Catholicism and the Economy of Miracles in West Germany, 1920–1960
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New German Critique Catholicism and the Economy of Miracles in West Germany, 1920–1960 James Chappel And so, with Leo’s Encyclical pointing the way and furnishing the light, a true Catholic social science has arisen, which is daily fostered and enriched by the tireless efforts of those chosen men whom We have termed auxiliaries of the Church. —Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (1931) In 1952 a German Catholic sociologist told his audience about a recent trip to a coal mine outside Cologne. He was awestruck by the large, artificial val- ley, in which he could see one or two workers directing a vast assemblage of machinery. “How,” he wondered, “would such a mine have looked in Roman times?” Doubtless, he reasoned, it would have been staffed by slaves. In the current world of technology, however, workers have received their proper dig- nity. Their labor “is more like the reign of a sovereign than the yoke of a slave.” These mighty sovereigns, the coal miners, were only following the divine injunction to enjoy “dominion over the earth.” While some atavistic Christian writers had extolled the old peasant economy, the sociologist continued, a close linkage can be found between modern economics and the Christian faith. Modern labor might seem dehumanizing, but its monotony is in fact reminiscent of Benedictine monks, who deliberately chose repetitive tasks as a spiritual exercise. Factory labor, it turns out, is conducive to singing and to the New German Critique 126, Vol. 42, No. 3, November 2015 DOI 10.1215/0094033X-3136985 © 2015 by New German Critique, Inc. 9 Published by Duke University Press New German Critique 10 James Chappel contemplation of God. We should not bemoan our new economy, he declared, but celebrate the profound “harmony between technics and faith.”1 The speech, in both its institutional location and its ideology, helps us see how capitalist, growth-oriented economic reconstruction could be squared with the dominance of Christianity, and specifically Catholicism, in both the popular and the political culture of West Germany in the decade after World War II. The speaker was Joseph Höffner, founder of the Münster-based Insti- tute for Catholic Social Science and soon to become archbishop of Cologne. He was a friend to Konrad Adenauer and adviser to his government, particu- larly in policies toward workers and families; Adenauer, of course, was the leader of the Christian Democratic Union, the party that dominated West Ger- many between the end of the war and the 1960s. While Höffner had the ear of Adenauer, he also spoke to Catholic industry and church leaders across the continent. His audience for this speech was the annual study session of the Union Internationale des Associations Patronales Catholiques, an interna- tional association of Catholic employers’ federations (Höffner represented the Bund der katholische Unternehmer, the premier of its sort in Germany). Höffner did not provide a mere aureole for a fundamentally secular reimagining of the economy. He is a deeply representative figure, in that the tradition of Catholic social science he epitomized was central to Christian Democratic governance. How did Catholics come to embrace the “econ- omy,” to the extent that Oswald von Nell-Breuning, one of the world’s lead- ing Catholic economists, could claim by 1949 that “an action, which strives for economic success through following the laws of economy . is . not merely economically sound, but also, for this very reason, ethically sound”?2 As with socialism, national peculiarities abounded, so the present article focuses on “Catholicism in one country”: West Germany.3 Here Catholic politics and Catholic social science achieved unparalleled significance, espe- cially at the heart of the dominant Christian Democratic Union. This was not just any economy: it was a Wirtschaftswunder, a miracle economy. And, like all other miracles, it was bound up with the sacred. Catholicism in these decades functioned as a political economy and a social science. This is not the way we are accustomed to thinking about reli- gion, particularly in Germany, where Carl Schmitt’s notion of “political theol- 1. Joseph Höffner, “Progrès téchnique et progrès humain,” in Progrès économique et progrès social (Paris: Études, 1952), 76–77, 81, 75. 2. Quoted in Hans Tietmeyer, “Kirche und Wirtschaft,” in Kirche—Staat—Wirtschaft auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert, ed. Karl Gabriel (London: Lit, 2002), 21. 3. This story, mutatis mutandis, held true across much of Western and Central Europe. For an extended version of this argument, see my forthcoming monograph. Published by Duke University Press New German Critique Catholicism and the Economy of Miracles 11 ogy,” alongside the overweening interest in the relationship between Catholi- cism and Nazism, has dominated the debate. The influence of religion cannot be reduced to politics, however. Religion greatly influenced “society” and its governing sciences, too. This approach has been neglected for some time, but it seemed natural to a long tradition of scholarship linking Karl Marx, Werner Sombart, Max Weber, Max Horkheimer, R. H. Tawney, and E. P. Thompson. Yet the exploding interest in religion in recent decades has coincided with an emphasis on culture and nation, and a corollary disinterest in political economy. This is true especially in Germany, where the study of religion has been domi- nated by the questions that animate German historiography more generally: the questions of democracy, anti-Semitism, and the nation. Posed by German his- tory as a field, these questions found answers in the Catholic tradition. Kevin Spicer and John Connelly, for instance, have analyzed Catholic anti-Semitism, while Margaret Anderson, Noel Cary, and Karl-Egon Lönne, following the lead of Ronald Ross and Rudolf Morsey, have thought about the Center Party and Catholicism’s relationship to democratic politics more broadly. Rebecca Ayako Bennette, David Blackbourn, and Helmut Walser Smith have written about Catholic formulations of German national belonging.4 This avalanche of scholarship has put the question of religion back on the table, and rightly so. Yet, as a growing body of scholarship reminds us, the positioning of Catholicism on the axes of “nation” and “democracy” dis- tracts us from another facet of religion in postwar West Germany, and perhaps in modern societies more generally. Political form and national identity are not the only ways to think about modern power, as a constellation of theorists from Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben to Timothy Mitchell and Mark Bevir contends. This was especially true in the immediate postwar decades. The era’s characteristic “political” thinkers—Isaiah Berlin, Michael Oake- shott, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Raymond Aron, Robert Dahl—are more properly antipolitical thinkers, committed as they were to forms of pluralism that would deprive the field of the political of as much autonomy as possible. In practice, too, this was an era dominated more by interest group politics and neocorporatist bargaining than by parliaments. Philip Nord refers to the 4. Some recent works have bucked this trend yet still take quite different approaches from the one I take here. See, e.g., Christian Kuchler, Kirche und Kino: Katholische Filmarbeit in Bayern, 1945– 1965 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006); Mark Milosch, Modernizing Bavaria: The Politics of Franz Josef Strauss and the CSU, 1949–1969 (New York: Berghahn, 2006); and Petra van der Osten, Jugend- und Gefährdetenfürsorge im Sozialstaat: Auf dem Weg zum Sozialdienst katholischer Frauen, 1945–1968 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002). 5. See, for one example of many, Jörg Althammer, “Soziale Marktwirtschaft und katholische Soziallehre,” in Tradition und Erneuerung der christlichen Sozialethik in Zeiten der Modernisier- ung, ed. André Habisch, Hanns Jürgen Küsters, and Rudolf Uertz (Freiburg: Herder, 2012), 270–87. Published by Duke University Press New German Critique 12 James Chappel post-1945 states as “technocorporatist” and describes the French Fourth Republic in terms that evoke Mitchell’s portrayal of Egypt at the same time: these modernizing states of the 1940s through the 1960s were governed by a conjunction of interest group politics, bureaucracies, and social sciences.6 The slippery concept of democracy, in other words, is not an especially helpful rubric if we want to understand how European states rebuilt themselves after 1945. This insight allows us to reformulate the standard research question. How, previous historians have wondered, did Catholics become acclimated to democracy? This approach follows an unspoken but pervasive notion of Euro- pean history as a medieval morality play, in which the character called “Democracy” fends off a number of contenders before emerging victorious because of its inherent virtues. In this Pilgrim’s Progress version of history, Catholicism is understood as an entity that either supports democracy or opposes it. This is not, though, how Catholicism functioned: as Leo XIII had already made clear in the 1890s, Catholics were doctrinally obligated to remain indifferent to political form. For the most part, Catholics followed his command, and there was very little Catholic political theory in the century after Leo XIII, in the sense of Catholics arguing, qua Catholicism, in support of a particular political form, be it democracy or monarchy (of course, there were Catholic democrats and Catholic monarchists, but close studies of their writings show that they were careful to toe the papal line by disavowing a strict linkage between their faith and their politics). Instead of political theo- rizing, Catholics in the twentieth century followed Leo’s other command: to go forth and study the social, as he announced in Rerum Novarum (1891). “Catholicism is powerful because it is, above all, a sociology,” declared Ferdi- nand Brunetière, editor of the Revue des deux mondes, in 1905.7 Ernst Karl 6. For theory, see Mark Bevir, Democratic Governance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 2002); Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979, ed.