HONORS THESIS IN GLOBAL STUDIES
FAILED CASE OF THE INTERNATIIONAL INVOLVEMENT: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
(1915-1967)
A Major Paper Submitted to the Faculty of the Department of Global Studies Of the University of Minnesota
By Jargalmaa Erdenemandakh
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Bachelor of Arts (Summa Cum Laude)
Main reader: Professor Ajay Skaria
Other readers: Professor Stuart McLean
Professor William Viestienz
Dec 20, 2013
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Glossary
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……3-4
1. A. Macmohan letter and Balfour Declaration…………………………………………………………….……….5-6
1. B. Formation of a Palestinian nationalism...... 7-10
1. C. Peel Commission, Macdonald White Paper ……………………………………………...…………….…11-12
1. D. Zionist nationalism…………………………………………………………………………………………………....13-14
2. A. Resolution 181 in relation to Israeli and Palestinian declarations of statehood……….…15-17
2. B. Why did the Resolution 181 pass?………………….……………………………....…………………………18-20
2. C. Outcomes of the Resolution 181 (1948-1967) ……………………...... 21-23
3. A. Resolution 242. What did it say?………………………………...... 24-26
3. B. Resolution 242 and its interpretation by the Israeli and Palestinians...... 27-29
3. C. Interpretations of Resolution 242 by the U.S…………………………………………………..………….29-30
3. D.UN’s institutional challenges in the conflict mediation processes…………………………….…31-31
4. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..………………………………………………32-34
4. Bibliography…………………………………….………………………………………………………………….…...... 35-40
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1. Introduction
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been the most hotly debated and discussed conflict of the 20th century. What fascinated me the most was the task to find the main culprit that created the conflict in a way that it was fairly cumbersome to resolve. After careful examination of the myriads of conflicting articles and books, I came to realization that the most important period of the conflict was the beginning period, when international involvement was quite extensive. I feel that the policy papers, official documents of League of Nations and UN have potential to entangle the mystery of the conflict’s complexity.
This paper assesses three British policy papers regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Mandate of League of Nations and two most important UN resolutions involved in the conflict.
My paper would be divided in three major parts: section I will examine British policy papers such as Macmohan letter, Balfour declaration, Mcdonald White paper; section II will be a detailed analysis of UN’s resolution 181; lastly, section III will focus on UN’s resolution 242.
Section Palestine is a former British colony, so the British policy papers reveal how the Palestine was treated as a colony and how Jewish and Palestinian nationalistic aspirations, if any, evolved through the mandatory power’s policies. Palestine fell under British control after the World
War I, and the colonial system was regulated by the League of Nations. Examining the Mandate issued to Palestine would determine whether Palestine had the right of self-determination and potential to be a nation. The first UN resolution I would examine is the resolution 181 that partitioned the Palestinian territories in two separate domains: Palestinian and Israeli. However, the plan wasn’t successful, so another resolution, resolution 242, came into being to, again, draw the line between the Palestinian and Israeli territories. What went wrong with these two
3 resolutions, so that the borders have become the main issue of the conflict? This is the central question of my paper.
Another core issue is if anything went wrong with both of the resolutions, then what were those issues and whether or not those problems still persist until today hindering and prolonging the conflict. My pursuit is to find the core issues that still keep the conflict active or prevent the negotiations. The last core task is to find out what challenges the UN as a mediator faces and whether or not it can ever overcome those obstacles.
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1. A. Macmohan letter and Balfour Declaration
The importance of the Middle Eastern oil in the British Navy became the primary reason for Britain to dissolve the Ottoman Empire. “Naval supremacy was central to England’s conception of its world role and to the security of the British Empire1” as it was the primary fuel to rival German and American navies that directly threatened the British colonial expansion. To reach the goal, Britain had to gain Arab support and in 1915 Sir Henry McMahon, promised to support “an independent Arab state2” in a letter to Arab tribal leader Sharif Faisal bin Hussein of Mecca, so that “Great Britain … will assist to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of governments3 of those (Arab) territories”. Faisal supported the British in the war against the Ottomans in exchange for a unified Arab country centered in Damascus, Syria that would include today’s Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and the Jordan.4. Unfortunately for the
Syrian nationalists, part of Syria fell under France’s rule after the battle of Maysalun in 1920 and the French did not want Arab independence. Faisal, the Arab leader, had to flee from Syria5 and later became the King of Iraq with the help of Britain. Promises of a united Arab country were not fulfilled: France and Britain signed the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 according to which France formed a new Syria. Britain announced that Transjordan became a British Mandate6, but the status of Palestine was left out. According to the treaty, Britain assumed that Palestine was under direct British control.
1 D.Yergin, p. 152. 2 N.Mitchell, p.14. 3 Mcmohan letter 4 N.Mitchell, p.32. 5 N.Mitchell, p.33. 6 Aruri, p.18.
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Britain intended to leave out the status of Palestine to “establish a homeland for the Jews in the holy land7”, because just a few years before Britain issued a policy paper, called the Balfour
Declaration, which supported such establishment. Some scholars argue that the Balfour
Declaration was issued as a favor to the USA8 who stepped into the World War I recently, but there is little evidence that suggests the U.S favored the Jewish state at that point. Most likely it was a product of a friendship between Zionist leader Weizmann and British Lord Arthur Balfour9 when the former worked in British naval laboratories. The Balfour Declaration opened Palestine to Jewish immigrants, “so that by 1931 the Jews constituted 16%, and by 1947 one-third of
Palestine's population10”. The Balfour Declaration was followed by turbulent clashes between
Palestinian and Jewish nationalists from 1922-193611, the riots in 1929 and of 193612 being the most violent.
7 D. Söderblom, p. 1. 8 Honeyman, p. 6. 9 Lord Balfour was responsible in preparing the Balfour Declaration 10Honeyman, page 7. 11 N.Mitchell, p.35. 12 N. Mitchell.p. 39
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1. B. Formation of a Palestinian nationalism
Palestinian Arabs saw the central authority in
13 Syria as the step towards “Arab independence”
that would assist Palestine in resisting Zionist
movement that started with the issuance of the
Balfour Declaration. The collapse of the “United
Arab” state became a shifting point in Palestinian
nationalism and facilitated the formation of their
identity as Palestinians. The Palestinian nationalism
was formed precisely against the Balfour Declaration and existed as a powerful movement in the first two decades of the mandate years14. Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem, the religious leader, Hajj Amin has emerged as an influential national leader supported by the majority of Palestinians to lead a movement against the Zionist expansion in
1928.
Amin was mostly concentrating on fighting against the Zionist encroachment, rather than forming the distinct Palestinian identity, In such endeavor, Amin never directly attacked the
British, thus the Mandate government under Herbert Samuel considered Hajj Amin to be a moderate.15 Amin’s public policy was such that “the Palestinians should not revolt against the
British rule, which was …ephemeral; instead, they should concentrate on opposing the Zionists,
13 Muslih, p. 118. 14 Muslih, p.118 15Nicholas Mitchell, p. 39.
7 who were the main threat to the Palestinian nationalists16”. Amin only attacked the Zionists, rather than establishing the national identity separate from Syrians and Transjordanians. or
,simply, Arabs.
Amin demanded Palestinian right of independence from the Britain through sending delegates and letters, however he wasn’t persistent and assertive and didn’t attack the Britain for treating Palestine as a “lesser” colony. His claim was based on the “A” class Mandate issued by League of Nations and the above-mentioned Macmohan letter, meaning the Palestine was entitled to be independence. After Wold War I, former German and Ottoman territories had to reclassified in a three-tier system: the colonies that have reached more independence were labeled as “A”class, less independence-“B” class, and least independence- “C” class mandate.
According to Article 2217, the League of Nations classified territories belonging to the Ottoman
Empire as “A” class Mandates 18 , because accordingly they “have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory19”. To the demand of Amin, the British Empire responded; however, by stating their Treaty of Sevres, concluded with France in 1920 (in clear violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations) that explicitly referred to communities of the Turkish Empire as having reached the stage to declare independence. Churchill stated: “Palestine was not mentioned in the Treaty of Sevres and fell under direct British control.”20 The Palestinian nationalism wasn’t developed as a unique
16 Mattar, p. 26. 17 Söderblom, p. 1. 18 Nicholas Mitchell, p.41 19 Article 22. 20 Nicholas Mitchell, p. 41.
8 nationalism and was still regarded by the British as an “Arab” territory that had an unknown status.
The Palestinian nationalism could
have grown into a distinct identity based
on the “A”-class mandate, but the
leader’s demand for the independence
was only limited to letters and delegates.
The national identity formation never
fully developed the Amin’s leadership
was gone. The Palestinian nationalist
movement was significantly weakened
when Amin had to flee to Lebanon in
1937 to escape arrest when the British
accused him of assassinating “British
officials Galilee District Commissioner
L.Y. Andrews and British Constable P.R. McEwen .”21 Without the Amin’s leadership Arab nationalist resistance in Palestine fell. Palestinians had “a central authority based on traditional family hierarchy and prestige22” and without Amin the movement did not hold together. The remaining Palestinian nationalists were fractured into numerous guerrilla groups and continued to attack Zionist settlements through 1939.
21 Nicholas Mitchell, p. 86. 22 Nicholas Mitchell, p. 95.
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Former Ottoman Empire territories that were classified as “A” class mandate territories.
Note that Palestinian territories are on the map
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1. C. Peel mission, White Paper of 1939-British way of solving the conflict
To end the violent conflicts, colonial powers
must understand the national interests of the
Jews and Palestinians, but it appears that Britain
did not comprehend the clash of the two
nationalisms. Even if Britain knew it, it proceeded
to put the British interests ahead anyways. The
mandatory power tried to establish a bi-national
state in Palestine through the Peel Commission in
1937 acknowledging the clash of two
nationalisms. However, the plan left one
significant amount of land to the direct British
control, the Negev desert to be exact, so that
there would be some way to get to the Suez Canal
of Egypt. The plan also did not allot as much land
to the needs of the Holocoust survivors. Statistics show that most Holocoust survivors settled either in the U.S or in Palestine. The peel commission failed, because it only reflected the selfish imperial needs of the Britain, instead of the reality of the situation.
In 1939, another policy paper came into the force, the MacDonald White Paper. Britain assumed that the two nations would reconcile with each other and “called for an independent
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Palestine established within 10 years, governed jointly by Arabs and Jews”.23 It’s clear that the
British knew that the Balfour declaration was a mistake that needed to be corrected and by this policy, Britain started restricting the Jewish immigration. The policy didn’t take into account the need for the two potential nation-states to be sovereign, independent from Britain’s presence, and the urgency of Jewish immigration to Palestine due to the Holocaust that intensified with the start of World War II in 1939. Palestinian Arabs and Jews rejected the policy, because it was clear that with this policy the real power over Palestinian territories would still be in the hands of its colonial power and no separate identities will be created. Even the text of the White
Paper suggests that the United Kingdom will gain commercial and strategic advancements from the independent Palestine. 24 However, “the policy set forth with the MacDonald White Paper of 1939”25 remained the main policy of the British Empire until the end of the mandate period of 1948 and restricted Jewish immigration by military force. The mandatory power solutions were selfish and weren’t intended to solve the conflict; rather it was intended to secure British interests to the Suez Canal.
23 Macdonald White Paper, section 1 24 The White Paper of 1939, Section 1, paragraph 9. 25 Towards Nakba: the failure of the British mandate of Palestine, Nicholas Ensley Mitchell, 2007, p. 94.
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1. D. Zionist nationalism. Early periods and in the aftermath of White paper
Zionism or the nationalist project of establishing national homeland for the Jews is described by Naomi Shepherd as “monolithic”26 and comparison to the Palestinian nationalists, were determined towards a single: a Jewish state27 in Palestine. Chaim Weizmann and Ze’ev
Jabotinksy are the first Zionist leaders to develop a viable strategy for the Zionist project in terms of legitimacy and military and political power. Weizmann declared that Britain as a superpower must back up their Zionist project28 in order to make it successful. He was the main influence to the Balfour declaration that opened the gates of the Palestine for Jewish settlement. To legitimize their project in order not to be perceived as a yet another European colonial project, Chaim Weizman insisted “instead of ‘establishment’ to use ” a “re- establishment”29 of the Jewish homeland. In 1914, Ze’ev Jabotinsky suggested to create “a
Jewish volunteer corps30” to help Britain fight the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and tightened
Zionist Congress with the British government. This military cooperation created two giant military divisions called Haganah and Irgun that later crushed the joint forces of Arab Legion.
These two leaders have built the foundation for a viable Israeli state.
The Zionism managed to stay strong even amidst the ideological split between the leaders and the British restriction of Jewish settlement by force during the mandate period of
Palestine. Three influential leaders had different views on the Zionist project. Weizmann was explicit that the Zionists desired a “harmonious co-operation with all sections of the people of
26 Shepherd, p.24 27 Nicholas Mitchell, p.45. 28 Nicholas Mitchell, p.54. 29 Nicholas Mitchell, p.55. 30 Nicholas Mitchell, p.58.
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Palestine31”, whereas Jabotinsky saw the Jewish settlement of Palestine as a “colonial project”32 and “Ben-Gurion’s attitude towards the Zionist settlement developed as their project gained more power33: Before World War I, Ben-Gurion stated that Palestinians had the right to view
Palestine as their homeland whereas by 1930 they only had rights to their homes; Zionists were entitled to the rest34, the reason being that “Palestine is undeveloped and awaits its builders35”.
This division, made the Zionism even stronger, because the fracture made the two Jewish military divisions called Haganah and Irgun even stronger. In 1946, in the wake of the White
Paper, “the pressure of the Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe added to the resentment the
Zionists36”, Irgun no longer restrained from attacking the British and “bombed the center of the
Mandate government at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem”37 to the Jewish perception of the
British government. In By 1939, Jabotinsky had been expelled from Palestine; David Ben-
Gurion’s Labour Zionism had become the mainstream. The Zionist movement stayed strong throughout the mandate period of 1948. The fracture of the ideological leaders and the restriction from settlement only made the movement stronger.
31 Palestine, Correspondence, ch. 2. 32 Jabotinsky, 33 Teveth, Shabtai, p. 38. 34 Nicholas Mitchell, p.134. 35 Teveth, Shabtai, p. 38. 36 Nicholas Mitchel, p.92 37 Nicholas Mitchell, p.94
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2. A. Resolution 181 in relating to Israeli and Palestinian declarations of statehood
Unable to resolve the Palestinian problem and getting bombed by the Israeli Irgun,
Britain handed the problem to the United Nations; however, the UN again ignored Palestinian self-determination. The mandates of the League of Nations eventually were inherited by the
United Nations under the name of “Trust Territories”, and all former “A” class mandate territories have gained their independence easily. A request by Arab High Committees 38
(representing the majority of Palestinians) and Arab states to add the additional agenda "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence”39, and repeated requests by Arab states to refer the question of legal status of Palestine to the
International Court of Justice40, were rejected by the General Assembly. Instead, a special session of the General Assembly was called, “at which 7 of the 11 nations recommended that
Palestine be divided in two states stating the Nazi atrocities against the Jews”41. Thus, the sympathetic global sentiment towards the Holocaust prevented the UN from declaring
Palestinian independence and strictly adhering to its policies inherited from the League of
Nations.
Resolution 181 or the Partition Plan, adopted by the UN General Assembly to deal with the question of Palestine, didn’t have any legal basis to partition Palestine. “The United Nations did not possess any sovereignty or exercise any other right over Palestine42”, nor did it have any legal validity or enforcing mechanism as it was “adopted by General Assembly, not Security
38 John Quigley,2010 p. 91. 39 John Quigley, 2010, p. 90. 40 Badil, p. 1. 41 John Quigley, p. 91. 42 D. Söderblom, p. 4.
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Council.”43 Thus, the partition plan had only a recommendatory role to resolve the Palestinian question. However, even non-binding, the unjust resolution has played a vital role in denigrating self-determination of inhabitants and “assigned 55 % of Palestine for the creation of a Jewish state44”. However, the UN’s symbolic power was strong, because the mandatory superpower British handed Britain’s role to deal with the colonial sphere.
The Partition plan upgraded the status of
Jewish
43 D. Söderblom, p. 5. 44 Söderblom, p. 5.
16 homeland to “Jewish state45”, leaving the definition of a future Palestinian state merely as vague as “Arab state”46, thus delegitimizing Palestinian right of self-determination. Perhaps, this terminology reflects the perceived identity of Palestinians Furthermore the partition plan left only 45% of land to Palestinians, mostly unfertile land that was a "vital land bridge protecting
British interests from the Suez Canal to Iraq47”, thus serving the foreign needs, not the needs of residents. British land registration documents state that Palestinian Arabs owned 93 percent of the land and Jews owned only 7 percent of the land48. The plan didn’t grant the integrity of territory for both Palestinians and Israelis, dividing the territory in six disconnected cantons plus
“Java as an enclave of the Arab State49”. By comparing today’s Palestinian territories to the proposed partition plan, one can see why today’s Palestinian territories have become discontinuous. In short, the resolution deepened the conflict and soon after the vote on the
Partition plan, violence throughout Palestine and neighboring Arab states broke out.
45 Resolution 181, part II (B).http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm 46 181, part II (A) http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm . Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement, State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 195. 48 Söderblom, p. 4. 49 Söderblom, p. 5.
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2. B. Why did the resolution 181 pass?
If the resolution 181 was so unethical and illegal, then the question is why it did pass as a resolution in the first place? In this chapter I’ll explore this question. Since we know that the
Holocoust atmosphere had a profound effect on passing the resolution, I would jump to the political atmosphere of the General Assembly and its effect on whether the resolution would or would not get passed. Then, it would be worthy to analyze whether the resolution had a potential to be applied and exist as a framework of resolving the conflict.
The approval of a partition plan depended heavily on Cold war superpowers, which were very aware of the violent consequences of resolution 181. Contrary to British hope to achieve a lasting solution, the UN became a stage to enforce the Cold War politics by the Cold
War superpowers. Russia was consciously aiming for conflict in Middle East, because a Jewish state among the Arabs would offer Russia the bulwark against British imperialism50 and would
“ensure chaos and confusion in the Middle East by creating, against Arab opposition, a Jewish state.”51 The US President Truman, neglected American national interests 52and despite State
Department advice and Department of Defense pressure, supported the Partition Plan to ensure his election success in 1946. New York was pivotal for Truman, and the political leader knew that Zionists in New York “would vote as a bloc and might win or lose an election.”53 On
October 4, close to the election and an important Jewish religious festival, President Truman issued a statement calling for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine and urged
50 D. Söderblom, p.5. 51 Kermit, p. 4. 52 Kermit, p. 4. 53 Kermit, p. 12.
18 the "the creation of a viable Jewish state". 54 The United States and the Soviet Union found themselves in agreement regarding the Partition plan’s “solution”. “This was not only remarkable - at the time it seemed like a true wonder.”55 This miracle swayed opinions of many
Soviet and American satellite states, and the resolution was passed.
Thus, it’s clear that the partition plan was intended to create chaos, rather than a lasting peaceful solution. The loophole of the resolution was assigning part of the land to some entity called “Arabs” that don’t have definite status. The non-binding effect of the resolution could not have ensured any implementation of the suggested plan. However, the Cold war atmosphere and Holocaust sympathy at the General Assembly made it possible to approve the partition plan anyways, even if it meant that the resolution would create more chaos than what it was before.
54 Kermit, p. 12. 55 Evyatar Friesel, p. 15.
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2.C. Outcome of the Resolution 181 (1948-1967)
In this chapter I’ll explore how the events had progressed in the aftermath of partition plan.
Specifically, it’s interesting that the loopholes of the resolution were so obvious that so many countries have tried to exploit the unknown state of Palestinian territories. First, it would be better to explore how the British, still searching for a route to Egyptian Suez Canal, have tried to annex the Palestinian land through its ally Transjordan. Second and third, it’s significant to analyze what claims Arab Legion countries and Israel had to make to justify the annexation of the Palestinian land. Lastly, I will examine how does the international community label the annexation of Palestinian land.
In the aftermath of the partition plan, Britain was seeking to re-establish its route to the
Suez Canal through expanding Transjordan and annexing Palestinian land. The British had become increasingly hostile towards the idea of an independent Palestine in favor of a greater
Jordan to accommodate its needs56. Transjordan was of considerable importance to the British
Empire for being a bridge to the Suez Canal, a potential air base and a leader of Arab Legion, the only properly organized and equipped force in the Middle East. The “official” reason for this hostility was explained by B.A.B Burrow, the head of the Eastern department: “A separate Arab
State would be a foot bed of ineffectual Arab fanaticism is very likely fall in the end under
Jewish influence and be finally absorbed in the Jewish state, thereby increasing the area of possible Russian influence and excluding the possibility of our obtaining strategic requirements in any of Palestine.57 Britain steadily resisted the attempt by the UN to partition Palestine into 2 independent states, but did not resist the Israeli state contrary to the opinion of Israel. Britain
56 Kermit, p. 55. 57 Roger Louis, 1986, p. 377.
20 preferred to incorporate the land allotted to Palestinians to Transjordan and even encouraged
Transjordanian King Abdullah to usurp as much land as possible of the territory allocated to the
Arabs to secure the expansion of British Kingdom that had catastrophic results to Palestine.
The vague definition of Palestine as “The Arab State” in resolution 181 made the Arab high committee (official representatives of the Palestinian people) only assume58 that it was entitled to secure Palestinian borders, whereas the Israelis could declare their independence the day before the British mandate ended, on May 14th, 1948. More importantly not declaring the status of Palestine as an independent state, left the vacuum of the authority over the supposedly Palestinian land59, gave the Arab League members Tranjordan (Transjordan pushed by the British to annex as much Palestinian land) and Egypt incentive to annex and occupy West bank and Gaza Strip during Israeli-Arab war of 1948 justifying their actions as the “necessary and adequate protection”60 for their Muslim brothers. The vacuum of authority over the proposed Palestinian land, gave the incentives for the Israeli to create their state beyond the proposed borders of Israel through the resolution 181. “Israel didn’t restrain itself to the proposed borders of resolution 181”, 61 nor did the resolution have a binding effect to enforce to definite Israeli-Palestinian borders. The situation worsened in June 1967, in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, the proposed Palestinian territories of West bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza
Strip were captured by the Israelis and created uncertainty of their status.
58 John Quigley, 2010 p. 103. 59 If Palestine was declared as sovereign it could have been the rightful owner of West Bank, Gaza Strip and more land allotted through partition plan. 60Arab League’s Cablegram addressed to the UN’s Security Council, 1948 61 John Quigley, p. 104.
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Other Israelis captured “territories such as Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights [which] clearly constituted illegal occupation in the legal sense under customary law”62, because they were under Egyptian and Syrian sovereignty respectively. “From a legal standpoint, Israel took the view that in the absence of a prior sovereign, Israel’s control of the West Bank and Gaza did not fall within the definition of occupation”63. Furthermore, Stephen W. Schwebel, the former
Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State wrote in the American Journal of International
Law: “Where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder, better title.” 64 Jordan and Egypt illegally invaded West bank (East Jerusalem as part of
West bank) and Gaza strip in 1948 and held it until 1967, when Israel captured the territory. In short, according to Schwebel and subsequent American politicians, Israel’s occupation of West bank is not illegal, because it had been the victim of aggression in 1967. This claim can be disputed, because according to resolution 181, the West bank and Gaza strip belonged to the
Arab people and Israel, defending itself on a foreign territory, cannot claim legal rights to own that foreign land. The UN, the International Court of Justice, and international community use the term “occupation” of the West bank, Gaza strip and Golan Heights, but the terminology is highly disputed by the Israelis.
The lack of sovereignty gave incentives for Jordan and Egypt to annex Palestinian territories and made it acceptable for Israel to annex the proposed Palestinian territories and even dispute the legitimacy of Palestinian governance in West bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza
62 Avinoam Sharon, p. 8. 63 Avinoam Sharon, p. 9. 64 Schwebel, p.32
22 strip. It’s clear that international recognition of Palestinian sovereignty was desperately needed in order for Palestine to claim its territories, which resolution 181 did not provide. The vagueness and the non-binding effect of resolution 181 have created the modern Israeli-
Palestinian conflict over territories in West bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza strip. The whole process of annexation can be seen from the below picture.
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3. A. Resolution 242. What did it say?
At the end of the Six-day war, in 1967 the UN’s Security Council got involved in the dispute of territories again to resolve the disparities of opinions and to determine the rightful owner of the land in the West bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza strip and Golan Heights. “The Soviet Union, then the superpower-of-choice for Egypt and Syria”65 wanted to push for a resolution that would make Israel retreat to the borders before 1967. On the other hand, Israeli didn’t wanted pre-1967 borders, claiming that Israel had right to have defensible borders that would protect it from the Arab threat and demanded the recognition of its existence. The special relations with the U.S allowed Israel to represent its interests in the Security Council. The “Security Council argued throughout the summer and fall of 1967” 66 to appeal to both Russia and the U.S,
Security Councils that have power to veto any resolution, before agreeing on the resolution 181.
The first two sections of resolution 242 seem to be of much importance and dispute:
“The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the
need to work for a just and lasting peace, in which every State in the area can
live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of
the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of
65 Eric Black, p.45 66 Eric Black, p.46
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a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application
of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent
conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in
the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of
every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of
demilitarized zones”67
The text of the resolution 242 basically said nothing specific and was vague enough to appeal to both of the arguing Security Councils and passed as a resolution. It appears that the resolution was intended to appeal, rather than to resolve. The Later resolution 242 got its binding force through resolution 33868, although the binding force did not mean much when the language of the resolution does not solve the problem of borders. Palestinians rejected it,
67 Resolution 242. 68 Rostow, p. 275.
25 because there was not even mentioning the future Palestinian land, and they were only referred to as “refugees” causing problems in the region. It requires the Israeli withdrawal to territories of pre-1967 (all or some of the territories being unclear) that the Russians and Arabs
(Syria, Egypt and Palestinians) wanted. From the other hand it required what the U.S and Israel wanted: the recognition of Israel (the only disputed state at that point in the region was Israel) as a state and includes the words “the secure borders” that would be used later to claim the defensible borders of Israel that are located in occupied West bank, specifically Jordan valley of
West bank that is considered a defensive border for Israeli. The resolution passed because it could appeal to both Security Councils, not because it was a “resolution” that could resolve the conflict.
Resolution 242 “is considered as a building block” by many scholars of Palestine, Israel and the U.S by virtue of the vagueness that leaves the interpretation to imagination. Although it is not a strong resolution, it is a good thing to have a starting point for negotiations. The resolution created disparities in interpretations and each side saw what they want to see in the resolution. The main point of disparities remains the borders that existed before 1967 and whether or not Israel must retreat to pre-1967 borders leaving occupied territories to the
Israelis.
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3. B. Interpretation of the resolution 242 by Palestinians and Israeli
The resolution 242 deludes the Palestinians into thinking that the international body, UN, favors pre-1967 borders in resolving the conflict. “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”; those two phrases are enough for the Palestinians to insist on complete Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied by Israel in 196769. Palestinian PLO and Abbas have been clear that they won’t give up 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital”70 and will go for a very limited amount of land swap, specifically 2% in West bank. 71 Palestinians have traditionally insisted on complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories based on the
French version of the sentence which calls for “withdrawal…,” or “retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit.”72 (emphasis on “des forces” that is mistakenly interpreted by Palestinians as “the territories”). Furthermore, the international terminology of “occupation of territories in West bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza” further supports the Palestinian interpretation. This belief led into a path of not negotiating with Israel, and dealing with the situation only through the international bodies like UN or Quartet. Only the current Palestinian President Abbas was first from all the Palestinian diplomats and leaders to actually meet with the Israeli regarding the issue.
Israel on the other hand, has developed a strong stance on negotiating significant amount of land directly with Palestinians in order to meet Israel’s right of “defensible borders”. Israel argues that the English version, calls for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
69 Ruth Lapidoth, p. 88. 70 Ruth Lapidoth, p. 88. 71 Odelia Englander, 2009, p. 10 72 Ruth Lapidoth, p. 90.
27 occupied in the recent conflict”73. Further, they cite the actual drafters of the resolution. When drafting the wording American president Johnson, they say, refused to accept the demand of
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that Israel withdraw from “all the territories” to the prewar lines.
Johnson agued Israel needed “recognized boundaries” that provided “security against terror, destruction and war.”74 Ruth, the leading Israeli expert on international law, draws our attention to the English version that omitted “the” 75before “territories” and the fact that only the English version was passed as a resolution. Israelis point out that “withdrawal from territories” doesn’t mean going back to pre-1967 borders and insist on the need to keep
“secure borders” of the occupied lands, namely Jordan Valley of occupied West Bank. Israel refuses to accept any UN enforcement of other resolutions regarding the conflict and uses its ally, the U.S, to keep the UN from interfering the negotiations.
73 Resolution 242. 74 Speech by President Lyndon Johnson, June 19, 1967; http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US- Israel/lbjpeace.html . 75 Ruth Lapidoth, p. 88.
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3. C. Interpretation of the resolution 242 by the U.S
Since 1967, the UN has not played much role in the conflict with the adaptation of resolution 242; however, the text of resolution 242 still plays a big role in the negotiation process. Today the U.S has become the main mediator in the conflict by keeping the UN off the table through its veto power in Security Council. The role of the U.S. is increasing due to the fact that Palestinian diplomats have historically preferred to negotiate through international bodies grounding their territorial claims on Resolution 242. This chapter will explore how has the U.S historically understood Resolution 242 and whether or not the U.S backed up Israeli claims to defensible borders.
According to Dr. Gold, the former permanent representative of Israel to the United
Nations, both democrats and republicans have historically backed Israel's view on "defensible borders.”76 In other words, the U.S support is bipartisan. As stated above the U.S President
Lyndon B. Johnson was decisive in forming the language of resolution 242 and made it quite explicit that Israel does not need to go back to the 1967 borders and accommodated Israeli security needs in the West Bank. In 1973, in reference to the 1967 borders, Nixon acknowledged, “the Israelis can’t go back to the other borders 77 .” In 1975, the Ford administration in a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin admitted: “The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will give great weight to Israel’s position.”78
The Reagan administration was the first to defend the Israeli defensible borders and in 1982,
Secretary of State Shultz under the Reagan administration stated, “Israel will never return to
76 Dr. Dore Gold, p. 50. 77 Dr. Dore Gold, p. 55. 78 Dr. Dore Gold, p. 55.
29 the 1967 borders.”79 The Clinton administration talked about “annexing settlement blocs in the
West bank by Israel conditional upon a land swap”. In sum, the U.S. has historically backed up
Israel’s interpretation of the resolution 242.
The Israelis were assured of U.S support of defensible borders by a letter from U.S.
President Bush to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon in 2004. He wrote: “The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel’s security, including secure and defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel’s capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.”80 “Secure boundary81” for the Israelis in resolution 242 may suggest any military presence starting from NATO and the U.N Peace Corps, but in this letter Bush has affirmed that the U.S supports Israel’s ability to provide its own security. In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained on Israel Radio that “Israeli population centers” referred to “the large settlement blocs” in the West Bank82. The Obama administration did not press for full withdrawal either, although he called for the 1967 borders as a starting point with mutually agreed land swaps. Another additional act the U.S proposed for the resolution of the conflict was the idea of a contiguity of Palestinian territory or the connection of the West bank and Gaza in exchange for the territories annexed in the West Bank.
Dr. Gold opposed this idea arguing that this “safe passage” would cut Israel in half. In short, the
U.S. has not demanded or will likely not demand full Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders outlined in the resolution 242.
79 Letter of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 1997. 80 Dr.Gold, p. 11. 81 Resolution 242. 82 Dr. Dore Gold, p. 16.
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3. D. UN’s institutional challenges in the conflict mediation processes
Today, the UN’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is limited to humanitarian aid, because the U.S, as a permanent member of the Security Council, successfully kept the UN from the negotiating table since 1967 using its power to veto any binding resolutions concerning this issue. The structure of the UN does not allow the UN to become the mediator that would bring peace in the region. The U.S, as a Security Council, keeps many of the resolutions favoring
Palestinians from being implemented, whereas the General Assembly had become a tool to politically isolate Israel. The resolutions about the condemnation of the Israelis are originated
“by the Arab Group and passed by a wide margin, because the Arab Group belongs to the two largest blocs in the Assembly – the Non-Aligned Movement (113 members) and the Group of 77
– which offer automatic support for the initiatives presented by their members.” 83 Israel’s
Permanent Mission to the UN said that the General Assembly allows the Arab states “to avoid dealing with other conflicts within the Arab and Muslim world; and…enables them to pay lip service to the Palestinians through the United Nations action that costs little but brings considerable political benefit.” 84 Hence, the structure of the UN’s Security Council has handicapped it from taking any active role in the conflict since 1967. On the other hand, because of the General Assembly’s discrimination towards Israel, the UN has lost its credibility of an unbiased mediator for Israeli, which partly becomes the reason for keeping the UN away from the conflict by the U.S’ veto.
83 Odelia Englander, 2009, p. 9. 84 Odelia Englander, 2009, p. 8.
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4. Conclusion
The Israeli-Palestinian is a complex conflict that couldn’t have arisen if it wasn’t for the irresponsible extensive external international involvement since 1915. The conflict’s prospects of being resolved are quite dim. Here I want to highlight the UN’s actions that have greatly contributed to the creation of the modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These things prolonged and will prolong the conflict in the future: denial of Palestinian right for self-determination,
UN’s impact on territorial discontinuity of Palestine and the UN’s structural and technical shortcomings.
Denying the Palestinian right for self-determination since 1917 was not only immoral, but also illegal. Instead of following the mandate system of League of Nations, Britain ignored it to fulfill its selfish interests for various reasons. Later, UN as a successor of League of Nations and as an adopter of the mandate system had legal responsibilities to grant Palestine independence, even if it would mean partitioning Palestine in two sovereign entities. Instead the UN was irresponsible to allot territories to Palestinians that couldn’t even claim its territories by virtue of being without the status of sovereignty. The U.S as a Security Council won’t allow the Palestine to become a country without resolving its border issues first. Today,
Palestine is not able to become a fully recognized state and to have a total control over the nation to combat its multitudes of domestic issues, just because Palestine can’t resolve the border issues that have become truly difficult to resolve.
The territorial discontinuity of the Palestine is the direct result of the partition plan or the so-called “resolution” 181. It’s hard to imagine Palestine as a viable state, when it’s Gaza is disconnected from the other half, West bank, and is taken over by the terrorist group Hamas
32 that swears not the make peach with Israel. To connect the two Palestinian territories would mean to cut the Israel in half. Not to cut the Israel would mean the resettlement of the Gaza strip Palestinians closer to West bank, so that the two can create a continuous territory.
Another option would be to connect Gaza and West bank, but to give up the whole border line of West bank to Israel, so that they the latter can have its “defensible borders”, and still have a continuous territory. (The Negev desert Israeli can get to Tel Aviv through the Jordan Valley
85and West bank’s border territories touching the Dead Sea). These methods would involve huge territorial swaps. Options of resolving the conflict beyond resolution 242 exist, but the sheer potency of the resolution 242 overshadows any other possibilities beyond pre-1967 borders for Palestinians.
This conflict has revealed many shortcoming of the UN’s decision process: power balance, weak potential of the resolutions to resolve problems and the UN’s weakness in enforcing the resolutions. The first weakness of the UN is its structure is allowing permanent members of Security Council to be more potent than the UN and its actions. It’s clear that in the future UN can’t have much role in the conflict’s negotiations and even to amend its “imperfect
“resolution 242, because of the veto power of only one Security Council. The second problem with the UN is the nature of the resolutions that only serve the purpose of getting passed by
General Assembly or Security Councils, but have lost their purpose of resolving. The resolutions 181 and 242 only served to fulfill the purpose of appealing to voters, but lack meaningful context to solve or even prevent the problems. The third weakness of the UN is its weak accountability of its resolutions or actions. The partition plan clearly needed to be
85 BBC new coverage claims that Jordan Valley is the defensible border for Israeli
33 enforced to prevent possible problems of violating the decisions, but the UN carried no accountability to sustain peace in Palestine.
To summary, the UN’s involvement in Israeli-Palestinian issue was not just negative, but instrumental in creating today’s chaos in Middle East. The mistakes of the UN’s decisions were paid by people’s lives and homes. What is tragic is that, the UN’s shortcomings are still alive and function without any alterations. What is more tragic is that the globe’s only peacekeeper, doesn’t have capacity and will not be able to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY:
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35
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36
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37
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11. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall” 1937,
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%20UN%20Resolution%20181%20-%2029%20Nov%20194.aspx
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Books:
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State University of New York Press”, 1994
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and Schuster”, 1992
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6. John Quigley, “The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict”,
2010
7. Teveth, Shabtai, “Ben-Gurion: the Burning Ground 1886-1948”, 1887
8. Muhammad Muslih, “The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism”,1988
9. Eric Black, “Parallel Realities”, 1992
10. Aruri, “Jordan: a study in political development”, 1970
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