Policy Initiatives that Steer Terrorism A Case Study of L. Paul Bremer's De-Ba’athification of the Iraqi Army Ali G. Awadi, Ph.D. Henry Ford College, USA Email: [email protected] Policy Initiatives that Steer Terrorism: A Case Study of L. Paul Bremer's De- Ba’athification of the Iraqi Army Ali G. Awadi, Ph.D. Abstract A key objective of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was to bring democracy to Iraq by severing all links with Saddam Hussein’s toppled regime. As we’ve now discovered however, this “de- Ba’athization” policy was terribly short-sighted and led to horrific sectarian fighting in Iraq, attacks on U.S. troops when they were occupying the country and eventually the rise of ISIS and other terrorist groups that are wreaking havoc on the region today. We will delve into the complicated political, ethnic and religious dynamics that exist in Iraq to examine why, rather than leading to peace, the dismantling of the Ba’ath infrastructure instead unleashed instability on the Iraqi people soon followed by utter chaos and incalculable suffering for the population of Iraq (and even outside its borders) that continues to this day. We all know the famous Santayana quote that those who fail to learn from the lessons of history are doomed to repeat it. The question is, do we have the political will and wherewithal to put that wise advice to practical use in our current and future foreign policy. Keywords: Iraq Policy, De-Ba'athification, Army, Bremer, Terrorism Introduction When the United States led a multi-national coalition into invading Iraq in 2003, the ostensible reason was to thwart the ambitions of Iraq’s leader, the notorious dictator Saddam Hussein, to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Though no WMD were subsequently uncovered in Iraq, a parallel motive, always thinly veiled at best, was the ouster of Hussein from power and the toppling of his regime. This overthrow was accomplished militarily in very short order, as the United States was able to use technological superiority, particularly with air power, to great advantage. Hussein’s army collapsed and organized resistance came to an end in the wake of the American-led onslaught. However, once the initial military objectives were achieved and the regime was driven out, not surprisingly this created a tremendous power vacuum in Iraq (Mitchell & Massoud, 2009). Hussein had ruled the country with an iron fist for decades. Using brutal tactics, he had very effectively suppressed any political opposition, monopolizing control over the nation’s entire infrastructure. So what would become of Iraqi society now that he was gone? With no viable democratic institutions in place, how would the newly “liberated” Iraq recover from the foreign invasion and move into the future as a successful sovereign state with a credible government? With the hindsight of more than a decade now available to us, it is clear that American planners, along with Iraqi opposition groups, did not investigate these questions adequately before giving the green light to invading Iraq. Chaos and terrorism were the result. We will begin by briefly analyzing the pre-invasion history of Iraq, in order to give some perspective into the policy blunders that have led to unspeakable suffering for the Iraqi people, along with thousands of American casualties. Middle East Review of Public Administration (MERPA), (2)1, 2016 Page 2 Historical Overview It is impossible to understand Saddam Hussein, his regime and the aftermath of its collapse without some knowledge of the history of the Ba’ath party. The movement traces its origins to the 1940s when it was founded by two Syrian teachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar and their stated objective was Arab unity, socialism and the modernization of the Arab world (Terrill, 2012). Their slogan was “One Arab nation with an eternal mission.” What many Westerners may not realize is that this movement was not primarily religious. It viewed Islam as an important facet of Arabic culture, but Ba’athism itself was more of a secular ideology. Their aim was to infiltrate the military and other centers of state power. They succeeded in Iraq in 1968, in large part due to the efforts of a young revolutionary named Saddam Hussein. By 1979 Hussein had consolidated his position within the party and within Iraqi politics and assumed leadership of the nation as its president. He had many years earlier befriended the movement’s co-founder Michel Aflaq when both men were living in exile. He used the older man’s patronage to his advantage, as he continued to consolidate his grip on power. Saddam skillfully used the Ba’ath party to gain control of the army and insulate himself from possible coup attempts. He later used Ba’ath party apparatus to help create and nurture a personality cult for himself. The party’s actual ideology, however, had little to do with the personage of Saddam Hussein or for that matter any particular individual. The hallmark of Hussein’s leadership style was the instilling of fear. He ruled with fierce ruthlessness as head of one of the most totalitarian regimes in the world (Terrill, 2012). By 2003, membership in the Ba’ath party in Iraq had reached at least two million. However, membership did not in any way protect any Iraqi’s from Hussein’s wrath if for even the smallest reason he suspected any person or group of disloyalty. In fact, attaining a degree of stature within the Ba’ath party could be fatal because Hussein would often purge those in the party who seemed to be growing too prominent, as he was concerned that such people or groups of people could eventually pose a political threat to him. Nonetheless, in the view of many outside observers, the Ba’athist era in Iraq was for all practical purposes synonymous with Hussein’s reign. In reality, though, it was “leadership” from the barrel of a gun, with violent coercion ruling the land. American Decision-Making and Policy Justification American leaders, in deciding to invade Iraq, of course realized that once Saddam Hussein was ousted from power, a replacement government would need to be formed. But before that could happen, the U.S. and its allies installed what came to be known as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). It was led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who arrived in Baghdad in May of 2003, shortly after the cessation of major combat operations (though much additional fighting would ensue in the years to come). In addition to serving as the head of the CPA, Bremer was also George W. Bush’s presidential envoy to Iraq. Bremer’s very first major act in his new position was a May 16, 2003, order to “de-Ba’athify” Iraqi society. According to Bremer, he was told by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith that such an order was absolutely essential to Iraq’s rehabilitation (Terrill, 2012). However, how did American policy makers reach this conclusion? What was it based upon? Some thought that it would be similar to “de-Nazification” in Germany after World War Two. Middle East Review of Public Administration (MERPA), (2)1, 2016 Page 3 Furthermore, such a view does not take into account the very different circumstances of 1945 Germany and 2003 Iraq (Terrill, 2012). First and foremost, though, Bremer and others were convinced that removing any remnants of Ba’athist influence from the new (still to be formed) Iraqi military was of utmost importance. To start this process, what was left of the Iraqi military would need to be disbanded. According to Bremer, in his 2006 book, “My Year in Iraq,” he actually didn’t have much of a choice in the matter because the Iraqi armed forces had, in effect, disbanded themselves. He also contended that the decision to disband the old army and form a new one (rather than recalling the existing military) was a wise move. Bremer states: “Iraq’s new professional soldiers are the country’s most effective trusted security force. By contrast, the Ba’athist era police force, which we did recall to duty, has proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi people it is supposed to protect.” (Weiler, 2009). Indeed, there can be no doubt that the stranglehold that Hussein and the Ba’athist Party had over everyday life was all-encompassing. Members filled jobs at every level of the society and loyalty was not a request but a demand. Party members were bound to inform on their neighbors, co-workers and one another. It was all part of Hussein’s intricate network of control that he used to keep a tight grip on the reins of power (Stover, Megally, & Mufti, 2005). There were other reasons for wanting to remove all Ba’ath influence from the “new” Iraq. Stover, Megally, & Mufti (2005) assert that one of them has to do with the identification of Ba’athism with the Sunni branch of Islam. Saddam Hussein (though by all accounts not a man of strong religious convictions) was a Sunni, and the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath Party was therefore seen as a threat to the country’s religious majority, Shia Muslims. This also influenced Bremer’s decision to remove the top four ranks of Ba’ath Party members from their positions and ban them from future employment in state jobs (Stover, Megally, & Mufti, 2005). Due to all of the ethnic tensions in Iraq between rival groups, Bremer and others believed that Iraq would be more stable and unified with all remnants of the Ba’ath era completely eradicated.