Syria's Reconstruction-A Russian Political Project the Situation In

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Syria's Reconstruction-A Russian Political Project the Situation In Syria’s Reconstruction-a Russian Political Project The Situation in Sweida is Heating Up Yazidi children are ISIS’s ticking time bomb Photo by: Jian Haj Yousef 1 Editorial Editorial .......................................................................... 3 Geneva and Astana Index Geneva and Astana Article .............................................................................. 4 Suwar Team Deir Ezzor: The marginalized city becomes the center of major power struggles in the region The Syrian people today feel bitter and disheartened about their situation and that of their community and country, which has been divided into cantons and isolated pockets, as a result of a war that has reinforced • Deir Al-Zor.. War on Terrorism Destroys the Margin- alized City social and geographical division, displaced millions and killed thousands. • The Russian-American Conflict in Deir al-Zor Chaos These feelings are enhanced by the actions of the different regional and international powers including Rus- of a Frantic Race sia, Iran, Turkey, the United States of America and the Gulf States who have not played any positive role in • Deir al-Zor Residents.. From the Horrors of Shelling de-escalating the Syrian war or supporting efforts for a peaceful solution. On the contrary, these powers have to the Hell of Displacement exacerbated the situation, with some participating directly in the conflict, making the losses and destruction more disastrous. All this has increased the feeling of loss among Syrians, especially as the negotiations taking Dialogues ...................................................................... 12 place do not bring about a solution to the death of Syrians. Suwar Magazine interview with Riad Hammoud Darar, a Syrian opposition political and social activist and The Geneva negotiations do not appear to be making any significant progress on a political solution to the author from Deir Ezzor. Syrian issue, with the exception of Mr. De Mistura›s submission to the United Nations Security Council call- ing for all parties to participate together at the expert level on legal and constitutional issues to break the 18 Point of View ................................................................ stalemate. The opposition is concerned with the discussion of the political transition and demands progress Geneva and the Road to a Political Solution in this area, while the regime delegation insists that fighting terrorism should be the priority for any nego- The rhythm of the lens ............................................. 22 tiations. Meanwhile the absence of international support for the negotiations exacerbates the situation. The countries active in the Syrian negotiations want to promote their interests through a variety of avenues, but Reports and Investigations ..................................... 24 a political solution is not one of them, which is why they do not put pressure on the participating parties to • The Situation in Sweida is Heating Up reach a solution. • Children of the Idlib Countryside.. From Schools to In the context of the vicious cycle of these difficult political negotiations, the Russians and the Turks devel- Recruitment Camps oped another framework in Astana, which is focused on military negotiations. These negotiations are consid- • Yazidi children are ISIS’s ticking time bomb ered by some to be more important than the political negotiations in Geneva and even as an alternative to them. This sentiment is particularly prevalent after the participating parties in Astana reached an agreement Window on Rights ..................................................... 39 on “de-escalation zones», which were drawn on the basis of the ceasefire agreement, and with Russia, Tur- Honor Crimes: A Continuous Injustice key, and Iran as guarantors. This de-escalation agreement seemed to satisfy the demands of many regional • تتأصل المدنية بالوعي • Trapped and Abandoned and international parties. This indicates that the military and armed groups are the decision-makers in The Experience of Female Detainees in Syria the Syrian war. International resolutions and political negotiations are not effecting what is happening Monthly Magazine about Civil Society, on the ground with the displacement of populations, demographic changes, and the redrawing of maps Democracy and Human Rights. Economy ........................................................................ 46 and borders to separate these de-escalated areas. These practices will have implications and conse- Syria’s Reconstruction-a Russian Political Project quences on the country›s future and its territorial integrity. Suwar is an independent magazine with an editorial board consisting of Syrian Culture ............................................................................ 53 (investigative) journalists. Akitia.. The Story of Land and Identity Cinema ........................................................................... 56 To contact and send contributions and suggestions: On the Bride’s Side Email: [email protected] To Be Syrian .................................................................. 59 Facebook: suwar-magazine website: www.suwar-magazine.org Articles appended to the names of their writer convey their opinions only, and it does not necessarily convey the opinion of 2 3 the magazine or the editorial team Article Deir Ezzor: The marginalized city becomes the Deir Al-Zor center of major power struggles in the region War on Terrorism Destroys the Marginalized City Ahmad Al-Ali Newly discovered archaeological finds indicate that the history of the city of Deir al-Zor dates back to about 10,000 Deir Al-Zor BC and that it has been inhabited since the 9th century BC. Civilizations followed one after another in the city, which has witnessed the days of the Assyrians, the Acadians, the War on Terrorism Destroys the Marginalized City Romans and others. Islamic rule passed through this city, before spreading to the rest of Syria and then later to the Ottoman Empire. After the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreements in 1916, which redistributed Arab land formerly Ahmad Al-Ali under Ottoman rule between the two powers, Deir al-Zor became a marginalized city on the edge of Syria. Most of its economy depends on agriculture and livestock, because of its proximity to the Euphrates River. The Russian-American Conflict in Deir al-Zor Deir al-Zor is considered one of the most important ment of the Syrian revolution and its streets witnessed cotton producing cities in Syria, which was ranked sec- demonstrations exceeding 250,000 people. As the Syr- Chaos of a Frantic Race ond in the world in production before 2011. It is also ian revolution became more militarized, many of its famous for the cultivation of wheat, barley, sugar beet, residents became members of the Free Syrian Army; Kamal Al-Srouji fruit trees, and vegetables, and is one of the most im- thousands of its inhabitants were arrested and forcibly portant livestock producing cities with cattle and sheep disappeared in the regime’s prisons; large parts of the Deir al-Zor Residents in addition to fish from the Euphrates River. city and its countryside were destroyed and thousands Deir al-Zor Governorate is the second largest Syrian were killed by the regime’s air force. From the Horrors of Shelling to the Hell of Displacement province, covering an area of 33,000 square kilometers. With the emergence of ISIS and its expansion and con- It has strategic importance, making it one of the most trol over the majority of the province as well as their George K. Maiala important cities in Syria because of the oil and gas fields efforts to control the oil of the region, the main nerve of discovered there in the 1980s. These fields are mainly Deir al-Zor`s economy, the international alliance for the located on the northeastern side of the Euphrates River, “war against terrorism” began to target the area in order in the region which is locally called the “island” (al-Ja- to eliminate ISIS, after taking control of Raqqa. zeera in Arabic). In addition, there are pumping and as- Deir al-Zor is currently witnessing an intensity in fight- sembly stations of oil coming from Hasakeh and Raqqa ing that has not been seen in other cities since Aleppo. Governorates. The difference is that the whole world is bombing it, Although Deir al-Zor was the richest of the Syrian prov- including the Syrian regime and its Russian ally; the in- inces during the rule of Hafez al-Assad, it became more ternational coalition; and local and foreign militias who marginalized and impoverished. Despite the high rate of are providing support from the ground. education, the regime deliberately brought in employ- Whatever the identity of the final victor, the ultimate ees from other provinces to manage the oil sector, rath- loser in this war are the Syrian civilians who have been er than educate and recruit from the area’s residents, or uprooted from their land and seen the foundations of develop an industrial base accompanying the produc- their lives destroyed. In Deir al-Zor today you will find tion and refining of oil, forcing many of its youth to mi- only empty cities and villages, and hundreds of hectares grate outside the country in search of sources to make of arid land that were once green fields. a decent living. In the 1980s, the people of Deir al-Zor suffered on a large-scale from arrests and were killed In this issue, Suwar Magazine opens and explores the due to their perceived affiliation to the Muslim Brother- myriad issues facing
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