles,” 357. 265 See Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (III),” 189. 247
With this sort of progression in mind, we can note that the other major historical source that seems to be an influence in SCG 1.15-27 is the Mystical Theology of Dionysius. Thomas references an order of negative theology in SCG 1.14 that is consistent with the order of Dionysian negative theology, as characterized by Albert: negative theology ought to proceed from the lowest to the highest so as to distinguish God from all things. Although Thomas does not replicate the order he offers as an example in SCG 1.14 (God is not an accident, God is not a body), we can highlight SCG
1.17, 1.20, and 1.25-27 as progressive moments in the project of distinguishing God from more and more things—first from matter, then from bodies, then from any genus whatsoever (most importantly from the genus substance), then from composition with creatures as their actus essendi or esse commune, and finally from any composition with creatures as a formal cause. This progression is different from that found in the Mystical Theology itself, insofar as Thomas does not in these chapters get as far as explicitly denying such names as goodness and being of God—indeed, the moment in which Thomas affirms that God is ipsum esse is crucial—but there is still something of the spirit of progression from the lowest to the highest operative in the order of SCG 1.15-27. It is also precisely with respect to this progression that Avicenna provides a supplement to Aristotle, by removing God from any generic community with any creature.
Finally, the placement of SCG 1.26-27 is appropriate, given that these chapters represent the culmination of the stated goal of the via remotionis, namely, to arrive at a knowledge of God as distinct from all other things. As noted above, it is in these chapters (and especially in 1.26) that God as ipsum esse is established to be per se subsistens, rather than entering into composition with creatures as esse commune.
I would therefore propose that the order of SCG 1.15-27 can thus in large part be explained in terms of Thomas’s engagement with and appropriation of his historical sources. The preference 248 for negative theology and its fundamental order are adopted from Dionysius, while the content is taken, in stages, from Aristotle and Avicenna.
B. SCG 1.28-43
We need not give much further attention to the historical influences on SCG 1.28-43; as indicated above, this sequence of chapters forms a coherent unit, insofar as they are concerned with establishing the eminence of divine perfection and stating some of the consequences of that eminence for the project of naming God. In Sent. 1.2.1.3 makes clear that Thomas sees in the work of these chapters the necessary complement to the limited account of divine naming found in
Avicenna and Maimonides.266 This especially helps us to understand the placement of unity and infinity in SCG 1.42-43; according to In Sent. 1.2.1.3, these are two of the aspects of the eminence of divine perfection, the third being universality, which is treated in SCG 1.28. For Thomas the separate subsistence of God, established in SCG 1.26, is the bridge from the Avicennian identification of God as ipsum esse to this claim about the universality of divine perfection, a claim that Thomas associates with Averroes’ reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. We can say that on the one hand, the predominantly Avicennian sequence from SCG 1.21-25 complements Aristotle, whereas
SCG 1.26-27 provides the link to the account of divine eminence in SCG 1.28-43, which complements Avicenna. That being said, Thomas follows Avicenna’s example in subordinating his discussion of divine goodness to the notion of perfection.267
C. SCG 1.44-102
We can identify several sources of influence on the content of SCG 1.44-102, in which
Thomas considers divine immanent operation. First, Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s
266 Cf. Thomas’s more complete treatment of Maimonides in De pot. 7.5 [Marietti 2.198-99]. 267 Avicenna, Prima philosophia 8.6 [Van Riet 2.412-413]. 249
Metaphysics indicates that he sees in Aristotle a discussion of divine operation in Metaphysics 12.9-10; in this discussion, Aristotle discusses the knowledge, life, and beatitude of the unmoved mover.
Second, Avicenna treats truth, intelligence, the objects of divine knowledge, and joy and happiness in his Metaphysics 8.6-7.268 Thomas’s extended treatment of the objects of divine knowledge—in which he affirms God’s knowledge of creatures insofar as He is their cause—is indebted to
Avicenna (albeit not with respect to God’s knowledge of creatures as individuals).269 Third, Peter the
Lombard treats divine knowledge, will, and justice in Sentences 1.
In none of these sources, however, do we find the precise order in which Thomas treats the five central names—intelligence, truth, will, life, beatitude—considered in SCG 1.44-102.270 As noted above, the order of these chapters seems to be fundamentally a matter of the order of argumentative dependence. These positive attributes are distinct according to their intelligible contents (rationes), and Thomas argues from one to another in terms of this positive content. Whatever is intelligent has will; whatever has intelligence and will is living; and on the basis of such premises Thomas argues from one positive divine name to another, in the via eminentiae as a way of argumentation. We find something of this order in both Aristotle (who argues from knowledge to life and from perfect knowledge to beatitude) and Avicenna (who similarly argues from perfect knowledge to beatitude).
Avicenna also treats beatitude at the end of his presentation, just as Thomas does. Although Peter the Lombard treats divine will after divine knowledge, the reason for the order is not argumentative priority; Thomas explains the order in which Peter treats knowledge, power, and will in terms of the scope of the respective objects of these operations. (Thus, God knows things that are outside what
268 Avicenna, Prima philosophia 8.6-7 [Van Riet 2.413-33]. See Hoping, 158; Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra Gentiles (II),” 553. 269 See especially Avicenna, Prima philosophia 8.7 [Van Riet 2.423-28]. 270 Avicenna treats truth before intelligence. That Thomas treats truth after intelligence is, I would suggest, a consequence of the fact that he primarily emphasizes truth of intellect rather than truth of being in his account of divine truth. By contrast, Avicenna’s discussion of divine truth emphasizes truth of being first. See above, p. 143. 250
His power directly produces, such as evil things, and He can do more things than He actually wills.)271
Thomas orders a wider range of material according to the rationale that seems to govern portions of both Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.9-10 and Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.6-7. There is not any content in SCG 1.44-102 that is without some historical precedent. Furthermore, the rationale of argumentative dependence appears, at least in particular arguments, in both Aristotle and Avicenna.
Finally, we can note that whereas SCG 1.15-27 preserves something of the order of Dionysian negative theology, SCG 1.44-102 does not follow the order of Dionysian affirmative theology: the arrangement is not from what is more common to what is less common among creatures.272
D. SCG 2.1-22
There is little to say about historical influences on the order among the early chapters of
Book 2, but we can say something about their place in the larger structure of the Contra Gentiles.
Thomas understands the role of intelligence, power, and will within Book 1 of the Sentences to be prepatory for the discussion of creation in Book 2. Thomas presents divine transitive operation in this way in the Contra Gentiles, as the prologue to his discussion of creatures in the remainder of
Book 2. There is a close connection, in this way, between discussion of transitive divine operation
(operatio) and God’s works (opera).273 He places his discussion of divine immanent operation, however, within Book 1’s consideration of God in Himself. This is grounded in the observation, noted above, that the divine names treated in Book 1 “express the divine essence,” whereas power is
271 See above, pp. 155-56. 272 To take the most obvious example, life is more common than intelligence. 273 SCG 2.2 [Leon. Man. 94]: “Sic igitur patet quod consideratio creaturarum pertinet ad instructionem fidei Christianae. Et ideo dicitur Eccl. 42: ‘Memor ero operum Domini, et quae vidi annuntiabo: in sermonibus Domini opera eius.’” 251 among names that imply a relation of God to creatures: to speak of God’s power is to speak of God as the principle of effects distinct from Himself.
4. SUMMARY CONCERNING THE ORDER
We find in the Summa contra Gentiles the confluence of several principles and historical sources, such that we cannot offer one simple formula from which it is possible to derive the entire order of the divine names. The most fundamental division in the structure of Thomas’s treatment of the divine names is according to the distinction between substance and operation, with the latter subdivided into immanent and transitive. Parallel to this distinction between substance and operation, Thomas emphasizes the methodological distinction between naming God through negations (the via remotionis) and naming God through relations (which he originally called the via similitudinis). This twofold division is broadly consistent with how Thomas conceives of the order of science in the case of separate substances, and it is with respect to the order of science that Thomas justifies the transition from reasoning about whether God exists to reasoning about what God is not. However, neither the twofold division of divine names nor the order of science can provide a comprehensive rationale for the entire order of the divine names. Nor is the triplex via able to provide such a comprehensive rationale, although it is very helfpul to articulate the order of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles according to the order causality, negation, eminence (CNE).
As for the historical sources that influence the order, we can highlight two points. First, with respect to the order of argumentative dependence, Thomas’s apparent attempt at grounding everything said concerning God in the conclusion of the argument from motion—as well as the limited success with which this project meets—are best understood in light of Albert’s view that the philosophers are unable to arrive at a certain knowledge of the divine attributes, because they know
God as first mover rather than as creative cause. On the one hand, Thomas goes as far as he can to 252 prove the divine attributes through a knowledge of God as the unmoved mover; in this effort, he even presents Aristotle’s argument for divine intelligence from the Metaphysics as his first argument in
SCG 1.44. On the other hand, however, Thomas’s arguments reveal the limited fecundity of the first way—at least as it is formulated in the Contra Gentiles—as a foundation for proving the divine names.
As we shall see in c. 6 of this dissertation, most of the major differences between the orders of the divine names in the Contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae can be accounted for in terms of this issue.
Second, we can name several distinct historical influences on the sections of Thomas’s treatment of the divine names. Thomas sees in Aristotle the distinction between the substance and operation of the unmoved mover.274 The sequence from SCG 1.15-27 is largely indebted to Aristotle and Avicenna for its content and to Dionysius for the rationale of its order. SCG 1.28-43 functions as a unit devoted to establishing the eminence of divine perfection and spelling out the consequences of this eminence for divine naming. This section is unified by its concern with topics that Thomas treats in In Sent. 1.2.1.3, in which he understands his account of divine eminence as a necessary complement to the impoverished account of divine naming found in Avicenna and
Maimonides. SCG 1.44-102 follows an order of argumentative dependence in which Thomas argues from one positive name to another (as from intelligence to will or from intelligence and will to life); here Thomas generalizes an approach for which there is precedent in both Aristotle and Avicenna.
Finally, by treating divine power in preparation for his discussion of creation, Thomas follows the example set by Peter the Lombard in his Sentences. None of these historical influences serves to determine the entire order.
274 See above, p. 110. CHAPTER FIVE: THE COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE
Dedicated to Reginald of Piperno, Thomas’s companion and secretary—and apparently written at his request—the Compendium theologiae presents a briefer account of the divine nature, found in CT 1.3-36.1 Compared to the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas has excised a number of divine names and characteristics. As we shall see, the order of the divine names is largely similar, but there are some important and surprising differences. As we shall see, some of the interpretive difficulties and questions that arise concerning the Compendium when it is compared to the Contra Gentiles will be resolved in our examination of the Summa theologiae in chapter six.
Thomas announces that the purpose of the Compendium theologiae is to support “a knowledge of the truth necessary for human salvation,” summarized and organized in connection with the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.2 The Compendium was intended to have three books, each one corresponding to one of these theological virtues, but only the first book and part of the second were ever completed. Torrell places the first book in the Roman period, from 1265-67, making it almost contemporary and perhaps even overlapping with the composition of the Prima pars of the Summa theologiae.3
1. THE ORDER OF ARGUMENTATIVE DEPENDENCE
Analysis of the order of argumentative dependence is easier in the case of the Compendium, since there are on average a smaller number of arguments in each chapter.
1 CT 1.1 [Leon. 42.83]: “Vt igitur tibi, fili carissime Raynalde, compendiosam doctrinam de christiana religione tradam, quam semper pre oculis possis habere, circa hec tria in presenti opere tota nostra uersatur intentio.” See Torrell, 164-67. 2 CT 1.1 [Leon. 42.83]: “Consistit enim humana salus in ueritatis cognitione, ne per diuersos errores intellectus obscuretur humanus. . . . Vnde Apostolus ad Corinthios in fide, spe et caritate, quasi in quibusdam salutis nostre compendiosis capitulis, totam presentis uite perfectionem consistere docuit. . . . [C]irca hec tria in presenti opere tota nostra uersatur intentio. Ac primum de fide, secundo de spe, tertio uero de caritate agemus; hoc enim et apostolicus ordo habet, et ratio recta requirit.” 3 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, 349-50. 253
254
A. ARGUMENTATION FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE
In CT 1.3 we find only one argument for God’s existence, which Thomas as “evident to reason.”4 The argument is a version of the argument from motion, the starting point of which is interesting: rather than arguing deductively (as he does in the first argument from motion in SCG
1.13 and in ST 1.2.3) for the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, instead the argument in CT 1.3 begins: “For we see all [things] which are moved to be moved by other [things].” To support this assertion by an inductive argument, Thomas supplies a range of examples in which something higher moves something lower: the elements are moved by the celestial bodies; among the elements the stronger moves the weaker; and even the lower celestial bodies are moved by the higher.5 Although not all of these claims are evident from sense experience, these would all be matters of frequently common opinion in accordance the cosmology received from Aristotle. The argument concludes that “there must exist a first mover that is supreme above all; and this we call God.”6 Thomas does not include in this formula that the supreme first mover is immobile; rather, he advances argumentation to establish this in the following chapter. The starting point and the conclusion of this argument respectively exhibit two tendencies that will continue throughout the Compendium:
Thomas employs simpler or more accessible arguments, and he spells out at greater length steps in argumentation through which he passes quickly in other texts.
4 CT 1.3 [Leon. 42.84]: “Circa essentie quidem diuine unitatem, primo quidem tenendum est Deum esse; quod ratione conspicuum est.” 5 CT 1.3 [Leon. 42.84]: “Videmus enim omnia que mouentur ab aliis moveri: inferiora quidem per superiora, sicut elementa per corpora celestia; et in elementis quod fortius est mouet id quod debilius est; et in corporibus etiam celestibus inferiora a superiori aguntur.” 6 CT 1.3 [Leon. 42.84]: “Oportet igitur primum mouens esse quod sit omnibus suppremum; et hoc dicimus Deum.” 255
B. ARGUMENTATIVE DEPENDENCE IN THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE NAMES
The series of divine names treated in CT 1.4-36 is somewhat abbreviated compared to the
Contra Gentiles. One important difference that we must note immediately is the absence of divine goodness from these early chapters of the Compendium. I have set aside any direct consideration below of Thomas’s discussion of divine goodness in CT 1.109-110, because Thomas himself places these chapters entirely outside the sequence of divine names treated in CT 1.4-36. We can note, however, that Thomas brings up divine goodness—which God possesses by His essence (CT 1.109) and without any possibility of loss (CT 1.110)—to serve as a contrast with the participated and defectible goodness of creatures.
Focusing on CT 1.4-36, we can divide the treatment of the divine names into three sections that correspond roughly to SCG 1.15-27, 1.28-43, and 1.44-102 (the main divisions of Book 1 of the
Contra Gentiles). As we shall see, however, the parallel sections in the Compendium differ in some important respects.
(i) The via remotionis in CT 1.4-17
In the first sequence, from CT 1.4-17, Thomas treats the following divine names or characteristics: immobility, eternity, necesse esse per se, sempiternity, the absence of succession, simplicity, identity with essence, identity of essence and esse, that God is not in a genus, that He is not a genus, that He is not a species predicated of many, unity (in the sense of uniqueness), incorporeality, that He is not the form of a body. This material largely corresponds in content to
SCG 1.15-27, but with some additions and rearrangement. The most obvious changes are the addition of unity (which was treated by SCG 1.42) and the later placement of incorporeality, after the sequence of divine characteristics associated with Avicenna’s Metaphysics (the identity of essence and esse and the following). 256
(1) Immutability and eternity in CT 1.4-8
Unlike in SCG 1.14, in the Compendium Thomas offers no explicit remarks about the principle from which his argumentation concerning the divine nature will proceed. Such a declaration might seem unnecessary, since Thomas offers only one argument for God’s existence.
Suggesting that divine immutability will be the principle of all his subsequent argumentation,
Thomas devotes CT 1.4 to establishing that God is immobile, through two arguments grounded in the identification of God as the first mover.7 Imitating the sequence set forth in SCG 1.15, Thomas proceeds to treat eternity in CT 1.5. However, it is possible that this brief chapter, which offers only one argument, was not going to remain after revisions, which Thomas never completed.8 The primary evidence for this—besides the cursory character of CT 1.5 itself—is that 1.7-8 are devoted to defending at greater length sempiternity and the absence of succession in God, the two primary components of the Boethian understanding of eternity.9
What is it that Thomas deems it necessary to treat in CT 1.6, before proceeding to a more complete defense of divine eternity? In this chapter, he offers two arguments for the claim that
God’s existence is necessary. By presenting this claim that God is necesse esse as preparatory for a discussion of divine eternity, Thomas follows the example that he had set in SCG 1.15, in which his
7 By including this chapter, Thomas indicates that there is a difference between concluding to a first unmoved mover and concluding to a first mover that is immobile. For Scott MacDonald’s concerns about this issue in the Contra Gentiles, see Scott MacDonald, “Aquinas’s Parasitic Cosmological Argument,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 119-55, esp. 136-42. Thomas’s argumentation in CT 1.4 appeals to the metaphysical notions of act and potency, in order to rule out the possibility that God is both mover of Himself and moved in the same respect. CG 1.4 [Leon. 42.84]: “A se ipso autem si mouetur, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut quod secundum idem sit mouens et motum, aut ita quod secundum aliquid sui sit mouens et secundum aliquid motum. Horum quidem primum esse non potest. Cum enim omne quod mouetur, in quantum huiusmodi, sit in potentia, quod autem mouet sit in actu, si secundum idem esset mouens et motum, oporteret quod secundum idem esset in potentia et actu: quod est impossibile.” 8 Cyril Vollert claims in a note in his English translation of the Compendium theologiae that this chapter was likely going to be deleted. See Aquinas’s Shorter Summa, tr. Cyril Vollert (Manchester: Sophia Institute Press, 1993), 11, n. 12. 9 See CT 1.8 [Leon. 42.85]: “Ex hiis autem duobus apparet quod proprie est eternus; illud enim proprie est eternum quod semper est et eius esse totum est simul, secundum quod Boetius dicit.” 257 de novo argumentation for the existence of necesse esse per se and the subsequent identification of God
(as first efficient cause) as this necesse esse per se served as a part of an argument for divine eternity. In analyzing SCG 1.15, I emphasized the importance of this link in argumentative dependence to the identification of God as the first efficient cause.10 Does such a link appear here in CT 1.6?
In the first argument of CT 1.6, Thomas grounds the claim that God’s existence is necessary in the claim that He is immutable in every way, asserting that whatever has possible existence and possible non-existence must be mutable. Since it is not possible for God not to exist, it is necessary for Him to exist.11 Here we find a link between the necessity of God’s existence and His immutability not presented in SCG 1.15. However, we should note that an element is missing:
Thomas asserts that God’s existence is necessary (necesse esse), but he does not conclude that His existence is necessary through itself (necesse esse per se). This is no small omission, since both the third way from ST 1.2.3 and the following paragraph in CT 1.6 note that “every necessary [being] either has a cause of its necessity in another, or it does not.”12 Thomas would include under the heading of those things that have necesse esse such things as angels and the heavenly bodies: it therefore cannot be the case that from God’s having necesse esse alone that Thomas can infer any exclusively divine characteristics.
In the second argument in CT 1.6, Thomas does ultimately conclude that God is necesse esse per se, but this argument does not appeal either to God’s being the first mover or to His being immutable. Rather, this argument is a parallel to the de novo argument for God’s existence in SCG
10 See above, p. 164 n. 15. 11 CT 1.6 [Leon. 42.84-85]: “Omne enim quod possibile est esse et non esse, est mutabile; sed Deus est omnino immutabilis, ut ostensum est: ergo Deum non est possibile esse et non esse. Omne autem quod est, et non est possibile ipsum non esse, necesse est ipsum esse, quia necesse esse et non possibile non esse idem significant: ergo Deum esse est necesse.” 12 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet.” Cf. CT 1.6 [42.85]: “Et quia aliqua necessaria sunt que sue necessitatis causam habent. . . .” 258
1.15 (and thus also to the third way in ST 1.2.3, although I will compare this text in CT 1.6 with the argument in SCG 1.15).13 To facilitate comparison with the de novo argument from SCG 1.15, I will distinguish three stages of this second argument in CT 1.6. (1) Thomas begins by arguing that whatever has possible existence or non-existence “requires something else which makes (faciat) it to exist: since considered in itself, it is equally related to both,” that is, to existence and non-existence.14
This is, despite its brevity, a close parallel to the beginning of the argument in SCG 1.15.15 (2)
Thomas then continues by noting that whatever causes something to exist is prior (causally) to that thing, but “there is not anything prior to God;” Thomas thus concludes that it is necessary for God to exist.16 This is rather different from the text in SCG 1.15, in that Thomas does not here appeal to the impossibility of an infinite regress in order to conclude that something necessary must exist; instead, he takes God’s existence and His status as prior to all for granted, in order to conclude that
God’s existence must be necessary.17 This is why I have not characterized this second argument in
CT 1.6 as a de novo argument for God’s existence. (3) Thomas then notes that “since there are some necessary [things] which have a cause of their necessity, which must be prior to them, God who is the first of all does not have a cause of His necessity; whence it is necessary for God to exist through
Himself.”18 This third section is also somewhat different from the argument in SCG 1.15, which
13 For comparison between the de novo argument in SCG 1.15 and the third way, see above, p. 164 n. 15, and below, pp. 294-95. 14 CT 1.6 [Leon. 42.85]: “Item, omne quod est possibile esse et non esse, indiget aliquo alio quod faciat ipsum esse, quia quantum est in se se habet ad utrumque.” 15 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Videmus in mundo quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est possibile esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa.” 16 CT 1.6 [Leon. 42.85]: “Quod autem facit aliquid esse, est prius eo; omni igitur eo quod est possibile esse et non esse, est aliquid prius. Deo autem non est aliquid prius; ergo non est possibile ipsum esse et non esse, sed necesse est eum esse.” 17 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Sed in causis non est procedere in infinitum, ut supra probatum est per rationem Aristotelis. Ergo oportet ponere aliquid quod sit necesse esse.” 18 CT 1.6 [Leon. 42.85]: “Et quia aliqua necessaria sunt que sue necessitatis causam habent, quam oportet eis esse priorem, Deus qui est omnium primum non habet causam sue necessitatis; unde Deum esse per se ipsum est necesse.” 259 again appeals to the impossibility of infinite regress in order to conclude that there must exist something necessary through itself, which is then identified as God.19 Here in CT 1.6, Thomas again takes God’s existence and priority for granted, in order to conclude that God’s necessity cannot be caused by another, from which it follows that He is necessary through Himself.
In this second argument in CT 1.6, we have identified God as necesse esse per se, through an argument appealing to God’s status as primum omnium. What is the force of this claim that God is primum omnium, and how is this claim justified? It seems clear that Thomas identifies God as the first efficent cause of being in this argument. Thomas’s earlier argumentation in CT 1.3 established that
God is the “first mover that is supreme over all,” but it is not immediately apparent that this is equivalent to being the first efficient cause of being—after all, Aristotle’s supreme first mover in
Metaphysics 12 is usually taken to be a final cause.20 Either we must say that Thomas relies implicitly here on the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality, or we must say that he sees a way of arguing from God’s being the first mover to His being the first efficient cause of being—a move that he seemed to avoid making in the detailed argumentation of the Contra Gentiles. The former possibility, that Thomas takes for granted something he has not explicitly defended in the
Compendium, would perhaps be consistent with the less rigorous character of this work, in which, for example, we have seen Thomas conclude to the existence of a first mover without any mention of
19 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde; vel non, sed est per seipsum necessarium. Non est autem procedere in infinitum in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis aliunde. Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per seipsum necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum sit causa prima, ut ostensum est. Est igitur Deus aeternus: cum omne necessarium per se sit aeternum.” We should recall that this de novo argument in SCG 1.15 is ultimately an argument for divine eternity. 20 For a recent case against the identification of Aristotle’s first unmoved mover as the final cause of motion, see Enrico Berti, “Da chi é amato il Motore immobile? Su Aristotele, Metaph. XII 6-7,” Méthexis 10 (1997): 59-82 and Berti, “Ancora sulla causalità del motore immobile,” Méthexis 20 (2007): 7-28. For a rebuttal, see Kevin Flannery, “On Professor Berti’s Interpretation of the Causality of the First Unmoved Mover,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 10.3 (2012): 833-61. 260 the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.21 The latter possibility, that Thomas now sees a greater fecundity in the identification of God as first mover than he did in the Contra Gentiles, is a possibility to which we will return several times in analysis of the subsequent chapters of the Compendium.22
As for CT 1.7-8, we can summarize their arguments as follows. The former chapter offers four arguments for the claim that God is sempiternal, appealing to the following premises:
1. It is necessary for God to exist. 2. God is immutable in every way. 3. There cannot be a cause of being for God, because He is the first being. 4. Existence does not belong to God from some extrinsic cause, because that cause would be prior to God.
Thomas introduces explicitly the notion that God is primum ens, a claim that can especially be associated with the identification of God as the first efficient cause of being (ens)23 or of existence
(esse).24 This connection is confirmed in this argument from CT 1.7, which argues that “everything that did not always exist, if it began to exist, requires something which is for it the cause of existing; for nothing can reduce itself from potency to act or from non-existing into existing. But nothing can be a cause of existing for God, since He is the first being.”25 God cannot have a causa essendi, because
21 To be fair, there is a principle similar to omne quod movetur ab alio movetur—or rather to the principle from which Thomas proves omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in ST 1.2.3—advanced in the first argument for God’s immobility in CT 1.4 [Leon. 42.84]: “Cum enim omne quod mouetur, in quantum huiusmodi, sit in potentia, quod autem mouet sit in actu.” Cf. ST ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu.” My point is only that Thomas does not explicitly cite such principles in his presentation of the argument from motion itself. 22 See below, pp. 289-93, for treatment of the first way in the Summa theologiae. I also touch on the question of whether the first way should be given an existential interpretation, as for example Joseph Owens and John Knasas interpret it, on p. 297 n. 31. 23 See De ver. 21.4 [Leon. 22*3/1.601]: “Hoc enim Deum omnes de Deo loquentes intelligunt quod est omnium principium effectivum cum oporteat omnia entia ab uno primo ente effluere.” 24 De ente 4 [Leon. 43.377]: “Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima que Deus est.” See above, pp. 163-64. 25 CT 1.7 [Leon. 42.85]: “Item, omne quod non semper fuit, si esse incipiat, indiget aliquo quod sit ei causa essendi; nichil enim se ipsum educit de potentia in actum uel de non esse in esse. Deo autem nulla potest esse causa essendi, cum sit primum ens; causa enim prior est causato. Necesse est igitur Deum semper fuisse.” 261
He is primum ens. Again, we have to wonder whether Thomas has introduced a claim that can be ultimately grounded in the identification of God as first mover.
CT 1.8’s treatment of the claim that there is not any succession in God is straightforward, justifying this assertion through two arguments grounded in God’s immutability. Succession only belongs to those things “in some way subject to motion,” and so the immutable God cannot have any succession in His being.26 Thomas concludes at the end of the chapter that God is eternal in the proper sense: He exists always and “His entire existence is simultaneous.”27
(2) Divine simplicity and unity in CT 1.9-17
The contents of CT 1.9-17 largely parallel SCG 1.18-27. In these chapters, Thomas treats divine simplicity, the identity of God with His essence, the identity of His essence with His esse, that
He is not in a genus, that He is not a genus, that He is not a species predicated of many, that He is one, that He is not a body, and that He is not the form of a body or a power in a body.28
As in SCG 1.18—but in contrast to ST 1.3.7—Thomas introduces the notion of divine simplicity by deductive arguments prior to his consideration of the particular modes of composition to be removed from God.29 He advances two arguments, one grounded in the identification of God as the immobile first mover, the other in the claim that He is the first being. The former argument asserts that “in every composition there must be two [items] which are related to each other as potency to act.” But since everything is mobile insofar as it is in potency, there can be no
26 CT 1.8 [Leon. 42.85]: “Successio enim non inuenitur nisi in illis que sunt aliqualiter motui subiecta; prius enim et posterius in motu causant temporis successionem. Deus autem nullo modo est motui subiectus, ut ostensum est; non igitur est in eo aliqua successio, sed eius esse est totum simul.” 27 CT 1.8 [Leon. 42.85]: “Ex hiis autem duobus apparet quod proprie est eternus; illud enim proprie est eternum quod semper est et eius esse totum est simul.” 28 CT 1.9-17 [Leon. 42.85-88]. 29 See above, p. 176-77. 262 combination of potency and act in the first mover, which is immobile in every way (omnino immobile).
Thomas concludes that “it is therefore impossibile for the first mover to be composite.”30
The second argument asserts that “there must be something prior to every composite, for components are naturally prior to the composite,” concluding from this that “therefore it is impossible for that which is the first of all beings to be composite.”31 Because all components are causally prior to what is composed of them, it follows that whatever is composite must be causally posterior to something. But nothing can be prior to the primum ens—that is, God—and so God cannot be composite.32 Thomas then offers some further support for this argument by appealing to the order found among things (according to the Aristotelian cosmology), in which the elements are prior to and simpler than the mixed bodies, and the heavenly bodies are prior to and simpler than the elements. He concludes then that “the first of all beings must be simple in every way.”33
Comparing these two arguments, we should note that the latter ultimately concludes with the unqualified assertion that God as first being is completely simple (omnino simplex), whereas the former argument, grounded in the identification of God as the completely immobile (CT 1.4) first mover (CT 1.3), concludes that He is not composite, without the adverb omnino. This is no small difference, since a created, finite separate substance (that is, an angel) is for Thomas said to be
30 CT 1.9 [Leon. 42.85]: “Inde etiam apparet quod oportet primum mouens simplex esse. Nam in omni compositione oportet esse duo que ad inuicem se habeant sicut potentia ad actum; in primo autem mouente, si est omnino immobile, impossibile est esse potentiam cum actu, nam unumquodque ex hoc quod est in potentia mobile est: impossibile est igitur primum mouens compositum esse.” 31 CT 1.9 [Leon. 42.85]: “Adhuc, omni composito necesse est esse aliquid prius, nam componentia naturaliter sunt priora composito; illud igitur quod est omnium entium primum, impossibile est esse compositum.” 32 Cf. SCG 1.18 [Leon. Man. 17]: “Omne compositum posterius est suis componentibus. Primum ergo ens, quod Deus est, ex nullis compositum est.” 33 CT 1.9 [Leon. 42.85]: “Videmus etiam in ordine eorum que sunt, supra composita simplicia esse: nam elementa naturaliter sunt priora corporibus mixtis; inter ipsa etiam elementa primum est ignis, quod est subtilissimum; omnibus autem elementis prius est celeste corpus, quod in maiori simplicitate constitutum est, cum ab omni contrarietate sit purum. Relinquitur igitur quod primum entium oportet omnino simplex esse.” 263 simple or not composite, albeit in a qualified way (secundum quid) rather than in every way (omnino).34
This raises a question about the force of the first argument: Can it establish the unqualified simplicity from which one could further conclude that God’s essence is identical with His esse?35 If it can, it again does so by virtue of some greater fecundity that Thomas sees in God’s complete immobility than he did within the Contra Gentiles.
As for the remainder of CT 1.9-17, there are few surprises in the order of these chapters, except for the addition of unity (1.15) and the late placement of incorporeality (1.16). Thomas also adds chapters clarifying that God is not a genus or a species predicated of many, supplementing the claim that God is not in a genus, which was also treated by SCG 1.25. Finally, he also delays the treatment of the claim that there are no accidents in God until CT 1.23, which I will attempt to explain in the next section.
Thomas offers two arguments in CT 1.10 in order to establish that God is identical with His essence. The first argument begins by explaining that a thing’s essence is that which is signified by its definition. Thomas then notes that the essence of the thing defined will be identical with it, unless they are distinct by something accidental (nisi per accidens). This would be the case insofar as there is something else that “happens”(accidit) to the thing, something “that is outside its definition; as white,
[which is] beyond that which is rational and mortal animal, happens to man. Whence rational and
34 See In De heb. 2 [Leon. 50.273]: “Est tamen considerandum quod, cum simplex dicatur aliquid ex eo quod caret compositione, nichil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid simplex, in quantum caret aliqua compositione, quod tamen non est omnino simplex; unde et ignis et aqua dicuntur simplicia corpora, in quantum carent compositione que est ex contrariis que inuenitur in mixtis, quorum tamen unumquodque est compositum, tum ex partibus quantitatiuis, tum etiam ex forma et materia. Si ergo inueniantur alique forme non in materia, unaqueque earum est quidem simplex quantum ad hoc quod caret materia, et per consequens quantitate que est dispositio materie.” 35 Perhaps it can, as the argument would seem to depend upon the exclusion of all potency from God. To be precise, however, what is excluded is that the first immobile mover should be in potency to the acquisition of some new act. In at least one text, Thomas also excludes this from an angel, contending that an angel does not possess any potency that is not completed by act. See In Sent. 4.5.1.3 qc. 3 ad 7 [Moos 4.211]: “Ad septimum dicendum quod quamvis nulla creatura sit in qua non sit aliquid de potentia, ad minus secundum quod ejus natura se habet ad esse quod recipit a Deo sicut potentia ad actum; tamen aliqua creatura est in qua nihil de potentia remanet quae non sit completa per actum, sicut est Angelus.” 264 mortal animal is the same as man, but it is not the same as a white man insofar as he is white.”
Thomas concludes from this that for anything in which there are not found two items, one of which is per se and the other per accidens, “it is necessary that its essence be absolutely identical with it.”36
Thomas thus links together (a) composition of a thing with anything outside of or beyond its essence with (b) composition of supposit and essence, indicating that the absence of the former implies the absence of the latter.37 He continues his argument, observing that because of God’s simplicity, it cannot be the case that there should be found in Him two items such that one of them is per se and the other per accidens. As a consequence, God must be identical with His essence.38 This argument thus appeals to the simplicity established in CT 1.9 in order to exclude supposit-essence composition.
The briefer second argument in CT 1.10 relies on the claim that supposit-essence composition is an instance of potency-act composition, because “an essence is formally related to
36 CT 1.10 [Leon. 42.85-86]: “Essentia enim uniuscuiusque rei est illud quod significat diffinitio eius. Hoc autem est idem cum re cuius est diffinitio, nisi per accidens; in quantum scilicet diffinito accidit aliquid quod est preter diffinitionem ipsius: sicut homini accidit album preter id quod est animal rationale et mortale: unde animal rationale et mortale est idem homini, sed non idem homini albo in quantum est album. In quocumque igitur non est inuenire duo quorum unum est per se et aliud per accidens, oportet quod essentia eius sit omnino idem cum eo.” 37 This text is thus consistent with the principle advanced in Quodl. 2.2 according to which supposit and essence differ in angels. In Quodl. 2.2.2, however, Thomas offers the inverse of the principle from CT 1.10: if something is able to have something “happen” to it that is beyond its nature, then supposit and nature differ in it. See Quodl. 2.2.2 [Leon. 25/2.217]: “Secundum hoc igitur, cuicunque potest aliquid accidere quod non sit de ratione sue nature, in eo differt res et quod quid est, siue suppositum et natura: nam in significatione nature includitur solum id quod est de ratione speciei, suppositum autem non solum habet hec que ad rationem speciei pertinent, set etiam alia que ei accidunt; et ideo suppositum significatur ut totum, natura autem siue quiditas ut pars formalis.” In this text, Thomas goes on to explain that both esse and certain other things, by which he presumably means various accidents, “happen” to an angel’s supposit, beyond the nature of its species. [Leon. 25/2.217]: “In angelo autem non est omnino idem, quia aliquid accidit ei preter id quod est de ratione sue speciei, quia et ipsum esse angeli est preter eius essenciam seu naturam et alia quedam ei accidunt, que omnia pertinent ad suppositum, non autem ad naturam.” For discussion of whether Quodl. 2.2.2 represents a change in Thomas’s views about the relationship between supposit and essence in angels, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 243 ff. 38 CT 1.10 [Leon. 42.86]: “In Deo autem, cum sit simplex, ut ostensum est, non est inuenire duo quorum unum sit per se et aliud per accidens; oportet igitur quod essentia eius sit omnino idem quod ipse.” 265 them of which it is the essence, as humanity [is related] to a man.” But there is no combination of potency and act found in God, and so He must be identical with His essence.39
In CT 1.11, Thomas then argues for the identity of essence and esse within God. His argumentation parallels that found in CT 1.10, in that the first argument appeals to God’s simplicity, while the second appeals to the claim that God is pure act. The first argument explains that if a thing’s essence is other than its esse, then there is in it a composition of “that whereby it is” and of
“what it is.” Such composition must be excluded from God, and so “in Him His essence is not other than His existence.”40
The second argument in CT 1.11 begins by noting that God is pure act without any combination of potency. It follows from this that God’s essence must be “an ultimate act, for every act that is short of ultimate is in potency to an ultimate act.” In speaking of an “ultimate act,”
Thomas means to indicate that a given act may still be in potency to some further degree of actualization, as for example habitual knowledge (first act) is both an actualization of the intellect as well as a principle of potency for actual knowledge (second act).41 By an ultimate act, Thomas thus means an act that is not itself a principle of potency for some further degree of actualization. God’s essence must be an ultimate act, in this sense, because God’s essence—with which He is identical—
39 CT 1.10 [Leon. 42.86]: “Item, in quibuscumque essentia non est omnino idem cum re cuius est essentia, est inuenire aliquid per modum potentie et aliquid per modum actus; nam essentia formaliter se habet ad rem cuius est essentia, sicut humanitas ad hominem. In Deo autem non est inuenire potentiam et actum, sed est actus purus; est igitur ipse sua essentia.” 40 CT 1.11 [Leon. 42.86]: “Vlterius autem necesse est quod Dei essentia non sit aliud quam esse ipsius. In quocumque enim aliud est essentia et aliud esse eius, oportet quod illud alio sit et alio aliquid sit; nam per esse suum de quolibet dicitur quod est, per essentiam uero suam de quolibet dicitur quid sit: unde et diffinitio significans essentiam demonstrat quid est res. In Deo autem non est aliud quo est et aliud quo aliquid est, cum non sit in eo compositio, ut ostensum est; non est igitur in eo aliud eius essentia et suum esse.” 41 For the source of the distinction between first act and second act—with the use of habitual knowledge and actual knowledge as an example—see De anima 2.1 412a22-27 [McKeon 555]. For a confirmation that a second act is an ultimate act—because an operation is an ultimate act—see ST 1-2.3.2 [Leon. 6.27]: “Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a Philosopho nominatur.” 266 is pure act without any combination of potency.42 Thomas then observes that existence itself (ipsum esse) is an ultimate act. In support of this claim, he offers an argument appealing to the relationship between motion and act. He reasons that there must be an ultimate act towards which every motion tends, because motion is a passage from potency to act. Furthermore, since every natural motion tends to what is naturally desired by the subject of the motion, “there must be an ultimate act which all [things] desire: but this is existence.” Esse is what is desired by all things, and as the term of desire it must be an ultimate act.43 Thomas concludes: “It is necessary therefore that the divine essence, which is pure and ultimate act, be existence itself.”44
That Thomas appeals to God’s absolute simplicity in both CT 1.10 and 1.11 makes clear the importance of the question raised above, concerning whether or not unqualified simplicity can be ultimately grounded in the identification of God as the absolutely immobile first mover. Along these same lines, we have seen in both CT 1.10 and 1.11 that Thomas offers arguments appealing to the claim that God is pure act, in the latter case explicitly noting that this claim was established earlier in
42 Cf. SCG 1.92 [Leon. Man. 84]: “In Deo autem est actus perfectissimus. Actus igitur in eo non est sicut habitus, ut scientia: sed sicut considerare, quod est actus ultimus et perfectus.” 43 Cf. In Sent. 4.49.1.2 qc. 1 [Parma 7/2.1187]: “Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod bonum quod omnia concupiscunt, est esse, ut patet per Boetium in lib. de Consolat.; unde ultimum desideratum ab omnibus est esse perfectum, secundum quod est possibile in natura illa.” Cf. ST 1-2.2.5 obj. 3 [Leon. 6.21]: “Sed ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus.” If nothing else, this argument for the status of esse as an ultimate act is interesting as an alternative to what would seem to be a more typical approach for Thomas, one invoking the notion of participation: ipsum esse must be an ultimate act, because ipsum esse does not participate in anything else. For a text making this connection between esse as ultimate act and participation, see QD De anima 6 ad 2 [Leon. 24/1.51]: “Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis est ab omnibus; ipsum autem nichil participat. Vnde si sit aliquid quod sit ipsum esse subsistens, sicut de Deo dicimus, nihil participare dicimus.” The language of participation is somewhat absent from CT 1.3-36. The notion of participation is invoked in a substantive way only in the second argument of CT 1.13 for the claim that God is not a genus. 44 CT 1.11 [Leon. 42.86]: “Item, ostensum est quod Deus est actus purus absque alicuius potentialitatis permixtione; oportet igitur quod eius essentia sit ultimus actus, nam omnis actus qui est citra ultimum est in potentia ad ultimum actum. Vltimus autem actus est ipsum esse. Cum enim omnis motus sit exitus de potentia in actum, oportet illud esse ultimum actum in quem tendit omnis motus; et cum motus naturalis in hoc tendat quod est naturaliter desideratum, oportet hoc esse ultimum actum quod omnia desiderant: hoc autem est esse. Oportet igitur quod essentia divina, que est actus purus et ultimus sit ipsum esse.” 267 his argumentation.45 Where in the order of argumentation has this strong claim been established?
Thus far in his previous arguments, Thomas has only mentioned the absence of potency in God in
CT 1.9, and there he grounds this claim in the immobility of God. Although it was ambiguous within CT 1.9 whether or not Thomas was defending absolute simplicity on the basis of immobility—and thus ultimately on the basis of the argument from motion—here in CT 1.10-11 it seems clear that Thomas does ground the exclusion of all potency from God in the identification of
God as the first immobile mover. This represents a significant departure from the apparent reservation exhibited in this matter in SCG 1.16 and 2.25.46 I will later argue, however, that the first way in ST 1.2.3 does establish that God is pure act.47
CT 1.12-14 (that God is not in a genus, that He is not a genus predicated of many, that He is not a species predicated of many) unfold without any major surprises. In these chapters, all of
Thomas’s arguments are grounded in the identity of God with His essence, the identity of His essence and esse, or in His being pure act. One reason why Thomas might deem it necessary to spell out the latter two claims is because of the intended audience of the Compendium, who are perhaps less familiar with metaphysics.
The two claims spelled out in CT 1.13-14 also serve as preparation for CT 1.15’s discussion of divine unity (which concerns unity in the sense of uniqueness). The first argument for God’s unity appeals to these claims: if there were many gods called God univocally, “it is necessary that they share either in a genus or in a species; but it was shown above that God cannot be a genus or a
45 CT 1.10 [Leon. 42.86]: “In Deo autem non est inuenire potentiam et actum, sed est actus purus; est igitur ipse sua essentia.” CT 1.11 [Leon. 42.86]: “Item, ostensum est quod Deus est actus purus absque alicuius potentialitas permixtione.” Cf. CT 1.12 [Leon. 42.86]: “Ostensum est autem in Deo esse purum actum absque permixtione potentie.” 46 See above, pp. 167-174. 47 See below, pp. 289-93. 268 species containing many under Himself: it is impossible therefore that there be many gods.”48 The second argument for divine unity in CT 1.15 depends, in turn, on the identity of God with His essence, appealing to the principle that “it is impossible for that by which a common essence is individuated to be shared [in common] by many [things].” It follows from this that any essence that is individuated by itself cannot be shared in common by more than one thing. But the divine essence is self-individuated, because God is His very essence; and so God must be one only.49 Finally, the third argument appeals to a distinction between two ways in which a form can be multiplied: through differences (as, for example, color is differentiated into its various species) and through reception by various subjects (as whiteness is multiplied in many white things).50 Both of these ways of mutiplication can be excluded with respect to the divine essence, because God is ipsum esse subsistens, which is not received in any subject and cannot receive the addition of any difference. It thus follows that there cannot be more than one God.51
Appearing later in the order of the divine names compared to its placement in SCG 1.20, incorporeality is treated by two very brief arguments in CT 1.16. The first argument appeals to the
48 CT 1.15 [Leon. 42.87]: “Si autem uniuoce, oportet quod conueniant uel in genere uel in specie; ostensum est autem quod Deus neque potest esse genus, neque species plura sub se continens: impossibile est igitur esse plures deos.” 49 CT 1.15 [Leon. 42.87]: “Item, illud quo essentia communis indiuiduatur, impossibile est pluribus conuenire: unde licet possint esse plures homines, impossibile tamen est hunc hominem esse nisi unum tantum. Si igitur essentia per se ipsam indiuiduetur et non per aliquid aliud, impossibile est quod pluribus conueniat; sed essentia diuina per se ipsam indiuiduatur, quia in Deo non est aliud essentia et quod est, cum ostensum sit quod Deus sit sua essentia: impossibile est ergo quod sit Deus nisi unus tantum.” 50 Cf. De ente 4, in which Thomas identifies three ways in which a form can be multiplied: (1) by the addition of differences, (2) by reception in diverse matters, (3) by being absolute (and unreceived) while another instance of the form is received in another. De ente 4 [Leon. 43.376-77]: “Impossibile est ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentie, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species; uel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diuersis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diuersis indiuiduis; uel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione.” 51 CT 1.15 [Leon. 42.87]: “Item, duplex est modus quo aliqua forma potest multiplicari: unus per differentias, sicut forma generalis, ut color in diuersas species coloris; alius per subiecta, sicut albedo. Omnis ergo forma que non potest multiplicari per differentias, si non sit forma in subiecto existens, impossibile est quod multiplicetur; sicut albedo si subsisteret sine substantia, non esset nisi una tantum. Essentia autem diuina est ipsum esse, cuius non est accipere differentias, ut ostensum est; cum igitur ipsum esse diuinum sit quasi forma per se subsistens, eo quod Deus est suum esse, impossibile est quod essentia diuina sit nisi una tantum. Impossibile est igitur esse plures deos.” 269 absolute simplicity established in CT 1.9,52 while the latter appeals to divine immobility: no body is a mover without undergoing motion—a claim that Thomas notes is apparent by induction—and so the unmoved mover cannot be a body.53 Comparing CT 1.16 to SCG 1.20, we can note the removal of the physical arguments for divine incorporeality based on the eternity of motion, which had received lengthy attention in the earlier work.
Thomas follows up his treatment of incorporeality with the claim that God is neither the form of a body nor a power in a body in CT 1.17. Here he combines claims that were treated in SCG
1.20 (that God is not a power in a body) and SCG 1.27 (that God is not the form of a body). As we shall see in a moment, Thomas transitions easily from his conclusions in CT 1.17 to the discussion of divine infinity in the following two chapters. Thomas’s arguments in CT 1.17 appeal to God’s status as absolutely immobile and as the first mover, thus grounding these claims in the argument from motion.
(3) Conclusions concerning CT 1.4-17
To summarize, CT 1.4-17 is for the most part a condensed presentation of the material from
SCG 1.15-27, with the addition of divine unity and the later placement of incorporeality. Thomas has greatly reduced the number of arguments in each chapter, beginning with the elimination of all the arguments for God’s existence other than a version of the argument from motion. Although it is ambiguous at first whether some of his stronger conclusions (that God is necesse esse per se and omnino simplex) can be grounded in the argument from motion—Thomas even introduces the claims that
God is primum ens and the first efficient cause of being to support his arguments for these
52 CT 1.16 [Leon. 42.87]: “Patet autem ulterius quod impossibile est ipsum Deum esse corpus. Nam in omni corpore compositio aliqua inuenitur, omne enim corpus est partes habens; id igitur quod est omnino simplex, corpus esse non potest.” 53 CT 1.16 [Leon. 42.87]: “Item, nullum corpus inuenitur mouere nisi per hoc quod ipsum mouetur, ut per omnia inducenti apparet; si ergo primum mouens est omnino immobile, impossibile est ipsum esse corpus.” 270 conclusions—in the end it seems clear that Thomas does reason from the identification of God as the first mover to the conclusion that God, as pure act, is identical with His esse, with all of the consequences that follow from this identity. This represents an apparent development as compared to the Contra Gentiles.
In analyzing the order of SCG 1.15-27, I explained that Thomas weaves together the orders of argumentation found in Aristotle and Avicenna into an integrated order in the spirit of the
Dionysian via remotionis, proceeding from the denial of the lower to the denial of the higher in a way that progressively distinguishes God from more and more things. Furthermore, Thomas proceeds in
SCG 1.20-27 by first denying various modes of intrinsic composition within God, followed by the denial of any extrinsic composition of God with creatures. By the later placement of incorporeality in CT 1.16, Thomas has disrupted both the Dionysian order and the order according to this distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic composition. Why would he do this? One possible explanation for the placement of incorporeality in CT 1.16 is just its close proximity to the notions discussed in CT 1.17 (that God is neither the form of a body nor a power in a body). Perhaps this grouping is presumed to be more accessible to the intended audience of the Compendium, for whom this progression of topics would seem more natural. A similar explanation can be given for the placement of unity in CT 1.15, in that Thomas’s first argument depends upon the conclusions of the previous two chapters.54 In this way, there might not seem to be any deeper rationale for the order of the divine names in CT 1.4-17 other than (a) the grouping of closely related topics and (b) the requirements of the order of argumentative dependence, in light of the reduced number of arguments Thomas gives.
54 Whereas in SCG 1.42, Thomas is able to argue for divine unity from God’s being the highest good and perfect in every way, these arguments are not available in CT 1.15. 271
(ii) Establishing the eminence of divine perfection in CT 1.18-27
Corresponding for the most part to the contents of SCG 1.28-43—except for the absence of a discussion of divine goodness—Thomas addresses divine infinity, perfection, and issues associated with divine naming in CT 1.18-27. The most striking change in the order is that whereas Thomas concludes with divine infinity in SCG 1.43, here he begins with it in CT 1.18.
(1) Divine infinity and infinite power in CT 1.18-19
Thomas advances two arguments for the conclusion that God is infinite. The first appeals to the premise that “no act is found to be limited except by a potency that receives it,” as forms are limited by matter. Thomas gives the limitation of form by matter as an example of one way in which a form is limited by a receiving principle; he does not mention the reception of esse by essence.
Thomas continues: “If therefore the first mover, who is neither the form of some body nor a power in a body, is act without any admixture of potency, it is necessary for Him to be infinite.”55 Here
Thomas appeals to the conclusion of the previous chapter—that God is neither the form of a body nor a power in a body—not exactly to justify the claim that God is pure act, but rather to point out some of the ways in which God is not an act received in and limited by another. By doing this, he leaves aside the case of an angel, which is neither the form of a body nor a power in a body, without being infinite pure act, because its esse is received and limited by its essence.56 In the parallel argument in SCG 1.43, Thomas does explicitly note that God’s esse does not inhere in any form or nature.57 In any event, by pointing out that God is absolutely incorporeal, Thomas also prepares the
55 CT 1.18 [Leon. 42.88]: “Nullus enim actus inuenitur finiri nisi per potentiam que est eius receptiua: inuenimus enim formas limitari secundum potentiam materie. Si igitur primum mouens est actus absque potentie permixtione, qui non est forma alicuius corporis neque uirtus in corpore, necessarium est ipsum infinitum esse.” 56 The Leonine edition notes that in one manuscript, we read “quia non est forma alicuius corporis neque uirtus in corpore” rather than “qui non est. . . .” See CT 1.18 [Leon. 42.88], note on line 11. If quia were the correct reading, this would be a probable argument at best. 57 We saw above that Thomas advances the principle that unreceived act is unlimited in the second argument in SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, 272 way for his explanation of how it is that God is said to be infinite in a different way from how corporeal things are (or would be) infinite.
It seems most likely that we should class the second argument in CT 1.18 as probable rather than demonstrative. This argument appeals to the order among things in the Aristotelian cosmology, according to which higher things are greater both in quantity and in simplicity, as the heavenly bodies exceed sublunary things in both respects. Thomas then argues: “It is necessary therefore that that which is first among all beings—and that than which another cannot be prior—exist in a mode of infinite quantity.”58 Now, Thomas clarifies at the beginning of CT 1.18 that infinity is predicated of God negatively (denying that He is limited in any way) rather than privatively (as a quantity is called infinite, as lacking the sort of termination that it should have).59 In this second argument in
CT 1.18, however, Thomas transitions rather easily from the gradation in quantity found among bodies to the conclusion that God must be infinite. It is for this reason I think the argument must be classed as probable rather than demonstrative.
Thomas observes in SCG 1.43 that God is called infinite both respect to the infinity of His essence and with respect to His infinite power, while emphasizing the former; he also notes that each of these kinds of infinity implies the other.60 Here in the Compendium, Thomas devotes a
est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum.” For treatment and for references to secondary literature, see above, p. 199, including n. 125. 58 CT 1.18 [Leon. 42.88]: “Hoc etiam ipse ordo qui in rebus inuenitur demonstrat: nam quanto aliqua in entibus sunt sublimiora, tanto suo modo maiora inueniuntur. Inter elementa enim que sunt superiora maiora in quantitate inueniuntur, sicut et in simplicitate: quod eorum generatio demonstrat, cum in multiplicata proportione ignis ex aere generetur, aer ex aqua, aqua autem ex terra; corpus autem celeste manifeste apparet totam quantitatem elementorum excedere. Oportet igitur id quod inter omnia entia primum est, et eo non potest esse aliud prius, infinite quantitatis suo modo existere.” 59 CT 1.18 [Leon. 42.88]: “Hinc etiam considerari potest ipsum esse infinitum, non quidem priuatiue secundum quod infinitum est passio quantitatis, prout scilicet infinitum dicitur quod est natum habere finem ratione sui generis, sed non habet; sed negatiue, prout infinitum dicitur quod nullo modo finitur.” 60 See above, p. 197-200. 273 separate chapter to the infinity of the divine power, with his first argument in CT 1.19 reasoning from the infinity of the divine essence.61 His second argument appeals to the hierarchy of beings in terms of act and potency: just as prime matter has an infinite receptive power, so God as pure act must possess infinite active power.62
(2) Divine perfection in CT 1.20-23
Thomas introduces his discussion of God’s perfection in CT 1.20, a chapter that begins by explaining how it is that God’s infinity does not imply any imperfection (as infinity does imply imperfection in material things, because termination is something that quantity should possess), but rather “pertains to His supreme perfection.” Employing the distinction between privative and negative infinity drawn in CT 1.18, Thomas explains that God is not infinite as quantity in matter would be—through privation—but rather He is infinite as pure form or act.63 This functions as an initial argument for the divine perfection, and Thomas proceeds to offer a second argument for the conclusion that God is “more perfect than all,” appealing to His status as “naturally prior to all,
61 CT 1.19 [Leon. 42.88]: “Hinc etiam apparet Deum infinite uirtutis esse. Virtus enim consequitur essentiam rei, nam unumquodque secundum modum quo est agere potest; si igitur Deus secundum essentiam suam infinitus est, oportet quod eius uirtus sit infinita.” 62 CT 1.19 [Leon. 42.88]: “Hoc etiam apparet, si quis rerum ordinem diligenter inspiciat. Nam unumquodque secundum quod est in potentia, secundum hoc habet uirtutem receptiuam uel passiuam; secundum uero quod actu est, habet uirtutem actiuam. Quod igitur est in potentia tantum, scilicet materia prima, habet uirtutem infinitam ad recipiendum, nichil de uirtute actiua participans; et supra ipsam quanto aliquid formalius est, tanto illud habundat in virtute agendi: propter quod ignis inter omnia elementa est maxime actiuum. Deus igitur, qui est actus purus, nichil potentialitatis permixtum habens, in infinitum habundat in uirtute actiua super alia.” 63 CT 1.20 [Leon. 42.88]: “Quamuis autem infinitum quod in quantitatibus inuenitur imperfectum sit, tamen quod Deus infinitus dicitur summam perfectionem in ipso demonstrat. Infinitum enim quod est in quantitatibus ad materiam pertinet, prout fine priuatur; imperfectio autem accidit rei secundum quod materia sub priuatione inuenitur, perfectio autem omnis ex forma est. Cum igitur Deus ex hoc infinitus sit quia tantum forma uel actus, nullam materie uel potentialitatis cuiusque permixtionem habens, sua infinitas ad summam perfectionem ipsius pertinet.” There is here again an implicit usage of the principle that unreceived act is unlimited. 274 moving all.”64 By advancing an argument for divine perfection from God’s status as the first mover,
Thomas has adopted a different approach from that found in SCG 1.28.65
I noted in analyzing SCG 1.28 that Thomas concludes both that God is most perfect and that He is universally perfect, and here in CT 1.20 Thomas first argues that God is more perfect than all before he argues for divine universal perfection in the following chapter.66 Thomas presents two arguments for the universal character of God’s perfection in CT 1.21, that “all perfections of things preexist superabundantly in Him.”67 The first argument appeals to God’s status as the first mover
(and as therefore what ultimately moves things to their respective perfections), while the second appeals to the infinity of the divine essence. Like the second argument in the previous chapter, the first argument here in CT 1.21 represents a development compared to SCG 1.28, in that Thomas explicitly grounds God’s universal perfection in His status as the first mover. The argument depends upon the principle that “everything that moves something to perfection previously possesses in itself the perfection that it confers upon the other, as a teacher previously possesses in himself the teaching that he hands on to others.”68 Thomas draws no distinction here between univocal and equivocal causes, an important precision he will offer in the parallel text from ST 1.4.2.69
The second argument in CT 1.21 reasons from divine infinity to universal perfection.
Thomas argues that whatever has some perfection but lacks another is necessarily “limited under
64 CT 1.20 [Leon. 42.88-89]: “Hoc etiam ex rebus aliis considerari potest. Nam licet in uno et eodem quod de imperfecto ad perfectum producitur, prius sit tempore aliquid imperfectum quam perfectum, sicut prius puer quam uir; tamen oportet quod omne imperfectum a perfect tradat originem; non enim oritur puer nisi ex uiro, nec semen nisi ex animali uel planta. Illud igitur quod est naturaliter omnibus prius, omnia mouens, oportet omnibus perfectius esse.” 65 See above, p. 191-94. Thomas even removed an argument for God’s perfection from His status as first mover from SCG 1.28. 66 This parallels what we will find in ST 1.4.1 and 1.4.2. 67 CT 1.21 [Leon. 42.89]: “Necesse est omnes perfectiones rerum in ipso preexistere superhabundanter.” 68 CT 1.21 [Leon. 42.89]: “Nam omne quod mouet aliquid ad perfectionem, prehabet in se perfectionem quam alii confert; sicut doctor prehabet in se doctrinam quam aliis tradit.” 69 ST 1.4.2 [Leon. 4.51-52]. 275 some genus or species,” and hence cannot have an infinite essence. “If therefore the divine essence is infinite, it is impossible that it should possess the perfection of only some genus or species and lack others; rather it is necessary that the perfections of every genus and species should exist in it.”70
The double negation that characterizes some of the argumentation for universal perfection in SCG
1.28 is also found here; as Thomas puts it here, it is impossible that God should lack the perfections of any genus. (There is not, however, a direct argument from God’s lack of imperfection to his universal perfection, as there is in SCG 1.28.)71 This argument in CT 1.21 has no parallel in SCG 1.28 or in ST 1.4.2, but it does have a parallel—reasoning in the other direction—in SCG 1.43’s treatment of divine infinity.72 Whereas the discussion of infinity in SCG 1.43 subordinates the notion of divine infinity to perfection (because divine infinity is precisely infinity of perfection), here in CT 1.21
Thomas appeals to divine infinity as a principle for establishing universal perfection. This argument makes clear that neither in the Contra Gentiles nor in the Compendium is the reason for the order of these two divine names simply a matter of priority in argumentative dependence.
In CT 1.22-23, Thomas offers two clarifications concerning God’s universal perfection: all the perfections said to belong to God are in reality one in Him, and there are no accidents in Him.
By the former point, Thomas spells out something for the reader to a greater degree than he does either in the Contra Gentiles or in the Summa theologiae.73 With the latter, Thomas addresses a point that
70 CT 1.21 [Leon. 42.89]: “Item, omne quod habet aliquam perfectionem si alia perfectio ei desit, est limitatum sub aliquo genere uel specie: nam per formam, que est perfectio rei, quelibet res in genere et specie collocatur. Quod autem est sub genere et specie constitutum non potest esse infinite essentie: nam oportet quod ultima differentia per quam in specie ponitur, terminet eius essentiam; unde et ratio speciem notificans diffinitio uel finis dicitur. Si igitur diuina essentia infinita est, impossibile est quod alicuius tantum generis uel speciei perfectionem habeat, et aliis priuetur; sed oportet quod omnium generum et specierum perfectiones in ipso existant.” 71 For treatment of the role of double negation in the argumentation of SCG 1.28, see above, pp. 191-93. 72 SCG 1.43 [Leon. Man. 41]: “Omne namque quod secundum suam naturam finitum est, ad generis alicuius rationem determinatur. Deus autem non est in aliquo genere, sed eius perfectio omnium generum perfectiones continet, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus.” 73 Thomas makes brief mention of this notion—the identity of all the divine attributes with the divine essence—in his discussion of the identity between God and His essence in ST 1.3.3. 276 he discusses earlier in the two major works, in SCG 1.23 and ST 1.3.6. Perhaps he delays the discussion of this point until CT 1.23 on the assumption that the intended audience of the
Compendium might need this clarification at this moment, after having been told about God’s universal perfection, according to which He possesses perfections that are accidents in creatures, such as wisdom. The placement of SCG 1.23 makes sense both insofar as accident-substance composition is a mode of composition opposed to divine simplicity and insofar as SCG 1.23-25 are united by their consideration of the five predicables. The later placement of CT 1.23 leaves behind both of these rationales, perhaps from a pedagogical concern.
(3) Divine naming in CT 1.24-27
Compared to SCG 1.30-36, Thomas offers a somewhat abbreviated account of divine naming in CT 1.24-27. Thomas explains that the plurality of divine names does not contradict the divine simplicity; that the divine names are not synonyms; that through the divine names we never define God (because none of the conceptions signified by these names grasp the divine essence perfectly); and that we attribute perfections to God according to analogy.74 The only addition here compared to the parallel section from the Contra Gentiles is the claim about the impossibility of defining God, which found an earlier placement in SCG 1.25. Again, I would suggest that Thomas
74 CT 1.24-27 [Leon. 42.90-91]. The account of the analogy of the divine names in CT 1.27 is very brief compared to that found in SCG 1.34. Thomas claims that the divine names are predicated according to analogy, “that is, according to a proportion to one [thing].” Thomas does not here distinguish between the analogy of many to one and that of one to another, as he does in SCG 1.34. His account is consistent with the analogy of one to another, however, as he goes on in CT 1.27 to express the same thesis found in SCG 1.34, that the divine names are predicated in a primary way (per prius) of creatures with respect to the imposition of the names—because these names are derived from the perfections of creatures—but they are predicated in a primary way of God with respect to the reality signified (res significata) of the names. This indicates that the “proportion to one” at issue in CT 1.27 is the proportion of a given creaturely perfection to the divine perfection—the analogy of one to another. CT 1.27 [Leon. 42.90-91]: “Dicuntur igitur secundum analogiam, id est secundum proportionem ad unum. Ex eo enim quod alias res comparamus ad Deum sicut ad suam primam originem, huiusmodi nomina que significant perfectiones aliarum rerum Deo attribuimis. Ex quo patet quod, licet quantum ad nominis impositionem huiusmodi nomina per prius de creaturis dicantur, eo quod ex creaturis intellectus nomina imponens ascendit in Deum, tamen secundum rem significatam per nomen per prius dicuntur de Deo, a quo perfectiones descendunt in alias res.” Cf. SCG 1.34. For discussion of analogy in SCG 1.34, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 560-62. 277 discusses this point here (rather than grouped with the predicables) from a pedagogical concern: if I am capable of defining creaturely perfections such as power, and if I attribute these perfections to
God and identify them with His essence, it might seem that I am capable of defining God.75
(4) Conclusions concerning CT 1.18-27
CT 1.18-27 is a condensed version of the material from SCG 1.28-43, but with the discussions of divine goodness and unity removed and with the order of infinity and perfection inverted. Just as in CT 1.4-17, we find that Thomas grounds his major conclusions concerning God in the conclusion of the argument from motion, departing from his approach in the Contra Gentiles.
(iii) Divine operation in CT 1.28-34
Thomas’s treatment of divine operation in CT 1.28-34 is quite abbreviated, compared to the
Contra Gentiles. He offers consideration of the following claims: God is intelligent; His knowledge is actual rather than potential or habitual; He understands through His essence; He is identical with
His act of understanding; He has will; His will is identical with His intellect and His essence; His will is identical with His act of willing. As in the Contra Gentiles, Thomas follows up his attribution of intelligence and will to God with the clarification that God is identical with His intellect, with His will, and with their respective acts. However, there is no lengthy discussion, as in the Contra Gentiles, of how God knows creatures or of the supreme perfection of the divine knowledge and will.
Thomas also removes discussions of divine life, virtue, and beatitude. I will offer just brief consideration of CT 1.28 (intelligence) and CT 1.32 (will).
75 CT 1.26 [Leon. 42.90]: “Cum intellectus noster secundum nullam harum conceptionum quas nomina dicta de Deo significant, diuinam essentiam perfecte capiat, impossibile est quod per diffinitiones horum nominum diffiniatur id quod est in Deo: sicut quod diffinitio potentie sit diffinitio potentie divine, et similiter in aliis.” 278
(1) Divine intelligence in CT 1.28
Thomas advances three arguments for God’s intelligence in CT 1.28. The first appeals to divine universal perfection and to the greatness of intelligence as a perfection.76 This is an instance of what I called above a pure perfection argument or argument from universal perfection. The second argument depends upon God’s status as pure act and His consequent absolute freedom from matter, as “freedom from matter is the cause of being intellectual.”77 This is a version of the argument from God’s immateriality to His intelligence, which we characterized above as an argument in the via remotionis.78 Finally, the third argument appeals to God’s status as the first mover, suggesting that to be a first mover—which employs other things as instrumental movers—seems to be proper to intellect, “whence man by his intellect uses as instruments animals, plants, and inanimate things.”79
76 CT 1.28 [Leon. 42.91]: “Vlterius autem ostendendum est quod Deus est intelligens. Ostensum est enim quod in ipso preexistunt omnes perfectiones quorumlibet entium superhabundanter; inter omnes autem perfectiones entium ipsum intelligere precellere uidetur, cum res intellectuales sint omnibus aliis potiores: oportet igitur Deum esse intelligentem.” Cf. SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “Deo nulla perfectio deest quae in aliquo genere entium inveniatur, ut supra ostensum est: nec ex hoc aliqua compositio in eo consequitur, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, habens in se omnium perfectionem. Deus igitur est intelligens.” 77 CT 1.28 [Leon. 42.91]: “Item, ostensum est supra quod Deus est actus purus absque potentialitatis permixtione; materia autem est ens in potentia: oportet igitur Deum esse omnino immunem a materia. Immunitas autem a materia est causa intellectualitatis, cuius signum est quod forme materiales efficiuntur intelligibiles actu per hoc quod abstrahuntur a materia et a materialibus conditionibus: est igitur Deus intelligens.” 78 See above, p. 36. 79 CT 1.28 [Leon. 42.91]: “Item, ostensum est Deum esse primum mouens; hoc autem uidetur esse proprium intellectus, nam intellectus omnibus aliis uidetur uti quasi instrumentis ad motum: unde et homo suo intellectu utitur quasi instrumentis et animalibus et plantis et rebus inanimatis. Oportet igitur Deum, qui est primum mouens, esse intelligentem.” Although one might question whether this could be intendend as a demonstrative rather than a probable argument, Thomas does use the rather forceful oportet Deum esse intelligentem in the conclusion. Cf. SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43]: “In nullo ordine moventium invenitur quod movens per intellectum sit instrumentum eius quod movet absque intellectu, sed magis e converso. Omnia autem moventia quae sunt in mundo, comparantur ad primum movens, quod Deus est, sicut instrumenta ad agens principale. Cum igitur in mundo inveniantur multa moventia per intellectum, impossibile est quod primum movens moveat absque intellectu. Necesse est igitur Deum esse intelligentem.” 279
(2) Divine will in CT 1.32
Curiously, the first argument in CT 1.32 for divine volition presupposes that God is the perfect good, something not explicitly established earlier in the Compendium. (As mentioned above,
Thomas does briefly treat divine goodness later, in CT 1.109-110.) This mention of goodness is crucial to the argument as Thomas formulates it: God understands Himself as the perfect good, “but the understood good is loved by necessity.” Love is, however, an act of will, and so God must possess will.80
For our purposes, it is most important that both of Thomas’s arguments for the divine will in CT 1.32 depend upon the prior conclusion that He is intelligent. This places these arguments properly within the via eminentiae, insofar as the reasoning is from one positive divine attribute to another. We will find the same order of reasoning in ST 1.19.1.
2. THE ROLE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ORDER
We can briefly discuss the role of the principles of order discussed in chapter two of this dissertation, in addition to another rationale that I will suggest determines many of the peculiar features of the order of the divine names in the Compendium. First, there seems to be no special role for the transcendentals, since Thomas explicitly treats neither divine goodness nor divine truth in CT
1.4-36, and so we can leave this possible rationale behind.
80 CT 1.32 [Leon. 42.92]: “Vlterius autem manifestum est quod necesse est Deum esse uolentem. Ipse enim se ipsum intelligit qui est bonum perfectum, ut ex dictis patet; bonum autem intellectum ex necessitate diligitur, hoc autem fit per uoluntatem: necesse est igitur Deum uolentem esse.” Cf. SCG 1.72 [Leon. Man. 69]: “Ex hoc enim quod Deus est intelligens, sequitur quod sit volens. Cum enim bonum intellectum sit obiectum proprium voluntatis, oportet quod bonum intellectum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volitum. Intellectum autem dicitur ad intelligentem. Necesse est igitur quod intelligens bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volens. Deus autem intelligit bonum: cum enim sit perfecte intelligens, ut ex supra dictis patet, intelligit ens simul cum ratione boni. Est igitur volens.” 280
A. THE ORDER OF SCIENCE
The orders of the divine names in the Compendium theologiae and in the Contra Gentiles are similar enough that we are able to divide the order in the Compendium into sections (1.4-17, 1.18-27,
1.28-34) that parallel the major divisions in the Contra Gentiles (1.15-27, 1.28-43, 1.44-102). In virtue of these parallels, we can quickly treat the role of the order of science. We saw above in treating of the Contra Gentiles that Thomas’s order of procedure is consistent with but not comprehensively determined by his understanding of the order of science when it comes to the treatment of separate substance: at best, human science can determine concerning God whether He exists, what He is not, and certain things according to likenesses found in creatures. This order of science corresponds to successive consideration of God’s existence, nature, and operation. The condensed order of the divine names in the Compendium remains consistent with this order.
B. THE ORDER OF THE TRIPLEX VIA
We can also say that, like the Contra Gentiles, the order of the divine names in the Compendium proceeds according to the order causality, negation, eminence. God’s existence is established through an argument in the via causalitatis; there follow a series of successive negations that eventually serve to establish the eminence of the divine perfection; and finally there are arguments in the via eminentiae, reasoning from one positive divine attribute to another. It is perhaps even more apparent in the Compendium that the eminence of divine perfection is established through negation, given that Thomas argues for God’s perfection from His infinity.
Just as in the Contra Gentiles, we cannot say that Thomas pursues the via remotionis in such a restricted fashion that he only offers negative names or conclusions. Although he has removed the treatment of divine goodness as a positive name, still in CT 1.11 he establishes that God is ipsum esse and proceeds to employ this divine name as a positively attributed middle term in subsequent 281 argumentation.81 This being said, because of the removal of the treatment of divine goodness, the divine names in the Compendium come closer to a neat division between negative and positive names, with the transition to the discussion of divine intelligence in CT 1.28 representing the turning point.
Unlike the Contra Gentiles, the section devoted to the work of the via remotionis no longer seems to be governed by the Dionysian order of negative theology: simply by the later placement of incorporeality, Thomas leaves behind the Dionysian order of proceeding from the lower to the higher in what one removes from the divine. There is also no mention of the goal of knowing God
“as distinct from all things,” the purpose underlying the order of Dionysian negative theology.82
C. THEOLOGICAL PURPOSE AS A PRINCIPLE OF ORDER
There is another principle that informs the order of the divine names in the Compendium: this is the specific theological purpose of the first book, which is, as stated above, to summarize “the truth necessary for salvation” with respect to the theological virtue of faith. We find remarks in CT
1.2 and 1.35-36 that suggest how this theological purpose informs the content and order of
Thomas’s treatment of the divine nature.
First, in CT 1.2, Thomas indicates that the knowledge of faith fundamentally concerns two things: these are “the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ.”83 Concerning the former— the divinity of the Trinity—Thomas says that three things must be known: “first, the unity of the
[divine] essence; second, the Trinity of persons; third, the effects of the divinity.”84 The treatment of
81 CT 1.11 [Leon. 42.86]: “Oportet igitur quod essentia diuina, que est actus purus et ultimus sit ipsum esse.” CT 1.12 [Leon. 42.86]: “Hinc autem apparet quod Deus non est in aliquo genere sicut species. Nam differentia addita generi constituit speciem, igitur cuiuslibet speciei essentia habet aliquid additum supra genus; sed ipsum esse, quod est essentia Dei, nichil in se continet quod sit alteri additum: Deus igitur non est species alicuius generis.” 82 Cf. SCG 1.14, treated above on pp. 224-28. 83 CT 1.2 [Leon. 42.83]: “Circa hec ergo duo tota fidei cognitio uersatur, scilicet circa diuinitatem Trinitatis et circa humanitatem Christi.” 84 CT 1.2 [Leon. 42.84]: “Circa diuinitatem uero tria cognosci oportet: primo quidem essentie unitatem, secundo personarum trinitatem, tertio diuinitatis effectus.” 282
God’s existence and nature from CT 1.3-34 is Thomas’s presentation of the unity of the divine essence, in preparation for his consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity. Looking ahead to his treatment of the Trinity beginning in CT 1.37, we find that Thomas depends upon the conclusions drawn in his treatment of the divine nature, especially his conclusions concerning the intelligence and will of God and the identity of these operations with God Himself: from the start, Thomas presents the second person of the Trinity as the Word that is begotten by God’s self- understanding.85 This suggests to us one possible reason why Thomas doesn’t give as exhaustive of a treatment of the divine names as he does in the two summae: here in the Compendium, he is content to treat the divine characteristics necessary for the exposition he intends to give concerning the Trinity, leaving aside many things.
Second, in CT 1.35, Thomas indicates that all of the divine names and characteristics he treated CT 1.3-34 “are all comprehended in one brief article of the Creed, when we profess to believe ‘in God, one [and] omnipotent.’” Thomas’s choice in word order here seems deliberate: he says that we profess to believe in Deum unum omnipotentem, whereas the Nicene Creed begins Credo in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem.86 He then goes on to explain how the divine names he has listed are summed up by this article of the Creed:
For, since this name ‘God’ (Deus) would seem to be taken from the Greek name theos, which is itself taken from theaste—which means to see or to consider—by the very name of God it is manifested that He is intelligent and, as a consequence, volitional. But by this that we call Him one, a plurality of gods and all composition are excluded: for [nothing] is unqualifiedly one except that which is simple. But by this that we call [Him] omnipotent, it is shown that
85 CT 1.37 [Leon. 42.93]: “Accipiendum est autem ex hiis que supra dicta sunt quod Deus se ipsum intelligit et diligit; item quod intelligere in ipso et uelle non sit aliud quam eius esse. Quia ergo Deus se ipsum intelligit, omne autem intellectum in intelligente est, oportet Deum in se ipso esse sicut intellectum in intelligente. Intellectum autem prout est in intelligente, est uerbum quoddam intellectus; hoc enim exteriori uerbo significamus quod interius intellectu comprehendimus: sunt enim secundum Philosophum, uoces signa intellectuum. Oportet igitur in Deo ponere uerbum ipsius.” Cf. SCG 1.53. 86 CT 1.35 [Leon. 42.92]: “Ex hiis autem omnibus que supra dicta sunt, colligere possumus quod Deus est unus, simplex, perfectus, infinitus, intelligens et uolens. Que quidem omnia in Symbolo fidei breui articulo comprehenduntur, cum nos profitemur credere ‘in Deum unum omnipotentem.’” 283
He is of an infinite power from which nothing can be subtracted; in which it is also included that He is infinite and perfect, for the power of a thing follows upon the perfection of its essence.87
Without going as far as saying that this text discloses a complete rationale for the order of the divine names—after all, Thomas treats divine intelligence and will last—we can say the following. First, this text suggests why Thomas pares down the list of divine names he treats in the Compendium: in a work devoted to a brief exposition of the faith, he will explain only what is necessary for an understanding of the Creed’s opening phrase (and, as we noted above, for exposition of the doctrine of the
Trinity).
Furthermore, this text also helps to explain some of the organization of CT 1.4-34. After establishing God’s existence, Thomas first treats God’s simplicity and unity—corresponding to unum—and then His infinity, perfection, and power—corresponding to omnipotentem. Significantly,
Thomas deems it necessary to treat these three characteristics, rather than explaining and defending omnipotence in a narrow theological sense.88 A straightfoward division of the divine names in the
Compendium is thus suggested by this text: (1) names associated with unity, (2) names associated with omnipotence (in this broader sense), and (3) names concerning divine operation.
87 CT 1.35 [Leon. 42.92-93]: “Cum enim hoc nomen ‘Deus’ a nomine greco quod dicitur ‘theos’ dictum videatur, quod quidem a ‘theaste’ dicitur, quod est uidere uel considerare, in ipso nomine Dei manifestatur quod sit intelligens, et per consequens uolens. In hoc autem quod dicimus eum unum, excluditur deorum pluralitas et omnis compositio: non enim est simpliciter unum nisi quod est simplex. Per hoc autem quod dicimus omnipotentem, ostenditur quod sit infinite uirtutis cui nichil subtrahi possit; in quo etiam includitur quod sit infinitus et perfectus, nam uirtus rei perfectionem essentie eius consequitur.” This text makes explicit the distinction between one in the sense of uniqueness and in the sense of transcendental unity. For the etymology of theos, compare John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1.9 [Buytaert 49]: “Secundum vero nomen: theos (id est Deus), quod dicitur . . . a theaste (id est considerare universa: nulla enim eum latent, immo omnium est considerator.” 88 By this, I mean that Thomas does not interpret the use of omnipotentem in the Creed to mean merely that Christians profess belief in the capacity of God to do whatever is logically possible. In fact, he doesn’t even mention this aspect of omnipotence in CT 1.3-34. Cf. Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum, a popular work devoted to explaining the Creed, in which Thomas similarly refrains from addressing the meaning of Patrem omnipotentem in terms of the technical definition of omnipotence. In fact, he hardly mentions divine power at all, but he does comment on the nobility and perfection of God. 284
In light of this division we can understand the differences between the order in the Contra
Gentiles and that in the Compendium. As noted above, by the later placement of incorporeality,
Thomas renders his treatment of the intrinsic modes of composition incomplete, and he disrupts the
Dionysian order that had governed the parallel section of the Contra Gentiles. Of the intrinsic modes of composition denied of God, however, incorporeality (which negates the composition of quantitative parts) is the least relevant for establishing that there is only one God, since bodies, which are individuated by matter, can share in the same species. Similarly, the later placement of the claims that God has no accidents and that God cannot be defined can be explained in the same way: these claims are less relevant for establishing divine unity (in the sense of uniqueness). The treatment of simplicity from CT 1.9-14 is thus ordered primarily towards the establishment of divine unity
(uniqueness) in CT 1.15. This is supported by the order of argumentative dependence in these chapters: Thomas establishes the identity of God with His essence and the identity of His essence and existence; in turn both of these theses are invoked to establish that God is neither a genus nor a species; and from these conclusions Thomas establishes divine unity. Why treat incorporeality at all, if it is not necessary for establishing the unity of God? I would suggest that incorporeality and the claim that God is neither the form of a body nor a power in a body serve as the bridge from unity to infinity—as noted above, Thomas appeals to both of these claims in his first argument for divine infinity.
But if this text from CT 1.35 indicates something of the rationale for these differences, why doesn’t Thomas treat divine intelligence and will first—corresponding to the order in which he comments on in Deum unum omnipotentem in CT 1.35? Although Thomas modifies the order of the divine names presented in the Contra Gentiles in light of the specific theological purpose of the
Compendium, he does not ignore the requirements of the order of argumentative dependence. We can 285 look to CT 1.36, in which Thomas explains that all of the things he has said about God up to this point in the Compendium “were also considered subtly by many Gentile philosophers.”89 We should not interpret CT 1.35 to mean that Thomas’s purpose in CT 1.3-34 is only to explain the first phrase of the Creed: he also establishes these claims through philosophical reasoning. But then how does one establish that God has intelligence and will? Although Thomas does give one argument for
God’s intelligence following from His being the first mover, his other two arguments depend upon
God’s simplicity and perfection—if Thomas wants to give these arguments without violating the order of argumentative dependence, then he must treat divine operation after God’s unity and perfection.
CT 1.35 raises one other question: Why doesn’t Thomas mention God’s immutability, necessity, or eternity in his list of divine names? With respect to God’s immutability, we can say that it does play a necessary role in the order of argumentative dependence, since Thomas appeals to
God’s immutability in order to establish that He is pure act, free of all potency. But he never appeals to God’s eternity to establish anything else about God, and he only appeals to His necessity in arguing for His eternity. It was easy to understand the early placement of eternity in SCG 1.15. It follows from divine immobility, but even more importantly, Thomas (exhibiting dependence upon
Aristotle) appeals to God’s eternity in order to establish the absence of potency in Him. In the
Compendium, eternity no longer plays any role as a principle of further conclusions. This leaves its early placement somewhat difficult to explain, except that Thomas is still reproducing something of
89 CT 1.36 [Leon. 42.93]: “Hec quidem que in superioribus de Deo sunt tradita, a pluribus etiam gentilium philosophis subtiliter considerata sunt.” Thomas then qualifies this, by noting that many of them also erred in thinking about God; and those who did ascertain the truth did so—and only scarcely—after long, difficult work. Yet still, here Thomas affirms that the truths concerning the unity of the divine essence are within reach of philosophical argument of the very sort he has offered in CT 1.3-34 286 the Aristotelian order of argumentation. As we shall see, Thomas treats eternity later in the Summa theologiae.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Two features stand out especially when the order of the divine names in the Compendium is compared to the Contra Gentiles. First, unlike the Contra Gentiles, Thomas grounds many of his strongest conclusions concerning the divine—especially that God is pure act, with all of the implications of this claim—in the conclusion of the argument from motion. This would suggest that
Thomas, at this later point in his career, sees a greater fecundity in the identification of God as primum movens than he did in writing and revising the Contra Gentiles. This apparent development is all the more surprising, in context, given the less rigorous version of the argument from motion in CT
1.3. Has Thomas’s opinion concerning the fruitfulness of the argument from motion developed, or should we wonder if many of the arguments in the Compendium can only be probable arguments? I will argue in the next chapter that it is clear that Thomas understands the argument from motion in
ST 1.2.3 to establish that God is pure act.
We can also note that, although Thomas grounds his most important conclusions in the argument from motion, his presentation of the argument from motion (as well as his argumentation for God’s incorporeality and infinity) involves a significant departure from the Contra Gentiles with respect to the role played by the eternity of motion. Thomas never mentions the eternity of motion, even hypothetically, as an element in any of his arguments. If Thomas does see a greater fecundity in the argument from motion, this is despite the fact that he discards the very principle that gives most of Aristotle’s parallel arguments their force.
Second, we can highlight the four most prominent differences between SCG 1 and CT 1.3-
34: (a) the removal of many divine names and characteristics, (b) the earlier placement of unity, (c) 287 the later placement of incorporeality, and (d) the inversion of infinity and perfection. These differences would all seem to be related, in light of the texts from CT 1.2 and 1.35-36 treated above.
Thomas treats only those divine names necessary for the specific theological purpose of the first book of the Compendium, which is to present in a condensed fashion the truths of faith necessary for salvation. With regard to the differences in the order, Thomas places his discussion of divine unity as the culmination of his exclusion of various modes of intrinsic composition; the discussion of incorporeality then serves as a bridge to the discussion of infinity; and Thomas treats infinity before perfection because his primary emphasis in this section is on the infinity of the divine essence and power, which bear an obvious connection to the first phrase of the Creed.
In light of the foregoing, we can say that Thomas modifies but does not radically restructure the order of the divine names in the Compendium. The changes he makes would seem to be related to the specific theological purpose of the work, but he maintains an order of argumentative dependence consistent both with the order of science and with the order causality, negation, eminence.
CHAPTER SIX: THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE
Begun during his time in Rome (1265-68), the Summa theologiae contains Thomas’s most mature discussion of God’s existence and nature, in ST 1.2-26. Thomas announces in the prologue to the Summa theologiae that his purpose is to teach “those things that pertain to the Christian religion in a way . . . that befits the instruction of beginners.”1 Thomas indicates that several features of other theological presentations have presented impediments to learning by the less advanced: these include the multiplication of unhelpful questions and arguments, frequent repetitions, and—most importantly for our purposes—a lack of attention to the requirements of the order of instruction
(ordo disciplinae). Consequently, we should expect Thomas to present the divine names in a carefully planned order reflective of pedagogical concerns.
1. THE ORDER OF ARGUMENTATIVE DEPENDENCE
The treatment of the divine nature in the Summa theologiae strikes something of a middle course between the Contra Gentiles and the Compendium. It is very close to SCG 1.15-2.22 in its content. The only additions are the treatments of omnipresence and of divine providence.2 On the other hand, there are a smaller number of arguments in each article, compared to the chapters of the
Contra Gentiles; this conforms to Thomas’s claim that he will avoid unhelpful multiplication of arguments.
1 ST prologus [Leon. 4.5]: “Propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium.” 2 Omnipresence received only a passing mention in SCG 1.26. Thomas also treats the claim that God is everywhere later in SCG 3.68. Divine providence is treated at great length in SCG 3.64-163. 288
289
A. ARGUMENTATION FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE IN ST 1.2.3
The conclusions of the five ways serve as the principles from which nearly everything else said about God in ST 1.3-26 is derived.3 The five ways conclude to the existence of: 1) a first mover, which is moved by nothing;4 2) a first efficient cause;5 3) something which is necessary through itself, not having a cause of necessity in another, but which is the cause of necessity for other things;6 4) something which is for all beings the cause of existence, of goodness, and of every perfection;7 5) an intelligence by which all natural things are ordered to their ends.8 Just as in the
Contra Gentiles, Thomas also offers arguments in ST 1.3-26 in which he appeals to God’s status as the first being.9 In order to compare the orders of argumentative dependence in the two summae, we should begin by briefly comparing the five ways with parallel texts in the Contra Gentiles, particularly with respect to the conclusions drawn in these parallel arguments.
(i) The first way: parallels in both SCG 1.13 and 1.16
The obvious parallel to the first way of ST 1.2.3 is the first version of the argument from motion in SCG 1.13. Just like the first way, this version of the argument from motion employs as a premise the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. Thomas offers three arguments in support of
3 The reason for the qualification “nearly” is that one of the arguments in ST 1.11.3 for divine unity is a de novo argument appealing to the universe’s unity of order. For a range of treatments of the five ways, see Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs of God’s Existence (New York: Schocken Books, 1969); Van Steenberghen, Le problème de l’existence de Dieu dans les écrits de s. Thomas d’Aquin, 165-244; Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 444-485; Brian J. Shanley, “Commentary,” in Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on the Divine Nature, tr. Brian J. Shanley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 192-99. 4 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur: et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.” 5 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam: quam omnes Deum nominant.” 6 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis: quod omnes dicunt Deum.” 7 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.32]: “Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum.” 8 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.32]: “Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem: et hoc dicimus Deum.” 9 See above, pp. 163-64. 290 this premise in SCG 1.13, the third argument of which parallels the supporting argumentation offered in the first way in ST 1.2.3, in that both arguments appeal to the notions of act and potency.
I will suggest, however, that there is a critical difference between these parallel arguments for omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, with respect to the scope of motion at issue.
The argument for omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in ST 1.2.3 concerns motion defined broadly as the reduction of potency to act, which would include operation (such as acts of the human intellect or will).10 As David Twetten points out, the reply to the second objection in ST 1.2.3 suggests this broad meaning, by holding that acts of the will “must be reduced to some first principle, immobile and necessary through itself, as was shown [above].”11 Although the first way of
ST 1.2.3 involves this broad metaphysical meaning of motion, I would note that the third argument for omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in SCG 1.13 defines motion as the act of what exists in potency as such, which is the definition of motion from Physics 3.1.12 Thomas distinguishes throughout his
10 David Twetten interprets the scope of the term motion both in the first argument from motion in SCG 1.13—at least with respect to the third argument for omne quod movetur ab alio movetur—and in the first way of ST 1.2.3 in the same way, according to what he calls a metaphysical interpretation: in both cases, motion is a metaphysical term that includes any reduction of potency to act whatsoever. David B. Twetten, “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas: How the Proof from Motion Concludes to God,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 70 (1996): 259-78. This interpretation emphasizes the wide meaning of motus—which would include operations such as those of intellect and will—in the first way. I will differ from Twetten, however, insofar as he thinks that this wider meaning of motus is also at work in the Contra Gentiles. Wippel observes that the third argument for omne quod movetur in SCG 1.13, which appeals to the notions of act and potency, might include within its scope a broader meaning of the term motion than the other two arguments. He does not speak decisively on the issue, in contrast to Twetten. Wippel does favorably compare Twetten’s position on the first way in ST 1.2.3 to his own reading. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 420-21, 457 n. 40. 11 ST 1.2.3 ad 2 [Leon. 4.32]: “Similiter etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducer in aliquam altiorem causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas humana: quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.” Confirming this, later in the Summa theologiae Thomas includes the operations of the human will under the following principle: “everything which is sometimes an agent in act and sometimes [an agent] in potency must be moved by some mover,” and he argues in this text that God must be the first mover of the will. ST 1.9.4 [Leon. 6.78]: “Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente.” See Twetten, “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas: How the Proof from Motion Concludes to God,” 268 ff. Cf. Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 449-53. 12 SCG 1.13 [Leon. Man. 11]: “Tertio probat sic. Nihil idem est simul actu et potentia respectu eiusdem. Sed omne quod movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia: quia motus est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi.” 291 career between the motion that is the act of what exists in potency (which he calls the act of the imperfect) and operation (the act of the perfect), which includes sensation, understanding, and willing.13 By calling physical motion the act of the imperfect, Thomas means that motion in this strict sense is a progressive actualization that is not yet complete, as for example a body presently moving from one place to another is not yet at the terminus of its motion. By contrast, operation does not involve this sort of progressive actualization: operation is an act that is immediately complete.14 Operation does not fall under motion defined as the act of what exists in potency as such, as the subject of actual operation is not still in potency to the complete act. The scope of the term motion—and of the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur—must therefore be narrower in
SCG 1.13 than in ST 1.2.3.15
13 In Sent. 1.4.1.1 ad 1 [Mand. 1.132]: “Differt autem operatio a motu, secundum Philosophum, quia operatio est actus perfecti, sed motus est actus imperfecti, quia existentis in potentia.” Cf. In Sent. 2.11.2.1 [Mand. 2.282]: “Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, operatio et motus differunt: operatio enim est actus perfecti, ut lucidi lucere, et intellectus in actu, intelligere; sed motus est actus imperfecti tendentis in perfectionem.” ST 1.18.1 [Leon. 4.225]: “Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicitur moveri.” See also ST 1.14.2 ad 2. Thomas also employs the distinction between perfect act and imperfect act in his explanation of Aristotle’s definition of motion in In Phys. 3.2 #285 [Marietti 145]: “Sic igitur actus imperfectus habet rationem motus, et secundum quod comparatur ad ulteriorem actum ut potentia, et secundum quod comparatur ad aliquid imperfectius ut actus. Unde neque est potentia existentis in potentia, neque est actus existentis in actu, sed est actus existentis in potentia: ut per id quod dicitur actus, designetur ordo eius ad anteriorem potentiam, et per id quod dicitur in potentia existentis, designetur ordo eius ad ulteriorem actum.” The distinction between motion as the act of the imperfect and operation/actuality (energeia) as the act of the perfect is found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 9.6 1048b18-34. 14 For example, there is no progressive actualization involved in the operation that is seeing the color red. One might see red for one second or for ten seconds, but the activity is complete throughout this duration. One’s understanding of this distinction between motion in the strict sense and operation is assisted by the recognition that the former necessarily involves the succession of temporal parts. In Sent. 4.17.1.5 qc. 3 ad 1 [Moos 4.853-54]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motus dupliciter dicitur, ut patet in 3 De anima. Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti, qui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet quod sit successivus, quia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad perfectionem suae speciei. . . . Alius motus est actus perfecti, qui magis operatio dicitur, qui non expectat aliquid in futurum ad complementum suae speciei, sicut sentire; et talis motus non est successivus, sed subitus; et si contingat quod talis motus sit in tempore, hoc erit per accidens, quia mensuratur in quolibet instanti illius temporis in quo dicitur esse.” 15 Within SCG 1.13, Thomas follows up the third argument for omne quod movetur ab alio movetur with the qualification that for Plato, the term motion includes operations such as understanding, but these are excluded from motion as Aristotle defines it. SCG 1.13 [Leon. Man. 11]: “Sciendum autem quod Plato, qui posuit omne movens moveri, communius accepit nomen motus quam Aristoteles. Aristoteles enim proprie accepit motum, secundum quod est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi: qualiter non est nisi divisibilium et corporum, ut probatur in VI 292
This difference between the scope of the term motion in SCG 1.13 and in ST 1.2.3 would explain why Thomas might allow a greater fecundity in the argument from motion in the later text.16
In both the first version of the argument from motion in SCG 1.13 and in the first way of ST 1.2.3, the force of the conclusion that there exists some immobile mover depends upon the scope of the term motion and of the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.17 If omne quod movetur is only defended with respect to the physical motion that is “the act of the imperfect,” then the argument for the existence of an unmoved mover based on this premise would only immediately conclude to the existence of something that does not undergo physical motion. This leaves open the possibility that this mover is itself moved with respect to operation—that it has a potency for operation that is actualized—in which case this mover would not be pure act. I would suggest this is why Thomas is so careful, later in the order of argumentation in the Contra Gentiles, not to ground the claim that
God is pure act in the conclusion of the argument from motion.18
At the end of SCG 1.16, we find a de novo argument that is, in a crucial aspect, another close parallel to the first way of ST 1.2.3.19 Although Thomas does not speak about motion explicitly, this
Physic. Secundum Platonem autem movens seipsum non est corpus: accipiebat enim motum pro qualibet operatione, ita quod intelligere et opinari sit quoddam moveri; quem etiam modum loquendi Aristoteles tangit in III de Anima.” 16 As indicated above, in SCG 1.16 Thomas refrains from grounding the conclusion that God is pure act (or is absolutely free of potency) in the conclusion of the argument from motion, instead excluding only passive potency and potency to existence. This has significant consequences for the entire order or argumentative dependence, since so many of Thomas’s later conclusions concerning God depend upon the identification of Him as pure act. See above, pp. 167- 174. 17 If, hypothetically, the term motion were restricted to changes of color, and if omne quod movetur ab alio movetur were only proved to be true of things moved with respect to a change of color, then the argument from motion would only immediately conclude to the existence of a mover that is immobile with respect to changes of color. 18 It is because Aristotle’s definition of motion excludes operation that Thomas can say at the end of his presentation of the first argument from motion in SCG 1.13 that it makes no difference whether one concludes to the existence of some intelligent first self-mover, “following Plato,” or to “a first which is immobile in every way, following Aristotle.” SCG 1.13 [Leon. Man. 12]: “Nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotelem.” 19 SCG 1.16 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Videmus aliquid esse in mundo quod exit de potentia in actum. Non autem educit se de potentia in actum: quia quod est potentia, nondum est; unde nec agere potest. Ergo oportet esse aliquid aliud prius, quo educatur de potentia in actum. Et iterum, si hoc est exiens de potentia in actum, oportet ante hoc aliquid aliud poni, quo reducatur in actum. Hoc autem in infinitum procedere non potest. Ergo oportet devenire ad aliquid quod est tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia. Et hoc dicimus Deum.” 293 argument concerns that which “passes from potency to act” and the agent “by which it is reduced from potency to act.” In the first way in ST 1.2.3, Thomas claims that “nothing is moved except insofar as it is in potency to that to which it is moved,” and he defines what it is to move something as “nothing other than to reduce something from potency to act.”20 Thus, although Thomas doesn’t use the term motion in this final argument from SCG 1.16, he still employs the definitions of motion and of being moved that will appear in the first way of ST 1.2.3. Unlike the arguments based on the immobility and sempiternity of the first mover in SCG 1.16, however, this final argument does conclude without qualification that God “is only in act and in no way in potency.” This gives us good reason to believe that Thomas understands the first way in ST 1.2.3—unlike the first version of the argument from motion in SCG 1.13—to establish immediately that God is pure act. Thomas does not, however, explicitly include the claim that God is pure act in the conclusion of the first way, and when he later appeals to the thesis that God is pure act, he does not take it for granted that this has already been established. Thomas may have strengthened the argument from motion in the
Summa theologiae, as compared to the Contra Gentiles, but he does not call any attention to this fact.
(ii) The second way’s parallel in SCG 1.13
The second way in ST 1.2.3 is a close parallel, without any major qualification, to the argument from efficient causality found in SCG 1.13. The second way in ST 1.2.3 adds an explanation that something cannot be its own efficient cause.21
20 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]. 21 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant.” 294
(iii) The third way: parallel in SCG 1.15
As explained above in c. 4, we find a parallel to the third way in SCG 1.15, appearing as a step in an argument that ultimately concludes to divine eternity.22 Without attending to all of the differences between the contents of the two arguments, we can note that in each case Thomas concludes to something that is necessary through itself (per se necessarium).23 The only significant difference between the conclusions of these arguments is that in SCG 1.15, Thomas makes an explicit appeal to the prior characterization of God as the first cause, in order to identify the being that is necessary through itself as God, whereas in ST 1.2.3 he presents the third way as a fully independent argument for God’s existence.24 One might wonder whether the third way in ST 1.2.3 implicitly depends upon the second way for the identification of the being necessary through itself with God, but this turns out to be irrelevant for our present purposes, since there are no explicit
22 See above, p. 164, esp. n. 15. 23 SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 16]: “Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per se necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum sit causa prima, ut ostensum est.” ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis: quod omnes dicunt Deum.” 24 Ibid. There are significant differences between the first part of each argument, as well. Both arguments reason from the existence of generable and corruptible things that are possibilia esse et non esse to the existence of something that exists necessarily. The argument in SCG 1.15 reasons to the claim that such things must be efficiently caused to exist through the premise that such things are “equally related to existence and non-existence,” and it then employs the impossibility of infinite regress to arrive at something that exists necessarily. By contrast, the third way in ST 1.2.3 invokes the premise that quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est, bringing temporal considerations into the argumentation in order to conclude that there must be something that exists necessarily, since it is evident that something exists now. SCG 1.15 [Leon. Man. 15-16]: “Videmus in mundo quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est possible esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. Sed in causis non est procedere in infinitum, ut supra probatum est per rationem Aristotelis. Ergo oportet ponere aliquid quod sit necesse esse.” As Wippel explains, it is important not to read this equal relation to existence and non-existence as implying that “a possible entity enjoys some kind of preexisting reality in itself.” Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 438. ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.31]: “Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario: quae talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse: cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia quae sunt talia, semper esse: quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset: quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset: quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia: sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus.” 295 appeals to God’s status as the being necessary through itself in the treatment of the divine nature in
ST 1.3-26.
(iv) The fourth way: a partial parallel in SCG 1.13
One of the arguments for God’s existence in SCG 1.13 is a parallel to an ancillary conclusion in the fourth way of ST 1.2.3.25 The ultimate conclusion of the argument in SCG 1.13 is that there exists something that is supremely being (maxime ens), “and this we call God.”26 The fourth way in ST
1.2.3 initially concludes that there exists something that is “most true, and best, and most excellent, and consequently supremely being,” but Thomas does not immediately identify this maxime ens as
God. Rather, he invokes the principle that whatever is the maximum in any genus is the cause of everything else belonging to that genus. Thomas then concludes that the maxime ens is the cause of esse and of every other perfection, and it is this cause of perfections that is identified as God.27 The fourth way of ST 1.2.3 thus makes explicit that God is the cause of perfections—including esse—in all other things.
(v) The fifth way: parallel in SCG 1.44
The argument concluding to the existence of a providential governor in SCG 1.13 is not the closest parallel in content or conclusion to the fifth way of ST 1.2.3: rather, the closest parallel is an argument in SCG 1.44, which concludes that there must exist some intelligence that establishes the natural ends of things. Thomas identifies this institutor naturae as the first efficient cause of the being
25 See above, p. 163 n. 10. 26 SCG 1.13 [Leon. Man. 14]: “Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse aliquod quod est maxime ens. Et hoc dicimus Deum.” 27 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.32]: “Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaph. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis. . . . Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum.” 296 of all things, which is God.28 This parallel to the fifth way thus appeals to the characterization of
God as the first cause in order to identify the institutor naturae as God. Such an explicit reference to
God’s status as the first efficient cause is absent in the fifth way, in which Thomas concludes that there must exist an intelligence “by which all natural things are directed to their end, and this we call
God.”29
(vi) The identification of God as first being and the five ways
As we shall see below, the identification of God as the first being (primum ens) plays a fundamental role in the order of argumentative dependence in ST 1.3-26, perhaps even more so than in the Contra Gentiles. I argued above, in c. 4, that we should associate the name primum ens especially with the conclusion of the argument from efficient causality, based on texts in which
Thomas speaks of the first being as the first efficient cause of existence (esse). The force of the name primum ens is to identify God as causally prior with respect to esse. Matters are slightly more complicated in the Summa theologiae, because both the third and fourth ways conclude, independently of the second way, that there exists a first efficient cause of esse.30 With respect to the third way, its conclusion is that there is something whose existence is necessary through itself and is the cause of the necessity of the existence of other things. Concerning the fourth way, the argument explicitly concludes that God is the cause of esse for all other things. In light of this, we should associate the
28 SCG 1.44 [Leon. Man. 43-44]: “Cum ergo ipsa non praestituant sibi finem, quia rationem finis non cognoscunt; oportet quod eis praestituatur finis ab alio, qui sit naturae institutor. Hic autem est qui praebet omnibus esse, quem Deum dicimus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non autem posset naturae finem praestituere nisi intelligeret. Deus igitur est intelligens.” See above, pp. 204-205. 29 ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.32]: “Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.” As with the third way, one might wonder whether such a reference to the identification of God as the first cause is implicit. This makes no difference for the order of argumentative dependence, however, since there are no appeals to the conclusion of the fifth way in the treatment of the divine nature in ST 1.3-26. 30 This assumes that the fourth way concludes to a first efficient cause of existence, a point accepted by most interpreters. For a treatment of a range of possible interpretations of the fourth way—with an emphasis on the question of what kind of causality is involved in the first stage of the argument—see Joseph Bobik, “Aquinas’ Fourth Way and the Approximating Relation,” The Thomist 51 (1987): 17-36. 297 name primum ens not only with the conclusion of the second way, but also with the conclusions of the third and the fourth.31
B. THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE THROUGH THE VIA REMOTIONIS IN ST 1.3-11
We find a special emphasis on the via remotionis in ST 1.3-11. In these questions, Thomas treats God’s simplicity, perfection, goodness, infinity, omnipresence, immutability, eternity, and unity. Compared to the order in SCG 1.15-43, the most obvious changes are the introduction of questions devoted to omnipresence and immutability, the later placement of eternity, and the placement of unity after infinity. The purpose of this section will be to trace the lines of argumentative dependence from the conclusions of the argumentation for God’s existence.32
The prooemia of ST 1.3-11 provide some helpful clues concerning how Thomas conceives of the order of these questions. He expresses methodological and pedagogical concerns, in addition to claims concerning the requirements of argumentative dependence. Thomas begins the prooemium of
ST 1.3 by noting that “it being known of something whether it exists, it remains to be inquired how it is, so that it might be known concerning it what it is.”33 Thomas then introduces something of a wrinkle into the distinction between the questions an sit and quid sit, by interjecting the question quomodo sit. After explaining that we cannot in fact know how God is, but can only know how He is
31 Some would argue that we should also associate the name primum ens with the conclusion of the first way. For example, Owens and Knasas hold that the first way takes as its point of departure the existence of motion, and so they would contend that the first way concludes to the existence of a first cause of being. See Joseph Owens, “The Conclusion of the Prima Via,” St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God, ed. John R. Catan (SUNY Press: Albany, 1980), 158-60; John F. Knasas, “Thomist Existentialism and the Proofs Ex Motu at Contra Gentiles I, C. 13,” The Thomist 59 (1995): 591-615. This interpretation would also extend to the arguments from motion in SCG 1.13. One difficulty is that interpreting the first way as being concerned with the existence of motion makes it indistinguishable from the second way. While I would not embrace such an interpretation of the first way, here it will be sufficient only to note that if one holds that the first way justifies an appeal to God as primum ens, then this would be insofar as the first way is taken to be “existential” in character. 32 See Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, 184-85 for an analysis of ST 1.3-11 that takes into account the manner in which arguments for the various divine names are grounded in the conclusions of the five ways. Cf. Elders, “L’ordre des attributes divins dans la Somme théologique,” Divus Thomas 82 (1979): 225-32. 33 ST 1.3 pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit.” 298 not, Thomas explains that he will treat three topics: 1) how God is not, 2) how He is known by us, and 3) how He is named.34 ST 1.3-11 is thus devoted to the question of “how God is not,” with the latter two items assigned to qq. 12 and 13, respectively. Thomas proceeds to explain that we show how God is not “by removing from Him those things that do not belong to Him, such as composition, motion, and other [things] of this kind.”35 Thomas explicitly indicates here only the topics of q. 3 (simplicity, by which composition is removed) and q. 9 (immutability, by which motion is removed).
Thomas then offers the following concerning the contents of qq. 3-11: “First therefore we will inquire about His simplicity, through which composition is removed from Him. And since simples among corporeal things are imperfect and parts, second we will inquire about His perfection; third, about His infinity; fourth, about immutability; fifth, about unity.”36 Thomas does not indicate here why he wishes to begin with the removal of composition. As for why perfection follows after simplicity, Thomas seems to suggest that his concern is fundamentally pedagogical. The things called simple among corporeal things are (i) the elements and (ii) substantial forms, and in each case these “simples” are less perfect than the wholes of which they are parts. In order to know
God through the via remotionis, we remove from God a condition that belongs to those things we identify as simple among corporeal things. Thomas’s concern is to head off a potential misunderstanding that could easily arise from the claim that God is absolutely simple.
34 ST 1.3 pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit. Primo ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis cognoscatur; tertio, quomodo nominetur.” 35 ST 1.3 pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Potest autem ostendi de Deo quomodo non sit, removendo ab eo ea quae ei non conveniunt, utpote compositionem, motum, et alia huiusmodi.” 36 ST 1.3 pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Primo ergo inquiratur de simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio. Et quia simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo inquiretur de perfectione ipsius; tertio, de infinitate eius; quarto, de immutabilitate; quinto, de unitate.” 299
It is not immediately clear how the remaining topics of ST 1.3-11 are related to the topics mentioned in ST 1.3 pr. and to the project of explaining quomodo Deus non sit, and so we must turn to the prooemia of later questions to provide some clues. The prooemia of ST 1.4-11 make clear that, in
Thomas’s mind, some of the topics treated in these questions are subordinated to others, in the following instances. 1) The discussion of goodness in qq. 5-6 is subordinated to the topic of perfection. 2) Omnipresence is subordinated to infinity. 3) Eternity is subordinated to immutability.
In each of these cases, the subordination seems to be a matter of argumentative dependence: for example, Thomas notes that the discussion of goodness will follow after perfection “because each thing, insofar as it is perfect, is thus called good.”37 In conjunction with what we have already seen in
ST 1.3 pr., this allows us to identify simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity as more fundamental or primary in the argumentative structure of ST 1.3-11.38
37 ST 1.4 pr. [Leon. 4.50]: “Et quia unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo agendum est de perfectione divina; secundo de eius bonitate.” 38 John of St. Thomas identifies simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity as the five “principal attributes” treated in ST 1.3-11, with the remaining divine names in this sequence understood as secondary or subordinate. See John of St. Thomas, Introduction to the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas, tr. Ralph McInerny (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 2004), 27-29; John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus (Paris: Vivès, 1883), vol 1, 196-97: “Ex ratione autem actus puri secundum conceptum entis increati oriuntur quinque principalia, et quasi radicalia attributa pertinentia ad ipsum esse Dei, per quae removentur a ratione actus puri quinque conditiones, seu defectus entis creati, et potentialis, scilicet compositio, imperfectio, limitatio, mutatio, et divisio, seu pluralitas, et per attributa removentia istas conditiones, Deum cognoscimus via etiam remotionis. Sunt autem quinque attributa, scilicet simplicitas contra compositionem; perfectio contra imperfectionem; infinitas contra limitationem; immutabilitas contra mutabilitatem; unitas contra divisionem, seu pluralitatem. . . . Ex his autem attributis, quae sunt magis radicalia in entitate, sequuntur alia tria quasi accessoria, et consecuta ad ista. Ad perfectionem enim sequitur bonitas. . . . Ad infinitatem etiam sequitur immensitas, ut est infinitas quantitatis, et ratio praesentiae localis, licet ad contactum hujus praesentiae in Deo non sufficiat infinitas in ratione entitatis, sed etiam in ratione operationis, et actionis, quia est contactus virtualis. . . . Denique ad immutabilitatem sequitur aeternitas. . . .” As indicated above in c. 1, pp. 12-13, I refrain from calling simplicity or any other negative divine name an attribute, following Thomas’s terminological practice. I would otherwise cautiously embrace this thesis, although as we shall see later, it is important to recognize the priority of goodness as a divine name in a certain respect; furthermore, infinity, immutability, and infinity are arguably in a way subordinated to divine perfection. 300
(i) Divine simplicity in ST 1.3
Under the heading of divine simplicity, ST 1.3 treats the following claims: (1) God is not a body; (2) God is not composed from matter and form; (3) God is His essence; (4) God is His esse;39
(5) God is not in a genus; (6) there are no accidents in God; (7) God is simple in every way; (8) God cannot enter into composition with anything or be a part of anything. This is fairly close to the content of SCG 1.18-27.40
With respect to the order of argumentation, two features of ST 1.3 stand out. First, by the relatively late placement of the claim that God is entirely simple (omnino simplex) in ST 1.3.7, Thomas abandons the approach of using deductive arguments appealing to God’s absolute simplicity to exclude particular modes of composition. Instead, the first argument for absolute simplicity in ST
1.3.7 is an inductive argument appealing to the conclusions of aa. 1-6.41 Second, we can note the almost complete absence of direct appeals to the conclusion of the first way. Only the first argument of ST 1.3.1—which argues that God is not a body—explicitly appeals to God’s status as the first unmoved mover.42 This is in fact the only direct, explicit appeal to the conclusion of the first way in all of ST 1.3-26. The other two arguments in ST 1.3.1 appeal, in turn, to God’s status as primum ens and to His status as “the most excellent among beings,” which comes from the preliminary, ancillary
39 Although the conclusions of aa. 3-4 are here stated in positive form (that God is His essence and His esse), it is important to note Thomas arrives at these conclusions through the via remotionis. 40 Thomas places the exclusion of difference, definition, and demonstration propter quid from God in ST 1.3.5. He also introduces ST 1.3.2 to treat the question of whether God is a composite of matter and form as a separate question from whether God is a body—the purpose of this latter introduction is apparently to engage critically with universal hylomorphism, which would posit matter-form composition even in the angels. 41 Such an inductive argument is sound only if the distinction of modes of composition is exhaustive; at the least, the force of the claim that God is omnino simplex is perfectly clear. 42 ST 1.3.1 [Leon. 4.35]: “Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum: ut patet inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est corpus.” 301 conclusion of the fourth way.43 This is one of two such appeals to this part of the fourth way in ST
1.3-11, the other of which will appear in the ST 1.3.2.44
The second argument of ST 1.3.1, which appeals to God’s identity as primum ens, is critically important in the order of argumentative dependence, as this argument establishes that God is “in act and in no way in potency,” that is, that God is pure act.45 The argument begins by appealing to the
Aristotelian thesis that, although potency might be temporally prior to act in a given case,
“nevertheless act is absolutely prior to potency: since that which is in potency is not reduced to act except through a being in act.”46 Having established the absolute priority of act, Thomas then appeals to the identification of God as the first being in order to conclude that “it is therefore impossible that in God there be something in potency.” From this strong claim, Thomas deduces that God is incorporeal: since every body is in potency, it follows that God is not a body.47
As indicated above, it seems best to associate the name primum ens with the conclusions of the second, third, and fourth ways of arguing for God’s existence. I have also indicated why we should understand the first way in the Summa theologiae to include implicitly in its conclusion that
God is pure act.48 Whatever the first way may implicitly establish, however, Thomas does not take it
43 ST 1.3.1 [Leon. 4.36]: “Tertio, quia Deus est id quod est nobilissimum in entibus, ut ex dictis patet.” ST 1.2.3 [Leon. 4.32]: “Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens.” 44 This is the second argument in ST 1.3.2, which appeals to God’s status as “the first which is good and best.” [Leon. 4.37]: “Primum autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per participationem: quia bonum per essentiam, prius est bono per participationem.” To be “the first which is good and best,” God must be good of His essence, rather than by participation. 45 ST 1.3.1 [Leon. 4.35]: “Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia.” This argument and its conclusion parallel some of the content of SCG 1.16. See above, pp. 167-69. 46 ST 1.3.1 [Leon. 4.35]: “Licet enim in uno et eodem quod exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus tempore, simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia: quia quod est in potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu.” 47 ST 1.3.1 [Leon. 4.35-36]: “Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in potentia: quia continuum inquantum huiusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.” Thomas offers as support for the claim that body is in potency the premise that body is infinitively divisible; this presupposes some familiarity on the part of the reader with Aristotle’s Physics, particularly Book 6. 48 We can also note a close connection between the reasoning of the first way, formulated in terms of act and potency, and the reasoning of this second argument in ST 1.3.1. 302 for granted in ST 1.3.1 that God is pure act. Instead, to establish this he appeals to God’s causal priority with respect to being.49 We can also note, though, the similarity between the reasoning of the first way and the reasoning of this argument in ST 1.3.2, which both identify God as the first agent responsible for the reduction of potency to act in all posterior things.
The arguments in aa. 2-7 of q. 3 are so similar with respect to the premises concerning God to which Thomas appeals that we can treat these articles together quickly.50 First, we find arguments appealing to God’s status as pure act in all but a. 3 (which argues for the identity of God with His essence, appealing only to the conclusion of a. 2, the absence of matter-form composition in God).51
Similarly, every one of these articles except a. 3 offers at least one argument appealing either to the claim that God is the first efficient cause or to the closely related claim that God is the first being.
49 As noted above, some interpreters will hold that the first way does conclude to the existence of something that is causally prior with respect to existencee. See above, p. 297 n. 31. 50 The arguments in aa. 2-7 appeal to the following premises concerning God: ST 1.3.2 (no matter-form composition in God): 1. God is pure act (ST 1.3.1, 1st way) 2. God is the first and best (from the initial conclusion of the 4th way) 3. God is the first efficient cause (2nd way) ST 1.3.3 (identity of God with His essence): 1. there is no matter-form composition in God (ST 1.3.2) ST 1.3.4 (identity of God’s essence and esse): 1. God is the first efficient cause (2nd way) 2. God is pure act (ST 1.3.1, 1st way) 3. God is the first being, and so cannot be a being (ens) by participation (2nd, 3rd, 4th ways) ST 1.3.5 (God is not in a genus): 1. God is pure act (ST 1.3.1, 1st way) 2. God’s essence is His esse (ST 1.3.4) 3. God’s essence is His esse (ST 1.3.4) 4. God is the principle of all being (2nd, 3rd, 4th ways) ST 1.3.6 (absence of accidents in God): 1. God is pure act (ST 1.3.1, 1st way) 2. God is His esse (ST 1.3.4) 3. God is the absolutely (simpliciter) first being (2nd, 3rd, 4th ways) ST 1.3.7 (God is simple in every way): 1. inductive argument (ST 1.3.1-6) 2. God is the first being (2nd, 3rd, 4th ways) 3. God is the first uncaused cause (2nd way) 4. God is pure act (ST 1.3.1, 1st way) 5. God is form itself and esse itself (ST 1.3.4) 51 Thomas’s only argument in ST 1.3.3 appeals to the conclusion of a. 2, that there is no matter-form composition in God. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 238-53 for discussion of supposit/essence identity and distinction. 303
Finally, once Thomas establishes the identity of God’s essence and esse in ST 1.3.4, he appeals to this conclusion as a premise in the following two articles, which deny that God is in a genus and exclude accidents from Him. Comparing ST 1.3.1-7 to SCG 1.18-25, Thomas has stripped away any explicit dependence upon the conclusion of the argument from motion, except in the first argument of ST
1.3.1.
As for ST 1.3.8, which argues that God does not enter into composition with other things, in three arguments Thomas appeals twice to God’s identity as first efficient cause and once to the fact that He is “the absolutely first being.”52 As indicated in c. 4, it is through the argumentation of SCG
1.26-27 that Thomas establishes that God is entirely separate from body and from any creature.53
We shall see in ST 1.4.2 and ST 1.7.1 that Thomas appeals to the well-known claim that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens. If it is in ST 1.3.4 that Thomas proves that God is ipsum esse, it is in a. 8 that ipsum esse is shown to be per se subsistens. Since ST 1.3.8 appeals neither to the conclusion of the first way nor to the claim that God is pure act, the separate subsistence of God is not grounded in the conclusion of the first way.54
(ii) Divine perfection in ST 1.4
In the prooemium of ST 1.3, Thomas indicates that we should consider God’s perfection after
His simplicity, because those things that are “simple among corporeal things are imperfect and parts.”55 The consideration of divine perfection serves as a complement to the divine simplicity, correcting a misunderstanding that might arise from calling God simple.
52 ST 1.3.8 [Leon. 4.48]: “Ostensum est autem quod Deus est primum ens simpliciter.” 53 See above, pp. 226-28. 54 This is with the same caveat as above: if one interprets the first way as concluding that God is causally prior with respect to being (that He is primum ens), then the first way would ground the separate subsistence of God. 55 ST 1.3 pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Et quia simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo inquiretur de perfectione ipsius.” 304
In three articles in q. 4, Thomas argues that God is most perfect,56 that He is universally perfect, and that creatures are like God. The first article is concerned with perfection in the sense of completeness according to kind,57 and Thomas’s single argument appeals to the identification of
God as the first efficient cause. Something is perfect insofar as it is in act; but the first active principle must be in act to a supreme degree, “and consequently [it must] be perfect to a supreme degree.”58 Here Thomas reestablishes and strengthens the claim that God is “in act to a supreme degree,” grounding this again in the identification of God as the first efficient cause.59
In ST 1.4.2, Thomas advances two arguments for God’s universal perfection, “that the perfections of all things are in God.” He cites Averroes’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5, that by universal perfection he means that God “does not lack any excellence which is found in any genus.”60 As noted above, this meaning of perfection goes beyond the notion of completeness according to kind: God’s universal perfection encompasses the excellences of every genus or kind..
Thomas’s first argument appeals to the identification of God as “the first efficient cause of things,” concluding that “the perfections of all things must preexist in God, according to a more eminent
56 The videtur quod of ST 1.4.1 suggests that Thomas is only going to advance the claim that God is perfect, but his argument in the article’s respondeo concludes that God is maxime perfectum. I noted above in treatment of SCG 1.28 (pp. 193-194) that Thomas concludes there that God is universally perfect and that He is most perfect, albeit with some ambiguity as to whether these are distinct conclusions. ST 1.4.1-2 treat these as distinct conclusions. 57 ST 1.4.1 [Leon. 4.50]: “Nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis.” There is a double negation involved in the meaning of perfection, that what is perfect (1) does not (2) lack what is due to it. For discussion of the importance of this double negation, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 516. 58 ST 1.4.1 [Leon. 4.50]: “Unde primum principium activum oportet esse maxime esse in actu: et per consequens maxime esse perfectum. Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse perfectum, secundum quod est actu.” The replies to the three objections also emphasize the close connection between perfection and actuality. 59 We will see a similar repetition of this line of reasoning (from first efficient cause to pure act) later, in ST 1.9. 60 ST 1.4.2 [Leon. 4.51]: “Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur universaliter perfectum: quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae inveniatur in aliquo genere, ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et hoc quidem ex duobus considerari potest.” For this text in Averroes, see above, p. 190, n. 96. 305 mode.” Thomas attributes this sort of argument to Dionysius, who holds that “God is all, as the cause of all.”61
The second argument for divine universal perfection employs the formula that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens, “from which it is necessary that He contain in Himself the entire perfection of existing.”62 The entire perfection of existing, however, includes the perfections of all things, and so no perfection can be lacking to God.63 Thomas also attributes this line of argumentation to
Dionysius.64 Now, according to this second argument, it is because divinum esse is subsistent through itself that God cannot lack anything of the entire perfection of existing; just as if there were a separate, subsistent heat, it would not lack anything of the power of heat.65 This is important, with respect to argumentative dependence, because Thomas established the claim that God is per se subsistens in ST 1.3.8, in which all of his arguments appeal to the identification of God either as first efficient cause or as first being.66
Finally, in ST 1.4.3 we find Thomas’s treatment of the claim that creatures bear a likeness to
God, a parallel to SCG 1.29. Once again, Thomas appeals to the identification of God as the first efficient cause, employing the principle that every agent makes something like itself (omne agens agit
61 ST 1.4.2 [Leon. 4.52]: “Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva rerum, oportet omnium rerum perfectiones praeexistere in Deo secundum eminentiorem modum. Et hanc rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens de Deo quod non hoc quidem est, hoc autem non est: sed omnia est, ut omnium causa.” 62 ST 1.4.2 [Leon. 4.52]: “Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens: ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat.” 63 ST 1.4.2 [Leon. 4.52]: “Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi: secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent. Unde sequitur quod nullius rei perfectio Deo desit.” 64 ST 1.4.2 [Leon. 4.52]: “Et hanc etiam rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens quod Deus non quodammodo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum in seipso uniformiter esse praeaccipit: et postea subdit quod ipse est esse subsistentibus.” 65 ST 1.4.2 [Leon. 4.52]: “Manifestum est enim quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem: sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse de virtute caloris.” Thomas employs a similar argument in De ente 4 [Leon. 43.376-77], appealing to a hypothetical separate heat as part of his argumentation to establish that there could only be one esse subsistens. 66 Taking the formula ipsum esse per se subsistens, that God is ipsum esse can be established through the claim that God is pure act, but that ipsum esse is per se subsistens depends upon the identification of ipsum esse as the first efficient cause of being. 306 sibi simile) in order to conclude that all creatures, insofar as they are beings, are likened to God “as to the first and universal principle of all existing.”67
(iii) Divine goodness in ST 1.6
After a consideration of goodness in general in ST 1.5, Thomas treats God’s goodness in ST
1.6. Thomas indicates in the prooemium of ST 1.4 why the discussion of goodness will follow after perfection: this is because “each thing, insofar as it is perfect, is thus called good.”68 This suggests that the rationale for subordinating goodness to perfection is a matter of argumentative dependence.
In the first three articles of this question, he concludes that God is good, that He is the highest good (summum bonum), and that to be good per essentiam is proper to Him alone. In the first article, Thomas’s single argument for divine goodness once again appeals to God’s status as the first efficient cause: “Since therefore God is the first efficient cause of all [things], it is manifest that the character (ratio) of the good and of the desirable belong to Him.”69 Furthermore, just as in ST 1.4.1-
2, Thomas attributes the reasoning he presents to Dionysius: “Whence Dionysius in the Divine
Names attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that God is called good, ‘as He from whom all things subsist.’”70 Finally, in the reply to the second objection (which had argued that not all creatures can desire God, so that God cannot be good as “that which all things desire”),
Thomas contends that “all things, by desiring their proper perfections, desire God Himself, insofar
67 ST 1.4.3 [Leon. 4.54]: “Et hoc modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse.” 68 ST 1.4 pr. [Leon. 4.50]: “Post considerationem divinae simplicitatis, de perfectione ipsius Dei dicendum est. Et quia unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo agendum est de perfectione divina; secundo de eius bonitate.” 69 ST 1.6.1 [Leon. 4.66]: “Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit ratio boni et appetibilis.” 70 ST 1.6.1 [Leon. 4.66]: “Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens quod bonus dicitur Deus, sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt.” 307 as the perfections of all things are certain likenesses of the divine esse”—this appeals to the conclusion of ST 1.4.3.71
This line of thinking then plays a crucial role in the argumentation of a. 2 for the claim that
God is the highest good. Thomas reminds the reader that good is attributed to God “insofar as all desired perfections flow from Him, as from the first cause.” But because God is not a univocal agent—His effects are of neither the same species nor of the same genus as Himself—the perfections that He causes exist in Himself in a more excellent way. God is the non-univocal cause of every creaturely perfection, “and because of this He is called the highest good.” That God is called the highest good is thus tied to His universal perfection and to the claim that creatures are like
God insofar as they are beings caused by Him. As the first efficient cause of all the perfections desired by creatures as their respective final ends, He must possess all of these perfections in a most excellent and unified way.72
In ST 1.6.3, Thomas argues that God alone is good of His essence.73 Thomas explains that
“each thing is called good insofar as it is perfect,” but there are three levels or grades of perfection in a thing: (1) the perfection a thing possesses insofar as it exists at all, (2) the perfection a thing
71 But then only some creatures desire God explicitly by intelligence and will; other creatures desire “certain participations of His goodness, which extends even to sense cognition”—it is in this way that non-human animals desire God. Finally, some things have only natural appetite without cognition; these things too desire God by desiring their own perfection. ST 1.6.1 ad 2 [Leon. 4.66]: “Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum: quod est proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori cognoscente.” 72 ST 1.6.2 ad 2 is especially helpful for clarifying that God possesses in the simplicity of His essence all of the peculiar perfections/ends respectively desired by each creature. Here Thomas clarifies how we should understand the characterization of the good as that which all things desire, which comes from Nicomachean Ethics 1.1. [Leon. 4.67]: “Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur bonum est quod omnia appetunt, non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur: sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet.” 73 ST 1.6.3 [Leon. 4.68]: “Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam.” Here Thomas takes for granted that for something to possess a characteristic by its essence (per essentiam) is distinguished from possessing it by participation (per participationem). 308 possesses insofar as it is the subject of accidents necessary for its perfect operation, and (3) the perfection a thing possesses when it attains something distinct from itself that is its end. No creature possesses all three of these sorts of perfection by its very essence. God, on the other hand, first exists by His very essence, unlike any creature, since His essence is ipsum esse. Second, He has no accidents, and He possesses all of the perfections that are accidents in creatures (such as wisdom) by
His very essence. Third, He is not ordered to anything distinct from Himself as to an end, but He is rather the ultimate end of all things. From this, Thomas concludes that God alone is good of His essence. In terms of argumentative dependence, Thomas here appeals to the conclusions of ST 1.3.4
(that God’s essence is His esse), 1.3.6 (that there are no accidents in God), 1.4.2 (that God possesses all of the perfections of creatures in a more excellent way), and 1.6.1 (that God is good and is the end or ultimate term of desire for all things). While the first two of these earlier conclusions can ultimately be grounded in the first way, the latter two are ultimately grounded in the identification of
God as the first efficient cause of existence.
Throughout ST 1.6, Thomas’s treatment of divine goodness emphasizes and depends upon the identification of God as the first efficient cause. Thomas also attributes this close connection between divine goodness and efficient causality to Dionysius. As noted above, the prooemium of q. 3 suggests that q. 6’s treatment of divine goodness is subordinated to the notion of perfection, treated in q. 4. This subordination turns out to be in part a matter of argumentative dependence, as both ST
1.6.2 and 1.6.3 appeal to God’s universal perfection. An even more fundamental connection between q. 4 and q. 6 arises from their common foundation in the identification of God as the first efficient cause. 309
(iv) Divine infinity in ST 1.7
Thomas treats God’s infinity in the first two articles of q. 7. In ST 1.7.1, Thomas shows a special concern for explaining that God’s infinity is infinity of perfection, unlike the sort of infinity associated with matter. He explains that whereas matter is called infinite when it is not terminated and perfected by form, form is infinite when it is not contracted by matter. Thomas then appeals to the claim that “existence itself is the most formal of all.” Since God is ipsum esse not received in another but rather subsisting through Himself, “it is manifest that God Himself is infinite and perfect.”74 The reasoning in ST 1.7.2, which establishes that only God can be absolutely infinite, similarly appeals to the identity of essence and esse in God: unlike God, every creature has “existence received and contracted to a determinate nature.”75
Thomas provides little in the way of definite clues as to why infinity follows after perfection and goodness. The prooemium of ST 1.7 simply asserts that God’s infinity must be considered after
His perfection.76 We should recall that In Sent. 1.2.1.3 contends that the eminence of the divine
74 ST 1.7.1 [Leon. 4.72]: “Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia, antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate huius rei. Materia autem perficitur per formam per quam finitur, et ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur materiae, habet rationem imperfecti; est enim quasi materia non habens formam. Forma autem non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo contrahitur, unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.” Thomas’s argument here depends upon the metaphysical principle that unreceived esse is unlimited. R. te Velde has denied that this principle is defended by Thomas. See te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 150- 54. Wippel defends this principle at length in Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act is Unlimited,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 123-151, esp. 136-37 for his treatment of ST 1.7.1. See also Clarke, “The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?” New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 167-94. 75 ST 1.7.2 [Leon. 4.74]: “Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam de Angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per aliquam materiam, sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse infinitum simpliciter.” 76 ST 1.7 pr. [Leon. 4.72]: “Post considerationem divinae perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate.” 310 perfection is characterized by universality, plenitude, and unity,77 and I have suggested above in c. 4 a connection between plenitudo and infinity.78 Such a connection is also suggested by ST 1.9.1.79 I would therefore suggest that the discussion of infinity follows after perfection because the notion of infinity qualifies the notion of perfection.
I would also speculate that a pedagogical concern might be involved in the placement of infinity after perfection and goodness. Just as Thomas indicated concerning divine simplicity that one might mistakenly think that it implies that God is imperfect or a part, similarly calling God perfect might seem to imply that God is limited or that He is somehow measured by some finite standard. When we say that a creature is perfect or complete, we mean that it has everything it is supposed to possess, as an infant is perfect in one sense because he has ten fingers and ten toes.80 In other words, it is easy to think of perfection as a completeness according to which something “fills out” or “measures up to” some standard. By following up the discussion of God’s perfection with infinity, Thomas makes clear that God is complete—lacking nothing—but also limitless and immeasurable.81
77 See above, p. 38. 78 See above, p. 234. 79 ST 1.9.1 [Leon. 4.90]: “Deus autem, cum sit infinitus, comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod prius non pertingebat.” 80 Cf. In Meta. 5.18 for Thomas’s explanation of how the simplest meaning of perfection is completeness according to quantitative parts. 81 Thomas also refers to God’s infinity as His being incircumscriptibilis in ST 1.7 pr. [Leon. 4.72]. This is noteworthy, as it serves to connect Thomas’s notion of divine infinity with both Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa and the Summa fratris Alexandri, both of which discuss the claim that God is incircumscriptibilis. Thomas cites Damascene in the sed contra of ST 1.7.1. For Damascene, see De fide orthodoxa 1.2 [Buytaert 14]: “Quoniam igitur est quidem Deus sine principio, sine fines, aeternus et sempiternus, increatus, immutabilis, inalterabilis, verus, simplex, incompositus, incorporeus, invisibilis, inpalpabilis, incircumscriptibilis, infinitus, incomprehensibilis, incognoscibilis, bonus, iustus, omnipotens, omnium creaturarum conditor, omnitenens, omnicernens, omnium provisor, potestativus, iudex, et cognoscimus et confitemur.” For the Summa fratris Alexandri, see Pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 2, q. 3, tit. 1, cap. 1 [Quaracchi 1.62]. 311
(v) Divine omnipresence in ST 1.8
The discussion of God’s existence in all things and His being everywhere in ST 1.8 represents an addition in comparison to Book 1 of the Summa contra Gentiles, in which there is only a brief mention of God’s omnipresence in SCG 1.26.82 (There is a chapter devoted to omnipresence later, SCG 3.68.) The prooemia of both ST 1.7 and 1.8 suggest that the reason why omnipresence follows after infinity has to do with argumentative dependence.83 In the four articles of ST 1.8,
Thomas advances the following claims: that God is in all things; that God is everywhere; that God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence; and that it is proper to God alone to be everywhere.
Although Thomas seems to imply that omnipresence will follow from infinity in terms of argumentative dependence, nearly all of the arguments in ST 1.8 appeal, once again, to God’s identity as the first efficient cause of being. Thomas argues that God, as the cause of existence for every creature, is in all things as an agent is present to its effect—and indeed God is present in all things in an intimate or interior way, because esse is “that which is innermost to each [thing], and
82 SCG 1.26 [Leon. Man. 28-29]: “Quartum etiam quod eos ad hoc inducere potuit, est modus loquendi quo dicimus Deum im omnibus rebus esse: non intelligentes quod non sic est in rebus quasi aliquid rei, sed sicut rei causa quae nullo modo suo effectui deest.” 83 ST 1.7 pr. [Leon. 4.72]: “Post considerationem divinae perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de existentia eius in rebus: attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus.” ST 1.8 pr. [Leon. 4.82]: “Quia vero infinito convenire videtur quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo conveniat.” A text from ST 1.9.2 [Leon.4.92] also suggests this connection in argumentative dependence: “[Deus] sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra dictum est.” In this, Thomas’s approach parallels the close connection between infinity and omnipresence in the Summa fratris Alexandri, in which infinity and omnipresence are treated as two modes of the immensity of the divine essence: infinity is the “immensity of God with respect to Himself” and omnipresence is treated under the heading of the “immensity of God with respect to place.” Summa fratris Alexandri Book 1, pars 1, tr. 2, q. 1 [Quaracchi 54]: “Consequenter quaeritur de immensitate divinae essentiae. Quae immensitas determinatur quantum ad quatuor: primo, quantum ad se: et sic determinatur per infinitatem; et quantum ad intellectum: et sic determinatur per incomprehensibilitatem; et quantum ad locum: et sic determinatur per incircumscriptibilitatem; et quantum ad durationem: et sic determinatur per aeternitatem.” In q. 3 tit. 2, the Summa fratris treats the localitas divinae essentiae, as the second topic after incircumscriptibilitas. [Quaracchi 64]: “Consequenter quaeritur de localitate divinae essentiae. De qua plura inquiruntur: 1. an Deus sit alicubi vel nusquam vel in se ipso; an Deus sit ubique; quid est Deum esse ubique; utrum ab aeterno conveniat ei esse ubique; an sit ei proprium esse ubique.” 312 what is most profoundly in all.”84 Thomas also appeals to the identity of essence and esse in God in
ST 1.8.1 (in order to justify the claim that esse must be the proper effect of God as the first cause) and to divine providence (which has not yet been explicitly established) in ST 1.8.3 to justify the claim that God is in all things by presence.
(vi) Divine immutability in ST 1.9
Up to this point in Thomas’s treatment of the divine nature, we have observed the dominance of argumentation depending immediately upon the identification of God as the first efficient cause. This trend continues in ST 1.9, which is devoted to God’s immutability, in that
Thomas begins ST 1.9.1, which establishes that God is immutable in every way (omnino immutabilis), with an argument grounded in the identification of God as the first being. Once again, Thomas rehearses the argument from God’s status as first being to His being pure act. He then notes that
“everything which is changed in any way, is in some way in potency,” allowing him to conclude that
“it is impossible for God to be changed in any way.”85 Thomas then offers two other arguments.
The second appeals to God’s absolute simplicity, and his third argument appeals to God’s infinity.
One surprising feature of the argumentation in ST 1.9.1 is that Thomas does not appeal to the conclusion of the argument from motion; it is also surprising that he devotes a separate question to God’s immutability at all. In the Contra Gentiles, Thomas takes it for granted in SCG 1.14-15 that
84 ST 1.8.1 [Leon. 4.82]: “Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit rei, secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest: cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime.” Bernard Montagnes considers this to be an especially important feature, within Thomas’s mature understanding of the analogy between God and creatures, of efficient causality, that “la causalité efficiente établit entre les êtres et Dieu un rapport par lequel celui-ci est présent au plus intime de tout ce qui est sans cesser d’être transcendant.” Bernard Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1963), 93. 85 ST 1.9.1 [Leon. 4.90]: “Respondeo dicendum quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus: et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est Deum aliquo modo mutari.” 313 he has already established that God is absolutely immutable. As indicated above, however, the force of the claim that God is omnino immutabilis would seem to be limited in the Contra Gentiles. This limitation has consequences in SCG 1.16, in which Thomas refrains from arguing that God is unqualifiedly pure act on the basis of immutability or eternity, instead concluding from these premises only that God lacks passive potency and potency to esse. As explained above in c. 4, the passive potency that Thomas excludes from God in SCG 1.16 would seem to be only the potency for change associated with material things.86
In ST 1.9.2, Thomas expands the meaning of passive potency in such a way that God alone can be said to lack passive potency. This article is devoted to explaining that God alone is entirely immutable, and so Thomas offers a detailed explanation of the ways in which creatures are mutable.
A creature is mutable either by a potency (power) in another or by a potency in itself. All creatures are mutable in the former way, by the divine power, upon which they depend for their preservation in existence. With regard to mutability by a potency within a creature, Thomas offers the following:
But if something is called mutable through a potency existing in it, thus also every creature is mutable in some way. For there is in a creature a twofold potency, namely active and passive. But I call [that] potency passive, according to which something can achieve its perfection, either in existing or in attaining [its] end.87
This respresents a development of the notion of passive potency, compared to SCG 2.25, in which
Thomas equates passive potency and potency to esse.88 In ST 1.9.2, Thomas divides passive potency
86 See above, pp. 167-74. 87 ST 1.9.2 [Leon. 4.91]: “Si autem dicatur aliquid mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia, scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel in consequendo finem.” 88 SCG 2.25 [Leon. Man. 111]: “Primo quidem igitur potentia activa ad agere est, potentia autem passiva ad esse. Unde in illis solis est potentia ad esse quae materiam habent contrarietati subiectam.” It is in light of such an expanded understanding of passive potency that Thomas can say in De pot. 1.2 that “because there is nothing of passive potency admixed with Him, He is pure act not received in another; for God is His very existence, received into no [subject]. ” Such a line of argumentation—from the absence of passive potency to pure act—is avoided in the Contra Gentiles. 314 into potency to esse and potency to the attainment of the end. Furthermore, he subdivides potency to esse into potency with respect to substantial esse and potency with respect to accidental esse.
With these divisions of potency in mind, Thomas assigns mutability and immutability to creatures: 1) Sublunary bodies are mutable with respect to both substantial esse and accidental esse. 2)
Celestial bodies are mutable only with respect to accidental esse, in particular with respect to place.
They are immutable with respect to substantial esse, which is to say that they are naturally incorruptible. 3) Incorporeal substances (angels) are immutable with respect to both substantial and accidental esse; that is, they lack passive potency to esse.89 There is, however, in angels “a twofold mutability, one insofar as they are in potency to [their] end, and there is thus in them mutability with respect to the choice from good to evil, as Damascene says. The other [mutability is] according to place, insofar as by their finite power they can attain to certain places to which they previously did not attain.”90 Angels thus possess mutability with respect to one kind of passive potency (the potency to the end) and with respect to their active potency for acting on bodies.
Thomas can now explain why God alone is absolutely immutable. First, He is in no way mutable with respect to the power of anything outside Himself, since He is entirely uncaused.
Second, He lacks all passive potency, both potency with respect to existence and potency with respect to attaining an end. Finally, by His active potency, God is always present to all places—and so it is never the case that God comes to be active in a new place where He was not previously active. This final claim depends upon the assertion of divine omnipresence, treated in the previous question. In comparison to the Contra Gentiles, Thomas is here in a better position to argue for the
89 This is not to deny a real composition of essence and esse, or to deny that an angel’s essence is related to its esse as potency to act. It is effectively only to deny that anything can act upon an angel so as to destroy it: it has no passive potency with respect to its existence. 90 ST 1.9.2 [Leon. 4.91-92]: “Sed tamen remanet in eis duplex mutabilitas. Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem: et sic est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut Damascenus dicit. Alia secundum locum, inquantum virtute sua finita possunt attingere quaedam loca quae prius non attingebant.” 315 unqualified and unique character of divine immutability at this later point in the order of argumentation.
(vii) Divine eternity in ST 1.10
The first three articles of ST 1.10 concern divine eternity.91 In the first article, Thomas defends the Boethian definition of eternity as “the total, simultaneous, and perfect possession of limitless life.” ST 1.10.2 argues that God is eternal (in this Boethian sense) from His absolute immutability. In ST 1.10.3, Thomas then argues that God alone is eternal, because He alone is unqualifiedly immutable. Finally, he argues that creatures participate in divine eternity in various limited degrees, insofar as they are immutable.
(viii) Divine unity in ST 1.11
Thomas’s discussion of unity in ST 1.11 begins with two articles devoted to questions about transcendental unity, paralleling ST 1.5’s discussion of goodness in general. Thomas then discusses divine unity in two articles. ST 1.11.3 argues that God is one, in the sense that there is only one God
(or that there are not many gods). Thomas advances three arguments for this conclusion. The first appeals to God’s simplicity, in particular to the identity between God and His nature: it is impossible for there to be many gods sharing in the divine nature, because the divine nature is God Himself.92
91 The final three articles of ST 1.10 concern questions about time (the mode of duration of corporeal things) and the aevum (the mode of duration of created spiritual substances, the angels). 92 ST 1.11.3 [Leon. 4.111]: “Primo quidem ex eius simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest: sed id unde est hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem convenit Deo: nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur esse plures Deos.” A hoc aliquid is “something individual in the genus of substance” (QD De anima 1 [Leon. 24/1.7]). That whereby something is a hoc aliquid is its principle of individuation. As Thomas explains here, a principle of individuation—that whereby something is a hoc aliquid—cannot be communicable to many, that is, able to shared in common by more than one thing. That whereby Socrates is a man—the human essence or form—can be shared in common by many things, as many individual humans can have humanity (an essence) by virtue of their substantial forms; this is why there can be more than one human being. But that whereby Socrates is this man cannot be shared in common by many. For Thomas, this principle of individuation in corporeal things is designated matter: this matter cannot be shared in common by more than one individual substance. 316
The second argument appeals to the infinity of divine perfection, citing in particular God’s universal perfection, in order to argue that if there were more than one God, they would have to differ from one another in some respect, which would imply imperfection in all but one.93 The third argument is a de novo argument from the unity of the world, paralleling a similar argument in SCG 1.42.94
ST 1.11.4 then argues that God is supremely one (maxime unus), a claim that seems to treat unity as an intensive characteristic admitting of more and less.95 We can note that in his argumentation Thomas appeals to the notion of transcendental unity as undivided being, in order to argue that God is maxime unus because He is both maxime ens and maxime indivisum.96 Thomas supports the claim that God is maxime ens by appealing to His identity as “subsistent existence itself, undetermined in any way.”97 I would suggest that this appeals not only to the conclusions of ST 1.3 that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens, but also to the claim that God is infinite, not being determined or limited in any way. (Perhaps surprisingly, Thomas does not appeal to the conclusion of the fourth
93 ST 1.11.3 [Leon. 4.111]: “Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis. Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret eos differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Et si hoc esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus: si autem hoc esset perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures Deos.” This argument also suggests, again, that Thomas understands infinity as qualifying the divine perfection. 94 ST 1.11.3 [Leon. 4.111]: “Tertio, ab unitate mundi. Omnia enim quae sunt, inveniuntur esse ordinata ad invicem, dum quaedam quibusdam deserviunt. Quae autem diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno ordinarentur. Melius enim multa reducuntur in unum ordinem per unum, quam per multa: quia per se unius unum est causa, et multa non sunt causa unius nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt aliquo modo unum. Cum igitur illud quod est primum, sit perfectissimum et per se, non per accidens, oportet quod primum reducens omnia in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est Deus.” Cf. SCG 1.42. Insofar as this argument appeals to the premise that “that which is first is most perfect,” one might construe the argument as depending upon the previous argumentation establishing that God is most perfect, in order to support the final identification of the one orderer of the universe as God. The core argument is still a de novo argument, insofar as it departs from the unity of the world rather than from some previously established claim concerning God. Whether the unity of the world is evident, however, is questionable. 95 I will treat this issue below, in consideration of the triplex via. 96 ST 1.11.4 [Leon. 4.112]: “Cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque autem competit Deo.” 97 ST 1.11.4 [Leon. 4.112]: “Est enim maxime ens, inqauntum est non habens aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum.” 317 way in order to establish that God is maxime ens.) That God is maxime indivisum follows from His absolute simplicity, in that He is divided neither in act nor in potency.
(ix) Conclusions concerning ST 1.3-11
We find in ST 1.3-11 the dominance of argumentation appealing to or ultimately grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause or as the first being. We saw above that the prooemia of qq. 3-11 suggest that the discussions of goodness, omnipresence, and eternity are respectively subordinated to perfection, infinity, and immutability. In these prooemia Thomas also implies that this subordination is a matter of argumentative dependence, that goodness follows from perfection, omnipresence from infinity, eternity from immutability. In the case of eternity, it is true that all of Thomas’s arguments for eternity depend upon immutability. With respect to omnipresence, however, Thomas only employs arguments appealing immediately to God’s status as the first efficient cause of being. The case of goodness is somewhat mixed. On the one hand,
Thomas’s only argument for the claim that God is good in the body of ST 1.6.1 appeals to His status as the first efficient cause. On the other hand, there are moments in ST 1.6 (such as the reply to the first objection of ST 1.6.1) that do depend conclusions from ST 1.4.
Argumentative dependence would seem to explain much of the order of ST 1.3-11, which is to be expected in a work intended to follow a clear ordo disciplinae. Surveying the contents of ST 1.3-
11 at the level of questions, we can note that one argument in q. 4 depends on q. 3;98 that q. 6 depends on both qq. 3 and 4;99 that Thomas at least implies that q. 8 depends upon q. 7;100 that q. 9
98 In one argument in ST 1.4.2, for the claim that God is universally perfect, Thomas appeals to the claim that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens, established in ST 1.3.4 and 1.3.8. Otherwise, the remainder of ST 1.4 depends only upon the identification of God as the first efficient cause. 99 See above, p. 305 for treatment. Again, elements of ST 1.6 depend only upon the identification of God as the first efficient cause. 100 See above, p. 306-309. Thomas implies that omnipresence follows from eternity as a matter of argumentative dependence, but he offers only arguments appealing to God’s identity as the first efficient cause. 318 depends on q. 8; and that q. 10 depends on q. 9. Argumentative dependence alone does not explain the precise placement of qq. 7 or 11. We should recognize, however, that the arguments that
Thomas is able to employ are in part a function of the order of the divine names. We saw above in c. 5 that Thomas offers an argument from divine infinity to universal perfection in CT 1.21;101 that
Thomas is able to offer such an argument is a consequence of the placement of infinity before perfection in that work. It will be necessary, therefore, to complement argumentative dependence in trying to account for the order of the questions of ST 1.3-11.
C. KNOWING AND NAMING GOD IN ST 1.12-13
We should highlight a few features of ST 1.12-13, which concern how God is known and named by us. Thomas introduces ST 1.12 by indicating that it concerns “how [God] exists in our knowledge, that is, how He is known by creatures.”102 The bulk of ST 1.12 concerns the possibility and the limits of any vision of the divine essence by a created intellect. For our purposes, it is necessary to say something about aa. 4 and 12. In ST 1.12.4, Thomas advances the thesis that “the knowledge of any knower is according to the mode of its nature,” such that “if the mode of existing of some known thing exceeds the mode of the nature of the knower, it is necessary that knowledge of that thing be beyond the nature of that knower.”103 This would seem to be an application of the principle that whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver, given that knowledge is a reception of the known in the knower—a point already made by Thomas when he
101 See above, p. 274-75. 102 ST 1.12 pr. [Leon. 4.114]: “Quia in superioribus consideravimus qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis.” 103 ST 1.12.4 [Leon. 4.120]: “Cognitio enim contingit secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Unde cuiuslibet cognoscentis cognitio est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur modus essendi alicuius rei cognitae excedat modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis.” 319 characterizes our knowledge of God as His presence in our knowledge.104 Having claimed that a knower cannot attain knowledge of what is beyond its own mode of existing, Thomas then points to the fact that in God alone essence and esse are identical—and He takes this to be the divine mode of existing (which must be exclusive to God)—in order to conclude that vision of the divine essence must exceed the natural power of any creature.105
In ST 1.12.12, Thomas repeats the point that the human intellect cannot by its natural power in this life arrive at a vision of the essence of God. He does allow, however, that from our knowledge of sensible things, “we can be led to this, that we should know of God whether He exists; and that we should know of Him those [things] which necessarily belong to Him insofar as
He is the first cause of all [things], exceeding all His effects.”106 I cited this text above in c. 2 as a text in which Thomas distinguishes between two things known about God insofar as He is the cause: (a) whether He exists and (b) what must belong to Him as the first cause of all. It is according to this characterization of the via causalitatis that I will later classify certain questions within ST 1.3-11 as belonging to the via causalitatis in terms of the method of argumentation they employ.
As for ST 1.13, we need to highlight Thomas’s thesis in ST 1.13.2 that the divine attributes signify the divine substance; we will attend later to ST 1.13.11, which concerns the priority of the name qui est. Thomas’s claim in a. 2 follows upon what he indicates in a. 1, that we are able to name
104 Cf. ST 1.75.5 [Leon. 5.202], which argues for the immateriality of the human soul from the character of human intellectual knowledge as a reception of forms in an absolute, immaterial mode: “Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis.” For treatment of this principle, see John Tomarchio, “The Modus Principle in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,” (Ph.D. thesis in Philosophy: CUA, 1996). 105 ST 1.12.4 [Leon. 4.121]: “Solius autem Dei proprius modus essendi est, ut sit suum esse subsistens. . . . Relinquitur ergo quod cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens, sit connaturale soli intellectui divino, et quod sit supra facultatem naturalem cuiuslibet intellectus creati, quia nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.” 106 ST 1.12.12 [Leon. 4.136]: “Sed quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea quae necesse est ei convenire secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata.” 320
God by means of causality, eminence, and negation, albeit not such that “the name signifying Him should express the divine essence according to what it is” in itself. Names signifying God do not express the divine essence in the way that, for example, the name ‘man’ expresses human nature by signifying a definition.107 Divine naming signifies God without expressing any quidditative knowledge. This being said, Thomas clarifies in ST 1.13.2 that positive divine names such as goodness and wisdom signify the divine substance or essence, albeit deficiently, and are predicated of Him substantially, according to the manner in which the human intellect knows God in this life on the basis of created likenesses.108 Thomas explains that “when God is called good, the meaning is not ‘God is the cause of goodness’ or ‘God is not evil;’ rather, the meaning is that what we call goodness in creatures preexists in God, and indeed according to a higher mode.”109
Although these two questions are not our primary focus, since they do not directly concern particular divine names, still I would note that they find their place in the structure of ST 1.3-26 insofar as (1) q. 13 is subordinated by argumentative dependence to q. 12 and (2) q. 12, which concerns God’s existence in our knowledge, follows after the assertion of q. 8 that God “exists in all things.”
107 ST 1.13.1 [Leon. 4.139]: “Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est, significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.” 108 ST 1.13.2 [Leon. 4.141-42]: “Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius.” Cf. De pot. 7.5. For discussion of the development in Thomas’s thought on this point, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 541, n. 139. 109 ST 1.13.2 [Leon. 4.141-42]: “Sic igitur praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen, sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitur dicitur Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis, vel Deus non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem.” 321
D. THE DIVINE OPERATION THROUGH THE VIA EMINENTIAE IN ST 1.14-26
In ST 1.14-26, just as in SCG 1.44-102, Thomas argues from one positive name to another, in an order fundamentally determined by the relationships between the intelligible contents (rationes) of these positive names. For example, having established that God has knowledge in ST 1.14,
Thomas will be able to argue that God has will in ST 1.19, by appealing to the premise that whatever is intelligent must have will.
In the prooemium of ST 1.14, Thomas provides a clear account of the rationale for the content and organization of ST 1.14-26. He begins by invoking the distinction between substance and operation, indicating that what has come previously has concerned the divine substance, while what follows will concern God’s operation. He then distinguishes between immanent and transitive operation, naming God’s knowledge (ST 1.14) and will (ST 1.19) in connection with the former and
His power (ST 1.25) in connection with the latter. He observes that discussion of divine life (ST
1.18) should follow after divine knowledge, because understanding belongs to living things. Finally, he notes that the discussion of both truth and falsity (ST 1.16-17) and of the divine ideas (ST 1.15) will follow after discussion of divine knowledge (scientia), because knowledge is “of truths,” and what is known is always somehow in the knower. Complementing this account, the prooemium of q. 19 notes that after treating God’s will, Thomas will treat of those things that pertain to the divine will absolutely, followed by those things that pertain to the divine intellect in its relationship to the divine will. The former topics are God’s love (ST 1.20) and justice and mercy (ST 1.21), while the latter is providence (ST 1.22-24), treated generally in ST 1.22 and in a special way in connection to human beings in the discussions of predestination and the book of life in ST 1.23-24. In this way, many of the divine names treated in ST 1.14-26 play a subordinated role. Taking into account all of the prooemia of ST 1.14-26, it is clear that qq. 15-17 (divine ideas, truth, falsity) are subordinated to q. 14 322
(divine knowledge); that qq. 20-21 (divine love, justice, and mercy) are subordinated to q. 19 (divine will); and that qq. 23-24 (predestination, the book of life) are subordinated to q. 22 (divine providence), which is in turn subordinated to both divine knowledge and will.
We noted above in treatment of the Contra Gentiles that the discussion of divine operation follows a rational order according to the via eminentiae, understood as the way of argumentation according to which one positive attribute follows from another. For example: God is intelligent; whatever is intelligent has will; therefore God has will. The prooemia of qq. 14 and 19 indicate that the same sort of argumentative structure is at work in the consideration of divine immanent operation in the Summa theologiae. The only major difference between the Contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae in this respect is that whereas in the former divine beatitude clearly finds its place as the culmination of the discussion of divine immanent operation, in the latter Thomas places beatitude (ST 1.26) after divine power (ST 1.25). I would also note a peculiarity about the prooemium of ST 1.26, which begins:
“But finally, after consideration of those things that pertain to the unity of the divine essence, the divine beatitude remains to be considered.” What is peculiar about this introduction is that it sets apart consideration of divine beatitude from those things “that pertain to the unity of the divine essence.” Similarly, the prooemium of ST 1.27 (the first question on the Trinity) begins as follows:
“But having considered those things that pertain to the unity of the divine essence, it remains [for us] to consider those things that pertain to the Trinity of Persons in the divine.”
(i) Divine knowledge in ST 1.14
Thomas covers approximately the same ground in the sixteen articles of ST 1.14 that he does in SCG 1.44-58. He begins, in ST 1.14.1, by establishing that there is knowledge in God. Whereas
SCG 1.44 had offered seven arguments for the claim that God is intelligent, Thomas offers only one argument in ST 1.14, a version of the argument from God’s immateriality. As indicated numerous 323 times above, this argument is characterized by Thomas as belonging to the via negationis, in the sense that it depends upon a prior negative name. Surprisingly, compared with the Contra Gentiles, Thomas does not offer an argument for divine knowledge appealing to God’s universal perfection.110
In ST 1.14.2, Thomas proves that God understands Himself, basing his argument on the claim that God is pure act: God must Himself be the object of His understanding, because anything else would imply some composition of potency and act in God. ST 1.14.3 then extends this claim, by establishing that God comprehends Himself. (To comprehend means to know something insofar as it can be known: it is to know in a manner that exhausts the intelligibility of what is known.) Thomas does not appeal to divine perfection in His argument, but only to what has been established so far in
ST 1.14: God possesses a power for knowing (virtus in cognoscendo) insofar as He is immaterial pure act, which is His actuality in existing (actualitas in existendo), and so His knowing must be perfectly adequated to His being. In the remaining articles of ST 1.14, Thomas treats God’s knowledge of things other than Himself.
(ii) Divine life in ST 1.18
Thomas introduces the discussion of divine life with two articles devoted to life in general: a.
1 asks whether all natural things have life, and a. 2 asks whether life is an operation. Thomas indicates that life is properly attributed to those things “that move themselves according to some species of motion,” whether this is motion as the act of the imperfect—physical motion—or as the
110 He does appeal to universal perfection in ST 1.14.1 ad 1, not in order to justify the attribution of knowledge to God, but to condition that attribution by the claim that created perfections exist in God in a higher, absolutely simple mode. ST 1.14.1 ad 1 [Leon. 4.166-67]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas, altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod, quandocumque aliquod nomen sumptum a quacumque perfectione creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae. Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia et actus purus.” 324 act of the perfect, such as understanding and sensation.111 In ST 1.18.3, Thomas explains that life is in God in a most proper way (maxime proprie), since something is said to have life because it operates of itself, rather than being moved by another. Thomas offers an account of the various degrees of life found in creatures, insofar as a greater degree of self-movement is found in higher sorts of living things. Concerning human beings, Thomas notes that we move ourselves in a more perfect way than plants or non-human animals, because by intellect we establish the proximate ends that we pursue in our acts. However, both the knowledge of first principles and the willing of our final end are supplied to us by nature, and in this way we too are moved with respect to our operations. This leads Thomas to conclude, with Aristotle, that God possesses the highest degree of life, because His act of understanding is identical with His nature, and in no way is what He naturally possesses determined by another. We find appeals here (a) to a claim established in ST 1.14.4 (that God’s act of understanding is His substance) and (b) to the claim that God is in no way caused or moved by another.
(iii) Divine will in ST 1.19
The argument by which Thomas establishes that there is will in God is simple and briefly stated: “It must be said that there is will in God, as there is also intellect in Him, for will follows upon intellect.”112 By comparison, in the Contra Gentiles, Thomas offers several arguments for divine will, most of which depend upon the previously established claim that God is intelligent or has intellect—but he also offers two arguments grounded respectively in the identifications of God as the first mover and as the first efficient cause.113 Here in ST 1.19.1, Thomas offers a brief defense of
111 ST 1.18.1 [Leon. 4.225]: “Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicitur moveri.” 112 ST 1.19.1 [Leon. 4.231]: “Respondeo dicendum in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus: voluntas enim consequitur intellectum.” 113 See above, pp. 206-208. 325 why every intelligent nature must have will—intellectual appetite—but for our purposes what is most important is the structure of the argument, which exemplifies the procedure by which Thomas proceeds from one positive divine attribute to another, in the via eminentiae. Thomas also concludes at the end of his respondeo that divine willing (velle) is identical with the divine essence, just as is the divine understanding.114 The remaining articles of ST 1.19 largely correspond to SCG 1.74-88, establishing such claims as that God wills things other than Himself, that He does not will things other than Himself necessarily, that His will is immutable, and that no cause of divine willing can be identified.115
(iv) Divine love, justice, and mercy in ST 1.20-21
Thomas’s argument for attributing love to God in ST 1.20.1 simply appeals to the presence of will in God: love is the first and most fundamental movement of the will, and so if God has will,
He must love. In this way, divine love is clearly subordinated to divine will in terms of argumentative dependence.
As for justice, Thomas first distinguishes between commutative and distributive justice, excluding the former from God (presumably because commutative justice concerns exchanges between equal parties, but no creature is equal to God). To support the attribution of distributive
114 ST 1.19.1 [Leon. 4.231]: “Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita suum velle.” 115 Concerning the claim that no cause of divine willing can be identified, Thomas explains that the act by which God wills His own goodness and the act by which He wills all other things, for the sake of His goodness, are identical, both with each other and with God Himself. To assign a cause to the divine will would be, therefore, to say that God Himself is caused, which is impossible. Although Thomas denies that a cause can be assigned to the divine will, this doesn’t mean that there isn’t a reason (ratio) for what God wills: the ratio volendi for God is His own goodness. See ST 1.19.4 ad 3 [Leon. 4.238]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.” This allows Thomas to assert in ST 1.19.5 ad 1 that “the will of God is reasonable, not because something is for God a cause of willing, but insofar as He wills one thing to be because of another.” ST 1.19.5 ad 1 [Leon. 4.239]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.” For discussion of this distinction between a reason and a cause, see Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on the Ultimate Why Question: Why is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever?” in The Ultimate Why Question, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 100-106. 326 justice to God, we find a de novo argument appealing to the order of the universe: “the order of the universe, which appears as much in natural things as in voluntary things, demonstrates the justice of
God.”116 Thomas then approvingly cites Dionysius, that God by His justice gives to all things what is proper to them.117
With respect to mercy, Thomas primarily attends to clarifying what it means to attribute mercy to God: mercy is attributed not as a passion of the sense appetite (sorrow over another’s misery), but according to the effect of mercy (which is to dispel the misery of another). Thomas indicates that mercy belongs supremely (maxime) to God, because “defects are taken away by the perfection of goodness: but the first origin of goodness is God, as was said above.”118
(v) Divine providence in ST 1.22-24
Thomas treats God’s providence and two special topics associated with it (predestination and the book of life, a metaphor for predestination) in ST 1.22-24. I will not give any direct treatment to these two special topics, which concern divine providence over human beings, except to note that their inclusion depends upon the claim that man is directed by God towards an end that exceeds his natural power, namely, the beatific vision of the divine essence. Perhaps as a consequence of this, Thomas treats his claims concerning predestination as a matter of fittingness rather than as a matter of philosophical demonstration.119
116 ST 1.21.1 [Leon. 4.258]: “Sicut igitur ordo congruus familiae, vel cuiuscumque multitudinis gubernatae, demonstrat huiusmodi iustitiam in gubernante; ita ordo universi, qui apparet tam in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis, demonstrat Dei iustitiam.” 117 ST 1.21.1 [Leon. 4.258]: “Unde dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Div. Nom.: Oportet videre in hoc veram Dei esse iustitiam, quod omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et virtute.” Thomas quotes (with some alteration) from John the Saracen’s translation of this passage from Divine Names 8 [Dionysiaca 1.437]: “Oportet autem videre divinam justitiam in hoc veram justitiam et quia omnibus attribuit propria secundum uniuscujusque exsistentium dignitatem, et uniuscujusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et virtute.” 118 ST 1.21.3 [Leon. 4.260]: “Tristari ergo de miseria alterius non competit Deo: sed repellere miseriam alterius, hoc maxime ei competit, ut per miseriam quemcumque defectum intelligamus. Defectus autem non tolluntur, nisi per alicuius bonitatis perfectionem: prima autem origo bonitatis Deus est, ut supra ostensum est.” 119 ST 1.23.1 [Leon. 4.271]: “Respondeo dicendum quod Deo conveniens est homines praedestinare.” 327
Thomas argues for the attribution of providence to God from the claim that God is the first cause of things “through His intellect,” such that the order of all things towards the divine goodness as their ultimate end must preexist in the divine mind. Providence is this plan or archetype in the divine mind of the ordination of all things to their end.120 Providence is thus attributed to God on the basis of several previously established claims concerning divine knowledge and goodness.121
We should also note that there is something of a relational character about the notion of providence, as God’s providence necessarily concerns the created order. By contrast, God’s knowledge and will are understood to be of Himself primarily, and of creatures in a secondary way.
In this way, providence is like power: on the one hand, providence as an operation of God is identical with the divine essence; on the other hand, providence necessarily implies a relation to creatures. Providence can therefore be considered as a quasi-relational name.122
(vi) Divine power in ST 1.25
Thomas discusses the following issues in the six articles of ST 1.25: whether there is power in God, whether God’s power is infinite, whether God is omnipotent, whether God can make the past not to have been, whether God can do what He does not, and whether God can do better than
He does. We will leave aside the topics of the final three articles. In ST 1.25.1, Thomas distinguishes between active power/potency and passive power/potency, attributing the former to God “in the highest degree” (summe) from the prior claim that God is pure act, since “it is manifest that each
120 ST 1.22.1 [Leon. 4.263]: “Omne enim bonum quod est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, ut supra ostensum est. In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue in finem ultimum, qui est bonitas divina, ut supra habitum est. Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie providentia est.” 121 For discussion of Thomas’s argumentation for divine providence, see Brian J. Shanley, “Thomas Aquinas on Demonstrating God’s Providence,” The Science of Being as Being (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 221-242. 122 For this notion, see above, pp. 18-19. 328 thing, insofar as it is in act and [is] perfect, is accordingly the active principle of something.”123
Thomas thus grounds the attribution of power to God in the prior identification of God as pure act.
In replying to the fourth objection in ST 1.25.1 (which objects that God’s knowledge and will are the causes of things, and so it is unnecessary to attribute power to God), Thomas indicates that although knowledge, will, and power are really (secundum rem) the same in God, still they differ from one another according to reason (secundum rationem). Divine power is understood to differ from divine knowledge and will, insofar as “power indicates the notion of a principle of executing what will commands and what knowledge directs.”124 Thomas then offers an alternative explanation as to why it is appropriate to attribute power to God: “divine knowledge or will, insofar as it is an efficient principle, possesses the character (ratio) of power. Whence consideration of knowledge and will in
God precedes consideration of [His] power, as a cause precedes [its] operation and effect.”125
Thomas indicates that God’s knowledge and will are treated prior to His power precisely because divine knowledge and will possess the character of power, for we identify God’s knowledge and will as the cause or principle of creaturely effects.126 To have treated divine power prior to treating divine knowledge and will could have suggested that God is the principle of created effects by something other than His knowledge and will. It is therefore best for us to consider God’s power in light of our claims about His knowledge and will, rather than vice versa.
123 ST 1.25.1 [Leon. 4.290]: “Manifestum est enim quod unumquodque, secundum quod est actu et perfectum, secundum hoc est principium activum alicuius. . . . Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est purus actus, et simpliciter et universaliter perfectus.” 124 ST 1.25.1 ad 4 [Leon. 4.290-91]: “Ad quartum dicendum quod potentia non ponitur in Deo ut aliquid differens a scientia et voluntate secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem; inquantum scilicet potentia importat rationem principii exequentis id quod voluntas imperat, et ad quod scientia dirigit; quae tria Deo secundum idem conveniunt.” This follows upon the clarification offered in the response to the third objection, in which Thomas indicates that power in God indicates not a principle of action, but only the principle of the extrinsic effect (i.e., a creature). 125 ST 1.25.1 ad 4 [Leon. 4.291]: “Vel dicendum quod ipsa scientia vel voluntas divina, secundum quod est principium effectivum, habet rationem potentiae. Unde consideratio scientiae et voluntatis praecedit in Deo considerationem potentiae, sicut causa praecedit operationem et effectum.” 126 See ST 1.14.8 and ST 1.19.4 for the claims that God’s knowledge and will are the cause of creatures. 329
In ST 1.25.2, Thomas argues that God’s power is infinite, appealing to the infinity of the divine essence. He rehearses the argument first presented in ST 1.7.1, that God’s esse is infinite
“insofar as it is not limited through something receiving [it],” again reflecting dependence on the principle that unreceived act is unlimited. Because active power is attributed to God insofar as He is in act, it follows from His infinite esse that His active power must likewise be infinite.127 This sequence of argumentation reflects the claim Thomas offers explicitly in SCG 1.43, which is that infinity of essence implies infinity of power. Finally, in ST 1.25.3, Thomas argues for God’s omnipotence, a notion very closely related to the infinity of divine power.128 God’s omnipotence, like the infinity of His power, is seen to follow from the infinity of the divine esse.
The late placement of divine power in ST 1.25 is thus not a consequence of the requirements of argumentative dependence. Thomas argues for the attribution of power to God from His being pure act, something established implicitly in the first way in ST 1.2.3 and explicitly in ST 1.3.1. Nor is its late placement a matter of the order according to the via eminentiae by which one can argue from one positive divine name to another (as from knowledge to will). Rather, God’s power is placed late in the order because divine power must be rationally subordinated, in our consideration, not only to the infinity of the divine esse, but also to the divine knowledge and will, understood as the cause of created effects. To treat God’s power prior to treating His knowledge and will might give the impression that God is the cause of created effects by something other than His knowledge and will.
127 ST 1.25.2 [Leon. 4.292]: “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum, inquantum non est limitatum per aliquid recipiens; ut patet per ea quae supra dicta sunt, cum de infinitate divinae essentiae ageretur. Unde necesse est quod activa potentia Dei sit infinita.” 128 In brief, to call God omnipotent explicitly indicates that God can by His power produce anything logically possible; whereas calling His power infinite does not explicitly indicate this aspect of His power. Thus, one could mistakenly think that God’s power is infinite, such that He is capable of creating (something that requires infinite power), but that there were some logically possible created effects that God’s power could not immediately produce. 330
(vii) Divine beatitude in ST 1.26
Thomas concludes his treatment of the one God with beatitude, just as he concluded SCG 1 with discussion of divine beatitude. As noted above, Thomas introduces his discussion of divine beatitude in a somewhat surprising fashion, by placing it as posterior to those things that “pertain to the unity of the divine essence,” in a manner similar to his introduction of the Trinity in the following questions. Thomas argues that beatitude belongs to God by first defining beatitude:
For nothing else is understood by the name beatitude except the perfect good of an intellectual nature, to which it belongs to know its sufficiency in the good which it possesses, and to which it belongs that something either good or evil may happen to it, and [which] is master of its operations. But each of these belongs most excellently to God, namely to be perfect and intelligent. Whence beatitude belongs supremely to God.129
This definition of beatitude indicates why the discussion of beatitude follows after everything that pertains to both the divine intellect and will (and everything subordinated to them), since it is in discussion of divine will that it is established that God is, as it were, master of His own operations.
(viii) Conclusions concerning ST 1.14-26
For the most part, we can say that ST 1.14-26 unfolds according to the order of the via eminentiae as Thomas understands it, that is, according to the order of argumentative dependence by which one positive divine name follows from another. Because God has knowledge, He must be living and have will; the remaining contents of ST 1.14-24 are subordinated to divine knowledge, divine will, or to both. The placement of the discussion of divine power in ST 1.25 is not, however, determined by the requirements of argumentative dependence. It is nevertheless rationally subordinated, in our understanding, to the divine knowledge and will, which are understood as the
129 ST 1.26 [Leon. 4. 301]: “Nihil enim aliud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae; cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.” 331 divine operations by which God causes creatures. Finally, the placement of divine beatitude in ST
1.26 represents the culmination of the via eminentiae.
E. CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ORDER OF ARGUMENTATIVE DEPENDENCE
I would offer three general conclusions concerning the order of argumentative dependence in ST 1.3-26. First, the requirements of argumentative dependence would seem to explain much of the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae. This is to be expected in a work explicitly conditioned by a concern for the ordo disciplinae. This being said, certain details of the order cannot be explained as a matter of argumentative dependence alone. I would especially note the placement of infinity, unity, and power. We should keep in mind, too, that the arguments employed by Thomas are themselves in part a function of the order of the names, and so the requirements of argumentative dependence alone cannot sufficiently explain the order.
Second, with respect to how the order of the divine names is grounded in the conclusions of the five ways, we find that Thomas exhibits a preference in ST 1.3-11 for basing his argumentation in the identification of God as the first efficient cause. Comparing the Summa theologiae to the Summa contra Gentiles, we can especially note the disappearance of most arguments grounded explicitly in the identification of God as the first unmoved mover.130 Furthermore, even where the placement of certain divine names is implied to be a matter of argumentative dependence, Thomas offers arguments grounded in the second way. For example, goodness and omnipresence are placed as subordinated by argumentative dependence to perfection and infinity, respectively, but in both cases
Thomas’s arguments appeal to God’s identity as the first efficient cause.
130 For example, arguments for God’s goodness, infinity, and intelligence explicitly grounded in the first way in SCG 1.37, 1.43, and 1.44 are not replicated in ST 1.6 and 1.14. 332
Third, one type of argumentation is conspicuously absent in ST 1.3-26: there are almost no pure perfection arguments, that is, arguments appealing to God’s universal perfection in order to establish that a particular pure perfection should be attributed to God.131 The only instance of a pure perfection argument in ST 1.3-26 appears in ST 1.14.11, in which Thomas argues that God possesses knowledge of singulars, from the premise that “all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God according to a higher mode.”132 This will be an important issue below.
2. THE ROLE OF PRINCIPLES OF ORDER
A. THE ROLE OF THE ORDER OF SCIENCE
The order of science plays a particularly important role in the Summa theologiae, beginning in
ST 1.1, which presents sacra doctrina as a science with God as its subject. In this section, I will first present one possible way of understanding the role of the order of science in structuring the order of the divine names, in terms of the distinction between essence and properties. I will then proceed to analyze how Thomas employs the order of the scientific questions in ST 1.2-26.
(i) Essence and properties: the formal constituent of the divine essence?
Both in his De Deo uno (a commentary on ST 1.2-26) and in his Dieu: son Existence et sa Nature,
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange characterizes the order of the divine names in terms of the distinction between essence and properties. Garrigou-Lagrange’s position is fundamentally a response to a question posed by the commentatorial and neo-scholastic traditions. This question concerns what is called the constitutive divine attribute or the formal constituent of the divine essence in our understanding. Garrigou-Lagrange poses the question as follows:
131 One argument in ST 1.11.3 for divine unity appeals to God’s universal perfection, but this argument is not a pure perfection argument. 132 ST 1.14.11 [Leon. 4.183]: “Omnes enim perfectiones in creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia cognoscat.” 333
Although it is not possible to know in a natural way what constitutes the Deity as it is in itself, among the absolute perfections which can be known in a natural way, is there not one, according to our imperfect mode of knowing them, which is the fundamental principle of the distinction between God and the world and which is the source of all the divine attributes? If such be the case, we should be right from the logical point of view of our imperfect knowledge in saying that this perfection is what formally constitutes the divine essence. It would be in God what rationality is in man: the specifying principle which distinguishes Him from other beings, and from which His properties are derived.133
Garrigou-Lagrange thus characterizes the formal constituent of the divine essence as the divine perfection, in our understanding, (i) that sets God apart from all other things and (ii) from which all of the other divine attributes can be derived, as properties are derived from the essence. He continues:
The divine perfections, as they are in themselves, though not distinct from one another, are all equal, in the sense that no one of them is more perfect than the others, each of them implying the others. But, inasmuch as they are distinct from one another according to our mode of knowing them, and are analogically like created perfections, it is possible to find a certain order among them, in that there is a first among them.134
Garrigou-Lagrange thus grounds the order of the divine names in the identification of the formal constituent of the divine essence in our understanding. He goes on to argue that this formally constitutive attribute is ipsum esse per se subsistens, connecting this with Thomas’s identification of qui est as the supremely proper name of God.135
If we take the question concerning the formal constituent of the divine essence for granted, then Garrigou-Lagrange’s answer—that it is ipsum esse per se subsistens—would seem best. The more fundamental question, however, is whether or not there is such a thing as the formal constituent of
133 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, tr. Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 1949), 9. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, 19: “The formal constituent of the divine nature, according to our imperfect mode of knowing it, is what we conceive in God as being the fundamental principle that distinguishes Him from creatures, and that is the source of His attributes.” Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Deo Uno, 126- 31. For another more recent source endorsing the same thesis concerning the formal constituent of the divine essence, see Stephen Theron, “The Divine Attributes in Aquinas,” The Thomist 51.1 (1987): 37-50. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid., 11, 18-19. 334 the divine essence in our understanding, understood as one perfection attributed to God that both
(1) distinguishes God from all things and (2) serves as the principle from which all other divine attributes are derived, just as properties are derived from an essence. Does Thomas think that there is such an attribute that formally constitutes the divine nature in our understanding in both these ways?
As for the former feature—that the formal constituent would distinguish God from all things—the identification of God as ipsum esse per se subsistens is crucial for the distinction of God from the world, by distinguishing between unreceived, unparticipated subsistent esse itself and every being whose essence is distinct from, participates in, and receives its actus essendi. In this respect, the answer favored by Garrigou-Lagrange is indeed best, with the qualification that God’s infinity is also involved in distinguishing Him from all things. For our purposes in this dissertation, however, it is the latter feature (that the formal constituent is the principle from which all the other divine names can be derived) that is most important, since it concerns the relationship between the formal constituent and the rest of the divine names.136 As Garrigou-Lagrange himself suggests, this formal constituent would be the foundation of the order of the divine names. Does Thomas in fact ground all of the remaining divine names in the identification of God as ipsum esse per se subsistens? Is this how
Thomas thinks about the priority of the divine name ipsum esse? To address these questions, we will
(a) recall certain details from the analysis of the order of argumentative dependence and (b) investigate the reasons Thomas himself offers for the priority of qui est as a divine name.
136 As a point of terminology, Garrigou-Lagrange includes both negative and positive divine names under the term attribute, whereas I have indicated that Thomas seems to prefer to use the term attribute to speak about the positive divine names. Garrigou-Lagrange himself defines “divine attribute” in function of the formal constituent, as follows: “The expression ‘divine attribute,’ in its strict sense, is usually defined as an absolutely simple perfection which exists necessarily and formally in God and which, according to our imperfect mode of knowing it, is deduced from what we conceive as constituting the divine essence.” Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, 33. 335
First, with respect to order of argumentation in the Summa theologiae, Thomas does derive certain crtically important conclusions from the identification of God as ipsum esse per se subsistens, such as God’s universal perfection (by a second argument in 1.4.2) and infinity (1.7.1). He also implies that omnipresence can be derived from infinity, although his arguments in ST 1.8 appeal to
God’s identity as first efficient cause. In ST 1.11.3, one of Thomas’s arguments for divine uniqueness appeals to God’s universal perfection, which can be grounded in His identity as ipsum esse per se subsistens.137 (It is important to note, however, that this is not a pure perfection argument.)138
Finally, there is a pure perfection argument in ST 1.14.11 for the claim that God knows singulars; this argument thus also appeals to divine universal perfection, which can be grounded in the identification of God as ipsum esse subsistens.139
With respect to the remaining content of ST 1.4-11, however, Thomas repeatedly appeals to the identifications of God as first efficient cause (or first being) and as pure act. (One feature of
Garrigou-Lagrange’s defense of his position, as an interpretation of the Summa theologiae, is that he takes ipsum esse per se subsistens and actus purus as interchangeable and equivalent in meaning.)140
Furthermore, we have seen that virtually everything concluded in ST 1.14-26 depends upon the conclusion of ST 1.14.1, that there is knowledge (scientia) in God, for which Thomas argues in ST
1.14.1 from God’s immateriality. Nearly the entire discussion of God’s operation makes no explicit
137 ST 1.11.3 [Leon. 4.111]: “Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis. Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret eos differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Et si hoc esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus: si autem hoc esset perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures Deos.” 138 That is, the reasoning is not that uniqueness is a pure perfection that must be attributed to God. Rather, the argument is that if there were two Gods, they would have to differ in some respect; but this is precluded by the universality and infinity of the divine perfection. 139 ST 1.14.11 [Leon. 4.183]: “Respondeo dicendum quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia cognoscat.” 140 See Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, 16-21. This is also the approach taken by Joseph Pohle; see Joseph Pohle, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, tr. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1911), 165-66. 336 appeal to the identity of essence and esse in God.141 By no means do I wish to minimize the importance of the conclusions that Thomas does derive from this identity, such as universal perfection and infinity. My purpose is only to clarify that Thomas does not present the order of argumentative dependence in ST 1.3-26 in such a way that every other divine name explicitly follows from ipsum esse per se subsistens.
Now, perhaps Thomas would conceive of another possible way of argumentation, one different from that found in the Summa theologiae. One approach, which we do find in the Contra
Gentiles, is to derive positive divine attributes (such as goodness or intelligence) from the claim that
God is universally perfect. I have noted the near total absence of such arguments in this section of the Summa theologiae. But is there any reason to doubt that Thomas could have employed such arguments? Are we not justified in assuming that all of the other divine attributes can ultimately be derived from God’s identity as ipsum esse subsistens, even if Thomas chose not to present such arguments explicitly?
In order for pure perfection arguments to work as a way of arriving at the attributes of the divine essence, we have to assume that whatever is a pure perfection is not only somehow found in
God but is an essential attribute. As it turns out, this is a problematic assumption. Surprisingly, other than the argument for God’s knowledge of singulars in ST 1.14.11 mentioned above, the only other instance of a pure perfection argument in the Summa theologiae does not appear in ST 1.3-26, but rather in ST 1.29.3, which argues that the name person is fittingly posited in divinis. Thomas argues as follows:
Person signifies that which is most perfect in all [of] nature, namely subsistence in a rational nature. Whence, since everything which is of perfection is to be attributed to God, because
141 There is one appeal to this identity in ST 1.14.4, which establishes that God’s act of understanding is identical with His essence. The discussion of God’s infinite power and omnipotence in ST 1.25 appeals to God’s infinity, which is grounded in the identity of God’s essence and esse. 337
His essence contains in itself every perfection, it is fitting that this name person be said of God. Nevertheless, it is not [said of God] in the same way in which it is said of creatures, but in a more excellent way, just as with the other names which, imposed by us on creatures, are attributed to God, as was shown above, when treating of the divine names.142
Thomas only concludes from this argument that it is fitting that the name person should be said of
God. Now, according to Thomas’s Trinitarian theology, personality is not an essential attribute, and the term person signifies not the divine essence but rather a subsistent relation, of which there are three in God. The divine essence—with all of its attributes—is that which is one and common to the three divine persons, and so any attribute of the essence is one and common to the three persons. If Thomas were to hold that pure perfection arguments always yield essential attributes, then he would be constrained to accept that personality is an essential attribute. It would follow from this that there is only one divine person, just as there is one divine esse or one divine act of understanding. According to Thomas’s understanding of the relationship between reason and faith, philosophical reasoning can neither demonstrate nor contradict the revealed mysteries of the
Christian faith, such as the Trinity.143 Given that Thomas is willing to employ a pure perfection argument to establish that it is fitting to predicate the term person of God, it seems doubtful that
Thomas considers the pure perfection argument to be sufficient for deriving the essential attributes.
Through pure perfection arguments we can derive things that are somehow in God or fittingly said of God, but these names are not limited to the essential attributes.
We should therefore not overstate the importance of universal perfection as a link in the order of argumentative dependence. The assertion of God’s universal perfection does open up
142 ST 1.29.3 [Leon. 4.331]: “Respondeo dicendum quod persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura. Unde, cum omne illud quod est perfectionis, Deo sit attribuendem, eo quod eius essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem; conveniens est ut hoc nomen persona de Deo dicatur. Non tamen eodem modo quo dicitur de creaturis, sed excellentiori modo; sicut et alia nomina quae, creaturis a nobis imposita, Deo attribuuntur; sicut supra ostensum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur.” 143 For Thomas’s most careful articulation of the relationship between philosophical reasoning and the contents of the Christian faith, see In De Trin. 2.3. For discussion, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 380 ff. 338 conceptual space, as it were, for accepting the attribution of perfections such as intelligence and life to God, but Thomas appeals to other lines of argumentation to establish these attributes. There is insufficient textual warrant for the supposition that ipsum esse per se subsistens could be, through universal perfection, the divine attribute from which all other divine names are derived.
Consequently, ipsum esse per se subsistens cannot be identified as the formal constituent of the divine essence with respect to the second feature indicated by Garrigou-Lagrange, namely, that it be the divine attribute from which all others are derived.144
To further support this conclusion, we should examine the reasons given by Thomas in ST
1.13.11 for the claim that “He who is” (qui est), the name that God revealed to Moses, is the most proper name of God (maxime proprium nomen Dei). Thomas offers three reasons, appealing to the (1) signification, (2) universality, and (3) consignification of the name qui est. We can dispense quickly with the third reason: qui est, which is in the present tense, consignifies present existence, which befits the eternal God who knows neither past nor future within Himself.145 The first two reasons given by Thomas require a little more attention. The first reason is that the name qui est “does not
144 Is there no other path from which Thomas could derive the remaining divine names from God’s identification as ipsum esse subsistens, apart from pure perfection arguments? I will discuss what might be called transcendental arguments—from God’s being ipsum esse to His being one, true, and good—below, but here I will just note the total absence of any such argument in any of Thomas’s treatises on God. We have also noted Thomas’s frequent dependence on the identification of God as the first efficient cause, even after having established that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens. For example, Thomas argues for God’s perfection, goodness, and omnipresence in this way. If we could reason from God’s identity as ipsum esse subsistens to His being the first efficient cause, then we would have the path of reasoning desired, with respect to at least some of the divine names. Now, it must be conceded that God’s identity as ipsum esse is, along with all of the positive divine attributes, prior to His being the first efficient cause, since the positive divine attributes signify His essence, whereas the latter designates God’s logical relation to creatures. Along similar lines, Thomas indicates that we cannot think that God is good merely because He causes good creatures; rather, He causes creatures because He is good. But how would Thomas construct an order of argumentation proceeding from (i) His identification as ipsum esse subsistens to (ii) His status as the first efficient cause? Such a deduction cannot be necessary, since this would violate Thomas’s understanding of God’s freedom to create or not to create. Even if we must acknowledge that all of God’s attributes are prior to His being the efficient cause, this still does not seem to afford us with a path of reasoning through which we could deduce all of the divine names from ipsum esse subsistens. 145 ST 1.13.11 [Leon. 4.162]: “Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione. Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum.” For the claim that verbs consignify time according to what modern grammar calls tense, see De interpretatione 3 16b6-8 [McKeon 41]: “A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time.” 339 signify some form, but esse itself. Whence, since God’s esse is His very essence, and this
[characteristic] belongs to nothing else, as shown above, it is manifest that among the other names this [name] most properly names God, for each thing is denominated by its form.”146 Thomas emphasizes that the identity of essence and esse in God is what distinguishes God from every creature, since such an identity belongs to Him alone—this reinforces the first characteristic
Garrigou-Lagrange associates with the formal constituent of the divine essence. There is, however, no indication that Thomas means for us to take God’s esse as His essence in our understanding in such a way that everything else said about God is derived from this fundamental attribute.
The second reason given by Thomas for the maximal propriety of the name qui est is the universality of the name. He explains that every other divine name is either less common (such as, for example, wise) or, if it is convertible with qui est (such as, for example, good), then still it adds something beyond qui est according to reason.147 But since our knowledge in this life always falls short of how God exists in Himself, divine names are in fact more proper insofar as they “are less determinate and more common and absolute.” The name qui est “determines no mode of existing, but is related indeterminately to all” modes of existing, and so it is the maximally proper name.148
This is a somewhat negative emphasis: the supreme propriety of the name qui est arises from the fact
146 ST 1.13.11 [Leon. 4.162]: “Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat Deum: unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma.” 147 Thomas thus appeals here to his doctrine of the transcendentals, which are convertible with being and add something to being only secundum rationem. According to Thomas, being (ens) is that which is (quod est). 148 ST 1.13.11 [Leon. 4.162]: “Secundo, propter eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum. Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae infinitum.” 340 that this name is less determinate than any other name.149 I would suggest that this second reason for the maximal propriety of the name qui est strikes an important balance with the thesis, presented in
ST 1.4.2, that ipsum esse per se subsistens must possess the entire virtus essendi and therefore contain every particular perfection found in creatures. Thomas indicates that qui est is the maximally proper name not because it implies every particular perfection, but rather because it refrains from determining any particular mode of existence, in recognition of the fact that our knowledge of God in this life always falls short of the mode in which God exists in Himself. I would suggest that this negative emphasis stands in contrast to the thesis of Garrigou-Lagrange, which arguably treats ipsum esse per se subsistens as a working substitute for definitional knowledge.150
To conclude, then, neither the details of the order of argumentative dependence nor the reasons Thomas gives for the priority of the divine name qui est justify the thesis that ipsum esse per se subsistens is related to the other divine attributes as the source from which they are all derived. This is clear with respect to the order of argumentative dependence in the Summa theologiae as Thomas
149 Cf De pot. 7.2 ad 9 [Marietti 2.192], the famous text in which Thomas asserts that esse is the “the act of all acts, and consequently it is the perfection of all perfections.” In this text, Thomas explains that esse is least determinate, but not such that it is determined by anything more formal than it; that is, esse is not determined as potency by some act. Rather, esse is determined to a particular mode of being by its reception in some nature, as act received by potency. 150 Cf. R. te Velde, Aquinas on God, 66: “According to Thomas, God can only be approached by thought in an indirect and negative fashion. This characteristic negative approach to the divine is of crucial importance for the interpretation of the phrase ‘self-subsistent being.’ Instead of being a definition of God, it is intended to designate the divine reality according to the indirect and negative fashion in which we come to know that reality.” We should also mention the issue treated by Thomas in ST 1.13.11 ad 1, concerning the Tetragrammaton (YHWH), the incommunicable name of God. Thomas explains that although qui est is a more proper name of God with respect to that from which the name is imposed—that is, esse—and with respect to the modes of signification and consignification, still both the name God (Deus) is more proper than qui est with respect to what the name is imposed to signify, which is the divine nature. The Tetragrammaton is even more proper than the name God in this respect. ST 1.13.11 ad 1 [Leon. 4.162]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen Qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est Tetragrammaton, quod est impositum ad significandum ipsam Dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.” For discussion, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 540; Armand Maurer, “St. Thomas on the Sacred Name ‘Tetragrammaton,’” Mediaeval Studies 34 (1972): 275-86, reprinted in Armand Maurer, Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers (Toronto: PIMS, 1990), 59-69; Luis Clavell, El nombre propio de Dios según santo Tomás de Aquino (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1980). 341 actually presents it. Furthermore, insofar as any attempt to derive the other attributes from ipsum esse per se subsistens would depend upon pure perfection arguments grounded in God’s universal perfection, we should note that there is good reason for doubting that pure perfection arguments are sufficient for deriving essential attributes. Recognizing God as ipsum esse per se subsistens is critically important for understanding the distinction between God and creatures—and this is one of the reasons given by Thomas for the priority of the name qui est—but this is only one part of what
Garrigou-Lagrange and the tradition for which he speaks mean by the formal constituent of the divine essence.151
If we take the notion of “what constitutes the divine essence in our understanding” in a different and simpler sense—as what we should think about when we consider the divine essence according to natural reason—then rather than saying that one attribute formally constitutes our understanding of the divine essence, I think it is better to say that this understanding is constituted by what Thomas accomplishes in ST 1.3-26 as a whole. As Thomas explains in In Post. an. 1.41, any knowledge of the simple essence of any separate substance in this life must be “composed from things first relative to us.”152 Thomas emphasizes here the composite character of our knowledge of
151 Garrigou-Lagrange cites a number of past Thomists as supporters of his view, including Capreolus, Bañez, and Del Prado. He also cites Charles-René Billuart as a Thomist who explicitly raises the question of the formal constituent of the divine essence, but ultimately concludes that it is subsistent intellectual activity rather than ipsum esse subsistens. See Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, 10-11. For Billuart, see Charles-René Billuart, Cursus theologiae juxta mentem divi Thomae (Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1886), vol. 1, 41-50. Cf. Joseph Pohle, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, tr. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1911), 159-76; Pohle speaks about the “metaphysical essence” of God rather than the formal constituent of the divine essence. 152 In Post. an. 1.41 [Leon. 153-54]: “Si qua ergo res est, quae non habeat principia priora, ex quibus ratio procedere possit, horum non potest esse scientia, secundum quod scientia hic accipitur, prout est demonstrationis effectus. Unde scientiae speculativae non sunt de ipsis essentiis substantiarum separatarum. Non enim per scientias demonstrativas possumus scire quod quid est in eis; quia ipsae essentiae harum substantiarum sunt intelligibiles per seipsas ab intellectu ad hoc proportionato; non autem congregatur earum notitia, qua cognoscitur quod quid est ipsarum, per aliqua priora. Sed per scientias speculativas potest scire de eis an sint, et quid non sunt, et aliquid secundum similitudinem in rebus inferioribus inventam. Et tunc utimur posterioribus ut prioribus ad earum cognitionem; quia quae sunt posteriora secundum naturam, sunt priora et notiora quoad nos. Et sic patet quod illa, de quibus habetur scientia per ea quae sunt priora simpliciter, sunt composita secundum se ex aliquibus prioribus. Quaecunque vero cognoscuntur per posteriora, quae sunt prima quoad nos, etsi in seipsis sint simplicia, secundum tamen quod in nostra cognitione accipiuntur, componuntur ex aliquibus primis quoad nos.” 342 separate substances, and I would suggest this strikes a rather different note from the insistence that one attribute formally constitutes our understanding of God’s essence. The human intellect is proportioned to the composite rather than to the simple, and we should embrace rather than attempt to escape this feature of our knowledge in our consideration of the divine essence.
(ii) The order of the scientific questions and the meaning of quomodo non sit
As we have seen, Garrigou-Lagrange compares ipsum esse per se subsistens in our understanding of God to rationality in our understanding of human nature. Along similar lines, Garrigou-Lagrange indicates that, as soon as it is established that God is ipsum esse in ST 1.3.4, Thomas transitions from the ascending way of discovery to the descending way of judgment.153 This suggests something like a transition from demonstration quia to demonstration propter quid, just as any demonstration of properties from a thing’s essence runs from cause to effect.
To further support the conclusion that we should not construe the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae in terms of the distinction between essence and properties—and that we should not identify ST 1.3.4 as a turning point to anything like propter quid demonstration of the remaining divine names—I will now turn to a consideration of the role played by the order of the scientific questions in ST 1.2-26. Concerning his treatment of the divine essence, Thomas offers the following:
But concerning the divine essence, the first [thing] to be considered is whether God exists; second, how He is, or rather how He is not; those things that pertain to His operation, namely knowledge, will, and power, will be considered third.154
153 Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, 19-20; De Deo uno, 127. For treatment of these notions, see above, pp. 56-60. 154 ST 1.2 pr. [Leon. 4.27]: “Circa essentiam vero divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit, vel potius quomodo non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae ad operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de voluntate et potentia.” 343
We should pay close attention here to the terminology employed by Thomas to characterize his treatment of the divine essence: first he will consider an Deus sit, and then he will consider quomodo
Deus sit, or rather, quomodo Deus non sit. As explained above, an sit is the scientific question posed concerning the existence of the subject of a science.155 As for quomodo sit, I argued above that
Thomas inserts this as an intermediate question between an sit and quid sit. One text indicating this relationship between quomodo sit and the other scientific questions is the prologue of ST 1.3:
It being known of something whether it exists, it remains to be considered how it is, so that it might be known about it what it is. But since concerning God we cannot know what He is, but what He is not, we cannot consider concerning God how He is, but rather how He is not.156
Here Thomas presents quomodo sit as a question that is preparatory and apparently necessary for arriving a knowledge of quid sit: because we cannot know what God is, it must also be that we cannot even know how He is in this technical sense.
Thomas thus connects the order of presentation in these early questions of the Summa theologiae with the order of the scientific question, but he indicates that we never get as far as answering the question quomodo sit, let alone quid sit, utrum sit, or propter quid.157 We should recall that utrum sit is the scientific question that concerns the properties of the subject. It is impossible even to pose properly the question utrum sit without already knowing what the subject is. For this reason, although Thomas frames the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae with reference to the order of science, this does not mean that the distinction between essence and properties plays a role
155 This is consistent with ST 1.1.7’s identification of God as the subject of sacra doctrina. 156 ST 1.3 pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit.” 157 For consideration of the four scientific questions, see above, pp. 46-49. 344 in structuring his presentation. We simply never get this far in our knowledge of God, in terms of the order of the scientific questions, because we cannot even know how or what He is.
As indicated before, the question quomodo sit would seem to concern the preparatory knowledge necessary for arriving at quidditative knowledge. A proper quidditative knowledge is expressed, whenever possible,158 through a definition: a definition is the ratio through which something’s quiddity is expressed. How, then, do we arrive at a definition? Thomas indicates that to know what a thing is is to know it precisely as it is distinguished from other things. This is why a proper definition is given by proximate genus and specific difference. Prior to arriving at distinct definitional knowledge of a quiddity, it is possible for one to possess only a confused knowledge of that quiddity, as when for example one knows only a remote genus and certain accidents of the thing in question.159 The most confused knowledge that one might possess of a quiddity, then, would be to know only its most remote genus—that is, which of the ten categories under which it falls. One minimum that would constitute an answer to the question quomodo sit, then, would be whatever it is necessary for one to know in order to be able to identify something’s category.160 This interpretation of quomodo sit fits well with Thomas’s understanding of the categories themselves as modes of existing—quomodo sit can be understood as “what is its mode?” I will suggest below that the categories are in fact a helpful background principle for the content and order of ST 1.3-11.
158 It is possible to know what something is without being able to properly define it, in the case of those things that cannot be strictly defined. For example, the categories (substance, quantity, quality, etc.) cannot be strictly defined by genus and difference, because they are themselves the summa genera. See In Sent. 1.2.1.3 [Mand. 1.66]: “Sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut quantitas et qualitas, et hujusmodi, quae non definiuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. Et tamen ratio qualitatis est id quod significatur nomine qualitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas.” 159 As indicated above in c. 2, Thomas compares this confused knowledge of a quiddity (through remote genus and accidents) to the knowledge of God through the triplex via. See above, pp. 75-77. 160 A procedure like this is indicated in De anima 1.1, in which Aristotle indicates that the first question to be asked concerning the soul, in seeking to discover what the soul is, is to inquire after its category. 345
(iii) The distinction between essence and operation
Although I have argued against the claim that the distinction between essence and properties structures the order of ST 1.3-26, the distinction between essence (or substance) and operation plays a critical role, as it is according to this distinction that Thomas divides his treatment of the unity of the divine essence into ST 1.3-11 and ST 1.14-26. Thomas offers no comments concerning the suitability of employing this distinction to structure his consideration of God. We should recall the text from In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4, which we treated above in c. 1, concerning the distinction of the divine names. In this text, Thomas distinguishes two approaches to divine naming: (1) according to what is in God and (2) in accordance with the understanding of the human intellect.161 These two approaches correspond to two ways of distinguishing the divine names, (1) into names concerning essence, power, and operation and (2) into negative names and names implying a relation of God to creatures. I argued above that the latter approach, with its methodological emphasis informed by epistemological concerns, is employed in the Summa contra Gentiles. What we find emphasized in the
Summa theologiae, I would suggest, is a modified form of the first approach. Whereas chapters in the
Contra Gentiles assert that God is intelligens, volens, and potens, in the Summa theologiae Thomas asks whether there is scientia, voluntas, and potentia in God.162 The primary division in his presentation is according to the distinction between substance and operation. Presumably Thomas leaves power
(virtus) out, because power is not attributed to God as the principle of His operations: God’s power is considered in ST 1.25 as the principle of created effects, not as the principle of divine operation.163
161 In Sent. 1.22.1.4 ad 4 [Mand. 1.542]: See above, pp. 21-25. 162 SCG 1.44, 1.72, 2.7; ST 1.14.1, 1.19.1, 1.25.1. 163 ST 1.25.1 ad 3 [Leon. 4.290]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia in rebus creatis non solum est principium actionis, sed etiam effectus. Sic igitur in Deo salvantur ratio potentiae quantum ad hoc, quod est principium effectus: non autem quantum ad hoc, quod est principium actionis, quae est divina essentia.” 346
The most important background source for the threefold distinction between essence, power, and operation is Dionysius’s Celestial Hierarchy, c. 11. Thomas cites this text in ST 1.75 pr., in order to introduce his division of the study of the human soul into consideration of its essence, power, and operation.164 We can also note that the order of questions in Thomas’s treatment of the angels largely parallels the order of questions in ST 1.3-26: first Thomas treats the substance of an angel (including its relations to place, motion, and time), then its knowledge and will; this is followed by consideration of the creation of the angels.165 There is thus something of a repetitive structure in the consideration of God, angels, and the human soul in the Prima pars.
B. THE ROLE OF THE TRIPLEX VIA
As we have seen above, Thomas introduces ST 1.3-11 by indicating that we can only pursue answers to the question quomodo Deus non sit. Again, we should take the question quomodo sit in a technical sense, inquiring after a preparatory knowledge from which one could derive quidditative knowledge. A knowledge of how God is, in this technical sense, is impossible. This can give the impression that Thomas’s treatment of the divine essence will be exclusively negative in character.
As a result, the positive claims advanced in ST 1.3-11—such as that God is good—can seem surprising.
164 ST 1.75 pr. [Leon. 5.194]: “Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur. Et primo, de natura ipsius hominis; secundo, de eius productione. Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam. Et ideo prima consideratio circa animam versabitur. Et quia, secundum Dionysium, XI cap. Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad virtutem sive potentias eius; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius.” For the reference to Dionysius, see Celestial Hierarchy 11, in Pseudo- Dionysius: The Complete Works, tr. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 175: “One clearly observes that, for reasons beyond this world, there is within all divine minds the threefold distinction between being, power, and activity.” 165 ST 1.50 pr. [Leon. 5.3]: “Circa vero angelos, considerandum est primo de his quae pertinent ad eorum substantiam; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad eorum intellectum; tertio, de his quae pertinent ad eorum voluntatem; quarto, de his quae pertinent ad eorum creationem. De substantia autem eorum considerandum est et absolute, et per comparationem ad corporalia.” 347
Counterbalancing the negative emphasis in the prooemium of ST 1.3, Thomas concludes his discussion of the divine essence in the prooemium of ST 1.12 by indicating that in the preceeding questions he has considered “how God is in Himself.” Rather than quomodo Deus sit, here the expression is qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum.166 If we have taken quomodo sit as the sort of preparatory knowledge from which a quidditative knowledge can be derived, then qualiter Deus sit must indicate a knowledge of “how God is in Himself” that cannot yield any quidditative knowledge. I would suggest that it is precisely through the consideration of “how God is not” (in a technical sense) that
Thomas arrives at some statements concerning “how God is” (in a broader, but still positive sense).
I will argue that the interplay between negative and affirmative moments in our knowledge of God is in fact the key to the structure of ST 1.3-26, especially the structure of ST 1.3-11.167
As indicated above, the content of ST 1.3-11 can be understood as organized around certain principal divine names (simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity) with three subordinate names (goodness, omnipresence, eternity). I will later suggest, based on historical sources and parallels, that we can also take all of ST 1.6-11 as subordinated to divine perfection.168
Now, it is clear that Thomas considers simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity to be negative names.169 On the other hand, goodness is clearly a positive divine attribute. What of omnipresence and eternity?
166 ST 1.12 pr. [Leon. 4.114]: “Quia in superioribus consideravimus qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis.” 167 For a similar account that emphasizes the interplay between negative and positive moments in ST 1.3-11, see R. te Velde, Aquinas on God, 77-85. The main difference between my account and te Velde’s is that he treats perfection as positive in character and associates ST 1.4 directly with the via eminentiae (p. 78). As was also the case with respect to the Contra Gentiles, I will argue that perfection is fundamentally a negative divine name, albeit one with implications that pave the way for the via eminentiae, which is pursued as a method of argumentation (from one positive divine name to another) in ST 1.14-26. 168 Along similar lines, R. te Velde interprets simplicity and perfection as two principal divine names, with the remainder of ST 1.3-11 subordinated to them. See R. te Velde, Aquinas on God, 77-85. 169 In itself, perfection is a negative name. To call something perfect is to deny that it lacks what is appropriate for it according to what it is. We might say that although perfection is a negative name, it has immediate positive implications. See above, pp. 189-90, for the Aristotelian and Avicennian sources for this understanding of perfection. 348
The claims advanced in ST 1.8 are affirmative rather than negative in both form and content:
God is in all things, everywhere, present to all creatures. Omnipresence is not, however, a positive attribute in the same way as goodness or wisdom: in saying that God is in all things and everywhere, we are not attributing to God a perfection that is to be identified with the divine essence. Rather, the claims advanced in ST 1.8 are relational in character: God is in all things in a most intimate way as the cause of esse for all things. Omnipresence should therefore be understood as a relational divine name. As Thomas clarifies later in ST 1.13.7, such a relation of God to creatures is logical rather than real, although the relation of creatures to God is real. By calling omnipresence something said affirmatively of God, I do not mean that it posits something in God in the same way as a positive divine attribute.
Concerning eternity, matters are a little more complicated. On the one hand, Thomas emphasizes that we come to a knowledge of eternity through negating two features of time, succession and the limits of beginning and end. This is why the Boethian definition of time includes the qualifiers tota simul et perfecta and interminabilis.170 This might suggest that eternity is without qualification a negative divine name.171 On the other hand, Thomas does something in ST 1.10.2 that
There is some dispute over the status of infinity as negative or positive. Garrigou-Lagrange, for example, contends that infinity as ascribed to God is a positive notion. See Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, 34: “There are attributes expressed by terms which are negative in form (such as infinity), but which denote a positive perfection.” R. te Velde strikes something of a middle course, by indicating that infinity is a negative attribute (I would prefer negative name) but still denotes a perfection. See R. te Velde, Aquinas on God, 82. In ST 1.11.3 ad 2, Thomas compares infinity to incorporeality and unity as names said negatively or privatively of God. See below, n. 177. 170 Cf. In Sent. 1.8.2.1 [Mand. 1.202] for a parallel treatment of how Thomas understands the force of these qualifiers in the Boethian definition. For the original Boethian text, see Consolatio Philosophiae 5 pr. 6 [Loeb 422]: “Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.” 171 In SCG 1.30, Thomas refers to ‘eternal’ as a divine name that signifies the supereminent mode of divine perfection through negation. SCG 1.30 [Leon. Man. 32]: “Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum.” Furthermore, in In Sent. 1.8.2.1 ad 1 [Mand. 1.202], Thomas compares eternity to unity: “Simplicia, et praecipue divina, nullo modo melius manifestantur quam per remotionem, ut dicit Dionysius De divinis nomin. Cujus ratio est, quia ipsorum esse intellectus perfecte non potest comprehendere; et ideo ex negationibus eorum quae ab ipso removentur, manuducitur intellectus ad ea aliqualiter cognoscenda. Unde et punctus negatione definitur. Et praeterea in ratione aeternitatis est quaedam negatio, inquantum aeternitas est unitas, et unitas est indivisio, et hujusmodi non possunt sine negatione 349 he does with no strictly negative name: he affirms that God is His eternity.172 Furthermore, the negative elements of the Boethian definition qualify its positive core, possessio vitae.173 Finally, a number of other texts seem to consider eternity alongside positive attributes such as goodness or wisdom, albeit distinguished from them because eternity is attributed to God alone, whereas names like goodness and wisdom are also predicated of creatures.174 In one of these texts, Thomas also indicates that eternity expresses “existence according to the highest mode.”175 I would therefore suggest that although eternity includes negations in its definition, these negations qualify a fundamentally positive core: this core is indicated by Boethius’s possessio vitae, but Thomas also refers to this positive core as duratio or simply as esse.
Along similar lines, I would also point out that within ST 1.11’s treatment of unity, we find a transition from the treatment of one as a negative divine name towards what appears to be a positive statement, in the assertion that God is supremely one (maxime unus). Thomas is clear in ST 1.11.3-4 that unity is predicated of God negatively or privatively, insofar as to predicate unity is to deny division. In this, he compares unity to incorporeality and infinity as divine names predicated
definiri.” I would note, however, that this text indicates that it is insofar as eternity is unity and unity is indivision that there is something negative in the definition of eternity; but one is defined not only by the negation of division, but as undivided being. 172 Cf. In Sent. 1.19.2.1 [Mand. 1.465-69], in which Thomas argues for the same conclusion, that eternity is identical with God’s substance. The response is concerned primarily with distinguishing time, aevum, and eternity, so as to overcome the objection that eternity cannot be God Himself, because God cannot be identical with time or the aevum. [Mand. 1.468]: “Sed quia esse aeviternorum est acquisitum ab alio, ideo aevum mensurat esse quod habet principium; non autem aeternitas, quae mensurat esse quod non est acquisitum ab alio.” 173 Eternal and atemporal are not perfectly equivalent, since the aeviternal is atemporal but distinct from the eternal. There is therefore more to the intelligible content of eternity than just the negation of features of time: there is also the notion of duration or the possession of being or life. See In Sent. 1.8.2.1, In Sent. 1.19.2.1. Cf. Shanley, “Eternity and Duration in Aquinas.” 174 De ver. 21.2 ad 8 [Leon. 22*3/1.598]: “Sed quaedam Deo tantum conveniunt, ut aeternitas et omnipotentia, quaedam vero quibusdam creaturis et Deo, ut sapientia, et iustitia, et alia huiusmodi.” Cf. In Sent. 1.8.2.2 ad 1. 175 In Sent. 1.8.2.2 ad 1 [Mand. 1.205]: “Quamvis divina bonitas sit communicabilis, non tamen secundum modum altissimum, prout est in Deo: unde summa bonitas non communicatur. Et quia aeternitas dicit esse secundum altissimum modum, qui est in Deo, ideo non communicatur: sed esse absolute sumptum communicatur, sicut et bonum.” 350 privatively.176 On the other hand, though, Thomas explains in ST 1.11.4 that God can be called supremely one because He is both supremely being (maxime ens) and supremely undivided (maxime indivisum). Thomas does not suggest any similar account for other negative names such as simplicity and infinity. We can thus note that unity as a divine name, like eternity, contains a sort of positive core and that, as a consequence, we can say that God is maximally one.177
ST 1.3-11 is thus characterized throughout by alternation between negative and affirmative/positive moments. Within ST 1.3, the treatment of simplicity, a negative divine name, yields the conclusion that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens, which is proper, positive, and analogical.
Similarly, the treatment of God’s perfection—a negative name178—in ST 1.4 yields the positive assertions that God is good and the highest good in ST 1.6.179 A similar relationship obtains between
176 ST 1.11.3 ad 2 [Leon. 4.112]: “Et licet in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum modum apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.” 177 This being said, in replying to the objection that unity cannot admit of more or less, because one is predicated privatively, Thomas indicates that something said privatively can admit of more or less insofar as its opposite admits of more or less. Because something can be more or less divided—or divisible—we can speak of something as being supremely undivided. See ST 1.11.4 ad 1. One is not a purely negative term in its signification (since it includes being in its signification); still one is predicated negatively of being, because in its signification one adds only a negation to being. Similarly, one is predicated negatively of God, although the name one includes being in its signification and does posit being in God. See De pot. 9.7 [Marietti 2.243]: “Unde unum et multa ponunt quidem in divinis ea de quibus dicuntur; sed non superaddunt nisi distinctionem et indistinctionem, quod est superaddere negationes, ut supra expositum est. Unde concedimus, quod quantum ad id quod superaddunt eis de quibus praedicantur, remotive in Deo accipiuntur; in quantum autem includunt in sua significatione ea de quibus dicuntur, positive accipiuntur.” 178 I characterize perfection as a negative name, because to call God perfect is to deny something of Him. To call God perfect is is to deny that He lacks anything due to Him according to His mode of perfection. Because it is the (1) denial of a (2) lack, there is a sort of double negation involved in the notion of perfection. For this reason, perfection as a divine name has immediate positive implications. I will still refer to perfection as a negative name, but this is not to ignore that in its very meaning it reflects the passage through negation to arrive at affirmation that I am suggesting fundamentally characterizes the argumentative structure of the whole of ST 1.3-11. For one indication that Thomas regards perfection as a divine name said more negatively than positively, see De ver. 2.3 ad 13 [Leon. 22/1*2.54]: “Perfectionis nomen si stricte accipiatur in Deo poni non potest quia nihil est perfectum nisi quod est factum; sed in Deo nomen perfectionis accipitur magis negative quam positive, ut dicatur perfectus quia nihil deest ei ex omnibus, non quod sit in eo aliquid quod sit in potentia ad perfectionem quod aliquo perficiatur quod sit actus eius; et ideo non est in eo potentia passiva.” 179 Even within ST 1.4 itself, we can see the movement towards the positive through the negative, in that the very meaning of perfection involves a double negation, that God (1) does not (2) lack anything due to Him according to His mode of perfection (ST 1.4.1) or any of the excellences of any kind of thing (ST 1.4.2). See the previous note. 351
ST 1.7 (divine infinity) and ST 1.8 (omnipresence) as well as ST 1.9 (immutability) and ST 1.10
(eternity). In each of these cases, the subordination of affirmative or positive divine names to negative names is a matter of argumentative dependence.180 Finally, the treatment of divine unity in
ST 1.11 includes positive moments, both in the signification of the name one and especially in the assertion that God is maximally one.
We can summarize our findings concerning the interplay between negative and affirmative/positive moments—and the corresponding subordination by argumentative dependence—in the following schema:
- q. 3: - q. 4: - q. 9: - / + q. 11: - q. 7: infinity simplicity perfection immutability unity
+ q. 3 aa. 4&8: + q. 6: + q. 8: + q. 10: ipsum esse per goodness omnipresence eternity se subsistens
+ q. 14: knowledge
I would suggest that this structure of alternation between negative and affirmative/positive moments (with the corresponding subordination by argumentative dependence) is central to how we should characterize the order of ST 1.3-26 in terms of the elements of the triplex via. Recalling the distinction between how the elements of the triplex via concern (a) methods of argumentation and
180 As indicated above, Thomas seems to exhibit a preference for establishing his claims in ST 1.3-11 by appealing immediately to God’s identity as the first efficient cause. This is especially evident in ST 1.6 and 1.8. Thomas indicates in his prooemia that ST 1.6 (goodness) and 1.8 (omnipresence) are respectively subordinated, by argumentative dependence, to ST 1.4 (perfection) and ST 1.7 (infinity), but the arguments he actually presents in these questions appeal to God’s identity as the first efficient cause. See above, pp. 297-299, for treatment of the prooemia; see below, pp. 370-71, for an explanation from a historical influence for why Thomas prefers argumentation grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause. 352
(b) the signification of particular divine names,181 I would characterize the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae in terms of the elements of the triplex via as follows.
ST 1.2.3, in which we find the five ways, is primarily an exercise in the via causalitatis as a method of argumentation, although Thomas also associates the first part of the fourth way with the via eminentiae. The conclusions of the five ways include, in the names used to signify God, various moments of causality, negation, and eminence: for example, to call God the first uncaused cause includes all three elements of the triplex via.182
Thomas pursues the via remotionis in ST 1.3-11 both (a) by first emphasizing certain principal negative names (simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity) and (b) by employing argumentation that yields, from these negative names, positive moments such as ipsum esse, goodness, omnipresence, eternity, and maximal unity. Among these latter names, some (such as ipsum esse and goodness) are unqualifiedly proper, analogical divine attributes, which thus pertain to the via eminentiae (or rather to all three elements of the triplex via) with respect to their signification.
Omnipresence is affirmative and relational; and eternity and unity as names contain some positive core in their signification. To borrow the language from the prooemia of ST 1.3 and 1.12, consideration of quomodo Deus non sit yields a knowledge of qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum that includes affirmative or positive moments.
ST 1.3-11 is thus broadly speaking an exercise in the via negationis, in these two ways just identified. As I have noted above, however, Thomas exhibits something of a preference in ST 1.3-11 for argumentation grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause, particularly in arguing for God’s perfection, goodness, and omnipresence. As indicated above, Thomas associates
181 See above, p. 83. 182 See above, p. 77, esp. n. 91. 353 the via causalitatis not only with argumentation for God’s existence, but also with arguments that establish what must belong to God insofar as He is the first cause.183 We can thus classify the argumentation for God’s perfection, goodness, and omnipresence as belonging to the via causalitatis.184
The via remotionis, as a method of argumentation, finally culminates in the argument establishing that there is knowledge in God in ST 1.14.1. The attribution of knowledge to God involves all three elements of the triplex via; this question also inaugurates the method of argumentation in the via eminentiae, by which Thomas infers from God’s knowledge that He also possesses will, life, love, justice, mercy, and providence. All of these positive attributes involve all three elements of the triplex via in their signification. We should also note that the contents of ST
1.4-11 play an important role paving the way for the treatment of our knowledge and naming of
God in ST 1.12-13 and for the argumentation according to the via eminentiae in ST 1.14-26. It is in light of our understanding of the eminence of the divine perfection that the argumentation in ST
1.14-26 can proceed.185
To conclude: just as in the Summa contra Gentiles, we can say that Thomas follows the order of causality, negation, and eminence in his presentation of the divine names in the Summa theologiae. This characterization admits of many qualifications, however, because in fact the three elements of the triplex via—both with respect to method of argumentation and with respect to the signification of the divine names—are interwoven throughout ST 1.2-26. To appeal to the metaphor I offered
183 See above, p. 83. 184 Leo Elders characterizes ST 1.4-8 as pertaining to the via causalitatis and ST 1.9-11 as pertaining to the via eminentiae. There are reasonable grounds for some of these associations, in that the argumentation especially in ST 1.4-6 primarily belongs to the via causalitatis, and what is established in ST 1.9-11 are features of the very eminence of the divine perfection, which paves the way for argumentation in the via eminentiae in ST 1.14-26. 185 For lengthier analysis of this issue, see the treatment of the parallel chapters in the Contra Gentiles above, pp. 233-35. 354 earlier, the elements of the triplex via function more like instruments in a musical trio: at some times one or another element is at the forefront, and sometimes one element even “plays solo,” but only presupposing what has been set forth previously and anticipating what is to come.
C. THE ROLE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS
We have seen above that Garrigou-Lagrange characterizes the order of the divine attributes in terms of the distinction between essence and properties, identifying ipsum esse per se subsistens as the formal constituent of the divine essence in our understanding. In elaborating on this view, he relates the order of the divine attributes to the order of the transcendentals. Garrigou-Lagrange aligns ST
1.3.4 (on the identity of essence and esse in God) with being and ST 1.3.7 (on absolute simplicity) with transcendental unity. He then explains the placement of divine truth (in ST 1.16) after goodness
(in ST 1.6) as a consequence of the fittingness of treating divine truth after divine knowledge, suggesting that but for this fittingness, the proper place of truth as a divine name is prior to good.
For Garrigou-Lagrange, the order of the transcendentals informs the order of the divine names.
Jan Aertsen also attributes to Thomas the view that there is a close connection between the orders of the transcendentals and of the divine names. Taking support from In Sent. 1.8.1.3, Aertsen concludes that, concerning the divine names taken from the transcendentals, “for Thomas the transcendentals 'being,’ ‘one,’ ‘true,’ and ‘good’ precede other names. The order among these four names is based on the order of the communissima.”186 This being said, Aertsen does not extend this claim as a principle for analyzing the order of presentation in the Summa theologiae.
Here we will engage with the views of Garrigou-Lagrange and Aertsen by considering two issues: (1) The role that the transcendentals play within the order of argumentation in ST 1.3-26. (2)
The role of what might be called the order of propriety in structuring the order of the divine names.
186 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 363. 355
(i) Argumentative dependence with respect to the transcendentals
Garrigou-Lagrange relies throughout his analysis on the view that, because of the convertibility of the transcendentals, one can immediately conclude from the fact that God is ipsum esse that He is also one, true, and good. It is notable, however, that one does not find any arguments in either of the two Summae or in the Compendium along these lines: Thomas does not immediately conclude from the fact that God is ipsum esse (or that He is the primum ens) that He is one, true, or good.187 The discussion of goodness in general in ST 1.5 perhaps leads one to expect that the reasoning of ST 1.6.1 will be that “whatever is a being is good, but God is a being,” and so forth, but this isn’t the path Thomas takes. Instead, he appeals to the more fundamental claim (in the order of discovery) that God is the first efficient cause. The discussions of transcendental unity and truth in
ST 1.11.1-2 and ST 1.16.1-4 can lend themselves to a similar expectation, but once again, we find that Thomas does not employ this “transcendental” argumentation to establish God’s unity or truth.
Why might Thomas not employ such a line of reasoning in the Summa theologiae? I would suggest that there are two likely reasons. The first is that Thomas intends, in the case of both goodness and truth, to attribute these perfections to God not only from their creaturely meaning as transcendental perfections, but also from their creaturely meaning as acquired perfections.188 This is especially clear in the case of truth, as Thomas indicates in ST 1.16.5 that we name God as truth from both truth of being (truth as a transcendental perfection) and truth of intellect (truth as an
187 There is one text in Thomas’s Commentary on the Liber de causis in which we find an argument from the claim that God is esse purum to conclude that He must also be pure goodness. See In De causis 9 [Saffrey 64]: “Causa autem prima nullo modo habet yliatim, quia non habet esse participatum, sed ipsa est esse purum et per consequens bonitas pura quia unumquodque in quantum est ens est bonum.” Thomas does here subordinate the divine esse, acknowledged as unparticipated esse, to a premise expressing the transcendental character of goodness, that “each thing insofar as it is a being is good.” The reasoning from esse purum to bonitas pura here exemplifies the sort of “transcendental argument” that is absent from both Summae and the Compendium. 188 We should recall that transcendental good and true are relational transcendentals that one discovers by considering the relation of ens to something else; they do not follow upon the consideration of ens considered only in itself. For treatment of De ver. 1.1, see above, p. 86. 356 acquired perfection).189 Indeed, the primary emphasis in ST 1.16 is on truth of intellect rather than on truth of being.
With respect to goodness, Thomas offers the following in De pot. 9.7 ad 5, comparing the case of goodness with that of unity as divine names. He explains that the good that is (1) convertible with being, which adds nothing real to being, is not the same as the good that is (2) in the genus of quality, which does add something to being, such as for example “some quality by which man is called good.” Similarly, one can distinguish between the one that is convertible with being and the one that is the principle of number in the genus quantity. In this way, goodness and unity are similar.
The difference, however, is “that good understood in both ways can enter into divine predication,” but only the one convertible with being can be predicated of God, not the one that is the principle of number.190
Although he does not explicitly reaffirm this point in the Summa theologiae, I would suggest that the distinction between bonum secundum quid and bonum simpliciter in ST 1.5.1 ad 1 can support the conclusion that goodness is attributed to God not only precisely as convertible with being, but also as acquired perfection. In brief, Thomas elaborates on the convertibility of being and goodness by noting that one can distinguish between a thing’s being according to its existence as a substance
189 ST 1.16.5 [Leon. 4.212]: “Veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas.” 190 De pot. 9.7 ad 5 [Marietti 2.243]: “Ad quintum dicendum quod bonum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ente, quod nullam rem supra ens addit; bonum autem quod est in genere qualitatis, addit aliquam qualitatem qua homo dicitur bonus; et simile est de uno, sicut ex dictis patet. Sed in hoc differt quod bonum utroque modo acceptum potest venire in divinam praedicationem, non autem unum: non enim est eadem ratio de quantitate et qualitate, sicut ex dictis patet.” Cf. De pot. 7.4 ad 2 [Marietti 2.196]: “Licet bonitatis humanae et sapientiae et iustitiae, qualitas sit genus; non tamen est genus eorum secundum quod de Deo praedicantur, eo quod qualitas, in quantum huiusmodi, dicitur ens eo quod inhaeret aliqualiter subiecto. Sapientia autem et iustitia non ex hoc nominatur, sed magis ex aliqua perfectione vel ex aliquo actu; unde talia veniunt in divinam praedicationem secundum rationem differentiae et non secundum rationem generis.” 357
(which he calls ens simpliciter) and its being according to its further actualization by accidents (which he calls ens secundum quid). He then draws a parallel distinction between a thing’s goodness just insofar as it exists as a substance (which he calls bonum secundum quid) and its goodness insofar as it reaches its ultimate perfection through the acts appropriate to it (which he calls bonum simpliciter).191
Having drawn these distinctions, it is clear that bonum secundum quid corresponds to ens simpliciter, and that bonum simpliciter corresponds to (or rather is one instance of) ens secundum quid.192
If we are to affirm that in God alone ens simpliciter is also bonum simpliciter, then we must attribute to Him the sort of goodness possessed by creatures as a received, accidental perfection, and not only the goodness secundum quid that is convertible with a creature’s being as a substance. As seen above, in ST 1.6.3 Thomas distinguishes between a creature’s perfection (1) insofar as it exists as a substance and (2) insofar as it possesses the accidents necessary for its perfect operation. God alone is perfect and good by His essence in both these ways, because (a) His essence is His esse, and (b) He has no accidents, “but those things which are said of others accidentally belong to Him essentially, such as to be powerful, wise, and others of this sort.”193 Furthermore, Thomas indicates in ST 1.6.2
191 ST 1.5.1 ad 1 [Leon. 4.56]: “Licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque: unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid; non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu. Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile: et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid.” 192 ST 1.5.1 ad 1 [Leon. 4.56]: “Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens: secundum vero ultimum actum, dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid et bonum simpliciter.” The qualification that bonum simpliciter corresponds to some but not all instances of ens secundum quid is necessary, because in a given case, ens secundum quid might not involve the perfection and goodness of the thing in question. For example, a vice and a vicious action are accidents that further actualize a human being beyond substantial esse, but in this case the human being is not bonum simpliciter. 193 ST 1.6.3 [Leon.4.68]: “Solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia 358 that “good is attributed to God, as was said, insofar as all desired perfections flow from Him, as from the first cause;” he goes on to conclude that all such perfections “exist in Him in a most excellent mode.”194 These perfections attributed to God include all of those qualities that constitute, for each kind of creature, goodness as a received perfection. I would therefore suggest that ST 1.6 is consistent with the claim that the good attributed to God is derived not only from good taken as transcendental (as adding nothing to being except secundum rationem), but also from goodness as the acquired quality by which a creature is made perfect. Such goodness is not an accident in God, something added to the divine substance—rather, it is identical with the divine essence itself.195
Furthermore, we do not attribute to God just the acquired perfection by which man is called good— the example Thomas gives in De pot. 9.7 ad 5—but all of the desired perfections appropriate to every kind of creature. It is for this reason that Thomas can conclude at the end of ST 1.6.4 that God is the exemplary, efficient, and final cause of all goodness.196
What is entirely clear in the case of truth—that Thomas does not attribute to God only truth as transcendental but also truth as a received perfection—is thus also the case with respect to the attribution of goodness. This could help explain why Thomas does not appeal to a “transcendental”
vero perfectio alicuius est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse, quod habet per suam formam substantialem, secunda vero eius perfectio consistit in caliditate, levitate et siccitate, et huiusmodi, tertia vero perfectio eius est secundum quod in loco suo quiescit. Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam essentiam, sed soli Deo, cuius solius essentia est suum esse; et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter, ut esse potentem, sapientem, et huiusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet. Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus per suam essentiam.” Thomas similarly distinguishes in ST 1.6.3 ad 3 between the goodness that is the esse of a creature and the goodness that is “some added perfection.” In this text, Thomas also distinguishes perfection in a third sense, noting that creatures are also perfect insofar as they are joined to their extrinsic final ends. 194 ST 1.6.2 [Leon. 4.67]: “Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut a prima causa. . . . Sic ergo oportet quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca, quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum bonum.” 195 Cf. De pot. 7.4 [Marietti 2.194-96]. 196 ST 1.6.4 [Leon. 4.70]: “Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis.” 359 argument in ST 1.6 or in ST 1.16: his arguments are intended to establish more than just the attribution of goodness or truth qua transcendentals.
A second possible reason why Thomas doesn’t employ “transcendental” arguments—and a reason that would also apply to unity—is that being as a transcendental is just ens commune, the being common to the ten categories, and it is ens commune that is convertible with one, true, and good. For
Thomas, however, God does not fall under ens commune, and one might doubt whether the convertibility of being, one, true, and good itself transcends the distinction between ipsum esse and ens commune. To employ a “transcendental” argument of the form suggested above could be seen as subordinating God to ens commune.197 To take the case of unity, Thomas does not appeal in ST 1.11.4 only to the claim that God is maxime ens, but also to the claim that, as absolutely simple, God must be maxime indivisum. That is, Thomas does not assume that the convertibility of being and one extends to the divine; he instead justifies the claim that God is undivided within Himself.
There are thus insufficient grounds for the claim that the order of the divine names is a function of the order of the transcendentals insofar as God’s unity, truth, and goodness can be derived, in the order of argumentative dependence, from the identification of God as primum ens or ipsum esse. We will now turn to the way in which Thomas himself does relate the order of the transcendentals to the order of the divine names, in terms of the order of propriety.
197 At the least, an argument of this form might presuppose too much about the analogy of being between creatures and God. Even if it is ultimately acceptable to extend, through analogy, the convertibility of being with the other transcendentals to the divine so as to argue from God’s being to His goodness, still such a method of argumentation might not be as illuminating concerning what we mean when we say that God is good. Such an approach might yield the conclusion that God is good, but it might not yield, for example, the rich conclusion of ST 1.6.4 that God is the exemplary, efficient, and final cause of all goodness. To connect this discussion with the previous discussion of the role of the triplex via, we should recall that ST 1.6 can be classed under the via causalitatis in terms of its method of argumentation; Thomas is identifying what must be attributed to God insofar as He is the first cause of creatures. The “transcendental” form of argumentation— immediately from God’s being to His goodness—would instead be an instance of argumentation in the via eminentiae as we have described it above, insofar as it proceeds from one positive attribute to another. In this case, it would appear to be the argumentation in the via causalitatis that is the most powerful. 360
(ii) The order of propriety
We examined above ST 1.13.11, the text in which Thomas explains the supreme propriety of the divine name qui est, and we found that Thomas’s second reason appeals to the maximal universality of the name, also noting that any names convertible with it “in some way inform and determine it,” just by the fact that they “add something to it according to reason.”198 That is,
Thomas appeals first to the maximal commonness or universality of the name qui est and second to the order secundum rationem among those things that are maximally common. This is virtually identical to the argument offered for the priority of qui est in In Sent. 1.8.1.3, the text cited by Aertsen for his assertion that the order of the divine names is the order of the transcendentals.199 It is thus Thomas’s consistent position throughout his career that the divine names taken from the transcendentals (1) are more proper than other divine names and (2) are ordered in propriety by their order among themselves secundum rationem. Thomas also notes, however, in both In Sent. 1.8.1.3 and ST 1.13.11, that good is the most proper divine name “with respect to causality,” and in this way he defends the priority of good in Dionysius’s Divine Names.200
Does the order of propriety influence the order of the divine names in Thomas’s presentation in the Summa theologiae? That there should be some connection between the order of propriety and the order of presentation is suggested by the first objection in In Sent. 1.8.1.3, that what is prior should be treated first.201 Thomas does treat God’s being first, by proving His existence and by concluding, relatively early in the order of arguemntation, that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens
198 ST 1.13.11 [Leon. 4.162]: “Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant ipsum.” 199 In Sent. 1.8.1.3 [Mand. 1.199-201]. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 360. 200 In Sent. 1.8.1.3 co. and ad 1 [Mand. 1.200]; ST 1.13.11 [Leon. 4.162]. 201 In Sent. 1.8.1.3 [Mand. 1.199]: “Videtur enim quod hoc nomen ‘qui est’ non sit primum inter divina nomina. De prioribus enim prius est agendum. Sed Dionysius prius agit de bono in lib. De div. nom., quam de existente. Ergo videtur bonum prius esse ente.” 361 in ST 1.3.8. He then treats God’s goodness shortly thereafter, in ST 1.6, followed by unity in 1.11 and truth in 1.16. This order—being, goodness, unity, truth—does not correspond to the order of the transcendentals taken in themselves secundum rationem. But perhaps it is consistent with the order of the transcendentals according to their degree of commonness as received perfections; this is the second possible order of the transcendentals given by Thomas in De ver. 21.3, treated above.202
As we have seen, goodness and truth are not attributed to God only as divine names taken from the transcendentals, but also from their status in creatures as received perfections. Goodness as acquired perfection is not maximally common, because not all creatures attain to their ultimate perfection. With respect to truth, truth of intellect is also less common, because it is a perfection received only by creatures with intellects. Being is in this way more common than received, accidental goodness; and received, accidental goodness is more common than truth of intellect. The order in which Thomas treats divine being, goodness, and truth in ST 1.3-26 is thus at least consistent with the order of propriety according to commonness.
What about unity, though? The sort of unity predicated of God—transcendental unity rather than the quantitative unity that is the principle of number—is maximally common, just like being. So shouldn’t the discussion of divine unity precede goodness, if the order of presentation is determined by the order of propriety according to which qui est is the maximally proper name? This gives us some reason to doubt that the order of propriety is the primary rationale behind the order of
Thomas’s presentation. Garrigou-Lagrange attempts to maintain the priority of unity by identifying transcendental unity with absolute simplicity, which is treated in ST 1.3.7. There is some textual basis for this: as we saw above in treating the Compendium theologiae, Thomas indicates that the divine simplicity is implicitly included in what is meant when we profess belief “in one God” in the Creed,
202 See above, pp. 85-90. 362 because only the simple is absolutely one.203 Furthermore, the argumentation in ST 1.11.4 for God’s maximal unity appeals to His absolute simplicity to justify the claim that He is maxime indivisum. But it still remains the case that Thomas does not explicitly treat divine unity immediately after simplicity, and for Thomas simplicity and unity do not mean precisely the same thing.
We have seen above that Thomas’s argumentation for God’s maximal unity in ST 1.11.4 appeals to the infinity of the divine esse, which would supply us with one reason why unity is placed after infinity. Since goodness is subordinated immediately to perfection according to the structure indicated above in consideration of the the triplex via, goodness comes before infinity.204 With respect to the order of propriety, I would also suggest that Thomas’s order of presentation reflects this order, not only with respect to the commonness of being, goodness, unity, and truth, but also insofar as goodness is the most proper divine name in the order of causality.205 That is, we can take the order of these divine names in the Summa theologiae—being, goodness, unity, truth—as the most fitting compromise between the competing orders of propriety based on commonness and on causality.
To conclude, Thomas is clear that the divine names taken strictly from the transcendentals— and not from acquired accidental goodness or truth of intellect—are more proper than all other divine names and are ordered among themselves according to the order of the transcendentals
203 CT 1.35 [Leon. 42.92-93]: “In hoc autem quod dicimus eum unum, excluditur deorum pluralitas et omnis compositio: non enim est simpliciter unum nisi quod est simplex.” There is still a distinction between simple (as what lacks composition) and one (as undivided being), insofar as composition and division are not the same; after all, something composite can be one, even if it is not “absolutely one” as a simple thing is. 204 That unity is placed after infinity in the Summa theologiae is itself a point of contrast with the Contra Gentiles, in which infinity is the final culmination of the via remotionis in SCG 1.43. That Thomas concludes with unity rather than infinity might reflect the different target of ST 1.3-11—that it is concerned with the unity of the divine essence as preparatory for discussion of the Trinity—from that of SCG 1.15-43, in which Thomas says that his purpose is to distinguish God from all things through negations. 205 ST 1.13.11 ad 2 [Leon. 4.162]: “Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum est causa, non tamen simpliciter: nam esse absolute praeintelligitur causae.” 363 considered in themselves. This is not, however, the order among the transcendentals that is relevant for the order of presentation in the Summa theologiae, because Thomas attributes goodness and truth to God not only from goodness and truth as maximally common but also from acquired accidental goodness and truth of intellect.206 The order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae can be characterized in terms of the order among the transcendentals, but the latter is not the sole rationale that determines the former.
D. MODES OF EXISTING AS A PRINCIPLE
This last point can be extended to include all of the principles of order treated so far: although we can helpfully characterize the content of ST 1.2-26 in terms of the order of science, the elements of the triplex via, and the order of the transcendentals, it does not seem that any one of these orders serves as the sufficient rationale for Thomas’s order of procedure. Thomas simply doesn’t attempt to force his discussion of the divine essence to fit into any preconceived schema.
That being said, of the principles of order treated so far, several items seem to go the farthest as structuring elements. First, the distinction between substance and operation, which is the explicit foundation for the division into ST 1.3-11 and ST 1.14-26, does not seem to be reducible to any of the other principles of order discussed so far; that Thomas structures his discussion of the divine essence according to this distinction is not a consequence of some other rationale. Second, I would point to the subordination of positive or affirmative divine names to negative divine names, as outlined above in my treatment of the role of the triplex via. Third, then, I would point to the priority of negative theology in Thomas’s approach, which he characterizes by saying that we seek to
206 We should again note that this does not mean that goodness and truth are attributed to God as if they were accidents superadded to his essence. 364 determine quomodo Deus non sit, a question that we have attempted to understand with reference to the order of the scientific questions.
I would like to suggest a principle that helps to explain the content and much of the order of
ST 1.3-11, in conjunction with the principles already identified. This supplemental principle is the notion of modes of existing (modus essendi), a term with a wide extension that includes the following items: (i) the categories, (ii) the transcendentals,207 and (iii) motion.208 In this analysis, I will defend the following set of correlations concerning ST 1.3-11.209
divine name created mode of existing that is the point of departure simplicity substance and composition perfection quantity goodness transcendental goodness and quality infinity quantity omnipresence place immutability motion, action, and passion eternity time unity transcendental unity
These correlations are not intended to indicate that exactly the same relationship obtains between each divine name on the left and the created mode of existing on the right. There is, however, some clear connection in each case, as I will attempt to document now.
207 For the categories and the transcendentals as modes of being or of existing, the classic text is De ver. 1.1. To be precise, Thomas refers first to modes of being (modi entis), which can be distinguished into special modes and general modes. The former, the special modes of being, correspond to diverse modes of existing (modi essendi); these are the ten categories. The transcendentals besides ens are then characterized as general modes of being (modi entis) that follow upon every ens. See De ver. 1.1 [Leon. 22/1*2.5]: “Sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur, quod dupliciter contingit. Uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis; sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera: substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens, et ita est in aliis generibus. Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens.” For discussion of the notion of modes of existing, see John Tomarchio, “The Modus Principle in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,” (Ph.D. dissertation in Philosophy: The Catholic University of America, 1996), 247-79; Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of Being According to Modes of Existing,” The Review of Metaphysics 54.3 (2001): 585-613. 208 See In Meta. 4.1 #540-41 [Marietti 152], in which Thomas attributes to motion a particular mode of existing; in this text he also refers to accidents and substance as having distinct modes of existing as well. 209 I have indicated the difference between the principal and the subordinate divine names by indentation. 365
What we find in ST 1.3 is primarily Thomas’s elimination from God of the modes of composition found in created substances. Some substances are bodies composed of divisible parts; these same substances are composed of matter and form; there is furthermore in at least some substances a composition of essence and supposit;210 all created substances are composite with respect to essence and esse; furthermore, all created substances are subject to accidents; and the essence of every created substance involves the composition of genus and difference.211 ST 1.3-11 is concerned with the divine substance or essence (as distinguished from divine operation, treated in
ST 1.14-26), and Thomas begins by denying of God all of the modes of existing peculiar to created substances qua substances, that is, their modes of composition. This culminates in the denial in ST
1.3.6 that God belongs to any genus at all, including—most surprisingly—the genus of substance.
Turning to ST 1.4, the connection of the notion with perfection with quantity might not be immediately obvious to us, but such a connection would have been taken for granted by Thomas.
Within ST 1.4.1, Thomas does not invoke the notion of quantity, but he says that we call a thing perfect “which lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection.”212 This is arguably somewhat unsatisfying, as it appears to be a circular definition that mentions the thing to be defined in the defining formula. In other texts, though, Thomas discusses a thing’s mode (or measure) of
210 For treatment of the apparent development in Thomas’s thought concerning the identity of supposit and nature in angels, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 238-59. 211 Metaphysics, as the science of being as being, is primarily the science of substance (by virtue of the analogy of being according to which substance is the primary meaning of being), and in Thomas’s metaphysics some of the most important conclusions drawn concerning substance concern these various modes of composition. 212 ST 1.4.1 [Leon. 4.50]: “Unde primum principium activum oportet maxime esse in actu, et per consequens maxime esse perfectum. Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis.” We should recall here the element of double negation in Thomas’s understanding of perfection. 366 perfection in conjunction with what he calls its virtual quantity.213 In De ver. 29.3, which concerns infinity, Thomas links virtual quantity with a thing’s mode of perfection:
Quantity is twofold: namely, dimensive, which is considered according to extension; and virtual, which is understood according to intensity: for the virtue of a thing is its perfection, according to that [saying] of the Philosopher in Physics 8: “each thing is perfect when it attains to its proper virtue.” And thus the virtual quantity of any form whatsoever is understood according to the mode of its perfection. But both [kinds of] quantity are differentiated into many [sorts]: for under dimensive quantity are contained length, width, and depth; and number in potency. But virtual quantity is distinguished into as many [sorts] as there are natures or forms, whose mode of perfection determines [their] entire measure of quantity.214
Here Thomas links together a thing’s mode of perfection with the measure of its virtual quantity.
Thomas then goes on to note that “if a thing is called a being, virtual quantity is considered in it with respect to the perfection of existing;” and he attributes infinite virtual quantity to God with respect to the perfection of existence.215
Furthermore, in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, Thomas explains that the first two meanings of perfection given by Aristotle in Metaphysics 5.16—both of which concern what Thomas
213 The notion of virtual quantity is taken up by Thomas in a number of texts. See, e.g., In Sent. 1.17.2.1; De ver. 29.3; ST 1.42.1 ad 1; ST 2-2.24.4 obj. 1. The distinction between dimensive quantity and virtual quantity, particularly phrased as the distinction between quantitas molis and quantitas virtutis, is derived from Augustine’s De quantitate animae. For a recent treatment of virtual quantity in Thomas’s thought, see Martín Echavarría, “La cantidad virtual (quantitas virtualis) según Tomás de Aquino,” Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafisica 46 (2013): 235-59. Echavarría connects this notion of virtual quantity with the notion of virtus essendi, which plays a critical role in the second argument for universal perfection in ST 1.4.2. For discussion of the notion of virtus essendi in terms of Thomas’s understanding of esse as intensive act, see Wippel, “Platonism and Aristotelianism in Aquinas,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 282-84; Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 2005), 180-87; Fabro, Participation et causalité, 224-25. 214 De ver. 29.3 [Leonine 22*3/1.855]: “Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod finitum et infinitum circa quantitatem intelliguntur, ut patet per philosophum in I Physic. Est autem duplex quantitas: scilicet dimensiva, quae secundum extensionem consideratur; et virtualis, quae attenditur secundum intensionem: virtus enim rei est ipsius perfectio, secundum illud philosophi in VIII Physic.: unumquodque perfectum est quando attingit propriae virtuti. Et sic quantitas virtualis uniuscuiusque formae attenditur secundum modum suae perfectionis. Utraque autem quantitas per multa diversificatur: nam sub quantitate dimensiva continetur longitudo, latitudo, et profundum, et numerus in potentia. Quantitas autem virtualis in tot distinguitur, quot sunt naturae vel formae; quarum perfectionis modus totam mensuram quantitatis facit.” 215 De ver. 29.3 [Leon. 22*3/1.855]: “Nam in uno et eodem diversa quantitas virtualis attendi potest secundum diversas rationes eorum quae de ipso praedicantur; sicut ex hoc quod dicitur ens, consideratur in eo quantitas virtualis quantum ad perfectionem essendi.” 367 calls intrinsic perfection—are taken from completeness as a quantitative notion.216 The fundamental notion of perfection is that a thing does not lack something of its due quantity, whether this is dimensive (or predicamental) quantity or virtual quantity. As Thomas puts it in ST 1.42.1, in treating the equality among the divine persons, “quantity in the divine is nothing other than His essence,”217 and he explains (in the reply to the first objection) that the sort of quantity predicated of God is virtual quantity, which is itself explained in terms of perfection.218 There is thus a clear connection between the notion of perfection and that of virtual quantity, and perfection as a notion is ultimately derived from the consideration of quantity. This also extends, as we have seen, to Thomas’s understanding of infinity: God is called infinite with respect to virtual quantity.
The remaining correlations I posited above are less difficult to defend. The goodness attributed to God in ST 1.6 is derived from transcendental goodness and from what is acquired, qualitative goodness in creatures, insofar as it is caused by God. ST 1.8’s treatment of God’s presence in all things clearly relates God to place. ST 1.9 excludes from God all susceptibility to motion, which Thomas characterizes as a mode of existing;219 by excluding motion, Thomas also
216 In Meta. 5.18 #1038 [Marietti 272]: “Sicuti igitur primus modus perfecti accipiebatur ex hoc quod nihil rei deerat de quantitate dimensiva sibi naturaliter determinata, ita hic secundus modus accipitur ex hoc quod nihil deest alicui de quantitate virtutis sibi debitae secundum naturam. Uterque autem modus perfectionis attenditur secundum interiorem perfectionem.” 217 ST 1.42.1 [Leon. 4.435]: “Quantitas autem in divinis non est aliud quam eius essentia.” 218 ST 1.42.1 ad 1 [Leon. 4.435-36]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est quantitas. Una scilicet quae dicitur quantitas molis, vel quantitas dimensiva, quae in solis rebus corporalibus est, unde in divinis personis locum non habet. Sed alia est quantitas virtutis, quae attenditur secundum perfectionem alicuius naturae vel formae, quae quidem quantitas designatur secundum quod dicitur aliquid magis vel minus calidum, inquantum est perfectius vel minus perfectum in caliditate. Huiusmodi autem quantitas virtualis attenditur primo quidem in radice, idest in ipsa perfectione formae vel naturae, et sic dicitur magnitudo spiritualis, sicut dicitur magnus calor propter suam intensionem et perfectionem. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, De trinitate 6, quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse, nam melius dicitur quod perfectius est. Secundo autem attenditur quantitas virtualis in effectibus formae. Primus autem effectus formae est esse, nam omnis res habet esse secundum suam formam. Secundus autem effectus est operatio, nam omne agens agit per suam formam. Attenditur igitur quantitas virtualis et secundum esse, et secundum operationem, secundum esse quidem, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt maioris durationis; secundum operationem vero, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt magis potentia ad agendum.” 219 In Meta. 4.1 #540-41 [Marietti 152]: “Sciendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci. . . . Aliud autem huic proximum in debilitate est, secundum quod generatio et corruptio et motus entia dicuntur.” 368 excludes categorical action and passion. The treatment of eternity as the divine mode of duration in
ST 1.10 obviously involves comparison to time. Finally, the unity attributed to God in ST 1.11 is derived from transcendental unity.
When Thomas indicates that he will inquire quomodo Deus non sit, we can take this quomodo as quo modo, “in what mode?” This reading comports with the earlier claim that quomodo sit inquires after what is preparatory for quidditative knowledge, since in seeking after a definition one typically begins by trying to determine its category. I would suggest that there is a rough parallel between the order of ST 1.3-10 and the order of the categories.220 This parallel does not determine the details of the order of ST 1.3-10, but it especially helps to explain the order of simplicity, perfection, and infinity at the head of the sequence and of omnipresence, immutability, and eternity later. Even if the order of substance and quantity as categories is not the immediate inspiration for the order of simplicity, perfection, and infinity, still the treatment of virtual quantity and “mode of perfection” given above clarifies why God’s perfection should be treated after simplicity: a thing’s mode of perfection is according to its nature or form, and it is through consideration of simplicity that we conclude that God’s essence is ipsum esse. This also helps to explain the placement of unity: after treatment of divine names associated with the categories, Thomas next names God from unity as a transcendental mode of being. We can even extend this further into ST 1.12 (on our knowledge of
God) and ST 1.14 (on God’s knowledge), by noting that cognition is another mode of existing.
220 For discussion of the order of the categories in Thomas’s derivations of the categories in his Commentaries on the Physics and Metaphysics, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 208-228. The order in In Phys. 3.5 #322 [Marietti 157-58] differs somewhat from that found in In Meta. 5.9 #891-92 [Marietti 238-39]. In the former, the order is: substance, quantity, quality, relation, passion, action, time, place, position, habit. In the latter, it is: substance, quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, position, action, passion. I have suggested a rough correspondence between the order of ST 1.3-10 and the order of the categories. The divine names corresponding to substance, quantity, and quality precede those corresponding to place, time, action, and passion. Thomas is willing to present the latter categories (which are among those involving denomination by something extrinsic) in varying orders. 369
3. THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL INFLUENCES
We can be rather brief concerning the historical influences on the order of the divine names in ST 1.3-26, since it exhibits many of the same points of influence as the Summa contra Gentiles. We will be able to point out some developments and novel influences. In this case I will organize my comments by the names of historical influences rather than by section of the Summa theologiae.
A. ARISTOTLE AND AVICENNA
We noted above in treating the Contra Gentiles that SCG 1.15-27 in particular exhibits a combination of Aristotelian and Avicennian influence, reproducing first a sequence of argumentation (from eternity to incorporeality) from Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, followed by a sequence (from SCG 1.22 to 1.26) primarily indebted to Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.4. Furthermore, throughout SCG 1, we find occasional arguments directly appealing to the conclusion of the argument from motion. Arguably the only remaining vestige of the argumentation directly indebted to Aristotle’s reasoning in the Physics or Metaphysics is found in ST 1.3.1, in which the first argument for the claim that God is not a body depends upon His identification as the unmoved mover.221
Whereas we encountered in the Contra Gentiles two parallel lines of argumentative dependence—one grounded in the conclusion of the argument from motion, and the other grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause—what we find in the Summa theologiae is that Thomas has abandoned one of these lines of argumentation in favor of the other. This results in the later placement of eternity in 1.10: eternity is no longer presented as the principal divine name from which all others will follow.
The relative increase in the importance of Avicennian influence in the Summa theologiae is also reflected by the fact that the only argument for divine intelligence in ST 1.14.1 is the argument from
221 For the order of argumentation in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, see above, pp. 92-110. 370 immateriality, which Thomas associates with Avicenna in In Sent. 1.2.1.3. Furthermore, just as in the
Contra Gentiles, Thomas concludes his treatment of the unity of the divine essence with a consideration of the divine beatitude in ST 1.26—this follows the example of Avicenna’s Metaphysics.
This being said, by no means does Thomas completely abandon Aristotle’s influence. Most importantly, the fundamental order of the divine names that he presents—simplicity, perfection
(which I will suggest below is itself qualified by infinity and immutability), unity, operation—is the same order that Thomas identifies in his Commentary on the Metaphysics. That is, even if the
Aristotelian order of argumentation for divine incorporeality is no longer a strong influence as it was in SCG 1.15-20, still Thomas’s presentation of the order of the divine names is fundamentally consistent at a general level with the order Thomas recognizes in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.222
B. DIONYSIUS
In treating the Contra Gentiles, I suggested a Dionysian influence on the order of SCG 1.15-
27, insofar as Thomas progressively distances God from more and more creatures—from matter, from bodies, from any genus, from any composition with creatures. This same order is still reflected in ST 1.3’s treatment of the divine simplicity.
I would point to two points of Dionysian influence that are peculiar to ST 1.3-11. The first is what Thomas calls Dionysius's “magisterial rule” in the Divine Names, that causal divine names— names understood as designating created effects and attributed to God as the cause—concern the divine essence.223 This may help to explain why Thomas exhibits such a clear preference for argumentation appealing immediately to the identity of God as the first efficient cause in his treatment of the divine essence, particularly in his treatment of divine perfection and goodness. It
222 See above, p. 110. 223 In De div. nom. 2.1 #126 [Marietti 41]: “Et ex hoc potest accipi regula magistralis quod omnia nomina designantia effectum in creaturas, pertinent ad divinam essentiam.” 371 would also explain the shift away from pure perfection arguments, which do not necessarily conclude to names that signify the divine essence or substance, as we have seen above.
Second, as noted above, Thomas treats c. 9 of the Divine Names, which is concerned with comparative divine names (such as greatness, similarity, sameness, etc.), by relying upon such notions as simplicity, the likeness of creatures to God, infinity, omnipresence, immutability, and unity. We can draw a connection between the comparative character of these names in the Divine
Names and the project of investigating quomodo Deus non sit and qualiter Deus sit: recognizing that we cannot grasp what God is in Himself, we nevertheless compare Him to creatures through various negations and relations. Along similar lines, Thomas’s detailed consideration of divine perfection in his commentary on c. 13 appeals to both infinity and immutability as notions that qualify the distinctively divine mode of perfection.224 In treating the Contra Gentiles, I indicated that Thomas seems to place unity and infinity as divine names that qualify the divine perfection; within the Summa theologiae, immutability can be added to this list. Consequently, we can also think of ST 1.4-11 as a unit collectively concerned with the divine perfection.225
C. PETER THE LOMBARD
We can indicate a point of apparent development away from the Lombard’s influence. In the
Contra Gentiles, Thomas presents divine power and transitive operation as a sort of prologue to his consideration of creatures in Book 2; in this he imitates Peter’s discussion of divine power in the
Sentences as preparatory for the discussion of creation. In the Summa theologiae, however, Thomas places his consideration of the divine power within his treatment of those things pertaining to the unity of the divine essence. It is possible, however, that Thomas places power before beatitude in
224 See above, p. 128 n. 126. 225 I would again point to In Sent. 1.2.1.3 as providing support for this reading of infinity and unity as features qualifying the eminence of the divine perfection. 372 anticipation of the order of the remainder of the Prima pars (which concerns creation) and the
Secunda pars, which begins with a consideration of beatitude as the final end of human operation.
D. SUMMA FRATRIS ALEXANDRI
I would point out one other special historical influence on the content of ST 1.3-26, especially on ST 1.7-13: this is Book 1 of the Summa fratris Alexandri.226 I provide here an outline of just the topics of the questions in the first six treatises of Book 1, including the number of chapters.227
Treatise 1: q. 1: God’s existence [2 chapters] q. 2: immutability [3 chapters] q. 3: simplicity [3 chapters] Treatise 2: q. 1: infinity (immensity with respect to Himself) [2 chapters] q. 2: incomprehensibility (immensity with respect to our knowledge) [2 chapters] q. 3: omnipresence and existence in things (immensity with respect to place) [18 chapters] q. 4: eternity (immensity with respect to duration) [13 chapters] Treatise 3: q. 1: unity [13 chapters] q. 2: truth [14 chapters] q. 3: goodness [20 chapters] Treatise 4: q. 1: the meaning of power [5 chapters] q. 2: the characteristics of divine power [15 chapters] q. 3: what is possible for the divine power [10 chapters] Treatise 5, section 1: q. 1: divine knowledge in itself [17 chapters] Treatise 5, section 2: q. 1: divine foreknowledge (knowledge of the future) [7 chapters] q. 2: divine disposition (knowledge of what He will do) [5 chapters] q. 3: providence and fate (knowledge of His rule) [13 chapters] q. 4: divine predestination, the Book of Life (knowlege of the saved) [42 chapters] Treatise 6: q. 1: the meaning of divine will [3 chapters]
226 For discussion of the state of the question concerning the authorship of the Summa fratris Alexandri, see Kenan B. Osborne, “Alexander of Hales,” The History of Franciscan Theology, ed. Kenan B. Osborne (Franciscan Institute: New York, 2007), 13-18. For our purposes, all that is important is that almost all of Book 1 would have been complete long before the composition of Thomas’s Summa theologiae. 227 Questions and number of chapters take from table of contents in Summa fratris [Quaracchi 1.754-62]. 373
q. 2: the causality of the divine will [3 chapters] q. 3: the differences of the divine will [3 chapters] q. 4: the subject of the divine will [3 chapters] q. 5: the fulfillment of the divine will [1 chapter] q. 6: the conformity of the human will to the divine [8 chapters]
Several features of these first questions of the Summa fratris Alexandri stand out. First, there is a tremendous overlap in content with ST 1.3-11 and 1.14-26.228 Descending to the content of the chapters and articles, the overlap in content is even more striking: for example, of the 42 articles in
ST 1.3-11, no less than 30 articles have a direct parallel in a chapter or article in this section of the
Summa fratris Alexandri. Of these 30 parallel articles, 15 consider the same topic nearly verbatim. This sort of parallelism continues with respect to the content of ST 1.14-26, for which the majority of questions asked by Thomas have a direct textual parallel in the Summa fratris. Second, we find within the Summa fratris Alexandri that the treatment of the transcendental divine names is according to the order of the transcendentals; Thomas would have therefore been familiar with a work in which this order was followed. Third, there is a tremendous multiplication of questions in the Summa fratris
Alexandri compared to the Summa theologiae. For many of the questions listed above, chapters are subdivided into articles and even subarticles: for example, there are a total of 16 articles contained in the 3 chapters of Treatise 6, q. 3.
Thomas’s Summa theologiae differs from the Summa fratris Alexandri sometimes in the answers given to these parallel questions, frequently in the principles and explanations offered, but above all
(a) in the order of presentation and (b) in the elimination of a tremendous number of questions. For this reason, I would suggest that, at least with respect to the content of ST 1.3-26, the Summa fratris
Alexandri may be, in addition to commentaries on the Sentences, a target of the criticisms contained in
228 There are also parallels to many of the articles in ST 1.12-13 elsewhere in Book 1 of the Summa fratris Alexandri. 374 the prooemium of the Summa theologiae. Within ST 1.3-11, the major addition by Thomas is the treatment of divine perfection, which does not receive independent treatment in the Summa fratris
Alexandri. This is all the more significant, given the manner in which the remainder of ST 1.6-11 is either subordinated to or can be understood as a qualification of the divine perfection.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The most important key to understanding the order of the divine names in ST 1.3-26 is to appreciate the interplay between negative and positive/affirmative moments in our knowledge of
God, as outlined above in our treatment of the role of the triplex via. It is especially crucial to note the role played by the via remotionis as a method of argumentation through which Thomas derives positive conclusions, especially that God is ipsum esse, good, and that He has knowledge. Once
Thomas has established God’s knowledge in ST 1.14, most of the remaining divine names treated through ST 1.26 follow according to the via eminentiae, understood as the method of argumentation by which one positive divine name follows from another. The entire project of ST 1.3-26 is also situated with respect to the order of the scientific questions, but in such a way that we never get farther in our study of God than a knowledge of an sit and quomodo non sit; although, as we have seen, the latter does not preclude ultimately positive or affirmative implications.
Two particular principles cited by some interpreters—the distinction between essence and properties and the order of the transcendentals—surprisingly do not structure the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae. It is also surprising that neither pure perfection arguments nor
“transcendental” arguments play any explicit role in ST 1.3-26. Thomas also exhibits a preference for argumentation grounded in the identification of God as the first efficient cause, although for divine knowledge he offers only an argument in the via remotionis. 375
Just as in the Contra Gentiles, we find in the Summa theologiae a confluence of many principles and historical influences, and again it is difficult to offer one simple formula from which the whole order of the divine names can be derived. There is an overlapping of likely reasons for the placement of particular divine names. Thomas’s order of procedure is rational, but it is not according to one simple rationale.
CONCLUSION
I will conclude by offering remarks under three headings. First, I will observe what is common to the order of Thomas’s presentation of the divine names in his three treatises on God.
This will allow some general statements about the order of the divine names in his writings. Second, we can note what distinguishes these three parallel treatises with respect to the order of the divine names. This will allow some brief statements about points of development in Thomas’s thought, especially from the Contra Gentiles to the Summa theologiae. Third, I will offer some concluding observations about the significance of the order of the divine names in Thomas’s writings.
1. WHAT IS COMMON TO THOMAS’S THREE TREATISES ON GOD
There is overall consistency in the orders in which Thomas presents the divine names throughout the three parallel treatises on God. I offer, on the following page, a table indicating how the order of the divine names in the three treatises on God can be compared in terms of a consistent structural core, based on God’s existence, simplicity, perfection, and operation. In each case, after having offered argumentation for God’s existence, Thomas pursues the via remotionis, giving extended treatment to the divine simplicity early within this order. This is followed by consideration of the divine perfection, after which Thomas is able to transition to a consideration of questions concerning divine naming. After this, he proceeds to a consideration of the divine operation. After establishing God’s intelligence, he derives divine will from intelligence. The remaining divine names treated by Thomas are moved somewhat flexibly among these core names. Many names are also absent from the Compendium theologiae, but this has the advantage of helping to clarify for us what
Thomas regards as indispensable in a brief presentation of the divine names.
376
377
SCG 1.13-2.22 CT 1.3-36 ST 1.2-26 God’s existence (1.13) God’s existence (1.3) God’s existence (1.2.3) immobility (1.4) eternity (1.15) eternity (1.5-8) simplicity (1.16-1.27) simplicity/unity (1.9-17) simplicity (1.3) infinity of essence (1.18) infinity of power (1.19) perfection (1.28) perfection (1.20-23) perfection (1.4) likeness of creatures to God (1.29) likeness of creatures to God (1.4.3) goodness (1.6) infinity (1.7) omnipresence (1.8) immutability (1.9) eternity (1.10) unity (1.11) how God is known (1.12) divine naming (1.30-36) divine naming (1.24-27) divine naming (1.13) goodness (1.37-41) unity (1.42) infinity (1.43) intelligence/truth (1.44-71) intelligence (1.28-31) knowledge/truth (1.14-17) life (1.18) will (1.72-90) will (1.32-34) will (1.19) love (1.91) love (1.20) moral/intellectual virtues (1.92-94) justice/mercy (1.21) no will of evil, no hatred (1.95-96) life (1.97-99) providence (1.23-24) power (1.25) beatitude (1.100-102) beatitude (1.26)
This consistent structural core—existence, simplicity, perfection, operation—can be understood in several complementary ways. To begin, with respect to historical antecedents, such an order is consistent both with Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8 and with Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12, particularly as Thomas interprets and presents the latter in his Commentary. That is, the structural core of
Thomas’s presentation of the divine names is consistent with the order he finds in the two best historical expressions of philosophical theology.
Furthermore, this order can be articulated in terms of the elements of the triplex via, according to the order causality, negation, eminence. Thomas demonstrates God’s existence in the 378 via causalitatis; he then transitions into a primary emphasis on the via remotionis, beginning with simplicity. After arriving at God’s perfection, elaboration on the divine perfection and its implications—particularly in his discussions of divine naming—pave the way for argumentation from one positive attribute to another in the via eminentiae. Thomas relies heavily on such arguments in his consideration of divine operation. Now, I have argued above against thinking of any particular order of the elements of the triplex via as absolutely fundamental, for two reasons. First, all three elements of the triplex via are already involved in the knowledge that God exists through, for example, the second way. To conceive of a rigidly compartmentalized order of the triplex via would obscure the presence of all three elements in our initial knowledge of God’s existence. Second, even within a section primarily associated with one element of the triplex via, we find both divine names and ways of argumentation associated with a different element. For example, within ST 1.3-11, which is primarily associated with the via remotionis, we find that Thomas identifies God as ipsum esse and as the highest good, positive divine names that involve the via eminentiae; and most of Thomas’s arguments for divine perfection and goodness in ST 1.4 and 1.6 pertain to the via causalitatis as a method of argumentation.
Finally, we should note the connection between this core order—existence, simplicity, perfection, operation—and the order of science. After having answered an sit Deus in the affirmative through demonstration quia, Thomas recognizes that because he cannot pursue an answer to the question quid sit Deus—which is the question that naturally follows upon the knowledge that something exists—he must instead pursue the negative quid Deus non sit or quomodo Deus non sit. We can thus understand Thomas’s procedure in comparison with the order of the scientific questions.
Furthermore, the distinction between essence (or substance) and operation also seems to be derived from the scientific consideration of creatures. In our understanding of God, we ascribe to Him a 379 logical distinction between essence and operation—between what He is and what He does—because this real distinction in creatures whose essences we do know informs the very structure of our reasoning about them.1 We can say that the order of the divine names is thus modeled on the order of the scientific consideration of creatures, albeit in a modified form.
I have here noted connections between the order of the divine names and the order of science. Above, I also remarked that the core order common to all three of Thomas’s treatises on
God is consistent with those found in both Aristotle and Avicenna, particularly as Thomas interprets and presents the latter. At this point, we should call attention to the distinction that
Thomas draws in SCG 2.4 between the philosophical and theological orders with respect to consideration of God and of creatures. He explains that philosophical teaching considers creatures as they are in themselves, and it proceeds from this to a consideration of God, known as the cause of creatures. By contrast, the teaching of faith—theology—considers creatures “only in their relation to God,” and it considers God first and creatures afterward.2 This distinction between the philosophical and theological orders concerns the order in which God and creatures are treated, relative to each other; it does not say anything about the order in which God Himself is considered, either within philosophy or within theology. That the fundamental core of the order of presentation in Thomas’s three treatises on God matches the order found in Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8 and
Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 is thus of no small importance. The consideration of God that is the
1 If there is anything that calls to mind the order of judgment—as opposed to the order of discovery—in Thomas’s presentation of the divine names, I would suggest that it is in this structure of considering essence prior to operation. In our consideration of living corporeal creatures, it pertains to the order of discovery to consider vital operations so as to discover the essence of the soul. By placing essence prior to operation in his considerations of God, of angels, and of the human soul, Thomas follows what is, in the case of the human soul, the order of judgment (or order of reality). 2 SCG 2.4 [Leon. Man. 96]: “Exinde etiam est quod non eodem ordine utraque doctrina procedit. Nam in doctrina philosophiae, quae creaturas secundum se considerat et ex eis, in Dei cognitionem perducit, prima est consideratio de creaturis et ultima de Deo. In doctrina vero fidei, quae creaturas non nisi in ordine ad Deum considerat, primo est consideratio Dei et postmodum creaturarum.” 380 culmination of philosophy—as this is represented by the achievements of Aristotle and Avicenna— appears to be, in its order, the model upon which Thomas bases his consideration of God’s essence and operation in works that follow the theological order by beginning with a consideration of God in Himself. Thomas also remarks in the same SCG 2.4 that it pertains to theology to employ principles and arguments taken from the philosophers:3 this would seem to extend to the fundamental order of the divine names that Thomas adopts in all three of his treatises on God.
I would suggest that there is at least one critical difference, however, between the use of this core order of the divine names within the theological order and its “natural habit” as the culmination of metaphysical reasoning. This difference is that Thomas does not take for granted every philosophical conclusion that is prior, in the order of discovery, to the philosophical consideration of God. Most importantly, the composition and real distinction of essence and esse within creatures is, for Thomas, prior in the philosophical order of discovery to the knowledge of God’s existence as ipsum esse subsistens.4 As De ente 4 makes clear, the claim that essence and esse are composite in creatures affords an excellent point of departure for an argument for God’s existence.5 Within his treatises on God, however, Thomas does not take for granted the composition and real distinction of essence and esse in creatures. Indeed, he doesn’t even take for granted that there is not one esse
3 SCG 2.4 [Leon. Man. 96]: “Et ideo interdum ex principiis philosophiae humanae, sapientia divina procedit. Nam et apud philosophos prima philosophia utitur omnium scientiarum documentis ad suum propositum ostendendum.” 4 That knowledge of the real distinction is prior in the philosophical order of discovery to a knowledge of God’s existence is not uncontroversial: it was a point of ongoing debate between Owens and Wippel in particular. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 145-150 and the sources cited on p. 136, n. 39. 5 De ente 4 [Leon. 43.377]: “Omne autem quod conuenit alicui uel est causatum ex principiis nature sue, sicut risibile in homine; uel aduenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma uel quidditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produceret: quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tantum; alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res que non est esse tantum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima que Deus est.” 381 formale common in reality to all things.6 Thus, although the core order of the divine names in
Thomas’s treatises on God seems to be modeled on the order in which the metaphysician considers
God, this does not mean that Thomas takes for granted all of the conclusions that are prior, in the order of discovery, for the metaphysician.
Another common feature of the order in the three works is the manner in which Thomas proceeds in his consideration of divine operation. In each case, he begins with divine intelligence or knowledge, and then he proceeds to argue for other positive attributes such as will, life, and beatitude; these arguments pertain to the via eminentiae understood as a way of argumentation from one positive divine attribute to another. Even though the Compendium theologiae’s treatment of divine operation is rather abbreviated, it maintains this order in its presentation of divine intelligence and will.
2. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE ORDERS OF THE THREE TREATISES ON
GOD
In this section, I will be brief, and I would refer readers to the conclusions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters of this dissertation for further detail. Apart from the fundamental core common to Thomas’s three treatises on God—existence, simplicity, perfection, operation—we find variation, sometimes significant, in the placement of particular divine names. I will offer some brief commentary here on what I take to be the most significant peculiarities of each of the three works.
6 SCG 1.26 [Leon. Man. 27-29]. 382
A. THE PLACEMENT OF GOODNESS, UNITY, AND INFINITY IN SCG 1.37-43, AFTER DIVINE
NAMING
In both the Compendium theologiae and the Summa theologiae, Thomas places his discussion of divine naming immediately prior to the consideration of divine operation. In the Summa contra
Gentiles, however, the discussion of divine naming in SCG 1.30-36 precedes the treatment of divine goodness (SCG 1.37-41), unity (1.42), and infinity (1.43). I have not attached great significance to this difference above, as I think that either arrangement is reasonable.
Treatment of divine naming immediately after perfection (SCG 1.28) and the likeness of creatures to God (1.29) is reasonable, insofar as the likeness of creatures to God is the foundation for positive, analogical divine naming. I have tried to explain the contents of SCG 1.28-43 together as a whole by reference to the critically important In Sent. 1.2.1.3, which makes clear that Thomas regards all of the topics treated in this section of the Contra Gentiles as closely related.7 In brief, In
Sent. 1.2.1.3 makes clear the close connection between the likeness of creatures to God and the possibility of positive divine naming, and it characterizes the eminence of the divine perfection in terms of universality, plenitude, and unity. The universality of the divine perfection is treated in SCG
1.28, and I argued that divine infinity is related to what Thomas calls plenitude in In Sent. 1.2.1.3. As for the placement of goodness in SCG 1.37-41, this seems to be a consequence of Thomas’s subordination of goodness to perfection, a feature that remains the same in ST 1.4-6. Finally, I would suggest that Thomas ends SCG 1.15-43, which is primarily devoted to the via remotionis, with divine infinity, because a recognition of God’s infinity seems critical for the knowledge of Him as distinct from all things—this is the purpose that Thomas announces for the via remotionis in SCG
1.14.
7 See above, pp. 233-35. 383
That Thomas delays the discussion of divine naming until ST 1.13 seems to be in part a consequence of its having been paired with ST 1.12, which concerns how God is known by creatures (or His presence in creaturely knowledge). The placement of ST 1.12 after the discussion of divine infinity seems necessary, given that Thomas’s argumentation for the claim that no creature can comprehend God’s essence (ST 1.12.7) depend upon the divine infinity. As noted above, ST 1.4-
11 can also be thought of as one section together devoted to the divine perfection; divine goodness in ST 1.6 is subordinated to perfection, and ST 1.7-11 (from infinity to unity) concern divine names that serve to qualify and clarify the divine mode of perfection.
B. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE ORDER IN THE COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE
Certainly the most distinctive feature of the Compendium theologiae is its brevity, including the absence of several divine names treated in the other two treatises on God. There is no difficulty about understanding this brevity; the Compendium is clearly intended to be a compact presentation of certain essentials of the Catholic faith, beginning with truths about God that can be known through natural reason. This compactness has proved helpful above in identifying the central order of the divine names common to the three treatises. I have suggested above that some of the peculiarities in the placement of certain divine names or characteristics—such as the separation of the claim that
God lacks accidents from the section devoted to simplicity—can be explained by pedagogical concerns in a work addressed to a wider audience than the other two treatises. Others—such as the placement of infinite power before perfection—may be a consequence of Thomas’s desire to organize his treatment of the preambula fidei concerning God in this work according to the opening phrase of the Nicene Creed. Studying the Compendium theologiae has also proved invaluable, because it clarifies the extent to which Thomas is willing to modify the order in which he presents the divine names, for the sake of pedagogical concerns or in relation to themes he wishes to emphasize. 384
C. THE LATER PLACEMENT OF IMMUTABILITY AND ETERNITY IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE
I have attempted to explain this development with reference to three factors: (1) the shift away from argumentation explicitly grounded in the conclusion of the argument from motion, (2) the corresponding shift from an order primarily inspired by Aristotle to one that incorporates insights derived from Dionysius’s Divine Names, and (3) the fact that a deeper understanding of the meaning of immutability and eternity is permitted by their later placement in the order.
First, I have given significant attention above to arguing that the Summa contra Gentiles reflects the limited argumentative fecundity of the conclusion of the arguments from motion; the identification of God as first efficient cause (or as primum ens) emerges as the more powerful principle for Thomas’s argumentation concerning the divine names. Explicit appeals to the conclusion of the argument from motion or to divine sempiternity, although not infrequent, still appear in a small minority of chapters. Furthermore, I have argued that many of Thomas’s most important conclusions concerning God—for example, that He is pure act, the identity of His essence and esse, and His universal perfection—are not ultimately grounded in the argument from motion in the Summa contra Gentiles. My argument rests upon my interpretation of SCG 1.16 in light of SCG 2.25. I have argued that we should understand, as a terminological matter, that Thomas’s exclusions of passive potency and of potency to existence from God in SCG 1.16—these being conclusions that are founded upon the conclusion of the argument from motion—are narrower in meaning than the exclusion of all potency whatsoever or the identification of God as pure act. What we find in the Summa theologiae is a shift away from explicit dependence on the conclusion of the argument from motion and towards a nearly exclusive dependence upon the identification of God as first efficient cause (or as primum ens). The shift away from dependence upon the conclusion of the argument from motion helps to explain why immutability and eternity—the most obvious 385 consequences of the conclusion of the argument from motion—no longer serve in the Summa theologiae as early principles of the order of the divine names.8
Second, with respect to historical influences, the later placement of immutability and eternity in the Summa theologiae indicates a shift away from imitating the order of argumentation found in
Aristotle’s Physics 8 and Metaphysics 12. In its place, I have suggested above that Thomas, drawing on insights he develops in his Commentary on the Divine Names, comes to understand ST 1.4-11 as a unit collectively concerned with the divine perfection.9 Understood in this way, both immutability and eternity serve to qualify and strengthen our understanding of the divine mode of perfection.
Immutability and eternity thus find their place alongside infinity and unity, which function in both the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae as features of the eminence of the divine perfection.10
Third, the later placement of immmutability and eternity makes it easier for Thomas to establish these divine names according to a clearer or deeper meaning. First, the later placement of immutability in ST 1.9 after ST 1.8’s treatment of God’s presence in all things allows Thomas to distinguish in a precise way between the exclusively divine mode of immutability and the qualified immutability possessed by certain creatures in various respects. Thomas is thus better equipped, later in the order of argumentative dependence, to be able to explain in a complete and clear fashion why
God alone is said to be absolutely immutable. Second, with respect to eternity, SCG 1.15’s treatment makes only brief reference to the full Boethian meaning of eternity, and most of Thomas’s arguments in this chapter seem to conclude only that God is sempiternal. I would suggest that
8 In addition to the later placement of immutability and eternity, this also helps to explain the reformulation of the argument from motion in the first way of ST 1.2.3 into a version that parallels the final, de novo argument of SCG 1.16, an argument that does conclude to the existence of God as pure act. 9 See above, pp. 370-71. 10 See treatment of In Sent. 1.2.1.3 above, pp. 38-39, for the claim that universality, infinity, and unity are features of the eminence of the divine perfection. 386
Thomas’s explanation of and argumentation for the Boethian meaning of divine eternity in ST 1.10 is facilitated by the clear and more complete account of absolute immutability in ST 1.9.
Finally, I would also recall that the structure of ST 1.3-11 displays in a striking way the interplay between negative and positive moments in our knowledge of God in this life.11
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE NAMES
In this final section, I will briefly consider questions pertaining to the significance of the order of the divine names in Thomas’s writings, followed by an explanation of the ways in which we can or cannot identify a rationale for the order in which Thomas presents the divine names. I will primarily refer here to the Summa theologiae, Thomas’s most mature presentation of the order of the divine names.
In chapter one of this dissertation, we investigated Thomas’s claim in In Sent. 1.2.1.3 that the multiplicity of the divine attributes (the positive divine names) can be said to be in some way on the part of God Himself (ex parte Dei), insofar as this multiplicity results from the fact that God infinitely exceeds the human intellect.12 That is, the multiplicity of the divine attributes—and thus their distinction secundum rationem from one another—is itself a consequence and reflection of God’s infinite perfection. With respect to the negative divine names, I argued above that they are distinct from one another insofar as the creaturely characteristics that such names remove from God are distinct: corporeality, finitude, and motion are all distinct characteristics of creatures. I concluded above that the order of the negative names cannot be ex parte Dei, but would rather arise from some order among the creaturely characteristics denied by the negative names. I raised and left unresolved the question of whether the order of the positive divine attributes might, in some way, reflect or
11 For this, see above, pp. 346-54. 12 See above, pp. 40-41. 387 convey something of God’s perfection. Is the order of the divine attributes in some way ex parte Dei, as Thomas indicates that the multiplicity of these divine names is? Does the order of the divine attributes follow upon or reflect the divine perfection, as the multiplicity of the divine names follows upon and reflects the infinity of His perfection?
I am ultimately inclined towards a negative answer to this question. The order in which
Thomas presents the positive divine names does not seem to be a consequence of or to particularly reflect the divine perfection in any of its aspects. If the order of the positive divine attributes in
Thomas’s presentation were intended to reflect or convey something about the divine perfection, it seems unlikely that their order would be a function of the order of the negative divine names.
Thomas places the positive divine attributes—such as ipsum esse, goodness, intelligence, and life— within an order of argumentation in which negative divine names play a leading role. In the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas cites God’s absolute immutability—taken as the negative aspect of the conclusion of the arguments from motion—as the principle from which his reasoning concerning
God will proceed. Similarly, Thomas devotes CT 1.4 to establishing God’s absolute immobility; this treatise also omits discussion of several positive divine attributes within CT 1.4-36. Most importantly, in the Summa theologiae, Thomas consistently places his positive or affirmative conclusions about God in subordination to negative names or conclusions; I have argued above that the interplay between negative and positive/affirmative moments in our knowledge of God is the most important key to understanding the order of the divine names in ST 1.3-26.13
What, then, is the significance of the order of the divine names? What difference does the order of presentation make? At this point we should transition to considering the question of
Thomas’s rationale: What is he trying to accomplish by his order of presentation? I would suggest
13 See above, pp. 346-54. 388 that, in each of his treatises on God, Thomas allows his order of presentation—which remains consistent in its core order and can be characterized in terms of the triplex via and the order of science, as indicated above—to be modified according to concerns or themes at the forefront of the work in question.
With respect to the Contra Gentiles, I would name as the most important theme the more radical emphasis on the via remotionis, in light of the limitations of human knowledge vis-à-vis the divine: this is, I believe, why discussion of the via remotionis ultimately concludes with divine infinity, which at once serves to express the knowledge of God as distinct from all things and to justify the necessity of the via remotionis.
In the Compendium theologiae, we can identify Thomas’s desire for compactness and for clarity in communicating to a potentially less sophisticated audience. We have also noted that he coordinates his order of presentation with the first phrase of the Nicene Creed: his presentation is thus aimed to help the believer to better understand what is professed in the Creed.
Finally, in trying to understand the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae, we should take seriously what Thomas indicates in his prologue, that the order he intends to follow is the ordo disciplinae. I think it is clear that the order of the divine names in the Summa theologiae does in particular moments serve to make the divine names known in a clearer way, through philosophical reasoning, than would be possible in a different order. I have taken note above of several such moments in the Summa theologiae. For example, the placement of perfection after simplicity—and in particular after the conclusion that God is ipsum esse subsistens—is especially reasonable in light of the fact that Thomas defines perfection in terms of what he calls a thing’s mode (or measure) of perfection, which is according to its nature or form. God’s essence or nature is His esse, and so the mode (or measure) of the divine perfection is according to His esse—even if we acknowledge that we 389 do not grasp the divine esse in itself so as to know what God is. Similarly, the placement of infinity after perfection and goodness would seem in part to be a consequence of the fact that Thomas understands God’s infinity as the infinity of His perfection or goodness. Or, to give another example, the placement of both immutability and eternity later in the order (in ST 1.9-10) permits a clearer and deeper understanding of the meaning of these particular divine names, as compared to their early placement in the Contra Gentiles or Compendium. Finally, the placement of divine power after intelligence and will forestalls a possible confusion, that one might think of the divine power as in any way independent of divine intelligence and will; God is said to have power insofar as He is the principle of effects extrinsic to Himself, but whatever He causes is caused through His intelligence and will.14 I think that we can understand these moments well in connection with Thomas’s stated intention to follow the ordo disciplinae in the presentation of the divine names.
These are, however, only particular examples, and all of this does not sum up to any claim that there is only one possible order of presenting the divine names that is the clearest possible in every respect. Thomas himself recognizes that treating simplicity before perfection might also cause some confusion, in that corporeal things that are called simple—such as the elements—are less perfect than things that are composite.15 I have suggested in a similar way that the placement of infinity after perfection can correct a possible confusion: to call something perfect seems to suggest finitude, given that what we normally identify as perfect is what has “filled out” its finite limit of perfection.16 Beyond the requirements imposed by the order of argumentative dependence itself, the placement of the divine names in any particular order of presentation seems to involve advantages
14 For this point, see above, pp. 328-29. 15 ST 1.3 pr. [Leon. 4.35]: “Et quia simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo inquiretur de perfectione ipsius.” For treatment, see above, p. 298. 16 See above, p. 310. 390 and disadvantages. We can presume that Thomas aims at what seems to be, overall, the clearest order of presentation for a student being led through this order of instruction. It seems unavoidable, in any possible order of presentation, that there will be the possibility of momentary confusions, which will have to be corrected as one proceeds further.
With respect to all three of Thomas’s treatises on God, I have argued throughout this dissertation that there is no solitary rationale that determines Thomas’s order of presentation.
Thomas resists subordinating his discussion of the divine nature to any single schema, such as the order of the transcendentals or a rigidly conceived order of the triplex via. Thomas’s procedure is informed by a combination of philosophical principles, historical influences, and pedagogical concerns. As we have seen, much of Thomas’s order of presentation is best understood in reference to the scientific order in which human beings understand creatures. He modifies this order as necessary, in light of God’s simplicity and infinity, but he does not abandon it completely. Above all,
Thomas’s aim is to teach, and the order of the divine names in his works—especially in the Summa theologiae—is the result of his deliberation about the best means to achieve this purpose. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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