A Battle That Must Not Be Forgotten:

An Interview with Captain John O’Donnell

Interviewer: Kyle Rushford

Interviewee: John O’Donnell

Instructor: Alex Haight

Date: February 13, 2013

Table of Contents

Interviewee Release Form...... 3

Interviewer Release Form...... 4

Statement of Purpose...... 5

Biography...... 6

Historical Contextualization: “A Battle That Must Not Be Forgotten”...... 8

Interview Transcription...... 23

Audio Time Indexing Log...... 45

Interview Analysis...... 46

Appendix I...... 51

Appendix II...... 52

Appendix III...... 53

Appendix IV...... 54

Works Consulted...... 55

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this Oral History interview with Captain John O’Donnell is not just to learn about World War II and the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but also to gain a new perspective on World War II and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In history textbooks, a reader cannot learn about the personal experiences of the average person who was there to witness and/or participate in event. Mr. John O’Donnell describes his life from childhood to the end of his service. This interview provides an understanding of the life of a child growing up in the Great Depression and life as a naval aviator during World War II.

Biography

Captain John O’Donnell was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1921. His parents were both Irish immigrants. John’s father worked as a chauffeur for a wealthy Philadelphia family. As a child growing up in the Depression years, John was exposed to both the poor side and the wealthy side of society. He graduated from high school in 1939, the same year that Germany invaded Poland and started

World War II.

John and his friends knew that the United States would eventually be pulled into World War II. In 1942, John enlisted and decided to join Naval Aviation. After finishing Pre-Flight School, Basic Training, and Advanced Training, John joined a fighter squadron and was deployed to the Pacific Theatre. John O’Donnell participated in multiple bombing raids in the Philippines. He served with distinction in the Battle of Leyte Gulf where he was stationed in Task Unit Taffy 2 under

Admiral Felix Stump. He engaged Admiral Kurita’s forces off the coast of the island,

Samar. It was through the efforts of Taffy 1, Taffy 2, and Taffy 3 that convinced

Admiral Kurita that he was walking into a trap, which led him to retreat. This retreat meant the end of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and a major victory for the United States.

John left the Navy in 1946, but was returned in 1951, served in the Korean War, and left the service for good in 1970. Over the course of his service, he has earned many medals and special awards for his service such as the Distinguished Flying Cross and

7 Air Medals. Overall, John served for a total of twenty-three years in active service without any combat or service-related injuries. Thanks to the GI Bill, he was able to study and graduate from the University of Pennsylvania and earned a Master’s Degree at George Washington University.

During his service in the Navy, he married in 1967, and now has two daughters and four grandchildren. John worked for twenty-one years in data processing for HP. He has also written an unpublished book called “Ghost 14” about the fictional story of a real, missing plane that was part of a shipment the Shah of Iran. John O’Donnell now resides in Potomac, Maryland with his wife.

A Battle That Must Not Be Forgotten:

Leyte Gulf

A historian, Norman D. Palmer, once described the Battle of Leyte Gulf as,

“the greatest naval battle in history” (Palmer 129). In terms of tonnage of ships and tonnage of ships sunk, the Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval battle in the world. The US Navy faced off against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Philippines.

The Americans were commanded by Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Fleet Admiral

William “Bull” Halsey, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, and Vice Admiral Thomas

Sprague. The Japanese were commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, Vice

Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, and Vice Admiral Shōji Nishimura. President Franklin D.

Roosevelt ordered troops to land on the island of Leyte to liberate the Philippines.

The Navy’s purpose was to provide support for the troop landings in the Philippines.

The Americans won a decisive victory over the Japanese forces. The damage unleashed upon the Japanese Imperial Navy, left it incapable of inflicting any serious damage to the US Navy. After the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Japanese supply lines were cut off and this allowed the American forces to free the Philippines, paving the way for an eventual victory. After that battle, the Japanese had no chance of winning the war. Although the battle was a blunder, the overall greatness of the Battle of Leyte

Gulf cannot be denied.

World War II in Europe began when Germany invaded Poland in September of 1939, but for America, it began when the Japanese launched an attack on a US naval base called Pearl Harbor in Oahu, Hawaii on December 7, 1941. In 1937, Japan attacked China. Two years later, the US placed a trade embargo on Japan, cutting off one of Japan's main suppliers of oil and iron. Japan allied itself with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to enable them to expand their empire to the Pacific. The Japanese wished to expand their empire to encompass the entire Pacific Ocean, and the only obstacle standing in their way was the US Navy’s Pacific fleet. Pearl Harbor was the headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet. It had a submarine base, oil storage facilities, and seven airfields. If the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, they would cripple the

United States Navy and they would be able to seize the Pacific territories before the

United States Navy could recover. The Japanese carriers were in position at the night of December 6th. The attack was planned to take place on Sunday morning, when the inhabitants of the base and island would be least prepared. 90% of the damage occurred during the first 10 minutes of the attack. American radar operators noticed the Japanese aircraft, but were informed that it was just their B-

17 bombers that were due in soon. At 7:40, the flight commander fires a flare into the sky to signal his men to commence the attack. The Japanese were poised to strike, and the flight commander was confident that total surprised had been achieved. The Americans then picked up a radio message from the flight commander that said, "Tora, Tora, Tora", which was a signal to the Japanese High Command that total surprise had been achieved. This was sent just before the first bomb was dropped. Then, without warning at 7:55 in the morning, Japanese planes flew overhead and began the attack. The first wave consisted of 189 planes. The second wave consisted of 167 planes. Bombers destroyed vulnerable planes and hangars, fighters strafed the bases with their machine guns, and torpedo planes launched torpedoes against Battleship Row. After the Americans realized they were under massive attack, they tried to launch ships that hadn't been hit yet, tried to get fighters in the air, and returned fire with AA guns. Luckily America's aircraft carriers were away. These would later become important in the war that America has been pulled in. The last of the Japanese aircraft returns at 1:00 in the afternoon. The

Japanese only lost 29 out of their 350 attacking planes. The US lost over 2,000 lives that day. Eighteen warships were sunk or damaged and 180 aircraft were destroyed.

In one horrific case, the USS Arizona's ammunition was hit by a Japanese high- altitude bomber, and caused a massive explosion, killing over 1,000 sailors and marines in an instant. It’s funny how history tends to repeat itself as the attack on

Pearl Harbor has many similarities with the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks sixty years later.

The lack of intelligence gathering and processing allowed the Japanese and Al-Qaeda to get within striking distance of their targets. Both enemies used aircraft to damage and destroy their targets. The lack of preparation and the element of surprise added to the horror of the attacks. Soon after the attacks, the President of the United States declared war on those responsible. The next day on December 8th, President

Franklin D. Roosevelt described that day as, "A day that will live in infamy" and declared war on Japan. After the attack, the Japanese launched a naval blitzkrieg operation where within six months; they conquered more territories than Germany did in the war in Europe. Admiral Yamamoto, the planner of the attack on Pearl

Harbor, stated, "I fear we have succeeded in awakening a sleeping tiger."

The Philippines was an American-occupied archipelago. General MacArthur was the field marshal of the Philippine Army and commander of American forces in the Far East. In 1942, the Japanese arrived, drove off the American forces stationed there, and captured the Philippines. During his retreat, Douglas MacArthur famously stated, "I shall return" (Cutler 5). MacArthur was later made Commander in Chief of the forces in the Philippine area, and started to plan an attack to return to the

Philippines. When it came time in 1944 for President Roosevelt to decide America’s next move in the war, he consulted General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz for guidance. MacArthur argued that the US Navy should move in on the Philippines because no one assisted the Americans in the Pacific Theatre more than the

Filipinos, as they provided America with men, ammunition, and information. He argued that they had a moral obligation to go back to the Philippines, take the islands, and free their comrades. Nimitz argued that it would be more productive and faster to bypass the Philippines and just approach Japan. He argued that they should let the Japanese in the Philippines "whither on the vine" (32-33). It was almost time for the election, and Roosevelt believed that attacking the Philippines would help in the poles. MacArthur won the argument, and President Roosevelt decided that they should go to the Philippines.

The Formosa Air Battle took place in October of 1944 before the Battle of

Leyte Gulf. On October 12th, American forces launched aircraft from their carriers and commenced a bombing raid. The Japanese responded by sending wave after wave of aircraft to defend. The US forces dominated the battle and maintained air superiority, due to superior training and weaponry. The Americans lost less than

100 aircraft, whereas the Japanese lost over 500. Although the US Navy lost several ships and some were badly damaged, the Imperial Navy lost countless. This battle thwarted the Japanese from sending large amounts of aircraft to interfere in the

Battle of Leyte Gulf that would take place later that month.

Admiral Kurita was the commander of the Second Fleet or the First

Divisionary Striking Force, which would engage the US Navy at the Battle of Leyte

Gulf. He "always remained faithful to the ancient arts of his ancestors. He would sometimes practice archery on the deck of his flagship, the Atago” (Thomas 173). He was seen as a specialist in the art of night torpedo attacks by the Japanese Imperial

Navy. Even though he had seen considerable combat during the war, he had never gotten the chance to fire a torpedo at the Americans. He was known by his men to be arrogant, but "privately he was full of doubts" (Thomas 173). He was usually in high spirits, but on the eve of the battle, he looked to be exhausted, worried, and somber.

He was suffering from the lingering effects of dengue fever, but he knew that a

Decisive Battle was coming and he was nervous. This was the man destined to face off against Admiral William Halsey at Leyte Gulf. "Before we're through with'em, the Japanese language will be spoken only in hell" (Cutler 38). Halsey said this after he saw the damage the Japanese did at the attack on Pearl Harbor. He was said to be

"the US Navy's most colorful admiral" (Cutler 38). Throughout the war, Halsey referred to the Japanese as "rats", "bastards", "monkeys", and later "lousy yellow rat monkey bastards" (Cutler 38). America wasn’t ready to go to war after Pearl Harbor, but Admiral Halsey and his men were. He was also known for his contagious aggressive spirit, which he would bring with him when he fought in the Battle of

Leyte Gulf. When General Douglas MacArthur deployed troops to liberate the

Philippines, the 3rd and 7th fleets of the US Navy were sent to provide support. In response to this, the Japanese deployed the First Divisionary Striking Force to stop the invasion. On the morning of October 22, the main Japanese forces left at 8:30.

The fleet would split up once they reached the tip of Borneo. Kurita would move toward the Philippines, west of Palawan Island, at the slow speed of 16 knots to conserve fuel for the trip home, if possible. On the morning of October 24, the fleet picked up speed to 24 knots and snake eastward through the Sibuyan Sea islands after reaching the island of Mindoro. The force entered the San Bernardino Strait around nightfall. The San Bernardino Strait connected the island-filled Sibuyan Sea on the west side of the island of Leyte to the open Philippine Sea on the east. It was known to be narrow and tide-ripped. Once they exited the San Bernardino Strait,

Kurita would engage the enemy forces at night and sail down the east coast of the island of Samar. By the time it was dawn, the fleet would reach the mouth of the

Leyte Gulf (Thomas 184, 185). Admiral Nishimura's forces moved with Kurita's until they reached the tip of Borneo. Admiral Nishimura's forces made up of two battleships, a cruiser, and four destroyers were the southern arm of the Sho-

Go pincer. Their purpose was to advance to the Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf's southern entrance (Thomas 188). Admiral Ozawa was in charge of the northern force of the Sho-Go pincer. His forces would maneuver in the north, while Kurita divided his forces in the south. The northern force was used as a decoy operation for Halsey’s

3rd Fleet. His forces were made up of carriers, which were once the pride of the

Imperial Navy. Their decks’ were less than one-third filled with 108 fighters and bombers, flown by pilots who didn't know how to land on a carrier (Thomas 210,

211).

Kurita's forces passed west of the "Danger Ground", which was known for its shoals and reefs. The Palawan Passage, as it was called, measured to about twenty to thirty miles wide. It was a perfect position for a submarine ambush. That night, two

American submarines, the Darter and the Dace, spotted contact on the radar. The commanders were aware of the invasion of Leyte Gulf, but they were still in the dark of Kurita's fleet movements. The commanders only assumed that the Japanese would pass through the Palawan Passage. After confirming his suspicions with the radar, the captain of the Darter, Cdr. David McClintock, contacted Cdr. Bladen

Clagett, his partner on the Dace, who was also his classmate at the Naval Academy.

Once the Darter spotted the enemy ships in the morning and the lead ship was almost on top of him, McClintock ordered his men to "Fire one!" (Thomas 190). The crew got lucky, for the ship they fired at was the Atago, Kutaki's flagship. A Japanese lookout yelled, "Six torpedo tracks, coming dead-on. No time to evade” (Thomas

190). The officers only watched in horror as four of the six torpedoes rammed into the Atago. The men on board then proceeded to abandon ship, but not before they took off their shoes, as was tradition to take off one's shoes before committing suicide, leaping off a bridge or a cliff or jumping out of a window. Admiral Kutaki escaped, along with his chief of staff, Admiral Koyanagi. The men all swam about two hundred yards to reach the Kishinami. The Takao was the next ship to be hit and sunk. Then a 10,000-ton cruiser called the Maya was sunk by the submarines and disintegrated. Chaos spread throughout the fleet. There were countless false sightings of periscopes. The admirals then decided to pick up speed and change course. Admiral Kutaki was left with little choice, for there laid many uncharted rocks and shoals in the dangerous ground. For the rest of the morning, the Japanese were responding to false submarine alarms and setting depth charges. Finally at

3:40 in the afternoon, Kutaki was transferred from the Kishinami to the Yamato, and was made the new flagship. The Americans had made the first move and started the largest naval battle in history.

At 8:20 in the morning of October 24, a search flight sent by the Third Fleet sighted "Big ships!" (Thomas 199). There were four battleships, eight heavy cruisers, and 13 destroyers. Admiral Halsey, without consulting Admiral Marc

Mitscher, who was the "tactical" commander of the fast carrier task force, ordered the men to strike. This order cut Mitscher out of the chain of command. This was completely against procedure, but Halsey was not a by-the-book man. It was also at

8:20 that Admiral Kurita, on the bridge of the Yamato, sighted three American planes (Thomas 200), which meant that American carriers were nearby. Finally, at

10:30 AM, the Americans arrived from the east with thirty planes, consisting of fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo bombers (Thomas 200, 201). The Yamato's 150

AA guns shot up like the needles of a porcupine and opened fire. One Japanese soldier recalled it looking like a tropical storm. At noon, the Americans returned.

From the bridge, the commanders noticed something odd: The Musashi's bow wave had become a huge cataract of water. "The commanders did not know it at that moment, but they were watching blood pour from an Achilles' heel" (Thomas 202).

The super battleships were floating fortresses wrapped in hard steel and although the side armor was safe from adjacent turret fire, the bow was left vulnerable to the

Americans' high-explosive torpedoes (Thomas 202). Nobody knew it yet, but the

Musashi, known to be unsinkable, was slowly flooding. The ship was torpedoed nine times, and could barely keep up with the fleet. Then the fifth and biggest wave of aircraft arrived, and circled the ship like vultures, while blowing holes in it and spreading shrapnel across it. Once again, the American's retreated. Kurita had little to no intelligence on the American position, and his superiors "turned a deaf ear"

(Thomas 204) to his requests. Kurita's fleet was continuously hit by wave after wave of American aircraft that day. On the fourth attack, a bomb plowed into the deck of the Yamato. On the side of the ship was a hole six square feet on one side and twenty-four square feet on the other (Thomas 205). The ship shook and tilted a little, but nobody even flinched. Ten Japanese aircraft were sent out to defend

Kurita's fleet, and four were shot down. Kurita's staff knew that the fleet was in a bad position. Kurita's operations officer continuously told him that the fleet should withdraw, at least for time to regroup. Kurita was reluctant, but ultimately decided to retreat.

When Halsey discovered Admiral Ozawa's northern arm, he ordered a concentrated force to chase after it. However this was exactly what Kurita had wanted to happen, for Ozawa's forces were only diversionary. When Halsey said that he was going to chase the northern force, he left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded. Admiral Kinkaid remained at the gulf, but he was left with little protection now that Halsey had left his side. Although people knew that Ozawa was a decoy, nobody spoke up to Halsey and suggested they go back to San Bernardino Strait. At 3:12 of October 24, Halsey sent out a message labeled "Battle Plan"

(Thomas 211). Admiral Willis Lee was to form a battle line with the six battleships, five cruisers, and nineteen destroyers of the Third Fleet. The battle line, or Task

Force 34, was instructed to engage the enemy from a distance. This message was relayed throughout the Third Fleet. Admiral Kinkaid intercepted the message.

Because of the message, Kinkaid assumed that he didn't have to worry about the San

Bernardino Strait. Another misunderstanding was that using short-distance radio, he said that Task Force 34 would only be formed when he gave the order or when it was needed. Kinkaid and Nimitz never received that message, so they assumed it had already formed. Now that Halsey had been diverted and Kinkaid assumed that

Task Force 34 was in position, the San Bernardino Strait was unguarded.

On October 25th, Admiral Nishimura arrived at Surigao Strait virtually untouched, and luckily while he was just arriving, Halsey was leaving. Admiral

Kinkaid who was supposed to be supporting the beach landings was now left alone to fight off the Japanese fleet. Kinkaid ordered Admiral Oldendorf to organize a

"welcoming committee" (Cutler 175) for Nishimura's approaching forces. Kinkaid attacked the Japanese with PT boats, destroyers, light cruisers, heavy cruisers, and battleships. Superior naval strategy called for the alignment of one's ships so that they are perpendicular to the enemies' bows to make them easier targets. As

Kinkaid's forces opened fire, Nishimura merely strove forward to try to break through their line. The only considerable damage done to an American ship was accountable to mere friendly fire. Two Japanese destroyers were rapidly sunk, a battleship was cut in half, and Nishimura's battleship, the Yamashiro, illuminated the sky and eventually capsized as it blew apart (Cutler 199). At this point, the conflict seemed lost, so Nishimura’s forces retreated.

With Kurita’s plan to divert Halsey’s forces a success, he sailed through the

Surigao Strait and started attacking the ships supporting the American landing forces. After Kurita went through the San Bernardino Strait, he went after the landing forces. The admiral, with powerful ships, started attacking the landing forces, which were lacking aircraft carriers and the types of powerful ships that

Kurita possessed. Luckily Kurita never organized a battle line, instead he made it a complete free-for-all. It was chaotic. However, a squall blew in and blinded the

Japanese temporarily. Once the squall blew over and the Americans were in Kurita's line of fire again, Sprague ordered his forces to attack the Japanese saying, "Forward the light brigade! Charge for the guns!" (Cutler 239). The rounds fired would only bounce off the sides of Kurita's super battleships, which were equipped with 16- inch thick hulls. However, eventually the American ships got so close to Kurita's massive ships that the Japanese couldn't lower their guns low enough to hit them.

The Japanese cruisers started to sink more and more American ships. In one case, a ship's steering systems were badly damaged. In another case, the men had to abandon ship because all their guns had been destroyed or damaged. A total of five

American ships were sunk. Kurita, however, believed that he was being bated into a trap, and called for retreat. However this was only the beginning of another unconventional form of attack.

Before the battle began, the Japanese decided that operation Sho-Go would be combined with air attacks by pilots called kamikazes, which means divine wind. When the survivors of Kurita’s attack were celebrating, at 10:00 AM on

October 25, Japanese "Zeke" fighters with bombs hanging from their wings plunged downward towards the American ships (Thomas 303). The first kamikaze,

Lieutenant Seki, landed his plane and himself into the deck of St. Lo. The plane's fuselage ignited the ship's supply of bombs and torpedoes, resulting in a chain reaction of explosions. The ensuing blast peeled apart the flight deck and launched pieces of the carrier to heights as much as a thousand feet (Thomas 303). After

Seki's attack, a dozen more kamikaze pilots followed, plowing themselves into

American ships. Luckily, Seki was the only one who succeeded in sinking a ship. This began a new era of warfare, (Thomas 303) for the Battle of Leyte Gulf was the first engagement where the Japanese utilized organized kamikaze attacks. This was the last attack made by the Japanese at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the battle, Admiral

Sprague said that, “The failure of the enemy to wipe out all vessels of this task unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, torpedo counter attack, continuous harassment of the enemy by bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks, and the definite partiality of Almighty God." (Thomas 264).

The headline, “Leyte: Japs Caught Fleet Off Balance” (Walker 1), of the

Christian Science Monitor is something that really stands out. Calling the Japanese

“japs” was considered derogatory and offensive, despite this, it was freely made the headline of this news article. Throughout the article, there were some reports that were nonfactual and incorrect. One example is when the article stated, “the Japanese fleet... was crushed with America’s naval might”(Walker 1). In truth, many Japanese ships survived and because of a bad decision made by Admiral Halsey, several

American ships were sunk and sailors’ lives were lost. Although in some areas the

Japanese were defeated by superior American strategy and naval power, but about one-third of the Japanese forces escaped from Halsey’s grasp and the other third retreated before Halsey’s forces could return. The article also describes how the

Americans sunk “every major ship in the Japanese fleet” (Walker 2). However, many ships: cruisers, destroyers, and super battleships survived. This newspaper is clearly biased, for it exaggerates Japan’s inferiority and America’s success, and this paper never mentions Halsey’s huge strategic blunder.

A writer of the New York Times newspaper, Hanson Baldwin, is less biased and partial than Walker. Unlike the previous article, this paper gives an adequate overview of the battle and what happened during it. Baldwin even goes as far as to complement the Imperial Japanese Navy, “The Japanese strategy in this Battle of the

Philippines is surprising, but the timing has been skillful” (Baldwin 1). To complement the Japanese military, especially in a public newspaper, must’ve been rare due to the widespread hatred of the “japs” after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This newspaper also openly exposes not only the fallacies of the Japanese propaganda, but also American media, “Our communiqués claim the sinking or severe damage of

Japanese carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and the enemy has admitted the loss of two carriers and one destroyer” (Baldwin 1). Although this particular news article gives more of the facts and less of the exaggerations, it still appears to be partial to the American side. Throughout the article, Baldwin never mentions

Halsey’s major mistake and states that America has claimed victory over the Japanese forces, “No matter what their intentions, the Japanese have very clearly lost the opening round and very probably the battle” (Baldwin 1).

The Battle of Leyte Gulf is certain to be the subject of unending interest and debate. It was the greatest naval battle in history, and had a decisive effect on the

Pacific War” (Palmer 129) said a historian in a review on C. Vann Woodward’s book on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Many historians reviewed it and added their own opinions about the battle. Historian Norman D. Palmer explains that the interest in the battle stems from the wide range of naval warfare; from PT boats and destroyer escorts to the newest and biggest warships. Also it’s interesting how all kinds of heroic stories stem from the veterans of both the American side and the Japanese side. However despite his interest in the battle, Palmer, like many historians, criticized both Kurita’s decision to retreat instead of pushing further into the Leyte

Gulf and Halsey’s decision to leave the Bernardino Strait unguarded to chase

Ozawa’s diversionary forces. An historian, James A. Fields, also praised the Battle of

Leyte Gulf calling it “the greatest sea fight of the recent war” (Fields 84). Fields makes an interesting comparison of Kurita and Halsey, “both departed from their basic missions to seek other action; both engaged a weak enemy force thinking it a strong one; both broke off these engagements to find another enemy, and both failed in this attempt” (Fields 85). In this passage, Fields makes allusions to Kurita’s engagement with the American forces off Samar thinking it was a powerful force,

Halsey’s chase of Ozawa’s forces thinking it was the main part of the Japanese Navy,

Kurita’s decision to break off his attack in the gulf, and Halsey’s breaking off of his chase to assist the American forces in Samar. Many people have different impressions of aspects of the Battle of Leyte Gulf and of World War II. Kiernan in his oral history project argues that submarines

“contributed more than any single weapon to the defeat of the Japanese empire”

(Kiernan 6). Although submarines did contribute significantly to the war effort and played an important part during the beginning of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, they didn’t participate to any degree after the first day. The two submarines stationed in the

Palawan Passage, the Darter and the Dace, were successful in sinking a total of three ships, one of which was Vice Admiral Kurita’s flagship, but that was the only main accomplishment and usage of submarines during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. For the remainder of the battle, the damage done to the Imperial Japanese Navy was inflicted by battleships, destroyers, PT boats, cruisers, and aircraft. However,

Kiernan did make a valid point when he stated that, “the Battle of Leyte Gulf was the final death blow to the Japanese Navy” (Kiernan 10). The Japanese Navy had already been hindered by lack of proper training, ammunition, and fuel, and with this battle, the Japanese lost ships, manpower, and aircraft. With these casualties inflicted upon them, this would be the last major naval battle ever fought with Japan.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval battle in history and was the last major naval battle fought in World War II. This battle led to the liberation of the

Philippines, it cut off Japanese supply lines, and paved the way for a potential invasion of Japan. There were mistakes made by the US such as Halsey chasing a decoy force and leaving the fleet and invasion forces unprotected, and there were mistakes by the Japanese such as Kurita retreating because he mistakes Sprague’s forces for a much bigger fleet than it actually was. This battle also showed that courageous acts of bravery such as Admiral Sprague’s “Charge of the light brigade” can turn the tide of a battle. Many components, personalities, and weapons contributed to make this such an important victory for the United States. The coordinated efforts of the submarines, PT boats, aircraft, destroyers, cruisers, and battleships helped win the day. Despite Halsey’s mistake, Kinkaid still defeated

Nishimura’s forces and Halsey had the manpower and the firepower necessary to defeat Ozawa and Kurita. The Battle of Leyte Gulf demonstrated the power of the US

Navy and showed its potential to become a great world power.

Interviewee/Narrator: John O’Donnell Interviewer: Kyle Rushford Location: Captain O’Donnell’s home, Potomac, MD Date: January 2, 2013

Kyle Rushford: My name is Kyle Rushford and I am interviewing Captain Jack

O’Donnell on the date of January 2nd, 2013. Can you describe what your hometown was like when you were young?

John O’Donnell: Yes I can, Kyle. I consider myself fortunate to have an interesting junior life and hometown school life. My parents are migrant Irish–were immigrant

Irish, both born in Ireland. And my father worked as a chauffeur for a wealthy

Philadelphia family. And my school years from first grade to eighth grade, I spent part of my time, several years up to third grade, living in a small apartment over a garage on Irving Street in West Philadelphia. It could be described more as an alley than it was a street because in the houses on Irving Street there were only two occupants: my family and a man that had a repair business further up the block. The rest of the street was devoted to the entrance to the back yard of fraternity houses, the University of Pennsylvania fraternity houses, and private families, fairly well to do families on the whole block. But after third grade, my father’s employer, the

(?Revan?) family, moved to (?Arbor?), Pennsylvania and this was a complete difference in the orientation there. My school companions were from wealthy families and they did not understand at the time that there were really two classes of people: the servants that worked for the families and the wealthy children. And I remember one of the children asking me whether my nanny would let me have peanut butter and jelly sandwiches after school because her nanny did not allow her to have anything between meals. It was interesting to see how they lived vs. what I was experienced. Now, I understood that there were two classes, but the Lizenery family, there were four children, they thought we were all the same, until they got to private school, Miss Porter’s School in Bryn Mawr, and then they realized that there were servants and there were them, but for the early years I really enjoyed seeing the difference and to me it was very interesting that I was accepted by those people, and actually it was because they had no realization. But throughout that period, I was well aware that there were classes, and remember these were the Depression years, and the wealthy families had more advantages than the rest of the people in

(?Arbor?), the working people, and certain other people that I had experienced when I went to St. James (?Oracle?) School in West Philadelphia. Now, we did move back to West Philadelphia, and I was there through the remainder of my parochial school, and then came high school. I went to West Philadelphia Catholic High School for four years and graduated in 1939.

KR: Were you interested in flying as a kid? [4:47]

JO: The first thing I remember being interested in flying was because of Mrs.

?Revan?, the wife of the president of Otis Elevator Company. She gave me a book for

Christmas that was called “The First World Flight”. And the flight was conducted I think about 1935 when four Army Air Corps crews flew all the way around and I think of the four that started, two of them finally made the trip all the way. They were flying Douglas bombers at the time and I was very interested, I thought it was quite interesting. The other interest was Dave Rogers, who was a classmate of mine, and I made model airplanes, World War II model airplanes. The rich kids in ?Arbor? would buy them, we sold them for maybe a dollar or doll I war and a half a piece. It was a great business. Dave and I made I would say probably between 20 to 30, maybe even more World War II model airplanes. So I was interested in flying.

KR: Were there any events from your childhood that had an impact on your development later in life?

JO: I would say Mrs. (?Revan?) sending me “The First World Flight” book.

KR: Were there any teachers or sport coaches that had an impact on you?

JO: I would say I was very impressed, even to this day, with parochial school education that I got both in grammar school and in high school. I can’t praise more than the nuns, the sisters of St. Joseph parochial school, and the Christian brothers in high school. Both of them were extremely (?valuetational?) to me and I would say influenced my life up to the present time.

KR: Had you ever thought about serving in the military before World War II began?

JO: No I did not, as a matter of fact I was interested in becoming a doctor. There was a very popular author, AJ Cronin, at the time. I remember one particular novel, it was called “Magnificent Obsession” about going through doctors’ training and the one thing I remember that impressed me was that all through the Christmas holiday, he had to stay at school to continue his training. And I thought, “Wow, that is real dedication.” For Christmas holiday, you’re supposed to have some down time. I was very impressed by that. In high school, I had two friends whose father was a veterinarian at the University of Pennsylvania and they would come down on

Saturday and I would meet them at the veterinary hospital at 40th and Spruce and they were more interested in playing stickball, but I was more interested in following their father around doing his rounds looking at hunting horses, cows, and all kinds of animal life. He found out I was interested and I was given a job to take care of feeding the animals, and assisting in operations. I was actually in the operating room, and that kind of assisting me in making the decision that medicine was going to be my career.

KR: Why did the Navy appeal to you? [9:20]

JO: When the war started, we were all interested. We knew we were going to go to war. President Roosevelt was saying he was going to keep us out of the war, but eventually the United States was going to be drawn in, and I thought I would like to fly because of my background in making model airplanes. I thought the Army Air

Corps was for me, until I read an article that said the toughest branch to get in is

Naval Aviation. So I thought, “If that’s the toughest, that’s the one I’m going to try.”

And to give you a little background in Naval Aviation at the beginning of World War II, the Navy had only six carriers and Henry Kaiser was a builder of commercial ships, tankers, and ships that could transfer materials to England, and he made a presentation to President Roosevelt saying that these ships, if I just took all the compartments, made a flight deck below, and moved the bridge structure over to one side, I can make one carrier a month. So Roosevelt was impressed, but the Navy said there’s no way. (telephone rings) These little things would bob around all over the place, besides the carrier would be too dangerous and we don’t have the people to man these carriers. So Roosevelt said, go out and find people who can man these carriers. [Interview interrupted by telephone call] So, the carriers that the Navy had at the time were about eight hundred to a thousand feet long and thirty-three thousand tons in buoyancy, whereas Kaiser was proposing a five hundred foot deck carriers that weighed seventy-eight hundred tons, about a third of what the fleet carriers were and the Navy just were very opposed to it, but he insisted. So when war was declared, I went down to join Naval Aviation, and they said how much college do you have and I said, “None”, and they said forget about it, you can enlist now. So I said let me think about this. I went home in January. In May, Harry Ogden, who was a classmate of mine, was the first high school graduate in the whole

Philadelphia area to be accepted into Naval Aviation, the V-5 Program. I was down there the next day with a couple of my friends. First of all, I had read too much about it. I had read that this physical exam they give: the Schneider Index, which tested your blood pressure, your breathing, and all these things having to do with your basic condition. It was very hard to pass. Now if I hadn’t read about it, I would have been ignorant and I wouldn’t have to worry about it. I was so nervous that I flunked the first two times. Finally I asked the Corpsman, “Let me do the eye test and the whirling chair and all these other things and if I pass those, then I’ll take the

Schneider” and he said, “Well, okay”. So I took the other tests, so I was relaxed, and I scored a fourteen out of sixteen on the Schneider. I was ready to go.

KR: How did you and your friends feel about entering the military during wartime?

Were you afraid, proud, or excited? [14:28]

JO: I’ll tell you, the principle thing that concerned my friends and myself was the draft. And the local draft boards would send you a letter, “Greetings”, and everybody hated to get that “Greetings” letter and they would assign you to any service they wanted. Now I thought that -- that did not appeal to me. So that’s why I pursued

Naval Aviation because, first of all, they said it was the toughest and that impressed me–I was impressed and I passed it. But my friends were really less interested and they said “let’s all wait for the draft and let’s all go together”, which was a fallacy because the draft board didn’t care whether you’re buddy was with you or not.

KR: Can you describe basic training?

JO: Yes I can, Kyle. The Naval Aviation was divided into three sessions. It was Pre-

Flight School, which was three months to get you really into physical shape. The emphasis was almost entirely on physical training with about ten maybe fifteen percent devoted to academics, and it was principlely a naval orientation with very little on engineering or anything else, that was later on. I attended pre-flight at

Chapel Hill, North Carolina for three months. You went from there to Basic Training.

It was called E-Based meaning “elimination based”. So this was conducted in open- cockpit, (?entry-end?) airplanes called “Yellow Perils” (laughs). And I had made a bad choice in choosing Glenview, Illinois for Basic Training because it was the wintertime in January of 1943 and the temperatures were running up to below zero in open-cockpit. That was not a good choice. My friends went to Dallas where they had almost perfect flying weather all the time. They graduated three or four weeks ahead of me. That was what you were really concerned about was going from Basic

Training into the Advanced Training phase. Each phase was three months, so you were expected to graduate from the day you reported to Pre-Flight to the time you got your wings was normally nine months. Well because of choosing Glenview, and I had weather conditions there and also when I reported to Corpus Christie for

Advanced Training, I got the flu and was rotated. What I did was, I spent a week in the hospital in the sick bay recovering from the flu, but by this time my class had already gone to one base. So I had to be inducted into the next class coming in and I lost all contact with my friends practically and the people I trained with for the last part were mostly from the west coast. It was just the rotation that caught me off, so I didn’t have too many friends, but I did get my choice. After Basic Training, I asked for Fighter Training. I had three, well four choices: fighters, torpedo bombers, bombers, or patrol aircraft, and I got my first choice. I went through in a lot of time.

And after graduating and getting my wings by Corpus, I was assigned to Advanced to

Operational Training in Miami flying fighter aircraft in Operational Training. Then the next phase is Carrier Qualifications, and they conducted them on two small carriers on the Great Lakes. So, I was back to Glenview, my old Basic Training station for my final Carrier Qualifications on the two carriers-they were the

Wolverine and the Santie and you had eight carrier landings and you were considered qualified. And I went to West Coast and joined the Fighter Squadron.

KR: What was your first impression of the country you were deployed to?

JO: If it suits you, Kyle, I think this would be a good time to talk about Leyte Gulf because that was the country I was initially deployed to. I was impressed with just the lush country that I saw. There were some small towns. The first ones I saw on my first raid, little towns on the interior of the islands in the Philippines: Negros and

Panay, and we made fighter sweeps over Japanese landing bases there. My first impression was that it looked like a beautiful, beautiful country. To have to tare it up with war was an unfortunate circumstance.

KR: What did you think about Admiral Halsey? [20:19]

JO: Okay do you want to go through some of the details I have in my printout there

(hand drawn map), Kyle? You might know some of this, if you want to look at one, and it’ll give you an orientation on Halsey, how things came about, what people thought of him. What I first thought we’d do is give an orientation on the forces who were involved. Now if you’ll look at the diagram here on the right side, you’ll see the Third Fleet carriers, those were Admiral Halsey’s. They had four groups of anywhere from three to five carriers, a total of about thirteen fleet carriers, including Essex class and there were about ten carriers built on cruiser hulls called

CVLs. Now if you’ll look toward the island here closer to Leyte, we have the Seventh

Fleet carriers and that were the ones that I was concerned with. There was Taffy 1,

Taffy 2, and Taffy 3. The northern one was Taffy 3, and the southern one was Taffy

1. Now also, we’ll look at the Japanese forces. Now the first indication that the

Japanese invasion was going to be on Leyte was on the seventeenth of October. Now they had three plans. First of all, they called them Sho 1, Sho 2, and Sho 3. Sho 1 they thought was going to be Leyte Gulf, Sho 2 they thought was going to be on the west coast of Luzon, and Sho 3 they thought was going to be on the southern part of the

Philippines. But the first indication that there was going to be an invasion on Leyte

Gulf was when two United States submarines attacked them in the Sulu Sea or

Suragaio or whatever it was called in the inland waters of the Philippines, and that gave both the Third Fleet, the Seventh Fleet, and the Japanese that the invasion was going to be in Leyte Gulf in the center of the Philippines. So as you can see, there were four Japanse forces north. You had the carriers under Admiral Ozawa. Then you had a force coming down from the Home Islands under Nishimura, and these forces were going to join with one of the forces coming out of the Burma area, and these were under Kurita and Nishimura forces were going to join going through the

Suragaio Strait in the south and through the San Bernardino Strait in the north. Now on the twenty-fourth, Admiral Halsey sent some strike forces to intercept these

Japanese forces that were coming through the Sulu Sea and in the waters of the Philippines. Now from a report that he got, they had sunk and annihilated two carriers and the forces were heading west and retiring, so at that point he said “My plan is I’m going to have Admiral Lee with four new battleships and we will take positions at the San Bernardino Strait. With that, Admiral Kinkaid with the Seventh

Fleet said “Okay, if Halsey’s going to bottle up and take battle positions at the San

Bernardino, I’ll take the support forces that were supporting the landings and deploy them into battle lines across the Suragaio Strait. Now the admiral on my ship,

Taffy 2, Admiral Felix Stunt, who I have the greatest admiration for, he was if not the primary force at Leyte Gulf, he was in the top rank of why we achieved success because he looked at the situation and said, “Well, the battle’s is going to be fought there, so I’ll arm some of my torpedo bombers with torpedoes because they’ll be stragglers either from Suragaio or San Bernardino. They’ll be opportunities for us to sink some of the Japanese battleships.” So during the evening there, the Third Fleet had one carrier, the Independence, that was a night carrier and they deployed fighters and torpedo bombers on reconnaissance missions and they reported at dusk that this force that had turned west, had reversed course and were turning east. So even though Halsey had that information, he, by signal flag and by audio transmission between his forces, but not to the Seventh Fleet, he said “Okay, I’ve changed my mind. I’m taking the whole force: all the carriers, all the battleships north with me because we’ve sighted these carriers up north.” So without telling anyone in the Seventh Fleet, the Seventh Fleet spent the night of the twenty-fourth with some submarine actions, but principley, the real action was in the Suragaio

Strait. These Japanese fleets were coming through the Suragaio with the narrowness of the Suragaio Strait had formed a line of not rest, but in tandem. So they could not bring their guns except the ship at the very lead would have had any chance to shoot at Oldendorf’s battleships. They were in a continuing line; they’d come in, shoot, retire to the back line, reload, and they just annihilated the force coming through the

Surigaio. Now remember on the night of the twenty-fourth, these search planes had not only reported that the force headed for the San Bernardino Strait had reversed course and were now heading east, but they also reported that the San Bernardino itself was lit up with navigation lights, which they had never seen at any time during the previous engagements that we had. And here these ships were coming through and the report was made back to Admiral Halsey and one of his task groups under

Admiral Bogan said, “Well if you’re going to have the battleships there, why don’t you have at least one carrier groups to support the battleships?” and Halsey never even, well he gave him a very peremptory yes, we have this information, so Bogan just said, “Well, okay”. And they also informed Admiral Marc Mitscher, who was the head of all the carriers, “It seems we have some information now that Japanese ships were returning.” And his response was, “Does Admiral Halsey have this information?” And they said yes, and he said, “Well, he’ll do what he has to do”.

There was a rivalry–well, lets say not very good feelings between Marc Mitscher and

Halsey. And Halsey was what I would call an inexperienced carrier admiral. After

Pearl Harbor when all the battleships were sunk, the few carrier admirals looked like they were going to be the primary force, and the battleship admirals did not like that at all, so there was a rivalry set up immediately. And Halsey’s training essentially was in battleships and cruisers, not carriers, but he did have a very brilliant operations officer, Captain Miles Browning, who was responsible for anything you read about Halsey’s brilliance. The primary force behind it was Miles

Browning. So the morning when I got involved, we were scheduled to do as we have been doing from the eighteenth through the twenty-fourth, supporting the beach operations. I was scheduled to fly in as troop support over Leyte Gulf, the island of

Leyte. When we got to the waiting room, we found out that a Japanese fleet was twenty miles north of Taffy 3, and Taffy 3 was never being engaged, but 18.1 inch guns from the Yamato, which was the largest guns in history. The Japanese had two battleships with 18.1 inch guns and the rest had 14 inch guns. So they opened up on the Third Fleet carriers. The wind was from the west primarly, so they could not launch–they had already launched some of their airplanes, but they were interrupted by fire from the west, so they had to turn to the east and make smoke to try to conceal the carriers from the battleships and Japanese cruisers. So unfortunately, they ran into a rainstorm too, and Admiral Sprague’s plan was to try to come around and head to Leyte Gulf where he thought he might get some support from Leyte. But in the meantime, they were closing. When we manned our airplanes, the bridge called down and asked the skipper of the squadron, Bob Barnes, and I was his wingman, and they said, “Do you want to lead the carrier force or common air patrol?” and he answered he’d take the common air patrol because we didn’t know besides the battleships, we figured they were going to have air support also.

So, my division, Bob Barnes was on the port catapult, and they had to arrange the number four man, well the number three man was on the starboard catapult, so we launched, and I was the number three that catapulted off, so it was not in the order that we would join up on, but we were immediately dispatched and we intercepted a

Japanese torpedo bomber that was approaching by itself and no other fighter forces or anything. So when it saw us, it turned and headed west again, and we were what we called “bracketing”. John Sergeant, the number four man, and me, and the number two man on one side, and Larry Walker, normally the number three man, and the skipper on the right side, and he was about as fast as we were. We weren’t gaining on the torpedo bomber at all, and then he dropped the torpedo going west away of the ships, so he was no longer any threat to the carriers. So combat air patrol, the CIC, the controller said, “Okay, return to your position over the ship”. So I started turning back and the skipper started turning back, and we didn’t see where

Larry Walker was. But in the clouds up ahead, I saw this flame coming out and this airplane coming down, and we thought, “Is it Larry?” Larry, he had disobeyed orders

(laughs) to return to the ship, and where the Japanese pilot made his mistake was trying to climb and if he had stayed down low, we weren’t gaining on him, but when he started to climb up, he lost speed and Larry shot him down, and the skipper was irate (laughs). But we got through it, and we returned to the ship. And for the remaining three hours of the battle, we had no more intercepts, but our obligation was to stay aboard while the other torpedo bombers and fighters from the other ships attacked the battleships and the cruisers that had penetrated Taffy 3. And they were approaching on us, and I remember seeing these colors the bombs that the rifles that they were buying, each ship had a different color, so they knew where their bombs were hitting and bright red, yellow, and purple, and the waters of the

Philippines were just brilliant blue. You could almost see down a hundred feet, and to see these bombs hitting around there and they were just stirring my ship, I was wondering I was even going to have a ship to land on. For whatever reason, Kurita thought he was being lured into a trap and he reversed course and he started back toward of the center into the strait, and we didn’t know why it had happened. And all of a sudden, we were no longer under attack, so that gave us a chance. We had used all our torpedoes. Taffy 3 was given credit by the naval historian, Morrison was his name, that Taffy 2 was the greatest contributor to the success of turning the ships around. Felix Stunt, what I like about him, not at the time, I thought he was too hard on us, but he had us night qualified. Even the fast carriers were not night qualified. But before the deployment to Leyte Gulf when we formed up at the

Admiralty Islands, he had us- first of all we had what they called “Night Field Carrier

Training” where on a runway, they had a signal house, and they had it marked out – the deck. We practiced on a runway then you go out and practiced on a ship at night.

We had other carriers where other guys were just sitting around drinking beer all afternoon, and old Stunt had us out flying. It turned out to be because the second flight, the second strike we did was at night. In the meantime, Admiral Halsey’s out here and he’s listening to what’s going on, and Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor is listening to this, and he’s under the impression, the same as Kinkaid, the Seventh

Fleet admiral, was that four battleships are supposed to be at San Bernardino Strait.

So he sent a message out to Halsey saying, “Where is Lee?” and the messages that they sent out in code, they would use little padding on it so the Japanese, if they picked up the code, wouldn’t really understand it. So whoever encoded this put padding saying “The whole world wants to know” (laughs). It was padding, but it sounded like Kinkaid or Nimitz was saying the whole world wants to know where these battleships are, but he wasn’t, but that’s how Halsey read it, and he blew his stack. But that was the whole thing, he was out chasing these carriers that were in very pour shape with minor strike capability. They were there as a decoy. So, finally detached McCain’s group to help us down. We heard word that they were underway.

And what I most remember about this as we were joined up and headed north toward the Suragaio Strait was sighting a Japanese cruiser that was circling, it obviously had no controller, it had probably taken a bomb or torpedo to its steering gear, and it was making a small circle, and it had two destroyers taking people off the ship. And the strike leader said back to the carrier force, “Do you want us to go in and attack this?” and he said, “No. Go after the main force.” So we did... and I saw them just disappear from sight, and then we sighted the main force. Now we fired every round we had, we made actually three rounds. So we’re now out of ammunition and it’s now dusk. We sighted seven Japanese Zeroes above us, we were about down maybe we were down less than five hundred feet. There were seven

Japanese Zeroes in a line, and they were going through acrobatics: making rolls and a tail chase. And I thought, “If they see us, we’re done”. First of all, we were down low, they had the speed on us, and they could just make runs on us and shoot us out of the sky. But they went through their acrobatics, never came down, never did anything. Maybe they were putting on a show for their Japanese ships, but whatever it was, there was no attack. And we came back and made a night landing.

KR: That’s incredible! I mean you had no ammunition, and they could’ve come in fast, so they could’ve easily blown you out of the sky.

JO: I know. It really was a miracle.

KR: What was your most frightening experience during the battle? [47:31]

JO: I made a dive on a cruiser on the near side of the deck position, which was a bad move because pulling out, I had to cross the whole disposition of Japanese ships.

What I should have gone in on the opposite side. What impressed me was, we had always been taught to fire in short bursts so you don’t burn up your .50 caliber guns.

So I was making sure to provide maybe a two second, or three second burst and let up on the trigger. But what I noted was when I let up on the trigger, these tracers were still lighting up the whole area. And then I noted the tracers were coming back at me, not my tracers (laughs) going back at them. And the impression was it was like a ball of fire right in front of my fighter airplane and it would just disperse, as it got close, it dispersed around me. I don’t know why that was, but I didn’t take a hit at all. I got through the whole thing and crossed the whole fleet firing at me, and I said, “Get the next guy!” (laughs). But when we made our first run there, I was scared, I’ll be very frank with you, I was scared. But I looked over at the number four man, I was number two, and the number four man was white as a sheet. I was scared, (laughs) but I’m not as scared as he was. There was no color in his face at all.

The skipper said, “We gotta go in again.” So we did. The extent of the training and the brain orientation is the Japanese are the enemy. We just called them “Japs” or

“Nips”. We had training to if you were out of ammunition in a dogfight, they had training films to show how to attack when you are out of ammunition, and it was to come up below to the right or to the left of the Japanese airplane and go to full power and hit the tail of the airplane, particularly the horizontal stabilizer, and if you hit it, see your propeller is going this way, and if you hit it, it would force them down–the impression was that if you hit them and force the thing down, they would dive and go down below. Fortunately I never had to employ that tactic, but it was part of the training. You were expected to sacrifice–the redeeming factor was that if you pulled through like this (gestures with his hands), you would at least, even if your engine was out, you would be on the up side, gaining altitude, and you might be able to bail out. That was your salvation.

KR: What was your impression when you first saw or heard about the kamikaze attack at Leyte Gulf? [49:37]

JO: The first impression–the first news that we had about kamikazes was the Santee and Sangamaon, who in Taffy 1, were attacked by kamikazes. My impression was that’s ridiculous. But I witnessed the Ommaney Bay, which was one of our carriers, get hit by a kamikaze right next to us, and it was almost impossible to believe because if you were an aviator, you get an idea of watching them it’s through your own training. In the dive, an airplane, at a certain speed, he’s going to reach a point of no return, and to watch a kamikaze go past that–and you know even if he changes his mind, he’s going to hit the water, at the very least, but to see them just go straight into a carrier, if they could, or into the cruisers and destroyers, and other ships. It was something that I just could not believe. It was something remote from our orientation. Remember, the war in Europe, Kyle, was fought by cultures that were very similar to–well like my immigrant parents and there were German immigrants, Italian immigrants, so it was not unusual to see forces retire, but that was not acceptable at all to the Japanese. The principle thing you can do in wartime is die for the emperor. There have been isolated instances of Japanese aircraft hitting ships, but this was maybe through accident, but kamikazes were an organized, absolute weapon.

KR: What was your opinion of the Japanese during the war?

JO: We hated them. We hated them. The orientation we were given through all our training was that the Japanese were evil.

KR: What’s your opinion on a historian’s description of World War II as a “Good

War”?

JO: The rest of the world has developed into since World War II. My opinion is that war is political in most instances and the people who originate the war do not fight the war. Young men, young women who have no say in the matter at all that have to fight, I don’t agree with it. We do need a strong naval force, and Marines, and Air Force, and, Army, but instances where we go to war, the American public should have some say in it, not just politicians.

KR: Do you agree with the belief that World War II “was a war against an enemy of unspeakable evil”? [54:03]

JO: Well, I consider the German under Adolf Hitler to be an evil force. All you have to do, Kyle, is look at pictures of the Holocaust and what the Americans found at

Buchenwald prison camps and the piles of bodies and things like, and all the thousands and thousands of people who were annihilated and burned. That to me was evil and there were a lot of the German people who knew what was going on, but chose to avert their eyes. They did not accept the responsibility for what happened.

KR: What do you think about a historian saying that the Battle of Leyte Gulf was “the greatest naval battle of history”?

JO: Well, I can only go by what Samuel Elliot Marson says in his prologue to “The

Battle of Leyte Gulf” that’s what he calls it, and he bases it on the number of ships and the number of aircraft and the various dispositions of the forces to come up with that evaluation, and I guess that if you look at history, that if you look at the number of forces involved it was the premier battle of modern times, at least.

KR: Do you agree with a historian saying that, “Halsey’s actions had imperiled the entire operation”?

JO: Yes. Well, I think he missed out on the Battle of Midway, he was sick and he was replaced by Admiral Spruance. He had no previous experience, he was not an aviator himself, but he did keep Halsey’s staff including Miles Browning, his chief-of- staff. When Halsey had the fleet it was called the Third Fleet carrier forces, but when

Spruance had it, the staffs rotated, but they called it the Fifth Fleet. Third Fleet under

Halsey. Fifth Fleet under Spruance. Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf. Fifth Fleet at Midway.

Same ships. Same carriers. That’s just the way they organized it.

Kr: What’s your opinion on a historian’s statement referring to the treatment of

Japanese-Americans, “In one of its policies, the United States came close to direct duplication of Fascism”?

JO: Well, you have to take the whole thing into perspective. Now, there’s no disputing that the Japanese-Americans was as close to Fascism as we got when we were at war. But in context, the suddenness of the attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out by the Japanese, and the complete hysteria and everything that took place it, I wouldn’t say it was justified, Kyle, but I understand why it took place. The various things had to be taken because of the overwhelming defeat that we suffered at Pearl Harbor. Well first of all, we had to retaliate and one of the retaliations was the pursuit and the encampment of the Japanese-American people, but you can’t call it justified, no.

KR: Do you agree with another student’s belief that submarines “contributed more than any other single weapon to the defeat of the Japanese Empire”? [59:03]

JO: Well, I have not ever thought of it in that way, but if you look at the logistics of the thing, and as you know logistics was very important part in failure or defeat in wartime. Now, as opposed to the Japanese submarines and the German submarines in the Atlantic, anti-submarine warfare that both Britain and the United States initiated, the Japanese never initiated an anti-submarine warfare plan for execution.

So from that point of view, you can say that the submarines played a very important, if not the important part in the logistical defeat of the Japanese forces, but the actual fighting, I don’t think you can dispute that the Battle of Midway, and later on at the

First Battle of the Philippines, and Leyte Gulf were the three separate actions that led to the defeat of the Japanese forces.

KR: What’s your opinion on another student’s opinion that the submarines at Leyte

Gulf “worked tremendously in the American’s favor”?

JO: Well, they were in favor, but I have not read any history. I know the Japanese were the first to site the American submarines initially alerted our forces that the

Japanese were that close. I believe they sunk a cruiser and a small carrier a the beginning, but I would not say that they were the primary force, but my neighbor across the street, who was a submariner, might tell you different (laughs). But the fact is that we were all in it together, and who took credit for what, really doesn’t matter. In the long run, we were victorious.

KR: Do you agree with a historian’s statement that the Battle of Leyte Gulf “was the final death blow to the Japanese Navy”?

JO: I think it was, yes. There was nothing. Now, Okinawa, from the viewpoint of our forces, kamikazes were something we did not expect. We did not have tactics developed to fight the kamikazes. Regardless of how many airplanes you put up, one of them would always come through flak or cloud cover and dive on one of our ships. It caused tremendous damage. Now going back to Leyte Gulf, it wasn’t a kamikaze that sunk the Princeton, a single five hundred pound bomb from a

Japanese dive bomber that came not from a carrier, but from Luzon that hit the

Princeton that went through the carrier deck into the hangar deck and finally into ammunition storage. I had a friend, went through training with me, Paul Drury, was on the Princeton and he had to swim away from it. We had reviews and meetings over the years to review our experiences, and he shared his experiences. The kamikazes played a huge part in the damage to the US fleet, no doubt about that.

KR: A historian said that, “Even in the circumstances of Fascist aggression, the war was wrong.” What’s your opinion on this?

JO: No, I don’t think the war was wrong. I think Hitler, to start with, and Mussolini going into North Africa, the Russians going into Finland, in my opinion, there’s no way the British Empire or the United States could’ve avoided war without tremendous damage to society and to the cultures of Europe and the United States.

To call it evil, I thought it was justifiable.

KR: Is there anything else wanted to talk about that we didn’t get to? [1:05:09]

JO: Yes, there is. As you may or may not know, after the war there were very few prospects for veterans coming home from the war. The GI Bill, in my opinion, is the single most important piece of legislation the US ever passed. Your expertise, everything you’ve practicing, training for, and doing for the past few years, now that job has been eliminated. So, with the GI Bill, it gave us the opportunity to pursue over pre-war dreams. Imagine what the world would be like with no job skills, no education, and an industrial revolution that was in full gear. The US needed a highly educated, motivated, able work force and the GI Bill was able to fuel that.

KR: Is there anything else you want to talk about?

JO: No, I think we’ve covered everything.

KR: Okay. Thank you for taking time to meet with me.

JO: My pleasure, Kyle. You know, as the years go by, you don’t get too many opportunities to share your experiences, so I appreciate the fact that you were interested. To have young people interested in history, and the bygone generations,

I appreciate that too.

Audio Time Indexing Log

1. Interviewer: Kyle Rushford

2. Interviewee: John O’Donnell

3. Date of Interview: January 2, 2013

4. Location of Interview: John O’Donnell’s home in Potomac, Maryland

5. Recording Format: Video Recorder and IPhone

Minute Mark Topics Presented in Order of Discussion in Recording

1 Hometown

5 Interest in Flying

10 Appeal of the Navy

15 Feelings about Joining the Military During Wartime

20 Impressions of the Country Deployed to

25 The Battle of Leyte Gulf

30 The Battle of Leyte Gulf

35 The Battle of Leyte Gulf

40 The Battle of Leyte Gulf

45 The Battle of Leyte Gulf

50 Impression of Kamikaze Attack

55 Was World War II Against an Enemy of Absolute Evil

60 Contribution of Submarines to the Defeat of the Japanese

65 Was the War Wrong Interview Analysis

Historian Ronald J. Grele once said, “the focus of oral history is to record as complete an interview as possible—an interview which contains, within itself, its own system of structures, not a system derived from the narrow conventions of written history” (Grele Envelopes of Sound: The Art of Oral History 2nd ed). The opportunity to interview a war veteran, especially a veteran of World War II, who are becoming a rare breed as the war was fought nearly seventy years ago, was a great honor and a privilege. Oral history is an excellent way to learn about history and what really happened from the people who truly experienced an important event in the history of the United States or the World. It is far more valuable than some historians looking back on the event. Oral history is important because, as historian Michael Frisch puts it, restores “pivotal moments to life” and helps us

“imagine the drama of impending decisions and their unimaginable consequences, as distinct from the all-too-familiar monuments these decisions become in the landscape of the historical past tense” (Fisch In A Shared Authority: Essays on the

Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History). In the this example of oral history,

Captain John O’Donnell comments on several issues such as the Great Depression,

Naval Aviation, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Admiral Halsey’s mistake at the Battle of

Leyte Gulf, submarines in World War II, and war in general. John O’Donnell reinforces most historians’ criticism of Admiral Halsey, the significance of Battle of

Leyte Gulf, and the GI Bill. The interview of Captain John O’Donnell goes into his personal experiences from childhood, to basic training, to fighting in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, to post-war benefits. John first described what it was like growing up during the years of the

Great Depression. He lived as the son of a servant for a wealthy Philadelphia family, residing in both poor and rich neighborhoods. As a young boy, he was surrounded by other kids of higher social class who didn’t realize that they were the rich and he was poor, and would sometimes ask if “his nanny would let him have peanut butter and jelly sandwiches after school” (O’Donnell 1). He called himself “fortunate”

(O’Donnell 1) to have an “interesting” (O’Donnell 1) childhood, and to see the difference between the upper and lower class and how “I was accepted by those people” (O’Donnell 2), despite the difference in social class. John then described basic training from start to finish. He spoke of the obstacles he had to overcome: being separated from his friends, anxiety, sub-zero temperature, and illness. From basic training, John talked about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He was deployed under

Admiral Stunt off the coast of Samar to support the landings on the Battle of Leyte.

John talks about every aspect of the great battle, and goes in depth on Admiral

Halsey’s blunder. He also talked about his most “frightening experience” during the battle, in which he strafed across an entire Japanese carrier without taking a single hit. It is a rare occurrence to find stories like this in a history textbook, and it is a rare opportunity to talk about stories like this with the man who experienced them firsthand.

Although the Battle of Leyte Gulf was a victory for the United States Navy, the victory was not achieved through superior strategy and decision-making. As Admiral Takeo Kurita was making his way through the San Bernardino Strait with powerful battleships, Admiral Halsey was lured into a trap and took off after a small

Japanese decoy fleet. With this action, Halsey left 3 task units: Taffy 1, Taffy 2 (in which John O’Donnell was deployed), and Taffy 3 mostly unguarded. Had Admiral

Kurita not suspected a trap, when there wasn’t one, Taffy 1, Taffy 2, and Taffy 3 may have perished. Admiral Halsey and some historians defend his actions by saying that reports told him that the Central Forces could no longer be considered a menace to the Seventh Fleet. However many historians still believe that Halsey was still a failure. Many historians say that Halsey should have had better communication with the Seventh Fleet and Admiral Nimitz, and that he could’ve sent a portion of his forces to defend the San Bernardino Strait in the event that the Japanese do attack.

Captain John O’Donnell strongly agrees with the criticism of Admiral Halsey. John believes that the main reason Halsey was a failure was because he was trained in leading battleships and cruisers, but he was an “inexperienced carrier admiral”

(O’Donnell 11). John even agrees with a historian’s belief that Halsey’s actions “had imperiled the entire operation”. He even goes as far as saying that Halsey’s operations officer, Captain Miles Browning, “was responsible for anything you read about Halsey’s brilliance” (O’Donnell 12). Although it may be biased, Captain John

O’Donnell’s, a man who experienced the consequences of Halsey’s actions, opinion means more than a historian reflecting on the past.

A commonly spoken cliché is actions speak louder than words, and the actions and words of the American people and government towards Japanese-

Americans proved to be very outspoken. In response to the deaths of over two thousand sailors and marines at Pearl Harbor, the American people developed jingoist and racist attitudes towards the Japanese. Japanese-Americans were placed into work camps and forced to sell their homes and businesses. Overall, they were treated cruelly. Some historians and people of the day argue that this was justified because this was payback for what they did at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were

America’s enemy. Other historians and John O’Donnell question some of America’s actions. Although John O’Donnell admitted to hating the Japanese calling them “an enemy of unspeakable evil” (O’Donnell 19) and calling the Japanese soldiers “Japs” and “Nips” (O’Donnell 17), he did not condone the treatment of Japanese-Americans.

John did say that the war against the Japanese was “justifiable” (O’Donnell 23), but he did not find the way America retaliated against the Japanese justified. John even said that this was “as close to Fascism as we got when we were at war” (O’Donnell

20). Like John said, the way the United States turned against Japanese citizens was cruel, but you have to take the whole thing into perspective, like all history.

After World War II, over ten million grown men, including John O’Donnell, were about to be integrated back into the United States labor force at once. This could have caused mass economic chaos within the United States. In response to this, President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of

1944 or the G.I. Bill. This law provided benefits for America’s heroes such as cash payments of tuition and living expenses to attend undergraduate or graduate institutions. Some historians argue this bill had no impact on the lower class of the social pyramid, and it drove female students out of universities. Also, the fact that the bill included a one-year unemployment compensation prompted historians to say that the bill encouraged laziness. Other historians and World War II veterans, including John O’Donnell disagree. John states that the G.I. Bill is “the single most important piece of legislation the US ever passed” (O’Donnell 23) because “it gave us the opportunity to pursue our pre-war dreams” (O’Donnell 23). John himself was a veteran who benefited from the G.I. Bill. Before Pearl Harbor, John wished to become a doctor, but when the war broke out, his hopes for that were lost. Thanks to the G.I. Bill, he was able to attend the University of Pennsylvania and earn a master’s degree at George Washington University. Despite the fact that there was a negative side to the G.I. Bill, it provided millions of veterans to get the education and job they need.

This interview has taught me new things about World War II and it has taught me the value of history and oral history. This interview was a very unique experience and a great opportunity to learn about a subject I love from a man who experienced it firsthand. Learning history is important because to move forward, we as a society must look at what came before and understand why and how events occurred. To solve current problems, sometimes we must look back. However throughout this whole process, I learned I must improve my time management skills. I did not do an adequate job with managing workload ahead of time. Oral history gives power to the people in the sense that it gives the people the chance to tell their story and how they played their part

Appendix I

Leyte: Japs Caught Fleet Off Balance By Gordon Walker Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current file); Oct 26, 1944; ProQuest Historical Newspapers Christian Science Monitor (1908 - 1999) pg. 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix II

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix III

The Naval Showdown in the Pacific By HANSON W. BALDWIN New York Times (1923-Current file); Oct 26, 1944; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2009) pg. 2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix IV

Works Consulted

Baldwin, Hanson W. "The Naval Showdown in the Pacific." New York Times [New

York] 26 Oct. 1944: 1. Print.

Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944. New York:

HarperCollins Publishers, 1994. Print.

Fields, James A., Jr. The American Historical Review. Vol. 53. N.p.: American Historical

Review, 1947. Print.

Frisch, Michael. Oral History, Documentary, and the Mystification of Power. Albany:

University of New York Press, 1990. Print.

Grele, Ronald J. Envelopes of Sound: The Art of Oral History. 2nd ed. New York:

Praeger Publishers, 1991. Print.

Hastings, Max. Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945. New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 2007. Print.

O'Donnell, John. Personal interview by Kyle Rushford. 2 Jan. 2013.

Palmer, Norman D. "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science."

The Battle for Leyte Gulf. N.p.: n.p., 1947. 129-30. Print.

Terkel, Studs. My American Century. New York: New York, 1997. Print.

Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. Print.

Walker, Gordon. "Leyte: Japs Caught Fleet off Balance." The Christian Science Monitor

[Boston] 26 Oct. 1944: 1-2. Print.

Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States. Abr. Teaching ed. New York: The

New Press, 2003. Print.