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Congressional Record—House H5705 June 23, 2003 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5705 that it ought to all go for the common House with a number of my colleagues struction is to determine what has hap- good, that everything ought to be who will be joining me later, notably pened regarding our intelligence and thrown into one pot and everybody the gentleman from Massachusetts the political use of that intelligence by shares equally. If you believe in the so- (Mr. DELAHUNT) and the gentleman the Bush administration in the argu- cialistic type of government, then you from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE), to ments to support war in Iraq. There is can justify a death tax. But if you be- talk about Iraq. no question that the Bush administra- lieve in the democratic, capitalistic Mr. Speaker, we have had a great tion and the leading senior advisors to process which has made this country, military victory in Iraq. Our young the President stated with complete cer- by the way, the greatest country in the men and women performed with great tainty in the fall of 2002 that Saddam history of the world, there is no way courage and great effectiveness. We are Hussein had weapons of mass destruc- under any circumstances that you all very proud of our military and the tion, was developing more weapons of could justify this tax. fact that the threat of the Saddam mass destruction, and posed an immi- As I said earlier, last week we voted, Hussein regime is no longer present to nent threat to the region and, in fact, it is over on the other side now, we threaten regional and world peace. But to the world. In private briefings and in voted for permanent elimination of we have two questions that we believe public statements, the President of the that tax, of that death tax. Unfortu- need to be addressed: First, is our mili- United States and his senior advisors nately, most of the Democrats once tary mission complete in Iraq? Sec- assured Members of Congress and the again have chosen to support and to ondly, having won the military vic- American people that the weapons of continue the death tax. tory, are we winning the peace? mass destruction existed, that they It is time for the American public, Regarding the military mission, I were being developed in even greater Mr. Speaker, to understand why there would suggest to the House that our numbers, and that they posed an immi- is a difference between Republicans mission is not complete without a full nent threat. And many of us, myself in- and Democrats. There is one issue I accounting of the weapons of mass de- cluded, based our vote in favor of mili- feel very deeply about in my heart that struction. There is no question that the tary action against Iraq for the pri- separates our two parties. Granted, primary purpose for invading Iraq put mary purpose of disarming Saddam about 40 of the more conservative forward by the administration last Hussein of weapons of mass destruc- Democrats did vote to eliminate the year and accepted by a majority of the tion. Now we cannot find them. death tax and for that they deserve Members of Congress, myself included, More troubling, now stories are ap- credit. But when I am out there, I do was for the purpose of disarming Sad- pearing in the press and intelligence not feel like I am getting in a partisan dam Hussein of weapons of mass de- analysts are stepping forward, only on argument, I do not feel like I am tak- struction. There is no question that the record if they have retired, off the ing any cheap spots when I point out Hussein had such weapons in the past. record if they still are at work for the that the death tax is primarily sup- The international United Nations in- United States, saying, in fact, they ported by the Democrats and the elimi- spectors were finding them in the mid were not giving such certain advice to nation of the death tax is driven by the and late 1990s. Hussein used weapons of the White House in the fall of 2002, that Republicans. When you go out to the mass destruction, notably chemical they were saying we cannot be sure heartland of America, when you go out weapons, against his own citizens with what kinds of weapons of mass destruc- there into that countryside some time, devastating and brutal effects. No one tion Saddam Hussein had in the fall of see if you have got enough guts to look has dreamt up or made up the motion 2002. that farm family in the face and say to that Hussein had in the past weapons On September 26, 2002, the President them, it is because of you that the next of mass destruction. There is no doubt made a speech in the Rose Garden stat- generation in that family will in all that he did. But we cannot find them ing with great certainty that Saddam likelihood not be able to continue the now. We do not know where they are. Hussein had chemical and biological farming or ranching operation. Perhaps they are buried in the desert weapons of mass destruction and was I urge my colleagues and I urge espe- and we will find them next week. I developing additional chemical and bi- cially my Democratic colleagues, it is hope that is the case. Perhaps he gave ological weapons of mass destruction, time for you to surrender this issue, them to some other group or some and yet at the same time it now has be- because it is the right thing to do. It is other country. Perhaps he destroyed come public. The Defense Intelligence time for you Democrats to step up to them. We do not know what happened, Agency in September, 2002, was circu- the plate and support the American but many of us in the House believe lating a report through the White farmer and the American rancher and that we must have a full accounting of House in the highest levels of the ad- the American small business. The best what happened to the weapons of mass ministration saying ‘‘there was no way that you can do that is to vote to destruction before our military mission credible evidence that Saddam Hussein eliminate the death tax. Give these is complete, for two basic reasons. families, give these farms, give these currently had weapons of mass destruc- First off, we need to know where they tion or was developing more weapons of small businesses, give these ranches an are. If they are not in Iraq and have opportunity to go to the next genera- mass destruction.’’ There was some been given or taken someplace else, we evidence, but no credible evidence that tion. We all benefit. Our communities need to secure them, to dismantle benefit. Our environment benefits. that was a certainty. And that lack of them. We need to know who has the certainty did not make its way into Push the socialistic temptation aside custody of them. and adopt, rather, what I call the fair- the public and private arguments made ness doctrine. It is very simple, just be b 2300 by the administration. So many of us fair. If you could just be fair in your If they are in Iraq, we have to find feel that the Bush administration has a assessment of this horrible tax, you too them. We have to make sure that the growing credibility gap regarding the next time will join the Republicans and coalition forces gain custody of those weapons of mass destruction. vote against the continuation of the weapons of mass destruction and not Why does this matter? It matters death tax. another group that might use them for greatly for the President’s new doc- trine of preemption, of the preemptive f evil purposes. If these weapons have been destroyed, all for the better; but use of military power to stop an IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS we need to know why our intelligence enemy. I do believe in an age of terror DESTRUCTION did not know that fact. We frankly when we are dealing with adversaries The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. need to know what happened to them that do not always come from another GARRETT of New Jersey). Under the so that we could be sure that the world country who do not always have a cap- Speaker’s announced policy of January has been rid of that particular group of ital city to defend or a homeland to de- 7, 2003, the gentleman from Pennsyl- weapons of mass destruction and that, fend when we are dealing with terror- vania (Mr. HOEFFEL) is recognized for if they do exist, they are in safe cus- ists who are not only faceless but 60 minutes. tody. stateless that it may be necessary to Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I appre- The second reason that we need a full take preemptive military action if we ciate the opportunity to address the accounting of the weapons of mass de- are faced with an imminent threat to VerDate Jan 31 2003 03:59 Jun 24, 2003 Jkt 019060 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K23JN7.092 H23PT1 H5706 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 23, 2003 this country. But that presupposes that that nation and the Saddam Hussein not only with this piece of information, we have accurate intelligence. It is one regime in Iraq relative to the desire of but other pieces of information that thing to respond to an attack against Saddam Hussein to purchase highly en- were relied on or alluded to that sup- us.
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