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The Polities of National Communism, 1923 to 1930

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The Polities of National Communism, 1923 to 1930 6 The Polities of National Communism, 1923 to 1930 Having analyzed the implementation of the Affirmative Action Empire in Part One, I now turn to a consideration of the political crisis of korenizat- siia. This chapter traces the emergence of a hard-line critique of korenizatsiia during NEP and its subsequent intensification with the launching of Stalin's socialist offensive. Chapter 7 will show how conflict between Ukraine and the RSFSR eventually led to the triumph of this new hard line during the grain requisitions crisis in December 1932, when the Politburo issued two anti- Ukrainization decrees. These decrees would usher in a fundamental revision of the Affirmative Action Empire. In April 1925, Kaganovich had arrived in Ukraine and attempted to establish a consensus that Ukrainization was a core hard-line Bolshevik policy. As we have seen, he had considerable success before hard-line Ukrainization was ulti- mately undermined by the increased centralization accompanying the socialist offensive. This failure of hard-line Ukrainization should not be exaggerated. Ukrainization was not repudiated. It was not even criticized. Its implementa- tion was simply undermined, because it was now firmly categorized as a sec- ondary, soft-line policy. Before the December 1932 anti-Ukrainization decrees could emerge, much more was required: not just a beliefthat the implementa- tion of korenizatsiia was a secondary concern, or that korenizatsiia sometimes impeded the accomplishment of core Bolshevik projects, but rather a convic- tion that korenizatsiia itself was in fundamental opposition to core Bolshevik principIes. This belief emerged as the political struggle surrounding korenizatsiia in the national republics gradually convinced a growing number of influential Bolsheviks that korenizatsiia was exacerbating rather than preventing the 211 212 The Political Crisis of the Affirmative Action Empire growth of nationalism. A number of factors converged to foster this belief: first, the persistence of national identity politics; second, growing concern over the influence of the national smenol'ekh011tsy; third, growing concern that cross- border ties were being used to the detriment of the Soviet Union rather than to its advantage; fourth, the persistence of the Russian question; and fifth, the increasing centralization that accompanied the socialist offensive. The Shumskyi Mfair We already touched briefly on the Shumskyi affair in Chapter 3. It flared up suddenly in early 1926 during Ukrainian Politburo deliberation on how best to proceed with Ukrainization after the highly successful, but still incomplete, forced Ukrainization campaign of 1925. At a March 19 Politburo meeting, Kaganovich had put forward the slogan that the party should not "forcibly Ukrainize the proletariat." This was orthodox party policy, but Shumskyi appar- ently feIt it sent a dangerous signal of weakness. As a result, on March 31, at a second Politburo meeting devoted to the Ukrainization of the central TsK newspaper Kommunist, Shumskyi launched into a bitter attack on Kaganovich and the rest of the Ukrainian Politburo over the slow pace of Ukrainization.1 He accused Kaganovich of having said the party would not Ukrainize the proletariat, omitting the key word "forcibly." The other Politburo members denied Kaganovich had said this. In a rage, Shumskyi lashed out at the entire Politburo with superb invective2 : In the Party the Russian Communist dominates and conducts himself with sus- picion and hostility-to speak mildly-towards the Ukrainian Communist. He dominates and by relying on the contemptible se1f-seeking type ofLittle Russian [prezrennyi skurnicheskii tip malorossa], who in all historical epochs has been equally unprincipled and hypocritical, slavishly two-faced, and traitorously sycophantic. He now prides himself in his false internationalism, boasts his indifferent attitude to things Ukrainian and is ready to spit on them (perhaps even sometimes in Ukrainian), if that gives him the chance to serve and get a position. Kaganovich naturaIly rebuked Shumskyi, and the latter in turn declared he could no longer work in Ukraine.3 There are two important background facts to this episode. First, Shumskyi was a member of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party from 1909 to 1918, and in 1918 he heIped found the new Ukrainian Communist Party, borotJbisty (named after its journal BorotJba, "The Struggle"), which was formed from the 1 RTsKhIDNII7/26/3 (02.04.26): 17/3. 2Quoted in E. Hirchak, "Shums'kyzm i rozkol u KPZU," Bil'shlrPJk UkrlJiny, no. 5 (1928): 39-40. There was a stenogram for this session, but it apparently has not survived. 3 TsDAHOU1/6/102 (12.05-26): 129. RTsKhIDNI 558/11/738 (1926): 14-16. The Polities of National Communism, 1923 to 1930 213 left wing of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party and entered into a close allianee with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks.4 In March 1920, under Bolshevik pres- sure, the borotJbisty liquidated their party and its most influential members entered the Ukrainian Communist Party (KP /b/U). Lenin personally specified that Shumskyi should be made a member of the Ukrainian TsK. Shumskyi was typical of the large number of national communists, who were recruited by the Bolsheviks ftom nationalist Ieftist parties. Agamali-Ogly, a member ofthe leftist Azerbaijani Hurnmet Party, was another. These individuals often served as nationalities policy specialists. Shumskyi himself was first a liaison to the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) in PoIand and then Ukraine's Commissar of Education. He gave the important keynote address at the April 1925 pIenum that led to the adoption of hard-line Ukrainization. Second, Shumskyi's attack has to be seen in the context of the rampant factionalism within the Communist Party in all the national republics. The Ukrainian national communist faction had just successfulIy rid themselves of Emmanuel Kviring and Dmitrii Lebed in a manner that produced a Politburo rebuke.5 Shumskyi clearly hoped the same couId be done with Kaganovich. Already in October 1925, during an audience Stalin held with a KPZU delega- tion in Moscow, Shumskyi suggested that Kaganovich should be repIaced with an ethnic Ukrainian. Stalin reportedly agreed this would be desirable in princi- pIe, but argued that politically it was too soon to do SO.6 This certainly did nothing to slow Shumskyi's factional struggle with Kaganovich. Shumskyi's conflict with Kaganovich, then, would have be en of little politi- cal significance had he not again appealed to Stalin, in a meeting on April 20, to remove Kaganovich. He suggested Kaganovich be repIaced by Chubar, and that Chubar's position as head of Sovnarkom might be filled by either Zatonskyi, Skrypnyk, or Hryhorii Hrynko. All were ethnic Ukrainians, and Hrynko was a felIow former borotJbist, who would become better known in the 1930S as the all-union Commissar of Finance, Grigorii Grinko? Stalin initially counseled patience. In the meantime, however, Kaganovich had written Stalin a savvy letter sum- marizing his conflict with Shumskyi.8 He initially downplayed the affair, assert- ing that although Shumskyi daimed the conflict was over Ukrainization, it really had "no basis in substantive policy whatsoever" and instead reflected 4 AIl biographical detail taken frorn "Spravka o byvshern chIene TsK i Orgbiuro TsK KP /b/U Shurnskorn Aleksandre Iakovleviche," TsDAHOU (Uncatalogued Docurnent): 1-9. On the bororbisty, see Iwan Majstrenko, Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism (New York, 1954). 5 RTsKhIDNII7/3/497 (16.04.26): 57/32. The decree read: "1. Do not oppose the rernoval of Cornrade Kviring frorn Ukraine. 2. Tell TsK KP/bjU that they should have consulted with TsK RKP before they took the decision to rernove Kviring frorn Ukraine ...." 6 "Spravka," 6--7. Also, Shapoval, Ukraina, 21-22. Janusz Radziejowski, The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, I9I9->929 (Edmonton, 1983): lI8, 126n. 7 TsDAHOU 1/6/102 (12.05-26): 12Sl-I30, 176, 191; RTsKhIDNII7/33/552 (1926): 107. 8RTsKhIDNI 558/lI/738 (1926): 12-14. The letter is not dated so it is unclear ifit was written before or after Sta!in's April 20 meeting with Shmuskyi. 214- The Political Crisis of the Affirmative Action Empire Shumskyi's anger that he had not been elected to the Ukrainian Politburo. With sorne justice, Kaganovich claimed he could more plausibly be accused of pushing Ukrainization too much rather than too little. After this innocent beginning, Kaganovich cleverly inserted two damaging claims. First, he asserted that Shumskyi had "called a meeting of former borot'bisty, in which he mobi- lized his forces" against Kaganovich. To Stalin this would not at all signifY a nonpolitical personal conflict but rather a serious attempt at political opposi- tion by a Ukrainian nationalist non-Bolshevik movement. Second, Kaganovich attached six pages of inflammatory excerpts from the recent pamphlets of the flamboyant Ukrainian national cornmunist writer, Mykola Khvylovyi, in which Khvylovyi argued aggressively for orienting Ukrainian culture toward western Europe rather than Moscow.9 Kaganovich noted that Shumskyi defended Khvylovyi and suggested that their recent activity was evidence of a "growth in petit-bourgeois chauvinism." Kaganovich then ended his letter by wondering "what significance you, Cornrade Stalin, will give to [Khvylovyi's] writings" and by requesting that Stalin "write a brief letter with his thoughts about this incident. " Stalin took Kaganovich's bait. On April 26, he escalated the affair with a letter addressed to Kaganovich and the Ukrainian TsK Stalin noted that Shumskyi "had several correct ideas": that Ukrainian culture was growing, that the party must master it or lose influence to hostile forces, and therefore that "the spirit of irony and skepticism towards Ukrainian culture" reigning in the party must be overcome. However, Stalin also noted "at least two serious errors"10: First, [Shumskyi] mixes up the Ukrainization of our Party and Soviet apparat with the Ukrainization of the proletariat. We can and should, while observing the proper tempo, Ukrainize our party, state and other apparats.
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