From Symmetrical Bicameralism to Which Model? the Constitutional Reform and the Second Chamber in Comparative Perspective

Home , Maria Elena Boschi

From Symmetrical Bicameralism to Which Model? The Constitutional Reform and the Second Chamber in Comparative Perspective

Michelangelo Vercesi* [email protected]

Paper prepared for the panel ‘Il Parlamento italiano al bivio della riforma costituzionale: un’occasione per riflettere sull’evolversi degli studi parlamentari in Italia’, chaired by Andrea Pedrazzani and Luca Pinto, XXX Annual Meeting of the Italian Political Science Association, Milan, 15-17 September 2016.

1. Introduction This paper deals with the relationship between the lower and upper chamber in the Italian parliament. Moreover, it aims to provide insights on how the role of the upper house in the executive-legislative arena should change, according to the Renzi-Boschi constitutional reform.1 This constitutional law was approved by the parliament in April 2016 and will be subjected to a binding popular referendum before 2017. The crucial role that parliaments play in modern liberal-democracies makes the topic particularly relevant for the legislative studies with a focus on Italy. The well-known model of parliamentary democracy as a system of delegation and accountability (Strøm 2003) places parliaments at the core of the chain of delegation, between voters (parliament’s principal) and prime ministers (parliament’s agent) and cabinets. Battegazzorre (2011: 467) stresses the role of democratic parliaments as sources of systemic stabilization. With regard to the Italian political system, scholars have underlined the centrality of the legislature in the political process during the republican period, especially before the breakdown of the former party system in the early 1990s (e.g., Cotta 1994). The origins of the Italian parliament date back to the proclamation of the Reign of Italy in 1861. The new unitary State was born by virtue of the unification of some Italian territories under the rule of the former Reign of Sardinia. From this reign, Italy inherited the octroyée

* Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University Lüneburg. 1 The current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and the Minister for Constitutional Reforms and Relationships with the Parliament Maria Elena Boschi are the two main official proponents of the reform.

Constitution (the Statuto Albertino) of 1848 and its the bicameral parliament (De Micheli and Verzichelli 2004). The Statuto remained the Italian formal constitutional reference even during the Fascist period. However, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the monarchy was replaced by a republican State through a popular referendum (1946). A Constituent Assembly was elected and its members decided to preserve bicameralism: the 1948 Constitution (still in effect) provides that the legislature be made up of directly elected lower (Chamber of Deputies) and upper (Senate) houses with equal powers and functions, making Italy ‘the last of the identical [paritari] bicameral parliamentary systems’ (Pasquino 1992: 18). Since the very beginning of the republican period, the parity between the chambers has been being highly disputed in the public debate: the Italian bicameralism is still ‘one of the unsolved cruxes of the Constitution’ (Barbera 2004: 37). According to Russell (2001b: 454), Italian politicians ‘are supportive of bicameralism in principle, but want a second chamber with a more distinct composition and functions’. Parliamentary bicameral committees attempted to revise the institutional setting of the Republic in 1983-85, 1993-94, and 1997-98. However, none of these attempts were successful (Pasquino 2002: 74-75; Bull 2015. See also Russell and Sandford [2002]). The parliament could instead approve the replacement of the Senate with a ‘federal chamber’ in 2005, but the reform was rejected by the electorate via a popular referendum in 20062 (Bull and Pasquino 2007). In 2013, the then Prime Minister Letta asked a group of experts (ten ‘wise men’) to propose a broad institutional reform, but the reforming process was blocked by inter-party disagreements (Bull 2016). When in February 2014 the current Prime Minister Renzi sworn in, he presented the abolition of the symmetrical bicameralism as one the distinctive goals of the new cabinet’s program (Marangoni and Verzichelli 2014). Finally, on 12 April 2016 the Italian legislature approved the constitutional reform,3 which redefines the relations between the central State and regions and introduces a Senate hollowed out of some legislative prerogatives and representative of sub-national institutions. What type of bicameralism does this reform introduce? Will the Italian Senate become more similar or dissimilar to other upper chambers in parliamentary democracies? How does

2 Article 138 of the Italian Constitution states that constitutional changes must be approved twice by both houses, with an interval of time of at least three months between the approvals. Should the change not be approved the second time by a two-third majority, but only by an absolute majority, a referendum can be requested by one-fifth of one of the two houses, 500.000 voters, or five regional councils. In that case, the approval of the majority of valid votes is necessary for the entry into force. 3 ‘Via libera definitivo alla riforma costituzionale. Ora l’ultima parola ai cittadini con il referendum.’ In La Stampa, 12 April 2016, http://www.lastampa.it/2016/04/12/italia/politica/rush-finale-per-la-riforma-costituzionale-le- opposizioni-non-voteranno-BpWSbGzC3NRab0wJGo49GO/pagina.html.

2 this reform affect the distribution of power between parliament and executive? Where is the Italian parliamentarism going? This paper seeks to answer these questions. In the following section, I present a theoretical framework for the comparative study of bicameral legislatures in parliamentary democracies. Subsequently, I analyze the structural and functional features of the Italian Senate as it is and as it should be according to the reform. The fourth section deals with methodological issues, whereas the fifth compares Italy and other parliamentary democracies based on the theoretical framework and points out the direction of the prospective changes. The implications for the relationship between the executive and legislature are discussed in the conclusions.

2. A Framework for the Study of Upper Chambers 2.1 Bicameral Parliaments and the Functions of Upper Chambers Only a minority of countries in the world rely on bicameral parliaments. According to the information gathered by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, their number is 77 out 193 (39.9%) in 2016. In Europe, the ratio decreases to 35.4 percent.4 Historically, modern European bicameralism emerged as a tool to moderate the democratic element of the elected chambers (lower houses) by means of an aristocratic chamber (upper house), made up of hereditary or appointed members (Shell 2001; Barbera 2004). Nowadays, the presence of second chambers5 seems especially likely in large and decentralized States, where senators represent territorial interests (Patterson and Mughan 1999; Russell 2001a; Taagepera 2003). However, the range of interests represented in contemporary upper houses varies to a great extent: from those of linguistic minorities in Belgium to the interests of the Church in the United Kingdom and those of vocational categories in Ireland (Borthwick 2001: 22-23). Second chambers are veto players in the policy-making process and they can be sources of consensus and scrutiny of the government (Russell 2001b). Comparative legislative studies have dealt with bicameral parliaments from two main viewpoints: functional and structural (Blondel 1973; Polsby 1975; Mezey 1979; Mattson and Strøm 1995; Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2006; Pasquino and Pelizzo 2006). On the one hand, it

4 Data are available online: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/ParliamentsStructure.asp?REGION=All&LANG=ENG. Latest access on 30 August 2016. 5 For comparison’s sake, I use first as synonym of lower and second as synonym of upper to distinguish between parliamentary branches. Democratic lower houses are the main branches and are always directly elected. Terminological confusion can be provoked by the Dutch case, where the lower house is called Second Chamber (Tweede Kamer), whereas the upper chamber is called First Chamber (Eerste Kamer).

3 is argued that second chambers fulfill (or should fulfill) a couple of basic functions; on the other hand, the extent to which these functions are fulfilled would depend on the structure and the formal prerogatives of the upper houses. As Norton (1998: 205) has pointed out, the internal arrangement of legislatures has – albeit along with external variables – an independent effect on the outcomes of the political cycle. However, it is worth noting that focusing only on the upper house is not sufficient to understand its added impact. First, second chambers should be studied in relation to their lower counterparts; second, as Scully (2001: 96) has stated, ‘the most important point that must be understood with regard to relations between the first and second chamber in any parliamentary system of government is that they cannot be understood as separate from executive-legislative relations. […] And in turn, executive-legislative relations are impossible to understand in practice without recourse to the concept of party.’ Parties organize MPs’ behaviors and define the lines of political division within the chambers. Scholars generally agree that second chambers share with their institutional siblings three broad functions. The first is the representative function. Representation can be conceived of as morphological (representation of groups or communities), sociological (reflection of voters’ socio-demographic characteristics), and political (reflection of voters’ ideological and party orientations). The other two functions concern the legislative activity and the control of the government (Cotta et al. 2001: 318-326; Battegazzorre 2011). Following Sartori (1995: 250), however, we can group these two functions under the same heading of control, either legislative or political (i.e., of the government). The assessment of the effective fulfillment of these functions ultimately results in the observation of the chamber’s activities, even with regard to the representative function. As Battegazzorre (2011: 447-448) has pointed out, the concept of representation implies the idea of active promotion of interests. In empirical research, thus, ‘the representative function loses distinctiveness, fading into the […] control function, and eventually turning out to be absorbed’ (see also Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). In so far as the parliamentary branch is able to perform its functions against external resistances, one can depict the chamber, and thus bicameralism, as strong.

2.2. The Dimensions of Upper Chambers’ Strength Lijphart (2012) has suggested determining the strength of bicameralism mainly based on two structural dimensions. The first dimension is connected to the formal powers the second chamber is bestowed on. Similar or even equal constitutional powers make bicameralism

4 stronger. In addition, the author has mentioned, all else being equal, the compositional incongruence between the two parliamentary branches as a further dimension (see also Swenden 2004). In particular, the prime source of incongruence would be the overrepresentation of small territorial unities or minorities. However, Tsebelis (2002) has pointed out that in modern democratic parliaments, when it comes to shape MPs’ behaviors, divisions along party lines are likely to overcome territorial differences. Some scholars have argued that a complete measurement of veto players’ strength cannot avoid considering the perceived legitimacy among the population, since a lack of legitimacy can undermine the chance to use the institutional powers (Russell 2013; Heeß 2016). If, on the contrary, ‘there are no serious legitimacy concerns about the second chamber, the first two dimensions will in practice determine de facto bicameral strength’ (Russell 2013: 386). There are two approaches for the study of second chambers’ legitimacy, which can be associated to inputs, procedures, or outputs. On the one hand, one can follow an empirical way and survey the perceived legitimacy of institutions. With regard to this, Russell (2013: 375) has proposed to operationalize the concept as ‘social support.’ However, as Heeß (2016) has stressed, this could result in measuring the support towards the use of an institution, rather than the perceived legitimacy. In democracies, a legitimate institutional veto player would be an institution aimed to fulfill democratic goals, even if not directly elected. Secondly, the equation between legitimacy and social support can lead to measurement pitfalls, due to the difficulty of measuring social support over time in comparative analyses. The second approach, instead, posits normative criteria as proxies of (supposed) perceived legitimacy; this allows relying on a range of more clear-cut indicators. I argue that formal powers and membership incongruence are dimensions for the measurement of the organizational strength of second chambers, whereas legitimacy can be associated to the notion of authoritative strength. Organizational strength is internal to veto players; authoritative strength comes from outside the institution. An upper house can have prerogatives and institutional resources, but, at the same time, be not enough legitimate within the political system to pursue its prerogatives effectively, and vice versa (cf. Heeß 2016). It is worth noting that neither the organizational strength nor the authoritative strength per se are necessary conditions for affecting the political cycle. However, the combined absence of both is very likely to be a sufficient (but not necessary) condition (Schneider and Wagemann 2012) for an ineffective role. Based on this argumentation, second chambers can be of four types (Table 1).

Table 1. Types of parliamentary second chambers

Low organizational strength High organizational strength

High authoritative strength Type 1 Type 2

Low authoritative strength Type 3 Type 4

Conceptually, these types encompass the scope of both the resources and the contextual conditions to fulfill the aforementioned parliamentary functions (representation and control) and the three main dimensions of second chambers’ strength suggested by the comparative literature (formal power, incongruence, legitimacy). Overall, the four types account for the power – and thus the influence in the policy-making process – of second chambers. For empirical purposes, we have to list a set of indicators in order to place lower houses within each cell.

2.3. The Indicators of Upper Chambers’ Strength Based on the literature, I construe multiple indicators (Pennings et al. 2006: 69-70) for each dimension of analysis. First, formal power originates from both constitutional and other statutory prerogatives. In parliamentary systems, the characteristic prerogative of the legislature is the power to confirm and dismiss the government. As a rule, only lower chambers are responsible for (explicit or tacit) investitures and for no-confidence motions (Patterson and Mughan 2001; Bergman et al. 2003: 119). Therefore, if a second chamber shared such prerogative, it would be, all else equal, stronger. Secondly, upper houses can affect the policy-making by means of their legislative prerogatives. In particular, they can benefit from the power to introduce bills and the final veto on decisions (Money and Tsebelis 1992; Tsebelis and Rasch 1995). I consider the possibility to propose amendments that cannot be rejected by the lower house and the absence of time limits for delaying the legislation as forms of final vetoes. The larger the scope of these powers in terms of policy fields, the higher the influence. The second dimension is the membership incongruence between the first and second chamber. Following Tsebelis and Rasch (1995: 368), I argue that dissimilar partisan compositions are likely when the two chambers are not selected simultaneously and the respective selection systems diverge. Moreover, a proxy of (likely) incongruence is the difference between the two chambers’ representational principle (Heeß 2016).

Finally, legitimacy can be observed (presumed) through three indicators. The first is the direct election of the members of the chamber, that is, their democratic legitimation (Lijphart 2012). Secondly, second chambers can be perceived legitimate in connection with their outputs. With regard to this, a particular role is that of the morphological representation of territorial entities or marginalized groups within the society (Krook and O’Brien 2010; Heeß 2016). This kind of representation can be perceived as complementary to the representation of the polity as whole, which is typical of first chambers. In the following section, I present the Italian bicameralism, based on this discussion.

3. The Italian Senate and the Constitutional Reform6 3.1. The Italian Senate as It Is: Structure, Powers, Selection In line with the general pattern, the Italian second chamber is smaller than the lower house. However, comparatively, its size is one of the largest (Borthwick 2001: 20): the elected senators are 315 (while the first chamber is made up of 630 deputies). The Head of State can also appoint up to five life senators, ‘who have given honor to the Nation with their outstanding achievements in social, scientific, artistic, and literary fields’ (Article 59 of the Constitution, translated in Pasquino [2002: 68]). Moreover, former Presidents of the Republic become de jure life senators. Life senators’ votes on confidence or bills are especially important when the government enjoys unstable majorities in the chamber, as it has been the case in recent legislatures (see below). The minimum age to become senator is 40 years, whereas 25 years is the minimum age to get the right to vote for the Senate (the ages for the Chamber of Deputies are 21 and 18 years, respectively). Formally, the speaker of the upper house is the second highest office of the Italian State following the President the Republic (the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies is instead the third), for whom s/he stands in when the Head of State is abroad. The legislative term of both the Senate and the Chamber lasts five years, and the elections for the two houses are held on the same days.7 With regard to the formal powers of the Senate, cabinets need the confidence of both chambers and must resign even if only one of them withdraws the support. The Senate and the

6 This section is taken, with substantial and stylistic changes, from a part I wrote for the paper ‘The Reform of the Italian Senate: A Step Back for Women’s Representation?’, coauthored with Pamela Pansardi and presented at the 24th IPSA World Congress of Political Science in Poznań (23-28 July 2016). 7 According to the first version of the Constitution, the legislative term for the Senate was six years. However, after three simultaneous dissolutions to avoid incongruent majorities between the chambers, the parliament shortened the duration to five years, as of the 1963 election.

Chamber are also co-equal in the legislative process. The power to initiate legislation is shared and bills must be approved with the same text by the two parliamentary branches. Moreover, there are no time limits for the approval, and each chamber can delay the process indefinitely. Disputes between chambers are settled by means of the navette (shuttle) system (Money and Tsebelis 1992; Zucchini 2008). Finally, the parliamentary committee system of the Senate is as strong as that of the Chamber (Curini and Zucchini 2014; Pansardi and Vercesi 2016). Despite formal parity, party politics has been conducive to some differences in terms of membership. Indeed, party leaders and prime ministers have usually sat in the Chamber of Deputies. According to Pasquino (2002: 72), two reasons account for this.

‘The first one is very simple. If most party leaders sit in the House of Deputies, then it is likely, indeed almost assured, that all important debates and confrontations will take place in that chamber. […] The second reason […] is purely electoral. Up to 1992 the Italian electoral proportional system was complemented by a number of preference votes the voter could cast. Hence, famous and powerful candidates could prove their voting-getting ability (being candidates in up to three, multi-member constituencies) and at the same time could channel votes towards their party that otherwise would go elsewhere.’

Being candidate for the lower has been the rule for party leaders. However, the two chambers have recently become similar even in this respect. After five legislative terms in the lower house, People of Freedom’s leader Silvio Berlusconi entered the Senate in 2013. Moreover, the current leaders of the largest parties (the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi of the Democratic Party, Beppe Grillo of the Five Star Movement, and Matteo Salvini of the Northern League) are not MPs, neither in the Senate nor in the Chamber.8 The selection of senators and deputies is based on the same electoral system9 (Pasquino 2015). From 1948 to the early 1990s, the system was proportional, while in 1994 and 2001 the general elections were held under a mixed system. In 2005, the parliament approved a new proportional system with a majority bonus, used for the 2006, 2008 and 2013 elections. It is worth noting that, with regard to the Senate, the system distributed the seats separately for each region, whereas the allocation of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies occurred at the national level. The majority premium thus applied to each region (Chiaramonte 2015). For most

8 The same holds for Silvio Berlusconi, after his expulsion from the Senate in November 2013 resulting from a conviction for tax fraud. See ‘Silvio Berlusconi non è più senatore. Via libera del Senato alla decadenza. Il Cavaliere: “Lutto per la democrazia”.’ In La Stampa, 27 November 2013, http://www.lastampa.it/2013/11/27/italia/politica/decadenza-stasera-il-voto-su-berlusconi-cominciata-la- discussione-in-senato-UZnd9UDRvn1gKXBUKTuNeO/pagina.html. 9 According to Article 57 of the Constitution, senators are to be elected on a regional basis.

8 of the republican period, the two chambers have been congruent in terms of partisan composition. However, since 1994 higher incongruence has emerged (Table 2).

Table 2. Cabinet support in the two Italian parliamentary chambers, 12th-17th legislative terms Seats controlled by cabinet parties (%) Legislative term Cabinet Chamber of Deputies Senate 12th Berlusconi I (1994-1995) 58.1 49.5 Dini (1995-1996) 0.0 0.0 13th Prodi I (1996-1998) 44.0 48.2 D’Alema I (1998-1999) 50.3 51.7 D’Alema II (1999-2000) 48.6 50.8 Amato II (2000-2001) 49.5 51.4 14th Berlusconi II (2001-2005) 56.1 55.9 Berlusconi III (2005-2006) 55.4 54.6 15th Prodi II (2006-2008) 53.5 47.8 16th Berlusconi IV (2008-2011) 53.3 54.4 Monti (2011-2013) 0.0 0.0 17th Letta (2013-2014) 70.3 69.0 Renzi (2014-)* 59.2 45.0 * In office at time of writing. Note: data refer to the date of inauguration. Sources: Zucchini (2008: 15) and own elaboration of data from Döring and Manow (2016); Senato della Repubblica (www.senato.it)

The 2005 electoral law was overruled for the most part by the Constitutional Court, whose decision led to a fully-fledged proportional system. Eventually, on 4 May 2015, the parliament voted for a new electoral law, which came into force on 1 July 2016. The new system assures an absolute majority for the most voted list and proportionally allocates the remaining seats to the other lists (D’Alimonte 2015). However, the provision applies only to the selection of the first chamber, since the Senate and its role are modified by the constitutional reform.

3.2. The Reform of the Senate: Introducing Asymmetrical Bicameralism As touched upon, the constitutional reform approved by the parliament in April 2016 has been conceived and advocated by the executive. The law will enter into force if voters approve it with the referendum to be held before 2017. The main changes introduced by the reform concern the centralization of some competences from sub-national institutions to the central State. Secondly, it revises the Italian bicameralism deeply.10 The Chamber of Deputies will be the only branch with the power to

10 The full text of the constitutional law ‘Disposizioni per il superamento del bicameralismo paritario, la riduzione del numero dei parlamentari, il contenimento dei costi di funzionamento delle istituzioni, la soppressione del CNEL e la revisione del titolo V della parte II della Costituzione’ (GU Serie Generale No. 88, 15-4-2016) is available on the website of the Italian Gazzetta Ufficiale (official journal) of Italian laws: http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/stampa/serie_generale/originario. See also ‘Addio province, nuovo Senato e Federalismo: ecco cosa cambia con la riforma costituzionale’, 12 April 2016, http://www.lastampa.it/2016/04/12/italia/politica/addio-bicameralismo-nuovo-senato-e-federalismo-ecco-cosa- cambia-con-la-riforma-costituzionale-hTL8gvle7Bw6F5aii2aq2I/pagina.html.

9 provide and withdraw the confidence to the cabinet. As for the legislative prerogatives, the Senate will have full powers only in the field of constitutional laws and other laws with institutional and European scopes, whereas in ordinary fields it will be able only to solicit discussions and amendments of bills from the Chamber. The upper house will be able to do it within 30 days if the decision is taken by one third of the members. However, the lower house will have the power to refuse any change, although by only the absolute majority of its members if the bill regards the relations between the central State and the regions. The new Senate will be made up of 95 senators (74 regional MPs and 21 mayors) proportionally selected by 19 regional councils and two autonomous provinces (Trento and Bolzano), based on their partisan composition. Moreover, the Head of State will be able to appoint up to five senators for seven years, in accordance to the criteria already in effect. Voters will select the members of the Senate indirectly, when, during regional elections, they will indicate preferences among the candidates to the regional councils. Regional assemblies should make their choices in line with these voters’ indications. Each region and the provinces of Trento and Bolzano will select one representative mayor. Except those appointed by the President of the Republic, at least two senators will be allocated for each region, based on the population size. Senators will forfeit their seat when they forfeit their post at the sub- national level.

4. Method of Analysis For the comparative analysis of the Italian second chamber, I cluster the indicators listed above in two indices defining, respectively, the organizational strength and the authoritative strength of second chambers. I ascribe an equal theoretical weight to the indicators. I measure the variables, by assigning the value 1 to the full presence, 0.5 to a partial presence (where applicable), and 0 to total absence (cf. Ragin 2008). The only exception regards the legislative prerogatives. The literature has stressed the crucial role of the control of budget bills as a source of parliamentary influence (Heller 1997; De Giorgi and Verzichelli 2008). Especially with regard to this policy field, second chambers’ prerogatives can differ from the rest (Money and Tsebelis 1992). For these reasons, I distinguish between prerogatives about budget policies and prerogatives about other policies, assigning for each sub-indicator a value of only 0.5 for the full presence and – for non-budget policies – 0.25 for the partial presence. For each dimension, the relevant values are added and the result is divided by the hypothetically highest total score. The

10 index of organizational strength is the mean of the comprehensive scores of formal power (F) and membership incongruence (M). ∑ 푓 In formal terms, 퐹 = 푖 푖, where f is the value assigned to the ith indicator or sub- 푛푓 indicator of formal power and nf the total number of variables related to the formal power

∑ 푚 dimension. Similarly, 푀 = 푖 푖, where m is the value assigned to the ith indicator of membership 푛푚 incongruence and nm the total number of variables related to the relevant dimension. Hence, the index of organizational strength O is the result of (퐹 + 푀)/2. The index of authoritative ∑ 푙 strength (A) is instead the result of 푖 푖, where l is the value of the ith indicator of legitimacy and 푛푙 nl the total number of variables related to legitimacy. The two indices range from 0 (weak) to 1 (strong). Table 3 summarizes the possible scores for the quantification of each variable.

Table 3. Dimensions of analysis and quantification DIMENSION VARIABLE QUANTIFICATION Yes Partial No

Confidence 1 - 0 Non-budget legislation Introduction 0.5 0.25 0 Formal power Final veto 0.5 0.25 0 Budget legislation Introduction 0.5 - 0 Final veto 0.5 - 0

Different timing of selection 1 0.5 0 Membership incongruence Different procedure of selection 1 0.5 0 Different representational principle 1 0.5 0

Direct election 1 0.5 0 Legitimacy Territorial representation 1 - 0 Minorities’ representation 1 - 0

5. The Italian Bicameralism in Comparative Perspective In this section, I compare bicameralisms in Italy and in other parliamentary countries. With regard to the Italian case, both the current legislature and the parliament provided for by the constitutional reform are considered. Based on the framework for the analysis, I focus on the organizational and authoritative strength of second chambers. This comparison is the starting point for the discussion of the prospective consequences of the reform for the executive- legislative relationships. Indeed, mapping parliamentary systems based on systematic criteria allows making inferences about the direction of the constitutional changes and the possible approach to alternative models.

With regard to the selection of countries, I deal with the largest parliamentary democracies listed in Samuels and Shugart (2010: 32-33), including those systems with a score of five or higher on the Polity IV scale of democracy (Marshall et al. 2014) in the year 2015. The literature has highlighted some kind of relation between population size and institutional settings (Veenendaal 2015: 27-34). In his picture of 36 democracies, Lijphart (2012: ch. 14) has distinguished between countries above ten million inhabitants and other democracies, and I use this threshold to select the largest polities. The total number of cases is thus 13 (Table 4).

Table 4. The 13 largest parliamentary democracies in terms of population, 2015 Country Population

India 1,311,050,527.0 Japan 126,958,472.0 Germany 81,413,145.0 United Kingdom 65,138,232.0 Italy 60,802,085.0 South Africa 54,956,920.4 Spain 46,418,269.0 Canada 35,851,774.0 Australia 23,781,169.0 Netherlands 16,936,520.0 Belgium 11,285,721.0 Greece 10,823,732.0 Czech Republic 10,551,219.0 Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.org)

Greece is the only parliamentary democracy with more than ten million inhabitants and a unicameral parliament. All other countries in the list rely on a bicameral structure. As for the criteria for assigning numbers to the indicators of the analysis, a cabinet is defined as dependent on the confidence of the second chamber when the house can vote a binding motion of no confidence. Procedures of selection are considered different even when direct elections are held with different electoral systems. Direct election is conceived of as the prime source of democratic legitimacy, whereas the indirect election is meant to be a partial form of input legitimation.11 The representation of minorities is revealed only when quotas for ethnic/religious/linguistic minorities or other particular groups exist. With regard to ‘different timing of selection’, ‘different procedure of selection’, ‘different representational principle’, and ‘direct election’, the full score (1) applies when two thirds or more of the chamber’s members are involved. When instead the number ranges between one third (included) and two thirds, I assign the partial score. A partial ‘different procedure of selection’ applies also when the electoral system is similar, but the territories on which votes are distributed differ.

11 I include as indirectly elected both representatives in assemblies (such as regional legislatures) and members of executives stemming from elected assemblies (such as regional ministers in German Länder).

Table 5. Second chambers in 12 parliamentary democracies Country Name of the chamber Confidence Non-budget legislation Budget legislation Introduction Final veto Introduction Final veto Australia Senate No Yes Yes No Yes Belgium Senate No Partial Partial No No Canada Senate No Yes Yes No No Czech Republic Senate No Yes Partial Yes No Germany Federal Council No Yes Partial No No India Council of States No Yes Yes No No Italy Senate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Italy (reform) Senate No Partial Partial No No Japan House of Councilors No Yes No No No Netherlands Senate No No Yes No Yes South Africa National Council of Provinces No Partial Partial No No Spain Senate No Partial No No No United Kingdom House of Lords No Yes No No No

Cont. Different Different Different timing Territorial Minorities’ Country procedure of representational Direct election of selection representation representation selection principle Australia Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes No Belgium No Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes Canada Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Czech Republic Partial Yes No Yes No No Germany Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No India Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes No Italy No Partial* No Yes No Yes** Italy (reform) Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No Japan Yes Partial No Yes No No Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes No South Africa No*** Yes Yes Partial Yes No Spain No Yes No Yes Yes No United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes No No No * I have considered the electoral law into force for the 2006, 2008, and 2013 general elections. ** Quota for expatriates as indicated by Krook and O’Brien (2010: 257). *** Members of the second chambers are indirectly selected by provincial territories. Although the Constitution does not require simultaneity, general and provincial elections are usually held at the same time. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org); Krook and O’Brien (2010: 257-258); Money and Tsebelis (1992: 36-39); O’Brien (1997); Patterson and Mughan (2001); Russell (2001a); Senate-Parliament of the Czech Republic (www.senat.cz).

The comparative picture in table 5 presents significant cross-country variations with respect to the legislative powers. Eight out of 13 second chambers can introduce non-budgetary bills, but only two are allowed when it comes to legislate on budgets. Moreover, most upper houses wield final vetoes on some legislation, but only three can definitely block budgetary decisions. Countries vary to a great extent also with regard to the direct election: in only two cases, the chambers’ members are appointed, while in six polities a sort of indirect democratic legitimation exists. Usually, no quotas for minorities are introduced, except for Belgium and Italy. In Belgium, this results from the fact the linguistic divides coincide with the territorial distinctions. Territorial representation is a feature of almost all second chambers. The data show also that only four democracies make the time of the selection of the two parliamentary

13 branches correspond fully. In three cases, the coincidence is only partial, whereas six polities adopt fully-fledged differentiations. The indicators of the confidence to the cabinet and procedure of selection provide the lowest cross-country variation. Italy (with the current Constitution) is the only country where the second chamber can dismiss a government and, together with Japan, where the MPs in the lower and upper house are only partially selected through different procedures. The collected information is quantified and shown graphically in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Types of second chambers in 13 institutional settings

BEL

SP AUS ITA1

SAF ITA2 GE IND NTL

JPN CZE Authoritative strength Authoritative

CAN

UK 0 0 1 Organizational strength

Note: ITA1 refers to the Italian second chamber as it is; ITA2 refers to the prospective upper house according to the constitutional reform.

The upper left quadrant corresponds to the type 1 (see above) of second chambers, that is, those upper houses with an high authoritative strength (legitimate), but only a few resources of organizational power. In the lower right quadrant, the situation is overturned. The weakest second chambers can be found in the lower left quadrant, whereas the strongest are placed in the upper right space of the graph. The placement of the 13 houses confirms the validity of the proposed indices as an illustrative tool for the comparative study of second chambers (and bicameralism). For example, all the chambers of the type 2 – those of Australia and Italy – or however close to (Germany, India, and the Netherlands) are considered powerful for example also by Lijphart (2012). Among the strong chambers mentioned in his analysis, the Japanese House of Councilors is, on the

14 contrary, a deviant case. This is probably due to the fact the Lijphart has referred to the democratic legitimation as a source of organizational strength instead of the authoritative strength, thus increasing the score on the dimension of formal power. A further point of divergence is that he has focused only on the territorial differentiation to ‘measure’ the inter- chamber incongruence. Contrary to what one could expect at a first glance, the Italian Senate introduced by the reform appears not much weaker than its current version, even if substantially impoverished with regard to its powers over legislation. Indeed, it could have the resources to counterbalance the loss of formal power with a more pronounced differentiation in terms of membership. This means that the Senate could still function as an effective institutional check. Moreover, the chamber will lose the direct democratic legitimation, but, according to the theoretical framework, it will be able to rely on a new source of legitimation: the representation of territories. The impact of this resource, however, would depend on the voters’ support towards the sub-national entities affected by the recentralization process, which is provided for by the constitutional reform.

6. Conclusions: What Implications for the Executive-Legislative Arena? The constitutional reform introduces a system where most of the legislative powers are situated in the lower house, to which the cabinet is exclusively accountable. This implies that, even when the two chambers are not congruent, the government could have a greater room for maneuver – compared to the past – to limit the coalitional borders and, nonetheless, to have the support to stay in office and promote bills. As a consequence, the governmental Pareto Set (Tsebelis 2002) is likely to be narrower and, thus, the modification of the status quo should be easier, all else equal. However, in as much as the second chamber has legislative prerogatives, the Senate will be still a veto player in the policy-making process if there is an inter-chamber incongruence in terms of membership (Druckman et al. 2005; Zucchini 2013: 110). According to our argumentation, this situation is likely to occur. Moreover, I have focused on a further variable that can enhance the strength of the second chamber, that is, its (perceived) legitimacy. The new Senate will be legitimate by both an indirect democratic legitimation and the representation of different interests (Russell 2001b). Experiences in other countries prove that this factor can make even weaker upper houses able to make governing parties more sensitive to the upper house’s positions (Russell 2013).

Overall, the new Italian Senate could remain a relevant institutional player in the Italian political system vis-à-vis the government, although downsized in its scope of action. Our comparative analysis has shown that other ‘minor’ chambers can be strong for a series of reasons in spite of their subordinated role. Tsebelis and Money (1997: 211) have stated that ‘second chambers always exercise an influence on final outcomes of legislation.’ This holds in particular when other factors counterbalance the lack of formal power in all fields of legislation. The German Bundesrat, ‘the single most important institution’ of German federalism (Patzelt 1999: 60), is a case in point. As a conclusion, a caveat about the preliminary indicators proposed must be addressed. The rough distinction between non-budget and budget legislation that I have proposed cannot capture the degree of variance within the former category. A second chamber can wield power in relation to a great bulk of non-budgetary bills or only to a few issues, such as constitutional laws and relationships between the central State and sub-national territories. Our scores can tell if the competence is on all topics or only on some of them, irrespective to their number and their significance. Future research can point to comprehensive comparative analyses of the features of bicameralism I have dealt with, by intertwining them with electoral and party factors; on the other hand, a refinement of the indicators and their quantification could be the first step towards more fine-grained comparisons.

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