FEBRUARY 2017 Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War RENATA SEGURA AND DELPHINE MECHOULAN Cover Photo: A man holds a Colombian ABOUT THE AUTHORS flag with white stripes during a demonstration in support of the peace RENATA SEGURA is the Associate Director of the Conflict agreement between the Colombian Prevention and Peace Forum of the Social Science government and the FARC-EP, Bogotá, Research Council. Colombia, November 30, 2016. Guillermo Legaria/Stringer. Email: [email protected] Disclaimer: The views expressed in this DELPHINE MECHOULAN is a Policy Analyst at the paper represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. International Peace Institute. IPI welcomes consideration of a wide Email: [email protected] range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank all of the UN officials, IPI Publications Adam Lupel, Vice President government representatives, and experts who shared their Albert Trithart, Associate Editor insights in interviews conducted in New York and Bogotá Madeline Brennan, Assistant Production and by telephone. The authors are particularly grateful for Editor those colleagues who provided advice and feedback on earlier drafts of this report, including Catalina Acevedo, Suggested Citation: Mauricio Artiñano, Arthur Boutellis, Martha Doggett, Renata Segura and Delphine Mechoulan, “Made in Havana: How Fabrizio Hochschild, Adam Lupel, Ameya Naik, Jordi Raich, Colombia and the FARC Decided to Andres Salazar, Enrique Santos, Carolina Vizcaino, and End the War,” New York: International Christian Voelkel. Special thanks go to Sabrina Stein and Peace Institute, February 2017. Lesley Connolly for their research assistance and feedback © by International Peace Institute, 2017 on early drafts. All Rights Reserved IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their www.ipinst.org generous support. This publication was funded by the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen with resources provided by the German Federal Foreign Office. CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . 1 Introduction . 2 Historical Background and Past Peace Processes . 5 The Road to Havana . 9 PRELIMINARY MEETINGS THE SECRET PHASE THE PUBLIC PHASE The Role of the United Nations. 18 UN COUNTRY TEAM SUPPORT UN MISSION IN COLOMBIA Other External Actors . 24 Key Issues . 26 CEASE-FIRE INCLUSIVITY PLEBISCITE Conclusion . 31 iii Abbreviations DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DPA UN Department of Political Affairs DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations EU European Union FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organization FARC-EP Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICTJ International Center for Transitional Justice IOM International Organization for Migration MVM Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms OAS Organization of American States OHCHR UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender UNASUR Union of South American Nations UNDP UN Development Programme UNICEF UN Children’s Fund UNMAS UN Mine Action Service UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime UP Unión Patriótica 1 Executive Summary politics in Colombia and provided a controlled environment. While this proved to be essential On November 24, 2016, the government of for the parties to come to an agreement, it left Colombia and the biggest guerrilla group in the many Colombians feeling removed from the country, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de process and limited their sense of ownership. Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), signed a • A strategic use of the international community: final peace agreement. This accord put an end to the The dialogue was guided by a central premise: longest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere this would be a process “for Colombians, by and to long and convoluted peace talks. Over the Colombians.” This meant that the government course of more than four years, these talks went tightly controlled the process and excluded the through ups and downs, including moments of real possibility of an external mediator. Nonetheless, crisis—most profoundly when voters narrowly the Colombian government reached out to and rejected the initial peace accord in October 2016, mobilized the international community. Cuba leading to several weeks of renegotiation. and Norway, as guarantor countries, are credited With so many Colombians registering their with much of the success of the process. disapproval and with implementation of the accord Venezuela and Chile, as “accompanying” just beginning, can the peace process be considered countries, provided needed regional support. a success? This paper argues it can be, in that it And the United Nations, despite initial skepti- managed to achieve its main goal: to convince the cism from both parties, gradually grew into a FARC-EP to voluntarily set aside its weapons and significant role and is now at the center of the start the transition to becoming a political party. peace accord’s implementation. Although the What elements of the process contributed to this involvement of these actors was essential to the success? While we believe it is too early to properly successful outcome of the talks, it did not speak of “lessons learned” from the process, this translate into wider legitimacy inside Colombia. paper highlights the key elements that seemed to • A complex puzzle of mechanisms: The peace have worked and those that made progress process consisted of numerous mechanisms and difficult. These elements are examined across the spaces that worked simultaneously. While the three distinct phases of the process: (1) initial diverse channels of communication facilitated clandestine talks at the border with Venezuela that the achievement of an agreement, they also started in the spring of 2011; (2) secret negotiations prolonged the talks, which proved to be politi- in Havana, Cuba, starting in February 2012; and (3) cally costly. four years of public talks, which officially started in • Limited participation: At first, the talks were not October 2012. only geographically removed from Colombia but Across these three phases, the peace process also were held with an unprecedented level of involved a complex puzzle of mechanisms, secrecy. The process slowly opened to experts, advisers, facilitators, and experts, but several the press, and civil society, but participation factors emerge as central, both to its successful remained controlled and limited. While this resolution and to the problems likely to arise facilitated the negotiations themselves, it came at during implementation: a huge political cost. • A limited agenda: Previous talks with the FARC- • The search for legitimacy: The Colombian EP had been burdened by an extremely long government was much more effective at raising agenda that included many issues the public international support for the peace process than believed should not be settled in a negotiation at convincing its own people about the with an insurgent group. Reflecting this experi- importance of the agreement with the FARC-EP. ence, the agreed final agenda addressed just six The campaign in support of the process came late issues. and was woefully inadequate. With many still • A peace process removed from Colombia: questioning the accord’s legitimacy, it will be in Cuba’s hosting of the negotiations buffered the the hands of the next government to make sure talks from the daily occurrences of war and the Havana process is a solid foundation for a stable and long-lasting peace. 2 Renata Segura and Delphine Mechoulan Introduction FARC-EP and had been displeased by what they thought was a distasteful celebration that The government of Colombia and the biggest minimized the importance of the vote that would guerrilla group in the country, the Fuerzas Armadas take place a few days later. Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo In a statement on the evening of the plebiscite, (FARC-EP), signed a final peace agreement on former president (2002–2010) and current senator November 24, 2016.1 This accord put an end to the Álvaro Uribe, the leader of the opposition to the longest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere peace process, underscored that the victory of “no” (over fifty years) and to long and convoluted peace should not be interpreted as a desire to return to talks.2 The process had three distinct phases: (1) war, but rather as the need to improve the accord. initial clandestine talks between envoys of the In the following weeks, government officials met government of President Juan Manuel Santos and with various representatives of the opposition, who FARC-EP representatives at the border with presented a series of documents charting their Venezuela that started in the spring of 2011; (2) desired modifications.4 The government went back secret negotiations that took place in Havana, Cuba, to Havana on October 22nd after having distilled and started in February 2012; and (3) four years of these down to 455 concrete proposals and started public talks, which officially started on October 18, the renegotiation with the FARC-EP.5 A new 2012, with a joint press conference in Hurdal, accord, which, according to the government and Norway (see Figure 1). the FARC-EP, incorporated most of the requests of The peace process, as is frequently the case, went the “no” vote, was announced on November 12th.6 through ups and downs, including moments of real Although some analysts had initially been crisis. Yet the strongest blow was the result of the optimistic about the possibility of having a new plebiscite on October 2, 2016, when voters rejected deal that would satisfy Uribe and other leaders of the peace accord by a margin of less than 1 the “no” camp, it soon became clear that there percent.3 This brought preparations to start the would be no “national dialogue” that fully implementation phase to a screeching halt and embraced the process with the FARC-EP.7 The made evident the country’s polarization.