The rift between Roosevelt and Taft

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Authors Peterson, Hedvig Maria, 1891-

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/553520 THE SIFT BETWEEN ROOSEVELT AND TAFT THE RIFT BETWEEN ROOSEVELT AND TAFT

Hedvig Hail a Peterson

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£ - z TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter :age INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Statement of facta to ahov? the friend­ ship and political accord existing be­ tween Roosevelt and Taft at Taft * 8 e le c t!o n .

I . PERSONALITIES Roosevelt Training ...... 12 Struggle for health; training at college and in the West; offices held obtained by election or personal effort. C h a ra c te ristic s ...... 24 Politician: with courage, initiative and power, full of vigor, quick of ac­ tion, the Hpreacher m ilitant”; power­ ful in popular appeal; a strong execu­ tive; with leaning toward the left. T aft Training ...... 29 No physical defects to overcome, studied law, above all else favored the legal profession; offices held obtained mainly through appointment. Characteristics ...... 44 The Judge: courageous with principles above reproach, cautious, carefully weigh­ ing the pros and cons on the scale of law; unwilling to share his inner reasoning with the public, often misunderstood; political­ ly nearer the center than Roosevelt and l a t e r more conservative. I I . TAFT IN CONTROL S itu a tio n as found ...... 51 Roosevelt policies and popularity, Taft’s legacy ...... 51 Rumors of discord before Roosevelt l e f t for A fr ic a ...... 65 Taft's administration plans ...... 68 Discord in Congress ...... 72 Congress suspicious of the executive; struggle over speakership; hint of p o ssi­ b le break in Republican party.

132940 C h ap ter II. 5?£PT IN OORTKJL-(oeotlnued) ’ Main act® In the plot The tariff controversy ...... 75 Taft’s struggle for a Ion tariff; his utter failure in selling the 1909 tariff to the people. The Ballinger-Pinehot controversy ...... 84 The conservation issue; the people and events in the tragedy; the fatal effect on the Poosevelt-Taft relationship. I I I . ROOSEVELT THE PLAIN CITIZEN F ir s t re actio n ...... 98 Popular reception, then Sagamore Hill ...... 98 His reaction to the political situation ..... 99 Back in p o l i t i c s ...... 100 Immediate reason, the New York political situation *...... 100 His Western trip; New Nationalism ...... 101 November e le c tio n ...... 104 Taft ’ s reaction ...... 105 The personal relations of the two men stra in e d . Roosevelt refuses an Invitation to the White House; later visits Taft’s at Beverly - no confidences. Taft hurt and bewildered ...... 107 Friendly overtures after November Election .. 109 IToving toward a d e fin ite break ...... 110 Canadian re c ip ro c ity ...... 110 The prosecution of the United States Steel Corporation, the last straw ...... I l l The a rb itra tio n tr e a tie s ...... 114 Roosevelt decides to run for Republican n o m in a tio n ...... 116 IV. RESULTS OF THE BREAK Race fo r the nomination a t C h ic a g o ...... ISO Roosevelt dependence on popular support; the preferential prim aries ...... 120 Taft’s dependence on the conservative Repub­ lican organization ...... 122 Chicago convention controversies . *...... 126 Disputo3 over contosted seats ...... 126 Roosevolt breaks with the party ...... 131 Progressive party formed ...... 133 November e le c tio n ...... 134 Three cornered race; Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, 134 The Democratic party into power ...... 140 Conclusion ...... 140 Lost chances; historical pointers as to the possible cost of the r i f t ...... 141 ReconclIllation of the old friends ...... 143 C h a p te r Page BIBLIOGRAPHY 144 INTRODUCTIGH

It was in the early nineties that Theodore Roose­ v e lt and W illiam Howard T aft f i r s t mot, hut th ere i s no 1 velt was at the time civil service commissioner, and Taft had entered upon his duties as solicitor general. 111 saw Hr. and Mrs. Roosevelt in the reserved gallery and called 2 them over", Taft wrote Mrs. Taft in 1892, referring to a visit to the House of Representatives. Thus early In their careers these two men met, were drawn toward one another, and a true friendship was begun; a friendship that when strained and temporarilly severed, was destined to affect the course of our national history. In March, 1892, Taft resigned as solicitor general and became United States circuit judge for the Sixth Judi­ cial Circuit and left Washington. Roosevelt served as police commissioner of New York City, Assistant Secretary o f th e Navy, le a d e r o f th e Rough R iders, Governor o f New York, Vice President, and, finally upon the assassination of President McKinley, as President before the two friends were to be closely associated in politics. Taft was then in the Philippines, as head of the Philippines Commission.

Fowles, The Life and Times of

% aft to Helen H. Taft, March 9, 1892. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowles, I, 113-114 2 Roosevelt needed expert advice concerning the Philippines. A Senate Committee, which had heen appoint­ ed to formulate a legislative policy for the Philippines, decided to hold sessions for the purpose of enlightening themselves on conditions of the Philippines. The President was anxious to have Taft present, and requested Secretary Root to grant Taft a much needed leave of absence so that he could attend these sessions. Taft returned, testified before the committee and joined the President and Root in conference. Obviously this is the beginning of the future trio, Roosevelt, Taft, and Root. Taft impressed upon the President the desirability of a speedy settlement of the friar-land question, and, because Taft considered it important, Roosevelt sent him as head of a commission to 3 the Vatican. October, 1902, Taft now back in the Philippines, received the following cable from Roosevelt: n0n January first there will be a vacancy in the Supreme Court to which I earnestly desire to appoint you. . . I feel that your duty is on the court unless you have decided not to adopt a judicial career. I greatly hope you will accept. ■ . ■' ■ ■ ' "4 Would appreciate an early answer. Theodore Roosevelt." Of course, the ambition of Taft's life had been to become a justice in the United States Supreme Court, and he

13S-150.5DUffy’ Hel*ert Hq^rd Taft.

Helen Herron, Becollectiona of Pull Yearg, 3 appreciated Roosevelt1s friendly confidence; yet he was reluctant to accept, and regretfully cabled the President: Great honor deeply appreciated but must decline. Situation here most critical. . , Change proposed would create much disappointment and lack of con­ fidence. . . Look forward to time when I can accept such an offer but even if it is certain that it can never be repeated I must now decline. Would not assume to answer in such positive terms in view of words of your dispatch if gravity of situation here was not necessarllly known to me better than i t can be known in Washington.5 Henry Taft visited the President and related the President's views to his brother. Roosevelt wanted Taft to consider him and his difficulties. He needed Taft's advice on questions of policy outside the judicial duties. Besides the insular questions he wanted Taft to deal with those affecting labor and trusts. Taft, he said, was fearless, and did not consider the effect on himself of "either the J. P. Morgans or of the labor leaders." The most pressing Philippine questions had been solved, and someone e ls e could go on and b u ild on th e foundation now laid. The labor and trust problems were becoming more puzzling every day, and Taft could be of greater assistance here. The President also expressed the opinion that Taft would be a probable Republican nominee in 1908. A month elapsed. The President was determined to have Taft accept the Supreme Court appointment and he wrote T a ft:

^Taft to Roosevelt, Oct. 27, 1902. Quoted by H ^ard^aft^l^sli' Llfe and Times of William

^Pringle,^Henry Fbwlea,^The Life and Times of W illi » %

sorry, I haw the greatest confidence

whole field. The responsibility for any error •responsibility or in the last

the Supreme Court in th e vacancy caused by Judge sm ■**«»« ™ . x am very sorry if what I said, old this is one of the cases where the Preal­ dent. ls fit for the position, must take Lbllity and put the men on whom he most relies in the particular positions in which he himself thinks they can render the greatest . . . f This was a command and Taft prepared to obey it, But the news of his leaving created unrest. Everywhere posters went up, !,We want Taft". A monster demonstra­ tion was staged with a parade, and bands; thousands of Philippine marched to the Mai ac an an, where the natives implored Taft to remain. The other commissioners and a group of influential Philippine leaders sent cable­ grams of protest to the President. Taft cabled Roose­ velt again that he 11 recognized the soldier's duty to obey orders”; but before orders had been carried into action, and in view of their personal friendship, he took the liberty to make one more appeal. Taft, then, pro-

Roosevelt to Taft, Hov, 26, 1902. Quoted by Taft, Helen Herron, 265-266. cceded to restate his reasons for remaining.8 Taft did not think his plea mould be effective, but Roosevelt1 a answer came, short and decisive. He told Taft to remain where he was. ; ' ■ ; ; ■' • " " : - •' ' ' ■ : ....- - - • From a ll appearances th is was a co n test between equals. Says Pringle, Roosevelt and Taft were drawn very much closer to each other by this trouble sob© m atter of elevation to the Supreme Court. It was the real beginn­ ing of an extraordinary friendship based on mutual respect, admiration, even love.”9 ” ' Roosevelt fought on in Washington conquering new problems and preparing for the coming election in 1904; Taft remained.in the Philippines deciding knotty questions there, but always true to his friend at home. A letter from Henry Taft flirted the Presidency before his eyes. There has "been some talk in the newspapers about the op­ ponents of Roosevelt talcing you up as their candidate for the nomination In 1904”. Roosevelt did not have the wholehearted support of the Republican machine, he added. ! T aft re p lie d in d ig n an tly , th a t the moneyed in te r e s ts o f Wall Street could not use his name, because he refused to be a candidate. He thought Roosevelt*s nomination was and should be Inevitable. ”If they were to succeed in beating Roosevelt, they would beat the Republican party”

Roosevelt to Taft, Hov. 26, 1902. Quoted Taft, Helen Herron, 266. m um ^k& rv0^ ’ — — — — - he said and added, 10111 do not think they have any serious idea of using my name, and I find it difficult to treat 10 the matter in a sober tray," President Eoosevelt, in turn, valued this good n ill and support. In his Commence­ ment address. Harvard University, he acknowledged the splendid work done by William Howard Taft, Leonard Wood, and Elihu Root. "They have rendered inestimable service 11 to the American people" he said. Soon Roosevelt had reasons to remember and appeal to his friend again, and this time Taft's hopes of remain­ ing in the Philippines were blasted permanently, Harch 27, 1903 he received a letter from Roosevelt. A terrible calamity had befallen him; Secretary of War Root was leav­ ing him, "I wish to heaven", he stated, "I did not feel so strongly as I do about two or three men in the public service, notably Root and you." He asked Taft, most sin­ cerely, to consider giving up his resident guidance over the Philippines and to accept the post soon to be vacated by Root. He assured Taft that as Secretary of War he would still have the ultimate control of the Philippine situation and whatever was done could be done under his immediate supervision. "If only there had been three Tafts, I would have one on the Supreme Court, as the Ohio member, one in Root* s place as Secretary of War, and one perma-

10 Taft to H, W, Taft, April 16, 1903. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowles, The Li fe and Times of William Howard Taft. II, 248-249.

Theodore Roosevelt and nently Governor of the Philippines,” “Ho one can quite take your place aa Governor" he said, "hut no one of ishon I can think save only you can at all take Root's place as 12 Secretary." So Taft left the Philippines, reached Washington the first park of 1904 to join Roosevelt's official fami­ ly aa Secretary of War. Their relations continued charm­ in g . The P resident placed more and more burdena on hia nev? Secretary of War. He became the "trouble-shooter" at home and abroad; he had the Philippines to supervise and he vzao in charge of the Panama Canal. He v?as actually "pro-tcza president" of the United States. On leaving on a hunting trip the President expressed confidence that all would go well in Washington because he had "left Taft 13 sitting on the lid." Actually, "Taft was an able ex­ ecutive assistant rather than an adviser to Roosevelt. He no longer viewed the President objectively and weighed hia virtues and faults. He agreed without question on neaxly every policy, large or small." This was not a suitable method for training the man who would one day sit in "lonely splendor", himself, and wonder how he could escape 14 disaster now that Roosevelt could no longer guide him. After the election of 1904, Roosevelt had announced that he would never again be a candidate fo r the presldent- 12134

12 ~ Roosevelt to Taft, Feb. 14, 1903. Quoted by Duffy, Herbert Smith, 162-163. 13 Hew York Times, April 4, 1905. Quoted by IS a^T aft^/07 272' — ~

l4Ibid., 272. • lal nomination. But as hie term rushed he

the logical man. But Roosevelt was sincere and highmlnd- ed and wholly loyal to his friend. So when a vacancy oc- cured in the Supreme Court, he again offered the place to Taft. If Taft really wanted the Supreme Court he should have it; if he desired the Presidency he could count on administrative support. Some time later the Secretary of War, llrs. Taft, and others were guests at the White House. After dinner the President threw himself Into an easy chair and said in an sepulchral voice: "l am the seventh son of a seventh daughter and I have clairvoyant powers. I see a man weighing three hundred and fifty pounds. There is something hanging over his head. I cannot make out what it is. . . At one time it looks like the presi­ dency, then again it looks like the chief justiceship.11 "Make it the presidency," said Mrs. Taft. "Moke it the chief justiceship,said Hr.. Taft. Ho much preferred a judicial future hut his wife with his family urged him toward executive laurels. Mrs. Taft called on the President later and the following day Roose­ velt mentioned "a half hour’s talk with your dear wife" and added, "were the decision mine, I would as a matter .

------=------:------— Pringle, Henry Fowies, Theodore Roosevelt, a Bloaratto. 4 9 7 . ------16 16 Kohlsatt, Herman Henry, From McKinley to ItM ing. 161-162. 9 ojt course accept the • • • years of service In the war de­ partment . . . and then abide the fall of the dice as to 17 whether I became President." So lira. Taft had her wish. When the whirling plummet of President Roosevelt?s vision came to rest over Mr. Taft's head i t presented the Presi­ dency side to the world. Early in 1908 friendly correspondents circulated the news that Taft was Roosevelt's choice for tho next pre­ sidential nomination of his party. His control of the po­ litical organization and his popular strength made Taft's nomination practically secure. There still remained a . movement abroad to nominate Roosevelt for a second term, but to circumvent its gaining momentum in the convention, Roosevelt had taken due precaution. June 18, 1908, Taft was nominated on the first ballot to become the standard bearer of the Republican party. He resigned as Secretary of War to give his time to the campaign. He decided to < rest for a while at Hot Springs, Virginia. The President upon hearing of Taft's nomination, issued the following statem ent: I feel that the country ia Indeed to be con­ gratulated upon the nomination of Mr. Taft. I have known him Intimately for many years and I have a peculiar feeling for him because through­ out that time we have worked for the same object, with the same purposes and ideals. I do not believe there can be found in the whole country a man so well fitted to be President. Ho is not

B i a l V ' H6nly POT1<3B' 2 K S 10 only absolutely fearless, absolutely disinterest­ ed and upright, but he has the widest acquaint­ ance with the nation*s needs without and within and the broadest sympathies with a ll our c itiz ­ ens. He would be. as emphatically a President of . the plain people as Lincoln, yet not Lincoln him­ self would be freer from the least taint of demagogy, the least tendency to arouse or appeal to any class hatred of any kind. He has a pecu­ lia r and intimate knowledge of and sympathy with the needs of all our people - of the fainter, of the wage worker, the .business man, the property owner.18 1920 This was valuable tribute from his friend and for­ mer chief. Taft shrank from the.ordeal of the campaign# But the nation know that a vote for Taft was a vote for Boobevelt, and the President took active part in managing the campaign, and in due course Taft was elected in Hovem- 19 ber. Roosevelt concluded to remove himself from a ll possible political activity by going to Africa on a hunt­ ing trip. He wished to leave Taft free and mhampered in 20 the administration he was about to start. There can be found not the sligh test trace of resentment in Roosevelt's letters to his successor, Though pressed for time, he consented to write a biographical appreciation to this man who was, still beyond any doubt, his trusted friend and heir to his policies. As a final gesture of true

18 War Secretary Diaries, 3370. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Powies, The IAfe and Times of William .Howard Taft, I , . 356...... 19 Abbott, Lawrence Frazer, The Letters of Archi­ b a ld B u tt. 99. 20 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Selections from the Corros- pondencq of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, II, 11 friendliness President-elect and Mrs. Taft were invited to spend the night "before inauguration at the White House, guests of tho Roosevelts. The following day Roosevelt left Washington for his African trip, and Taft officially "began his administration. On Roosevelt's return in 1910, the intimate rola- tion of close friendship was not resumed, and "by 1912 th ere had come an open "break in "both th e ir personal and political relations. What had caused this rift? CHAPTER I

PERSONALITIES

The tendency for men to admire tr a its in others that they do not themselves possess is a /well marked human characteristic* Probably this mas the basis of the intimate friendship between Roosevelt and Taft, For i f ever two men were opposites in temperament and equip­ ment for l i f e these two men wore opposites. Both men had the good fortune to be bom of well known established families with every opportunity for ed­ ucation and with an atmosphere of patriotism and unself­ ish service, both to country and the people about them. Both remained true to this heritage. Here the searcher for truth and for the explanation of their miaundorstand­ ing must turn to a closer scrutiny of their differences. Roosevelt was a delicate child suffering acutely from attacks of asthma. He was not a strong boy, and was by nature timid. He was fond of books and had an Intense devotion to natural history. Not able to attend school, he was tutored at home. A severe attack of asthma sent him on a v is it to Koosehead Lake. This time

1 Bishop, Joseph Bucklln, I, 2. 13 he was traveling alone and he missed his strong younger brother’s protection. Four other young boys mere travel­ ing in the stagecoach. They made him t:retched tilth teas­ ing. "At first merely unhappy he finally decided to fight* But he found anyone of his tormentors could, without difficulty, hold him at arm’s length. The boys did not hurt him except mentally. There he was deeply 2 wounded." The incident reveals the bud of the future militant Roosevelt. More important it. strengthened the boy’s determination in his fight for health and strength. He began at once to take boxing lessons. Systematic ex­ ercise brought him out victorious in this struggle and in 1876 he entered Harvard. Here he made himself an ath­ lete by sheer determination and hard work. Hampered by extreme near-sightedness, ho became none the less a-for- 3 midable boxer and an excellent shot. During a boxing bout in the Harvard gymnasium an in c id e n t oecured th a t showed h is u n flin ch in g devotion to fair play and his instinctive command of a situation. Hank *79 and Roosevelt were displaying a spirited contest. A mistake on Hr. Hank's part revealed a prophetic flash of the Roosevelt that was to come.* Time was called on a round, Roosevelt dropped his guard, and Hanks landed a heavy blow on his nose, which spurted blood. Loud hoots

2 Pringle, Henry Fowies, Theodore Roosevelt, a Biography. 17-lb. 3 : Roosevelt, Theodore, An Antobio^raphy. 27-28. 14 and hisses from gallery and floor mere set up, whereat Roosevelt's arm was instantly flung out to command s il­ ence, "while his alert and slender figure stood quiet. 'It's all right', he assured us eagerly, his arm still in the air to hold the silence; then pointing to the time-keeper, ' ho didn' t hear him', he explained in . the same conversational but arresting tone, With bleeding nose he walked up to Hanks and shook hands with him." He grasped clearly what should be done, and took command o f the situation. Again Wiotor describes young Roose­ v elt at a -Harvard Dicky in itia tio n . "'Let nobody commit a nuisance,* he immediately said; and I don't think X ever heard him say anything broader." The school-mate, when writing, had forgotten what happened, but him he remembered. Physical weakness in his case opinionated him to a delicate existence among his books; practical determination changed this to active leadership among

The prevalent spirit at Harvard in those days seems to have been that of "laisoez fairs." A student of the gentlo order must appear nonchalant, unemotional, and aloof. Roosevelt worked hard, and evinced a decided interest in both studies and events. In the class room, where custom decreed a bored attitude of Indifference, he showed genuine interest, asked questions and volunteered

Jtts, igbrns: % E225S22^ a* * mssa-

5r b ld ., 11- 1 2 . 15 opinions. His sot found It difficult to understand him, particularly his free and easy departures from the code of their "coHese-bred colonial order, which was chill and « genteel. . . He was one of them, but he could not behave & lik e one." After leaving Harvard, Roosevelt turned toward studying law. This he did not like, "The teaching of the law books and of the class room aeons to me to be against 7 justice.” However, this was written later in life after the court had foiled to grant legal status to some of his policies. Taft confided to Archibald Butt that "Roosevelt had a good deal of contempt for the judiciary. He did not like the delay^of the law when he felt the public weal was to be served." Roosevelt seemed eager to take part in civic af­ fairs and joined the Twenty-first District Republican Association of the City of New York.* His friends ridicul­ ed him. The organisation was not composed of "gentlemen", but saloon keepers, street car conductors and the like, and he would not be ablo to exert any influence but might be subjected to unpleasanties. To this he answered according to his Autobiography, "that if this were so it merely meant that the people I knew did not belong to the governing class, and that the other people did - and that I intended

6 v a s te r, Owen, 7 . 7 Roosevelt, Theodore, An 'Autobiography, 5.4. l e t t e r s to "be one of the governing class." He went among them a total stranger. He differed from them, in their machine methods, with entire frankness, yet, with his personal attraction, he made some devoted friends. He vaa ele c te d to the assembly in 1881, and thus Ills public career began. I t nas an e le c tiv e o ffic e and I t vias h is own I n itia tiv e that had launched him on the course to greater accomplish- 10 Bents. Almost from the first day of his entry into the legislature he took an outstanding place among his associ­ ates. It was a time of flagrant corporate influence of the "Black Horse Cavalry," of a group of members who made money by su stain in g corporation measures o r by levying th e familiar "strike bills." Roosevelt attacked them all open­ ly and aggressively. His initial move in favor of clean politics illu st­ rates his fearless behavior. In the assembly the Democrats had one more vote than the Republicans. The half dozen Tammany Democrats had made a "deal" with the machine Re­ publicans to nominate a speaker of their own. This would deprive the regular Democrats from their just right of elect­ ing the speaker, and the speaker thus shadily elected would divide patronage between his supporters. Deals of this kind were customary, and the first step had been taken when Boose-

9 Roosevelt, The ode ro, An. Autoulom-apiiy, 63. 10 Bishop, Joseph Bucklln, I, 7-8. XT volt entered the assembly. He arose to explain his vote and aired the entire situation. There was no way to stop him and once lig h t had exposed the business of the affair, the deal "was dead." Defeated in their scheme for elect­ ing the speaker, the "dealers" tried a move to deprive the speaker of most of his appointive power. Again Roosevelt, assisted by half dozen other young members,, exposed the . game and i t was defeated almost unanimously. Hot even the secret supporters dared vote affirmatively after the 11 move had received publicity. Thus th is "young man" from Hew York with a fearless independence and untiring energy fought corruption and sup­ ported beneficial legislation. Ho fought for the impeach­ ment of a corrupt judge, the Elevated Railway Company for tax evasion and against the "gag rule". When he was con­ vinced that he had voted contrary to good judgement on the railway rate b ill, he had the courage to admit his error and reverse his vote. This act he felt would wreck his political career, but explained, "I would rather go out of politics feeling that I had done what was right than to stay in with the approval of a ll men, knowing in my heart that 12 I had acted as I ought not to." Concerning the some in ­ cident he wrote tils son Theodore at Harvard, "It took me fully a year before I got back tho position I had lost, but

11 Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, I, 9-12. ^Ibid.. 18. 18 I hung ataadily at It and achieved my purpose.” Con­ tinually Roosevelt advanced through personal effort, and that "spirit militant", ready to fight obstacles, nas be­ ing groomed for bigger deeds. ' The fate of the "Cigar-Makers" tenement house b ill further substantiated Roosevelt1s opinion of the courts. This was one of the reform measures that he boldly sponsor­ ed. It prohibited the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses. The b ill passed but was declared unconstitution­ al by the Court of Appeals. The court said; "it cannot be perceived how the cigar-maker is to be Improved in his health or his morals by forcing him from his home and its hallowed associations^and beneficlent influences to ply his trade elsewhere." Roosevelt had personally visit­ ed a number of those one-rcomed "hallowed associations" • homes, where one or two families lived and worked. Hot a few of the worst tenement houses were owned by wealthy In­ dividuals who hired the best lawyers to convince the courts that it was "unconotitutlonal” to insist on bettering these conditions. His disgust and wrath was deep and abiding. It was this case that wakened him to the partial understanding of the fact that the courts were not necesaa- rilly the best judges of what should be done to better social and industrial conditions. The judges who decided 1314

13 Roosevelt to Theodore, Oct. 20, 1903. Quoted by Bishop, Joseph Buoklin, I, 20. 14 Bishop, Joseph Buoklin, I, 50# thio case were upright men. "They Imeu nothing whatever" Roosevelt said, "of tenement house conditions; they knew nothing whatever of the needs, or of the life and labor of thro e-fourths of their fellow citizens in great cities. They knew legalism but not life." Tills decision proved one of the most serious set-backs that the cause of in­ dustrial and social progress and reform received. It block-

.These early experiences of Roosevelt* a viewed in the light of' later experience had a lasting effect on his lino of thought. His sketchy studies of law had caused him to feel that the law and the courts hindered rather than t helped justiceZ' This last case further confirmed this belief. Thus it appears that hi a course as President in the regulation and control of groat corporations, and his later expressions on the recall of judicial decisions, were no new fancies but the logical result of many years of serious thought. He judged these institutions from the people*o point of view* It was the people who twice elected him to the Assembly. He had made enemies, but possibly rather be­ cause of the type of enemies, he entwined himself into the popular esteem of his constitutents. Roosevelt, having refused another turn in the Ansemb-

Roooevelt, Theodore .An Autobio^raphv. 89-90, 220.

> > / ly and having fulfilled hia duties at the national Conven­ tion in Chicago, 1884, left for hi a ranch of Bad Lands in the West. Here he learned to know people and they him, not from the window of the Pullman car but in close range of every day association. He was one of them. He worked as a cow-puncher; he hunted and shot big game. He came in contact with men-of a new type, rough, vigorous and IS often picturesque. He became popular and was consider­ ed a good fellow, a “white-man, entirely fearless, thorough­ ly good natured and kind, never quarrelsome and never safe IT to trifle with, bully or threaten.“ In 1888 Roosevelt took an active part In the Presi­ dential campaign and as a reward Harrison, reluctantly ap-_ , pointed him Civil Service Commissioner. Harrison had no desire for drastic reforms. . He said later, “The only trouble I had with managing him was that he wanted to put an end to all the evil in the world between sunrise and 18 su n se t.” Roosevelt found the commission struggling for ex­ is t an ce, laughed at, sneered at, surrounded by enemies in Congress and supported only by a small faction of the in­ telligent minority, who offered logical arguments in Its behalf. Roosevelt started to fight. He dared attack such powerful men in the party and in the financial world as

~ l 6 — K iotor, Owen, . 52...... 17 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Theodore Roosevelt. 12-17. York Times. April 22, 1900. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowles, Theodore Roosevelt, a Biography, I, 122. .. political etiquette and fought hard for the lav? he was 19 appointed to enforce. After six years of service in Washington, Roose­ velt returned to Hew York as prod, dent of the Board of Police Commissioners, to take up the crusade for righteous­ ness there. Senator Tom Platt, the Republican party lead­ er In Hew York, and his machine abhorred him, and it look­ ed as though all factions were against him. He set himself to expel politics and favoritism in appointments and pro­ motions and to crash corruption everywhere. His work, his midnight walks through the worst quarters of the groat city, to see how "the other half lived" or how the officers per­ formed their duty, attracted the attention of the countzy. He even drew international notice. The London Times---- carried interesting accounts of this honest and vigorous reformer. About this period Roosevelt wrote; "I be­ came more so t than ev er in my d is tr u s t o f those men, whether business men or lawyers, judges, legislators, or executive officers, who seek to nako of the Constitution a . 20 fetch for the prevention of work of social reform." More and more he saw the popular side of those social problems, and chafed at any restraint that seemed to hin­ der social Justice. 19*

19 Pringle, Henry Fowles, Theodore Roosevelt, a Biography, I, 122-125.

i , 150. 22 •W-:By 1897 Rooce-velt had worked hi a nay back In to •W-:By national politic a. He r/aa Aaolotant Secretary of Havy. With true executive insight he recognized the enlnent dan­ ger of a struggle nith Spain, and because of his efforts , ; a the navy was resonably well prepared for war. It was his foresight and prompt action that found the Asiatic squadron ready to advance and with Dovrey in command when war was declared. One day while acting Secretary, of War, he seized the opportunity to order Dewey to take his squadron to Hong Kong; to keep It in complete readiness; and in the event of war to detain the Spanish squadron in the East and begin offensive operations in the Philippin- 22 es. He was willing to assume the responsibility, with the well known result at Manila. The war cone and Roose­ velt became the glamorous leader of the Rough Riders. He returned from Cuba a hero and a good political possibility. Platt hated Roosevelt, yet, his political sagacity told him that Roosevelt as gubernatorial candidate, could assure a Republican victory in .Hew York. Platt, accord­ ingly, manuvered Roosevelt into calling on him. This was an awkward situ a tio n f o r R oosevelt, th e reform er, but the incident seemed to have had small effect on his popu­ larity , and the Rough Rider became Governor of Hew York, Senator P la tt soon found th at Roosevelt was act- 212223

21 Bishop, Joseph Bucklln, I, 92. 22IM d ., 95. 23 Steffens, Lincoln, Autobloaranhy. 345-348, 23 ing Governor, not lie. Ho inforaod Roosevelt that he taiew on admirable nan for the important appointment of Superin­ tendent of Public Works. Roosevelt declined the offered suggestion. He could not accept any man chosen for him. 24 He proposed to make his own appointments. • But Phat about those "Sunday morning breakfasts?" Roosevelt x?as hold up as "our Great Disappointment, gone over to the Enemy." Roosevelt explained those breakfasts to Wister. ' He had promised Platt as leader of the party, to consult him in regard to appointmenta and other matters. Yflster sums up the situation: "Those Sunday morning break­ fa sts Tihich the Governor has been taking with Hr. Platt have disturbed Mr. Platt*s digestion, even more seriously than they have scandalised the parlor pets of virtue. . . Roosevelt laid his cards on Platt*s breakfast table for Platt to fall in with his plans, or fight then; mostly 25 Platt had to fa ll in." . I t might have been well had Roosevelt recalled this situation, when ho judged Taft's sincerity in his close association with the Bosses in Washington. • The Governorship o f Hew York had been closely re­ lated to the Presidency, and this. Joined to his success os a Governor, brought him Into the field of future pol­ it ic a l speculation. McKinley was to be nominated and 24*

24 Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, I, 115, U lster, Owen, 72. 24 Roosevelt, as Tice Presidential nominee, mould strengthen the party ticket. Platt was"jubilant. Roosevelt out of Hev/ York politics; no nor© “Sunday Breakfasts". “Boose- 26 v o lt mas p o litic a lly dead." Roosevelt knew that the Vice Presidency mas a “shelf", but he did not like to refuse this opportunity to enter national politics and he followed his “star". In September 1902. President McKinley was assassinated and Hark Hanna1s forebodings cane true. When Roosevelt* s nano was being considered for the Vice Presidency, Hr. Hanna had warned: “Don* t cny of you realize that there* e 27 only one life between this madman and the White House?" On September 14, 1902, Roosevelt became President of the United States. Here he stood ready to enter upon his groat duty. He possessed the driving force of an intense energy and the firm belief that a man could do what he willed to do. He posses sod a keen insight, and he acted with uncommon speed and promptness. This led to the widespread notion that ho acted without thinking. Archibald Butt writes; “He thinks most rapidly and reaches a conclusion while other people are stating the. premises, but there is thought, and deep thought in every act of his. . .H e is not as Impetuous as he likes to appear." The author re- 26

26 Wister, Owen, 73. June 22, 1900. Quoted by 12S2Z2. Roosevelt, a Biography, 223. 25 lated a convoreatlcn about a proponed order to retreat a t the Sen Juan H ill and quoted Mr. Roosevelt; uHad 1 disobeyed the order it -would have been regarded as an im­ petuous act, l presume, but it really mould have been the result of careful thought after carefully neighing the 28 pros and cons." He knew what he meant to do under given circumstance#. When the contingency became actuality, he was ready, and he acted at once. Roosevelt was a great leader. His power and the source of his achievements lay to the greatest degree in the extraordinary hold which he developed and retained over the people. He had a charming personality that at­ tracted others to him, "It sticks by one, so when he comes into the room and stands as ho always does for one second before doing something characteristic, he elec- 29 .. . trifles the company." He was the one man I have known who never cast a shadow. Even his anger and his denun­ ciations . . , were not thunder from black clouds, they - , . 3 0 were a tropic blaze of heat." When he visited Charles­ ton the people came to see the President; they remained to listen to Roosevelt. Wilson, after sn interview with Roosevelt said: "Yes, he is a great big boy. I . . , was charmed by hia personality. There is a sweetness about him that is very compelling. You can't resist the

28 Butt, Archibald, I, lit. 29 Ibid., 225. 30 Wiotor, Owen, 47. pressing laui-dens of state, and keep hie spirit fresh and youthful.'5 He found relief in expression. Wlster drexv th is picture:“He cejno home from his morning's nork and he threw it off . . . like a horse who rolls over and kicks his legs in the air when the saddle has been taken off after a hard ride. He flashed out characterisations of congressmen, governors, or anybody that the conventional politician might possibly have whispered into the ear of - 33 ... a confidential adherent." Just as it was necessary for Lincoln to tell jokes and so forgot the heavy load of cares, so it was wholesome for Roosevelt to shake off the courts and tho Northern Securities, and behave like a school boy le t loose on the playground. He understood popular psychology. He appealed to the emotions, rather than to reason. He used slogans: “Fair play;" “Justice for a l l “The door of the White House shall swing open just as easily to the poor as to the rich" and others. “Why goodness me*. Why don't you see - why you must see that I can't close the door of hope upon a whole race'/1 was his explanation of the Hegro ques- 34 ■ Mon. Again, Roosevelt explained his own conduct; he and a party, we re traveling on a special train. Everywhere along the route people were gathered and his handkerchief

31 ; ' ' Pringle, Henry Fowies, Theodore Roosevelt, a BJography, 595,. ^^Roosevelt, Theodore, Letters to his Children. T ^W lster, Owen, 94. 34iMa., H7. I think a public nan uho does not understand ' th is so rt o f thing, who is unwilling to make a chow of hinaolf as I m doing now, f a i l s to see the point of view of just such people as we are passing now. It is some trouble for hin to jump up from his meals, as I have been doing all through lunch, but if it gives any of these poor people any pleasure to see their President, I have no right to deny them that spark of brightness. 25 Another characteristic that explains Roosevelt and the people was his ability of self-hypnosis. He could erect barriers against thoughts and memories that troubled him. “0hn remarked James Bryce, "but Roosevelt wouldn’t always look at things you know." Lincoln Steffen witness­ ed Roosevelt’s struggle with himself over his visit to Boss Piatt of the Republican State machine. He had gone to see Platt about entering the race for Governor of New York. This, in the public eye, was a surrender to Platt, and it was Platt’ s intention to lend a like interpretation. Roosevelt, the politician felt compelled to give out a contradictory statement to the press. It finally came, but it had taken days of solf-hypnosio to raako it ring 35 " . : 'V- . ; -• : . ■■ ■ ■ tr u e . Onco whm someone had reported a base a c t o f a man, he just said, "Roally’1, and wist fulness blurred his eyes. It narked the struggle between what he knew and ' - . - ' 3? . - - ' ■- * : ' - what he did not want to know. Some things it is best *37

- - - Abbott, Lawrence Frazer, 357. Steffen, Lincoln, Autobiography. 345-348. 37 Butt, Archibald, 68. , - - . " -- ? * - " . - - . SB for a leader not to ssa and not to remenbor. ■And Hoonovelt was a le a d e r. He v;aa not content to carry' out the will of the people. Ke considered it his duty to mould and guide that w ill. Ho understood the Jtaerlean people, and it was the large personal following that gave him his immense influence upon public opinion; and public opinion wan the weapon which to used to cany out his policies, Pringle says: “Roosevelt had en uncanny and envied knack for getting along with politicians, for know­ ing that the people wanted, for telling the people what to w ant." The moot outstanding characteristic of his admin­ istrative war was Insi stance upon applying moral standards rather than those of rule and precedent. Roosevelt mingled with the people or called their representatives to him, found out their thoughts and needs and if these had run ahead of the written record of the law, he also ran ahead trusting that the formal expression would in due course of time catch up. To him justice was paramount, not law. When he faced needed action, he would say: Is there any law against it? Ho? Then go ahead. Hi did r®- vero laws and the courts. To him they were human institu­ tions subject to human short comings and to be kept pure only by the free exorcise of comment by the people to whom mu- T 68’ as aai a=M ^ 39 Loupp, Francis B., “Taft and Roosevelt: A Composite study," Atlantic Monthly, CH, (November 10, 1910), 648-653. ------29 they owe their exlstance.4° Roosevelt’s education had been general; the offices he had held since he entered public life had been executive and legislative, never judicial; and he had reached hia goal by hard labor and through the no alum of popular support. The story of William Howard Taft proceeds at a different tempo♦ He was bora on September 15, 1857. His father, Alphonso Taft, was a lawyer in Cincinnati, but lived at Mount Auburn, a community of the city 's best fami­ lies. Taft's was the usual happy uneventful childhood of a small boy born into a well-bred family of easy circum­ stances and good background. He went to school, played games, and won popular­ ity among his follows. Ho was bright. Tills was fate's fortunate gift, for his father had little tolerance with stupidity. At Yale one year. Will stood fifth in his class. This was far from good enough to suit his father * bo said: "Mediocrity will not do for Will." His father thought he was too much inclined toward procrastination, stating; "A teacher at the high school hit your case when he said that you had the best head of any of the boys and 41 if you were not too lazy you would have great success.” Life was easy. It was not difficult to excel, and friend­ sh ip s were sweet. *4041

40 Pringle, Henry Fowles, Theodore Roosevelt, a Biography. 257-259. 41 Pringle, Henry Fowles, The Life and Times of W illiam Howard T a ft. I , 21-23. 30 In due course of time he entered Yale as his father end tuo brothers had done. Say's Pringle; "Yale in 1874 vms not yet trifling v/ith the liberal and danger­ ous notions of Harvard College." Taft proved an excellent student, big and heavy, quiet, good natured, humorous with great interest in college activities. He liked to direct college affairs both scholastic and on the athletic field. In fact hia father was none too pleased with early reports that his son had unusual talent for making friends. He complained "I doubt that such popularity is consistent 42 with high scholarship." Taft liked oratory but " . . , 43 he labored somewhat, was never fluent, facile and ready." It lay beyond questioning that Taft after graduat­ ing from Yale, should study law. So he carried on the' fami­ ly legal heritage and entered the Cincinnati Law School. The pursuit of a legal education was a leisurely affair and the work, particularly for a college graduate, was less than strenuous. The social life offered charming attractions and the young law student was in no hurry to plunge Into active work. While he was attending the Yale - Harvard boat races his father wrote ape siting of a case that had just been settled: a thing which you could have done, if you had been here, and earned a nice little fee for yourself. . . you will get a scolding when you roach home . . . for going off after pleasure

42 Horace Taft to Pringle, Dec. 2, 1933. Quoted by Prince,^Henry^Powies. The Life and Times of William 43

43 G. Vi. Burton to Pringle, Oct. 17, 1933. Ibid. Instead of attending to business. This gratify­ ing your fondness for society is fruitless or nearly so. I like to have you enjoyy ourself,. so far as it can "be consistent v/ith your success in life. But you will have to he on the alert . for business, and for Influence among ^ton if you would hope to accomplish success.44 Another reprimand followed; HI do not think you have accomplished this past year as much as you ought with your opportunities. You must not feel that you have time' 45 enough to while away with evezy friend who comes." But these plunges into the world of pleasure did not cause him to forget work entirely. He completed his studies and stood his entrance test, a rather perfunctory affair, in Hay* i860. When he finished school he did not enter private practice Immediately, hut continued a part- ; time job as a newspaper reporter. In a few months, how­ ever, Taft was offered the post of assistant prosecuting attorney. Taft did not fancy the competition of private practice. Fate was kind, on January 3, 1881, he entered upon his public career, that, with but few interruptions, was to keep him occupied the remainder of his life. He did his work well, but unlike Roosevelt, he was inclined 46 to accept life as it rolled along. In 1882 he was offered the office of collector of internal revenue for the first district with headquarters at Cincinnati; and he accepted. Again an office was p ffer- 444546

44 Taft to Taft, July 1, 1877. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowles, The Life and Timas of William Howard Taft, I , 48-49. 45 Taft to Taft, July 2, 1879• Ibid.. 49. 46 Pringle, Henry Fowles, # 2 Life and Times of W illiam Howard T a ft. I , 53. ed without any apparent solicitation on Taft* e part. In 1908, when Taft was the Republican nominee for president, William Alien White was oeeking information for a magazine sketch, and he wrote to Taft for aid. He had looked over tho records, yet he remained puzzled. He could not under­ stand why Taft had keen pushed from office to office with so little apparent effort on his part. Taft's brother had explained that those appointments had come to him because of his sunny, genial personality, and not due to the ad­ herence to the rules of the political game as it was play­ ed at the time. White, a little skeptical of this fra­ ternal explanation, asked Taft to toll him frankly where he had gotten his political pull* Had he not been "active, forceful and not entirely a negligible force in Cincinna­ ti's politics", or had he had powerful friends who pushed him? Taft's reply was equally frank. He denied that his lovely character had brought him these offices. "Like every well-trained Ohio man," he wrote, "I always had my plate the right side up when offices were falling." He admitted he got his political pull, first through his father's prominence, then through the fact that he was "hail-fellow-well-met with all the political people of the city convention-going type." He worked in the ward and sometimes succeeded In defeating the regular gang candidate — m u m , FT S' S S MS- ana M by hustling about among the poople to get them out. He had attacked gang methods, but kept on good- terms with all of the bosses, though with some, Cox for instance, -he had avoided any intimate political association. He, however, p o in ts out th a t the p o litic a l o rganisation had grown much stronger since those earlier days. . The above explains Taft1 s early, political creed. Ho was bom into the Republican party; he was happy when it was in power and ill at ease when it was not. In main, he accepted the method of tho party organisation. He rarely fought the political bosses. In 1035, some voters in Cincinnati1 s Eighteenth Ward refused to support Cox'# choice of delegates to a city convention. So they named d eleg a te s o f th e ir own. Cox said d e fia n tly , "The Creden­ tials Committee of the convention will take good care of the matter.8 Events substantiated the prophecy. The next day the machine delegates were seated, and William H. Taft was chairman of the Credentials Committee. In fairness to Taft, no records remain to indicate that they- 49 had been illegally named. Thus, while Roosevelt was fighting against organised corruption, Taft was following the "laisses faire” method of the established order of things. His Father' s admonition in 1304,when the national politico wore causing conscience pangs, was: "We have but

48 Taft to William Allen White, Feb. 26, 1903. T r i l o ’. 49 • Pringle, Henry Fowlcs Themfe.saaM .saak 2mi=B HoEazS SaQ, I, 60. one course, and that ia to support the party.” After serring one year as internal revenue collec­ tor, Taft reaignod and together nith hla father*a old part­ ner, opened a law office in Cincinnati, There was at the tine a definite struggle between the decent people and violence. Ton Gcnpboll, a lawyer, waa brought before the court on the charge of bribery in a previous murder trial. Taft as junior counsel pleaded the case. He pleaded hia case masterfully from points of facto. His opponent ap­ pealed to the emotions of the jury, Taft, now as always when he matched intellect against emotion, lost the case, but ho gained in reputation for justice and decency, Taft’s advance in the legal profession continued. A vacancy existed in the. Superior Court, and the Governor appointed Taft. Of this appointment Taft explains; ’’Paraker « . . appointed me without any solicitation on my part, , . Far alee r appointed me on the recommendation of Judge Harmon, who was my predecessor in office and who 51 had been a colleague of Faraker on the same bench.” Taft was being pushed from office to office, without, as any records show, doing much about it himself. Cincinnati with the rest of the country was being tom by labor troubles and Taft gave his share of decisions. In general these were contrary to labor. But to say that he showed

50 • Pringle, Henry Fowlss, The Life and Times of W illiam Howard T a ft, I , 66.

Taft to William Allen White, March 31, 1903. Quoted by Prinele^Iienry Fowies, The Life and Times of 35 favor!tiGm toward the employer is erroneous. Taft's legal mind was dominated by law and precedence, and in dealing with the new creation, labor unions, there was a dirge of .precedence that was applicable. His decision in the Moores and Company vs Bricklayer’s Union was a scholarly deduction from the old English law, but it returned to hmmt him in his later political ambitions. In 1889 his friends again busied themselves in his b e h a lf. There was a vacancy in the Supreme Court of the United States. Foraker and others urged President Harrison on his behalf. The President, however, did not think his Ohio supporters rated such award, and granted Taft the appointment no solicitor general instead. Taft wrote William Allen White that he had received the office “with­ out the slightest solicitation on my part or knowledge 52 ihat there was a vacancy in that office.” • The Taft’s joined the Washington circle. Here ho met Roosevelt and the two became friends; it appears how­ ever that Taft was not one of the intimates, Roosevelt, Root, and Rice; he associated more intimately with his legal associates. ' While in tills office he acquired a detailed know­ ledge of federal procedure. He worked out boarder lines between the m ilitary and the legislative powers; combed 52

52 Taft to William Allen White, March 31, 1908. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowlea, The Life and Times of W illiam Howard T a ft. I , 107. 36 the archleves of the past for precedence that would Invest the attorney general with legal rights to intervene against the ruthless destruction of timber in Alabama; and gather­ ed evidence to bolster Uncle Sam's courage in tnisting the “lion* o tall" in the Bering sea controversy. That Taft served noil Is not to be questioned, but, for later compart eon. It Is nell to note that he came Into national politics through the judicial entrance. : Influential friends in Ohio, again helped move Taft forward. Pressed by their solicitations, Taft was appointed judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit and ex- officio member of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit. Back in Cincinnati, Taft .spent eight tran­ quil years undisturbed by the uncertainties of politics, Taft never ceased to hope for elevation to the Unit ed S ta te s Supreme Court, b u t beyond the Ju d iciary .h e seemed free from political ambitions. During this time Taft be­ came dean and professor of law in the Cincinnati Law School. He taught two hours a week. "We reorganized the law school for the purpose of introducing the case-system," 33 he recalled. He seems to have assumed these extra duties in the interest of legal education. "Perhaps it is the comfort and dignity and power 54 that I like" Taft wrote in 1900. Those were happy years,

53 Addresses. XXXI, 44. 54 Taft to H. W., and Horace D. Taft, Jan. 28, 1900. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowies, The Life and Times of Taft, ao judge, was barred from active political life and he was sincere in observing this lim itation. ' Uhrest 'and discontentment ruled particularly in the West. The farmer could not sell his crops, the city man sould not sell hie labor. Labor chafed under injunctions issued against them. The Supreme Court in d eclaring the income tax u n co n stitu ­ tional, did not ease their pains. Could the Court have gone too far? mill am Halle tt Philipps, a Washington conserva­ tive, thought so. “The Supreme Court has determined" he said, "that the trusts may continue to" flourish", and that the "wealthiest classes-cannot be taxed on their income. They are yet to determine that Mr. Debs is to go to jail as a result of his protest against aggrandised capital." Mo doubt Taft thought that he spoke as a populist, social­ ist, anarchist or any 111st” that the future may develop©,’ The election of McKinley in 1900 was a relief to i, but he did not attain his hearts desire. The Presi­ dent appointed an o ld er nan to the Supreme Court, w hile R oosevelt gained h is o b jectiv e and became :V ice-P resid en t- and later President. Then Taft received a message that was to alter the trend of his life for the next twenty years. It was a tele­ gram from the President asking hint to come to Washington. There, the astonished Circuit Judge heard the President say

55 W. H. Phillips to Taft, April 15, 1895. Quoted by Pringle^ Henry Wow loo, The Life and Times of William 38 that-he.wanted Taft to go to the Philippines as a member of the new commission. Taft said later, "He might as well 56 have told, me that he wanted me to take a .flying machine, Taft did not like to give up his Judicial career, and he doubted his ability on such a venture. Root encouraged him to see it as his duty. He wrote: You have had an easy time in holding office since you were twenty-one. Now your country needs you. This is a task worthy any man. This is the parting of the ways. You may go on holding the Job you have in a humdrum medi­ ocre way. But here is something that will test you; something in the way of effort and struggle, and the question is, will you take the harder or the easier task? Taft did not like to make decisions in personal matters, and asked brothers Henry and Horace to te ll him what to do, A few days l a t e r he accepted on condition that he be head of the commission. He gave as reasons that the problem of the Philippines was now principally that ...... • ' ' ' ' 58 of framing the government and that was a lawyer's Job. The appointment was to be brief, nine months at the most. That it steered Taft on the road to the White House was not even vaguely seen then. The task proved an arduous one. Taft had to over­ come the popular antipathy against Y?hlte oppressors. To the Philippines United State's rule spelled Just another , Spanish tyrant with another name.. Taft's kindness and

56 Addresses. . XXXI, 70.

57i b i a . 53 Taft to H. W., and Horace D. Taft, Jan. 28, 1900. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowles, The Life and Times of , 39 understanding patience slowly overcame this barrier. He extended friendly hospitality to Philippine families of wealth, and position* The m ilitaiy regime took the oppo­ site course; they refused to have anything to do with them socially. The political effect of Taft*s policy of friend­ liness proved valuable in extending the government control. "These people" wrote Taft, "are very polite and decorous and the fact that their fathers and mothers or their grand­ fathers and grandmothers may not have been willing to pay a heavy tax for a marriage ceremony ought not to make uo 59 hesitate to receive them and entertain them.1’ The military stood in direct oppod. tion to the civil authority both in policy and methods. This problem was solved in 1901 when Taft was made civil governor of the island, and the civil authority assumed complete control. The friar- land controversy caused Taft to conduct months of court investigation, go on a mission to the Vatican, and plead his policy before the committee of Congress. United States purchased tho land, and that knotty problem was solved. When he left the islands to become Secretary of War under Boosevelt, he left an evlable record of achievement, Re­ sident Roosevelt said In an address at the University of California that not only had peace and material well being come to the Philippines to a degree much greater than had

59 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 8, 1900. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fbvies, The Life and Times of William 40 ■been deemed possible, but a greater measure of self- government had "been given them than had been granted to any other Asiatic people under foreign or domestic rule, ■ • ■ ■ ' ' 6o Japan being the possible exception.. Bid Taft’s experience in the Philippines groom " him for the White House? He had experienced great ex­ ecutive responsibility. He had mastered tariffs, curren­ cies, public improvements, and governmental finance. But the analogy between being Commissioner of the Philippines and President of the United States breaks down. Taft, In a marked degree, had dictatorial powers. No insurgents were there to harass him, no Gifford Pinchot to quarrel with him, - no Democrats to attack him, and, finally, no Roosevelt to misunderstand and turn against him. True, there were those who disagreed, but, in the last analysis, Taft had the final word.- He was the Judge. His decisions € l . . . . ■ ■ - .... wore law . During 1903 the Tafts gathered for several family conclaves at Mow York, to help determine what decisions their famous kinsman should make relative to offers from

■ - • ■ . . .. Washington. Taft declined offers to the bench because he felt It his duty to remain in the Philippines; his family decided against it because it would close his chances for further executive advancement. Henry Taft wrote that he

6°Duffy, Herbert Smith, 166. ■; - 6 i • Pringle, Henry Howies, The Life and Times of W illiam Howard T a ft, 1 , 165. did not want him to embitter hi a life by oee!d.ng political ambition a and perhaps being dloappolnted. Yet, not mini­ mizing his ability aa n" Judge, hio brother thought there Y?ao a greater future waiting him in the capacity, of a . statesman. Hie influence would reach a.larger number and his impress, on the history of the country would be pro­ portionately greater than if he ^limited his activities by taking a position on the bench...... This persuasion continued, "in the end to his lasting sorrow, he would give in and walk with slow, hesi­ tating md uncertain steps, into the political arena." In March cano the President’s request to accept the appoint­ ment of secretary of war, effective the first part of 1904 * Charley Taft cabled that the entire family was heartily in favor of his going to Washington. As usual he promised the needed financial aid. This time It was #G,000 annually. Mrs. Taft was pleased. She wrote later: . "This was in line with the kind of work I wanted my. husband to do, the kind . . . 63 of a career X wanted for him and expected him to have." Christmas 1903, Taft left for Washington. ’ Taft's complaint that he knew nothing about the army had no significance. Roosevelt could run that him­ self. Taft was brought home for other reasons. His legal knowledge was essential now that Root had le ft the Cabinet. — .------— 62 ■ ' • ■ ■: ■ - ' . ^ . Henry ¥. Taft to Taft, Jan. 10, 1903. Quoted by ^ ^ S i m ...... 3

S3 Taft, Helen Herron, 269-270. He hod won widosproad confidence while in the Philippine g end hio presence in the Cabinet would strong then the ad­ ministration, He would be a useful and effective speech- maker in the approaching election. The newspapers called Roosevelt, Taft and Root, "The Three Husketecrs" owing to their unceasing and united political activities. Intimate accord.marked their relations. Roosevelt entrusted Taft with various extra mis­ sions. Taft was to supervise the construe#on of the Panama Canal, he was to calm the irritating disturbances In Cuba and in the Philippines, and as a diversion stop at Japan to see what might bo done in the Russo-Japanese con­ troversy. Of Taft’s activities during those years, a New York newspaper editorial gives the following reviews Merely to record the movements and missions of tho Secretary of War requires a nimble mind. He journeys from Washington to Manila to reassure ten millions of natives restive under an experi­ mental scheme, of civil government and turns up in Panama to speed the digging of the Isthmian Canal, To give a fillip to a campaign for re­ form in some western state, or direct tho south­ ern Republicans in the way they should go, or en­ lighten the people down East as to the President’s home policy, or Illuminate the recesses of a problem in jurisdiction for the benefit of a Bar Association, la only a matter of grabbing a time tab le and throwing a change of clothing into a travelin g bag. Such are mere relaxations and holiday jaunts for tho Honorable William H. Taft. A Cuban revolution would be a poser to most statesmen, and to an ordinary Secretary of War a labor of Hercules; but to the business of bringing peace with honor to a distracted land, • deposing one government and setting up another, meanwhile gratifying everybody and winning the 43 osteon of the fiorceat xmrrlor, Hr. Taft fio- votoa only one page of the calendar and takes . . chip for the states to reoune his routlno ... duties as if he had clone nothing out of the common. But routine duties in Washington do not hold him long. An itinerary is aado up for him and he plunges Into the stress and turaoil of a . political campaign. He is to make speeches in Ohio and Illinois, and Idaho claims him toe# From Havana to Pocatello is something of a change and far ciy, hut it is all in tho day’s work for William H, Taft. . . All nice prob­ lems look alike to the Secretary of War who should be called the Secretary of Peace, so uniform is his success in smoothing the wrinkl­ ed front of conflict and making two laughs reach where one groan was heard before. During these years, Roosevelt furnished the motivat­ ing power, Taft was the trusted lieutenant. And ho was true-blue to his superior. On March 3, 1908 Taft attended a banquet at Boston. A previous speaker referred to Roose­ velt as a “political blue pill,*' which had possibly been necessary to euro exciting political ills, but which could now be dispensed with. Taft grew red with anger. “Whon I love a chief" he said, when his turn to apeak came, "and when I admire him from top to toe, I cannot be silent and permit such insinuations, although they may be hidden in 3eot . - 65 Only time and Roosevelt’s promise was to bring their Ideal cooperation to a close. Roosevelt, naturally, looked for a successor who could and would carry on ills policies, and Taft was his choice. He thought that be­

Duffy, Herbert Smith, 199-200. 65 Washington Post. March 4, 1908, Quoted by Prlnele. Henry Fonlea, The Life and Tlges of gm isa Howard ^ * cause ho had "been good in so many things, he mould be good in this. The very reluctant Taft under pressure from bio friend and under pressure from his family yielded. Instead of going to the bench he went to the White House. But the President took on himself much of the burden of the campaign, and in November, Taft was elected by a large majority. Now he must soon take command of affairs. Had l i f e been too easy fo r William Howard T aft? jrfiere Roosevelt had manure red for his positions, Taft had his handed to him. He had had a great deal of praise h ©ap­ ed upon him, partly for able work accomplished, and part­ ly because ho had been young to do it at all. In every in­ stance success had crowned his efforts. In the Philippines . and as Secretary of War, It had been necessary to work hard to master the abstracts. Could there be an element of softness still left in his character? "I don’t think ha realizes yet," wrote Archibald Butt, "that for seven years he has been living on the steam of Theodore Roosevelt and that the latter has boon his motive power and the things he has accomplished have been largely under the high pres­ sure of Mr. Roosevelt." He foresaw the readjustment that Taft would have to males; yet he predicted that the Presi- ; dent would learn to handle matters, possibly better, in his own may. When Roosevelt was gone, no doubt, Taft felt as though the steam had been out off and he had to supply 45 66 his oxm fuel. . Taft uas first and last the judge, v?ith the Judicial mind and methods of uork. , Ho was billing to uork hard, hut could not he rushed. Horace complained: 11 as usual, H ill had put the thing off until he had only two or three hours . to prepare in and then he had to work like a slave. «» « He has a wonderful power of work when he once gets start- 67 ed and the only danger is in . trusting It too much.11 “He cannot he hurried," confided Mrs. Taft, “and he does not mind whom he keeps waiting or how long they have to wait. He likes to go when he wishes and where he wishes and he does.not mind breaking engagemento.“ That habit might not work to such disadvantage for a judge, who must wait till all the.evidence is In, and then can use time at his discretion before giving the verdict, hut to an executive, if adhered to, it might prove fatal to his success. Taft was complacent and disliked discord. He want­ ed every man’s approval, and a rowe of any kind was repug­ nant to him* He believed that many things left to them­ selves would bring about the same result as if he took a hand himself in the settlement. He acted with promptness and vigor, when he had to act, but he would rather delay

66 Butt, Archibald, I, 27. 67 Horace D. Taft to Louise Taft, April 19» 1885. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowies, The Life and Times of W illiam Howard T a ft. I , 97. 68 Butt, Archibald, I, 6. * trouble then seek it. Could It have been Ills judicial training that nade - it difficult for Taft to share ills feelings or thoughts uith his friends or the public? He writes: 1 understand something of the condition of mind, or rather the condition of nerves, in which Theodore Roosevelt finds himself, though we have veiy different dispositions in the matter of talking. His mind is exceedingly ac­ tive, and when he is worried ho talks about the matters that worry him, indeed ho cannot -help talking about them, and he is not especially careful as he ought to be with respect to the persons to whom he talks, Nervousness and worry loosen his tongue, but it would be quite a mistake and quite an injustice to him to suppose that his action will fellow his words where he is merely thinking aloud. . . With me i t i s somewhat d iffe re n t. The more I worry the less I talk. I do not think this is as safe a condition for a person as that which relieves itself by the use of the tongue, but the nervousness is present in both of us, and If I were to express or follow the impulses that come to me in a condition of woriy it would lead to disastrous results. How I think that Theodore Roosevelt is no more likely to follow out his nervously spoken impulses and extreme statements . . , than I am those thought a caused in the same way,“9 Again during the controversy over the speaker­ ship, Taft wrote his friend Knox that he wanted another Speaker if they only could get rid of “Uncle Joe” Cannon. H© hoped they could. He thought Gannon owed i t to the public and to his friends not to force his candidacy any longer. Taft’s countrymen would have understood him better if these candid observations had reached the public; but these, in place were expressed only in con-

Taft to Knox, Oct. 24, 1909. Ibid., 410. 47 fidentlal letters, stan d . . If' - Was i t f| or was it his Judicial training .of indif: caused Taft to

m W WV V VU. w V w X U V J.A* WO. JL4 W JL LUJU publicity that this busin ess "brings no into. My. days

spent in trying to # * # > Llr. Roosevelt to suit liis own

t

Butt, Archibald, I, 51. a m ™ Z s i a i " " "R"' asussm -aa Taft's judicial mind relied on logical reassuring to win its point. His sympathy, his love, was in a way in the abstract, and he never permitted his heart to govern his mind. Ke could remove people from office, he could refuse to grant favors, with an Indifference that was 74 difficult to reconcile with, a man of his apparent type. “I do not allow myself", said he concerning his pardon­ ing power, "to be moved by anything except the Ibto^ I f there has been a mistake In the law, or if I think there has been perjury or injustice, I will weigh the petition most carefully, but I do not permit myself to be moved by 75 mere harrowing details.H He treated each case as though he were a judge on the bench. To understand Taft without understanding his love for the law and his legal reasqping, is impossible, and the people did not understand him. He depended upon lengthy logical reports to untangle all misunderstanding. The people did not read the reports. Roosevelt's charac­ teristic admonition ran: I told him he simply had to stop saying what he had said in this or that decision, for the moment you begin to cite decisions people at once think it is impossible for then to understand and they cease to comprehend and promptly begin to nod. I told him he must treat the political audience as one coming, not to see an etching, but a poster. He must, therefore, have st re airs of blue, yellow, and red to catch the eye and eliminate all fine lines and soft colors.7&

74 Butt, Archibald, I, 151. 75 Ibid.. 183. 76 Abbott, Lawrence Fraser, 143-144. The. popular demand o f the p o litic ia n was i l l s u it­ ed to the dignity of the judge. The excitement accompany­ ing a Roosevelt trip for instance, was conspicuously ab­ sent from the Taft.train. Taft took.no notice of the people; he entered his car, without even an attempt to substitute the “Good-bye and good luck" of the ex-President. He did not even look out of the window in response to the "hurrahs" from the street. He failed to value the popular appeal to the crowd. "What an opportunity he is missing," said a secret service man on one trip. "They will stop yelling when he w ill want them m oot. . . The o th e r nan has educat­ ed the public to know what to expect, and this one will be 77 a dead card if he don't change." In all fairness to Taft these men were laboring under Roosevelt’s hypnotic in­ fluence, yet Taft failed to see the importance of the po­ liticians emotional appeal to the public. To expect Taft’s administration to be but a more poll shed continuation of his predecessor was not to think at all. Taft assumed control of the executive deparaent with a mind, training and experience for the Judiciary. The one means prompt decisions, quick manuvexing, followed by a stroke that counts. The other means equipoise, de- liberation and carefully revised conclusions. For the best measure Taft must find an affirmative sanction in the statutes or precedence, or he could not accept it. He took

77 Butt, Archibald, I, 18-19. 50 as his guide the written law and the platfora pledges as IB the latest expression of the popular will. Taft's mind was not appeased to find that no law prohibited a given move; it must discover a law granting dofinate sanc­ tion to the proposed measure. No popular need or demand would cause Taft to change Ills opinion of the law in favor 79 of a wider interpretation. Hen of these different qualifications often do excellent team-work. The one supplements the other. Each alone may do an important work, but they reach their goal through different avenues of approseb. Roosevelt and Taft both had excellent human qualities and their motives were sincere. Each, however, saw a situation from a different viewpoint, and for the one to expect the other to see identical with him, could but lead to inevitable complica­ tio n s .

78 • - • ■. ■ . - Roosevelt, Theodore,An Autobiography. 388-389, 395. 79 Taft, villi an Howard, The Presidency. 125-130. J’ / CHAP5SR IX ■ : ' f: ' ' : . - ? TAPXIN

■ - : - -■ ■■ ■ - - ■ : ■ ■ - ■■' .. RaossTelt* a policy and popularity 7?as Taft16 legacy, Taft, ao hac "been Qhov?n, was chooen 'because Roosevelt had faith In his desire and ability to cany on . i • his policies; and he T/ao elected 'because he was Roose- ■ 1 1 ; ■ ...... ■ ' * - . ' % volt* o choice. "I m a neiabor of President Roosevelt* a Cabinet” wrote Taft. 111 agree heartily and earnestly in the policies which have come to bo known as the Roosevelt policies. . . 1 sympathize and believe in carrying out ■ ' • - - ■ 2 ■ : - . \ ■ ' ■ ■■ : those principles." It was later acid that Taft botray- ' . . ■: ■ ' •■■■'■ ' • ..v >-'.r . ■ , ed his friend and abandoned hie pid.nolples. It is Import- ant# then, to analyze more closely Roonovelt* s policy. In his Presidency he had striven hard to make America a liberal country. One of those in which aloi-t intorest not only in economic and political questions# but also In social problems id deemed essential to sound 3 " - • - - . . . - statesmanship. Tver since the dawn of industry on a large scale, the "laisces fairs” principle had been dominating our :— — ------—------;—- — ------— ------;------—-—

aTaft .to C. K. Heald, Doc. 25, 1907. Quoted Dy

Chamwood, Godfrey Rathbone Benson, R oosevelt, 179-180. country, The great man of ability, whether he be con- etmetor or financier, v;as to be let alone. He had develop­ ed the country and from him came prosperity. Such people as Plerpont Morgan, Alexander Cassatt, James J. Hill, George F. Bear, Andrew Carnegie, and B. H. Harriman, were used to having their own way; they could not conceive of any reason for questioning their rights to carry on their great plan as they saw fit. Each was a specialist in his own field and whatever he saw fit to do was in his own eye right. “In no other country . . . was such power held by the men who had . . . fortunes. The power of the indus­ trial leaders of the country h ad increased with great 4 strides. "Hands off" was their attitude even to the government, Harriman himself in 1906, when the battle between Roosevelt and the captains of industry waged hot, stated his position; "Whenever he wanted legislation from a State Legislature, he could buy it; that he could buy Congress, and that if necessary he could buy the judici- 5 ary." That their selfish, uncoordinated demands might eventually arouse enmity and hatred enimical to their privileged interests, never occured to them, Perhaps Roosevelt1 s genius lay in the fact that he realised this hidden danger. He believed that, if conditions were allow­ ed to go on as they were, they would defeat their own ends, 4 Roosevelt, Theodore, An Autobiography. 423-25. 5 Griffith, William, Theodore Roosevelt. His Life Meaning and Messages, II, 43?. 53 and that eventually the captains of industry nould seek greater government control# “They had much better accept me. I belong to their class. They had much better accept me Instead of some Bryan vho1!! come along and ride over • 6 them rough shod." They nere not receptive to outside control in their own interest. That they should voluntarilly submit in the interest of others was most emphatically denied In the fa- aoue four words of the Vanderbilts, while in conference 7 over the affairs of the railroads “The public be darmed." The danger from the opposite fringe in the #ocial group Owen XYloter p ic tu re s in h is d esc rip tio n o f h is t r i p to the west coast during the Pullman strike. The previous year he had witnessed Goxey's Army from a Pullman-sleeping car In Arisons,. It was a glimpse of social discontent, but amusement had been his chief reaction. He had not mingled with the coal miners or the rallroadworkers; his associates were the powerful, well-to-do whose ability had brought them success and shelter from such experiences. This year.he was again in a Pullman sleeper traveling west through Arizona ©n his way to San Francisco. It was during the Pullman strike, and passengers were concerned over the possibility of being sidetracked some place in the desert. At Benson, Tucson, and other stops the news was the same, nobody knew.

■ g Wistoiy Owen, 210-211. 7 Ibid.. 196. 54

people ho had never seen or harmed? The train reached ; Los Angeles the folloning day, but there Eugene Debs be­ came a definite reality. The Pullmon mould go no farther. All crowded into the day coaohes and melted, waited till dark. Nobody knew anything. . Wlster spent the night in a questionable hotel nearby. In the morning the train with its empty coaches was standing where he had left it; the sympathetic strike was on, and it could not move on. Winter bought a first class ticket on a steamer leaving for San Francisco. It was overcrowded. His first class ticket privileged him to sleep any place on the vessel where there was room; so he arranged himself among his "fellow victims like domino in sniff, my feet In the hair of one passenger and another passenger’s feet in mine," and so thoy slept for two nights. This experience left a greater impression than see­ ing Coxey’s Army out of a car window, and it was strength­ ened by events that followed. First the main line trains went out of service. Passenger and freight trains were standing where the order reached them, scattered over the eountry from the Hississippl to the Pacific. The local trains soon mot the same fate, and the last one to leave Oakland experienced a dramatic stop. "As it was passing a point at no high speed," writes Y/ister, "a Debs-minded 55 c itiz e n throw bin baby wrapped in th e .American Flag, in the path of the locomotive. She engineer jerked, the train to a atop, the strikers sprang out.on the locomotive and Mcilled it1 as they say," It had to he repaired in the shops /before it could he used. _ , >> Doha, in th is s tr ik e , had acted in h is own wny, . possibly the only effective nay open to him against genuine grevience. Wister, nith other travelers, nns moved ha- m m m of his own. incomwnlpBqe* -fhmm were millions of innooent citizens of footed by this strike that were in no way to blame for the grevionce of Debs. "That Vanderbilt - had said in words, Debs had said by bio acts; "The public 9 ' be damned.n The battle of self preservation had.caused both of these man ..to say, "The public be damned." , biiorc? did th e people come in? Uho was to take care of their intersstat The two extreme "fringes" were orgenized; the public was not; and in any such conflict the public remained helpless. Hero rests the main factor of Roosevelt's policy. He did not intend any one set of people to disregard the whole people.if ho could help it. The government must be In the saddle and control all,be it Pierpont ilorgan or Gonpers as the ocosalon demanded. Roosevelt emphasized this in many of his public speeches. On one occasion he

.8 " ' 'Wls-tor, - m m , . ^»"204, . . 9 ■: "...... '■ ■ So nate Executive Documents, 7, 53rd Congress, 3rd Session. 5G said: “First and foremost let us strive steadily to se­ cure absolute Justice as ‘between man and man without re­ gard to the man1s position, social or otherwise.” He warned the country against the pitfalls that had doomed the ancient and medieval republics. These had failed "be­ cause, in each case, the people had divided Into two campsj one esep contained the poor, who wished to plunder the rich, and the other the rich, who wished to exploit the poor. Once th is condition became a r e a lity , the down­ fall of the Republic followed. It made little difference which group triumphed, the end was the same. Roosevelt, however, had faith that the American people would not allow the government to fall into the hands of either the plutocrats or the mob. He deplored the tendency to Inflame the people against all men of wealth, honest or dishonest. He likewise branded as inimical to the gener­ al good, the reactionary, who -in his desire to conserve property, opposed all attempts to correct abuses of property. Be opposed the poor and the rich wrong doer alike j and he proposed to protect the honest man of 10 wealth by bringing his dishonest neighbor to Justice. This policy gave rise to his anti-trust activities. ”There is a widespread conviction in the minds of the Ameri­ can people,11 he said in his first message to Congress, that 10

10 G riffith, William, Theodore Roosevelt. His M fil HQanlng and Messages, I I , 57 "tho graat corporations known as trusts are in certain of their features and tendencies, hurtful to the general wel­ fare." Ho offered as his conviction that "combination and concentration should not be prohibited, but supervis­ ed and within reasonable limits controlled." The corpo­ rations were safeguarded by the government and in return they should work in harmony with the administrative in sti­ tutions. Since supervision and regulation of corporations doing Interstate business lay beyond the scope of state Jurisdiction, it evolved upon the national government to 11 assume this control. •. ■ Perhaps Roosevelt saw an omen in that baby wrapped in the American flag; perhaps he saw the rising tide, of popular discontent; perhaps he saw the growing belief that if you are rich you are wrong. Or had he seen at the mere mention of Rockefeller or liorgan people would turn red with rage? Something had to be done. In the Northern Securities Company suit, Roosevelt served notice that the Government and not the Harrimans governed the United States. The impact was instantaneous. The.stock market broke, and the captains had not profited by inside information, liorgan went to Washington. He protested that he had not been warned in advance, "if we have done anything wrong," said Hr. Morgen, "send your man to my

------" — — - — rn 11 Messages and Papers of the Pi^e si dents. XV. 6645-6646. ------58 man and they can fix it up*” "That cannot ho done," said th e P re sid e n t. Then Hr. Morgan asked: "Are you going to attack my other interests, the Steel Trust and the others?" "Certainly not",, replied the President, "unless tze find out that in any case they have done something that we regard- 12 ed as wrong." - ' ■ - This was a revealing illustration of the Wall ; Street point of view. Hr. Morgan looked upon the President, as a rival who was "bent on ruining all Ills Interests, or who might he won over to an agreement to ruin none. Tlie control from the White House continued. Such measures as the railroad rate h ill, the pure food and drag act, the anti-rebate law, the employers* liability, and the creation of the cool strike commission, hear witness to that. Roosevelt* s last lingering suspicion of the wisdom of the industrialist must have vanished during the struggle over the coal strike. "Abuses in the coal fields had long been comparable to tho horrors of slavery In the South. ' In Ohio, Illinois and Pennsylvania and other coal produc­ in g s ta te s , th e scaffo ld o f th e mine c a st i t s shadow o f despair." By 1901 the average yearly earning was §550, but conditions of employment were irregular and hazardous. The men worked ten to twelve hours a day, end during the year, 44l men had been killed. In 1899 Mitchell as prosi- ...I ... ■ i .. — ■ . i ■ ■■■■ — - - ——i ...... mm i— ....—■ * ——. 12 Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, I, 184. 13 13 Pringle, Henry Bowles. Theodore Roosevelt. a Biography, I, 264. ------a X0% rcage inoroaae. In 1901 the operators were determin­ ed not to allow government to influence them in their right­ ful struggle with the men. They refused arbitration and sacrificed the last remnant of public support. Dire suf­ fering threatened the country. Public sympathy was large­ ly with the miners, who stood ready to arbitrate and who behaved well. The owners continued obdurate. Roosevelt finally offered as alternative to arbitration, that he send the military in to operate the mines for public bene­ fit. This forced their hand. They agreed to arbitrate 14 and the commission went to work. All this time big business said “hands off.“ The President however was not attacking them as a class - he never considered the in­ terest of a class before the interest of the whole -h e was doing what in his opinion was beneficial to the entire people. The leaders of industry had come to feel quite sincerely that their own judgement was such that i t was improper to oppose it. Roosevelt did oppose it, and they grew very bitter toward him. As they grew bitter the people began to relax; their anger subsided; they felt that a just government was in control and that it stood between them and the arrogance of privileged wealth, or *

- — — _ — — — - ■ Department of Commerce and Labor Eulletlno, XLVI, 437-513. . . : ■ 15 Griffith, William, II, 390, the radicals of the labor. Of this the election of 1904 - 16 offered concrete evidence. . - : : Sonetines Roosovelt must have felt discouraged in trying to persuade people to equal Justice. The corpora­ tions and their adherents were embittered because the Northern Securities had been challenged by the law; in like manner the entrane labor union people v.ero angry be­ cause Roosevelt insisted that every person, whether he be­ longed to a union or not, be given an equal chance in Government employment. "Non, I believe in rich people nho act squarely," he said in a letter to Sewell, "and in. labor unions which are managed with wisdom and justice; but when eith er employee or employer, laboring man or capitalist, goes wrong, I have to cinch him, and that is all there is to it." Kith the people1s weal at heart Roosevelt took film grip on the conservation and tho development of our natural resources. Kith the old M eric an ideal of personal free­ dom, a few men considered that they could exploit minerals, water power, forest, and land for their personal gain. It was part of the old frontier spirit. But the frontier was closed in 1890 and Cengross had authorised the executive to withdraw forest land from homestead entry. Roosevelt with­ drew some 125,000,000 acres and was Instrumental in creat­ ing th® United States forest service; he sponsored the 1617

16 Adams, James Truslow, the Epic of America, 352-354. 17 Roosevelt to W. V, Sewell, Sent. 23, 1903. Quoted by Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, I, 253. new honontead and ralnoraX-land acts; through the reclama­ tion service ho opened the western part of our country for irngaM on; and the grazing problems were handled to is et new sltustdons, ■ . ; Roosevelt considered foresight as the most essen­ tial characteristic in handling the natural resources; and he deplored the reckless waste that had resulted from view­ ing the present only* His policy was to nsubstitute a planned and orderly development of our resources in place 18 of a haphazard -striving for immediate p ro fit.” Some details in tho method of handling this policy was later to.cause friction between Roosevelt and Taft* Roosevelt’s policy rested on a strong national government. He-held the doctrine that an inherent power rested in the nation outside of the enumerated powers con­ ferred upon It by..the constitution. He knew that the na­ tional government alone had sufficiently extensive power . to exercloo adequate control over the problems confront­ ing the people. Flo also realised the difficulties arising from the dual form of government; and should those prove insuperable, .remedy must be sought in the power of amend­ ments. Host problems, he considered, could be solved under the broad interpretation of tho constitution. To Roosevelt's practical mind, however, not even the Constitu­

te Griffith, Trillion, II, 545-550. *2 tion or the la.v?s mere privileged to B a y "The public be damned.,l The National government must remain in con- 19 trOl. - ' " ■ _r; Roosevelt believed in and fought for a strong ex­ ecutive . It. soldom oo cured to Roosevelt that the duty of the executive uas to carry out the mandates of the llgisla- ture. In so far as he could, he reversed this theory. Congress he felt, must follow the president*s leadership. Burtng his preparation for sending the fleet around the world, Senator Halo of the committee of naval affairs told Roosevelt that the navy could not go because Congress re­ fused to appropriate the money. Roosevelt retorted that there was money to send it as far as the Pacific and as far as he was concerned it could stay there. The money 20 was promptly supplied. ■ ■ ■ - In 1903 the president urged Congress to allow funds for the construction of four battleships. Congress allowed only two. About this Roosevelt wrote to Henry White ' "l knew I would n o t g et two and have those two hu rried up 21 unless I mado a violent fight for four." In the Panama affair Roosevelt had the choice of waiting for Congress to debate with the possibility of no canal, or acting through executive authority and building the canal while Congress debated. Roosevelt recognized 1920*

19 . . Griffith, William, II, 563, 602-612.

20Roosevelt, Theodore, An Autobiography. 552-553. \ a .- '' - ' Boosevolt to Henry White, April 27, 1908. Quoted by P rin g le , Henry Fowl©a, Theodore R oosevelt. M Biography. I, 410. 22 the independence of Panama• and built the canal . . ,.r ■ The Canto Donin go controversy occasioned si nil ai» executive action. Heckleaa Govornnont spending in Santo Domingo had brought the republic to the verge of dissolu­ tion. Italy and France were pressing.for payments of claims to thoir citizens. . The only method.to enable the payment of their claims would bo to take possession of the custom houses and that .would mean a possibly permanent occupation of Dominican territory. Both the.principle of the Honroc doctrine- sent the financial interests of the United States in Santo. Domingo,vRere threatened.; - An agree­ ment was signed by representatives of the government of Santo Domingo and of the Uni ted - States thereby the united States nno to undertake the task .of collecting.and. appor­ tioning the revenues of Santo Domingo. „ In his message, - Februaiy, 1905, Roosevelt pressed upon the Senate the urgent 23 need for the ratification of this agreement. The Senate refused to either ratify or reject the treaty. Roosevelt- - disregarded the action of the Senate and appointed an American as receiver of customs. After tno years of dis- 24 cussion the Senate ratified the treaty in 1907. The Constitution did not ezpllcltoly give the President the pouer to bring this agreement nith Santo Domingo; but n eith er did i t forbia h is doing so. 22*25

22 ' - ' ■ ■ Messages and 6901-6931; XVI, 7401, 25 " - ' •• ■■ ■■ ■ - Ibid., m , 7080-7081,'7376. State Department Foreign Relations. 1905, 334-349. Pan American Union Bulletin 25, 130-132. Roosevelt preferred to v?ork In harmony Tilth Congress, and succeeded admirably In working with and through such men as Cannon, Aldrich and others representing the very forces he was fighting. "With Mr. Cannon as Speaker, the House has 25 accomplished a lite r a lly phenomenal amount of good work", was his tribute to the man whom he later criticized Taft fo r depending upon. His great source of power lay in his strong hold on the people. They had faith in him and in his policy♦ When Congress proved reluctant, he would take the matter in ques­ tion to the voters. Action in Congress was usually a fore­ gone result. Roosevelt did not try to control the judiciary, but ho did not consider the courts above just criticism. The doubtful legality of any step never hindered him from tak­ ing i t . He was, however, shaken to the depths by the extent to which courts nullified his conception of what he thought was right. His early experience with the courts in New York had shaken his confidence in the courts as administers of Justice. Toward the close of his administration ho denied that the courts were exempt from criticism . To them th is was blasphemy. At Vicksburg, M ississippi, in October, 1907, he recommended that the Constitution be interpreted with liberality. He agreed that the Constitution represent­ ed a "fixed series of principles", yet in the interest of

25 Griffith, William, II, 398. 65 the people, it should not he used as an instrument to re­ tard progress, hut as a guide in the healthy growth of the nation. “Sometimes” he said "executive and legislative officers are under temptation to yield too much to an im­ proper public clamor. The temptation to the Judge - the long term appointive or elective Judge - is often just the 26 reverse." > . • Roosevelt believed in a strong executive and cared little for the criticism of "usurpation of power".' .When­ ever he could he established a precedent for strength in that branch of the government. He believed in working through the support of the plain people. . ."The farmers, mechanics, small tradesmen, hardworking professional non, feel that I am in a peculiar sense their President; that 1 represent the democracy in somewhat the fashion that Lineoln did; that is, not in any demagogic way but with the sincere effort to stand for a government by the people 27 and for the people." Andr the people loved and trusted Roosevelt. Tills was Taft's legacy. This was the policy he had agreed to accept as a guide for his administration; this was the man in whose footsteps he was to follow. After Taft was elected he sent Roosevelt a friend­ ly message containing these words; "I am bound to say that *27

26 Griffith, William, I I , 638. 27 Rhodes, James Ford, McKinley and Roosevelt Adnlnlstrationo. 384-385. 66 $ owe my election more to you than to anybody eloo, except my brother Charles." "Brother Charles" stood for the very forces Boosevelt had been fighting, md the linking of ^Charley’s" name %lth his throw a shadow over the success •f hi o poll cieo in the future? Hany rumors of di acord between the president and the president elect may be found. Neither Roosevelt nor Taft have left any verbal proof that such ex­ is te d . After the nomination, Taft resigned his office, to go to Hot Springs, Virginia, to rest and to prepare for the campaign, When he had finished his acceptance speech, he left, for Charley Taft's home in Cincinnati. He traveled by way of Oyster Bay to discuss the speech with Roosevelt, and to get his criticism and suggestions. According to Stoddard, tills marked the close of the intimate friendship between Roosevelt and Taft. The two men did not meet until five months later. Something is supposed to have happened at Cincinnati that forced Taft to seek other advice than Roosevelt's. He was held accountable for the round about way to Cincinnati when there was a more d ire c t route from Hot Springs than via Oyster-Bay. He was made to feel that in the future the Tafts', not the President, were Ms logical advisors. Taft had by habit gone to Roosevelt, and this was a new interpre­ tation of the situation. That he could not satisfy both ------:------:------—------— ------28 Wlster, Owen, 275. $7 1 oyaltioa had not occured to him, . How he 11 reluctantly" made hi0 choice. ..Only through sooaip did. the President - hoar of Taft' o plans and movements. Re on now on he travel­ ed to Cincinnati for his Biigeeotions and hy a direct route. "It was mid-August" writes Stoddard, "before Roosevelt realised that ho was under boycott. Except -by public profession, the candidate had forgotten that his friend 29 e x is te d . A rchibald B utt ro ia te s o th e r rsmioro of a possible

■■ ' . - ' ...... ' . ■ ■ - f : A -C ; ' ' rift between the two friends. Senator Lodge returned from seeing Taft at Augusta, January 5, 1909, and his tales boded d lseo rd . rn had waited, two days before he was allowed to see Taft alone - his brothers guarded him constantly. He.' had gathered that it was not the intention of the incoming President to retain the Cabinet or anyone that might keep him under the Roosevelt influence. He was do to rained to hew out Ms own administration, and he.guarded against any evidence to the possible charge that his was to be but a continuation of the Roocevolt regime. Butt gave as his opinion that it was Lodge, not Roosevelt, Taft was being guarded against; and, while Lodge might make Roosevelt feel badly, he could not succeed in shaking.his confidence in Taft, because Roosevelt "really loves him and his faith „30 in him i s ab so lu te. * mZSBVStirM tH m 30 Abbott, Lawrence Fraser, 271-338. €8 The Ohio Society In Hew York at its "banquet had not drank the toast to the health of the President. It was the nore surprising because Charley Taft was there. Roose­ velt, on hearing of this, felt a little dorm-cast, but re­ fused to credit the rumor that it was done to cause mis­ understanding between - bin and Taft * • ,!I think it w ill dis­ tress Taft when he hoars of it more than it has me", tmo his reaction, and added: I see a tendency, and I think it but natural, on the part of friends of Taft to discredit what I did for him in the campaign. They little realize that Taft is big enough to carve out his own ad­ ministration on individual lines, and if he were not, tills sort of thing would only add ungrate­ fulness to other charges which are bound to come up. I predict a brilliant administration for him. I felt he was the one man for the Presidency, and any failure in it would be as keenly felt by me as by himself and his family♦>L Th&t Roosevelt was determined to le t Taft have a free hand and that Taft considered independent action be­ coming the dignity of the office, is evident; that the first seeds of the future rift had been sown, must be based on these and other rumors. Taft did ovolvo an issue. His was to be a policy of organizing and strongthlng what had been don®; a sort of plateau in the progress of reform, in his acceptance speech Taft pronounced these views, and Roosevelt had read the speech and termed It admirable’.!

31 Abbott, Lawrence Frazer, 271-338. in my Judgement, io distinct from, and a progressive development of that which h as been performed by President Roosevelt. The chief function of the next adninistral the machinery. * • • * be promptly rest shall operate with sufficient accuracy and dis- littlo as possible. Such machinery is not now # + difficult work, therefore, of those who follow Hr. Roosevelt is to devise the ways and means by which the high level of business integrity may bo maintained and departures from It re­ strained without undue interference with legit­ imate business.^ • The T7ali Street Journal interprets Taft's address as a pledge to persue the middle course, Taft may have been subservient to Roosevelt; now he was mapping out a policy of his own. He planned to finish the work begun by Roosevelt rather than starting some entirely new pro­ ject. Roosevelt had been criticized for his methods. The Trail street Journal interpreted Taft' e speech as an assurance that different methods were to be emnloyed. 33 Taft was neither a reactionary or a revolutionist. Almost imnediatoly after the election Taft began the trying task of organising his cabinet. He wanted around him men with whom he could, work to the best advant­ age in his own way. Five of these appointments fell to lawyers. That he foresaw criticism for putting corpora­ tion lawyers in his Cabinet, hie letter to Nelson reveals. 70 It also gives his reason for braving tills criticism: Mr. Roosevelt1e function has been to preach a crusade against certain evils. He has aroused the people to demand reform. It becomes my busi­ ness to put that reform into legal execution by : - , the suggestion of certain amendments of the statute In tho governmental machinery. . . The people who are best fitted to do this, without injury to the business interests of the country, are those, lawyers who understand corporate wealth, the present combinations, its evils, and the method by which they can be properly restrained. I am hopeful, moreover, that the suggestions that we shall make to the first regular session of Congress will be received with respect and a desire to support them by those men - leaders in Congress - who would certainly oppose re­ commendations made by a Cabinet consisting of the more ra d ic a l members o f the p a rty .24 Later Taft was criticized for betraying Roosevelt In choosing his Cabinet. 11 One of the things that a man has to . . . do . .. . is to strain his heart strings . . . by declining to comply with the Impulses of personal 35 friendship.” Thus wrote Taft after he had finally completed the Cabinet. He had not strained his heart strings soon enough. Shortly after his victory at Chicago he made a statement about retaining the old Cabinet. Later when this ghost returns to hound him, he said: I meet this sort of tiling everywhere. One day, just after I was nominated, I told Roosevelt that .should I be elected, I did not see how I could do anything e lse b u t re ta in a l l the old members of the Cabinet who had been associated with him. I thought nothing more about it, but I learned later that Roosevelt had practically told every member of his Cabinet that he was going to be retained should I be elected. The only one he made it a

34 Taft to Vf. R. nelson, Feb. 23, 1909. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowleo, The Life and Times of William Howard T a ft, x , 3®2. 35 Pringle, Henry Fowles, Theodore Roosevelt. & Biography, 4?6, 71 point to -ask me to retain wao Meyer, and I retained bin. I an no'.? placed in the attitude of-breaking a promise to each of these ncm.^ Roosevelt1 3 version of the story as ho told it in 1916 adds th a t T aft had requested him to n o tify the members of his Cabinet that they were to be retained. Roosevelt also said in 1916 that.Henry and Charles Taft were the in­ fluences that persuaded the President-elect to change his mind. December 1908 Roosevelt denied any resentment con­ cerning the changes Taft proposed to make; but he expressed a hope that men who had served him well would bo taken care Of.36 37 38 --

If Mr. Safi Tiers to ask my advice as to his Cabinet I would not know what to say. I would possibly suggest to him to retain the present Cabinet and to make changes as he saw fit, but he cannot ask me and I cannot volunteer advice In the master. If he should ask my advice he would feel compelled to take it, whereas if he afike Root1s advice he can take i t or not as he oboes®s. ' - ■ ' -" . • ■■■ - Ho, Taft Is. going about this thing just as I would do, and while I retained licKinely1 s Cabinet the conditions were, quite different. I ,0 eatinot find any fault in Taft's attitude to me.?8 Roosevelt, at the time, gave no evidence of resent­ ment and Taft chose his Cabinet to suit the plans for his administration. Certainly there was a marked evidence of legal talent in the group, and recalling Roosevelt's lack of confidence in the legal profession as a power for prac-

36Butt, Archibald, II, 551. .^Abbott, Lawionce Frazer, 253. 38Ihia., 307. 7* tiool justice perhaps this did as nuch as anything toward shaking his faith in the future of liberal reforas.

was equally free from any intended affront. attempted to represent that you and I were in a t

, .2’-' odds during the last few months,11 the Invitation to spend the night bef< at the White House, “whereas you and I know that has not been the slightest difference between us.' '"ti ' ' Toward the end of his administration the relations between Roosevelt and Congress became somewhat stra in e d . This was due to various causes. The President sent message upon message to Congress, urging an elaborate program of legislation* Since it was so close to the end of the ter®, Congress did not feel obliged to meet these expectations. Congress felt also that Roosevelt ha-d taught the people to demand too much le g is la tio n , and had not allowed th e legislative brmch due credit for the measures already passed. The President had gained the confidence that ■ ■- ' / ' ': ' , : . ■' . - vv. ^ . rightfully belonged to Congress. His methods had been more direct than diplomatic, and tho legislators chafed 40 . - . 1 .' : under the executive dictates. Roosevelt describes th is Be session: . 4

Taft to Roosevelt, Feb. 25, 1909. Quoted by

lUiodes, James Ford, 3 # . 73 I continued in this way to get results until al­ most the close of my administration; and, the Repub­ lican party became once more the progressive and. Indeed, the fairly radical progressive party of the nation. When ay successor was chosen, however, the loaders of the House and Senate, or most of them, felt that It was safe to come to a break with me, and the last or short session of Congress held be­ tween the election of my successor and his inaugura­ tion, four months later, saw a series of contests between the majorities fn the two Houses of Congress and myself - quite as bitter as if they and I be­ longed to opposite political parties. However, I held my own. I was not able to push through the legislation I desired during those four months, but I was able to prevent them doing anything I did not desire, or undoing anything that I had already suc­ ceeded in getting done.41 President Roosevelt*s struggle with his last Congress only tended to make the conservatives more conservative and * further the break in the Republican party. His message to Congress contained some startling phrases. He called for the reenactment of a liability law; workmens compensation for. all government employees, expressing hope that the same broad principle should bo applied to all' private employees; and he stated that Injunctions “have sometimes been used heedlessly and unjustly, and . . . some of the injunc­ tions . . . will inflict grave and occasionally Irreparable wrong upon the enjoined." This distressed the respect­ ables. He did not forget the business leaders who had been attacking his attempts to enforce the law. He said that corporation lawyers were often successful in blocking en­ deavors to that end, and, yet, “the Federal Government does

4lDuffy, Herbert Smith, 230. M essages and Papers o f th e P residen ts , XVI, 7463- 7468. 74 scourgo cln; It doe a bid, sinners fear; for it has put behind the bars %'lth Impartial virility the powerful fin­ ancier, the powerful politician, the rich land thief, the rich contractor - all, no matter how high their station, against whom criminal misdeed can be proved.n He also : ■ 43 termed the liability law a "vory slovenly piece of work" After this message many of his friends turned against him, and cooperation proved Impossible. The law makers were suspicious of the growing power of the executive with what appeared to them its "radical" tendencies. When Taft took office, they were determined to ' . . ^ ^ call a halt and return to normality. - The danger from the insurgent element of the party was also growing. Such leaders as La Follette, Beveridge, Bristow, Norris, Clapp, and Deliver favored progressive JfJf. legislation. However the control of the House lay in th e epeekerehlp. Cannon, the former speaker, was of the reactionary school. Their only chance of success lay in breaking the speaker’s power over legislation. Before Con­ gress convened in 190% they had worked ceaselessly to make this possible. Roosevelt’s policy, inherited by Taft, and the RepiMicon platform were progressive in nature. They hoped for Taft’s support. Joe Cannon was perfectly aware of the opposition to

43 , Messages and Papers of the Presidents. XVI. 7470- 7471. ^Bowers, Claude Geznade, Beveridge and the Progres- QlVQ EroA 339. 75 hi a election as Speaker. He hoped, however, that i f every- thing went w ell, he would he elected; i f not he would a ti l l

. ■ " . . . . ■ . - . •' he a member of the House and could exert h is fu ll share of • ■ 45 ■ ■ - ’ V . power. Taft, i t appears, was not in sympathy with Cannon* a ■ ■ ■ ■ ...... ; . '■ plans. He wrote Roosevelt that his desire was to defeat Cannon; but that he hesitated to oppose him openly, since to try and then fa il would be worse than to le t events take - ~ - ... . . ■ ...... - ; ■ their course, and then deal with him later, the best way he 46 could. Root advised a war with Cannon, To him Taft wrote: I think that the attitude of Cannon, the cynical references that he has made in some of his speeches about promises and compliance with them, are enough to damn the party if they.are not protested against. I have not said anything for publication, but X am willing to have it understood that ny attitude is one of hostility toward Cannon and the whole crowd unless they are coming in to do the square thing. If they don*t do it, and I acquiesce, we are going to be beaten; and I had rather be beaten by not acquiescing them by acquiescing. You know me well enough to know that I do not hunt a fight just for the fun of it, but Cannon* a speech at Cleveland was of a character that ought to disgust everybody who believes in honesty in politics and dealing with the people squarely, and just because he has a nest of standpatters in his House and is so ensconced there that we may not be ablo to move him is no reason why I should pursue the policy of harmony. X don't care how he feels or how they foci in the House. I am not going to be made the mouthpiece of a lie to the people without disclaiming my re­ sponsibility, If they will play fair I will play fair, but if they won't then I reserve all ny . rights to do anything I find myself able to do.4« M yTaft r yifovw": papers. Library of Congress. Quoted t IMS- Taft to Roosevelt, IIov. 25, 1908. Quoted by Ih o ^ Ilmea Of m u m ' ' Thego were bravo wordo, and Roocevolt the m ilitant comes to calm th e u su ally peaceful T a ft. Ho Informed T aft at Hot Springs, that Representative J. A. Tonney had called at the White House and was “very anxious to have on Inter­ view arranged between you end the speaker." Roosevelt said It was "extremely important that you should have this inter­ view. . . I should like to have a chance to see you and give you a full statement of the facts as they seem to me and also of the facts as Cannon and Towney te ll me they 48 see th e n ." It appears the "facts" had convinced Roosevelt that the only course open, to Taft, through which he might hope to carry on his program, was through cooperation with Cannon and the more conservative Republicans. Taft, too, admitted defeat, when according to Roosevelt's suggestion he had seen eewm. There was no Gourde open to Taft. This Roosevelt knew and should have rememberedYet, Taft was not a diplomat; he was a judge, used to proclaiming his decisions. Had that not been so, he might' have avoided the mistake he Immediately made. In like circumstances Roosevelt should have publicly denounced Cannonisn, while privately assuring the speaker that he could count on his 49 support, and to pay no attention. Taft told the news­ paper correspondents th a t he had seen Cannon end was con-

Roosevelt to Taft, ITov. 28, 1903. Quoted by Prlngle^enry^Fov.'les, The Life and Times of william

49Sullivan, Hark, Our Times. IV, 375-382. flaunt of the speaker'a good faith, thus he made himself 50 into a question mark in the public mind. Also, through his subsequent refusal to cooperate w ith the insurgents in their fight against the speaker's power, he lost all chance of their support. I t appears he soon lo st complete­ ly the earlier confidence in the insurgent movement. That Taft foresaw possible public censure is re­ vealed in his farewell letter to Roosevelt just before . Roosevelt left for Africa: I have no doubt that when you return you w ill find me very much under suspicion by our friends in the West. Indeed, I think I am already so, because I was not disposed to countenance an in­ surrection of thirty non against one hundred and eighty outside the caucus. I knew how this would be regarded but I also knew that unless I sat steady in the boat, and did what I could to help Gannon and the great majority of the Republicans stand solid, I should make a capital error in the beginning of my administration in alienating the good will of these without whom I can do nothing to carry through the legislation to which the party and I are pledged. Cannon and Aldrich have promised to stand by the party platform and to follow my lead. They did so for you in the fir s t Congress of your administration and this is the fir s t Congress of mine, o f course, I have not the prestige which you had or the . popular support in any such measure as you had, to enable you to put through the legislation which was 00 rwaaifeable in your fir s t Congress; but I am not attempting quite as much as you did then, and I am hopeful that whet I do offer will be accepted and put through . . Senator Aldrich was the chairman of the Senate committee on finance, and as suchh e was a very necessary

PringlQ Henry Fowles, William Howard Taft, I , 407. 51 Duffy, Herbert Smith, 226-227 78 ally in the pending tariff struggle. By 1908 there was a general demand fo r t a r i f f re v isio n . The Dingly T a riff had hecome techlcally imperfect, and there was a desire to obtain better-basis for reciprocity; there was also a growing belief that the mounting high cost of living was 52 in some way connected with the high tariff. Roosevelt had avoided the tariff issue. He knew little about finance, but he may have recalled that most presidents who had tampered with this dangerous issue had gone down to defeat. He wrote Senator Lodge from Africa that lions were far less dangerous than sugar and lumber and wool schedules; “you are bound to have dlssatisfac- 53 tion with any tariff bill." Taft accented his legacy of doom. He believed in * low tariff; a belief possibly strengthened by his struggle fto Philippine reciprocity. The party platform was evasive but gave the impression of favoring a downward revision. Taft in his campaign speeches had pledged this interpreta­ tion. When the bill was introduced in the Congress, Senators Aldrich and Lodge- and others who favored higher duties, trifled with the truth. They contended that the platform pledged them to re v isio n , but nowhere d id i t say downward 5-4 re v isio n .

52 Ashley, G. B.* Ho den Tariff History. 237. 53 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Selections from the Corres­ pondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, II,

^Fiok, George L!., “The Payne-Aldrich Tariff", Political Science Quarterly. XXV (Harch 1910) 35-68. Taft had pledged deflnately for a lotror tar3.fr, and he was determined that no such Interpretation should "be read into the tati.ff Issue. Had he Immediately taken an aggressive step, the result night have been different. Vice-President Sherman advisod shutting off patronage. This in the beginning of on administration proves a par­ ticularly strong lever. • Had Taft called in reluctant „ senators and told them that the stream of patronage might be cut off, a lower rate schedule might have won. The President declined, not from timidity, but his interpreta­ tion of the constitution did not invest the executive with such power. Later in 1915, he wrote: "Our President has ho initiative in respect to legislation given him by law except that of mere recommendations, and no legal or formal method of entering into argument end discussion of the proposed legislation while pending in Congress.11 Of Roosevelt1 e belief that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in th® Constitution, Taft disapproved. It was, he said, an "unsafe doctrine” which might "lead under emergencies 55 to results of an arbitrary character." Or Taft could have called in the newspaper men and ehallenged the. loyalty of the opposition to the party and to himself. This he could not do. "Of course," he said

55 Taft, Killian Howard, Our Chief Itagistrate and His Powers, 125-157. - in a like manner, “Roosevelt would have cone back at the go preferring the charges and would . . . have them on the run, hut I cannot do things that way. I will let them go ®n# and by and by the people will see who is right and who Is wrong. There Is no use trying to be William Howard Taft 56 with Roosevelt’s ways." , - • : . The trouble was the people had no way of" knowing their President was acting from conviction and not sell­ ing out to the enemy. Besides to have opposed the Aldrich group would have meant Joining the insurgents. Tills pro­ gressive group of the Republican party lead by Senator . Dolliver launched a bitter opposition against both the method and the measure. Their scathing denunciation of the entire b ill roused wide attention, and drew popular 57 suspicion before the completion of the measure. Taft’s freedom from prejudice did not last long. He felt no kindred spirit with the emotional enthusiasm of this group. He soon lost confidence in them and his judgement become perverted by active hatred. “I have no objection to playing with a Democrat or with a Republican, but I have better use for my time than spending it with such . 58 blatant demagogues as either Deliver or Cummings.” : The tariff fight continued. Taft by means of a clover move to force an corporation tax as alternative for

Butt, Archibald, I, 235-236. ' 57 • ' .. - . U it as* 380mas Making the Tariff in the

58 ' - • ' - • Taft to P. H. Shaffer, March 26, 1910. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowles, The Life and Times of William Howard T a ft, I , 3*1. an Incono tax, v/hloh "both Cannon and /JLdrtch refused to consider, kept the Senate leadero from materially raising 59 tho House schedules. He 7/aa forced to compromise in order to get a 'bill passed at all, but shady: deals, such as the glovo schedule, he flatly rejected. Whether the bill as passed raised or lowered duties in general remains a controversial issue. -Those who insist on the'former, do not claim more than a two percent advancej and those who defended the measure do not claim more than from one and 60 one half to two percent reduction. An effort was made to distinguish between luxuries and necessities, but the: most outstanding change was placing-such materials as hides, top wool, and a largo percentage of the sugar on the free list. Tho act did not appreciably change the o l general average. - The Insurgents expected Taft to veto the b ill. He had considered this, but to what advantage? He knew that this was the boot he could do under the - circumstances. , ^ - Roosevelt and Lodge in their correspondence praised the measure. "As far as I can soe," wrote Roosevelt from the jungle, "there is no real ground for dissatisfaction . • . with the present tariff;- so that what we have to meet

59 * ' ■ ’ ' : ■ . Taussig, Frank William, The Tariff History of the United States. 377.

W illis, Parker H., "The Tariff of 1909, Analysis of the Act" Quarterly^oumal of Economics. X t t l , Ho. 9, (Ifovember 1909

"House Document , 948, 2nd Session. 92 i s n ot an actual need, but a mental condition.“ Roose­ velt, tho politician, might have n ot th is rAcntal co n d i- & " : . . . ------'' ' ' ? tion; Taft, the judge, prepared to throw coin and logical reasoning against the emotional atom that, greeted the t ... • ' ■ : " ■ ' now tariff schedule. What chance has reason versus emotion? T aft pro paired to to u r the country. While re stin g in hi a aunuaer hone in Massachusetts, be mad.e the fatal error of dining with Mr. Frick, the steel magnet. Tho occasion was hailed as further: proof that Taft was no follower of Roosevolt but a friend of the,wealthy oppressor, Taft should have prepared speeches but he procrastinated: “I would give anything In the world If I h ad the ability to clear away work as Roosevelt did*1, he complained to Butt, when the latter warned that time was slipping by. ”1 am putting off these speeches from day to day." Roosevelt - the Roosevelt of the White Rouse, later he too became rushed for tine - under similar circumstances would have prepared his speeches, then submitted them to careful criticism, before offering thorn to the public. Had Taft followed this method ho should have elimi­ nated from his Boston speech a tribute to Senator Aldrich for his great talents in financial matters. That the statement was true did not make it more effective as balm

- — Lodge, 'Henry Cabot, Selections from the Correspon­ dence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. II, 335. 63 Butt, Archibald, I, 185-192. 83 fo r emotional g r ie f . In TTloconoln ho. should never have failed to pay t^ltiuto to La Follette, its fa.vorlte son; and he might have dispensed nith his Winona speech in be- half of Tannoy, ill famed for his connection nith the

. .. - - - . - - - .. - ...... tariff bill. The Winona speech only raised the barrier ' between Taft and the people, and helped defeat him In 1912, r-- - - . - - : - ' ... The speech had been hurriedly prepared while oh the train, and no rod pencil had question malted #%e twenty-five dam­ aging words: M0n toe whole, however, I am bound to say th a t I think the Payne bill is the best bill that the He- pobllean party ever passed." The following morning the newspapers carried this caption: m u m ACT BEST TAHFF IN HiaRORZ, STUBS TAFT The full speech fell owed. But how many read that? The great; popular grievance was the increasing liigh coot of living and for this the people blamed the tariff. How could it be the best result of the President's efforts? That the high cost of living in the United States was, at best, caused in part b^r a general world condition was not generally understood. So Taft traveled on. He re­ ceived personal ovations of good will but he failed to allay the popular fear that he had joined the reaction­ aries, and the strong opposition to the tariff continued. Roosevelt caught the echo in faraway Africa.

54 Senate Documents 353» 62nd Congress, 2nd Session. 84 The people misunderstood Taft*s motives in the tariff issue, they mere to condemn them as eninical to their cause in the Ballingcr-PlncHot controversy. That - the true worth of the facts in the case bore slight com- . * parison to the political repercussion they created, con­ signee the entire affair to tho category of unfortunate episodes in history. This proved to*be particularly true in the Roosevelt end Taft relations. ^ r The case grew out of the conservation program. As has heenpointed out, Roosevelt took an exceptional inter­ est in the conservation and development of natural re­ sources. By. executive order tho President from time v to time set aside parts of the open lands and ruled^that these lands were no* to go into private ownership.- , Timber, minerals, and waters!tes were on some of these lands, but . not a ll contained valuable resources. . The opponents of the President passed, a law making these executive with- ~ drawals Ille g a l. It was part of the Agricultural appropria­ tion bill, so Roosevelt had to sign it. Before doing so, however, he asked the head of the forest department, Gifford Pinehot, to tabulate lands to be set aside as natural domain. Guided by his report, • Roosevelt withdrew 16,000,000 acres and then signed the b ill. This upset many elans to augment nrivate fortunes, but the oeonle felt

65. XII, 7638-7648. Roosevelt guarded their interests. Taft v/as in perfect agroenent with the general re­ sult, "but he doubted the leg a lity of the method used, " if Roosevelt had taken a different way he would be further along In some of Ills refom s” was his terse remark. C-ifford Pino hot, whom Roosevelt had known since his early days in New York, became his right hand men in th is work. He said of him: "Gifford Pinohot is the man to whom the nation owes moot for what has been accomplished as regards the preservation o f the natural resources of 69 our country." Plnehot in turnheld Roosevelt in venera­ tion. Garfield, the secretary of Interior in Roosevelt1s cabinet, had also showed marked interest in conservation, but in Taft’s opinion had held the law too lightly. Taft decided not to retain Garfield in his cabinet. Ho needed someone of a more legal mind to organize on a more substantial basis, the great work that had been start­ ed and to guide its future course. In his place he chose R. A. Ballinger, a Seattle Lawyer. During Roosevelt’s ad- ' ministration, Garfield, with the President’s personal in­ fluence, had persuaded Ballinger to sacrifice his own prac­ tice to become commissioner of the General Land O ffice. This he did in the Interest of Roosevelt’s conservation policy. He retained this office for about a year, when he

v 67 ' ‘ '■ ' Senate Documents, 719, Slot Congress, 3M Session, 32-105.. 68 70 returned to private practice. Garfield ^r.s v?ell liked and had a lar^e following. He had supposed he v?as to he retained, and nas none too pleased to hear of1 the change. Baldwin of the Outlook told . ' : ■ ■ . - -■ . : ■ ' ■ • ^ ^ the President-elect what Gifford Pinehot had told him con­ cerning Dick Eallingem 111 couldn't work with him. as I have with Jim (Garfield). Jim and I tliink alike concern- ing the matters in which the Forest Sorvlco and the Depart­ ment of the Interior are closely related. Ballinger end I 71 might clash.M : This merely confirmed Taft's conviction that he had chosen the right mm. It was further strengthened when Garfield without legal authority withdrew hundreds of ' : . ■. . . - 1 . . 72 . thousands of acres of land as water sites. Included among the lands withdrawn wore a good many thousand acres more or less suitable for farming. At any event people were living on them. Taft was convinced that no legal ground could be found for these withdrawals, and Secretary Ballinger therefore ordered the restoration of these lands. However he ordered the Geological Survey to investigate all the water power sites so that these could be preserved 73 for the future.

S u lliv an , Karte. 71.F. Baldwin to Taft, Jan. 13, 1909. Quoted by

Senate Documents, 719, 6lat Congress, 3rd Session, 70-73. ^Hibbard, Benjamin H., A History of the Public Land^Policles,^508^ Senat^Doouments^ 719^ 61 st Congress, 87 Taft wrote hio ‘brother in defense of this act: « One of the propositions that I. adhere to is that it is a very dangerous method of upholding reform to violate the law in so doing. Congress has the power to dispose of lands; not the ex­ ecutive. It is the "business of the executive to protoot the public lands within the limitation of his authority. The power of the President to withdraw land appropriated to popular settle­ ment by aot of Congress is exceedingly limited under the decision of the courts. This power, I do not h e s ita te to say, was exercised f a r beyond legal limitation under Secretary Garfield - and, more than that, unnecessarilly so.74 Again Taft explained his action to his intimates, but failed to think it necessary to give his reasons to the public. Through the wozk of the Geological Survey, Taft attained equally good results, but the people saw only his deviation from the Roosevelt course. They be­ came suspicious. Dullng Roosevelt’s administration people had be­ come coal-conscious. ' They began to realize that the supply T-“S not lim itless, and that care must be practic­ ed, should the ever increasing demand be satisfactorily met. Roosevelt withdrew from homestead entry some 66,000,000 acres supposed to contain ooed. Some of this " was in Alaska. A very small percent contained workable 75 coal, and still less could roach civilization. The fact that claims under dispute were practically worthless.

Taft to Hulbert Taft, May 12, 1909. Quoted - by Pringle, Heniy Fowles, The Life and Times of (71111 am Howard T a ft. 1, 481.

Senate Documents. 719, 61st Congress, Session, 9-10 r had little v/olght asainet the harangue of excited conserva­ tion! ota and careless journalists v/ho talked about billions of dollars being at stake. - ^ s ' The Ballinger-Pinchot controversy further aroused the popular suspicion that something v?as amiss. When

with a complicated ing claims to coal lands in Alaska. That these coal lands have proven almost valueless is beyond tho point. At that time the press saw to it that thoy were priceless gens in the popular mind. Clarence Cunningham of Wallace, Idaho, had located thirty three claims in Alaska for himself and 76 friends, for which they paid §52,800.00 to the government. I t was l a t e r claimed th a t Cunningham and a sso c ia te s had not acted in "good faith" under the law of 1904. It stated that any attempt to consolidate claims prior to six months be­ fore the title was granted was fraud. Conclusive evidence 77 that Cunningham attempted evasion % however has little bearing on the results. Ballinger while in tho land office received inquiri­ es about th e Gtmnlngham claim s. Not being acquainted w ith the facts, he referred the matter to H. H> Scharts, chief of the field service. He investigated and advised Ballii that nothing had been found to deny application for patents.

76 Sen Documents, 719, 6lst Congress, 3rd Session, 89T

719, 61at Congress, 3rd had "been aont "by Ballineor to investigate Alaskan coal lands In general, auaplcioned that the CuanlngUcan group. .... was not acting as Independently as they should. ; He ad­ vised the approval of; the claims he hold up so he night Investigate) further. BallinGcr agreed,'and Glavls con--, 78 tinued investigating. - This ended BallingcrTs connec­ tion with the claims as land commissioner. Ho le f t the service shortly afterwards - 1907 - much to the regret 79 of Roosovolt. «■: : . - • During his private practice he was approached "by Cunningham to explain a Journal:that might influence those claims adversely. . Bollinger prepared the affidavit, and while East on other "business, wont over same with Garfield. For this work he received a onaD^fce from • Cunningham. There was nothing Irregular In this; he was a lawyer in private practice. ■ r Ballinger entered Taft’s Cabinet under Garfield’s retreating shadow, That was the grievance Pinchot and ethers had toward.him. ■ It too was significant in the Balllnger-Pinchot affair. • . He realized that his previous connections with the

oi'ders to his undersecretaries and assistants that under

^ ^ ^Senate Documents. 719, Gist Congress, 3rd Session

79 "XXmil ^g^o^^cuments, 719, Gist Congress. 3rd Session no circumstanceo v?ero they to refer any questions pertain- 50 ing to these claims to him. - - ' »«eu2; ....'.gchwartz' of the land office ordered Glavis to re­ port his findings within sixty days. He promised, though he appears to have had no intention to do so, since ho foared Land Office Commissioner Dennett might react un­ favorably to the report. But Schwarts had had years of delay and refused to grant Glavis more time. The case 81 had already consumed too much time and expense. ^ At this point Glavis resorted to intrigue. He enlisted the aid of Chief Forester Hnchot to help him in his fight for delay. He recognised Plnchot's power as a cruoador for conservation, and he suavely hinted that it would be simple for Congress to transfer the Alaskan coal fields - the future coal supply of America - to the Forest department. It was rank insubordination to seek support from another department and it was presunp- ' tioue Interference for Pinchot to meddle beyond his granted sphere of influence. Pinchot advised Glavis to present his material to President Taft, He also wrote a letter of introduction to the President in which he pretended to have known Glavis for several years. Later on the witness stand he was forced to admit ho had seen him only once. Glavis *01

80 Senate Documents. 719, G ist Congress, 3rd Session, XXXVIIX, 2387; XXXIX, 2961; XL, 3615. 01 Senate Documents, 719, G ist Congress, 3rd S ession, XLV; XLVI. 91 son Taft and laid before him hi a charge a against Ballinger and the entire Department of the Interior. Just what the accusations mere no one has "over been able to evolve. They were h in ts and In sin u a tio n s. Even B randies as coun­ sel for Q1 avis before the investigating committee of Congress.was able to muster only implications and flimsy 32 accusations. Taft studied the Glavls report carefully, then re­ ferred it to George VI, Wicker sham, the Attorney General, also an able lawyer. He wrote the President the follow­ ing letter: The insinuations or charges of improper action on the part of Secretary Ballinger, Assistant Sec­ retary Pierce, Commissioner Dennet, or Chief of the Field Division Schwarts are, in my opinion, e n tire ly disproved. . . Tho record c le a rly shows that Secretary Ballinger was scrupulously care­ ful not in any respect to act upon those (Cunningham) claims. . . (fleffi.s' 1 re p o rt1 and summary abound in contradictions and mis-, statements. They omit to a degree that amounts to absolute suppression letters, telegrams, and other documents. . . His action in appealing to the Forest Service of the Department of ;■ Agriculture to intervene In these cases . . . was a breach of all proper dicipline. . .- Glavls’ actions appear to have been founded upon a wholly exaggerated sense of his own im­ portance, and a desire for personal advancement, rather than on any genuine desire to protect the interests of the Government.1^ Two days after receiving wlokersham1s report. Taft exonerated Ballinger and the other officers whom Glavls had be smudged. He also advised Ballinger to dis-

O p U Senate Documents, 719, Gist Congress. 3rd Session, iHXEV, 50.

Ickes, Harold Evening P o st, CC3CII, %. he wrote to VJIllian Kent: .? V ■ ' " ■■■ It is not 1: : m aaralnl etra the ehazigo o f .mi iw. in view of my d that questions should arif goldg b&Qk on the principles of administration. . =3 limited power under the Constli have got to of lan. Non, if that is reactionary, ob a reactionary, I c ritic ism "by men who is, who have not looked it oil sorts of motives to.those who i t . . . Plnchot i s ...... _ he is quite willing to camp outside the law to SO to h is J.HUU. . , the great "benefit that he has wo I do flnd. it necessary - to look i; of h is plans.04 , >:? After the exoneration of Ballinger, the b a ttle

' . \ . .. . . - really began The able propaganda machine which was part of the ForestSorvlce, was dispatched full forco, Pinehot was aided by such able disseminators of propa- ganda as Homan Hapgood o f C ollier* a Weekly and o th e r newspaper men." By publishing the Glavis report, end simultaneous propaganda, they made i t appear that veluable public domain was being stolen through w illful 1 ■ - : . . ; . . r . ' .■'l .. ■ ’ - ^ negligence on the part of administration officials. Captions, news articles, editorials, and cartoons screamed accusation at Ballinger and a warning to the

64 : ■ - t- : Taft to WilllGJii Kent, June. 29, 1909. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fewlea. The L ife and Time a of William people th a t they vmre being robbed. They did th is do successfully that xvhen investigation finally proved the Innocence of the maligned parties, to save their ov/n re­ putation they had to refrain from printing the truth. As a consequence, the attacked remained public villains. Taft Tzas advised to save himself by dismissing Ballinger. Ho responded with splendid scorn: - his innocence and in view of the conspiracy against him, I should b© a whltellvered skunk, 1 don't care how it affects my administration . * . before the people; if the people are sc unjust as this I don't propose to be one of kind that should sub has been made the ob spiracy, in which unscrupulous been used that ought to face of everyone connected with it Only the break with Roosevelt was to sadden him more than this affair did. He wondered, “how long will ■ - ' ... ' . . ■ . : ■■ ■-•. ■ •■■■ ■* ; '■¥, i Pinchot_ remain the St. George and Ballinger the Dragon?" But, he said those things in private and people were given no chance to know that Ballinger was not a Dragon and Plnchot not a Saint. This was Taft's falling and his tragedy as a public man. Ballinger, to clear himself, asked the Senate to ' \ : - '.f:. - . ""T / . ' . .- ' make a f u ll investigation, and on January 19, 1910, Congress by joint resolutions, authorized an investigation

to P, A. Baker. Hay Pringle, Henry Fowl© Howard T a ft. I , ■ 86 ■ ■ ■ ■■■ - Taft to Horace D. Taft, Dec. 27, 1909. Quoted by Ibid.. 506. 94

tion of the Forest Servlde tjas ever made. In the meantime, Pinchot had taken the matter -r directly to Congress. Ho sent a letter to Senator Dolllver to he read In the Senate. Ho referred, to Louis Glavis as "tho most vigorous defender of the people’s interests." He admitted that he had prepared, through Ms assistants a systematic and organized publicity campaign to discredit the Secretary of tho Interior, and that "having violated a rule of propriety as botv/ecn Departments, they deserved and had received a reprimand", hut their motives had been praiseworthy. He concluded by implying that Taft in dismissing Glavis

V7&G 1nBUD02xu.no, uion ox uno ronico o u uypo ono even Taft’s patience had missed Pinchot, who was in a good cause. Had Taft, halt to contention early In the have been avoided. Taft was ever the judge; the evidence must all be in.

^ ^ 87Senato Documents, 719, 3 rd

88 Pringle, Henry Fowlso, William Howard Taft. I , 507-508; 89 Sutherland, later mcmtior of the Suprono Court. Colllern T7eokly had hccop.o do only enough Involved .to- ' supply Glavio with ono of tho country1o moot brilliant lawyers, Louis D. Brandies. "Tho foe was §25,000,00. So tho I battle of wits continued. . Both C-lavis and Pine hot too!: the stand. Both, through their testimony admitted the absence of any evidence to prove corrupt practice. r The only sensation of the Congressional Inquiry was developed by Brandies. Ho discovered that the report compiled by !7ickershajn for Taft on which he based his Justification in exonerating Ballinger had been pre­ dated. '< Taft willingly explained tho circumstances. T7ickorsham used his notes, taken while going over tho

Later he put them in finished form. There was no mystery about the matter. But Brandies made the most of it. Paper headlines breathed "conspiracy." There must have been something to hide.; The President would protect Ballinger at any cost. In the public mind, they had re­ fused to toll the truth. The entire affair had little on the verdict of but on tho public mind I t was most damaging. C r:, 1 :: ' .'1.: 6%^,

89 719, G lut Congress, 3rd m e — t s .

Gist Congress, 3rd n 9 ’ Ballinger mm cleared legally from all accuoationo end pronounced »a competent and honorable gentleman, honest­ ly and faithfully performing the duties of his high office with an eye single to the public interest."9 "Personal animus, devouring ambitions, conniving schemes to defeat Taft and renominate Roosevelt in 1912, a ll got tangled up in the Ballinger affair,”"'' writes I ekes. That was its tragedy. The people were losing faith in Taft as its leader. In their opinion he was not following Roosevelt1s policy but had joined the exploiters group. The group who say, "The public be damned." "How are the people to know?" he once said. But ho said nothing in their language to let then know that their interests were his. Roosevelt, too, must have questioned his succes­ sor's motives, though he gave no evidence. When he re­ turned from the African jungle, there stood Pinohot his trusted lieutenant, with bags full of his convincing proof and propaganda. Not one lin e from Taft. ’ # Taft's action in this controversy Illustrates the difference between judicial and executive methods. The ad­ ministration can be likened to an army put into the field to win ground for the public welfare. The success of the campaign depended upon concentration, not diffusion of energies; yet two of the officers were having disagreement.

91 Senate 719, Gist Congress, 3rd Session, SSfff”

Iekes, Harold L, Evening Post, CCXII, Mo, 97 halted and undertook to settle the d ifficu lty by a duel.

Hot? would Roosevelt have connanded ouch a situation? He would have informed the disputants that they were there to destroy the enemy, not each other; and no matter what the controversy was, they must "drop it" or one of them must go outside the public service to do his further fight­ ing. This .he had done in the controversy between the / civil and military authorities in the Philippines/. Taft's course was the reverse. Ha patiently listened to both parties, said as pleasant things as he could to both, then urged an investigation by Congress, as a tr ia l j udgo turns the facts to the.jury before he applies the lac. Plnohot's dismissal came not as a decision of the controversy, but as an incident. He had committed what the judge termed contempt of court. : t . r ^ , . The gravest outcome of the whole affair was that it, more than any particular situation, precipitated the break between the two great leaders. How could Roosevelt see Taft's point of view; hew could he know that this was Taft's way, the only way he knew, of carrying out the Roosevelt policies?

■.-.. —...... IV

ROOSEVELT 2HE PLAIN CITIZEN

"The fact of tho matter is, none of us has aver Given the President a fair shorn as yet" said Hr. Brisbane in March, 1910. "v.’e have all been judging him by the standards of his predecessor and vie have yielded to the public clamor for him to use the attacking methods of Roosevelt. We are beginning to see him rightly, and I think he v/ill nin out if this Roosevelt home-coming does not upset all plans, and purposes of thoughtful men." Roosevelt did come hone and he did upset the plans not only of thoughtful men but of party politics in general. Roosevelt landed in New York June 18, 1910, and received the greatest popular ovation granted any private Individual before Charles Lindberg. In response to Hayor Gaymor’s speech of welcome he replied that it was the duty of one who had been President of the United States to help to solve the problems of the country "in private life as much as In public life." Ho meant thence forth to be noth- 1 ing but a plain citizen. In a previous letter to Taft ho

1 Bishop* Joseph Buckiln, II, 298. 99 had written: “l shall make no speeches nor say anything for two months, but I shall keep my mind as open as I keop my mouth shut." . , , , President Taft was not at Hew York to greet Roose- T®lt. He had given the matter considerable thought, how­ ever. Once he had decided to go, then changed his mind. This was not prompted by any intended slight toward Roose- 3 velt, as his enemies were later to make it appear. It was decided not on the basis of personal friendship, but of the President toward a private citizen. Taft said in the matter: _ __ :... .. For I sm charged with the dignity of the Executive, and I will say or do nothing that will put a momentary slight even on that great office. After all, I am determined to paddle my own canoe, and I do not want to say any­ thing at first which might mislead Roosevelt into thinking that I expect or desire advice. I think, moreover, that he will appreciate this feeling in me and would be the first one to resent the slightest subordination of the . office of President to any man.% He did send a wara l e t t e r of welcome w ith an in ­ vitation to visit the white House. Tills letter was de­ livered by Archibald Butt, his personal aide and who had also served under Roosevelt. Roosevelt appeared genuine­ ly pleased, and gave no indication of feeling any slight. Just nine days after Roosevelt had said he wished to remain a private citizen, he was back In politics.

Butt, Archibald, I, 395. 3 White, William Allen, "Should Old Acquaintance Be Forgot” , American. L7JCEV, (Hay 1912) 13-18. 4 Butt, Archibald, I, 389. after hie return uas at the it exoreiaes a t . Harvard University. Governor Hughes ona he nore seated to g e th e r on th e platform . 7'lnty Chamber nau the b r ie f conversation. "Do you Imov xvhat Hughen i s saying?11 said Chamber to Doctor Thayr. “He’s tolling Roosevelt that the Republican party is in a bad way and that he must Jump in and back the direct primary b ill. And Theodore is going to do it." Later in the day at the alumni luncheon Roosevelt said: . b : uur hovomor nas a very persuasive uay v.’ixn him. I had intended to keep absolutely clear from any kind of public or political question a f te r coming home, and I could carry out my resolution all right until I met the Governor this morning, and he then explained to me that I had come back to live in Hew York nou; that I had to help him out, and after a very b r ie f conversation, I put up my hands and agreed to help him.0 Ulster thinks that it nas the "preacher militant" of his nature that made him take this jump across this political Rubicon. It must have contributed in the deci- slon. Roosevelt knew the condition of the country. the condition of his party. Yet, the direct primary was ■ V.;. close to his heart. It 7/as to break the control by party B'esass. This had been his fight throughout his public .. ■; ■. : - - ; - " ' career. It v/as the people's fight. If he saw or allowed

lister, Owen, 279.

S i shop, Joseph Bucklin, II, 299-300. 'ft'*

S'" man be had uahorcd into tho V/hite Hougq, there is no T?ay of knowing. For the next two years events seemed to like situations where Roosevelt was a party in the game.

R o o sev elt's more lib e r a l views* H erbert Croly and h is

Croly like Roosevelt believed in moral reform. He adaitt-

100 racy, have appealed to Roosevelt. the West. What his motives were in departing on this tour is difficult to determine. E. K. Abbot in his introduction to The nationalism soys that it was in response to thoueaoft* of invitations, particularly from Cheyenne, Wyoming. When it was over he felt he had helped to secure a fairly unit- ed party support for the Republican Party. Though he may have done it unconsciously he really focused attention on himself, and caused bitterness end worry at the White House. Roosevelt was becoming more and more popular, while Taft remained at home quite forgotten.

7 Roosevelt, Theodore, “Nationalism and Popular Rule" Outlook* XC7TI, (June 21, 1911) 96, 8 Croly, Herbert D., The Promise of American Life, 29 35, 36, 454. 9 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Selections from the Correspond­ ence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, II, 391. % Roosevelt gave numroua cddroBces, discussing hlo liberal policy under the title ’’How Hationalinmn. The one that aroused more bitter criticism than any other was np.de on August 31, 1910* This address foretold tho political creed of the Progressive Party. Roosevelt quoted Abraham Lincoln’s belief that labor was ”prior to and independent of capital and deserved much the higher consideration. . * I stand for tho square deal . . . but . . . I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under tho present rules of the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity and reward for equally good service.“ Shore could be no effective control of corporations while "their political activity remains." Supervision and capitalisation was essential of all corporations "particularly the railways. I do not wish to see the nation forced into the ownership of the railways if it can possibly bo avoided, and the only alternative is thoroigh going and effective regulation." As for the tariff, "the duty of Congress is to provide a method by which the interests of the whole people shall bo all that receives consideration. To this end there must be an expert tariff commission, wholly removed from the possibili­ ty of political pressure or of improper business influence." 103 To prevent "awollon fortunes" Income and inheritance taxes •hould.-be applied. Other problems considered v;ere protec­ tion of labor, conservation of natural resources, and aid to the farmer. : -_■, .. • ' He did not ask for overcentralization, but ho believed that the improvements sought could best be ac­ complished through the national government. His "national- ism" put national needs before sectional, and in this * movement, he considered the executive pouer as the "steward of the public welfare." It demanded of the judiciary "that it shall be interested prlmarllly in human welfare rather than in property, just as it demands that the representative body shall represent all the 10 people rather than one class or section of tho people." Thus far Roosevelt had reiterated the views which had held when he was President. There were besides those some statements in tills address that came alarmingly close to socialism from which he had shrunk from and continued to stan, nationalism he said "implies a policy of a far more active governmental interference with social and economic conditions in this country than we have yet had, but I think we have got to face the fact that such an in­ crease in governmental control is now necessary."" Hors radical still: "The man who wrongly holds that every ------—----- 10 Roosevelt, Theodore, The Hew Rationalism, 27-28. 11_ „ ■ i^Dljde > 18 • human right is secondary to his profit must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who rightly maintains that every man holds his property oubjoct to the general right of the community to regulate it s uso^to whatever degree the public welfare may require it." Regulate the property of Hr. Harriman and Hr. Morgan in the interest of the people, and do it to what­ ever degree popular interest night demand? Those wore grave words. Even Roosevelt realised that he had failed to make himself clear. He wrote Senator Lodge, "A public man is to bo condemned i f he states a proper position in such fashion that he fails to make his point clear,__and permits good men to go wrong from mi sunder stand­ in g . 11 He admitted that his method of approach had been wrong. Y/hen Roosevelt returned from ills western trip bo found himself compelled to take part in the political wrangle of the November election. “I have boon cordially helping in the election of a Republican Congress," he wrote Ellhu Root, "having sp lit definitely with the in­ surgents on tills point; for though I am bitterly dis­ appointed with Taft, and consider much of his course absolutely inexplicable, I have felt that as in so many ------

12 ...... ^ . Roosevelt, Theodore, The Hew Nationalism. 23-24. 13 Roosevelt to Lodge, Sept. 20, 1910. Quoted by Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, 11, 303. 105 other ossoB, I T - Ir.'-'' ' ? . _1 ' ' actually were I eongroGs end to carry -- ' ' t: ; entire understanding on ’ ::? '9:1 meana the inn , - 01 In '* r p a rts o f ' n In - .> • 1;: ' ads ■ ■ ''1 caused the conoerratlve Republicans to go "literally In­ sane in their opposition" by his "Hen Rationalism"* It looked as uuouKd nooQovejLu wau -^urouKU * Williara Allen White, "As regards rayself, I think that the American people feel a little tired of ne, a feeling with ...... ’ 15 which I cordially ** » Bishop he wrote in this vein: The one that I think it prevents ray havl to faco the very unpleasant task of deciding o r n ot to accept th e nom ination in 1912 carried Hew York, I can see now that I would have had to make such a decision. Of course the decision seems easy enough? on the one hand to the well-meaning conservative person who regards Taft as a satisfactory President, and does not understand what any man sees to object to in him, and who feels that any re-

ioy firm ly b e lle v th a t only a still sore ---- — Quoted by Bishop, Josepl^Bucklin,R°II* °304-305.^°"

Roosevelt to White, Dec. 12, 1919. Ibid. . 305 106 unworthy desire to truckle to ultra-conserva­ tism, prevents ay coming out openly against Taft. But the choice is really infinitely more d i f f i c u l t . I have refrained from saying that I would not he a candidate in 1912, not In the least from self-interest, for I should regard It as the greatest personal calamity to he forced into accepting the nomination, and If it is possible to avoid it, I do not intend to be so forced Into accepting it; but because I do not wish to put myself In the position where if It boconos my plain duty to accept I shall be obliged to shirk such duty because of having committed myself. As things are now, I feel convinced that It will not become my duty to accept. They have no business to expect me to take command of a ship simply because the ship Is sinking.lb Again Roosevelt said, In the letter mentioned to Ellhn Root:

T aft and a woid stances will be T aft fo r Is not a ilolon and i f I illusion and

During this time there was tho unhappy Taft at the White House. He strove in his own way to make life better. "If only I knew what Roosevelt wanted", ho said to Archibald Butt in 1910. Later this attitude shifted toward Indignant condemnation.

Roosevelt to Bishop, Hov. 21 1910. Quoted by Bishop, Joseph Bucklln, II, 307-308. - \ ?-=' 17 Butt, Archibald, II, 485. 107 m visit the White House. This invitation Roosevelt de-le dined to accept. P resid en ts v is itin g V/aDitL-ngton. ■T': ' •.. ^ .V ' ' Taft* a at Beverly. It ly chat - none men’ s minds were mentioned. ___ __ „ , mother comer turned. . .1 think he felt just as I ‘ ' -1: ■ ■ . did, that it was best to have simply a social- personal * " v isit and not givo any opportunity for confidences " . '' T- -v -f" which might be embarrassing." * i \ : T r - . - - i -- ; Iho m aaov of 1910 naa unploaoant ond an unhappy one for left, ar, "oil as for Roosevelt. To ncet Rooso- ' volt’s "Hew nationalism" Taft lacked a comparable label, . So the people improvi sed one, the "Champion of tho Old Guard." . While Roosevelt talked to the people, Taft played golf with Frick and received Horgan at the White 1 9 ■ ' • . . ■ t. , . House. In reality this lacked importance: in the .public mind it '■W 108

% on the part of the conservatives. His tour through the YTost has been one continual ovation, and his speeches have been of the sane old, kind - attack­ ing corporations, corruption In politics, and setting forth his own views and his own actions as wicked powers of evil in the Republic. I am to say that his speeches are fu ller of ego now than they ever were, and ho allows himself to fall into a style that makes one think he considers , himself still the President of the United States. In most of these speeches he has utterly ignored me. . , His attitude toward ns is one that I find d iffic u lt to understand and explain. . . It looks a little bit as if he wore hunting rea- toward me. But I have It - that the sit tight and let him talk. He is at the head of ents are at the top of the wave. They hi Wisconsin they may carry Washington, are those which I an trying to put through. Those which go beyond are . . . utterly impracticable because they could never be gotten.through with­ out a revolution * ' ~ '* * " either of which is impossible^ In another letter to Horace Taft, he wrote: Ilia present mental condition, therefore, ro­ le ! sure time in finding reasons why he is ju sti­ fied in not supporting, ns. Roosevelt has no one to advise hln of the conservative typo, like Root or Moody or Knox or myself, as he did ' in office. . * thing of all others that I •am not going do is to stop cut of the way of Hr. Roosevelt when he is advocating such wild ideas as tho& in . , .the Osawatomic speech. I think the Hew Nationalism" . . . speech frightened ev —* 20_ 2 * t g re a tly ■i4 stirred up the Indignation and fear of the th tfc in k - < . . ■n

fo rth no to at random. Only the great strain ho r/as under explains this. His most sacred principles were being attacked, and the people wore floe icing to another leader. to Roosevelt, and made understanding more difficult. friction. The Republican leaders attempted the roll of peace makers. They planned a meeting of the two actors at the National Conservation Congress on September fifth . President Taft declined to act with the ex-Presidcnt, and they spoke on consecutive days. A second meeting was arranged at Now Haven. Here they visited alone for about an bear; !,If they are not farther apart" said Archie Butt 22 about this interview, "at least they are no nearer." Roosevelt supported Taft in the November election. This, as we have seen, found him in temporary political retirement. At this point at least, a correspondence reeoncilllation was effected. "The President and the Colonel are corresponding in a friendly sort of way," writes Butt.

21 Taft to Horace Taft, Sept. 16, 1910. Quoted by Pringle Henry Fowles. The Life and Times of Killian Howard T a ft. I I , 574.

22B u tt, A rchibald, I I , 520. V . •' ■ " . / ' ""

’ : ' ■ ' H# Only yesterday he vzrotc to Colonel Roosevelt giving his 23 viens on reciprocity and frankly asking for the Colonel's. 11 !Uho election over, Taft relaxed and began to push constructive leg isla tio n . The most important of these,. . te for our purpose, v?an the Canadian reciprocity agreement. Taft favored reciprocity with Canada. In his opinion it would be mutually advantageous to both countries; i t would strengthen the friendly relations with the Dominion, and it 24 could be node to benefit all sections of the United States. Taft also hoped that an interest in the reciprocity measure might allay the popular clamor for ta r iff revision until the tariff commission should have tine to act. Again Taft’s efforts only led to complications. The party was badly split; the Insurgents wore always in opposition. Roosevelt was quiet, but he wan soon to take the warpath again. The President fought for the b ill by direct appeal to Congress and to the people. Hearings and investigations followed. The measure finally passed 25 the Senate only to be rejected by Canada. I t was a move in the right direction, but in place of strengthening Taft's position, it further weakened it. The "Tost felt that the free list favored industrial East against their inter- 26 est; and it appears, though Roosevelt orginally in favor

834, 61at Congress, 3rd Session.

1st Session, of reciprocity, capitalized on this state of Tnind in the west and further weakened Taft's position. An accusation was xaado against Taft that he failed to prosecute monopolies d iligen tly. Fate proved the opposite. V«ith Roosevelt, he believed that the capitalist system waa- better than any other devised by man; and unless abuses under it were stopped, capitalism would be replaced by socialism or some other evil. But Taft had little rever­ ence for Wall Street; he revered the law a great deal more. There was an antitrust law to be enforced; and noth­ ing could sway Taft from this duty. During Roosevelt's administration, forty-four cases against monopolies had boon started. Taft's administration had brought twenty- two civil suits and, in criminal action, forty five in- 27 dictments had been found. ' An editorial in the Outlook remarked: uPresident Taft has not been as loud or spec­ tacular in his attacks upon the “trusts'1 as was his predecessor in the White House, but ho has been consistent, persistent and unwavering and results have been achieved or at any rate' have culminated during his administration 28 that have been distressing to Wall Street. - w ' In the course of events in the program of law on- . forcoment, a suit was filed aginst the United States Steel Corporation. Had Taft ever placed any motive above the

28 A Poll of the Press, “Tne Trusts, the People and the Square Deal", Outlook. XCIX (Dec. 2, 1911) letter of the Ian, this case should have been dropped be- . fore it was started. It was a direct attack on Roosevelt's honesty, or ability as an executive, and offended him mortally. . - - •. - ^ r ' During the panic of 1907 th is baffling problem had Its beginning. One factor in the financial distress was that #5,000,000.00 in the stock of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company was held an collateral of Iloors and Schley, a brokerage house, and that this could not be moved. The firm might fa il to open Monday, and th is night drag down other V/all Street financial firms, and the collapse become general. To avoid th is. United States Steel Corporation volunteered to purchase the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company for #45,000,000.00 thereby rehabilitate its stock, save Moore and Schley, and possibly avert a financial, crash. But would Roosevelt prosecute this merger as violating the Anti-Trust law? After a conference in Morgan10 study, by special train Gary and Frick hastened to Y'nohlngton. They were , at the White House early Monday morning; not hours but minutea counted now, Roosevelt interrupted his breakfast to see then. Roosevelt know little of finance, but hero was a situation not so much of law as of saving the country from calamity. He assured then that under no circumstance "Would he object to the merger. Ho ore and Schley la ter testified that a mere loan of #5 , 000, 000.00 would have 113 saved their credit. By 1903, Judge Gaxy tvbs testifying that §200,000,000.00 uas a fair enough valuation, and that the price paid v?ac an extra ordinary bargain. Frick stoutly maintained that the steel corporation had not want­ ed the merger, but had acted in good faith to save the financial situation. Ke accused Taft of following the 30 dictates of the mob in bringing the suit. It was charged in the bill that the steel trust's strength had been augmented during the panic of 1907, when, by deceiving and misleading President Roosevelt, it had obtained permission to take over the Tennessee Goal, Iron and Railroad Company. "Roosevelt Fooled",, proclaimed the 31 press the next day. Roosevelt was incensed. Ho testimony could con­ vince him that he had made a mistake. He had told the House Committee that investigated the steel corporation that the result of the merger had boon "beneficial from every standpoint . . . I never had any doubt of the wisdom 32 of my action - not for a moment." His final retort was 33 "I reaffirm everything."

Senate Documents, 27, 60th ss, 2nd Session.

607, 608 ■Dickenson to Taft, Sopt. Pringle, Henry Fowlr w illiam Howard T a ft. I I , '

Biography ^Roosevelt, Theodore, "The Trusts, the Peonle and the Square Deal,” Outlook, XCIX (Nov. 18, 1911) 649-656. This episode x7ao moot unfortunate. Until non there nao, perhaps, a chance th a t the ir& sunders tending "between Taft and Roosevelt night not last. The steel suit upset everything. About the middle of January, 1912, Roosevelt's sister, Mrs. D. Robinson discussed the matter with Archibald Butt. He found "only a groat sadness in her mind - no re­ sentment, no bitterness, only a deop regret that things should have turned out as they have.” "But", said Mrs. Robinson, her brother v?ould "never forgive the President for introducing or all cuing his nano to be introduced into the steel suit." —:v; "Oh, Major B u tt", she said . . . " i f i t had not been for that steel suit'. I vras talking with Theodore ' only last ucek, and he said that he could never forgive." "Of course you knot? th a t the P resident never oau that suit until it uao filed?"

that, and that in hia eyes is the rorat feature of the

special favor, sition. Taft was milling to include national honor as an arbitrable subject. Ho could not see mhy national honor

Butt, Archibald, II, 813, should not bo referred to a court just as n e ll as matters of property or natters of national proprietorship. Treaties .... ^ ...... ^ero negotiated vilth Greet Britain and France, and these ...... - - if : - T - r " w J/v - - ' T,ere sent to the Senate for ratification. Taft used .

„ ' / • : V i ''"V ■ ' very Buch tlie ccno ccthod as he used, in pushing the reci­ procity LIU. Only In this case Roosevelt's opposition 7?as more acu te. _ : . ' . Roosevelt had received the Nobel Brize for the furtherance of peace, but even Ills address of acceptance might have brought forebodings to the friends of arbitra­ tion. Ho said a great deal about a peace of righteous­ ness and justice, being "the only-kind of peace north , having", and thei peace could bo a "very evil thing" if it became a "mask for cowardice end sloth. . . Ho nation deserves to exist if it permits itself to lose the stem and Tlrll virtues. To Senator Lodge he wrote that the arbitration treaties wore the results of listening 33 to "maudlin sentiment." From the pages of the Outlook ho attacked the peace treaties, evolving national honor, and all such treaties with any country except England. Every effort of Taft’s to arouse the country in his support was defeated

Sonato Doqumonto, 353, 62nd Oonsreoa, 2nd Soosion. 37 Roosevelt, Theodore,. Works, Presidential Addresses and State Papers. VIII, 2217-2225. 116 by a now onslaught by Roosevelt. He told his aide: It is veiy hard to take all the slaps Roosevelt Is handing me at this tine, Archie. Everyone wants me to answer his last attack on the peace treaties in which he practically calls me a hypocrite. If it were anyone else I would know just what to do, but I can*t get into a public row w ith him. He knows th a t, and he has ne a t a disadvantage. I don't understand Roosevelt. I don’t know what he la driving at except to make my way more difficult. I could not ask his advice on all questions. I could not sub­ ordinate my administration to him and retain my self-respect, but it is hard, very hard, Archie, to see a devoted friendship going to pieces like a. rope of sand.39 Later in his How York speech, Taft made the state­ ment that Roosevelt considered as the match that set his campaign f ir e s burning. Speaking of th e lib e r a l movement ho said: "Such extremists would hurry us into a condi­ tion which would find no parallel except in the French Revolution or in that babbling anarchy that once character­ ized the South American Republics. Such extremists are not progressives; they are political emotionalists or 40 neurotics.” Roosevelt, after the November election, had not remained long in forgotten obscurity. Early in 1911 he made another speaking tour. The tangible objective of this trip was to be present at the dedication of the Roosevelt Dam at Roosevelt, Arizona. His speeches covered 3940

39 ' Butt, Archibald, II, 804, 40 Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, II, 317.

- - - published In. the

money in politics. Election of United States Senators by direct Vote* ■ - . • D irect o f f ic ia ls t: Direct elec ventions - President on the ballot for delegate. - ■ ^ V -' , ' The IntrodueMon of the initiative, referendum and recall,41 The entire treat!s was to fora the basis for the Progressive pi at fora. At Phoenix, Arizona, and at several other points he advocated the recall of nJudicial decisions;" but ex­ plained that he favored it only in extreme cases, when the people must choose between it and some serious evil. The pressure upon him to be a candidate increased in volume steadily and. rapidly during January 1912. Yet he hesitated to make the fatal plunge. Four years previous he had written;

*k* a XCVII (Jan . 21, qualms ao to whether I was not refusing to do what I ought to do, and abandoning great work on mere fantastic point of honor.42 It is Just na I would not bo willing to hurt my soldiers, to destroy my influence among men, who look up to me as a leader, by needlessly doing anything in battle which would give the idea that I was not personally brave; even though some given ris k miccht so cm a l i t t l e un­ necessary to an outsider.43 This leader-soldier relations must have Influenced Roosevelt in no small measure. Just as he felt in 1898 that after he had preached war with Spain, he must take active part in the conflict; so in 1912 he came to feel th a t since he had lead th e people to demand c e rta in pol­ icies he must not shirk from his duty to lead them In their fight to attain the realisation of the some. He must be willing to lead his followers in their fight 44 for progressive Republicanism. Roosevelt decided to heed the call of the liberals. A letter, signed by seven Republican governors formally requesting him to be a candidate for the Presidency, reached him February 10, 1912. Pringle thinks this was 45 prearranged. *4

Roosevelt to Sir George 0. Trevelyn, June 19, 1908, Quoted by Rhodes, James Ford, 383.

Ibid., 387. 4 Theodore

W illiam Howard T a ft, I I , February 12, 1912, 2aft aado his speech referring to the progressives as emotionalists and ’’neurotics". This must have aroused the "spirit militant" to give "his all" in the fight for reform. On his nay to Columbus to deliver an address, be^told reporters at Cleveland; "by hat is in the ring." "I shall not withdraw under any conditions. I represent a cause that mould make it cowardly for me to withdraw now. It aeons to me that I am the only hope against radicalism and demagogy, and that even if I go down to defeat, it is ay duty to secure the nomination If I can", wrote Taft after he had read Roosevelt’s 47 Columbus address. The "split" between Roosevelt and Taft was com­ p le te .

—- Thayer, Willi;

Taft to H.. D. Taft, April 14, 1912. I3S°iSr.r%. “■ CHAPTER IV rA

RESULTS OP THE BItSM ^ '

The party lin es had alreedy shown signs of change in alllgniaent. The Uost was progressive, the East more conservative regaidleso of party a ffilia tio n s. Only the Democratic South remained true to it s conservative prin­ cip les. Roosevelt* o decision to lead, the progressive group of the Republican party further complicated the p o litica l situation. ------/'■ ;1 :*Li; Roosevelt depended upon popular support. His Columbus speech, nA Charter of Democracy", made It per­ fectly plain to the leaders of the party that should hc become the nominee they could look for no compromise of principles from him. He further emphasized his views on in itia tiv e , referendum, and recall of elective state and municipal o ffic ia ls . Worst of a ll, he again attacked the judicial sanctuary. The recall, of judges should be used with caution, but impeachment was not a practical remedy for a bad Judiciary. He considered the judge- as much a servant of the people as any other official, and ------;---:------— ------:------Root to Taft, Hay 15, 1912. Quoted ty Pringle, Hen^FOTloa, The Life and Tines of El& lle H^ord M t, v?hen he considered "constitutional questions, when he de­ cides what the people as a whole can or cannot do, the people should havo the right to recall the decisions if 2 they think then wrong.11 * » • The address startled the conservative opinion of the country, and crystalised their continent of oppo-

Bit!

g Roosevelt, Theodore, "a Charter of Democracy," Outlook, C, (Feb. 24, 1912) 390-402.

W illiam Howard T a ft. I , 26? 122 and Itodill HcComlclc of the Hanreoter Company had already promised their financial support. : ■ -1 /? Taft for Ills support depended on the conservative Republican organization. He expressed the sentiement of this group v;hen he said: 4 Roosevelt has leaped far ahead of the most radical leaders of the Progressive party, and his heart is not with them, but he deludes himself that he nil! be able to guide it and stem it when he gets in power. He can't do it. He has gone too far. He will either be a hopeless failure if elected or else destroy his own reputation by becoming a socialist, being swept there by force of circumstances just as the leaders of the French Revolution were swept on and cn, all their in­ dividual efforts falling to stem the tide until it had run itself out.5 This was the fear of the more conservative group of the Republican party. They saw in the Roosevelt move­ ment an attach „on the existing order, government and busi­ ness alike; and they were determined to save themselves and the country from this danger. That he made use of patronage and the party machine, Taft never denied. It was the weapon at his command; and he deeply resented Roosevelt’s criticism in the natter. Roosevelt had worked through then, he was using those at his disposal now. ”Association with then", lie wixite, "when it is by and for Roosevelt has nothing of evil in it. It is only when they support me that bosses are wicked. Considering the use which Roosevelt has made of bosses In

5 Butt, ArciUbald, II, 846. 123 tho pact, one would think the hypocrlcy of cuch attacks x?ould "be soon, but not In the case of a popular Idol." 'raft frankly admitted that under the existing political system federal office holders took part In the contest. Hov/over, he pointed out, that at least seventy percent of the men holding federal jobs had been appointed by 6 Roosevelt. Precedence must have had a controlling in­ fluence, since, there the traditional convention method tas used, Taft ton in the delegation fight. r n Taft ima forced into a position that was not In accord nlth hie personal liking or political preference. He had to depend for support from the Old Guard. He had very little in common r/ith such nen as Penrose, Barnes, Daugherty, and warren Harding. The political conflict forced him to depend on th e ir aid now. They represented Capital in its most aggressive form, and the people in­ stinctively thought of them as the "Enemy". To meet the regular machine organisation, Roose­ velt depended on tho preferential primaries. This was a new law being tried for tho first time in thirteen states. This law allowed the rank and file of the party voters to express their preference for Presidential nomi­ nees when they voted for delegates to the convention. This was a short cut to the real popular wish, and through it 6

6 Taft to Horace D. Taft, April 14, 1912. Quoted by P rin g le Henry Fowiee, The L ife arid Times o f m i lam- : : Howard Taft. II, 773. R o o sev elt hoped to make Convention, The preconvention csnpnlcn van b itter and fraught with personalities. It vas impossible for Roosevelt to go on opposing the Administration without, becoming person­ al in his attacks. You can easily differ vith a nan you don't knov without causing any enmity*, but vith Taft, vhora Roosevelt had put in his place. It vras different. Taft had a right to feel that Roosevelt oued it to him to keep silent on administrative questions, no matter what his own opinions were, Roosevelt was not showing the same political skill that had characterised his former campaign. He had once believed that, "it is a 7 sign of the highest statesmanship to temporise." Now he misrepresented himself; made use of phrases that o v ersta te d what he .really meant, and his addresses showed lack of the usual thought and preparation. They gave the Impression that he was attempting to slash and cut his way to c o n tro l. The many u sefu l a c ts passed during Taft's administration wore forgotten, and the President was accused of joining forces with the "Enemy" against the people.

his speeches, but refrained from an open attack. Finally ...... —----—----:------— ----- — ' ' 7 : : , ' Roosevelt, Theodore, "Latitude and Longitude among Reformers," Century, LX, No. 2 (June, 1900) 211-216. 125 ho broke the silence and made a personal attack in his Boston speech of April 25th. Kero ho gave a lengthy - his speeches were usually long and full of statistics - refutation of all the counts in the indictment against him and defended his program. It v/as his first direct public utterance against Roosevelt and not even the thousands who had come to cheer him could dispel his weariness. Back in his private car ho said brokenly; „ „ 8 "Roosevelt was my closest friend," and began to weep. If Roosevelt overstated himself, Taft had the cap acity fo r saying the wrong th in g - "condemn me i f you w ill" , ho said in one o f h is speeches, "but condemn mo by other witnesses than Theodore Roosevelt. I was a men of straw, but I have been a man of straw long enough. Every man who has blood in his body, and who has been misrap- 9 resented as I have been is forced to fight." The Presi­ dent gave the impression that he was a nan of straw and that only extreme necessity could force him to fight. "I an a man of peace" pleaded Taft on another occasion, "and I don't want to fight. But when I do fight I want to hit hard. Even a rat in a comer will fight." Tho last, sentence does not appear in the transcript of the speech, but the newspapers carried it, and tho effect on 8

8 Selbold to Pringle, Deo. 13, 1934. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Bowles, The Life and Tims of William Howard T a ft, I I , 782. 9 Row Yoric Times, April 30, 1912. the readers tzqq Just as deadly.10 A close flcht, at least, Is apt to obscure vision. Add to this the fact that contestants were viewing the ob­ ject of the contest from two different points of view. His policy of popular government had become very nearly an ob­ session with Roosevelt, and with Taft in the Presidency ho believed that these would bo neglected and forgotten. Taft loved law and the courts, and a government based on these institutions. Roosevelt’s radicalism threatened the very foundation of this structure. How could the po­ litician and the Judge see eye to eye? Ac the Convention drew n ear, i t was evident th a t Roosevelt hold the majority of the Republican popular vote. In the states where preferential primaries were held, out of 382 delegates chosen, 278 wore pledged to Roosevelt, 63 to the President, 28 of whom came from Georgia, a Democratic state, and 36 had gone to La Follette. Taft had lost Ohio his own state. Where the old method of choosing delegates was used, the political organisation held firm and the 11 results were different. Roosevelt, while in office, had gained the ill will of the South through his apppintment of a Hegro as revenue collector in the port of Charleston. Taft had been particularly careful in his appointments in this section of the country, and the South wont to Taft.

l%ew York Tiros, May 5, 1912. 11 Folmesbee, S tan ley j., “Presidential Elections - Electrol and Popular Votes 1789-1924", Historical Outlook, XXIX, No. 5, (Hay, 1928) 223-231. 127 chosen by the traditional convention methods had been r fradulently selected. : ■ " The seating of delegates was the first issue in the 1912 Convention. It would be settled,' according to the low and custom of the p arty , by the members of the Republican National Committee who had taken office at the close of the 1908 Convention, Several of these had failed in being elected to the Convention, and, it was everything possible to decide the contest against him.

The to ta l ; Ten o f : from the territorial sented a - failed In reelGctlon. Thus Roosevelt could oay that twenty-nlne in the committee actually represented no- body, ' '' r-: - ,:' ' T - ' + .. ‘ .------, j - .f ; - ", ' - '' . - . - / - ' ~ . .. :L the newly elected committee, which was more agreeably disposed toward his cause, should decide the cases in dispute. Tills was a vain hope as the rule that gave the old committee control till after the convention was ' r-' » , -. '- - anchored hard and feat. No tired politician was going

12 rt II, 321-324. 123 to "bo frightened Into nutninsion "by any Roosevelt threat" 13 now. The Gonnittee even refused to reduce tho nuribor neceasary to demand a roll call from twenty to ten. It was now tho tom Steam Roller was first used. - Roosevelt, to win tho nomination, would havo had to gain control of some delegates now claimed for Taft. That some of the disputed scats should havo hem filled by Roosevelt delegates is beyond question, but that over two hundred of those rightfully belonged to Roosovolt, was part of the political game. Judoon C. Weiliver wrote In the Washington Times: « ■■■■ ■• f,-- ' There was no chance to develop the real Roosevelt •strength In the great northern states until later, For psychological effect, as a move in practical politics, it was necess­ ary for the Roosevelt people to start contests on these early Taft selections in order that a tabulation of delegate strength could be put out that would show Roosevelt holding a good hand. In the game a table showing Taft 150, Roosevelt 18, contested none, would not be very much calculated to inspire confidence, whereas one showing Taft 23, Roosevelt 19, contested 127, looked very different. That is the whole story of the larger number of southern contests that were started early in the game. It was never expected that they would be taken very seriously. They served a useful purpose, and now the Rational Com­ mittee is deciding them in favor of Taft in most cases without real division.14 Roosevelt had such friends on the committee as Senator Borah, T. C. du Pont, If. B. Kellog, and others.

14 Ib id ., 793-799. They more hatching every poooible opportunity for a conteot, yet Dorati 7/as forced to adnit: 11 Thera have been many frauds in the primaries, I don't say there vie re not. But there v/as no evidence of that fact presented. . . Under the circumstances 1 could not 15 vote to sustain the Roosevelt delegates.” Rhen Roosevelt arrived in Chicago and v?aa told only thirty-tv/o seats had been contested he immediately challenged; "Make it one hundred." "Tfo can't make it 100", nas the reply. The compromise 7/as seventy-tno. That seems to^be the origin of the famous figure seventy-tv,'o. But no storms of "cynical defiance" nor epithet of brigandage and rascality could move the august body from its intended course. Host of the contested delegates nont to Taft. Again the reformer and the judge had seen the issues from different points of vlen, uith the result that each sau himself in the right, Roosevelt had the popular support, and could the popular nil 1 have pushed its nay to the top, it nould have made Roosevelt the next Republican standard bearer. . From this viewpoint Roosevelt was waging war "against theft". On the other

. ■ ...... ‘ - - ■ - ' - ’ ■ Bide, Taft’s forces were following the time honored16 15

1 5 v, i., Ron York Times. June 12, 1912, 16 Kohlsatt, Herman Henry, __ Personal .Rqcolleetions of our Preside: method of electing delegates and of a machine controlled Convention, They did nothing irregular. Roosevelt had beei party to the same methods in 1900 and in 1904. He naa a 11 hypocrite” to object now. . " ' f'''. Roosevelt a rriv e d in Chicago in h is Rough Rider hat, while bands were playing and the people’s tribute rang in his ears. Some 20,000 people assembled in the Auditorium to hear him speak. wAs far as Hr. Taft and I are personally con- cornedhe said, "it little matters what the fate of either may be." Then followed a bitter attack on the Adadnl s t r a t i on In closingV . he' • said:. ' ... Our cause is the cause of fo r a ll in the interest of but a phaeo of the but it will be a sore disaster to lose, happens to me is not of the slightest conse­ quence; I am to bo used, as in so Ion i s UE and is then cast aside or le it; and I shall need no great to permit us ourselves putting far above our own inter­ nets the ■ fuse for whj we battle we shall It would be champion than it would be to win by the foul victory for which our opponents hope. But the victory shall bo ours, and it shall be by clean and^honest fi LAg W Taw flinching he

'■ _ : f-': -.^» - 1: had no counter-part. lie did not need to act

; brought to bin. HIc trained forceo held flraly In Chicago.

Roocevolt1 a moat intimate fric: On oeveral occaciono, the Roocevolt forceo attempted to break tbft lines, but uncucccasfully. Taft had 557 dele- ■ '

Roosevelt lacked about eighty. La Follctte held thirty

g1x» * go to R oosevelt. The ”£ carried everything for Taft# Ho at of the Rooacvelt dele- ” - : ' ^ :r \ C* ’f * . 5 - ", .r - 1 G Gates refrained from voting end bolted the convention. Would Roosevelt bolt the party? Rarller, Roose­ velt, considering hie support of Blaine, in 1084 m itte n : atea and atend alone for a great cause, but the necessity for such action is almost as rai-e as the necessity for revo­ lu tio n ." 19

19 Biography. 5 132 Had this hour arrived? "T. will accept the nomination for President if it is tendered to neu he answered the gover­ nors of the seven states, Kansas, Ilichigan, Hissouri, Heh- raefca. New H^pshlre, West V irg in ia , and Wyoming, "I w ill adhere to this decision until the convention has expressed Its preference, “Fake, pure fake" he had told newspapermen when questioned whether he were going to Chicago, but he con­ tinued, "I may alter my plans. If circumstances demand, 21 of course I 'll go'.*’ After the first session of the Convention, Sena­ tor Beveridge, leader of the insurgent group in the Senate, visited with Roosevelt for an hour, but no men- 22 tion was made of the new party. ‘ ~ .* While the Credential Committee was meeting on June 20, Roosevelt spoke to a large following at his headquarters at Congress Hotel. He announced: "So far as I am concerned, I am through. If you are voted down I hope you, the real and lawful majority of the convention, will organize as such. . . I hope you will refuse any longer to recognize a majority ...... Abbott, Lawrence Outlook, Cl (June 15, 1912

Sullivan, Mark, II, v e n tio n .” Hiram Johnoon of California announced that a non political party nan to be fomodj and it was agreed to hold a rump convention at Orchestra Hall that evening. Roosevelt had to dooido v/hat course to foil on. Borah considered everything uas over and advised Roose­ velt not to attend the meeting. “V/hat v/ould you have mo do?” asked Roosevelt. "If they do not nominate ne, they Trill nominate La Toilette.” r5 . V: "Colonel", said Borah* “those non will do Just as you tell thorn. , , Call in come of the leaders and te ll them that you do not rant any such action and they will not take any such action." About that time excited followers rushed in with stacks of telegrams, shouting, "The country is on lire; you must lead us." Borah loft 25 and Roosevelt attended the rump convention. The Third Party Convention was called to meet in Chicago, August 5, 1912. Although the delegates had to pay thoir own expenses, every state except South Carolina, was represented, many by three or four times the regular number of delegates, Beveridge was the chairman. Ecooe- *2425

Prlngle, Henry Fox Howard T a ft. I I , 802. 24 Ibid.. 808. 25 Johnson, Claudius Osborne, Borah of Idaho, 137-140. 134 velt delivered his "Confession of Faith" before a gather­ ing of some 20,000 people. It Has a convention of great "prom ises.'1 I t o f f ic ia lly organised and named the Pro­ gressive Party. It adopted a platform. It nas guided by Roosevelt* s Nets Nationalism tilth reservations. It said nothing about recall of judges; it favored a pro­ tective tariff in the interest of the working nan; it forgot to hot? an anti-trust plank. It called for a high degree of paternalism in government control. It tias less liberal than the Democratic platform. The platform, however, was the less important work of the convention. The tendency th en , as now, was to w rite platforms to be used for propaganda purposes during the campaign. The important act of the" convention was to nominate Roosevelt as the Progressive contestant in the „ coming election. He, not the party, was the real force, i’ho Progressive Convention adjourned singing hymns and with banners flying, ready to sally forth into the fight for victory in the election. The mi sunder- standing between Roosevelt and Taft had split the Re­ publican party in to two h o s tile camps and was now dragging the nation further into the conflict. On July 2, 1912, Woodrow m-aon was nominated by the Democrats at Baltimore, and the campaign developed into a three cornered fight. The more realistic within - the two Ho publican groups m et have roalisod that vlctoiy for either nan the moat remote poaalbility* After the convention Taft displayed lack of personal interest in the contest. "Well, I am chiefly interested in the re- nomination”, he had confided to Ills intimates shortly before the convention. , « "If mo lose the election I shall feel that the party is rejected, whereas if I fail to secure the rshomination it will be a personal 26 defeat." He insisted that he would make no speeches except his acceptance address. He was irritated when his friends pointed out that VTllson and Roosevelt were getting the publicity, while there was no news from him, except that he played golf. To Taft such an in­ terpretation lacked dignity; it boro analogy to the show business, where -P. ?. Bamum demanded as much advertisement as his competitors across the street. Taft refused to be placed in such a position and declined to take any re- 27 sponsibility. - : " The Republican party leaders, too, sensed a prob­ able defeat in November. "What do you fellows intend to do?" coinmitteoman Hulvanc was asked during contest for delegates in the Convention. "You know you can't elect Taft." To this Hulvane responded: "We can't elect Taft,

DUu VQ ctro going uO noici on x#o uni g ox^c*ni^u.1jXon^ vuia •Trxen :_____ —______:------■ ...... ------26 Butt, Archibald, II, 768. 27 27 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 22, 1912. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowles, The Life and Times of William Howard T a ft. I I , 818, v q got 'back four years from non, ne m il have It and not 28 th o se d____ insurgent a.” Tills dealing in n futures" caused a financial and a numerical depression in the Rapublicsn ranks. Charley Taft had contributed heavily tov?ard- th e pre-convention fund. How the treasu ry was a l ­ ways in want. Too, long the search for a man qualified to manage the finances and w illin g to assume the burden continued. At last Sheldon, who had resigned,, continued ; on. He had to conduct a campaign with loss than a million dollars where fomerly two to three millions had been used. 7/hatever else might happen, Roosevelt must be defeated. Taft appeared the weakest of the three candidates. It was wiser to place their bets on Wilson. So many of the fin- anciers, who preferred Taft, withheld contributions, and finally voted for Wilson to swell the anti-Roosevelt vote. Thus 7/11 son, besides retaining the undivided support of his own party, gained the unwilling support of discon­ tented factions within the enemy camp.. The Progressive party commanded and hold the popular support of the Re­ publican ranks, but tho Democratic party was .proclaiming a policy more liberal than those expounded by Roosevelt. Had tho Democratic party been in more conservative hands, the 1912 contest might have had a different ending. Wilson conducted a fine campaign. Tariff reduction was his main

28 Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, II, 526. thene. That v?ao unfortunate for both Taft end Rooeovolt. Here Taft had net strong criticism, and Roosevelt naa 29 Ignorant of economic problems. The Progressive party lacked organization and its ranks, held a motley of dissenters. Taft gave it

this description: ' ' f ^

platform which ho Of »®4 4-h * Roosevelt was aware that the "Lunatic fringes11, as ho termed the most radical and the most conservative political extreme a were among tils followers; however, be­ yond trying to steer a middle course, there was nothing he could do about it. But to say that Rocs evelt was radical was far from accurate. He believed what he said In his Hew York speech: "If on this new continent we merely build another country of greed, but unjustly di­ vided material prosperity, wo shall have done nothing; and we shall do as little if wo merely set the greed of envy _ — 5s 133 againnt tho greed of arrogance, and thereby destroy the 31 material viell-being of us all." He believed with the majority of hie followers, that a full and free life for the average nan could be achieved by gradual amendment of the existing system. - - Taft unfortunately held the opposite view. 11 Ho has not advocated the appropriation of a rich nan's property to distribute among tho poor" Taft wrote, "but that is only another stop and perhaps is one involved in the really successful accomplishment of those stops which 32 he proposes." In this belief, Taft allowed himself to be further pushed to the right. "I have no part", he again wrote, "but that of a conservative, and that I cm 33 going to play." In this lay in part tho cause for hi a defeat. Hay it not also have influenced tho trend of his reasoning years later while on the Bench? Roose­ velt and Taft were drifting farther apart. 7?hile Roose­ velt, though not radical, was moving toward the left, Taft was definitely allying ■ himself with the conserva­ tive right. All those months wore b itter months for both Taft and Roosevelt, neither seems to have had much faith in " ' Ulster, Owen, 302. 32 Taft to Hills, Aug. 7, 1912. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowls a, The L ife and Tines o f Willem Howard T a ft. I I , 822. 33 Taft to Dolla Tarrcy, Aug. 1, 1912. Ibid., 823. being elected. Taft held to his earlier statement: "I might as T?eli give up so far as being i corooa. ------, lik e me. perplexing jobs in my tins”, wrote Roosevelt to his ' friend Ulster, “but never one as perple2ti.ng and d iffi­ cult as that on which I am now engaged.: Taft remained in UashJ.ngton, busy with duties of Government, and an occasional lengthy report to set politi­ cal matters right - a report that very few people read. Roosevelt rushed over the country »fighting for the Lord" till the strain proved almost too much even for Roosevelt. Hi a voice was bothering him, and his co-workers feared that he was losing his grip - “he was repeating himself disastrously."^ Fate and Roosevelt1a calm command in an emergency revived the Progressive enthusiasm just before the election. Roosevelt was scheduled to speak in Milwaukee on the night of Hovenber 14th. On the way to the hall a half erased fanatic shot him. lie refused entreaties to be taken to a hospital before he had delivered the speech as scheduled. “I will make this speech or die", he said. The attempt on his life made a profound impression on the audience and on

— ------— ------—------—------;...... ' 34 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 22, 1912. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowl os’, %he Life and Times of William Howard Taft. II, 817. 35 U lste r, Owen, 36 Davis, Oscar King, Released for Publication. 349-358. 140 the people throughout the country. The futile Gtruggle closed with the election. The result proved true to predictions. Wilson received 6,286,214 popular votes; Roosevelt, 4,126,020; Taft, ~ 3,483,922. Of the electoral vote Wilson had 435, Roose­ velt 88, and Taft 8. The Democratic party, not the Republican, uas thus destined to steer the country's course through one of its most critical periods of hio- to iy . ' - " : - ' . Postmortems or predictions in history are both wrought with difficulties.^ The Roosevelt-Taft contro­ versy offer no exception to this fact. The general opinion is that Roosevelt loot Taft the election by form­ ing the Progressive party and running against him. Another opinion, that is worthy of somo consideration, la that the Republican managers killed the party by forcing Taft upon the people, after he had lost their support. Facts prove the truth of the former. What chances Taft might have had of being elected, had Roosevelt remained silent and taken no active part in politics, remains an opinion­ ated problem. Roosevelt with his strong hold on the people, had he lent his active support to Taft, might have changed defeat into victory. But a Roosevelt

El octroi and P= XIX, Ho. 5, - -y to h i g principle could not have boon the Roosevelt the country knen go w e ll. The most th a t could have been asked of him was to keep hlo thoughta to himself and keep hands off. That alone would have called for a big sacri­ fice. In either case it must not be forgotten that the 38 Democratic party made great gains in 1910. Had Roosevelt been able to lot events drift for s few years, his own life might have been brighter and happier, and - who knows? - forces rampant during the 1920'o might have been held in check and the country saved this period of sordid corruption. Taft or wilson victorious in 1912 may not have hindered Roosevelt from leading an undivided Republican party to victory in 1916. Then ho, not Wilson, could have been the War President - a position that suited Roosevelt* s personality. "I have no hard feeling toward Theodore", said Taft when asked if he would forgive the past. "And if I had, I certainly could wish him no worse luck than to be sick in bed while „39 Woodrow runs his war." What Roosevelt as the War Presi­ dent might have meant to the country can only be left to the realm of retroactive speculation. The Progressive party did not survive long. Roose­ velt realised that it had little real unity and made no

38 Author Unknown, "Roosevelt vs Taft", Independent LXm, No. 3301 (March 7, 1912) 483-484. 39 George McAney to H. P. Pringle. Quoted by Pringle, Henry Fowlos, Theodore Roosevelt and His Tines. 595. ■ , effort to keep it alive. English writer expresses this opinion; tt. . . it inpressed its main principles upon the nation before it died. That bolng so can one novz rogrot what Roosevelt did? . . The work which he began has gone forward. Would it have gone forward, if in 1912 he had walked in the path of prud- 40 ence?0 The progressive policies were carried forward under Democratic leadership. Could Roosovolt have so con­ trolled the Republican party that the Harding-Daugherty element in the 1912 convention had been powerless to re­ turn to power in 1920 and saved the nation from those 41 murkey years? In considering the results of the break between Roosevelt and Taft, those questions are mere reflections and must remain such. Taft, through his experiences during his final two years in the White House, had been allied with con­ servative and reactionary Influences, so different from the more liberal guidance under President Roosovolt. During his professorship at Tale he continued these associations. This appears of importance in view of the fact that Taft was to be Chief Justice in 1921. "He would" he said, "keep the heterodox and wild notions that are prompted by some professors of political economy"

te, William Allen, 389-434. out of the heads of the thlnk 11)11811 be aoine fioa' B se n changes in the Constitution. the federal government divorce he favored the amendment or annulment or abolition of the . Constitution . . to bo a serious h? p o litic a l into the con and Taft gradually became reconcilled. During the Con-

Grea3lonrl oanpalen of 1918 thoyf. “ rtBd t0Gether t0 return a Republican # That the old relation was entirely resumed may be putting it too strongly, but it was cordial enough. Taft in a letter to his ' we

' "Life Is too short to se personal attitudes of ennd^, and I am glad to havo the normal atatua re- V .. -4*-, ' -.. - f, ' cumed."

"

'V' \ A ______. ______;______, ^ a f t l S S ° i S n,n

T aft to II. V/. Rose, May 18, 1913* I b id . . 8 6 l.

Taft to C. P. Taft, May 31, 1918. Ibid.. 911, BIBLIOGRAPHi

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1 • i • * l930. W orcester, JDorm, P h ilip p in es Pa st and P resent BO.

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“ “ ’£E £8S8£F 'ssli-

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igord, 45, 527-528. Department of Co:nmerco md Labor B ulletin. 46. House Documents. 948, 61st Gongreso, 2nd Session. Pan American Union B ulletin. 25, 130-132. Senate Executive Documents, 7, 53rd Congress, 3rd S ession. Senate Documents, 27, 6Oth Congress, 2nd Session. Senate Document3, 163, Gist Congress, 2nd Session. JBSSg$g Documents. 719, Gist Congress, 3rd Session. Senate Documents, 787, Gist Congress, 3rd Session. Senate Document3. 834, Gist Congress, 3I'd Session. Senate Documents. 842, Gist Congress, 3rd Session. Senate Document, 849, Gist Congress, 3rd Session. Senate Documents. 38, 62nd Congress, 1st Session. Senate Document, 43, 62nd Congress, lot Session. Senate Documents. 56, 62nd Congress, 1st Session. Senate Documents. 55, 62nd Congress, 1st Session. Senate Document, 353, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session. Ec]?cil. l^MD -b? C5 / 9 ^ 6 / a 3900 1 00 12836 32b

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