DOCSLIB.ORG

The Political Economy of Stalinism Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Political Economy of Stalinism Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB575-FM CB575-Gregory-v1 July 31, 2003 9:53 The Political Economy of Stalinism Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives This book uses the formerly secret Soviet State and Communist Party archives to describe the creation and operations of the Soviet administrative-command system. It concludes that the system failed not because of the “jockey” (i.e., Stalin and later leaders) but because of the “horse” (the economic system). Although Stalin was the system’s prime architect, the system was managed by thousands of “Stalins” in a nested dictatorship. The core values of the Bolshevik Party dictated the choice of the administrative-command system, and the system dictated the po- litical victory of a Stalin-like figure. This study pinpoints the reasons for the failure of the system – poor planning, unreliable supplies, the preferential treatment of indigenous enterprises, the lack of knowledge of planners, etc. – but also focuses on the basic principal–agent conflict between planners and producers, which created a sixty-year reform stalemate. Once Gorbachev gave enterprises their freedom, the system had no direction from either a plan or a market, and the system im- ploded. The Soviet administrative-command system was arguably the most significant human experiment of the twentieth century. If repeated today, its basic contradictions and inherent flaws would remain, and its economic results would again prove inferior. Paul R. Gregory is Cullen Professor of Economics at the University of Houston and currently serves as a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is also a research professor at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. Professor Gregory has published widely in the field of Russian and Soviet eco- nomics for more than thirty years and served as a visiting professor at Moscow State University. Among his numerous books are Restructur- ing the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1990), Before Command: The Russian Economy from Emancipation to Stalin (1994), and Russian National Income, 1885–1913. He is the co-author (with Robert Stuart) of Russian and Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, now in its seventh edition. Professor Gregory received his Ph.D. in economics from Harvard in 1969. i P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB575-FM CB575-Gregory-v1 July 31, 2003 9:53 The Political Economy of Stalinism Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives PAUL R. GREGORY University of Houston Hoover Institution iii Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , United Kingdom Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521826280 © Paul R. Gregory 2004 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2003 isbn-13- 978-0-511-07103-4 eBook (EBL) isbn-10- 0-511-07103-5 eBook (EBL) isbn-13- 978-0-521-82628-0 hardback isbn-10- 0-521-82628-4 hardback isbn-13- 978-0-521-53367-6 paperback isbn-10- 0-521-53367-8 paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB575-FM CB575-Gregory-v1 July 31, 2003 9:53 Contents Illustrations page vi Tables vii Preface ix 1 The Jockey or the Horse? 1 2 Collectivization, Accumulation, and Power 22 3 The Principles of Governance 49 4 Investment, Wages, and Fairness 76 5 Visions and Control Figures 110 6 Planners Versus Producers 126 7 Creating Soviet Industry 153 8 Operational Planning 183 9 Ruble Control: Money, Prices, and Budgets 213 10 The Destruction of the Soviet Administrative-Command Economy 243 11 Conclusions 268 Appendix A: Archival Sources 273 Appendix B: The Structure of the State 275 Bibliography 289 Index 301 v P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB575-FM CB575-Gregory-v1 July 31, 2003 9:53 Illustrations Fig. 2.1 Soviet grain-procurement crisis 35 Fig. 2.2 Markets vs. coercion 36 Fig. 2.3 Soviet grain production and procurement 39 Fig. 4.1 Choice of maximum investment 87 Fig. 4.2 Dynamics of an increase in capital through investment 88 Fig. 4.3 Dynamics of an increase in the fair wage 90 Fig. 4.4 Nominal and real (1932 prices) investment, USSR, 1928–1938 92 Fig. 4.5 Annual growth rates, 1929–1937, nominal investment and labor productivity 96 Fig. 4.6 Stakhanovism 104 Fig. 6.1 Central Soviet administration 130 Fig. 6.2 Vertical vs. horizontal structures 134 Fig. 9.1 Vertical vs. horizontal transactions 216 Fig. 9.2 Monetary aggregates, 1932–1936 (on January 1 of each year) 225 Fig. 9.3 Interenterprise arrears, 1933–1939 (monthly, millions of rubles) 230 Fig. 9.4 Annual growth rates of money and investment goods prices, 1929–1938 240 Fig. 10.1 Soviet GDP growth in comparative perspective 244 Fig. 10.2 Comparative growth of Soviet capital stock 244 Fig. 10.3 Industrial output, industrial capital, and capital productivity, USSR 250 Fig. 10.4 Relative growth rates of consumption and investment 260 vi P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB575-FM CB575-Gregory-v1 July 31, 2003 9:53 Tables Table 2.1 Output, State Purchase, and Prices of Grain 33 Table 2.2 Mass Peasants’ Demonstration, 1930a (in USSR Territory) 42 Table 3.1 Politburo Meetings, 1930–1936 70 Table 3.2 Number of Issues Discussed at Politburo Meetings, 1930–1940 71 Table 3.3 Meetings of Politburo Members with Stalin, 1931–1939 73 Table 4.1 Second Five-Year Plan Investment Goals, 1933–1937, by Commissariat (Million Rubles, 1933 Plan Prices) 78 Table 4.2 Alternate Investment Plan Drafts, 1935 and 1936 (Million Rubles) 82 Table 5.1 Targets for the Fifth Five-Year Plan 117 Table 5.2 Mean Absolute Deviation from 100% Plan Fulfillment (Annual Plan vs. Five-Year Plan) 119 Table 6.1 First Quarter 1932 Plans, Cars 148 Table 7.1 Simplified Material Balance 157 Table 8.1 Stages of Annual Planning: Government and Ministries 192 Table 8.2 Stages of Enterprise Plans 193 Table 8.3 Planning Phases for the 1934 Annual Plan, Ministry of Heavy Industry, for 1933 194 Table 8.4 Meetings of Ministry Collegiums of NKTP and NKLP to Discuss the Annual Plan 198 Table 9.1 Distribution of Gosbank Credits, 1933–1936 (Percentages) 227 vii P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB575-FM CB575-Gregory-v1 July 31, 2003 9:53 viii Tables Table 9.2 Enterprises Credits: Commercial vs. Gosbank (Rank Orderings) 228 Table 9.3 State Budget, Second Five-Year Plan, 1933–1937 (Billion Rubles) 238 Table b.1 Staff of NKTP, 1930s 276 Table b.2a NKLP Staff, First Half Year–1933 277 Table b.2b Wage Bill of NKLP, First Half of 1933 (Rubles) 278 Table b.3 The Staff and Structure of Gump, March 1937 280 Table b.4 Gump’s Employees and Their Distribution by Profession, March 1937 281 Table b.5a Staff of Leather Footwear Administration of NKLP, 1935–1939 282 Table b.5b Staff of Leather Footwear Administration by Branch and Functional Divisions 282 Table b.6a Staff of Knitting Industry Glavk, 1935–1939 283 Table b.6b Staff of Knitting Administration by Branch and Functional Divisions 283 Table b.7 Schedule of Staff Downsizing in People’s Commissariat and Central Establishments of USSR 284 P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB575-FM CB575-Gregory-v1 July 31, 2003 9:53 Preface The collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, in some sense, also signaled the end of scholarly study of the Soviet administrative-command economy by economists. As a long-term student of this economy, I was acutely aware that our lack of knowledge about this economy remained considerable. This ignorance was not due to the lack of acumen or effort but to the veil of secrecy that had been erected by Soviet leaders around this system. As Mikhail Gorbachev began his policy of Glasnost in the mid-1980s, the barriers of secrecy began to fall, but the scholarly com- munity had by then turned its attention to more pressing agendas, such as the Soviet system in collapse and then the fundamental issue of its transi- tion. Specialists on the Soviet economy turned primarily to transition as did numerous newcomers to the field, attracted by the challenge of transi- tioning a planned socialist economy into something resembling a market economy. Few continued to study the fundamental nature of the Soviet administrative-command economy either due to the conviction that we already knew all we needed to know or the belief that there were better uses of our time. This book studies the creation of the Soviet administrative-command economy in the 1930s. I have written it for three reasons: First, only now is it possible to study the Soviet economic system without the barrier of secrecy. The Soviet State and Party Archives were opened to scholars in the early 1990s, and it is now possible to study the Soviet economy using the very records that its administrators used many years earlier.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russian History: a Brief Chronology (998-2000)
    Russian History: A Brief Chronology (998-2000) 1721 Sweden cedes the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea to Russia (Treaty of Nystad). In celebration, Peter’s title Kievan Russia is changed from tsar to Emperor of All Russia Abolition of the Patrarchate of Moscow. Religious authority passes to the Holy Synod and its Ober- prokuror, appointed by the tsar. 988 Conversion to Christianity 1722 Table of Ranks 1237-1240 Mongol Invasion 1723-25 The Persian Campaign. Persia cedes western and southern shores of the Caspian to Russia Muscovite Russia 1724 Russia’s Academy of Sciences is established 1725 Peter I dies on February 8 1380 The Battle of Kulikovo 1725-1727 Catherine I 1480 End of Mongol Rule 1727-1730 Peter II 1462-1505 Ivan III 1730-1740 Anne 1505-1533 Basil III 1740-1741 Ivan VI 1533-1584 Ivan the Terrible 1741-1762 Elizabeth 1584-98 Theodore 1744 Sophie Friederike Auguste von Anhalt-Zerbst arrives in Russia and assumes the name of Grand Duchess 1598-1613 The Time of Troubles Catherine Alekseevna after her marriage to Grand Duke Peter (future Peter III) 1613-45 Michael Romanoff 1762 Peter III 1645-76 Alexis 1762 Following a successful coup d’etat in St. Petersburg 1672-82 Theodore during which Peter III is assassinated, Catherine is proclaimed Emress of All Russia Imperial Russia 1762-1796 Catherine the Great 1767 Nakaz (The Instruction) 1772-1795 Partitions of Poland 1682-1725 Peter I 1773-1774 Pugachev Rebellion 1689 The Streltsy Revolt and Suppression; End of Sophia’s Regency 1785 Charter to the Nobility 1695-96 The Azov Campaigns 1791 Establishment fo the Pale of Settlement (residential restrictions on Jews) in the parts of Poland with large 1697-98 Peter’s travels abroad (The Grand Embassy) Jewish populations, annexed to Russia in the partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, and 1795) and in the 1698 The revolt and the final suppression of the Streltsy Black Sea liitoral annexed from Turkey.
    [Show full text]
  • Number 32 the Second Currency in the Soviet Union: on the Use of Checks in "Valuta-Rubles" by Soviet Citizens
    NUMBER 32 THE SECOND CURRENCY IN THE SOVIET UNION: ON THE USE OF CHECKS IN "VALUTA-RUBLES" BY SOVIET CITIZENS by Dietrich Andre Loeber Fellow, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies COLLOQUIUM April 18, 1978 ,. Preliminary draft. Not to be quoted or cited without the author's permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page # I. The Question Posed 1 II. How the Second Currency System Works 2 1. Rubles and Valuta-Rubles 2 2. Valuta-Checks 2 3. Administration of the Valuta-Check System 3 4. Persons Entitled to Use the Valuta-Check System 4 5. Where do Valuta-Checks Circulate 6 6. What Can be Bought for Valuta-Checks 7 7. And at What Prices 8 8. How Long a Second Currency Has Been Used 8 III. Enjoying the Advantages: The Economic Side 10 IV. Facing up to Reality in the Statutes: Legal Aspects 11 V. Uneasy Compromise: Ideological Implications 12 VI. Control of the Consequences: The Socio-Political Dimension 14 Appendix 1-3 Terms Used Explained on Page Val uta-Check 3 Valuta-Ruble 2 Val uta-Store 3 © D.~A~ Loeber 1978 THE SECOND CURRENCY IN THE SOVIET UNION: ON THE USE OF CHECKS IN "VALUTA-RUBLES" BY SOVIET CITIZENS by Dietrich Andre Loeber Fellow, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies I. THE QUESTION POSED The title of this paper may seem provocative. We are used to thinking that there is just one currency in the Soviet Union - the ruble. I thought so myself until I spent my sabbatical in ~1oscow last year. There I saw that a second currency in fact circulates in the USSR.
    [Show full text]
  • Revolution in Real Time: the Russian Provisional Government, 1917
    ODUMUNC 2020 Crisis Brief Revolution in Real Time: The Russian Provisional Government, 1917 ODU Model United Nations Society Introduction seventy-four years later. The legacy of the Russian Revolution continues to be keenly felt The Russian Revolution began on 8 March 1917 to this day. with a series of public protests in Petrograd, then the Winter Capital of Russia. These protests But could it have gone differently? Historians lasted for eight days and eventually resulted in emphasize the contingency of events. Although the collapse of the Russian monarchy, the rule of history often seems inventible afterwards, it Tsar Nicholas II. The number of killed and always was anything but certain. Changes in injured in clashes with the police and policy choices, in the outcome of events, government troops in the initial uprising in different players and different accidents, lead to Petrograd is estimated around 1,300 people. surprising outcomes. Something like the Russian Revolution was extremely likely in 1917—the The collapse of the Romanov dynasty ushered a Romanov Dynasty was unable to cope with the tumultuous and violent series of events, enormous stresses facing the country—but the culminating in the Bolshevik Party’s seizure of revolution itself could have ended very control in November 1917 and creation of the differently. Soviet Union. The revolution saw some of the most dramatic and dangerous political events the Major questions surround the Provisional world has ever known. It would affect much Government that struggled to manage the chaos more than Russia and the ethnic republics Russia after the Tsar’s abdication.
    [Show full text]
  • Socialist Planning
    Socialist Planning Socialist planning played an enormous role in the economic and political history of the twentieth century. Beginning in the USSR it spread round the world. It influenced economic institutions and economic policy in countries as varied as Bulgaria, USA, China, Japan, India, Poland and France. How did it work? What were its weaknesses and strengths? What is its legacy for the twenty-first century? Now in its third edition, this textbook is fully updated to cover the findings of the period since the collapse of the USSR. It provides an overview of socialist planning, explains the underlying theory and its limitations, looks at its implementation in various sectors of the economy, and places developments in their historical context. A new chap- ter analyses how planning worked in the defence–industry complex. This book is an ideal text for undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in comparative economic systems and twentieth-century economic history. michael ellman is Emeritus Professor in the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands. He is the author, co- author and editor of numerous books and articles on the Soviet and Russian economies, on transition economics, and on Soviet economic and political history. In 1998, he was awarded the Kondratieff prize for his ‘contributions to the development of the social sciences’. Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 128.122.253.212 on Sat Jan 10 18:08:28 GMT 2015. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139871341 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2015 Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 128.122.253.212 on Sat Jan 10 18:08:28 GMT 2015.
    [Show full text]
  • Communist) Academy
    4 I SCIENCE, ORTH ODOXY, AND THE QUEST FOR HEGEMONY AT THE SOCIALIST (COMMUNIST) ACADEMY Bolshevik intellectuals presented their cause as a class strug­ gle with bourgeois academia. Their primary field of battle in higher learning, however, was first and foremost institutional. When Evgenii B. Preobrazhenskii insisted in the Socialist Academy's newly founded jour­ nal in 1922 that the academy "represents the highest scientific research institute of Marxist thought," the academy leader was linking the Bol­ shevik declaration of war in organized intellectual life to his own insti­ tutional base. It has rarely been considered, but such assertions of pri­ macy implied as many internal ramifications for the Bolsheviks as outward effects for the nonparty intellectual world. The Socialist Academy - Preobrazhenskii elaborated on his claim to authority - "does not recognize social science not operating on the basis of Marxism. The Academy must turn itself into its own kind of Gosplan in the realm of ideology."l In this formulation, the assertion of orthodoxy, and the vision of a new kind of planned science, or nauka, is intertwined with the claim to hegemony - not simply of a doctrine, a party, or a class, but of an institution.2 1. E. Preobrazhenskü, "Blizhaishie zadachi Sotsialisticheskoi Akademii," Vestnik Sotsia­ listicheskoi Akademii (henceforth cited as VSA), no. 1 (November 1922): 7, 9. 2. "Hegemony" is employed not in tbe Gramscian sense, but in the blunter meaning most frequently implicit in tbe Bolshevik use of tbe word gegemoniia, denoting wide-ranging dornina­ tion, political subordination, and eon�ol over activities and resources. THE SOCIALlST (COMMUNIST) ACADEMY 1 193 No matter that Gosplan, the central state planning agency, was of negligible importance at the time Preobrazhenskii wrote; no matter, indeed, that the Socialist (after 1924, Cornmunist) Academy never achieved the hegemony in the Soviet scholarly world that its leaders coveted.
    [Show full text]
  • Counter-Intelligence in a Command Economy
    Counter-Intelligence in a Command Economy Mark Harrison* Department of Economics and CAGE, University of Warwick Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University Inga Zaksauskienė** Faculty of History, Vilnius University Abstract We provide the first thick description of the counter-intelligence function in a command economy of the Soviet type. Based on documentation from Soviet Lithuania, the paper considers the KGB (secret police) as a market regulator, commissioned to prevent the disclosure of secret government business and forestall the disruption of government plans. Where market regulation in open societies is commonly intended to improve market transparency, competition, and fair treatment of consumers and employees, KGB regulation was designed to enforce secrecy, monopoly, and discrimination. One consequence of KGB regulation of the labour market may have been adverse selection for talent. We argue that the Soviet economy was designed to minimize the costs. Keywords: communism, command economy, discrimination, information, loyalty, regulation, security, surveillance, Soviet Union. JEL Codes: N44, P21. * Mail: Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected]. ** Mail: Universiteto g. 7, LT-01513 Vilnius, Lithuania. Email: [email protected]. First draft: 26 April 2013. This version: 11 December 2014. Counter-Intelligence in a Command Economy Data Appendix Table
    [Show full text]
  • I I I I I I I ISBN: 0-85964-482-0 I I I J :1 I I I TABLE of CONTENTS I PREFACE Iii
    A R C H. I V E S 0 F T H E 'I SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND SOVIET STATE I I I I I Catalogue of Finding Aids and Docun1ents I fro1n three kev•. : archives i on n1icrofihn I I Fourth edition: June 2004 I I Published jointly by Slate Archival Service Hoover Institution on vVar. I Revolution and Peace of Russi a CRo' sarkhi \ .·) I I Distributed b\· l CfJ.., CHA D\VYCK-llFALEY 1:~ I f 1· I I I I Fourth Edition: June 2004 I I I I I I I ISBN: 0-85964-482-0 I I I J :1 I I I TABLE OF CONTENTS I PREFACE iii I INTRODUCTION v I HOW TO USE THE CATALOGUE xiii HOW TO ORDER MICROFILM XIV I LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xvii CENTRE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTATION (TsKhSD) I [Renamed Russian State Archive of Contemporary History - RGANI] OPISI I FINDING AIDS SERIES 1 I DELA/DOCUMENTS SERIES 2 ~ I RUSSIAN CENTRE FOR THE PRESERVATION AND STUDY OF DOCUMENTS OF MOST RECENT HISTORY (RTsKhIDNI) I [Renamed Russian State Archive of Social and Political History - RGASPI] OPISI I FINDING AIDS SERIES 3 I DELA/ DOCUMENTS SERIES 10 STATE ARCHIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (GARF) I r-series [Collection held at Pirogovskaia Street] OPISI I FINDING AIDS SERIES 15 I DELA I DOCUMENTS SERIES 57 I STATE ARCHIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (GARF) a-series [Collection held at Berezhkovskaia Naberezhnaia] I OPISI I FINDING AIDS SERIES 69 I DELA I DOCUMENTS SERIES 89 I, I­ I I 111 I PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION I The State Archival Service of the Russian Federation (Rosarkhiv), the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and Chadwyck-Healey concluded an agreement in April 1992 to I microfilm the records and opisi (finding aids) of the Communist Party of the fonner Soviet Union, as well as other selected holdings of the State Archives.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bolshevil{S and the Chinese Revolution 1919-1927 Chinese Worlds
    The Bolshevil{s and the Chinese Revolution 1919-1927 Chinese Worlds Chinese Worlds publishes high-quality scholarship, research monographs, and source collections on Chinese history and society from 1900 into the next century. "Worlds" signals the ethnic, cultural, and political multiformity and regional diversity of China, the cycles of unity and division through which China's modern history has passed, and recent research trends toward regional studies and local issues. It also signals that Chineseness is not contained within territorial borders ­ overseas Chinese communities in all countries and regions are also "Chinese worlds". The editors see them as part of a political, economic, social, and cultural continuum that spans the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, South­ East Asia, and the world. The focus of Chinese Worlds is on modern politics and society and history. It includes both history in its broader sweep and specialist monographs on Chinese politics, anthropology, political economy, sociology, education, and the social­ science aspects of culture and religions. The Literary Field of New Fourth Artny Twentieth-Century China Communist Resistance along the Edited by Michel Hockx Yangtze and the Huai, 1938-1941 Gregor Benton Chinese Business in Malaysia Accumulation, Ascendance, A Road is Made Accommodation Communism in Shanghai 1920-1927 Edmund Terence Gomez Steve Smith Internal and International Migration The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Chinese Perspectives Revolution 1919-1927 Edited by Frank N Pieke and Hein Mallee
    [Show full text]
  • The Monetary Legacy of the Soviet Union / Patrick Conway
    ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE are published by the International Finance Section of the Department of Economics of Princeton University. The Section sponsors this series of publications, but the opinions expressed are those of the authors. The Section welcomes the submission of manuscripts for publication in this and its other series. Please see the Notice to Contributors at the back of this Essay. The author of this Essay, Patrick Conway, is Professor of Economics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has written extensively on the subject of structural adjustment in developing and transitional economies, beginning with Economic Shocks and Structural Adjustment: Turkey after 1973 (1987) and continuing, most recently, with “An Atheoretic Evaluation of Success in Structural Adjustment” (1994a). Professor Conway has considerable experience with the economies of the former Soviet Union and has made research visits to each of the republics discussed in this Essay. PETER B. KENEN, Director International Finance Section INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SECTION EDITORIAL STAFF Peter B. Kenen, Director Margaret B. Riccardi, Editor Lillian Spais, Editorial Aide Lalitha H. Chandra, Subscriptions and Orders Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Conway, Patrick J. Currency proliferation: the monetary legacy of the Soviet Union / Patrick Conway. p. cm. — (Essays in international finance, ISSN 0071-142X ; no. 197) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-88165-104-4 (pbk.) : $8.00 1. Currency question—Former Soviet republics. 2. Monetary policy—Former Soviet republics. 3. Finance—Former Soviet republics. I. Title. II. Series. HG136.P7 no. 197 [HG1075] 332′.042 s—dc20 [332.4′947] 95-18713 CIP Copyright © 1995 by International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University.
    [Show full text]
  • Corel Ventura
    THE ROLE OF ISAAK PREZENT IN THE RISE AND FALL OF LYSENKOISM GIULIA RISPOLI1 ABSTRACT. The establishment of an “official” biology in the Soviet Union is often associated with the rise of Trofim D. Lysenko and with the unbridled power that he exercised with the active complicity of Stalin. However, Lysenko did not apply his tyrannical methods with the same effectiveness and to the same ends throughout his career. The institutionalization of the new agron- omy involved a complex combination of factors, and the power and charisma of those who surrounded Lysenko greatly facilitated his indoctrination of this branch of science. One of the most influential collaborators of Lysenko was the Marxist ideologist and Party official Isaak Izrailevich Prezent, whose relation- ship with Lysenko is crucial to understand Lysenko’s development from a simple plant breeder to a political force of the Soviet Union. KEY WORDS. Trofim D. Lysenko, Isaak I. Prezent, official biology, genetics, Academy Session, Alexander A. Malinovskij, science and politics, Soviet sci- ence, Stalinism, agricultural sciences. LYSENKO COMES TO POWER In a report published in 1944, the distinguished Soviet geologist Alexander E. Fersman was eager to demonstrate to the Western world the scientific advances achieved by the Soviet scientists thanks to the advent of Com- munism. His words sounded flattering especially in the field of biological sciences: In the study of the organism and its cells T. D. Lysenko was right when he wrote in the columns of the Herald of the Academy of Sciences that the nature of an organism is unusually pliant and inconstant, that changes in it may occur in the course of not only several generations but even during several days of its life, and that these changes may be caused artificially.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the Beginning of the Church
    Excerpts from the “The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy” By Alexander Schmemann Translated by Lynda W. Kesich (Please get the full version of this book at your bookstore) Content: 1. The Beginning of the Church. Acts of the Apostles. Community in Jerusalem — The First Church. Early Church Organization. Life of Christians. Break with Judaism. The Apostle Paul. The Church and the Greco-Roman World. People of the Early Church. Basis of Persecution by Rome. Blood of Martyrs. Struggle of Christianity to Keep its Own Meaning. The New Testament. Sin and Repentance in the Church. Beginnings of Theology. The Last Great Persecutions. 2. The Triumph Of Christianity. Conversion of Constantine. Relations between Church and State. The Arian Disturbance. Council of Nicaea — First Ecumenical Council. After Constantine. The Roman Position. Countermeasures in the East. End of Arianism. New Relation of Christianity to the World. The Visible Church. Rise of Monasticism. State Religion — Second Ecumenical Council. St. John Chrysostom. 3. The Age Of The Ecumenical Councils. Development of Church Regional Structure. The Byzantine Idea of Church and State Constantinople vs. Alexandria The Christological Controversy — Nestorius and Cyril. Third Ecumenical Council. The Monophysite Heresy. Council of Chalcedon (Fourth Ecumenical Council). Reaction to Chalcedon — the Road to Division. Last Dream of Rome. Justinian and the Church. Two Communities. Symphony. Reconciliation with Rome — Break with the East. Recurrence of Origenism. Fifth Ecumenical Council. Underlying Gains. Breakup of the Empire — Rise of Islam. Decay of the Universal Church Last Efforts: Monothelitism. Sixth Ecumenical Council. Changing Church Structure. Byzantine Theology. Quality of Life in the New Age. Development of the Liturgy.
    [Show full text]
  • The Use of Analogies in Economic Modelling: Vladimir Bazarov's
    The use of analogies in economic modelling: Vladimir Bazarov’s restauration process model Authors: Elizaveta Burina, Annie L. Cot Univeristy of Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne 2018-2019 Table of contents Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 3 Preface ............................................................................................................................................. 4 Section 1. The framework that determined Bazarov’s work ........................................................... 8 1.1. Russian economic science in 1920s ...................................................................................... 8 1.2. Intellectual biography ........................................................................................................... 9 1.2.1. Before the October Revolution of 1917 ......................................................................... 9 1.2.2. After the October Revolution of 1917.......................................................................... 12 1.3. Bazarov’s work in Gosplan ................................................................................................. 15 1.3.1. Early years’ work ......................................................................................................... 15 1.3.2. Money emission theory ................................................................................................ 16 1.3.3. Planification theory .....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]