Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership During the 20Th and Early 21St Centuries
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Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries Edited by John B. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman d25395_DSGraphics_NineteenGunSalute-cvr.indd 1 10/15/2009 1:47:13 AM U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL EDITION NOTICE Use of ISBN Prefix This is the Official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein identified to certify its authenticity. ISBN 978-1-884733-66-6 is for this U.S. Government Printing Office Official Edition only. The Superintendent of Documents of the U.S. Government Printing Office requests that any re- printed edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authentic work with a new ISBN. Legal Status and Use of Seals and Logos The logo of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), Newport, Rhode Island, authenticates Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman, as an official publication of the College. It is prohibited to use NWC’s logo on any republication of this book without the express, written permission of the Editor, Naval War College Press or the editor’s designee. Table of Contents Acknowledgements . iv List of Maps and Illustrations . v Introduction: John B . Hattendorf . vi 1. Radical, But Right — William Sowden Sims (1858–1936), by Branden Little and Kenneth J. Hagan. 1 2. Efficiency — William Harrison Standley (1872–1963), by Craig C. Felker. 13 3. Sound Judgment — William Daniel Leahy (1875–1959), by Robert James Maddox . 25 4. Right Man, Right Place, Right Time — Richmond Kelly Turner (1885–1961), by Donald Chisholm . 35 5. Clear Purpose, Comprehensive Execution — Raymond Ames Spruance (1886–1969), by Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.. 51 6. Disciplined — Thomas Cassin Kinkaid (1888–1972), by Trent Hone . 65 7. Persistent — Alan Goodrich Kirk (1888–1963), by David Kohnen . 77 8. Enthusiasm — Richard Lansing Conolly (1892–1962), by Jeffrey G. Barlow. 93 9. Out-Spoken — Arthur William Radford (1896–1973), by John K. Ohl . 107 10. Visionary Yet Realistic — Arleigh Albert Burke (1901–1996), by David Alan Rosenberg . 117 11. People Come First — Harry Donald Felt (1902–1992), by Eric W. Osborne . 133 12. Partnership — Horacio Rivero Jr. (1910–2000), by Sarandis Papadopoulos . .145 13. Bold But Prudent — Thomas Hinman Moorer (1912–2004), by Stanley D.M. Carpenter . 157 14. Multilateral — Richard Gary Colbert (1915–1973), by Joel J. Sokolsky . 171 15. Maverick — Elmo Russell Zumwalt (1920–2000), by R. Blake Dunnavent . .183 16. Operational — James Lemuel Holloway III (1922–), by David F. Winkler . .193 17. Readiness — Carlisle Albert Herman Trost (1930–), by Edgar F. Puryer, Jr. 203 18. Honesty — Leighton Warren Smith Jr. (1939–), by Paul Stillwell. .219 19. The Right Skill Sets — Joseph Wilson Prueher (1941–), by Bruce A. Elleman . 231 Conclusions — A comparative discussion of operational, strategic, and diplomatic leadership, by Bruce A . Elleman and John B . Hattendorf . 244 About the Contributors . 259 Index . 266 iii Arleigh Albert Burke Admiral Arleigh A. Burke (right) shaking the hand of Admiral Robert B. Carney at the U.S. Naval Academy on 17 August 1955. Secretary of the Navy Charles Thomas (center) replaced Chief of Naval Operations Carney with Burke (then a Rear Admiral) in expectation that Burke would be more open with the Secretary and would move more rapidly to adopt new technology. Photo courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command, Photo # 80-G-66974 Arleigh Albert Burke (1901–1996) Visionary yet Realistic Arleigh Albert Burke (1901–1996) By David Alan Rosenberg Admiral Arleigh Burke took office as the nation’s fifteenth Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) on 17 August 1955. Although famous as an aggressive and innova- tive World War II destroyer squadron commander, Burke’s importance as a strategic leader can best be understood in terms of the remarkable range of initiatives he put forward during his tour as CNO. One of his most important actions was also one of his first: the decision to push forward with development of a Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM).273 Burke’s predecessor as CNO, and long time friend and mentor, Admiral Robert “Mick” Carney, had not considered development of a seaborne ballistic missile system a high priority. There were serious technical difficulties involved in designing an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) suitable for shipboard use, and the Navy’s senior leadership felt it would be prudent to resolve these before making any commitment to a development program. Since the Air Force and Army were work- ing to develop their own long range ballistic missiles, Carney argued, the Navy could always piggyback on those programs when it was ready and he ordered the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics to desist from any advocacy work on behalf of the IRBM. Rescinding this restriction was one of Burke’s first acts as CNO. An mobile seaborne nuclear deterrent would have advantages over fixed land-based missiles and Burke believed from his own background in chemical engineering and from briefings by General Electric scientists in July that the solid fuel and guidance problems could be overcome. The “piggybacking” idea did not appeal to him. He knew that “the first service that demonstrates a capability for this is very likely to continue the project and the others may very well drop out.”274 If the Navy wanted its own IRBM, it would have to get ahead of the other services, not follow them. “I do believe we have been too conservative,” he wrote in October 1955: I think that we can go faster in the gamble on new weapons and new equipment and in their installation aboard ship than we have in the past. I also believe that the only way that we can speed up getting new equipment into the fleet is to put 273 Much of the material in this chapter is based on this author’s published studies of Admiral Burke, “Arleigh Albert Burke” in Robert W. Love, Jr., (Ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980) 262–319, 417–429; and “Arleigh Burke: The Last CNO” in James C. Bradford, (Ed.), Quarterdeck and Bridge, Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 360–393; and the author’s unpublished manuscript, “Arleigh Burke: Portrait of the Sailor and Commander in His Own Words.” 274 Memo, Burke to Rear Admiral Clark (Op-51), Rear Admiral Raborn (Office of the Secretary of the Navy), No Serial, Subj: ICBM – IRBM, 2 December 1955, in OF-CNO, Sept. 1955 – March 1956, AAB-CNO, NHHC. 117 Visionary yet Realistic the requirements down and demand performance, and this I intend to do. People without responsibility, either personal or financial, are quite free with sug- gestions but I know that when a man lays his reputation or the reputation of his company on the line for producing a piece of equipment, he usually produces it..275 On 19 October Burke recommended to Secretary of the Navy Charles Thomas that the Navy initiate an IRBM development program, and Thomas approved. In early November, Burke and Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor agreed to collaborate on the IRBM project, codenamed Jupiter, through a Joint Army-Navy Ballistic Missile Committee. On 17 November, Burke recommended, and Thomas approved, the appointment of Rear Admiral William “Red” Raborn to head a special projects office to oversea the Navy’s part in this collaborative effort. On 2 December 1955, Burke gave “Red” Raborn a “hunting license.” “It is quite evident” he wrote to Raborn and Rear Admiral John Clark, head of the Guided Missiles Division in Burke’s office, “that we must move fast on this fleet ballistic mis- sile and that our present schedules for shipboard launching are not good enough.” If it was necessary to pull resources from other projects to achieve that objective, he was willing to do it: If Rear Admiral Raborn runs into any difficulty with which I can help, I will want to know about it at once along with his recommended course of action for me to take. If more money is needed, we will get it. If he needs more people, those people will be ordered in. If there is anything that slows this project up beyond the capacity of the Navy Department we will immediately take it to the highest level and not work our way up through several days. In taking this type of action we must be reasonably sure we are right and at least know the possible consequences of being wrong because we will be disrupting many other programs in order to make achievement in this one if we are not careful. That is all right if we really make an achievement.276 Raborn proved up to the challenge. By the fall of 1956, a number of key techni- cal difficulties had been resolved, and the Navy was confident that it could produce a solid-fueled propellant system and a 600 pound nuclear warhead suitable for surface and submarine use. The Joint Army/Navy Ballistic Missile Committee survived little more than a year. In December 1956, a Navy Ballistic Missile Committee was established, and Special Projects, under Rear Admiral Raborn, was put in charge of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program, now codenamed Polaris. Burke’s order delegating enormous initiative and responsibility to Raborn in pursuit of the ambitious goals he himself had established was typical of his leadership 275 Letter, Burke to Henry H. Porter, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 26 September 1955, CNO Personal File Letters (hereafter CNO-PF), AAB-CNO, NHHC. 276 Memo, Burke to Clark, Raborn, 2 December 1955. 118 Arleigh Albert Burke (1901–1996) style.