US Navy photo

By John T. Correll

Battle of the , Leyte Gulf. It was also overshadowed 1944, the Japanese had scaled back their June 19-20, 1944, marked the by the other war news that month from plans but still hoped to hold a shorter end of Japanese naval airpower halfway around the world: The Allied inner perimeter, anchored on the east by as a signifi cant factor in World War II. landings in Normandy on D-Day, June 6, the . It was the single biggest to begin the invasion of occupied Europe. ’s greatest hero, Adm. Isoroku battle in history. However, naval history buffs still argue Yamamoto, who had planned the Pearl The fi rst day is remembered as “the about the Turkey Shoot and how Adm. Harbor attack, was dead, his airplane shot Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” in which Raymond A. Spruance—the non-aviator down over the jungles of New Guinea in US Navy pilots and anti-aircraft gun- in command of the US Fifth Fleet—might 1943 by AAF P-38s. There was no one ners shot down more than 300 Japanese have conducted the battle, but didn’t. of comparable stature to take his place. airplanes. Before the two-day battle was Meanwhile, the US armed forces were over, the Japanese had lost fi ve ships, REVERSAL OF FORTUNES engaged in an intramural argument about including three fl eet carriers, and a total The heyday of the Japanese navy in the strategy. Gen. Douglas MacArthur called of 476 airplanes and 450 aviators. Pacifi c did not last long. At Midway in for a push northward from New Guinea The Japanese fl ed with the ships and June 1942, fi ve months after the attack on through the led, of course, aircraft they had left. The carriers would , the Imperial Fleet lost four by MacArthur. Adm. Ernest J. King, not again be an effective force in the war carriers, one , and 322 airplanes Chief of Naval Operations, advocated except as decoys to distract the oncoming on the same day. an island-hopping approach across the Americans. Expecting fast conquest, Japan did not central Pacific where Adm. Chester W. The battle was part of Operation provide for replacing losses in aircraft and Nimitz was in command. Forager, the amphibious invasion of the trained aircrews. Japanese technology did King had an unusual ally in Gen. Marianas. Under the cover of air supe- not keep pace and the once-superior A6M Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, riority from US carriers, ground forces Zero fi ghter was soon outclassed by the of the Army Air Forces. Arnold, who took , , and Tinian, 1,500 US Navy F6F Hellcat and the Army Air rarely agreed with King on strategy, miles from Tokyo and the Kanto Plain Forces P-38 Lightning. wanted bases in the Marianas from which and within range for B-29 . The outer defensive perimeter—run- his new B-29 bombers could strike the For whatever reason, the Marianas ning through the Gilbert Islands in the Japanese home islands. Turkey Shoot never achieved the popular central Pacifi c around to New Guinea The came down fame of the carrier battles at Midway and and Sumatra—was no longer secure. By squarely on both sides of the issue, direct-

52 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2016 It was the biggest carrier battle of all time. It also gained bases from which B-29s could strike Japan.

ing an invasion of the Marianas in June The force created to stop the Ameri- advantages. His airplanes—lacking ar- 1944 with invasion of the Philippines to cans was the Mobile Fleet, to which mor and self-sealing fuel tanks—were follow a few months later. virtually all of Japan’s remaining car- lighter and had greater range. He could Operation Forager, drawn up by King, riers, , and were attack from 100 miles farther away than would strike at three islands in the Mari- assigned. The commander was Vice the Americans could. The Americans anas chain: Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa. would be far from support bases; Ozawa Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, who Ozawa pulled the Mobile Fleet together would have bases nearby. commanded the strike on Pearl Harbor, at Tawi Tawi in the southern Philippines. The American carriers, steaming west had been relegated to relatively minor All told, he had nine carriers with 450 from their anchorage at Majuro Atoll positions since the defeat of his carriers combat aircraft, fi ve battleships, 13 cruis- in the , would have at Midway. In 1944, he was commander ers, and 28 . It was a large force, the easterly tradewinds at their backs. of the Central Pacific Area Fleet on but as Ozawa knew, badly outnumbered To launch or recover aircraft, they had Saipan, which was not as impressive by the US Fifth Fleet. to swing around into the wind, turning as the name suggested. It consisted of In addition to the airplanes on his away from the enemy. Ozawa, facing patrol craft, coastal vessels, and some carriers, Ozawa could call upon hun- into the wind, could launch and recover ground forces. dreds of land-based aircraft dispersed while moving forward. Ironically, the first target of the Op- to islands around the perimeter from On the other hand, Ozawa’s Zero eration Forager attack would be Saipan. Guam to New Guinea to assist. fighters were no match for the US The plan was to lure the Fifth Fleet Hellcats. His pilots were minimally JAPAN’S DESPERATE PLAN into open water west of the Marianas trained and had little flying experience. The main Japanese naval strategy in where the land-based airplanes would His meager fuel supply did not allow World War II was the “Decisive Battle,” destroy a third of the US ships before expansive operations. inspired by Adm. Heihachiro Togo’s vic- the opposing carrier forces engaged. On June 15, Adm. Soemu Toyoda, tory over the Russian fleet at Tsushima Mobile Fleet aircraft would finish off commander in chief of the Imperial Strait in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War. the rest Fleet, sent a message to the Mobile In 1944, the Imperial Navy was des- Offsetting to some extent his shortage Fleet: “The rise and fall of Imperial perately seeking such an engagement, in numbers, Ozawa had several tactical Japan depends on this one battle,” he upon which the outcome of the war might turn. Fighter contrails paint the sky during the Marianas Turkey Shoot in 1944. AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2016 53 Halsey- Ozawa Oct. 25 Mariana Luzon Islands Lee Eric by map Staff Saipan Philippine Tinian Islands Rota Philippine Guam Sea Japan Task Mobile Force 58 Fleet Leyte Turkey Shoot June 19 Mindanao

Palau Majuro Atoll Islands

Tawi Tawi US Navy photos Navy US

said—the same words used by Togo foremost ships of the navy. Some senior was so large it took almost five hours at Tsushima. offi cers, notably King and Adm. William F. to clear the lagoon as it departed from Halsey Jr., had qualifi ed as naval aviators Majuro. It included battleships, cruisers, BLACK SHOE in midcareer. Others, notably Nimitz and and destroyers, but the heart of the task In command of Operation Forager Spruance, did not. force was seven fleet carriers and eight would be Spruance, regarded by CNO With a big carrier battle looming, many light carriers with 904 combat aircraft. King as “the most intelligent offi cer in of the “brown shoes”—so called because Mitscher’s pilots were mostly expe- the Navy.” Spruance had the complete naval aviators wore brown shoes with their rienced veterans. His principal aircraft trust of Nimitz as well. working uniforms—would have preferred were fast F6F Hellcat fi ghters, SB2C Although the main strength of his com- one of their own in command instead of Helldiver dive bombers, and TBF/TBM mand was a carrier task force, Spruance the “black shoe” Spruance. Avenger airplanes. Among the was not an aviator. He had been a cruiser The Fifth Fleet had been built up to complement of the carriers were two future offi cer for most of his career before com- extraordinary strength and consisted of US Presidents. Lt. Gerald R. Ford was ing to special prominence as leader of the more than 800 ships grouped into two assistant navigator on Monterey. carrier victory at Midway and—despite task forces. George H. W. Bush was an Avenger pilot the grumbling of some airmen—was now The striking arm was Task Force on San Jacinto. commander of the US Fifth Fleet. 58, commanded by Rear Adm. Marc Task Force 51 under Vice Adm. Rich- Between the world wars, battleships A. Mitscher, a longtime aviator deeply mond K. Turner brought the 127,000 had been displaced by carriers as the experienced in carrier operations. TF 58 amphibious assault troops who would

54 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2016 US Navy photo AIR FORCE Magazine on Guam. area except for about 50 still operational of the land-based Japanese aircraft in the attacks had already wiped out nearly all taking heavy casualties. by June 19, meeting fierce resistance and Seventy thousand Americans were ashore Mad” Smith, landed on Saipan June 15. Corps Lt.Gen.HollandM.“Howlin’ Marine Corps divisions under Marine positioned aircraft. islands where the Japanese had pre- Jima, Chichi Jima, Saipan, and other attacked the land bases on Guam, Iwo Ozawa had hoped—and systematically of Saipan—although not as far west as moved the Fifth Fleet into position west capturing theMarianas.InearlyJune,he was focused on his central mission of to induce the decisive battle, Spruance THE INVASION BEGINS slower kind. ships, but they were of the older and had combat vessels, including battle- transports andlandingcraft, Turner conduct the invasion. In addition to the By then, unknown to Ozawa, the US The invasion force, one Army and two While Ozawa was exploring ways / April 2016 / April ships and destroyers posted forward to force in five circular groups, the battle- Japanese attack. Mitscher deployed his end run. landing force vulnerable to a Japanese carrier defensive screen and leave the beachhead. He would not weaken the responsibility, thesecurityofSaipan wanted a fight.” against the Japanese fl eet. The aviators tions.” They “had not yet been pitted against islandairfi elds andfortifi ca- “They had had enough of the strikes fl eet,” saidnaval analystNormanPolmar. —wanted to strike the Japanese the 15 fast carriers, the pilots, and the riers but Spruance would not approve it. 58 pull away and go after the enemy car- Mitscher proposed to Spruance that TF Sea, some 400 miles from the Marianas. tion oftheMobileFleetinPhilippine battle. battle. Hellcats proved to be the Navy’s premier fi ghter in the last part of World War II. ton, his fl agship, during the Marianas campaign. 4. An F6F Hellcat launches during the in 1944. 3. Vice Adm. , commander of Task Force 58, aboard USS the Turkey Shoot. 2. Adm. Raymond Spruance as commander of Central Pacifi c Force during inbattle met they places the and forces Japanese and ofUS locations The 1. Instead, Task Force 58would await the Spruance held firm to his primary “The carrier ‘people’—the crews of Mitscher’s scoutsdiscovered theloca- from Guam and Saipan. out in a wide semicircle about 100 miles aircraft fi re. The US carriers were fanned chew up incoming airplanes with anti- had landed on Guam and that they and Ozawa assumedthatmany ofhisairplanes the hour. Oblivious to what was happening, wave. The radar screens were clear within ships madeshortwork ofthefi rstJapanese not land there. airfields on Guam so the Japanese could At the same time, dive bombers struck the the fi rst Hellcats took off to meet them. proaching bogeys just before 10 a.m. and again on the way back. rearm andrefuel,strike the Americans would hit the US carriers, land ashore to June 19. His intent was that his airplanes waves, launching the first one at dawn on force, Ozawa chosetodivide itupintofour TURKEY SHOOT The Hellcats and the gunners on the Task Force 58 radar picked up the ap- Rather than concentrating his smaller Lexing- 55 name stuck. to an “old-time turkey shoot,” and the Lexington the war. Bycontrast, 25Hellcatswerelost. toward becoming the leading Navy ace of down seven enemy aircraft, on his way pilot Lt. Cmdr. David McCampbell shot craft losses for the day above 300. Hellcat them to the bottom, raising Ozawa’s air- carriers andsending22moreairplaneswith fleet but US submarines did, sinking two wasn’t the end of it. Rota were shot down as well, and that on Guam and the neighboring island of by the Hellcats. Fifty more aircraft based returned, most of the others shot down 374 aircraft Ozawa sent out, only 130 at 11 a.m., 1 p.m., and 2 p.m. Of the damage on the American fleet. the shore-based units had infl icted great 56 One oftheaviators onthecarrier The US pilots did not reach the Japanese He launched his subsequent waves said the day had been akin miles astern. from Guam with Task Force 58 about 320 midnight, the Mobile Fleet was 460 miles sage instructing Ozawa to withdraw. By the Japanese fleet about 270 miles to the a garbled reportfromscoutairplaneplaced Ozawa. defense of Saipan and went in pursuit of Mitscher left some of his carriers for air tion was known with sufficient accuracy. attack the next day if the Japanese posi- Spruance directed Mitscher to pursue and kills during the Turkey Shoot. Alexander Vraciu, on the deck of USS Turkey Shoot, putting the Japanese homeland within range of US B-29s. 3. Lt. j.g. way on Tinian in the Mariana Islands in 1945. Tinian was captured shortly after the in the Philippine Sea. 2. B-29s of the 462nd Bomb Group taxi on the West Field run- 1. A Japanese aircraft carrier (center) is pummeled by US aircraft during the battle PURSUIT Around 9 p.m., Toyoda sent a mes- It was almost 4 p.m. on June 20 before That evening, withtheenemyonrun, holds up six fisix up holds Lexington, hissignify to ngers were lost in the effort. down 80 airplanes. Seventeen US aircraft another carrier and two oilers and shot Japanese fl eet and in short order sank on their return. meant they would belandinginthedark first one, even though the extra distance the second wave but did not recall the away than he had thought. He canceled that the Japanese were 60 miles farther send the second wave when he learned attack aircraft and was preparing to 216 fighters, dive bombers,andtorpedo range for the US aircraft. northwest, at the edge of the operational The American aircraft plowed into the Mitscher launched his first wave of AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2016 / April

US Navy photos US Navy photograph AIR FORCE Magazine airmen were rescued. down at sea, although nearly all of the of the airplanes ran out of fuel and went empty before they got there. Eighty-two it all the way back, their fuel tanks hitting 10:30 p.m. Many of them could not make pitch dark when they got there around 300 miles back to their carriers and it was the battle,saidthatamoredecisive victory Clark, who commanded four carriers in carriers.” Rear Adm. Joseph J. “Jocko” placing a non-aviator in command over Pearl Harbor was, “this is what comes of Spruance hadlettheJapanesefl eetescape. an outcry arose among the aviators that cluding sixcarriers. Almost immediately aircraft, he still had most of his ships, in- SPRUANCE UNDERFIRE Saipan, Nagumo shot himself to death. of Saipan was announced. In a cave on Premier Hideki Tojo fell the day the loss Aug. 10. In Tokyo, the government of July 18, Tinian on Aug. 1, and Guam authoritative. 450 aviators lost is widely accepted as T. Y’Blood’s count of 476 airplanes and when they sank. Naval historian William that crashed or were aboard the carriers Japanese losses,includingairplanes was lurking about. that made them easy targets if an enemy ships turn on their lights, even though For some of the TF 58 airplanes, it was The view at naval air headquarters at Even though Ozawa was down to 34 The US invasion force took Saipan Estimates vary for the two days of To help them land, Mitscher had the / April 2016 / April and defense.” to divide his air forces between offense such a spectacular score if Mitscher had ‘Turkey Shoot’ could never have made might have sunk some of ours. And the of the Japanese carriers, but the Japanese bombers would probably have sunk some World War II. “Our dive- and torpedo- the most respected naval historian of at Midway,” said , have favored the strong—it did not do so people tellyou,yourdecisionwas correct.” damn fi ne job there. No matter what other the battle, he told Spruance, “You did a tion. When helandedonSaipanfollowing Spruance for sticking to his basic obliga- incompetence. Nimitz ignored him. demanded that Nimitz fi re Spruance for senior naval aviator on Active Duty, mander of the Pacific Fleet and the most and his 15 carriers and 800 airplanes. Fifth Fleet at Saipan, including Mitscher most of the ships that had been with the Fleet, commanded by Halsey, who had main naval force there was the US Third Mac Arthur’s returntothePhilippines. The of Leyte Gulf in October, supporting Spruance declined to do,” Morison said. lure another American admiral todowhat survived were useful only as decoys to fl eetwas crippled,andthesixcarriersthat might have ended the war in a few day HALSEY GOESFORTHEBAIT “We cannot assume that fortune would Then and later, King heaped praise on Adm. John H. Towers, deputy com- Morison’s reference was to the Battle “Without its air arm, the [Japanese] s. inducing the Imperial surrender. Japanese will to continue the war and and Aug. 9, 1945, fi nally breaking the atomic bomb missions launched Aug. 6 islands to rubble. the infrastructure of the Japanese home months that followed, the B-29s reduced mission against Tokyo Nov. 24. Over the of them arrived Oct. 12 and fl ew their fi rst ager was the success of the B-29s. The fi rst ters to Guam in January 1945. established. Nimitz moved his headquar- logistics bases as well as airfi elds were Marianas, where fl eet, submarine, and Turkey Shoot was US possession of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz as commander in chief of the left of it. In 1945, Spruance succeeded in chief of the Imperial Fleet, or what was ippines. organized during the battle for the Phil- from suicide attack units, first the Japanese naval air threat was mostly end the war in a few days, but after that, destruction of the Mobile Fleet did not American fleets, withdrew prematurely. rita, fearful of being caught between two force avoided disaster only because Ku- he had succeeded in his purpose. The US his handful of airplanes, of course, but ers, and destroyers—in chase of Ozawa. Third Fleet—carriers, battleships, cruis- US Seventh Fleet, Halsey took the entire transports to a subsidiary force from the catch Halsey’s attention, which they did. of his ships to make a demonstration to the invasion convoys. Ozawa sent a few haps draw Halsey away from protecting Gulf, unable to do anything except per- and 13 airplanes left, was north of Leyte approaching from the west. battleships and other surface combatants Adm. Takeo Kurita, consisting of two was the First Striking Force under Vice peared intheMarchissue. article, “AllEyesonKheSanh,” ap- is nowacontributor. Hismostrecent Air ForceMagazine John T. Correllwaseditor inchiefof It was from Tinian that the two B-29 The ultimate legacy of Operation For- The greatest strategic value from the Ozawa went on to become commander Contrary toJocko Clark’s surmise, Ozawa lost all four of his carriers and Leaving the defense of the invasion Ozawa’s fleet, with only four carriers The strongestJapanesenaval force for18yearsand 57 ✪